If the day should ever come where Islamophobia gets concrete legal backing in Europe, it could be soon.
The European Parliament (EP) just voted to “condemn the strategies of Islamist entryism” and to develop ways to disrupt Muslim political movements in a resolution on 8 October.
Some 381 out of 720 MEPs worry Muslims are seeking to infiltrate democratic institutions, weaken European rule of law, gender equality, and what they deemed “European values”.
And almost every one of the centre-right and rightwing MEPs in the house voted to surveil EU funding for anti-racism organisations, so as to ensure none of it gets into the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The brotherhood is a transnational Muslim group founded in 1928 in Egypt, involved in religious revival, social welfare, and political activism.
But according to a French government memo from May 2025, as well as the EP resolution, it is guilty of “entryism”, to sabotage French democracy.
The EP resolution and French memo were dubbed “a political witch-hunt targeting racialised people – particularly Muslim, migrant and refugee communities” by academics and civil society, like the European Network Against Racism (ENAR).
The group called the EP motion “a stain” on the EU Parliament, belonging “within the tradition of discredited far-right conspiracy theories.”
ENAR is among those the EU has sought to defund, due to rightwing views that its work aligns with Islamist threats.
The Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO), a pan-European anti-Islamophobic group, which also risks EU defunding, said it had faced “relentless targeting and demonisation.”
Young Muslims in Europe were being forced “to choose between their identity and their right to belong,” FEMYSO president Hiba Latreche told EUobserver.
And the EP “witch-hunt” resolution, which was drafted by the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) group and authored by its French MEP, Céline Imart, comes at a bad time for this demographic.
Advocacy group Collective Against Islamophobia in Europe (CCIE) recently looked at 876 incidents of anti-Muslim hatred in Europe in 2025.
Four out of five incidents targeted Muslim women, 41 percent of which involved discrimination or violence linked to their headscarves.
Disturbingly, the documented episodes “occur predominantly in public or institutional spaces, highlighting the persistence of forms of institutional racism.”
But seeing as the EU Commission’s own anti-Muslim hatred group has been inactive since 2024, the prevailing view in Brussels appears to be that rampant Islamophobia in the EU is less of a problem than the imputed influence of a nebulous Islamic movement from Egypt, which is better known for providing social care to deprived communities, than aiming to overthrow French president Emmanuel Macron.
The EP motion did not legally bind the European Commission to propose new anti-Muslim Brotherhood measures.
But it did enforce a stereotype of Muslims “as acting in a nefarious, dangerous, anti-democratic manner, until proven otherwise,” said Omran Shroufi, a political science researcher at the Free University of Brussels.
Rightwing EU politics is pushing young European Muslims into a lose-lose, or Catch 22 situation.
The notion of “entryism holds Muslims to an impossible standard, where non-participation in public life is a sign of disinterestedness, a lack of civic duty and the growth of parallel societies, whilst active engagement in civic life is treated with suspicion,” Shroufi told EUobserver.
The centre-right EPP group used to represent a moderate EU mainstream.
But now it had joined with open racists on Europe’s far right to be “effectively calling for an institutionalised form of discrimination, where Muslim communities need to prove their European and democratic values – whatever these are supposed to mean – before being allowed a seat at a table,” Shroufi said.
Almost half of workers helping families care for children, older people, and people with disabilities, who provide vital domestic support in Europe, have considered quitting due to low pay and bad working conditions, a labour-union report found on Tuesday (13 October).
The 2026 personal and household services (PHS) employment monitor drew on more than 8,000 responses from workers, service users, and employers in 36 countries.
Around one in four respondents worked between 35 and 40 hours per week.
Meanwhile, six in 10 workers reported work-related musculoskeletal disorders, including back pain and tendon inflammation.
One in four also said they had experienced or witnessed verbal abuse, while nearly 15 percent had experienced either sexual harassment, physical, and/or sexual violence.
Care poviders’ mental health is impacted, with around six out of 10 reporting sleeping issues.
But these same workers play “an essential role in providing a dignified life for everybody in our ageing European societies,” Oliver Roethig, regional secretary of UNI Europa said in a statement.
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Russia is estimated to be recruiting 10 percent fewer soldiers this year than last, despite regions raising signing bonuses.
There is growing talk that criminal gangs have begun to take part in recruiting “volunteers”.
According to the Ukrainians, Russia is losing large numbers of soldiers, and October could be a record month.
Attacks on the land route to Crimea continue, reportedly prompting Russia to transport fuel in jerry cans in smaller vehicles.
Map of the day: Where Russia is advancing and where Ukraine is advancing
Videos of the day: Ukrainians hit a Russian radar; a man surfed on a Russian drone near Odesa; speculation spreads that Iran is supplying Russia with fuel.
Many Russians have left Russia in recent months. They feared the mobilisation that had been so widely discussed. Ukrainians said Russian president Vladimir Putin might resort to it after the September parliamentary elections. Many Russians fled to Armenia and Georgia, affecting rental prices in the capitals of these Caucasus states.
So far, no mobilisation has taken place. Russia continues to rely on its existing system of voluntary — and, in some places, involuntary — recruitment of new soldiers in Russian regions.
German economist Janis Kluge, who tracks regional data, wrote last week that Russia recruits around 1,000 new soldiers a day (30,000 a month). That is less than last year — down six percent in September and 10 percent over the year as a whole.
Nor did it help that, by his estimate, the sum paid by regions as a signing bonus had risen from $16,000 (€14,000) to $22,000.
In some places, recruitment is also beginning to move into the illegal sphere. Kluge wrote that local criminal gangs were now becoming involved in the system.
He mentioned the case of a prosecutor in Nizhny Tagil, a city of 400,000 in the Urals. In September, he appealed to the budget committee of the local duma.
He complained that signing bonuses for Russian soldiers were leading to an increase in crime in the city. He called for payments to agents who find volunteers willing to sign an army contract to be stopped.
According to Kluge, the prosecutor complained that criminal elements had become involved in recruitment in the city. He said an agent received $4,500 for finding one person to sign a contract.
Many turned to gangs to help them, with the assistance of corrupt police officers or military recruiters who are part of the scheme. “And this ‘persuasion’ may also involve violence, as another case from Sverdlovsk region shows: two criminals forced their victims to sign contracts and then seized their bonus payments,” Kluge wrote.
In Nizhny Tagil, 580 new soldiers were recruited last year, compared with 330 this year. It is not known how many of them criminal gangs helped to “persuade” in exchange for payment. In any case, the city does not want to change its system of rewards for agents because, in the words of the deputy mayor, it helps “fulfil our tasks”.
Overall, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Russia to supply enough manpower to the front. Moreover, it is currently losing large numbers of soldiers there, and October’s losses could even be record-breaking.
Ukraine publishes daily figures for killed and wounded Russian soldiers. These figures cannot be verified and may be inflated, but the trend suggests that the situation is worsening for Russia.
The table below also shows this. According to it, Russia lost around 46,000 soldiers in September — more than 1,500 a day — making it, according to Ukrainian data, the second-worst month since the start of the war. The figure was higher only in December 2024.
This October is on course to become Russia’s worst month in this respect. By the 12th day of the month, Russia had been losing an average of 1,620 soldiers per day. If Ukraine maintains this pace, it will be a record.
Number of Russian military casualties per month, according to Ukraine. Source: minfin.com.ua
Naturally, the question is how much these figures can be trusted. However, the Unmanned Systems Forces, a unit commanded by Robert Brovdi, known as Magyar, also publish figures for killed and wounded Russian soldiers.
The Ukrainian units under its command compete with one another over which can strike more Russian targets. They receive points based on this, which they can then use to buy more drones. Individual strikes should therefore be confirmed by video.
Given this, the data published by the Unmanned Systems Forces can be considered credible. They too indicate that October could be a record month, although their data cover only one-third of Russia’s total losses.
Number of Russian soldiers killed and wounded by SBS drones
The total number of Russian soldiers hit by Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS), and the number of those killed. These figures should be verified by video evidence. Red: killed; Orange: wounded; Pink: expected killed; Yellow: expected wounded. Source: Datawrapper/SBS.
Record-high losses and less substantial numbers of newly recruited soldiers suggest that Russia may have difficulties replenishing its units and, consequently, advancing further in Donbas or elsewhere.
Attacks on the land route to Crimea continue. Last week, French OSINT analyst Clément Molin published a table according to which the number of Russian lorries and trucks struck had reached a record 770. Several videos show that the number of attacks on vehicles heading to Crimea or to the front in southern Ukraine remains high. They are simply not discussed as much because this is no longer new.
I continue, on my side, to gather statistics on these mid-range strikes against logistics, not only in southern Ukraine, but also near Donetsk or Luhansk.
In September, at least 770 trucks/vehicles were targeted, only on the videos published by Ukraine more than 20km from the… pic.twitter.com/w9DrQTnGEM
Ukraine also destroyed the Chonhar bridge, which connects Ukraine with the Crimean peninsula. Russia has used a pontoon bridge there instead. This video shows Russian cargo vehicles crossing the pontoon bridge.
Russian truck drivers crossing into Crimea via a pontoon crossing at Chonhar, with a view of the damaged Chonhar Bridge and its support structures, before one of its spans collapsed. September 2026. https://t.co/YLDiB7lJQupic.twitter.com/3oU4GVylDd
The commander of Ukraine’s 41st Pilum Unmanned Systems Regiment, part of the 1st Azov Corps, recently provided interesting information on this issue. In an interview with Radio NV, he confirmed that the number of medium-range strikes was not declining and was increasing in some areas.
He said that the operational zone overseen by Ukraine extended from 30 to 300 km.
According to him, Russia is trying to bring as much fuel as possible to the front. Soldiers need generators to charge equipment, power radios and drones, and keep warm.
However, Ukrainian attacks on fuel tankers are reducing Russia’s ability to bring fuel to the front. According to the commander, in the Dobropillia direction, where his unit operates, Russia began transporting fuel in convoys this summer and switched to distributing it in passenger cars or small trucks, carrying the fuel in jerry cans.
This does not, of course, apply to all directions. However, an ongoing stream of new videos also confirms the destruction of fuel tankers.
Map of the day
Russian president Vladimir Putin’s latest — though certainly not final — deadline for capturing Donbas is by the end of this year. As on 14 previous occasions, it will not be met.
Unlike in previous years, however, it appears entirely possible that by the end of the year the territory of the free part of Donetsk region could be even larger than it is now. This is suggested by a map published by French OSINT analyst Clément Molin. It highlights areas where Ukraine is advancing and areas where Russia is pushing forward.
As can be seen, Russian forces largely hold the initiative in the north of Kharkiv region and at one location in the south of Zaporizhzhia region.
In the crucial Donetsk region, however, the situation is balanced; indeed, it could be said that Ukraine holds the initiative in more places. More specifically, it is clearing the northern area above Lyman and pushing further south towards Velyka Novosilka.
Ukraine’s 15th Reconnaissance Artillery Brigade published a video showing it striking a Russian 96L6 radar. This is a key component of the S-300 and S-400 air-defence systems.
The radar can be seen moving and hiding in a tree line. Nevertheless, a Ukrainian drone struck it. It is unclear whether it was actually destroyed, as the accompanying text claims.
Ukraine’s 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Brigade “Black Forest” located and destroyed a Russian 96L6 radar, a key detection component used with S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. The radar is valued at around $50 million and has a stated detection range of up to 300 km. #Ukrainepic.twitter.com/1K4BUZXZrg
A man near Odesa decided to surf on a downed Russian drone floating on the water off the coast. It hardly needs to be said that this is a fairly risky pastime. However, it indicates how at least some residents of Odesa view the daily Russian attacks.
❗️In 🇺🇦Odesa, a man decided to go surfing on a downed Russian kamikaze drone “Geran”. pic.twitter.com/l3MG3YkQiz
This could be a potentially rather interesting plot twist. The United States is at war with Iran, which has raised petrol and diesel prices at US filling stations. Donald Trump therefore agreed with Putin to import diesel from Russia. Russia itself, however, does not have enough diesel and has to import it.
This video shows a tanker truck with Iranian registration plates in Russia. Some infer from this that Iran is importing diesel — or other fuels — into Russia, which then sends diesel to America, despite America being at war with Iran.
However, it is too early to draw conclusions: we do not know what is in the truck or how many such Iranian tankers are heading to Russia. In any case, Russia is helping Iran in other ways.
A Western official told Bloomberg that Russia was supplying Iran with missiles that it uses in the war against the US and Israel. It was also previously reported that Russia was helping Iran target US bases in the region.
⚡️BREAKING: Convoys carrying Iranian Diesel Fuel are on their way to Russia, where there is a Fuel Shortage
This also raises the question of whether the fuel Russia exports to the United States might originate from Iran pic.twitter.com/J9Fzk7LVDa
By Tuesday (13 October), Russia had verifiably lost 24,192 pieces of heavy equipment (24,170 on Monday, 5 October). Of these, 19,155 (19,133) were destroyed by Ukraine, 1,002 (1,003) damaged, 1,194 (1,194) abandoned by their crews, and 2,841 (2,840) captured by the Ukrainian army. The total includes 4,453 (4,452) tanks, of which 3,358 (3,357) were destroyed in combat.
Ukraine lost 12,259 (12,238) pieces of equipment, of which 9,652 (9,633) were destroyed, 713 (711) damaged, 695 (695) abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) captured. The total includes 1,471 (1,466) tanks, of which 1,131 (1,126) were destroyed in combat.
Note: Neither side regularly reports its dead or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. This overview uses data from the Oryx project, which has compiled a list of equipment losses documented exclusively by photographs since the start of the war.
The European Commission is promising more support to Egypt, even as Egyptian warplanes reportedly bomb in Sudan and authorities carry out a campaign of violence against the refugees it hosts.
The civil war in Sudan includes reports of genocide, chemical-weapons use, mass rape, and starvation, forcing some 1.2 million Sudanese people into Egypt, which was described as a priority migration-busting partner by commission president Ursula von der Leyen on Tuesday (13 October), who also promised continuing support for Cairo.
In a letter sent to the 27 heads of state and government ahead of an EU summit on Thursday in Brussels, she spoke of “offering protection and durable solutions in … host countries”, as well as further aid for Sudanese people who had returned to parts of the country, now deemed relatively safe.
But her warm words stand in sharp contrast to internal EU documents on Sudan, released by the London-based group Statewatch earlier this month, and which speak of an Egyptian-led campaign of violence against the Sudanese it is tasked to help.
“The Egyptian authorities have continued arbitrary arrests, detention and deportation campaign against migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, with a sharp escalation of forced deportations being observed since January 2026,” said the Irish EU presidency, in an internal document written in September.
Estimates suggest Egypt hosts over nine million migrants and refugees.
Some 80 percent are Sudanese, Syrian, Yemeni, and Libyan nationals. Of those, just over 1 million are officially registered as refugees. Most come from Sudan.
And Egypt’s crackdown also comes amid a massive 74 percent funding cut for the UN’s refugee agency in the country, even as the EU’s financial support to Cairo increases, already totalling €5bn.
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Britain is expected to push for a new post-Brexit trade deal and increased information-sharing on immigration at a UK-EU summit in Brussels next month.
This comes as Andy Burnham, the country’s prime minister, says the post-Brexit “status quo is not good enough for Britain”, in a hint that he might seek to rejoin the European Union.
And, more than a decade after the Brexit vote, he also accused Russia of having meddled in the 2016 British referendum.
The UK leader will meet European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and European Council president António Costa in Brussels on 20 November.
And Costa has also said that European and British security and prosperity are “closely intertwined”, while a closer relationship could “promote stability in Europe and beyond”.
Made in Europe and immigration
The November summit will be an opportunity to “raise concerns” about ‘Made in Europe,’ Burnham told members of UK MPs on Monday (12 October).
The ‘Made in Europe’ proposal in the Industrial Accelerator Act would require companies to source a certain number of parts from within the EU to be eligible for public money in strategic sectors.
But UK officials are worried the law could hurt British manufacturers, with Burnham expected to seek concessions.
But the British premier also wants to go further in renegotiating his country’s ties with the EU.
“On the table is a trade deal on food and drink products, a deal on emissions trading, progress towards linking our energy systems, a new youth experience scheme, and deeper cooperation on immigration,” he said.
Burnham aims to address an EU import ban on UK meat, seed potatoes, and shellfish and wants to reduce costs for shipping other goods to mainland Europe.
He also hopes for closer work between European and UK border forces on immigration.
“On immigration, we could link up our law enforcement efforts once again [since brexit], sharing more data and criminal records of foreign nationals,” Burnham said.
He may aim to rejoin the Schengen Information System, a database for border management and law enforcement cooperation in Europe.
And he could also pursue greater freedoms for UK citizens to live in the 27 member states.
“It would be a major dereliction of duty to turn away [from the EU]” the UK leader told parliament.
10 years on from Brexit vote
The last EU-UK summit, held in London in 2025, was already branded as a reset in relations across the English channel, with a new defence and security partnership, reciprocal access to fishing waters, and expansion of student exchanges.
And leaders are expected to build on the previous agreements by discussing defence, energy, and climate, as well as trade and migration, at their meeting next month.
But under the terms of the EU and UK’s legal divorce in 2020, the two sides remain bound by complex limitations.
And Burnham told MPs on Monday that renegotiating Britain’s relations with the EU could add over £10bn (€11.8bn) per year to the UK economy by 2040, “with the potential to add significantly more,” even if it did not rejoin.
Russian meddling?
Burnham also told a podcast on 11 October that Russia had meddled in the country’s Brexit vote 10 years ago.
Upon assuming office in July, Burnham asked officials if there had been Russian interference in the 2016 referendum, he told The Rest is Politics, and officials gave him a “clear answer that yes, there was.”
“We haven’t informed people [the general public] sufficiently,” he added, amid similar Russian electoral interference in France, Germany, and further afield in Europe.
For his part, British foreign secretary Stephen Doughty subsequently told the LBC broadcaster: “I don’t think [Russia] succeeded in their efforts to undermine our election”.
And Burnham also rowed back in the parliament debate on Monday when pressed by opposition MPs, by saying the outcome of the Brexit vote remained legitimate.
But he added that Russia’s meddling in the UK’s 2019 general election was a matter of record and that it was “inconceivable that this was the first time”.
Appetite for EU re-entry
Burnham also dropped hints on Monday that Britain could rejoin the European Union.
“One thing I think is true is that public opinion has moved more quickly than political opinion. I think the political class is behind the public on this issue,” he said.
“At every stage, the British public will be the boss,” he added, while promising a “pragmatic approach” to the hot-button issue, which has the potential to enflame right-wing anger in England.
“We need to draw a line on a decade of drift and division [from Europe],” he said.
But questions of a holding second referendum were “jumping ahead too far” according to Burnham.
The Westminster debate came after YouGov polling commissioned by Best for Britain, a pro-EU lobby group, indicated that pushing for closer EU ties would be politically advantageous for Burnham’s ruling Labour party.
The organisation also claimed Britain could reenter the union within five years.
Brexit was “not a sacred cow”, said Emily Thornberry, a fellow Labour MP, on Monday.
Sandro Gozi, an Italian liberal MEP and chair of the UK-EU parliamentary partnership assembly, also said in a statement: “As a former member, and with much of the regulatory framework already in place, I personally do not see any serious reason why an application from the UK would not be achievable.”
“When countries are already closely aligned to EU rules, such as was the case for Sweden and Finland, the process for accession is faster than for applicants essentially starting from scratch,” he said.
Centre-left MEPs are trying to convince the European Commission to withdraw its proposal to pause EU methane rules, if parliament or member states try to delay them for more than one year.
Last week, energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen announced that the commission would propose delaying the import rules, due to kick in on 1 January 2027, by a year, following months of pressure from member states, the White House, and oil and gas companies.
But in a letter sent on Monday (12 October) to commission president Ursula von der Leyen and three of her commissioners, five Socialists and Democrats (S&D) MEPs said any postponement must be “strictly limited to a single year.”
The letter, seen by EUobserver, was signed by S&D vice-president Mohammed Chahim, Tiemo Wölken, Jens Geier, Günther Sidl, and Thomas Pellerin-Carlin.
If parliament or member states try to push for a longer delay, the commission should “make full use of its right to withdraw the proposal,” they wrote, “as such changes would distort its purpose.”
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“I’m okay.” That was the last message I sent my mother before an Israeli strike hit us, a group of seven journalists reporting in southern Lebanon.
Three years ago, on 13 October 2023, my colleague Dylan Collins and I headed to the southern border of Lebanon to cover the situation following cross-border shelling between Israeli forces and Hezbollah. We spent the morning filming UN peacekeeping force patrols along the blue line dividing Lebanon and Israel. The atmosphere was calm and nothing suggested that the day was about to change and upend our lives. We went to a coffee shop near a UN post where journalists from different outlets had gathered and there we met our friend and Reuters colleague Issam Abdallah.
Around 4:50PM, we heard a bombardment in a nearby town so we moved to an exposed hill in Alma Al-Shaab, where Al-Jazeera journalists Carmen Joukhadar and Elie Brakhya were positioned. Together with colleagues from Reuters, we were a group of seven journalists, all wearing press vests, reporting next to a car marked “TV”. We were clearly identifiable as press and spent about an hour filming while an Israeli drone hovered above us. At 5:57 I finished filing my photos and sent a message to my mother to tell her I was okay. Seconds later, I found myself on the ground, bleeding and screaming for help. Dylan rushed over with a tourniquet, but before he even had the time to put it, another strike hit.
Everyone disappeared and I was left alone, unable to move and the heat of the flames creeping closer to my face. I was terrified of burning alive, so I started crawling away with the camera still hanging from my neck and its strap tightening around my neck with every move. Two weeks later, I woke up from an induced coma with one leg missing, the other severely damaged, and Issam dead.
Not an isolated attack
What followed was as horrific and brutal as the attack itself and it didn’t stop there. What happened to us was not an isolated incident — for three years I watched journalists being killed in Lebanon and Gaza by Israeli forces in ways that felt painfully familiar.
In October 2024, Israeli forces struck a compound in Hasbaya where journalists were staying and killed media workers Ghassan Najjar, Mohammed Reda and Wissam Kassem, while they slept.
Human Rights Watch found no evidence of military activity at the site and concluded that the strike was deliberate and should be investigated as war crime.
Then in April 2026, journalist Amal Khalil was killed in southern Lebanon after an Israeli strike hit the building where she had taken shelter with her colleague Zainab Faraj, leaving both women trapped under the rubble. Investigations found that Israeli forces repeatedly obstructed rescue efforts.
Since our attack, dozens of journalists have been killed in Lebanon, and nearly 200 journalists have been killed in Gaza by Israeli forces.
Many have been mired by Israel with the same false allegations that they were “terrorists.” The dead can’t defend themselves against such accusations, but I survived and I can speak about what happened to us.
In June 2026 in an interview on France 2, Israel’s ambassador to France described the 13 October attack as a “mistake” saying that we were not targeted because we were journalists, but because Israeli forces had mistaken us for “terrorists.” The evidence tells a different story.
Five independent investigations by Agence France-Presse, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Reuters, and UNIFIL found no indication of fighters or military activity at the site, and no cross-border exchange of fire for more than 40 minutes before we were struck with a 120mm tank shell.
These investigations matter because they establish with certainty evidence beyond my own personal account.
What remains unanswered is who gave the order, who fired the double-tap strike, and why no one has been held accountable. These are basic questions that can be answered by Israel if they were sought by EU member states.
Three years on, Issam’s family and the survivors of this attack deserve to know: Who gave the order?
Evidence alone cannot deliver justice, someone must be willing to act on it. In the face of this attack, including the targeting of four of its own citizens on Lebanese soil, the Lebanese government has failed us.
Neither Lebanon nor Israel are party to the Rome Statute, meaning that the International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for the attack.
In 2024, Lebanon approved a special declaration that would have allowed the Court to investigate war crimes committed after 7 October 2023, only to later reverse its decision for political reasons.
And now, making our legal path even more complicated, in June 2026 Lebanon signed a new framework agreement with Israel whereby Clause 13 commits both sides to cease “all hostile and adverse actions in international and legal fora.”
EU urged to act
I have no hope left that we will ever get justice for what we lost, but I will not rest before I know the names and faces of those responsible.
Our case is the most documented instance of Israeli forces targeting the press on record. The October 13 targeted attack was perpetrated by Israeli forces on a group of journalists clearly identifiable as press.
If we cannot get answers in the face of such overwhelming evidence, what does it mean for the hundreds of journalists killed by Israeli fire throughout the region for which there is no such evidence?
This is where the European Union must act. The EU has repeatedly said that journalists must not be attacked and that violations of international law must be met with accountability. Today, we demand actions not just words and statements. The EU must demand that Israel provide a full account of the 13 October attack, including who ordered, authorized and carried out the strikes.
For me, this is not an abstract question of foreign policy. Issam was my friend. I survived that attack with one leg missing. I know what it means when the people responsible for an attack are allowed to remain unnamed and unaccountable.
I am asking the EU not simply to stand with journalists in words, but to stand with us in action.
The EU has political, diplomatic, and legal leverage. It should use it. If Israel refuses to fully explain what occurred and disclose those responsible for killing and maiming journalists who were visibly identifiable as press, EU member states should use every available mechanism to pursue accountability, including further targeted sanctions or suspending trade with Israel.
I refuse to believe that a military with advanced surveillance could have simply mistaken us for fighters and attacked us in a double-tap strike, a tactic repeatedly used by Israel in this war. But, if that’s truly what happened, then Israel must still answer for how such incompetence and failure was possible.
For now, justice evades us, but the truth of who gave the order is within reach and we must demand it.
EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.
Find the full transcript below:
The United States has imposed new sanctions on the International Criminal Court, this time targeting the institution itself. While the EU insists on its firm support for the ICC, it is still not using the one tool designed for this kind of situation: the blocking statute.
So, why is the EU holding back? First, a quick reminder of what we’re talking about. The International Criminal Court, or ICC, is based in The Hague. It tries people accused of the gravest crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
With one important limit: It can act when a crime is committed on the territory of a state that is party to the Rome Statute, or by one of that state’s nationals. The United States is not a party. Neither is Israel or Russia.
And Washington’s goal is clear: dismantling the court. The Trump administration considers it politicised and without legitimacy.
It is particularly opposed to the arrest warrant against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That’s why, since 2025, the US has imposed several rounds of sanctions, targeting judges and, more recently, the court’s president, the Japanese national, Tomoko Akane.
On Friday, Washington went a step further, targeting the court as an institution.
So what does that mean in practice? All of the court’s assets in the United States are frozen. And, crucially, American companies and citizens can no longer provide services to the court or its members.
You might remember the case of the ICC judge Nicolas Guillou, who has been under sanctions for some time. We’ve talked about him in a previous Briefed episode.
He has explained that he can no longer use basic services such as Mastercard, or online platforms like Airbnb. He has also been warning that these sanctions are meant to intimidate, and that they undermine judges’ independence.
In a state governed by the rule of law, judges must not be put under pressure. This explains why the court’s reaction is so strong. It speaks of an obstruction of justice and an attack on the rule of law. And it is now calling on its members to take concrete action to protect its independence.
In response, the European Commission and the European Council have expressed their support for the court and its work. But without going too far.
They say the EU is ready to take measures so that the court can keep functioning. Yet when the Commission is asked what those measures are, and this has happened several times in recent months, it sidesteps the question.
Because beyond negotiations and diplomatic pressure, there is a tool created for precisely this kind of situation: the so-called blocking statute. It protects Europeans against the extraterritorial reach of sanctions imposed by third countries.
It doesn’t concern American actors. It concerns European companies and individuals who, under the threat of secondary sanctions, may become overly cautious.
In the case of the ICC, it’s about the court’s European banks, insurers and service providers.
Several European countries have called for the blocking statute to be activated. Yesterday, at the Foreign affairs council in Luxembourg, the Belgian and Dutch ministers asked the Commission to start analysing whether to do so.
But for now, they are still waiting for an answer. The Commission believes the priority is to use the six months before the sanctions take effect to negotiate with Washington, possibly to get them withdrawn.
This approach was backed by several EU foreign ministers yesterday. Let’s see whether that window for dialogue is enough, or whether the pressure to activate the blocking statute keeps growing.
More than half of Europeans believe hens should no longer be caged, according to new data released on Tuesday (13 October).
And 75 percent of Europeans wanted the last hen in the EU out of its cage by 2035 at the latest, according to a poll conducted by Savanta on behalf of Humánny pokrok, an animal rights non-profit.
Pollsters asked 25,080 adults across 25 member states for their views on keeping hens in cages.
The results show that 16 percent of people were not sure when or if putting hens in cages should be banned, while 7 percent of Europeans supported hen-caging until at least 2045.
The survey comes five years after 1.4 million citizens signed the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) to ‘End the Cage Age’ and the European Parliament voted to endorse it.
‘Now is the time’
“This data shows millions of Europeans care about animal welfare,” said Barry Andrews, an Irish Renew MEP.
“Over 1.4 million signed the ECI, which was also supported by MEPs. Now is the time for the Commission to finally make a legislative proposal,” he added.
The delay in tabling legislation came after Copa Cogeca, a farming lobby group, insisted that banning hen cages could take up to 15 years.
But the new data says 52 percent of Europeans wish a hen cage ban was already in place.
The country most supportive of a hen cage ban was Austria, where 65 percent of people believed the last hen should have already left its cage, and 2 percent said cages for hens should never be banned.
Thomas Waitz, an Austrian Greens-group MEP, said an EU ban on animal cages is “long overdue” and urged Olivér Várhelyi, commissioner for health and animal welfare, to deliver an “ambitious timeline”.
“This long period of indecision is not just an affront to the European consumers who want better Animal Welfare, it also harms European farmers and producers who need reliable information for their investments,” Waitz said.
In Bulgaria, the member state which polled as least supportive, 33 percent of people believed the last hen should have already left its cage whereas 9 percent said cages should never be banned.
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On 15 September, the European Commission proposed a Skills Portability Act, a regulation designed to make qualifications digital, comparable, and easier to recognise across borders. It forms part of the Fair Labour Mobility Package and must still be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council before any of its measures can take effect.
It is a welcome step. But it leaves open a question that deserves more attention in Brussels: what happens to the skills young people develop every day but their diplomas and CVs do not capture?
Communication, teamwork, critical thinking, adaptability and resilience shape how people work with others and keep learning throughout their careers. Employers say they need these skills. According to the Commission’s 2023 Flash Eurobarometer, 74 percent of small and medium-sized enterprises reported shortages affecting at least one job role. Meanwhile, Eurostat found that in 2024 only 56.4 percent of people aged 15–34 in the EU with medium or high educational attainment reported a high or very high match between their field of education and the requirements of their current or last main job.
These figures measure different things and should not be read as pointing to a single cause. Together, though, they show that having qualified people and having the right capabilities in the right place are not the same thing. Young people build those capabilities in classrooms, vocational training, volunteering, creative projects and first jobs. Yet they struggle to show them in a form that an employer, particularly one in another country, understands and trusts.
The stakes are not abstract. In 2025, 11 percent of Europeans aged 15–29 were neither in employment nor in education or training. Skills recognition cannot resolve that on its own, but stronger links between learning and work are part of the answer.
In effect, we are asking young Europeans to cross borders with incomplete passports.
This is where micro-credentials can make a difference if they are built with credibility in mind. JA Europe coordinates EMPASS (Employment Skills Pass), an Erasmus+ Forward-Looking Project co-funded by the European Union. It brings together education providers, industry partners and Junior Achievement organisations to develop and validate an employability micro-credential covering 11 employability skills, from communication and teamwork to resilience and critical thinking.
The micro-credential was designed to be piloted with 1,500 students in Greece, Romania and Spain. According to the project’s latest monitoring figures, 2,700 young people now hold an EmPass certificate.
Beyond the pilot, the EMPASS approach is already demonstrating potential for wider uptake. The methodology has informed implementation and exploration activities in other countries, including Ukraine and Lithuania, and has been incorporated into wider youth employability initiatives such as the Global Alliance for Youth mentoring programme. This suggests that employability micro-credentials can be integrated into different learning and workforce-development contexts while maintaining a common framework for skills recognition.
A micro-credential does not replace a diploma, and no single certificate can capture everything a person brings to a job. Its value lies in complementing formal qualifications with clearer, validated evidence of what someone can do. The aim should not be another certificate that employers overlook.
Europe does not need more initiatives that show promise but struggle to reach scale. It needs bridges: between education and employment, between national systems, and policy ambition and lived experience. That means asking practical questions. Can a young person show the same verified capabilities to employers in different countries? Can employers see what microcredential assesses and how it was validated? Can schools and universities build it into existing pathways without adding administrative burden?
The answers will decide whether skills portability becomes opportunity or remains a policy ambition. They are also the focus of From Skills to Opportunity, a JA Europe forum in Brussels on 14 October, bringing together policymakers, employers, educators and youth organisations, including speakers from the European Commission, the World Employment Confederation and the European Vocational Training Association.
As the Skills Portability Act moves through parliament and council, Europe has a chance to put employability skills into the conversation from the start: not only how qualifications are recognised, but how capabilities developed through formal, non-formal and experiential learning can carry meaning across borders.
Employability skills are not an abstract policy debate. They are part of the foundation for participation, mobility, and opportunity in Europe’s labour market. The task now is to ensure that every young person carries a passport that employers recognise, wherever their learning and career take them.
Co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are, however, those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
EMPASS (Employment Skills Pass) is an Erasmus+ Forward-Looking Project, project no. 101132916.
Media contact: Irina Ilieva, Head of Marketing, Communications and Policy, JA Europe · irina@jaeurope.org · JA Europe aisbl, Victor Oudart 7, 1030 Brussels, Belgium
More than a third of people who receive warnings of disasters are unable to act before they strike, according to a global poll. Social resilience has fallen also in Poland, Greece, and France.
The findings, published by the Lloyd’s Register Foundation on Tuesday (13 October), drew on more than 143,000 interviews conducted by Gallup across 140 countries in 2025.
They show that an estimated 1.1 billion people – one in five adults worldwide – experienced a disaster in the previous five years.
Almost 220 million received no warning at all.
“A warning is only as good as what people are able to do with it,” said Nancy Hey, director of evidence and insight at Lloyd’s Register Foundation’s Global Safety Evidence Centre.
The gap between being warned and being able to respond is stark between rich and poor countries. Adults in low-income countries were almost twice as likely to have been affected by a disaster as those in high-income countries, at 31 percent compared with 16 percent.
Yet only 64 percent of affected adults in low-income countries received a warning, against 84 percent in high-income countries.
Even when warnings arrive, they do not guarantee safety.
The challenge is not simply to warn people when disaster approaches, but to ensure they have the means and support to act.
Fewer than half of warned adults in low- and lower-middle-income countries were able to act, compared with 71 percent in high-income countries.
Europe’s resilience is unequal
The report’s companion study, ‘A resilient life: How wellbeing shapes the capacity to cope’, pictures the preparedness to act under pressure — including in wealthier countries.
“There are some changes that are happening in Europe that I’m not seeing in other parts of the world,” Hey told EUobserver.
Across the EU, 77 percent of people affected by a disaster received a warning, compared with 80 percent globally.
But only 59 percent of those warned could act, against 64 percent worldwide and 71 percent in high-income countries.
“Some of the biggest drops globally have been in Greece, Netherlands, Estonia, and France, which is surprising given that generally that measure is going upwards,” Hey said.
Just 29 percent of EU households have a disaster plan, and only 28 percent of people think their national government is well prepared for a disaster.
Meanwhile, 44 percent say their government does not care about them at all, compared with 29 percent globally.
The differences between countries are stark.
In France, 80 percent of those affected received warnings, but only 61 percent could act. Just 22 percent of households have a disaster plan, compared with 47 percent in Germany and 60 percent in Austria. And overall, France’s social resilience has fallen six points since 2021.
Greece faces a deeper crisis of preparedness and confidence.
Only 55 percent of disaster-affected people received warnings, and just 39 percent of those warned could act. Only 12 percent believe their government is well prepared, while 70 percent say it does not care about them.
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Getting co-decision powers on the budget, finally enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty after more than a decade of inter-institutional battles, was one of the European Parliament’s big wins.
The challenge facing MEPs in the coming months is whether they are really going to use those powers on the 2028-34 budget.
The early signs are that they are spoiling for a fight. The Irish government’s compromise proposal tabled on Saturday (10 October) – an 8 percent cut worth €141bn to the European Commission’s spending plan – isn’t exactly butchery.
But it does display a startling lack of ambition, in particular on the raft of ‘own resources’ proposed by MEPs to make the budget process less vulnerable to member states wanting to reduce or at least freeze their annual contributions
This time round, MEPs have proposed a digital services levy, an online gambling levy, and a levy on crypto-asset capital gains.
Put together the parliament reckons that these new taxes could bring an additional €30bn to the EU’s budget, on top of the €57.4bn that the EU commission believes can be raised from other levies, such as the emissions trading scheme and the carbon border levy.
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“The issue is, do we have another leader to replace Pedro Sánchez?”.
Former Spanish congresswoman Hana Jalloul Muro is among her prime minister’s closest allies in the European Parliament.
“It has not been an easy mandate. Every day is a survival day, all the challenges that prime minister Pedro Sánchez has faced have been unprecedented,” the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) MEP told EUobserver.
They had faced the Covid pandemic, a volcanic eruption in the Canary Islands in 2021, and the migrant crisis in the Ceuta enclave in north Africa in the summer of 2026, she said – not to mention the corruption allegations levelled at his close relatives.
Sánchez’ PSOE party is trailing behind the centre right people’s party (PP) in the polls, which is also growing closer allied to the increasingly successful far-right Vox party.
“These elections will pit two models against each other,” Jalloul said.
“On the one hand, a progressive government that defends public services, improves wages and pensions, expands rights and protects the social majority. And on the other, a model represented by the PP and Vox, which, wherever they govern, have opted for privatisations and policies that risk widening inequalities,” she said.
Ceuta-linked election
Jalloul, who spoke to EUobserver at the European Parliament (EP) in Brussels, used to lecture on international terrorism at the University of Madrid, before she became vice-chair of the EP’s foreign affairs committee.
And she recalled the heated debate on the Ceuta incident on 31 July, including accusations that Morocco had engineered it to gain leverage over Spain.
“This is a crisis that we could not expect,” she said.
But had there not been a “good relationship with Morocco, [we] would never be able to return 90 percent of the 70,000 people that came in less than 72 hours,” she added.
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A lethal plume of toxic smoke was blowing towards us from a blaze at a battery manufacturing plant in Kaliningrad.
Troops in the Russian exclave had been ordered to help put the fire out: untrained and under-equipped, they mutinied. Terrified civilians were thronging the borders.
The Kremlin, oblivious to the unfolding humanitarian and environmental catastrophe, blamed the West for sabotage and incitement, and demanded a transit corridor across Lithuania.
The crisis scenarios were hypothetical; the aim was to explore the dilemmas and trade-offs they created. (You are the Lithuanian government. Do you let the mutineers in? Or leave them to be massacred?)
The games-master provided regular “injects” – new developments – such as ill-written social media posts from US president Donald Trump. He blamed the authorities in “Lithvastonia” for having started the fire in “Kaliningradia”.
An amusing parody, we thought. A few hours later, the real US president published news of his deal with Russian president Vladimir Putin on sanctions-busting diesel imports, then blamed Ukraine for being invaded.
Not so amusing, especially for our Ukrainian participant, a senior military commander there.
As we were leaving (us to safety, him to danger), news broke that Russia is stepping up its assassination attempts in Europe, targeting defence industry bosses (and perhaps Polish politicians). Our scenarios seemed tame in comparison.
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They looked like Russian “porcupines” and fought where the Kremlin considers Russian rear territory. They were protected by their own drone.
Drones also struck Yandex’s third data centre.
The battle for Dobropillia on a new type of map.
Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles caused the largest single massacre of senior Russian officers of the entire war in August.
Maps of the day — Dobropillia, Kharkiv region
Videos of the day — Abrams as a porcupine; MANPADS against a Geran; Russian port during an air raid; nighttime FPV drone combat; Kyiv resident narrowly escapes death at a playground
They looked like Russian “porcupines” and fought where the Kremlin considers Russian rear territory. They were protected by their own drone. Both the Russian and Ukrainian armies are continuing their efforts to return tanks and combat vehicles to the battlefield.
Russia recently attacked near Dobropillia with tanks fitted with upgraded Arena-M active protection systems.
The system itself proved effective, but was ultimately unable to withstand the flood of drones, and the attack ended in defeat and the destruction of the tanks deployed.
Last week, we also wrote about a successful operation by Ukrainian tanks from the 475th Assault Regiment.
And the same Ukrainian unit, also known as CODE 9.2, demonstrated a new use of heavy armoured equipment over the weekend.
Compared with the first case, this one revealed an important detail about the operation of accompanying drones and, thanks to geolocation, can also be used to verify the accuracy of Russian maps.
The battle took place in the Kharkiv region and involved a US-made Bradley combat vehicle as well as a tank. According to one source, it was an Abrams of Australian origin, although the appearance of its gun barrel does not suggest this.
In a video released by the unit, the Bradley advances first towards Russian positions and begins laying down covering fire. The tank joins it later, firing directly at the target.
While the Bradley’s turret has retained its mobility, the tank has effectively become an assault gun of the type known from the Second World War.
Its turret does not appear to be capable of moving, and the crew must aim the entire tank at the target. This reduces the effectiveness and speed of firing, while increasing its chances of survival.
A tank modified in this way is virtually indistinguishable from similar Russian adaptations. What distinguishes these attempts is, once again, the involvement of accompanying drones.
Aside from the heavy Vampire, first seen at 1:30, this primarily includes an FPV drone which, at 1:58, neutralises in an aerial duel the same type of Russian weapon that had attempted to strike the tank.
This is another example of how heavy equipment must be accompanied by drones at this stage of the war if it is to remain combat-capable.
Despite air support, another drone strikes it at 2:16 — after another had narrowly missed earlier. The tank remained mobile and withdrew successfully.
Beyond the operation itself, its location is also noteworthy: near the village of Anishchyne in the north-eastern part of the Kharkiv region, on the axis Russia calls the Velykyi Burluk direction.
The Ukrainian Telegram account Petrenko, which also provided the map below, precisely identified the site of the battle.
“The video reveals a discrepancy between reality and Russian claims of an alleged massive advance, the encirclement of Ukrainian units and the capture of more than 65 settlements,” the author wrote.
He noted that both vehicles operated in territory that most Russian maps mark in red — as a “Russian” zone.
This is the same area about which we have written repeatedly. For comparison, below is a map by the Russian state agency Ria Novosti. The village of Anishchyne does not appear on it, but the settlement of Vilkhuvatka — Olkhovatka in Russian — serves as a reference point in the centre-right.
The tank and Bradley were fighting around five km north of a location that Russia marks as securely captured.
Drones also struck Yandex’s third data centre. Graphs circulated online, particularly on Sunday, suggesting that Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s largest internet provider had restricted the operations of Russian bots around the world.
However, this has not yet been objectively proven. Russia has indeed reported outages affecting various internet-based services after each attack, but that is so far the only confirmed effect.
On this occasion, French analyst Clément Molin pointed out that the Russian Varyag drone brigade had attacked data centres in Ukraine in recent weeks and had boasted, among other things, of damaging Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest operator.
The situation has now been reversed, as it was previously with attacks on ships and warehouses. This time, however, to Russia’s disadvantage.
Russia 🇷🇺 bombed multiple data centers in Kyiv, Dnipro or Odesa these last few weeks and proudly showed footage about it
Now, Ukraine is bombing Yandex data centers and causing much more harm to Russia than Russia did to Ukraine.
The first centre hit was in Sasovo, in the Ryazan region, followed by a second in Kaluga, in the Kaluga region. On Sunday, the third of Yandex’s four largest centres was struck, this time in Vladimir, in the Vladimir region.
“This complex houses one of the company’s Galushkin supercomputers, which is among the most powerful in Russia,” Kommersant wrote, adding that the facility had been taken out of service, affecting 10 core Yandex services, including its email service.
The defence ministry is also working on the issue in an effort to protect the company’s remaining facilities. Citing its sources, Kommersant said replacing the damaged capacity could take up to six months.
The battle for Dobropillia on a new type of map. As the war evolves, so do the ways it is mapped. This Ukrainian OSINT profile, for example, has depicted the fighting for the important Donbas town — which protects the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the south-west — on a dynamic map.
Among other things, it shows that Russian forces are infiltrating the town through the village of Hanivka from the Nove Shakhove area.
Mashovets Dobropillia Russia wants Kramatorsk, to the north-east. Its strongest attack here heads west, into Dobropillia: up to 40 men a day along the Byk river.
If Dobropillia and Druzhkivka hold to late December, Russia would have to replan the offensive. pic.twitter.com/OXg8F1WYXy
For a clearer picture, we are also including a static DeepStateUA map, as the previous one is rotated and does not follow the usual compass orientation.
The two maps are rotated by around 90 degrees in relation to each other. On the following one, Dobropillia is in the centre-left. Nove Shakhove, from where Russian infiltrators are advancing, is almost at the centre, exactly 10 km to the east as the crow flies. A small arrow directly next to the settlement’s name indicates the direction of Russian attacks.
The green area in the upper part of the map is the so-called Dobropillia salient, which was fought over a year ago.
Russia reported nothing significant concerning Dobropillia after the weekend. “On the Dobropillia axis, our forces continue to push forward, but Ukrainian units retain the ability to counterattack. Heavy fighting is under way,” the Two Majors wrote, for example.
The Ukrainian Telegram channel Petrenko published a map over the weekend showing sites of new infiltrations. Its interpretation differs considerably from DeepStateUA’s version. Russian forces are shown closer to the town, but the direction of their advance is the same as in the two previous sources.
The sites of the recorded incursions were established on the basis of videos showing drones killing Russian soldiers attempting to advance further west.
Storm Shadow missiles caused the largest single massacre of senior Russian officers in August. On Friday (9 October), a joint project by Russian exile newspaper Meduza and the BBC’s Russian service added another 17,124 names to its list of Russian war casualties. This was the number it had counted since 21 September. In total, 276,113 Russian soldiers killed in the war are now known by name.
On the same day, the project’s authors published a detailed analysis of events in Donetsk on 26 August. The Ukrainian air force had attacked a building in Donetsk with Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles.
The strike was so intense that the target must have been something significant. Almost immediately, there was speculation that the building housed an important Russian headquarters.
Meduza and the BBC counted 20 high-ranking Russian military personnel killed during a joint meeting of the headquarters of the Centre group of forces and its subordinate 41st Army — 18 at the scene and another two from their injuries in the following days.
This week, in our update of Russian losses in Ukraine: – 17,000 names added to our list since September 21https://t.co/lBGxPNvv8z
They included seven colonels, six lieutenant colonels, five majors, one captain and one senior non-commissioned officer. They were identified thanks to access to nominal lists of headquarters staff as of 25 July and after that date.
It also emerged that this was not the first time officers of the 41st Army had had a bad day. During an attack on 8 September 2025, it lost a lieutenant colonel, two majors and a lieutenant. The toll on 4 August 2026 was even worse, when the army lost two lieutenant colonels, three majors, two captains and one lieutenant at once.
The following images illustrate the scale of destruction caused by the strike on 26 August:
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) August 26, 2026
Videos of the day
As Russian jet-powered drones become more widespread, videos are also appearing more frequently of Ukrainian soldiers shooting them down with man-portable air-defence systems, known by the English acronym MANPADS. This is one of them.
A Ukrainian soldier shot down a Russian jet-powered Geran-4 drone using an Igla-1 MANPADS over Ukraine’s Rivne region this morning. pic.twitter.com/4onx7UNclQ
Despite its best efforts, air defences at one of Russia’s ports were unable to shoot down a Ukrainian drone, which subsequently struck a Black Sea Fleet vessel. Note the beams of light used to assist with targeting.
Один из Z-блогеров опубликовал видео работы ПВО в гавани (Новороссийск?) и попадание дрона ВСУ в военный корабль. Дата съемки неизвестна, однако, уже видны те самые синие лучи, которые пару лет назад решили ввести как лучшее средство подсветки цели. Покупали их военные обычно за… pic.twitter.com/WvDuR369Z3
The Russian soldiers in this nighttime video appear relaxed. They were probably moving through an area they still considered relatively safe. But a waiting drone equipped with a thermal camera was tracking them.
A Ukrainian FPV drone lying in ambush at night spots a passing Russian assault group of four soldiers on a quad bike, waits for the right moment, then takes off and strikes them. pic.twitter.com/MD83B4RkKk
A Kyiv resident narrowly avoided a Russian drone at the last moment as it crashed into a playground.
A man narrowly escaped a Russian drone strike on the grounds of a kindergarten in Ukraine’s Kyiv region yesterday. pic.twitter.com/aOwWNAa6Vj
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 9, 2026
What are the losses
No update on Friday.
By Monday (5 October), Russia had verifiably lost 24,170 pieces of heavy equipment (24,138 on Tuesday, 22 September). Of these, 19,133 (19,105) were destroyed by Ukraine, 1,003 (1,000) were damaged, 1,194 (1,194) were abandoned by their crews, and 2,840 (2,839) were captured by the Ukrainian army. This includes 4,452 (4,448) tanks, of which 3,357 (3,353) were destroyed in combat.
Ukraine lost 12,238 (12,175) pieces of equipment, of which 9,633 (9,579) were destroyed, 711 (702) damaged, 695 (695) abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) captured. This includes 1,466 (1,464) tanks, of which 1,126 (1,125) were destroyed in combat.
Note: Neither side regularly reports its own dead or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. This overview uses data from the Oryx project, which has compiled a list based exclusively on photographically documented equipment losses since the start of the war.
The American humorist Will Rogers observed that there are three kinds of people in this world: those who learn by reading; those who learn by observation; and the rest, who have to learn by peeing on the electric fence for themselves.
In Europe, we have been learning things the hard way.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting turmoil came as a shock to our energy system. More recently, the conflict in the Gulf has sparked fresh shock waves.
Having built on our experience of the energy crisis in 2022, Europe was better prepared. But the fact of the matter is that we were still left exposed to external shocks.
Since the start of the conflict, the EU spent more than €100bn more on imported oil and gas, compared to the same period last year. We are not only learning the hard way – we are learning the expensive way.
And the lesson could not be clearer: we need to free ourselves from fossil fuel imports, as much as possible and as soon as possible.
The more clean energy that we produce – from homegrown sources like renewables, nuclear, and geothermal – the lower our bills become. At the same time, we also strengthen our energy security, cut our emissions, and reinforce our energy independence.
That’s the direction we are taking
Last year, we added 89 gigawatts of renewable energy to our energy system. One gigawatt is enough to provide electricity for up to 1m households.
And for the first time ever, the EU produced more electricity from solar and wind than from fossil fuels.
In other words, more of our energy is being “made in Europe”, which makes us less reliant on fossil imports. Since 2022, we have decreased our gas consumption significantly, to the order of 17 percent.
But it’s not just about how Europe generates electricity – it’s about how we share it. Over the past decades, EU countries have linked up their electricity markets to a degree not seen elsewhere in the world.
This makes it much easier to support each other with supplies in times of need, as well as to buy and sell electricity across borders at the best price.
This progress has firmed up the foundations of our energy system. But can these foundations withstand our uncertain times? I believe that they can and they will – as long we stick to a solid strategy.
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EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.
Find the full transcript below:
European gas storage levels are unusually low for this time of year, reaching their lowest autumn level since 2011.
With Russian gas imports set to end in 2027, could Europe face a tougher challenge in the months ahead?
First, how do Europe’s gas reserves work? EU countries fill underground gas storage sites during spring and summer, when demand is lower, and draw on these stocks during the winter, when heating pushes consumption up.
Since 2022, the EU has required member states to ensure their gas storage facilities reach 90 percent of capacity by a deadline between 1 October and 1 December. That helps secure supplies ahead of winter.
But this year, stocks are well below that target, at just over 70 percent in early October. They still have time to rise before the deadline, but the situation is attracting attention.
Does that mean Europeans are at risk of running out of gas this winter? According to the European Commission, no. It acknowledges that storage levels are low compared with previous years, but says the EU’s gas system should still be flexible enough to meet demand this winter.
That said, a colder or longer winter than expected, or disruptions to supplies in other parts of the world, could put additional pressure on the market. Especially at a time when the EU is preparing to phase out Russian gas imports in 2027.
The EU has adopted a gradual ban, with transitional arrangements for existing long-term contracts.
Russian liquefied natural gas, or LNG, is due to be phased out completely from January 2027 only. Russian gas delivered by pipeline will follow later, with the deadline set for the end of September 2027.
And Russian gas still accounted for around 12 percent of EU gas demand through May 2026. Imports even increased in the first months of this year compared with the same period in 2025, amid disruptions to energy flows linked to the war in the Middle East.
So, from January, Europe will lose one source of supply. Which means Europe should try and reduce its gas consumption.
But it’s easier said than done, particularly as winter approaches. Heating needs depend heavily on temperatures, and households cannot simply stop heating their homes.
Still, Europe has shown in the past that consumption can fall significantly. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Commission called on member states to reduce their gas demand by 15 percent.
And they succeeded: their gas demand fell of around 18 percent, compared with the previous five-year average. A few months ago, following the escalation of the war in the Middle East, the Jacques Delors Institute recommended reviving efforts to reduce gas demand.
That being said, the reduction achieved in 2022 was partly helped by a mild winter and greater use of alternative energy sources, including coal and nuclear power.
Those options may help again, but they come with limitations. Much will depend on the weather and how long the winter lasts.
Which doesn’t mean Europe should not call for lowering the demand and accelerate the deployment of renewable energy.
Nearly three decades after the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country remains deeply divided along ethnic and political lines.
The agreement brought peace, but its complex political system has done little to overcome those divisions. Republika Srpska, the predominantly Serb entity, has pursued an increasingly divergent political course, while Serbia and Croatia maintain close ties with different parts of the country.
And for Christian Schmidt, the international community’s high representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2021-26) the main threat is no longer a return to war, but political stagnation and growing frustration.
He says that weak civic engagement, slow progress towards EU membership and the influence of Russia and neighbouring countries are reinforcing Bosnia’s divisions. Young people, he says, are increasingly responding by leaving the country.
In this interview, Schmidt discusses foreign influence, the EU’s role, the legacy of Dayton, and why Bosnia’s future may depend on whether it can build a stronger political community across its ethnic divisions.
A country that remains divided
You started your work in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2021 and were there for five years. It was a period of major changes, with COVID and then the war in Ukraine. What were your experiences of these moments. How has the situation in Bosnia evolved?
I think there has not been sufficient involvement. Civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not very strong. It is, more than just politically, somehow divided on political issues. This prevents a joint political position or commitment from civil society to make more progress in democratic development and European integration.
So far, I don’t see that this has changed very much. It has also not changed that some parties, especially the SNSD, [Serb nationalist Milorad] Dodik’s party, but honestly not only them, are counting on ethnic differences as an argument for supporting their party instead of having a multi-ethnic approach. One can be doubtful about their real pro-European commitment.
Russia and its influence
When civil society is not engaged and when countries are not politically stable, we know that they are prone to interference from other states or political entities. Is this being seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
It is evident that neighbouring countries, especially Serbia and Croatia, have a kind of preferred relationship with parts of the country. This is, by the way, also established in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina [also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement]. So it is not necessarily something that is not in line with Dayton [Agreement].
But there is beyond this more interference if I refer, for example, to Serbia’s reaction on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 2024 about establishing an international day of commemoration for the Srebrenica genocide. There was a really remarkable attack against this, despite the fact that Serbia was not named in the resolution. There were only named individuals who had committed war crimes or genocide.
But it was used to create a “Pan-Serbian declaration”, which can be seen as a way of bringing cultural issues of the same ethnic group closer together. It has to be seen additionally as a tool to try to gain more political influence in the other part of the country.
You mentioned Croatia and Serbia. Is Russia also playing a role in these interferences?
Yes, but not ethnic interference. It is more through traditional good relations, especially with the Orthodox community, which is basically the Serb Orthodox community, where there are relations and a lot of activities, including in the media and on social media.
They [Russia] try to influence a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially Banja Luka and Republika Srpska, and Dodik is somehow to act as an influencer for Russian interests. This is indeed the case. Dodik has been sitting together with [Russian president Vladimir] Putin for the 11th time since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. This is really remarkable.
How important is Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dodik for Russia and for Putin?
The economic and political-strategic importance is nearly zero. But it can be used as a way of distracting from European and somehow American activities, just by giving them a negative impact on everything. So this is more seen as a tool, rather than an area of influence.
EU— only accession talks?
Does the EU have a role in fighting such interference — Russian, but also the ethnic interference from Croatia and Serbia?
The ethnic relationships are within the framework of Dayton, and they are acceptable. But I think it is very important that the EU makes it clear that European integration is not based on ethnic differences, but on uniting in diversity.
This is something that is very complicated. You cannot do this only with programmes or money. I think these challenges are the typical issues that you can address through European commitment, but in the details, it has not delivered.
Milorad Dodik has a great support even as he has been sentenced to one year in prison and barred from public office for six years in a first-instance verdict for disobeying the decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international envoy, High Representative Christian Schmidt. Source: EPA/Nidal Saljic.
Unfortunately, maybe the European Union should sit down again and think about more tools and opportunities, especially addressing civil society, to give more attraction to the European idea.
How would that work?
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The EU’s annual rule of law report, tackling advancements in corruption and fundamental rights, shares overly optimistic improvement that is far from the reality on the ground, a civil liberties group revealed.
Presented on a sweltering Friday in July, the EU commission’s 2026 rule of law report failed to avoid scrutiny, with NGO Civil Liberties Union for Europe (Liberties) observing a gap between professed achievements in member states and the reality of a significant lack of implementation of Brussels’ recommendations.
“This year’s Report shows continued positive progress across many Member States. And that is precisely why our Rule of Law Report matters. It has become a reference point, helping to shape national debates and drive reforms across our Union,” EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said back then in a statement.
But of all recommendations in the July report, Liberties’ Gap analysis report revealed that only four percent had been fully implemented, while 54 percent show limited to no progress.
“The Commission’s Rule of Law Report has the potential to be one of the EU’s strongest tools for preventing democratic backsliding,” said Kersty McCourt, Liberties’ rule of law expert. “But when recommendations are repeatedly issued without being implemented, and new threats are not identified early enough, the system loses its power”.
The report, published on Monday (12 October) and shared in advance with EUobserver, found that almost all recommendations issued in 2026 were regurgitations of those given in previous years, with only seven new recommendations being introduced this year.
The commission’s annual report “fails to unpack why some problems remain so entrenched,” Liberties said.
In its own study, the Berlin-based NGO suggested the reasons for slow movement to be bound from a lack of willingness from member states, a vacuum in the EU’s enforcement mechanisms, or issues becoming “so entrenched that progress is effectively impossible.”
This reduces the function of the report as a warning system for identifying early signs of democratic backsliding, since recommendations on emerging issues remain unaddressed and even if are formally adopted, often don’t translate into effective implementation.
Liberties observed this to be evident in the example of Nordic countries, which have grown to be exempt from scrutiny due to their traditionally strong reputations.
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Money and how to make more of it are among the top issues to be discussed among EU leaders as they gather for a two-day summit in Brussels, while they also struggle with ongoing problems on Ukraine, the Middle East, migration, defence, and new rules for EU-hopefuls, such as Montenegro.
The official talks kick off on Thursday (15 October) on how to make the 27 EU states more competitive in a turbulent world dominated by US tariffs, Chinese innovation, and Iran-war linked chokeholds in the Strait of Hormuz, which have forced the G7 wealthy nations to release 100m barrels of diesel and crude oil.
Gas prices have risen by 140 percent since the end of February with imported fossil fuels now costing an extra €100bn, says the European Commission.
In Europe, a grand scheme, a so-called “One Europe, One Market”, aims to spike European fortunes by saving an estimated €37.5bn for EU businesses by 2029.
The drive is part of a larger initiative to cut red tape and remove internal market barriers, including the eventual launch of a so-called EU Inc.
Ireland, which is currently steering the EU’s rotating presidency, had already announced that the summit would start with the competitiveness theme. And leaked draft conclusions, seen by EUobserver, lead with a sales pitch to step up ambitions over the ‘One Europe, One Market’ proposal.
It also gives a nod to the German car industry, by citing efforts needed to stop China from making too much money off Europeans. The goal is to get Europeans to spend more on European products, even if they are more expensive and less innovative.
The ‘more money’ talks dovetail into how to spend it (or not) in the EU’s next long-term budget, spanning 2028 to 2034.
António Costa, the president of the European Council, is hoping for an agreement of the nearly €2 trillion budget before the end of the year. People need predictability and stability, he said, in a invitation letter sent to the 27 EU states.
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