The sudden escalation in fighting between Ethiopian federal forces and Tigrayan rebels in the Afar region, raising fears of a new civil war, is part of a wider potential cascade effect from Yemen that could hurt Europe.
After months of low-level skirmishes, Ethiopian officials have accused the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front of launching an all-out offensive against federal government positions in northern Ethiopia.
So what does that mean for Europe and the EU? More than you might think.
Ethiopia’s economy is particularly vulnerable following the capture of Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline by the Houthi rebel group, who now control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Some 97 percent of Ethiopia’s trade is via Djibouti’s port. There is now a real prospect of a series of regional chain reactions and the prospect of civil war in northern Ethiopia is one of them.
This doesn’t directly impact on the EU’s interests, but it could soon enough.
Ethiopia is not alone in facing major new threats posed by the Houthis’ advances.
Egypt, a vital ally for the EU on migration control, faces its own economic crunch as it relies on Suez Canal tolls as a main source of foreign currency. That could lead to more financial demands being made of Brussels
For their part, Djibouti and Somalia face major security concerns. Djibouti hosts military bases for a handful of EU countries, as well as the EU itself, and the United States, China, and others.
Somalia, meanwhile, has a longstanding African Union (AU)-led security mission aimed at combatting the Al-Shabaab terror group to which the EU is the biggest single donor.
And the AU mission is particularly reliant on the EU after the Trump administration pulled the plug on US financial support earlier this year. The Houthis already supply at least $100m (€88m) in arms to Al-Shabaab, a smuggling operation now made easier by its coastal advances.
For the moment, the EU is offering only modest additional support. Last week, EU governments agreed to double financial support for the Djibouti Armed Forces to €20m under the European Peace Facility.
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The MEPs steering the EU’s key industrial law want “Made in Europe” to mean that goods are actually produced in the EU.
Their draft report on the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), presented to three parliament committees on Monday (28 September), would reserve the label, and the subsidies and public contracts that come with it, for goods produced in the 27 member states.
Partner countries such as Japan or Korea could be added later, but only if they meet set criteria.
This is a break with the EU commission’s proposal, which would apply to virtually every country with a free-trade or procurement deal with the EU.
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The EU’s delisting of two Russian oligarchs last week despite multiplying sabotage attacks in Europe was “regrettable”, while German-Russian talks at the UN ended in “ridicule”, EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas has said.
“It is regrettable that this [delisting] was the decision,” said Kallas on Monday (28 September) in Brussels at a defence ministers’ meeting.
“We are putting forward more listings, targeting their military-industrial complex, also targeting the finances of Russia, because we want this war to stop,” she added, referring to the 22nd round of Russia sanctions, due on 12 October.
Lithuania’s defence minister Robertas Kaunas also called the delistings a “step backwards”, adding: “This is not the time to reduce sanctions. We have to strengthen the pressure on Russia and [Russian president Vladimir] Putin’s environs”.
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EU migrant return hubs became the subject of a summit held in Munich on Saturday (26 September) as interior ministers from member and associate states met the European Commission to advance projects aimed at offshoring rejected asylum seekers.
But the meeting made little progress, partly because many of the attendees met in Copenhagen on 4 September, where leaders had announced an expected start to the policy by 2027.
Instead, the main takeaways from Munich included rehashed commitments on improved emergency responses as well as broadened use of Frontex, the EU’s border control agency, and migration diplomacy with third states.
Though the mass border crossing into Ceuta, the Spanish enclave in North Africa, was a subject of discussion, the 18 EU and non-EU interior ministers present in Munich did not include a representative from Spain, possibly due to Pedro Sánchez’s opposition to the return hubs policy.
But the UK’s home secretary Shabana Mahmood was present, talking of the need for close cooperation within Europe on migration issues,” Germany’s interior minister and meeting host, Alexander Dobrindt, told reporters on Saturday.
Despite Donrindt’s focus on “innovative solutions” for those with no right to stay in Europe but no way or returning, Berlin’s migration response would also be significantly dependent on expanded powers for Europe’s border agency, Frontex.
“We are seeing that the Pact is working. The number of irregular arrivals is dropping across the EU while at the same time the numbers of returns to third countries are increasing. That said, we cannot become complacent,” Jim O’Callaghan, Irish interior minister, told the press before the meeting.
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The European Commission is being pressed to deliver an animal cage ban by 2027 after failing to meet previous commitments.
Several hundred animal rights activists gathered at the EU’s office for health and food safety in Brussels on Monday (28 September) to encourage a ban on poultry cages and on the killing of male chicks.
The commission’s livestock strategy had committed in July to proposing legislation to outlaw the two practices by the end of 2026, with similar legislation on pig welfare expected to follow by mid-2027.
The legislation stems from a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) signed by 1.4 million people in 2021 to ‘End the Cage Age’. A vast majority of MEPs also subsequently voted to endorse the transition to improved animal welfare.
And while the commission had originally promised to table a proposal by 2024, this was derailed by farming lobbies and the deadline elapsed.
“We are here [at Monday’s protest in Brussels] because the EU has been delaying meaningful reforms for animals for years,” said Ombretta Alessandrini from Animal Equality, which organised the rally.
Ombretta Alessandrini is campaign manager at Animal Equality. (Source: EUobserver)
“Our democratic ask needs to be respected. We feel betrayed by the EU’s broken promises and we want the commission to do what they say,” she told EUobserver.
Animal Equality has also joined legal action against the commission over its broken promises, in a case examined at the European Court of Justice in March.
The commission is legally obliged to respond to a citizens’ initiative once it reaches 1m or more signatures.
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This story is a part of the weekly newsletter about security, defence, and tech in the eastern flank of Nato, How we cee it.
Over the past few weeks, a new wave of fear has engulfed Europe. A number of intelligence and government officials have spoken out, saying Russia could possibly attack a Nato country within months, not years.
On 18 September, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk warned that Russia is planning hybrid strikes with drones or rockets on European countries that support Ukraine, such as Poland.
Two days later, Czech intelligence chief Michal Koudelka told the Guardian that, as well as increased drone activity, a small-scale invasion of Nato territory bordering Russia could be part of the Kremlin’s plans.
Then, last Thursday, Denmark’s defence intelligence service said that Russia is likely to intensify its hybrid war against the West in the coming months, with more frequent attacks against Nato countries.
On the same day, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Poland’s foreign minister Radosław Sikorski said, according to TVP World: “We are receiving information … that Russia is preparing something big this year.”
This is not the first time a wave of comments like this has appeared. A similar situation arose last year, when various officials in Europe took turns escalating their rhetoric about the Russian threat.
It is possible that they are speaking out again because new information has surfaced within the intelligence community. The communication goal could be letting Russia know that they know. Much like CIA director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow last month, this could be an effort to make sure Russia doesn’t miscalculate.
The warnings also come in a different context from last year, when the Baltic countries were sounding the alarm. Russia has noticeably been turning up the temperature of its activity around Europe.
Back in July, a cruise missile crashed in Poland. According to experts, it was not a misguided missile, but one deliberately aimed at Poland. Then, in early August, a drone carrying an explosive device was discovered at Leipzig/Halle Airport in eastern Germany, close to Ukrainian cargo planes.
Germany’s interior minister Alexander Dobrindt said the Leipzig airport attack followed the “well-established pattern of Russian hybrid operations in Europe,” the BBC reported.
According to German investigators, who spoke to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the incident was also connected to other events, such as an attempted arson attack on a drone manufacturer in eastern Slovakia, and an arson attack in Munich on September 3, when several incendiary devices were thrown from a passing car onto a construction site near the headquarters of defence firms Rohde & Schwarz and Helsing.
In fact, there have been so many different incidents recently that the semi-regular drone incursions into Romania and the Baltics have become almost normalised and struggle to make headlines anymore.
Hypothetical scenarios abound
Scenarios of where Russia could take its hybrid attacks next are as abundant as onlookers’ creativity allows. They range from small attacks on factories, through the seizure of a small piece of land by an elite drone unit, all the way to the capture of the Suwałki corridor – a strategic piece of land between the Baltic states and mainland Europe.
Most recently, the CIA warned that while all eyes had so far been on the Baltics, Russia may be preparing a drone strike against Spain, France, and Italy.
According to Marko Mihkelson, chairman of the Estonian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, the snowball of speculation about an imminent Russian attack on Europe is gathering pace.
But as he sees it, isolated facts are being mixed with wishful thinking, worst-case scenarios and, at times, little more than the need to grab attention.
As he wrote in an opinion piece for the Estonian news agency ERR: “Russia understands that it can confuse and paralyse us through information operations alone. Constant speculation about the Baltic states and Poland risks creating the impression that this is primarily a problem for two or three countries on Russia’s doorstep, while the rest of Europe can somehow remain untouched.”
According to Mihkelson, Russia’s campaign against the West would not necessarily begin with a conventional attack.
It could start by undermining Nato from within: interfering in elections, amplifying polarising narratives, exploiting political divisions, and spreading fear. It could seek to isolate Ukraine by limiting Western support, and then test Nato’s willingness to stand together.
As for worries that Russia will attempt to grab land from the Baltics or Poland, there are no significant material or military changes to note along the borders.
Belarus did hold a four-day military exercise near its border with the Suwałki corridor in mid-September, but that is nothing close to the signals we were getting from Russia just before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Back then, physical military infrastructure was being constructed ahead of the attack.
There are also no significant changes in the Russian military’s posture to launch a land attack against the Baltics.
Estonian government officials confirm this. According to Estonia’s minister of defence, Martin Herem, its assessment of the Russian threat remains unchanged.
That means Russia’s main effort remains focused on its war in Ukraine, and neither Estonia, Denmark, nor other Nato allies currently see a threat requiring raised military readiness.
Military experts in Lithuania also see no signs of new escalation. This doesn’t mean Russia won’t continue to be dangerous. It means that Russia has been engaged in provocations against Nato countries for years already, and similar behaviour will continue.
“No one is currently planning to conquer us – not at this moment, nor this year. In this case, specific, very precise attacks or provocations are more likely, designed not so much to cause physical damage as to sow serious panic in people’s minds,” Deividas Šlekys, a professor at Vilnius University’s Institute of Political Science and International Relations, told the Lithuanian wire LRT on Monday (28 September).
And so, while last autumn it was the Baltic states sounding the alarm about a potential Russian attack, now their officials are looking to calm the panic about their aggressive neighbour.
The Ukrainian offensive continues on the northern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk sector of the front.
Russia has begun targeting data centres in Ukrainian cities.
Ukrainian drones struck a factory producing missile guidance systems.
It is no longer discussed as often, but Ukraine’s medium-range campaign is continuing successfully.
Maps of the day – a map of sites struck in Kyiv; Ukrainian successes around Lyman and Sloviansk.
Videos of the day – a swarm of Russian drones approaches Kyiv; a Ukrainian drone carrying a flag flew over the occupied town of Hola Prystan; the Ukrainian army used drones to deliver food to residents of occupied Oleshky in Kherson region.
The Ukrainian offensive continues on the northern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk sector of the front. “The situation on the Lyman axis remains difficult. According to reports from the ground, the enemy is trying to push Russian forces beyond the Zherebets River, along which meeting engagements are continuing. Ukrainian forces are active in the Yampil area and on the approaches to Lyman. Heavy fighting is under way to stabilise the line and individual positions,” the Russian Z-channel Two Majors wrote on Monday (28 September) morning.
Last week, the Ukrainian army asked OSINT experts not to help Russia by publishing their analyses. We therefore currently have information mainly from Russian accounts and from what official Ukrainian sources selectively release to the public. By coincidence, several reports concerning this particular battlefield emerged on Monday morning.
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky was the first to announce, without further details, on Sunday afternoon that there were “important results from our units taking part in Operation Vivaldi on the Lyman axis”.
On Monday morning, the 3rd Army Corps, which is conducting Operation Vivaldi, released details. “The opponent was misled and slept through the real strike,” corps commander Andriy Biletsky said.
The 3rd Army Corps liberated the villages of Nove, Ridkodub, and Katerynivka, and “restored control” over Karpivka and Novomykhailivka. It should be noted that two different timelines intersect at this point.
While Two Majors and other Russian accounts refer to current events, the report by Biletsky’s corps only acknowledges events that took place at the beginning of the summer. The Ukrainian command has only now admitted them and described them as the third phase of Operation Vivaldi. It also reported the capture of 250 Russians.
The Ukrainians also released previously unknown footage from the operation, showing an outdated BTR-60 armoured vehicle loaded with explosives and remotely sent to destroy a fortified Russian position, which it succeeded in doing.
During Operation Vivaldi, Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps converted Soviet-era BTR-60 armored personnel carriers into a massive unmanned explosive vehicles, using them to breach some of the Russian fortified positions during the offensive. https://t.co/1dKZ6TtE3Hpic.twitter.com/9SR9FbrZjx
The Ukrainians managed to convince the Russians that their target was the village of Shandryholove, to which they sent their reserves for counterattacks. However, the Ukrainians struck in the village of Nove, further east. This is where the footage of the BTR-60 attack was recorded.
French analyst Clément Molin said that Biletsky was referring in this case to events from May and June. According to him, the battlefield map looked like this at the time:
Ukraine 🇺🇦 just announced the 3rd part of "Vivaldi" operation, liberating multiple villages back in May and June
Today, the situation is even worse for the Russians. The Russian military channel Military Informant published two maps which still show the now non-existent salient north of Lyman, but the area without a Russian presence around the city has expanded.
“The Ukrainian army is advancing and pushing the Russian Armed Forces away from the city and surrounding villages. Russian forces, in turn, are trying to bring the situation under control and are conducting counterattacks. It is not difficult to see that the loss of these positions significantly complicates the entire operation towards Sloviansk,” Military Informant wrote.
Importantly, the improvement has not only occurred near Lyman, but also partly east of Sloviansk. “On the Sloviansk axis, Ukrainian forces carried out local counterattacks and pushed Russian forces out of positions east of Mykolaivka, as well as from the areas of Rai-Oleksandrivka and Velykyi Lis. However, the enemy advanced west of Fedorivka Druha towards the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal,” the Ukrainian account Petrenko said.
Rybar also confirmed Ukrainian attacks on the approaches to Sloviansk last week:
Finnish analysts from Black Bird Group recorded the same development. On their map, one Ukrainian advance runs from Sloviansk directly towards Rai-Oleksandrivka, while the other is slightly further north. Mykolaivka is in the centre, Sloviansk to its left and Lyman above it.
Russia has begun targeting data centres in Ukrainian cities. “Today, in Kyiv alone, Russian jet-powered drones ‘destroyed’ two kindergartens and two schools, an ordinary residential building, a car repair shop, several warehouses and telecommunications facilities,” Zelensky wrote on Sunday evening.
The following map shows some of these sites.
Weekend Ukraine map thread for Sunday 27th September 2026
Russian strikes targeting specifically civilian areas continue to increase, leaving many dead. The map below shows some (but not all) of the recent strikes upon Kyiv, which has been pounded this week. Cities will be left… pic.twitter.com/SW2mrzWdwn
The last category in Zelensky’s list of “targets” – telecommunications facilities – is worth noting. More specifically, these are data centres, which Russian drones have begun attacking in an attempt to cause internet coverage outages. They reportedly struck, among other sites, the headquarters of the major telecommunications operator Kyivstar. The Russian Z-channel Veteran’s Notes wrote that nine centres had been struck over the previous week.
The Russian Telegram channel Rybar, which consistently refers to Ukraine as “so-called”, assessed the results as “visible”, but said no “digital collapse” had occurred.
According to Rybar, some services were disrupted, but destroying several servers was insufficient to cause more serious damage. Moreover, digital infrastructure is decentralised and therefore more resilient.
Nevertheless, the Russians expect the new campaign to deliver longer-term results. “In addition to causing economic damage, it allows us to identify the opponent’s weakest points,” Rybar wrote. It expects that this will eventually make it possible to maximise the damage.
Ukrainian drones struck a factory producing missile guidance systems. This happened overnight from Friday to Saturday, when at least five production halls at the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant in Rostov region were damaged. Satellite imagery also confirms the strikes.
Satellite images from the Sept 26 strike on the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant in Russia’s Rostov region show hits on 5 workshops across 6 buildings, foundry 022 burning, optics 008 hit twice, assembly 009 at least 3 times, galvanic 010 once, machining 024 twice with a roof… https://t.co/Zm6XEbdFl3pic.twitter.com/lVLFPWjbY7
The location of the factory is marked on a map published by the Ukrainian general staff. The Ukrainian army said that it produces optical and electronic systems for guiding artillery, missiles and anti-tank weapons.
⚡️⚡️ Azov Optical and Mechanical Plant hit
During the night of 26th September 2026, units of the Defence Forces of Ukraine struck production facilities at the Azov Optical and Mechanical Plant in Azov, Rostov region, russian federation.
The attack was complex. Ukrainian website Militarnyi reported that it involved, among other weapons, Neptune missiles originally designed as anti-ship missiles.
The same source wrote that Russia manufactures at the factory components for Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles, R-74 short-range and R-37M long-range air-to-air missiles, Kh-101, Kh-35U and Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles, Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as guided glide bombs.
It is no longer discussed as often, but Ukraine’s medium-range campaign is continuing successfully. For the third consecutive month, Ukrainian drones have destroyed more than 600 trucks at distances of 35 to 300 km from the front, despite Russian countermeasures. The chart below, by Clément Molin, indicates that 640 Russian logistics vehicles have been destroyed so far in September.
When the campaign began with an effort to isolate Crimea, the Hornet drone was the most frequently mentioned. But even then, medium-range strikes were carried out by several types of drone. Military correspondent Francis Farrell wrote for the Kyiv Independent about one of them, named Zozulya.
“Its old-fashioned silhouette and simple piston engine driving a wooden propeller evoke the first fighters of the world wars. But without a pilot, and controlled from a command room anywhere in Ukraine via satellite coverage, this aircraft also represents the cutting edge of modern drone warfare,” the author wrote about the unmanned aircraft, a photograph of which was already shown by the Ukrainian army in April.
It does indeed show an almost primitive-looking weapon, on which nothing, apart from the panel receiving a Starlink satellite signal, evokes the 21st century:
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) April 25, 2026
Unlike Molin, the analytical account Playfra said that the number of so-called middle strikes had fallen slightly, but that they remained effective because the Russians “still cannot jam Starlink, which is essential if they want to stop Ukrainian medium-range strikes”.
The same source said that the smaller amount of video evidence was due to the Ukrainians no longer publishing it. This does not mean, however, that conclusive footage is not public. Some of it is also published by Russian sources, such as the Russian Telegram channel Military Informant in the images below:
Videos of the day
A swarm of Russian drones near Kyiv. Judging by the sound, these are older versions powered by a piston engine and a pusher propeller.
A drone carrying a Ukrainian flag flew over the occupied town of Hola Prystan in Kherson region, which had a population of 13,000 before the war. The town lies just 13 km south-west of the better-known Oleshky.
🇺🇦Над окупованою Голою Пристанню Херсонської області до 317-ї річниці міста пролетів український дрон із прапором громади. pic.twitter.com/2TcPlNwOXU
According to Ukrainian sources, the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky itself is deepening. Several thousand residents still live in the town and have very limited access to food. The Ukrainian army attempted to improve their situation using drones.
🔴 BREAKING: Ukraine delivered about 4 tons of food to temporarily occupied Oleshky in the Kherson region using drones.
The aid was delivered to 100 locations for residents, despite Russian forces reportedly shooting down aid drones and confiscating food. pic.twitter.com/TmGtZ9r3Bl
By Tuesday (22 September), Russia had demonstrably lost 24,138 pieces of heavy equipment (24,098 on Monday [14 September]). Of these, 19,105 (19,065) were destroyed by Ukrainians, 1,000 (1,000) were damaged, 1,194 (1,194) were abandoned by their crews, and 2,839 (2,839) were captured by the Ukrainian army. This includes 4,448 (4,447) tanks, of which 3,353 (3,352) were destroyed in combat.
Ukraine lost 12,175 (12,143) pieces of equipment, of which 9,579 (9,551) were destroyed, 702 (698) were damaged, 695 (695) were abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) were captured. This includes 1,464 (1,462) tanks, of which 1,125 (1,120) were destroyed in combat.
Note: Neither side regularly reports its own deaths or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. This overview uses data from the Oryx project, which has compiled a list of equipment losses documented exclusively by photographs since the beginning of the war.
The new biopic about the wartime leadership of general Charles de Gaulle is a must-watch. The two-part epic depicts the transformation of France’s fortunes from defeat and collaboration to victory and sovereignty, exemplified by de Gaulle.
He arrives in London with nothing but moral authority and self-belief, and — if this is a plot spoiler I apologise — returns home in triumph as his country’s leader and liberator, albeit with a little help from the British, Americans, and others.
The film, a box-office record-breaker in France, has many virtues, chiefly the impeccable acting of Simon Abkarian in the title role, and Simon Russell Beale as Churchill (speaking admirably understandable, if accented, French). But other aspects of the story hit me the hardest.
One was the all-too-topical depiction of the United States: vital for victory, yet misguided, sometimes even perfidious. In the cartoonish, goodies-and-baddies version of wartime history, few remember that US president Franklin Roosevelt did not back de Gaulle and his “Free French”.
Following the fall of France in 1940, the administration in Washington established full diplomatic relations with the collaborationist Vichy regime, regarding de Gaulle as an authoritarian pretender, and moreover militarily insignificant. Later, with the Nazis in retreat, the US planned to divide up post-war France and administer most of it as a colony: the place was too important to be run by the French.
The film simplifies the more complicated real-life story (de Gaulle made mistakes too), but it depicts the outlines vividly and accurately: a much-needed revision. It also touches on the shameful treatment, at US insistence, of French African soldiers. Their presence offended entrenched principles of racial segregation. These warriors were banned from the Paris liberation parade, also at American behest, for fear of tainting the newsreel pictures. This episode is not shown in the film.
Other untold stories lie further east, with equally poignant echoes today. I watched the film with a Czech friend: its thrilling, joyous denouement, with the uprising in Paris, and the arrival of the longed-for liberators, contrasts painfully with the events in her capital city in May 1945. There was an uprising in Prague too, but the Americans (only 80km away) let the Soviets march in. Warsaw, destroyed in the 1944 uprising, fared even worse.
Further off-stage are the tragic, heroic events in Tallinn in that year, when Otto Tief’s government briefly tried to restore Estonia’s independence as the Germans fled. Like the Latvian Central Council under Pauls Kalniņš, it was savagely ended by Soviet occupation.
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EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.
Find the full transcript below:
Rebuilding Gaza will require tens of billions of dollars. European countries have just approved new funding for water and waste management. But with the ceasefire still fragile, can reconstruction really get underway?
The EU has just approved two projects aimed at helping rebuild Gaza. Together, they provide €43m in support for the Palestinian Authority, mainly for water and waste management.
The funding is intended to improve access to drinking water for around one million people in Gaza, restore waste collection and launch pilot recycling programmes.
This comes on top of a much larger €883.6m package announced by the EU in July for Gaza. This is totally independent from the board of peace initiated by Donald Trump.
That is the purpose of the donor conferences regularly organised by the Commission. And this format has sometimes been seen as an alternative to the reconstruction efforts led by Trump’s Board of peace.
As far as the Board of peace is concerned, it also made new announcements last week, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly.
It announced a $2.45bn plan to support reconstruction over six months. Is that significant compared with Gaza’s needs? And do the two funding plans complement each other?
The short answer is: the funding is still far from enough. The needs for rebuilding Gaza are estimated at least $71bn.
The economy has also collapsed, with very little economic activity currently possible in Gaza and unemployment affecting almost the entire population.
But the different funding plans can complement each other.
The Board of Peace six-month plan is divided into dozens of areas of spending. One of the largest is the construction of permanent shelters to replace the tents where many people are currently living.
The plan also includes clearing rubble, rebuilding homes and restoring public transport, among other things.
But reconstruction also depends on security. Is the ceasefire holding, and is Israel committed to allowing aid and reconstruction to move forward? That’s one of the major questions.
European commissioner Dubravka Šuica stressed this point at the UN last week, saying that European assistance relies on clear commitments from Israel to facilitate the implementation of these projects.
Israel has reopened one crossing for international aid, but according to several international reports, it is still restricting the distribution of humanitarian assistance inside Gaza.
And although a ceasefire has been agreed, Israeli military operations targeting Hamas have continued, with civilians among those killed.
According to Gaza’s Health Ministry, 22 Palestinians were killed and 209 injured between 9 and 16 September alone.
Another 21 people were killed on 16 September when a residential building, already damaged during the war, collapsed.
Overall, more than 1,300 people have reportedly been killed in Gaza since the ceasefire began, according to Gaza health authorities.
What’s more, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, which is supposed to govern the territory under the peace agreement is still based in Cairo. Israel has not authorised all of its members to enter Gaza.
And the committee says the conditions for carrying out its mandate are not yet in place.
That is another obstacle to reconstruction getting fully underway.
There is one more source of uncertainty: possible Palestinian elections in November. Those elections could also be postponed.
So while funding for reconstruction is beginning to take shape, there are still major questions over security, governance and political stability.
Tens of thousands of autoworkers in Germany protested last week against the car giant’s drastic cuts – spanning job losses and plant closures – even as Volkswagen benefited from some €1.48bn in state subsidies to entice people to buy their brand of electric cars.
The figure, released to EUobserver via a parliamentary demand tabled by German Green MP Julian Joswig, revealed that the German state has doled out €10.1bn in environmental bonuses between 2020 to 2026 to lure people into purchasing electric cars.
As an individual named brand, Volkswagen received the most, followed by Tesla with €889m ahead of other brands like Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Audi, Renault, Hyundai, Opel, SEAT and Kia.
“When more than €10bn in public funding is involved, it must be possible to trace where the money goes and what economic impact it generates,” said Joswig, in a statement.
German domestic interest in electric cars has shown a steady increase over the years. Last month, over 30-percent of all new cars registered in Germany were electric. That is a new record, according to Germany’s Federal Motor Transport Authority.
Even so, the German car industry, including Volkswagen, are shedding workers amid plans to cut plants after being caught off guard by US tariffs and China, whose own industry is now pushing into the European market.
On Monday (21 September), Volkswagen was removed from the Euro Stoxx 50 index given its shrinking market valuation.
Volkswagen, which is a state-owned company, recently announced plans to repurpose its Osnabrück factory in north-west Germany in order to manufacture weapons for Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.
The irony is not lost given that Volkswagen was founded by Hitler largely on the back of Jewish slave labour, which is now set to produce arms for an Israel accused of having itself committed a genocide.
“I haven’t seen that being discussed here. Certainly not in the media. People do discuss it, but it’s not anywhere out in the public debate,” said Holger Görg, a professor of International Economics at the University of Kiel.
The car company also announced plans to close its plants in Emden, Hanover, Zwickau and Neckarsulm amid discussions of massive layoffs, potentially affecting some 100,000 people as well as job losses among numerous suppliers.
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Interior ministers will discuss how to secure borders and deport more immigrants this week, while foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas takes EU diplomacy to Syria.
Home affairs ministers meeting in Brussels on Thursday (1 October) will discuss “the overall state” and “security” of the Schengen free-travel area, as well as the adequacy of EU asylum law, after thousands of people entered the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in north Africa in July, prompting a border row between Italy, Denmark, and Spain.
The talks come ahead of the first post-Ceuta EU summit, due on 15 October, where rightwing EU leaders aim to drum up support for harsher measures.
The interior ministers will also “exchange views on how to improve returns of persons who do not have the right to stay in the EU through enhanced cooperation on readmission with priority non-EU countries”, the EU Council said, referring to potential deportations to Rwanda.
And they will examine how to increase surveillance of people’s movements, in order to get “early warning” of future “crisis situations”.
For her part, the EU foreign affairs chief, Kaja Kallas, will visit Syria, together with a large security detail, on Tuesday.
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It has been a good week for Russian soft power in the sporting world.
On Tuesday (22 September) in Brussels, the EU lifted a visa-ban on a portly 73-year-old Russian billionaire, Alisher Usmanov, who is head of the International Fencing Federation.
And on Saturday in Samarkand, FIDE, the world chess body, elected a Kazakh billionaire, Timur Turlov, who has no professional chess rating, but who does have strong links to Russia, to be its next president.
On paper, Turlov ended 30 years of Russian rule at FIDE, but at a closer look, his victory seems like its continuation under a false flag.
The 38-year-old financier was born in Moscow and made his fortune there, but left Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, renounced his Russian citizenship, and divested most of his Russian holdings, giving him a nice alibi against Western sanctions.
But he has still been blacklisted by Ukraine for ongoing business ties to Russia’s oil and gas sectors.
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On Tuesday (22 September), the Lithuanian parliament backed a proposal to lift the constitutional ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases on the country’s territory.
Lithuanian radio LRT reported on the development, which paves the way for nuclear weapons in the country.
Lawmakers overwhelmingly approved the constitutional amendment to lift the ban, with 99 votes in favour, 13 against and five abstentions. The proposal must pass two further parliamentary votes, three months apart, before it comes into effect.
This comes as Europe as a whole debates nuclear deterrence.
In March, French president Emmanuel Macron announced a new French nuclear doctrine. He also raised the possibility of extending France’s nuclear umbrella over countries that could temporarily host French strategic aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
However, the final decision on their use would remain in the hands of the French president.
France is the only EU member state with its own nuclear weapons and has a similar number of nuclear warheads to the United Kingdom, which sources them from the US.
However, France has long advocated greater autonomy from the US. Macron has justified this due to the inflammatory rhetoric of US president Donald Trump, who puts into question US commitments to European allies.
Ten European countries have joined France’s forward deterrence programme: the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland, which joined this month ending military neutrality after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
It was in the context of the new European nuclear architecture that MP Remigijus Motuzas, chair of the Lithuanian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, plus another 50 Lithuanian MPs tabled a proposal to lift the constitutional ban on deploying nuclear weapons on the Baltic country’s territory.
Lithuania borders Russia’s heavily-militarised Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, Moscow’s closest ally in its war against Ukraine.
“Given the situation we are in, the geopolitical situation and what is happening, I think it is certainly worth it,” parliamentary speaker Juozas Olekas said in May, referring to nuclear deterrence.
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In Berlin, you can be whoever you want to be – as long as you can afford it. By some estimates, the city is short of 100,000 flats. Economist Alexander Kritikos of the German Institute for Economic Research explains how the housing crisis contributed to support for radical political parties.
The housing crisis is one manifestation of wider discontent that is also reflected in support for political parties at opposite ends of the spectrum, from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) to the far-left Die Linke (The Left).
Find out:
Why so few new homes have been built in Berlin.
Will the Left’s plans to purchase homes from private owners work?
What lies behind growing support for the AfD?
How Germany can get back on track with digitisation.
Germany is one of Europe’s richest countries, but it suffers major housing shortages. How come?
The housing crisis is a problem in three or four large cities. Berlin is one of them, and it is a truly major issue here, especially after an influx of tens of thousands of people from within and outside the country.
What happened in 2003?
2003 was a turning point when Berlin became a city of start-ups. Before then, the people were unable to rent out their flats due to an oversupply.
When in the 1990s Berlin was restored as the capital, people expected that many would move here. But the calculations at the time overlooked one thing: the city [West Berlin] had been surrounded by a wall, and its residents could not move to the suburbs.
In the 10 to 15 years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, when rents were at their lowest, more people left the city than arrived. Developments were therefore exactly the opposite of what had been expected. The trend did not stop until 2003, when the last major wave of residents left.
Alexander Kritikos believes that expropriating flats will not resolve the crisis. Source: Anastasiia Furman, Deník N
The city began attracting start-ups. It had an excellent environment for their development and outstanding research institutions. From then until today, more people have been arriving in Berlin than leaving it.
It is therefore clear that, from a certain point onwards, we no longer had any additional flats or houses available to offer.
“When you expropriate something, no new homes are built. It does not solve the housing shortage; you merely shift it from one owner to another”
With so many people arriving, why were more homes not being built?
Building new homes became a bureaucratic nightmare. Obtaining all the permits and dealing with administrative matters took a great deal of time.
And construction became exceptionally expensive while politicians regulated rent levels. Many investors concluded that building homes was not worth their while. For them, costs were too high, bureaucracy too complex and income too low.
Doubts over Left’s proposed flat buy-backs
The Left plans to buy back 220,000 flats fromcorporate landlords. In 2021, 58 percent of Berliners voted in a referendum in favour of expropriation.Now, the Left wants to fulfil this mandate. What do you think?
When you expropriate something, no new homes are built. It does not solve the housing shortage; you merely shift it from one owner to another.
The Left also promise the number of flats will increase, but it will not. It cannot increase in this way.
Historically, Berlin’s housing stock was managed by public institutions, who offered lower rents. And we saw that those who benefited were people with good connections to those allocating the flats.
Whenever demand exceeds supply, other ways of allocating resources emerge, whether through personal connections, under-the-table payments or otherwise.
Mitte, a central Berlin district. Almost everyone would like to live here. Source: Anastasiia Furman, Deník N
It does, insofar as migrants also come to Berlin. But we must really distinguish between refugees and highly educated people who come here to establish their own businesses. They too are immigrants. So I would not say that migration is the problem. Rather, more people are arriving in Berlin than leaving, and that creates excess demand for housing.
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Why Operation Vivaldi is being described as the offensive operation of 2026 and a huge Russian disaster.
Robots in the leading role.
How the operation, which is not yet over, was prepared.
Satellite image of the day: damaged Russian refinery.
Videos of the day: a drone chasing motorcycles and a dummy used as bait.
The first stages of Operation Vivaldi. Long months of preparations in complete secrecy, followed by a series of steps that proved exceptionally successful thanks to smooth coordination and modern technology, have caused the Russian army a major fiasco in its campaign in eastern Ukraine.
Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi, aimed at pushing back Russian forces around Lyman in Donbas, was long shrouded in uncertainty. A growing number of accounts from within the 3rd Army Corps now show just how exceptional the operation is.
“I can say that this operation may become the most technologically advanced of all those carried out not only during the full-scale war in Ukraine, but anywhere in the world,” Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko told Denník N.
Розкриваємо деталі та масштаби першого сезону «Вівальді» від Третього армійського корпусу.Хто такі «флаговтики» rф і чому для боротьби з ними Трійка створила об’єднаний штаб, який на тактичному рівні координував дії спеціальних і розвідувальних підрозділів у межах єдиного задуму?Про л*квідацію інфільтрованого противника, чого це коштувало ок*пантам і як виглядають 85 км² території, очищеної від в*рога, — мовою мап і фактів Трійки!
The Ukrainian website NV, which spoke to soldiers involved in it, also considers it the most successful offensive operation of 2026.
Russia’s Meduza took a more cautious view, saying that Ukraine’s advance near Lyman is real, but that for now it is more accurate to speak of a series of local successes than a major strategic breakthrough.
In this article, we summarise what is currently known about the operation, which is still under way, and whose name was inspired by Vivaldi’s The Four Seasons, as it is intended to have exactly the same number of stages. The opening stage, involving extensive preparations, has already ended.
The first details were released in mid-September by Andriy Biletskyi, commander of the 3rd Army Corps, and further accounts gradually followed. Officially, Ukrainians spoke of the “clearing” of 75 km² and the deoccupation of 10 km² in the first stage, the loss of around 1,500 soldiers, more than 12,000 drones, and hundreds of armoured vehicles, artillery systems and vehicles.
The elite Russian Rubikon drone unit was also forced to withdraw because of heavy losses.
In the second stage, Ukrainian forces advanced by another 40 km² and took destroyed villages including Shandryholove, Derylove and Drobysheve.
The logistics of Russian forces in this section of the front collapsed and, according to NV, which spoke to Petro Horbatenko, the chief of staff of the 3rd Corps, the supplies of Russian units had to be moved outside Ukraine.
Thanks to this operation, Ukrainians have severely complicated the Russian occupiers’ ability to infiltrate in the Lyman direction. If the Russians intended to use this section of the front to capture the city and advance further towards Sloviansk, that has for now been thwarted.
The fortified belt of cities in Donbas is holding, although the overall situation is extremely difficult and unbearably dangerous for the ordinary residents who remain there.
The 3rd Army Corps published footage of one of its many operations. Once the “anti-drone cover” has been destroyed, the attack begins, along with the destruction of Russian armoured and transport vehicles.
Палають вантажівки, танк і мотоцикли — привіт від СБУ!
Під час операції «Вівальді» Третього армійського корпусу FPV спецпідрозділу «Альфа» СБУ нищили піхоту противника, незважаючи на «антидронові» плащі, які тільки більше привертали увагу.
According to the 3rd Army Corps, unmanned systems units carried out 36,000 strike missions during the first stage of the operation.
Unlike the unsuccessful attempt at a counteroffensive in 2023, when its plans were leaked, Ukrainians this time managed to plan the operation quietly for many months.
“For Russia, this is a catastrophe. It is a huge blow, and we can see that they are currently unable to stabilise the situation. They cannot stop this operation, especially as it has in fact only just begun. This is only the first stage; others will follow. That is why its significance is so crucial,” Kovalenko said.
The first task, he said, was to expand the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ zone of control between the Nitrius and Chornyi Zherebets rivers, both tributaries of the Siverskyi Donets. The salient created by the Russian occupiers between those rivers directly threatened the city of Lyman itself.
“In the long term, if Lyman had been captured, there was also a risk that Russian troops would reach the Siverskyi Donets River and its southern bank. They would then have been able to put pressure on Sloviansk, and above all on the entire Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban area. That is why it was exceptionally important for us to ensure the complete security not only of Lyman itself, but of the entire area,” the analyst from Odesa said.
The second important objective was to cut off Russia’s ability to exert pressure from the south on the range of high ground stretching towards Borova, from Novomykhailivka to Pershotravneve.
“By doing so, we have effectively pushed the Russians back to roughly the positions they held in October and November 2022. It can therefore be said that Russia fought for this section for almost four years, expending enormous human resources, forces and assets, only to be pushed back to its old positions within a few months,” Kovalenko said.
Robots in the leading role. Kovalenko said the operation was also unique because of the new technologies deployed, which show what warfare in the near future could look like.
“Until now, there has been no operation anywhere in the world in which ground robotic systems and drones have formed such a massive component,” Kovalenko said.
According to him, the 3rd Army Corps became the first operational-tactical formation to use a large group of ground robotic systems for demining.
“Within two days, nearly 30 km of roads were demined, mostly at night. Normally, two companies of combat engineers would need around two weeks to clear mines across such an area. All this was completed within 48 hours, mostly at night and without any loss of life, because it was all done by robots,” Kovalenko said.
Later, during counterattacks and offensive operations, robotic systems again formed the vanguard, with drones in some cases dropping them into position.
“Ground robotic systems were equipped with various weapons that enabled them to fire at the enemy. Many of this corps’ procedures and decisions during the offensive were based precisely on the use of these systems,” Kovalenko explained.
“Improvised explosive devices were used to blow up certain buildings where you would not want to send infantry,” Major Akhmet told NV. According to him, a vehicle carrying a kilogram of explosives simply drove up and destroyed the building. Such robots were also used for logistics, evacuation, or intimidation — in the form of a robot fitted with a turret — to deter Russians from advancing further.
According to Kovalenko, the 3rd Army Corps is among the most technologically advanced formations and has the highest proportion of robotic elements in the performance of various tasks. As a result, it was able to restore control over vast areas with minimal losses.
How it was prepared. According to NV sources from within Andriy Biletskyi’s corps, the overall preparations lasted many months, or as long as a year.
Footage of operations during Operation Vivaldi:
As Rodion Kudriashov, deputy commander of the 3rd Army Corps, wrote for Ukrainska Pravda, the situation at the front first had to be stabilised and enemy infiltration stopped.
“This sounds less impressive than the word ‘offensive’, but there can be no offensive without it. It is impossible to plan a complex operation if you do not know where your front line will be tomorrow,” Kudriashov said, adding that the beginning was not actually about moving forward, but about creating the conditions that would make it possible.
In the more interesting part of the operation, according to Dolyna, the commander of Kraken’s unmanned aircraft company, Ukrainians first destroyed logistical support to a depth of 50 km, leaving Russian soldiers on the “zero line” without food, ammunition or fuel.
“It was precisely because of the logistical failure that their drone pilots flew less often,” Dolyna told NV, describing the gradual demoralisation of Russian forces.
At the next stage, Ukrainians struck logistics as far as 120 km behind the lines. “In the enemy’s rear areas, Ukrainian drones systematically attacked and destroyed fuel and ammunition depots, as well as equipment repair bases,” NV wrote of the operations divided among the extensive formation of the 3rd Army Corps.
As Robert G. Rose stressed in his analysis for the Modern War Institute, former defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov had long realised that Ukraine needed to fight deep behind Russian lines because, as he put it: “Russia always operates at operational depth. Russian doctrine is built that way; Russia essentially created this concept.”
According to the analyst, Fedorov therefore favoured the transition to a higher-level corps system, enabling Ukraine to fight in depth and shift from tactical attritional warfare to fighting at the operational level.
A necessary prerequisite before this phase, however, was above all preparation for electronic warfare, which took nine months. Electronic warfare units systematically destroyed both large Russian drones and small reconnaissance drones, effectively “covering the Russians’ eyes”.
“Fortune loves silence,” Sergeant Akhmet told NV, commenting on how they had managed to conceal preparations for such a large-scale operation from the Russians.
At the front, electronic warfare specialists operated continuously, 24 hours a day. One unit member, Barista, described how they destroyed 150 enemy drones over one small area measuring 5 km. With a very limited information footprint, they managed, using drones and electronic warfare, to create confusion among Russian forces, which for a long time did not know what was happening.
After creating an information blackout and destroying logistics, the infantry could move in. During operations, it often found Russians disguised in civilian clothes, while some surrendered on their own because they had neither food nor water.
In war, it is assault units that capture territory, but according to the Ukrainians involved, the conditions for this had been created long beforehand. As Kudriashov, the deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, explained, “an offensive does not begin at the moment infantry receives an order to advance”.
“It begins much earlier: at headquarters, with commanders, in personnel training, logistics, intelligence, unmanned systems, support and dozens of decisions, most of which never make the news.”
According to NV’s findings, the key factor in the success of Operation Vivaldi was ultimately “well-developed interaction between units” — that is, seamless and smooth coordination.
“This was the best cooperation I have had during the war,” Ukrainian soldier Akhmet told the Ukrainian website. “If we spot the enemy somewhere in our zone, I always know that our neighbours will help us. You do not even have to tell them; they will help you. We try to do the same,” he added.
Satellite image of the day
Ukrainians attacked a Russian refinery in Kuibyshev, in Russia’s Samara region, this week. The fire indicated that the attack had been successful. Satellite images published by Radio Svoboda confirmed this. They show that the strikes destroyed five fuel tanks at the refinery. In August, Ukrainians hit a record number of Russian refineries.
💥 Four fuel tanks were destroyed at the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery as a result of a Ukrainian strike on September 22, – Radio Liberty pic.twitter.com/JXzDiqTXD3
When you are riding a motorcycle and a faster drone is chasing you, there are not many options. Either you veer into a ditch, risking death in a crash, or you keep going and the drone catches up with you. This video shows Russian soldiers, each choosing a different path. From the Ukrainian operator’s perspective, it was the best outcome: one drone took out two motorcyclists.
A SIGNUM FPV drone operator takes out two Russian motorcycle assault troops with a single drone.
Chased by the FPV, the first rider apparently panics while trying to evade it, loses control and crashes hard into the roadside. The drone then continues after the second rider and… pic.twitter.com/KUqsZCd2gH
This video shows a dummy in camouflage intended to imitate a soldier. While decoys of military equipment are fairly common in war, the use of such dummies is less widespread. In theory, a drone with a poorer camera could mistake it for a soldier, but it is unclear whether this actually works.
Russian decoy position with a dummy soldier.
Decoy positions themselves are extremely common and widely used. Dummy Russian soldiers have also appeared from occasionally throughout the war, but still do not seem to be nearly as widespread. pic.twitter.com/cblBYVCGGR
By Tuesday (22 September), Russia had verifiably lost 24,138 pieces of heavy equipment (24,098 on Monday, 14 September). Of these, 19,105 (19,065) were destroyed by Ukraine, 1,000 (1,000) were damaged, 1,194 (1,194) were abandoned by their crews, and 2,839 (2,839) were captured by the Ukrainian army. This includes 4,448 (4,447) tanks, of which 3,353 (3,352) were destroyed in combat.
Ukraine lost 12,175 (12,143) pieces of equipment, of which 9,579 (9,551) were destroyed, 702 (698) damaged, 695 (695) abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) captured. This includes 1,464 (1,462) tanks, of which 1,125 (1,120) were destroyed in combat.
Note: Neither side regularly reports its own fatalities or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. This overview uses data from theOryx project, which has compiled a list of exclusively photographically documented equipment losses since the start of the war.
EU governments are deadlocked on how to proceed with a major overhaul to the bloc’s pesticides rules following a sustained pushback from scientists and countries outside the EU.
The revisions to the pesticides regulation form part of a food-and-feed ‘Omnibus’ law proposed by the EU Commission last December and are primarily aimed at reducing bureaucracy for European farmers by making it easier to authorise and use pesticides.
But there are deep divisions among member states about some proposals, particularly the revised thresholds on maximum residue levels of chemicals.
Earlier this week, the Irish EU council presidency abandoned plans to get diplomats to adopt a formal negotiating position on the file.
For their part, a group of more than 500 scientists signed an open letter to the commission on 16 September demanding a pause on the file pending “an independent assessment, whether carried out by parliament’s own research service or by an equivalent independent body.”
“Given the scale of the changes under consideration, and in a broader context in which the scientific community is increasingly called upon to warn of cumulative environmental and health pressures, we believe that responsible policymaking calls for caution rather than speed,” the letter says.
Under the proposal, residue limits for certain pesticides banned in the EU could be lowered to the lowest level laboratories can reliably detect, even when those substances remain legally-used in exporting countries.
In order to avoid leaving any residue on fruits and vegetables, producers would essentially have to stop using the substance in question.
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“It takes years to sanction something that can be replicated in days—so what is the point of sanctions at all?”
This is a question we hear repeatedly in our work at the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) in Ukraine to close gaps in the sanctions regime.
And the frustration behind it is justified: several entities we submitted for designation years ago were added to the EU sanctions list only recently.
Since 2014, the European Union has sanctioned about 3,000 individuals and entities in relation to the war against Ukraine. The US has blacklisted over 7,000.
These lists include, among many others, third-country sanctions-evasion facilitators.
One such network exposed in late 2024 supplied microelectronics and British-made optical equipment later used in Russian military aircraft.
The UK sanctioned it nearly six months later; the EU took almost two years. It is one of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of such cases.
Sanctions take time: authorities must gather evidence, meet legal requirements, and assess their impact. Meanwhile, new companies can replace those under scrutiny, keeping the network running.
The British optics case shows how the main facilitator sourced goods from an alleged Hong Kong supplier of essential oils and confectionery flavourings — at an address shared with several companies already sanctioned for evasion.
(Almost) all roads lead to China
This essential-oils supplier was hardly an isolated curiosity.
It pointed to a wider infrastructure of shared addresses, corporate service providers, and unlikely businesses through which new suppliers can keep appearing as others are sanctioned.
Our study traced roughly 1,800 foreign suppliers and more than $800m [€702m] in trade in priority Western microelectronics—only a fraction of the true scale. Most passed through mainland China and, especially, Hong Kong.
China’s role in sanctions evasion — and the shell companies that help facilitate it — is hardly breaking news. But some suppliers in our dataset run very real businesses in rather unexpected fields.
Fuxin Pharmaceutical makes medicines and agrochemicals — and trades in Western microelectronics. Taibung Piping Equipment sells steel fittings for energy and petrochemical systems, alongside integrated circuits, semiconductors, and power electronics.
Shenzhen NuanQin Technology took things further.
It advertised “smart sex toys” but shipped to Russia no “Leopard Print Beginner’s Floggers” or “OMG! Feather Ticklers”.
Customs records show industrial electronics, integrated circuits, and other dual-use components instead.
Its corporate footprint is equally eclectic: NuanQin is also linked to an FPV drone retailer.
Many others have generic names, no websites, and almost no public footprint.
To a Western dual-use manufacturer, they may look like small retailers or freight forwarders — unremarkable enough to pass conventional sanctions screening and keep trading.
Shared addresses are a red flag
Their addresses can reveal what company-by-company screening misses. Sharing one with a sanctioned firm does not warrant automatic designation, but it is a strong signal of diversion risk.
The numbers speak for themselves.
One Hong Kong office unit housed at least 45 companies, with perhaps 20 more: 14 under sanctions or export controls, and 31 unrestricted. Together, they supplied Russia with over $16m in priority microelectronics—within our dataset alone.
Other obscure suppliers lead businesses to claim they sell hats, salon equipment, or even offer immigration services.
Such links may be unsurprising in a world of virtual offices and corporate service providers, but a simple sanctions check misses them, even as tens of millions of dollars in trade pass through.
Beyond the shopfront
Offshore links recur throughout the data. We found 33 addresses associated with offshore structures and used by 66 suppliers, fewer than half of them restricted. Together, those suppliers accounted for over $57m in shipments to Russia, including $26m from unrestricted firms.
A shared office in the British Virgin Islands or Seychelles may raise an obvious red flag. Other connections are much harder to spot.
Take another Hong Kong supplier linked to millions of electronics and microelectronics supplies to Russia. Its ordinary-looking office address has also been used by offshore service providers and operators of tankers linked to Russia’s shadow fleet.
A shared address does not prove a coordinated network, but it points to corporate infrastructure serving both chip procurement and oil-sanctions evasion.
An even more striking case leads to Liu Baoxia. The United States sanctioned her in 2017, and the FBI placed her on its wanted list in 2025. Her network smuggled US electronics to Iran for its missile and drone programmes through Hong Kong front companies in the Ho King Commercial Center.
NAKO identified at least 14 companies supplying microelectronics to Russia from those same offices. Only five have been sanctioned.
Follow the address, not the company
Every company in our dataset, sanctioned or not, supplied Russia with priority microelectronics. We found more than 200 addresses linked to restricted entities. Over 450 suppliers used them, accounting for nearly $380m in trade.
Since 2024, the US Bureau of Industry and Security has listed high-risk addresses alongside company names.
Yet address-based screening remains limited, especially outside the United States. The Common High Priority List shows that governments can agree on shared diversion risks.
They should now do the same for addresses, particularly as Russian and Iranian procurement networks appear to use overlapping corporate infrastructure.
A shared list would help governments and manufacturers scrutinise replacement companies before each requires a separate investigation.
An address does not make every tenant guilty by association. But it should stop an ostensibly clean supplier from getting an automatic green light. Sanctions target companies; evasion networks reuse the infrastructure behind them.
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