The EU has spoken out in support of “all those who have suffered under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes”. This comes on the eve of the Europe-wide Day of Remembrance of the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes on 23 August. Ahead of the Day, senior EU political figures have issued a strongly-worded statement against “hatred, intolerance and the denial of human dignity. The statement was issued by the EC Executive Vice-President for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy, Henna Virkkunen, and Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law, and Consumer Protection Commissioner Michael McGrath (pictured).
It reads: “On 23 August, we commemorate the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed in 1939 between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. “That pact, and the war and devastation that followed, brought intolerable suffering to millions of people across Europe and beyond. The years that followed were marked by occupation, repression, deportation and violence on a massive scale.”
It goes on: “Today, we honour the memory of all those who have suffered under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. “The pain endured by victims, survivors and their families echoes across generations. Every EU country is now home to a generation that has grown up free from tyranny and oppression.
“For many, freedom, democracy and peace may appear self-evident, but they are not. They were secured through extraordinary courage, sacrifice, resistance and resilience, and they must never be taken for granted. Remembering the past is therefore not only a duty to those who came before us. It is also a responsibility to future generations.”
The statement continues: “This day is a solemn reminder of the consequences of hatred, intolerance and the denial of human dignity.
“It calls on us to remain vigilant in defending the values on which the European Union is founded: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and fundamental rights.
"By preserving the memory of the past, we reaffirm our commitment to a Europe built on peace, justice and solidarity.”
Special events will take place this weekend to mark the anniversary of the First Battle of Mons on 23 August, the first major action of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in World War I.
Commemorations, which take place on Monday 24 August, start at 1pm at the Hôtel de Ville in Mons.
Representatives of RBL Brussels branch will also lay a wreath at the town's British Empire Memorial which was first unveiled by King Baudouin on 11 October 1952.
Several representatives of Royal British Legion Brussels will be taking part.
The RBL delegation is comprised of Captain (retd) Dennis Abbott (RBL Brussels Chair) (pictured); Colonel (retd) William Bache (ex-US Special Forces, Vietnam veteran and Co-Chair Brussels Battles and Books Club) and Lieutenant-Colonel (retd).
Others present will be Matt Hill (ex-US Marine Corps); Andrée Ferrant (RBL Brussels Joint Secretary); Mireille Picron (RBL Brussels Joint Secretary); Freddy Roiseux (RBL Brussels Standard Bearer); Professor Jean-Francois Husson (RBL Brussels committee, Namur representative) and Ela Nora Fidan (Brussels Battles and Books Club).
Wreaths will be laid at the Hôtel de Ville (Dennis Abbott), Nimy railway bridge where Lieutenant Maurice Dease and Private Sidney Godley each won the Victoria Cross (Ela Nora Fidan) and Saint Symphorien military cemetery (Col William Bache at British memorial, Lt Col Hill at German memorial).
Similar wreath-laying commemorations take place at the British Empire memorial at Place de la Bascule (Mireille Picron et Andrée Ferrant) and at the Irish Cross (Jean-François Husson).
There will also be commemorations in Brussels and Antwerp to mark the anniversary of the Liberation (3-4-5 September). Full info/timings are on the RBl Brussels website under “calendar.”
Speaking about the upcoming events, Abbott said: “The Brussels branch of the Royal British Legion has taken part in the commemorations to mark the anniversary of the Battle of Mons since its very formation in 1922.”
He added: "The battle has gone down in the annals of British military history thanks to the heroic stand by troops of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in their first major engagement of 1914. Outnumbered three to one by the Germans, they held out for hours before withdrawing, preventing the enemy from outflanking French positions.
"Wilhelm, the German Kaiser, is said to have dismissed the BEF as a 'contemptible little Army' before the battle, but the British fought tenaciously, none more so than Lieutenant Maurice Dease and Private Private Sidney Godley who were each awarded the Victoria Cross, the highest award for gallantry, for their defence of the railway bridge over the canal at Nimy."
Four German battalions attacked the bridge, which was defended by a company of the Royal Fusiliers.
Despite being mortally injured, Dease held the position until he was overcome by his wounds. Godley took over and despite sustaining a head wound covered the withdrawal before disabling the weapon.
Abbot added: "The branch lays a wreath at the position they held, which is marked by a plaque recalling their exploits."
Lance-Corporal Charles Jarvis and Captain Theodore Wright of the Royal Engineers were also each awarded the VC for preventing the enemy from seizing a bridge at nearby Jemappes. Wright was mortally wounded less than a month later.
The British suffered over 1,600 casualties (killed, wounded or missing) at Mons, around half from two battalions – the 4th Middlesex and 2nd Royal Irish. The German army lost about 5,000 men killed or wounded.
The Germans later established the St Symphorien Military Cemetery which contains the graves of graves of 284 German and 229 British and Commonwealth soldiers.
Among them are the graves of the first and last Commonwealth soldiers killed during the First World War, Private John Parr and Private George Price.
After the war, the veterans who took part in the Battle of Mons proudly called themselves the "Old Contemptibles" in response to the Kaiser's slur.
At the inauguration of the British Empire Memorial in Mons, the British Defence Minister, Field Marshal Lord Alexander of Tunis, recalled his "baptism of fire" in his first action as a young lieutenant in the battle on 23 August 1914.
The VIPs present included Belgian Prime Minister Jean Van Houtte, Major General Sir Edward Spears, who served as a liaison officer with the French forces during the battle, and British Ambassador Sir Christopher Warner, a Captain in the Royal Fusiliers in the First World War.
The memorial was originally erected in the Belfry Park, but was moved to the original frontline at La Bascule crossroads and re-dedicated in 1986. It is close to the Celtic Cross Memorial, which honours the Irish soldiers who fought in the First Battle of August 1914 and the Second Battle of Mons in November 1918.
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Janka Oertel, director of ECFR’s DARE* initiative, and Andrew Small, head of ECFR’s Asia programme, to examine the growing impact of the “China shock 2.0” on Germany and Europe.
A new wave of Chinese competition, driven by overcapacity and state-backed industrial strength, is hitting sectors such as car manufacturing, chemicals and machine tools. Germany is at the epicentre, with mounting job losses raising questions about Europe’s long-term economic resilience and competitiveness. The crisis is reshaping German politics, exposing government divisions and putting pressure on Chancellor Friedrich Merz ahead of September’s potentially divisive regional elections.
Together, Mark, Janka and Andrew discuss the policy options being considered in Brussels and in European capitals—from emergency trade measures to new industrial strategies. Can Europe protect its industrial base without triggering a damaging escalation with China? Is Germany able to lead a coherent European response amid its own political turbulence?
The disputed 2020 presidential election and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine accelerated Belarus’s integration into Moscow’s military strategy, with the country becoming a rear-operating base.
Since 2023, Russian deployments have increasingly positioned Belarus as a potential forward-operating base. Nuclear-capable systems, missile forces and military infrastructure on Belarusian territory mean that the Russian threat extends further along the EU’s eastern border.
Europe wants to preserve Belarus as a strategic buffer, yet sanctions and diplomatic isolation have not slowed Russian military entrenchment. Its continued path risks further binding Minsk to Moscow. Belarus has quietly become a major frontline security challenge for Europe.
The EU should move away from relying mostly on sanctions and economic pressure, and instead pursue a pragmatic strategy which aims to increase Minsk’s autonomy from Moscow. In the meantime, Europe must remain supportive of Belarusian exiles and its diaspora community.
The EU also needs to complement existing NATO deterrence with stronger support for countries on its eastern border, namely Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. This would reduce opportunities for Russian coercion and support Europe’s long-term plan for Belarus.
A satellite state
Take a map of Europe and find Belarus. Trace a finger clockwise, from the country’s northern borders and around to the east, where Russia is followed by Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Belarus’s capital, Minsk, is itself almost at the exact geographic heart of the country, surrounded by hills, with vast forests sprawled out like capillaries beyond.
It is from here that Belarus’s longtime leader, Alexander Lukashenko, looks out from his “Palace of Independence” on Minsk’s Pieramozcau Avenue. To the east, in Russia, his fellow authoritarian Vladimir Putin continues to decimate Ukraine from its eastern borders and scheme to undermine European political interests. To the west, stretching hundreds of kilometres past Belarus’s western border with Poland and across Germany, lies Brussels. Faced with instability across the continent, the EU’s capital is increasingly unsure about what to do with its problematic Belarusian neighbour.
The EU downgraded its diplomatic relations with Belarus in 2020 after the latter’s disputed presidential election, which saw Lukashenko’s government violently repress protestors who took to the streets to oppose the president seizing victory by undemocratic means. Although bilateral trade between the EU and Belarus was largely undamaged in the subsequent years, the fall in trade with the bloc after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 created an economic gap which Russia has exploited. For example, it has stepped up its own trading relationship with Belarus and become a key market for exports of Belarusian goods such as dairy products and petrochemicals—also allowing Moscow to evade EU sanctions. In doing so, Russia filled a vacuum for Belarus; Lukashenko, facing limited alternatives, deepened his dependence on Moscow.
Although Belarus did not formally commit troops to Russia’s war of aggression, it did allow the latter to house missiles, tanks, artillery, helicopters, aeroplanes and other military equipment in its territory prior to the invasion. It also provided military and civil infrastructure for Russia’s use, including airfields, hospitals and railway lines. This year alone, Russia has transferred more missiles—including dual-capable, hypersonic missiles—to Belarusian territory and conducted joint exercises encompassing the Belarusian Armed Forces. This, combined with a breakdown in dialogue between the EU and Belarus, gives Putin yet more sway in his quest to entrench Russia further into Belarusian structures.
Now that Belarus is apparently firmly committed to the supranational union of Belarus and Russia, known as the Union State, it has become a structural security concern for Europe. Russian deployment of nuclear-capable weapons on Belarusian territory makes Europe’s eastern flank more vulnerable, while Belarus’s already tense relations with neighbouring border states Poland, Latvia and Lithuania are at risk of deteriorating further. At the same time, Belarus has 879 political prisoners languishing, with Lukashenko’s regime having essentially outlawed any political or civic activity which the authorities see as a threat.
All this has compounded the breakdown in relations between Belarus and Europe. Russia is further emboldened to entrench its military deeper into Belarusian territory, tighten its economic dependencies and integrate the country further into its nuclear strategy.
This paper examines Belarus’s transformation from a problematic but stable buffer state between western Europe and Russia to a country which poses an increasing military and security threat to the EU. It argues that the EU should move away from relying solely on economic leverage and the blanket application of sanctions—which are pushing Belarus to rely more heavily on Russia—and develop a more targeted approach. Europeans need to actively contain the growing military and nuclear threat by finding new avenues of diplomatic negotiation, and by incorporating NATO-inspired approaches into its defence policy for its vulnerable eastern states.
Perhaps most importantly, Europeans need to assess to what extent they can treat Minsk as an autonomous actor capable of making decisions independently from Moscow. Europeans should take recent developments, such as Ukraine’s discovery of four signal relay stations in two Belarusian oblasts and their subsequent removal, as proof that Lukashenko retains the authority to make territorial-based decisions—especially under pressure from Russia.
However, for as long as Lukashenko remains in power, Belarus will never be entirely free of Moscow: he is an authoritarian, and Minsk remains sanctioned due to its breach of human rights clauses and mistreatment of its population. Belarus’s geopolitical position is also at least partly down to early decisions that Lukashenko made when he turned towards Moscow in the mid-1990s—a time when most other former Soviet nations chose real independence. Long before 2020, this posture led to missed opportunities with the EU, reinforced Lukashenko’s propensity to commit human rights violations and kickstarted Belarus’s deepening economic and military integration with Russia.
In its pursuit of a new strategy, the EU needs to recognise that—even if Belarus remains a stable, contained buffer zone—the country will not undergo a full democratic transformation. Europeans are thus searching for a Belarus which no longer presents an urgent security threat on its eastern border. They should aim to help shape a country whose stability reduces geopolitical risk without abandoning the EU’s long-standing commitment to democracy, human rights and the well-being of Belarusian society.
Belarus as a security actor
Belarus declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. But, with what Russia perceived as the NATO and European sphere of influence shifting eastwards, Belarus became increasingly valuable to Moscow—especially because of the Suwalki Gap, which lies between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarusian territory. The Russia-Belarus relationship became more entrenched once Lukashenko and Putin came to power in 1994 and 1999, respectively. The two leaders are hardly close personal friends—but they have nonetheless developed strong cultural and economic ties based on the similarity of their two anti-Western and authoritarian regimes, and their notion of a shared history.
Over the past 30 years, Belarus has moved closer to Russia in economy, trade and idea sharing. But it has gone beyond simply sharing a similar geopolitical outlook; now it is a militarised actor on the EU’s eastern flank. The first tipping point came with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. At this point, Lukashenko was already politically entangled with Moscow due to its support for Belarus’s trade network and economic sector after Minsk’s break with Europe in 2020. But the invasion meant that Belarus also became entrenched in the Russian military machine: in the early phase of Russia’s invasion, it became a launchpad for Russian ground offensives towards Kyiv and Chernihiv, and for missile strikes and combat aviation operations.
Since this period, Russia has attempted to consolidate its control even further. Now it has approximately 2,000 troops concentrated around air-defence systems, training facilities, logistics hubs and long-standing Russian military installations. Between 2022 and 2023, ammunition transfers from Belarus to Russia exceeded 130,000 tonnes. Since then, joint training centres, storage bases and transport corridors (many inherited from the Soviet period) have been repurposed and modernised under Belarus-Russia Union State programmes to support Russian operational needs. Rail-linked depots, armament storage facilities and training grounds now serve as key infrastructure for Russian forces on its western flank.
The second tipping point came with the two countries regularly staging recurring joint military exercises that institutionalise operational integration, such as the Zapad military drills which have been taking place since before 2022. Now Russia is eyeing up Belarus as a key component of its nuclear ambitions and has also deployed Oreshnik intermediate-range missile systems in Belarus. In April this year, Belarus confirmed it would no longer allow Russian conscripts who desert the military to leave via its border. Belarus is also a staging post for Russian nuclear missiles and joint military exercises.
The country has thus become Russia’s territorial, militaristic and logistical resource, achieved through durability, military routinisation and institutional embedding. The military aspect of this entrenchment is also compounded through hybrid attacks. For example, as early as November 2021 the EU condemned Belarus for facilitating the weaponisation of migrants—predominantly from conflict areas such as Iraq and Syria—who it had apparently encouraged to breach the borders of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
This form of hybrid warfare has continued into 2026: recent reports say that Lithuanian authorities have discovered a cross-border tunnel from Belarus to Lithuania, which they suspect is to continue to facilitate the potential movement of migrants through European territories. Now, with the Union State increasingly functioning as a homogeneous force, there is a threat that Belarus will become more emboldened to facilitate further dangerous hybrid manoeuvring. It intends to check Europe’s readiness and destabilise it from the inside.
Belarus as a threat to Europe
The difference in the threat which Belarus now poses to Europe lies in its shift—which has taken place over the past six years—from being Russia’s “rear-operating base” to Russia’s “forward-operating base”.
As Russia’s rear-operating base, Belarus functioned as a non-combat zone for logistics and maintenance. While it supported Russian military activity and provided strategic depth by shifting military infrastructure and combat flashpoints away from Russian territory, as a rear-operating base Belarus avoided deploying its own forces into Ukraine and directly engaging in combat operations. This allowed Lukashenko to avoid many of the challenges that Putin is experiencing, including politically sensitive military mobilisation, high personnel casualties and mounting internal economic pressure. This approach had previously provided Lukashenko with the degree of political deniability and diplomatic leverage necessary to continue negotiating with Western economies on economic sanctions and market access. He was able to point to Belarus’s arm’s-length approach to the war in Ukraine as proof that he was willing to engage with Europeans at a diplomatic and economic level.
However, Belarus’s position has changed since 2022. Evidence collected by the author demonstrates that Russia is increasingly establishing the country as a forward-operating base. Moscow is building on its routinisation and institutional embedding of military infrastructure to deploy personnel on Belarusian territory and undertake recurring joint military exercises, lately including nuclear forces preparation. Minsk’s rhetoric is changing to match these actions. In 2022, Belarus changed its constitution to allow Russia to store nuclear missiles on its territory; in a “Militarization of Europe” meeting held in June 2026, Belarus’s deputy minister of foreign affairs Igor Sekreta said he was “deeply concerned by… military exercises on NATO’s eastern flank” and “the EU and NATO… systematically promoting a militarist agenda at all levels.”
The Belarusian government is simultaneously becoming a component of Russian forward-military position and aligning ideologically with Russia’s view that Europe (and the West in general) constitutes an existential threat. Lukashenko himself reiterated this in May 2026, when he declared that “… [Belarus is] ready in every possible way to defend our common fatherland from Brest to Vladivostok.” The change is especially worrying for Ukraine, which is already fighting a war against Russia on several fronts. Its brow-beaten army could soon be required to deploy yet more resources to another defensive line on its northern border. Belarusian state media have suggested that Putin desires to open a “second front” against Ukraine, using Belarus as a launchpad for further attacks.
Indeed, evidence suggests that Russia is already using Belarusian infrastructure to gain an advantage in its drone warfare against Ukraine: in June 2026, Ukrainian intelligence services discovered four signal relay stations in the Belarusian oblasts of Homiel and Brest. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, appealed directly to Belarus to dismantle the sites or face potential Ukrainian consequences. The Belarusian president apparently acquiesced—although no public statement or confirmation has been made.
Belarus’s transformation into a forward-operating base was further bolstered in 2023, when Russia deposited tactical Iskander nuclear-capable warheads on its territory. Then, in early 2025, Russia moved Oreshnik hypersonic missiles to a location which experts estimate to be around 60km south of Minsk. This has changed the calculus for the rest of Europe. Europeans must contend with an additional nuclear threat right on its border (aside from Kaliningrad) and consider how this could compromise security along its eastern flank.
Meanwhile, as noted above, Belarus is mixing concrete actions with rhetoric that suggests it sees Europe as a threat to its own sovereignty. In the same speech, Sekreta commented that Poland, Latvia and Lithuania have a combined defence expenditure of €52bn, which is apparently “25 times more than Belarus allocates for defence”. This suggests that Belarus increasingly views European and NATO defence investments through the lens of Russian military planning. If left unchecked, Russian influence will leave EU member states more vulnerable to further hybrid attacks from Union State forces.
For Europeans, there is also potential for escalation in how these border countries respond, and uncertainty about where escalation could lead. For example, the Zapad-2025 military drills, which took place on September 12th 2025, prompted Poland to close its border with Belarus due to “heightened security concerns”. Prior to this, on September 9th and 10th, Russia had flown several drones into Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine. Lithuania also closed its border with Belarus for a whole month in October 2025 (and refused to enter negotiations to reopen it) after meteorological balloons travelled into its airspace from Belarus. The latter responded by accusing Lithuania of “pursuing an anti-Belarus policy”. Latvia, for its part, is struggling to deal with Belarus’s tactic of sending illegal migrants over its border. As of July 21st 2026, the Latvian government had recorded 8,413 instances of migrants attempting to cross into its territory this calendar year, stirring discontent prior to the parliamentary election in October. The country has also uncovered several sabotage operations that have appear to have been carried out by Belarusian and Russian spies.
European leaders heating up their confrontations in such critical areas is further adding to NATO’s headache. Belarus’s degradation as a buffer zone between western Europe and Russia means the potential for these flashpoints to drift further west is growing, not helped by a continually deteriorating diplomatic relationship between the Lukashenko government and the governments of neighbouring EU states. The proximity of Russian missiles and personnel to European territory could compromise NATO warning systems; it also suggests that the Union State is becoming increasingly willing to test European responses to its increasingly integrated deterrent.
Now the EU needs to reconfigure its strategy towards Belarus. The goal should be to ensure that Lukashenko does not limit his room for manoeuvre so much that he has no choice but to descend into a fully armoured satellite state; and that he has no choice but to react to any order Putin gives.
What Europe is doing…
On sanctions
Since Belarus’s flagrantly undemocratic 2020 presidential election, which sparked the country’s largest political crisis since independence, the EU and Belarus have downgraded their diplomatic relations. This is a cycle which Europe and Belarus have found themselves in since at least 2006: repression conducted by the regime triggers sanctions and isolation from Europe, which are followed by limited thaws and diplomatic re-engagement, which are then interrupted by renewed crackdowns—and so on. This time, however, the diplomatic downgrading was mutual: Lukashenko made Poland and Lithuania’s ambassadors leave Minsk in October 2020, and requested the EU ambassador return to Brussels.
In 2021, following Lukashenko’s contested re-election, Europe’s approach became more actively political. Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya lobbied European governments to move beyond broad economic measures, such as existing targeted sanctions, to adopt harsher and broader sectoral sanctions. These were directed at, for example, specific officials, judges, prosecutors and police officers responsible for repression of Belarusian citizens. Belarus, for its part, suspended participation in the Eastern Partnership, an initiative which aims to strengthen political and economic relations between the EU, its member states and the partner countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Europe’s response remains to take a blanket approach to sanctions towards Belarus. It reinforced its sanctions cycle even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the EU’s approach to Belarus is embedded within its anti-Russia packages. This means that the EU not only targets individuals involved in conflict operations, but also bundles Minsk in together with the trade restrictions, export controls and financial measures which it aims at Moscow. Europeans have fallen into the trap of treating their Belarus policy as an extension of their Russia policy, although some politicians—including French president Emmanuel Macron and, back in 2021, former German chancellor Angela Merkel—have also pursued limited efforts to test whether targeted incentives could shape Minsk’s behaviour.
However, some EU sources say that Minsk is an unwilling negotiating partner. It remains to be seen whether it will be explicit about the desire to reshape engagement with Europe. As of 2026, EU–Belarus relations remain largely frozen. They have seen only minimal diplomatic engagement and sustained sanctions, and only limited, transactional contact has emerged—for example, in negotiations over political prisoners and technical discussions over border management. In its latest sanctions announcement, the European Council extended its sanctions regime against Belarus until 2027.
The EU is thus in a difficult position when it comes to pursuing normalisation with Minsk. Since Europe’s Belarus policy is considerably shaped by Belarus’s neighbours, Lithuania and Poland—and Vilnius is especially reluctant to open any dialogue with Minsk—other member states are less emboldened to force through normalisation policies which are at risk of simply being blocked. What is clear is that, unless Belarus makes clear improvements in its human rights conditions and clearly distances itself from Russia’s war in Ukraine, European policy will remain structured around three aspects: progressive sanctions targeting regime elites and key economic sectors; political non-recognition of the legitimacy of Lukashenko’s rule; and support for Belarusian civil society and exiles.
Another problem for Europe is that continuing to heavily limit industrial trade and the transfer of dual-use goods and military equipment to Belarus could see Lukashenko rely more heavily on Putin’s open markets. But, if Europeans do not pursue sanctions, they indirectly aid Russia: Lukashenko supports Russia’s war against Ukraine by selling military and dual-use goods to Russia, thus helping it circumvent sanctions. This, in turn, creates a cycle of obligation whereby Minsk acquiesces to future military requests from Moscow and Russia further entrenches along Europe’s eastern flank.
The EU approach broadly treats Belarus as a subsidiary of Russia and narrows Europeans’ ability to develop a tailored security policy which directly targets Belarus as a forward-operating base. As things stand, sanctions on the economy and trade are not adequately addressing the developing threat that Belarus poses to European security. And they do not help alleviate the suffering of the ordinary Belarusians at home and in exile.
On the diaspora
Since 2020, Lukashenko has stepped up his repression and exile of Belarusian civil society actors opposed to his regime. Evidence collected by the author through focus groups carried out for ECFR suggests that, for Belarusians, exile is no longer perceived as a temporary or marginal condition. Rather, it has become a structural feature of Lukashenko’s authoritarian governance. Participants consistently described forced migration as a way for the Lukashenko regime to externalise dissent to maintain internal stability. The government pushes out political activists, journalists, researchers and civic organisers to reduce domestic pressure, while the regime projects an external image of control and normalisation.
This means that Belarus has shifted much of its political contestation into European societies. As a result, the EU has faced myriad challenges related to diaspora governance, transnational repression (including surveillance, intimidation, pressure on relatives and legal harassment across borders) and social cohesion. The EU has, particularly after 2020, provided unprecedented political recognition and support to Belarus’s democratic forces, including security guarantees and sustained funding. For Lukashenko, exile therefore functions as a strategic arena.
How Europeans govern this space—through legal regimes, funding structures or protection mechanisms—directly shapes whether repression through exile succeeds as a long-term strategy.
On its foreign policy approach
The EU’s treatment of Belarus as having limited sovereignty over its foreign policy is also at odds with the US approach. Washington’s current relationship with Minsk is based on President Donald Trump recognising Lukashenko as legitimate, and the US agreeing to negotiate sanctions relief in exchange for the release of political prisoners. America still casts Belarus as a strategic adversary; but it nonetheless accepts that the country needs careful handling to safeguard American and NATO interests in Europe. EU member states, which eye Washington’s approaches to Minsk with caution, have ramped up their scepticism further since Lukashenko joined Trump’s questionable “Board of Peace” (despite the Belarusian leader lending credence to Moscow’s campaign in Ukraine).
Overall, America is searching for “visible deals” whereby it can secure humanitarian wins via economic channels. The clearest example of this is its pursuit of calibrated sanctions relief: in 2025, Belarus released 123 political prisoners in return for the US easing sanctions on the Belarusian potash industry. And it could be argued that this has paid some dividends: lifting sanctions on Belarus helps ease the domestic economic pressure on Lukashenko, which leaves him less dependent on support from Russia for trade.
However, the thaw in America’s approach does nothing to address Belarus’s increasingly entrenched role as a Russian military staging post. Indeed, no approach taken by any American president ever has. And while former president Joe Biden synchronised Washington’s policy towards Belarus with that of Brussels, under his successor, Trump, the two approaches are disparate. Of course, the US does not have the major consideration of the security challenges which Belarus poses to Europe’s borders. But this divergence between America’s prioritisation of transactionalism and the EU’s prioritisation of security will only grow in the absence of a coordinated transatlantic framework towards Belarus.
There also exists the possibility that Lukashenko could exploit the gap between America’s leverage-based approach and Europe’s risk-based approach, to play each side against the other. From the US, Lukashenko has already achieved incremental sanctions relief and diplomatic rehabilitation while continuing to align Belarusian security with Russian territorial involvement and pursuing domestic repression. As it stands, all signs point to US bargaining having no impact on Belarus’s strategic alignment or its military cooperation with Russia. Human rights abuses remain.
What Europe can do next
Europe’s continued policy of isolating Belarus and imposing sanctions is turning the country towards Russia as a more attractive option for trade and investment. However, Europeans cannot simply restore diplomatic relations, even to their pre-2020 iteration: they need to hold Lukashenko accountable for his disregard of democratic norms and civilian abuse, and accountable militarily for his assistance to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
This requires developing an alternative approach which goes beyond the current binary choice of engagement or isolation and identifies as a priority exactly the type of Belarus that Europeans want to—or are willing to—work with. Europeans need to examine existing EU and US approaches to Belarus, and discover where Lukashenko could exploit gaps in their divergence—and where room for leverage and leeway exists.
This also requires Europeans to understand the type of pressure that Russia is exerting on Belarus. It is true that Russia continues to provide loans to Belarus, open its market to sanctioned Belarusian goods and give Belarus access to infrastructure through which it can continue exporting goods to Brazil, China and India. But this is illusory: Russia exerting “real” pressure would amount to trade wars, blockades of Belarusian goods, cutting off financial aid and propaganda attacking Lukashenko. Putin has exercised similar measures before, when Moscow was unhappy with Minsk. Now, in 2026, their actions might be well coordinated, but Russia has not established any real economic, financial, military, informational or political coercion against Lukashenko and his government.
Europeans could use this distinction to consider the type of Belarus they want to shape. This should be a Belarus which has secure, meaningful economic alternatives to Russia; a Belarus which sees the geopolitical and economic sense of having a choice of trading partners; a Belarus which has functioning communication channels. Overall, Europeans should expect that their future relationship with Belarus will go beyond mere transactionalism and value the voices of those who Lukashenko continues to silence. Europeans should seek a Belarus which retains a degree of political room for manoeuvre away from Putin’s military and political influence. The following recommendations set out how it can achieve this.
Support eastern border states
The EU has already made progress in strengthening its defence security arrangements for its eastern flank. For example, the 2022 Strategic Compass aimed to prevent crises in states most vulnerable to Russian (or indeed Belarusian) encroachment, and the EU has developed a targeted “Communication on the EU’s Eastern Regions Bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine” (or “Strong regions for a safer Europe”) programme. This includes the five priority areas of security and resilience; growth and regional prosperity; building on local strengths; connectivity; and empowering its people. The bloc is also channelling funds into shoring up transit routes and financing, including the customs infrastructure along its eastern border which is a target for Russian and Belarusian interference.
However, the EU should more deeply incorporate its support for states that border Belarus—which are facing hybrid pressure, border incidents and spillover risks—into a defence strategy which builds on the NATO model, particularly in its approach to deconfliction. This would mean better aligning military preparedness with diplomatic signalling and crisis-management channels.
For example, NATO maintains a partnership with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe which promotes risk-reduction frameworks and transparency measures among signatory states—including the Vienna Document, which has been signed by the US, all European nations and Russia. Europeans could establish a similar partnership with selected states which builds on Lukashenko’s willingness—up to now—to notify his Western counterparts about activities such as Zapad military drills, where in some instances he has even invited them as observers.
Strengthen connections inside Belarus
To go one step further, however, Europeans—and especially EU border states—should maintain established working-level diplomatic contacts in Belarus, especially those located at EU member-state embassies in Minsk. These could also be third-party intermediaries or use technical-level communication formats, such as hotlines, to relay information about military movements or developments.
This could also rely on trusting selected contacts inside the country itself: for example, there are several initiatives which hold meetings which bring speakers and thinkers together to share both Western and non-Western perspectives, including from inside Belarus and Russia. By acting as a conduit for open communication—and by remaining open and depoliticised—protecting such channels encourages a more open dialogue. This, in turn, mitigates the risk of miscalculation and helps develop a diplomatic environment in Belarus which is less dependent on the relations created through the Union State. The aim for Europeans should be to build a pro-EU constituency inside Belarus through democratic initiatives—not with the intention of overthrowing the regime tomorrow, but rather to embolden those who see it in their interest for Belarus to have normal working relations with the EU.
Europeans could also continue to financially support or work with Belarus’s small- and medium-sized businesses, both inside and outside the country. Directing economic support and capacity building to enterprises within its borders would strengthen the country’s independent economic capacity by allowing it to gradually decouple from other trade relationships. At the external level, in 2022 the EU and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development pledged €4bn for SMEs which had relocated their businesses abroad. The EU should explore ways in which it can strengthen Belarus’s SMEs inside the country, to help build a constituency which sees partnership with the West, not just Russia, as an advantage.
Opportunities exist for cooperation at the non-profit level, too. While not directly related to European security policy, concerted work by the EU to fund Belarusian NGOs and support apolitical initiatives can help strengthen the country’s national identity and foster conditions for a more fruitful working relationship. Europeans can connect with Belarusian youth and help shape a more democratic future of Belarusian leaders through the funding of communal projects such as Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps for Belarusian students.
The European Commission is funding ArtPower Belarus, in collaboration with the Belarusian Council for Culture and Danish Cultural Institute, from 2022-2028. This demonstrates how outreach in Belarus—with willing internal institutions—can forge a common sense of purpose and prevent the “othering” of either side. The EU should continue to strive for flexible support for civic and political activism, especially at the grassroots level, through institutions such as the European Endowment for Democracy.
Engage with the Belarusian diaspora
Europeans should treat the Belarusian diaspora as a “strategic constituency” and help secure their participation in national and international civil life. For example, despite Belarus’s exit from the Eastern Partnership, the country’s civil society remains active in the initiative. This political knowledge and organisational capacity are vital for educating Europeans and ensuring that Lukashenko’s approach does not condemn the country and its people for any longer than it already has. Indeed, the EU needs to ensure that the Belarusian diaspora remains at the forefront of its policies regarding safe migration and access; it must avoid inadvertently reinforcing the regime’s strategy of repression through exile, lest any temporary or fragmented protections undermine diaspora members’ political and institutional capacity.
The EU should prioritise legal stability and predictability for Belarusian exiles. Where possible, longer-term residence pathways, access to labour markets and recognition of professional qualifications should be expanded and harmonised across member states. Indeed, Europeans need to take transnational repression seriously as a security issue, not only a human rights concern. Surveillance, digital harassment, pressure on family members remaining in Belarus and alleged monitoring activities in EU states challenge European sovereignty and social cohesion. To counter this, the EU should keep pursuing democratic initiatives such as the project “Towards a Local Democracy Agency (LDA) Belarus in Exile”. Its establishment has helped reinforce the notion that exile is not a temporary condition and encourages the need for “sustainable democratic infrastructure” which supports communities in exile. Addressing these practices strengthens both diaspora resilience and internal EU security norms.
In the long term, the EU should introduce more permanent diverse and sustainable funding streams, and move away from reliance on emergency or externally volatile sources. While several exile-based civil society institutions have benefited from multi-year EU funding frameworks—and the EU has committed €200m since 2020 in supporting the Belarusian people—recent reductions in US assistance have exposed structural vulnerabilities. The EU needs to use such funding streams to support independent media, research organisations and civic initiatives in exile, since they are repositories of political memory and organisational capacity.
Europeans should also continue to engage with Belarus’s political opposition on a more formal level, rather than treating it as a protest movement. For example, they generally treat Tsikhanouskaya as the de facto leader of Belarus from her base in Warsaw. This gives Europeans access to a political figure with different views and priorities, and could see the two sides shape future engagement with Belarus via insights from the country’s more civic-minded, democratic channels. The EU should be wary of treating her as the sole alternative to Lukashenko, especially because it is unlikely that Tsikhanouskaya will be installed as his successor—but openness to her influence will bolster trust between Europeans and Belarusian exiled civic society. It will also provide EU member states with an understanding of how the Belarusian state works.
Link diplomacy with action
EU engagement should focus on areas where European interests are directly implicated and where limited leverage still exists. Recent developments, including prisoner releases secured through negotiations with the US and Lukashenko inviting Western officials to observe military drills, suggest that Minsk remains open to selective forms of engagement.
But while targeted incentives can produce limited concessions, the EU should avoid simply replicating the American model. Instead, the bloc must approach conditional engagement as a security instrument rather than simply a human rights policy. Unlike Washington, it has long-term security interests in Belarus—regional stability, border security, migration management, securing its eastern frontier—and needs engagement to be more strategic than transactional.
Europeans should therefore try to couch any diplomatic, economic or symbolic concessions (such as forming high-level diplomatic contacts, limited sanctions relief or participation in dialogue formats) in measurable and verifiable actions. These could include independent verification of the release and treatment of named political prisoners, a sustained halt to politically motivated detentions and access for international humanitarian organisations.
This could build on Lukashenko’s demands for sanctions relief in exchange for Belarus releasing political prisoners and ceasing its aggravation towards Europe’s eastern borders by making such concessions with the conditionality just described. Such engagement with Belarus could help generate durable behavioural change and address underlying sources of regional insecurity.
Untangle Minsk from Moscow
Europeans can also adapt their approach to Minsk based on how America treats it: as a viable, autonomous actor, not an extension of Moscow. The fact that negotiations between Trump and Lukashenko led to the release of prisoners—albeit with hundreds still being held—suggests that the Belarusian leader remains sensitive to economic pressure and to the optics of his own international legitimacy. Trump’s recognition of Lukashenko as Belarus’s legitimate president has only served to reinforce the latter’s willingness to reestablish closer contacts between Minsk and Washington. The US can use this thaw to its advantage to leverage selective sanctions adjustments (for example, easing restrictions on Belarusian potash exports in response to global fertiliser market pressures) and further widen Lukashenko’s limited transactional opening.
Europeans should consider whether closer coordination with Washington, whereby both camps identify common red lines and incentives for better diplomatic ties with Minsk, would deter potential coercion by Lukashenko and prevent him playing the US and Europe against each other. Indeed, the two erstwhile allies finding common ground in their strategy towards Belarus could secure further progress on humanitarian issues and demonstrate to Lukashenko that the US remains key in the protection of Europe’s eastern frontier. It is worth noting that, in this event, the EU should strongly articulate its own priorities—particularly regarding border security and societal agency—and pursue pragmatic coordination at the level of officials, agencies and technical experts.
A practical example of Belarus demonstrating more autonomy is the recent ultimatum proposed to Belarus by Ukraine. Zelensky’s bold statement over the four signal relay stations in Belarus led to their quiet removal (or they were at least turned off), suggesting that Lukashenko can roll back certain decisions—even on military issues. And, even if reports that it was in fact Ukraine which destroyed them are true, Lukashenko has accepted this development without retaliation. His response suggests that he fears the consequences of escalation from Ukraine and other Western allies. But it also supposes that Putin is not yet able to dictate Lukashenko’s every move, not even in zones which Union State forces could view as fundamental to ensuring their continued sovereignty. This episode shows that Lukashenko still retains meaningful room for manoeuvre even in matters of security, and that calibrated pressure from neighbouring states can shape his decisions.
Europeans should exploit this hint of residual agency to discover in which other areas Lukashenko retains an interest in limiting escalation or preserving his room for manoeuvre. They should determine in which other areas calibrated diplomatic and economic pressure could shape Belarusian behaviour and complicate Russian military planning. This could help decouple Belarusian decision-making from Russian power structures and isolate Lukashenko into a more favourable position for further negotiations.
Shaping stabilisation on European terms
By reducing the opportunities for Russian coercion and Belarusian-enabled hybrid pressure on the eastern flank, Europeans can better counter the impact of Russian entrenchment on their neighbour. But Europeans should not frame the recommendations as a part of a rehabilitation for the Belarusian regime. Rather, these policy suggestions should function to safeguard against further deterioration of the stable buffer zone that Belarus once provided for western Europe. Most importantly, they need to address the Belarus that has been created since 2020 and seek to prevent its further entrenchment as a Russian satellite state.
To achieve this, the most important thing Europeans can do is move beyond the false dichotomy between isolation and engagement. Europe can still rebuke Belarus as an externally managed satellite state, for example by disavowing the Lukashenko regime, while providing incentives which help it shape the conditions under which stabilisation unfolds. Europe cannot force rapid change in Minsk’s strategic alignment, but it could help prevent the complete consolidation of a security order in which Europe has no voice.
Europeans should also focus on how their approach to Belarus differs in the short and the long term. In the short term, Europeans need to prioritise preventing Russia’s military configuration in Belarus from becoming permanent and irreversible, and work to limit the extent to which Russia has entrenched itself into Belarusian military institutions. They should aim to separate Belarus from Russia as much as possible by ensuring that Moscow ceases stationing its weapons (conventional or otherwise) on Belarusian territory. At the same time, Europeans need to be aware of continued escalation, such as further military deployments on Belarus’s territory, applying hybrid pressure on member states or facilitating cross-border incidents.
In the long term, Europeans should not aim for Belarus to be aligned with the West; nor should they expect that their intervention will transform Belarus into a democratic state. But the EU should work towards Belarus becoming a country that is sovereign enough to resist becoming a permanent forward base for Russian power, and open enough to maintain a managed relationship with both Europe and Russia. Ideally, Belarus should become sovereign enough that it can make rational decisions—based on the best interests of its country and its people—regarding with which power it wants to be aligned.
As it stands, Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine shows no signs of abating. America, for its part, is increasingly reluctant to fund deterrence in EU countries, including those which border Belarus. It is, under Trump, using economic and political posturing to exert pressure on the Lukashenko regime. But Europeans can still find the avenues of cooperation which still exist in the allies’ fractured relationship. Most importantly, the EU needs to grant a degree of agency to its most problematic neighbour.
About the author
Vasil Navumau is a former visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He now works as a researcher at the University of Siegen, where he focuses on civic activism in eastern European countries, particularly Ukraine and Belarus, and its transformation via information and communication technologies.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Pavel Slunkin and the ECFR editorial team (in particular Amy Sandys and Portia Kentish) for their valuable input and suggestions, as well as Nastassia Zenovich for her graphics.
This work was produced as part of the project “Portrait of Exiled Belarusians and the Role of Belarus in Russia’s War on Ukraine”, financed by the European Union under the EU4Belarus – Support to Advanced Learning and Training (SALT II) programme.
This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.
France 24 a suivi pendant une nuit des migrants mineurs encore présents à Ceuta. Entre la peur, le froid et l’attente, de jeunes Marocains en quête d'une vie meilleure ont confié les détails poignants d'une histoire qui les a amenés à s'échouer dans l'enclave espagnole.
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Jörg Lau, international correspondent at Die Zeitand Jana Puglierin, head of ECFR’s Berlin office, to explore the political turmoil in Germany ahead of an electoral autumn. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government is becoming increasingly unpopular: it faces collapsing approval ratings, growing tension within the governing coalition and mounting pressure from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).
As regional elections approach, Jana argues that Germany’s traditional parties face difficult choices that could reshape the country’s political landscape, while Jörg discusses what the AfD’s rise means for Germany. A “firewall” has kept mainstream parties from cooperating with the far right in the post-war period—but Jörg reflects on the strain this is under, and whether the AfD’s first taste of regional power could transform German politics.
Together, Mark, Jörg and Jana assess the prospects for Merz’s leadership, the future of the CDU and whether Germany’s political centre can withstand such pressure. Are established parties capable of renewing themselves? What happens if the AfD makes gains at the regional level? And what would prolonged instability in Berlin mean for Europe?
This podcast episode was recorded on August 12th 2026.
La population de Ceuta, enclave espagnole au Maroc, a manifesté dimanche pour demander l'aide de Madrid et de l'Union européenne, dix jours après le déferlement de plus de 60 000 migrants sur son territoire. Sans ressources naturelles, Ceuta dépend beaucoup du secteur tertiaire et essaie de se réinventer malgré un chômage qui dépasse les 22 %. Mais elle continue d'attirer des milliers de jeunes marocains qui y voient une porte d'entrée vers l'Espagne et l'UE, et la promesse d'une vie meilleure.
Many—perhaps most—Trump administration foreign policy initiatives find ways to make money for people selected by Trump officials. These deals unjustly enrich a chosen few.
They can also create facts on the ground that could bequeath problems to the next US administration. For example, grants of property rights to friends and family by the Trump-controlled Board of Peace could decide who has land and money in Gaza. This would limit the discretion of any approach that aims to increase Palestinians’ role in the place they live in. Other peace deals contain similar long tails.
To address this threat to peace around the world, the next US administration should introduce anti-corruption sanctions from its first day in office. The new administration could bar non-US persons or institutions involved in such transactions from the US itself and from the American financial system. To do this, the administration would use the Global Magnitsky Act and related executive orders, including the Trump-issued executive order 13818.
Europeans can help this along even now. They can begin to declare their expectations that a new US administration will break from the practice of enriching chosen insiders. Such statements will influence preparations for the new administration. Over the next two years, Europeans can also preserve information about US insider dealing while publicly refusing to support or finance such deals where European interests are involved, including in the south Caucasus, Western Balkans, Gaza, Russia and Ukraine. And they can shore up their own sanctions and anti-corruption regimes.
Starting discussions about sanctions now will also send a message about the importance of professional, thorough investigations by journalists, civil society, and especially by congressional committees if Democrats take control of the House or Senate. This information can inform decisions about sanctions. Clear signalling from American and European political leaders now may deter potential foreign partners of the current administration from entering into corrupt deals over the remaining two years of the administration.
What sanctions can and cannot do
Sanctions will not provide complete answers in any situation, and they may not be appropriate in some instances. An understanding of how they work will clarify their importance and some of their limitations.
Executive order 13818 authorises sanctions against any “foreign person” (that is, not a US citizen or person) who participated in:
corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or bribery
The commercial aspects of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy appear to fall squarely into this framework. Even if not every instance is found to involve corruption, a close look is warranted. For example, Kazakh authorities were reportedly pressed to award a valuable mineral concession to a specific American company (associated with US political insiders, including the president’s family) while the administration considered financing for the development and export of the minerals. This was not an effort to promote a fair process in which American companies could compete—a staple of US government advocacy in any administration—but an attempt to short-circuit the normal process. It appears to involve the essence of the behaviour targeted by the Magnitsky act and executive order.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a specific American company was newly created by two US citizens with no relevant experience but with a track record of supporting the president (and one of whom is the brother of a senior official in the first Trump administration). The US lobbied for this company to receive a lucrative concession for a natural gas pipeline, and the US demanded the resignation of a reluctant international official.
American sanctions apply only to non-American citizens. It may seem unfair to leave US beneficiaries of a scheme out of a US response. But the administration’s power to require foreign persons or institutions to provide all relevant information about suspect transactions could impede the activities that unjustly enrich American insiders.
Further, by the end of the Trump administration, many insiders (and possibly some foreign persons) are likely to be covered by presidential pardons. This could make it difficult, if not impossible, to proceed with US criminal investigations, at least not without extensive litigation while the US justice system recovers from Trump’s attacks on its capacity. This could make a new administration look feckless, and foreign partners may expect that Trumpian practices will return in future administrations. Crucially, sanctions are not subject to the pardon power, and their emphasis on non-US persons and institutions will provide some protection against charges that they are part of a partisan agenda.
Another concern may be that sanctions have generally been adopted after careful review by relevant US agencies, including the Justice Department. Given the amount of information available, a reasonable basis for a decision on sanctions can be prepared for day one of a new administration. This decision can be accompanied by a provision that reviews will follow as new information becomes available and US government agencies rebuild enough capacity to conduct them.
The investigative resources of European governments, the US Congress (or parts controlled by Democrats after the 2026 midterms), civil society and independent journalism will provide an ample, well-documented basis for sanctions in many instances. By inviting those who might be subject to sanctions to provide information, the effort will gather more information, more quickly, aiding in decisions about priorities for further sanctions or investigations by congressional or law enforcement authorities.
Significantly, early sanctions may be necessary for a new administration to deliver on promises it makes on issues of foreign and domestic policy. For example, the Trump administration is seeking to have rights to minerals critical to US industrialisation granted to its preferred partners, including in Central Asia, Ukraine and eastern Congo. Individuals holding these rights would be important stakeholders in any policy shifts, even though they may have obtained the rights through insider dealing and could be opposed to the direction a new administration would like to take on policy.
The leverage provided by a policy of using sanctions may be a key instrument of foreign policy
The same situation could occur in other locations. In addition to the examples of Gaza and the Western Balkans noted above, in Venezuela, if a democratic government emerges, it may face challenges from Trump-affiliated companies accustomed to working with Maduro-regime holdovers kept in place by Trump and Marco Rubio. Control of a key trade route from Central Asia to global markets, along with a US-taxpayer funded investment vehicle, is said to be in the process of being placed under the control of a Trump-associated individual. In each instance, more knowledge about what deals are in place and how they came to be will improve both policy and decisions on sanctions. The leverage provided by a policy of using sanctions may be a key instrument of foreign policy.
The list goes on. Even before his second inauguration, a Trump-owned business accepted a $500m investment from a fund controlled by a member of the United Arab Emirates’ ruling family; within weeks the UAE received an exemption to purchase high-end computer chips. A Chinese businessman purchased $50m in a Trump-owned crypto business (part of the president’s $1.2bn windfall from crypto in 2025); weeks later his US criminal problems were resolved by the president.
If other jurisdictions like the EU and Britain join new American sanctions efforts, the costs to the non-US individuals and institutions affected will be real. To do this, the EU might consider how its rule of law initiatives, including its investigative bodies such as OLAF or the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, could prepare to work alongside US sanctions authorities. It could propose that the EU and the US return to coordinating assistance programmes to reinforce public procurement reforms. Various European states have national anti-corruption sanctions programmes; more should consider adopting them.
Some will worry that rapid deployment of sanctions may distract from a new administration’s positive agenda. This will depend on the strength of that agenda. Europeans can help make clear that they regard this as a false choice: a break from the insider dealing of the Trump administration should be part of a new, positive plan for government. This will make it easier for a new administration to adopt sanctions policy as part of leaving Trump practices firmly in the past.
There will, of course, be difficult decisions around the application of sanctions. Not every example of insider dealing will be proven to be corrupt. Some potential targets of sanctions may be important to other US administration initiatives, and if the new administration defers sanctions it may be subject to accusations of hypocrisy. Other countries may object strongly to seeing their institutions or citizens named in sanctions documents. A new administration will face many choices like this; people who want to exercise power from Washington therefore need to prepare now and confront the choice early. It is better to start with a strong tool like sanctions rather than to disarm everywhere pre-emptively in order to avoid hard choices in a few places.
Wise observers of democratic transitions have said that democrats taking power after corrupt regimes should seek to be quick, effective and legal; but that they can be only two of the three. But sanctions might get a new administration closer to three out of three. They provide a legal tool that will help the next administration be quick and effective in stopping the insider enrichment typical of Trump foreign policy while coming with limits (no targeting of US citizens) and with the ability to adjust quickly. By taking up this tool, it will free itself of shackles that would come from those who seek to control the land and property important to peace in many parts of the world. But this will come to pass only if people begin to talk about it now. European leaders have the ability to help make sure that happens.
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Adriana Abdenur, a Brazilian policy expert and co-president of the Global Fund for a New Economy, and Jorge Castañeda, former foreign minister of Mexico and professor at Sciences Po, to explore debates about development and ideas of strategic autonomy across Latin America.
Jorge explains why China’s role is varied across the region, arguing that Mexico and much of Central America remain deeply constrained by their economic ties to the US. Adriana discusses Brazil’s long tradition of strategic autonomy, describing how policymakers engage with China as both an economic partner and a source of ideas on development, technology and global governance.
Together, Mark, Adriana and Jorge explore how intensifying US-China competition is reshaping the region’s choices. Can Latin American countries balance relations with both powers? Is China a model, a market or simply another partner in a multipolar world? And what does strategic autonomy look like in an increasingly coercive geopolitical environment?
This podcast episode was recorded on July 31st 2026.
Cover image: picture alliance / Xinhua News Agency | Li Bo
Reluctance among German decision-makers has long stopped Berlin taking a tougher economic approach towards China. When France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Spain recently pressed the European Commission for tougher measures and faster trade defence action against China, Germany not only declined to join, it even called for stronger industrial ties with Beijing.
Yet, one thing Berlin should not worry about is voters’ disapproval should it pursue a more hawkish China policy. ECFR polling data find that Germans are the most China-sceptical out of 15 European countries surveyed. No fewer than 60% of Christian Democrat and Social Democrat supporters regard the country as an adversary or rival. In contrast, elsewhere in Europe, majorities still see China as either a “necessary partner” or even an ally. In Italy and Spain, 56% and 65% of people hold this view respectively. (Closest to the sceptical Germans are the French public; President Emmanuel Macron’s increasingly hawkish political posture vis-à-vis Beijing may have found an audience willing to listen.)
The China shock has hit Germany particularly hard: its manufacturing sector lost around 420,000 jobs between 2019 and 2025 and it continues to shed 10,000 jobs each month. The car industry is paying the highest costs, being squeezed out of a market increasingly dominated by Chinese manufacturers at home and abroad.
The mood in the European Council is shifting, and with Germany’s acquiescence. When EU leaders met in June 2026, they backed a stronger trade defence toolbox of existing measures against China. This included instruments such as the Industrial Accelerator Act’s “Buy European” provisions and limits on high-risk Chinese technology. Despite its past hesitations, Germany no longer acts as a spoiler on firmer EU action, and it has cautiously supported this new direction. Nevertheless, the combination of growing public scepticism towards China, mounting pressure on German industry and appetite for a more assertive policy on the European level creates a political mandate that German decision-makers could yet seize.
The German public’s views on the energy transition should also prove encouraging for their leaders. Voters want to see investment in renewables: 57% back what would amount to the growing electrification of the economy. Across the countries polled by ECFR, 61% of respondents say they support prioritising renewables and the clean tech sector.
This public support should help persuade leaders, including in Germany, that they can take action to limit emerging dependencies on China. They can accelerate the energy transition while de-risking the clean tech sector through providing support for domestic European industries, from wind to batteries.
For Berlin, and capitals across Europe, it is safer to move ahead rather than delay. Chinese economic policy is already doing irreparable damage to European industry—but European policymakers still need to protect an increasingly electrified economy from weaponisation by China. If they fail to do so, governments will almost certainly pay the price at the ballot box. Those that pursue electrification and economic de-risking as a single package are most likely to reap the political rewards.
Brussels (enr) – Local and regional leaders raised concerns that the next multiannual EU budget risks undermining investment in affordable homes needed to alleviate Europe’s deepening housing crisis.
“Europe’s housing challenge is not simply about building more housing units,” said Kata Tüttő, President of the European Committee of the Regions (CoR), an EU advisory body home to democratically elected regional and local representatives from all 27 Member States.
At a gathering in Brussels on Thursday, they demanded the EU “move from political ambition to concrete investment and delivery,” arguing that failing to invest now will only put affordable housing further out of reach for millions of Europeans.
As negotiations over the EU’s next long-term financial framework gather pace, cities and regions fear that affordable housing could become a casualty of competing spending priorities as several EU member states seek to cut the European Commission’s proposed €2 trillion budget for 2028-2034.
Tüttő called on the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU’s lending arm, to “mobilise the scale of investment” that cities and regions need to “make communities liveable” by providing essential infrastructure. She cited public transport, as well as energy and water infrastructure, as key examples.
Italian MEP Irene Tinagli, Chair of the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the Housing Crisis (HOUS), said addressing the housing crisis “requires investment, better coordination across all levels of government and a shared commitment from European institutions, Member States, regions and cities”.
The CoR and EIB on Thursday agreed on closer cooperation in key areas including social infrastructure, housing, and energy. The European Investment Bank’s president, Nadia Calviño, said “investing into resilient cities and regions, into cohesion and housing” was a strategic priority.
According to EIB figures, the world’s largest multilateral development bank provided a record €5 billion in financing for housing projects across Europe in 2025. The EIB is targeting an increase to €6 billion this year, Calviño confirmed.
The investments are a contribution to the European Commission’s Affordable Housing Plan, which was launched in December and aims to boost housing supply, mobilise public and private investment, and support Member States and regions in expanding social and affordable housing.
According to the Commission’s estimates, however, the EU needs to build 2 million homes each year to meet current demand, which amounts to an investment of approximately €153 billion per year.
This story was produced by the European Newsroom (enr) in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). The editorial responsibility lies with the enr.
Brussels (enr) – The European Union’s migration commissioner has renewed his call for Germany to gradually end controls at its internal borders, pointing to falling numbers of irregular arrivals and the bloc’s new asylum rules.
It was now time to gradually abolish internal border controls, Magnus Brunner told members of the European Newsroom (enr) network in Brussels.
The Austrian commissioner said the EU’s external borders were better protected and that irregular crossings had fallen sharply. Frontex recorded about one-third fewer irregular crossings at the EU’s external borders in the first half of 2026 than in the same period last year.
The EU’s new Pact on Migration and Asylum also took effect on June 12. Brunner said member states had begun implementing the rules and that the bloc was already seeing progress.
He welcomed steps by individual countries to ease controls. Checks on the border between Germany and Luxembourg on the Trier motorway have been lifted, he said. He also cited the suspension of controls between Austria and Slovenia.
Germany has had checks at its land borders since September 2024. Former Interior Minister Nancy Faeser ordered them, and her successor, Alexander Dobrindt, intensified them in May 2025. Dobrindt has repeatedly extended the measures, which are currently due to remain in place until September.
Brunner also defended the EU’s new Entry/Exit System, known as EES. The digital system records the entry and departure of travellers from outside the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
He acknowledged that the system had caused problems at some airports, including in Greece and Portugal, but said: “The system itself works very, very well.”
The system has faced criticism over long queues. The Airports Council International Europe has reported waiting times of up to five hours and missed connecting flights.
Brunner said professional truck drivers from the Western Balkans faced a particular problem because they can currently stay in the EU for no more than 90 days in any 180-day period. He proposed that EU member states and Western Balkan countries negotiate long-term visas on a bilateral basis.
Brussels (enr) – European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman David McAllister has urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to support German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s proposal for an associate membership for Ukraine as it moves towards joining the European Union.
The proposal is an opportunity that Ukraine should seize, the German centre-right lawmaker told members of the European Newsroom (enr) network in early June. Claims that it would amount to “membership light” or second-class membership were incorrect, he said.
Instead, it would allow Ukraine to become more closely integrated into the EU step by step before full membership, making the benefits of the bloc more visible to its people. One possibility would be for Ukraine to participate in the European Parliament as an observer, McAllister said.
Zelenskyy has expressed opposition to the idea, arguing that it would be unfair for Ukraine to be present in the EU but have no say in its decisions. In a letter to EU leaders, he called for the bloc to move faster and not keep Ukraine in a waiting room until full membership.
Merz said earlier that rapid full EU accession for Ukraine, which is fighting Russia’s invasion, is not realistic. For the interim period, he has proposed allowing Ukraine to attend EU summits and ministerial meetings without voting rights.
His ideas also include an associate member of the European Commission without a portfolio or voting rights, associate members of the European Parliament and an associate judge at the European Court of Justice.
Enlargement Agenda
McAllister said EU enlargement was high on the bloc’s agenda and that the Western Balkans were at the heart of Europe. A stable region was an investment in peace and security, he said.
The CDU politician called for each candidate country to be assessed individually and on its merits rather than treating the Western Balkans as a single group. Montenegro was a clear frontrunner, he said, while North Macedonia’s accession path remained blocked by a political dispute with Bulgaria.
Eight other European countries are officially recognised as EU candidate countries alongside Ukraine: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Türkiye.
Luxembourg (enr) – The European Investment Bank (EIB) is on course to meet, and potentially exceed, its target of allocating five percent of its financing in the European Union to security and defence projects this year, EIB President Nadia Calviño said.
That would amount to around 4.5 billion euros, according to the EU’s lending arm.
“Tt’s clear that we need more investment in the area of security and defence in Europe,” Calviño told members of the European Newsroom (enr) network in Luxembourg in June. “For the coming years, we are ready to do more to finance Europe’s security and defence capabilities,” the Spanish former economy minister added.
The EIB significantly increased its support for the sector last year in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the broader deterioration in the geopolitical situation. Financing for security and defence projects rose to more than 4 billion euros in 2025, four times the previous year’s level and almost five percent of all EIB Group financing in the EU.
“The shift of policy in security and defence has been a turning point for the EIB Group,” Calviño said.
Within only a few years, the bank had expanded its eligibility rules to include purely military projects. It now supports companies and investment funds active across the security and defence sector.
The EIB has gradually eased its financing rules since 2024. It can now provide funding for military equipment, infrastructure, services and technology. Weapons and ammunition remain excluded.
The Luxembourg-based EIB is the EU’s long-term lending institution. Its owners are the bloc’s member states, and its investments are generally intended to support the European Union’s political objectives.
The enr spoke with Calviño on the sidelines of the EIB’s annual Board of Governors meeting, as well as a meeting of EU ministers responsible for economic affairs, finance and the EU budget.
Gdańsk/Brussels (European Newsroom) – Ukrainian cities and regions risk being left out in deciding how billions in reconstruction funds are being used unless they are given a robust role in the planning, governance and implementation of reconstruction support, a joint statement by the European Alliance of Cities and Regions for the Reconstruction of Ukraine warned.
Meeting on the sidelines of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) 2026 in Gdańsk, Poland, the alliance called for a “localisation marker” in donor planning tools and ring-fenced funding with direct local access.
Antje Grotheer, President of the State Parliament in Bremen, Germany, and chair of the European Committee of the Regions’ (CoR) Working Group on Ukraine, argued that local and regional authorities should have a greater voice in donor discussions and reconstruction planning. She stressed that Ukraine’s decentralisation reforms have been key to maintaining resilience during the war.
“We feel there is an increasing need for stronger coordination of support that targets municipalities and regions,” Grotheer said.
Oleksii Riabykin, Deputy Minister for Rebuilding and Minister for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, said his country is already moving from emergency reconstruction to building resilient communities. Experience gained by Ukrainian cities, towns and villages during the war can help strengthen resilience across in Europe, he said.
EU law implementation
The joint statement released Wednesday stressed that over 70 percent of EU law is implemented at local level, but most reconstruction funding for Ukraine is still channeled through national governments, leaving municipalities to compete over the leftovers. At the URC 2026 in Gdańsk, the CoR and its alliance partners demanded a structural fix.
The alliance also encouraged Ukrainian regions to exploit existing EU programmes and platforms. It underscored the contribution of neighbouring EU countries to both Ukraine’s military efforts and its reconstruction, arguing that they should receive targeted support.
EU member states that share a border with Ukraine are Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.
The alliance brings together EU and Ukrainian local and regional authorities and was co-founded by the CoR, an EU advisory body, in June 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its goal is to coordinate an effective reconstruction of Ukraine that involves local and regional authorities rather than centralising the implementation of funds to the state.
The URC was also established after Russia’s full-scale invasion, building on the foundations of the annual Ukraine Reform Conference established in 2017 by supporters of Ukraine, including the European Union.
The URC 2026 takes place on June 25 and 26 and focuses on the sectors most impacted by Russia’s attacks, such as energy, critical infrastructure, and logistics. The lead-up to the conference was overshadowed by escalating dispute between Warsaw and Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had named an army unit after Ukrainian underground fighters from World War II who are also blamed for massacres of tens of thousands of Poles and Jews in what is now western Ukraine. In response, Poland’s right-wing conservative President Karol Nawrocki stripped Zelensky of a high Polish order of merit.
This story was produced by the European Newsroom (enr) in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). The editorial responsibility lies with the enr.
Migration policy is high on the European Union’s agenda. But one month after the bloc’s new rules – known as the Pact on Migration and Asylum – came into force, is the EU beginning to see the desired results?
For Magnus Brunner, European Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, the answer was yes. In an interview with the European Newsroom (enr) published on Thursday, he said that member states have begun implementing the rules and that illegal border crossings into the EU already dropped by 37% in the first half of 2026 compared to the previous year.
In light of these figures and the new rules, the Austrian politician said it is now time to “gradually” abolish internal border controls between EU member states, such as ongoing controls in Germany and Austria. He argued that the EU’s external borders were now better protected and reiterated that the number of irregular border crossings had fallen dramatically.
Journalists also quizzed Brunner about the Entry/Exit System, a new digital entry and exit procedure for people who are not from the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland. While admitting concerns from member states and critics that the system is still causing trouble in some member states, he said that it is generally performing as expected.
A major issue, however, remains for professional truck drivers from countries in the Western Balkans, who need to enter the EU to deliver goods. Currently, they can only stay in the EU for a maximum of 90 days within any 180-day period. As a solution, Brunner proposed to EU member states and Western Balkan countries to negotiate long-term visas bilaterally.
The interview was conducted by journalists from European Newsroom partner agencies dpa, APA, and CTK, on behalf of the entire network.
The European Newsroom (enr) welcomed a group of journalists from the United States to its offices in Brussels as part of their two-week exchange programme with the RIAS Berlin Kommission.
The visitors came from New York, Massachusetts, Washington, D.C., Missouri, Georgia, North Carolina, and Arizona and represented various media outlets such as Semafor, WCVB, NPR, CNN, KTVI/KPLR, WSOC Charlotte, Spectrum News, ABC, The Dispatch, and CBS.
What followed was a lively exchange about the state of journalism, news coverage and press freedom in the United States and Europe, how to get information from crucial sources, as well as the similarities and differences between the daily press briefings in the White House and the European Commission.
Tim Kohnen presented the European Newsroom’s work as a Brussels-based network of European news agencies. He was accompanied by Katharina Redanz and Niklas Treppner from the German press agency dpa Deutsche Presse-Agentur GmbH, who gave more insight on how to report on EU affairs as a correspondent in Brussels.
The RIAS Berlin Commission organises exchange programmes several times per year, primarily for radio and television journalists from the US and Germany. It is dedicated to improving German-American understanding in broadcast journalism, for example through immersive study trips and newsroom visits.
This time around, the journey took the journalists to Munich, Dresden, Berlin, Cologne, and Brussels. They were accompanied by Christoph Jumpelt, RIAS Executive Director.
Ireland will take over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union on July 1, 2026.
In a background briefing for the European Newsroom (enr) at the Permanent Representation of Ireland to the European Union in Brussels, journalists got an early glimpse of what the presidency will be working on in the months ahead.
Correspondents from several European Newsroom member agencies spoke with Eoin Flavin (Spokesperson Coreper II ) and Peadar Ó hÚbáin (Spokesperson Coreper I).
They engaged in a lively Q&A on a range of topics – from competitiveness, security, and defence to EU enlargement, support for Ukraine and online safety.
The talk brought together journalists from enr partner agencies dpa (Germany), CTK (Czech Republic), APA (Austria), and UKRINFORM (Ukraine).
More impressions from the briefing. Photos: Tim Kohnen/European Newsroom
In an interview with the European Newsroom (enr), the President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), Nadia Calviño, told journalists that the bank is on track to meet and possibly exceed this year’s target of allocating 5 percent of its EU financing to security and defence. According to the EIB, this amounts to around €4.5 billion.
According to EIB figures, the world’s largest multilateral development bank already quadrupled its financing for security and defence projects last year to €4 billion, reflecting Europe’s response to an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.
The enr spoke with Calviño on the sidelines of the EIB’s annual Board of Governors meeting, as well as a meeting of EU ministers responsible for economic affairs, finance and the EU budget , in Luxembourg on Friday.
The interview was conducted by journalists from European Newsroom partner agencies dpa Deutsche Presse-Agentur GmbH and ANSA on behalf of the entire network.
In an interview with the European Newsroom (enr), the leading German foreign policy politician in the European Parliament, David McAllister, urged Ukraine to accept a recent proposal by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz for an “associate membership” in the EU.
McAllister, who sits with the European People’s Party (EPP) and chairs the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), told the enr he is in favour of enhanced, step-by-step integration of Ukraine into the EU in order to make the benefits of the EU visible to the Ukrainian people. One example was for Ukraine to enter the European Parliament as an observer.
Kyiv had previously rejected the idea of an “associate membership”. In a letter to EU leaders, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote that it would be unfair for Ukraine to have a presence in the EU but remain without a voice. Instead, he urged the EU to move faster and not keep Ukraine in a waiting room.
Ukraine is not the only country in line for EU membership. Eight other European nations are currently also recognised candidates to join the bloc: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Türkiye.
McAllister told the enr that enlargement policy is at the top of the EU agenda and that the Western Balkan countries are at the heart of Europe. As such, a stable region is an investment in peace and security, he said.
At the same time, the German politician advocated for an individual approach to each country in the region based on merit, rather than grouping them together as one. He explained that the countries of the Western Balkans are individually at very different stages of progress. As an example, he pointed out that Montenegro is a clear frontrunner, while North Macedonia’s EU path remains blocked due to a political deadlock with Bulgaria.
The interview was conducted by journalists from European Newsroom partner agencies dpa (Germany), CTK (Czech Republic), and Tanjug (Serbia) on the behalf of the entire network.
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