“As we close the tap on Russian energy, we open the doors to a more diverse range of reliable suppliers,” EU energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen wrote in an op-ed for EUobserver this week.
“And these suppliers know that we are reliable buyers.”
One of those ‘reliable’ suppliers is the US, which provided 57 percent of the EU’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) last year and is on course to supply two-thirds this year, according to IEEFA.
Four out of five overseas gas cargoes arriving in the EU will be American by 2028, the think tank estimates. These expensive cargoes have kept coming in. But how reliable is that supply likely to remain?
US officials have already shown their willingness to use their gas dominance for strategic gain. In March, US ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder threatened that Europe could lose its favourable access to American LNG if it tried to reopen the ‘Turnberry’ bilateral trade deal.
“In switching from Russia to the US, the EU has jumped from the frying pan into the fire,” Pascoe Sabido, a researcher at Corporate Europe Observatory, wrote in a comment under Jørgensen’s op-ed.
And recent developments prove his point.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
A backlash is building against an EU ‘omnibus’ bill that seeks to make it easier to authorise and use pesticides across the bloc.
MEPs are still yet to set a date to vote on the European Commission’s proposal to extend how long pesticide active substances can stay approved in the EU, amid a series of protest letters from scientists, UN health experts, and divisions among member states.
EI parliament’s environment and agriculture committees were originally expected to hold a joint vote on a compromise text on 5 October, but shelved that date without proposing another as this article went to publication.
Sustained criticism has come from the scientific community.
Last month, a group of more than 500 scientists signed an open letter to the commission on 16 September demanding a pause on the file pending “an independent assessment, whether carried out by parliament’s own research service or by an equivalent independent body.”
They warned that the commission’s plan to extend grace periods for products withdrawn on safety grounds, widen derogations for hazardous substances, and restrict the use of the latest independent scientific evidence “seem difficult to reconcile with the precautionary principle and with obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, including the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas”.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
The Black Sea has become a new frontline between Russia and Ukraine, as the two agricultural powers join battle to halt each other’s exports.
On Tuesday (13 October), the Ukrainian-owned Chelsea 3, sailing under a Maltese flag, was struck by three drones only 30km off Bulgaria.
According to Bulgarian prime minister Rumen Radev, two ships were hit by drones, one of which sank.
The recent incidents underline the vulnerability of commercial shipping in a region where Russia and Ukraine depend on maritime routes for their international trade.
And on the coast, Bulgaria’s position is particularly sensitive, as a Nato member bordering the Black Sea.
EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen condemned the attacks on social media, calling them an “escalation” of the Russian war in Ukraine.
Nato general secretary Mark Rutte also reiterated the alliance’s commitment to regional security. “Nato would continue working closely with its Black Sea allies and had strengthened its posture along the eastern flank,” he said.
Shipping route under pressure
For Ukraine, access to the Black Sea is essential to exporting grain, sunflower oil, metals and other goods.
Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian Black Sea ports handled exports worth more than $40bn (€35.74bn).
Russian attacks on port infrastructure and shipping have severely undermined this trade, while the threat of further strikes raises the cost and risk of operating in the region.
Severe problems with Ukrainian agricultural exports became apparent as early as August, when the country managed to export only 20 percent of the grain it had shipped during the same period the previous year.
“With grain, it is more difficult,” Ukrainian agriculture minister Taras Vysotsky said.
He added that Ukraine’s domestic market was not suffering for now. Although buckwheat could become scarce, the main challenge for Kyiv now is to be able to export the supplies before they perish.
And alternative routes offer only partial relief.
Ukraine has increasingly relied on Danube ports, including Izmail and Reni, with cargo moving towards Romania’s Constanța port before being transferred to larger vessels for international markets.
But this corridor is under growing pressure from low water levels on the Danube, congested terminals and also drone attacks.
Waiting times for vessels seeking access to the river have exceeded two weeks.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
The EU is shying away from triggering rules that would shield people and companies working at or with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague from US sanctions, preferring instead months-long diplomatic outreach.
The European Commission on Wednesday (14 October) told reporters in Brussels that it was doing everything to seek “practical solutions”, while hoping that its diplomacy will help the court, which prosecutes people for war crimes, genocide, and other atrocities.
“We haven’t made any decisions yet. But we continue to discuss at every level,” said a commission spokesperson, when pressed on whether a little-known blocking statue, which would presumably damper the impact of the US sanctions, remains an option.
And an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday is expected to ask the US to reverse the decision, according to draft conclusions seen by EUobserver.
The EU’s little-known “blocking statute” would prevent EU companies and banks from complying with the sanctions. It was first used against US sanctions on Cuba, Iran and Libya.
The Trump administration had, last Friday, announced financial sanctions on the ICC as part of a larger assault to dismantle the court, after it issued arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, its former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
The Russians are making a mockery of Trump’s energy ceasefire.
What the restrictions on Starlink mean and how they are being felt.
The Russians are pushing towards Dobropillia.
The 3rd Army Corps reported on the next phase of Operation Vivaldi, but we learned nothing new.
Maps of the day — Lyman, Dobropillia
Videos of the day — a drone hit a flying Mi-28 helicopter; how a heavy machine gun is used in drone warfare; civilians fleeing the fighting were struck by artillery and mortar fire
Trump’s America is becoming a rogue state. Ukraine, as well as Europe as a whole, must now accept that the United States is openly supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Under the pretext of efforts to end the war, the US government — and, as of Tuesday, a major technology company as well — are openly backing the fight against Ukraine and, therefore, against European security.
The United States has recently taken several decisions in quick succession that could help Russia win the war, at a time when it was failing to do so on the battlefield.
US president Donald Trump eased sanctions on trade in Russian oil, enabling Russian president Vladimir Putin to better finance his aggression against Ukraine, and effectively called for the overthrow of Ukraine’s legitimate president.
A growing number of voices claim that the US has stopped providing intelligence on Russian air raids (this has not been confirmed, and some authorities deny it).
And the United States has now also deprived the Ukrainian army of the ability to carry out effective medium-range strikes.
It did so by dramatically restricting the Starlink service over Ukraine’s occupied territories. In practice, this will have serious consequences for the Ukrainian army’s ability to use drones for its previously highly effective attacks on Russian logistics.
What the restrictions on Starlink mean and how they are being felt. Since this morning, the Ukrainian army has reported restrictions on the operation of receivers for SpaceX’s satellite system.
Thanks to Starlink boss Elon Musk’s equipment, they destroy hundreds of Russian army trucks and other military equipment every month at distances of 30 to more than 100 km.
However, on the night of 14 October, Ukrainians lost access to the military part of the system known as Starshield, meaning that the devices did not function at speeds above 160km/h. This means drones cannot carry out combat missions because their operators cannot guide them to their targets.
The situation deteriorated further during the day. Serhii Sternenko reported that the army later reported losing control at speeds above 70 km/h. This means grounding Ukraine’s drone fleet for medium-range attacks.
It is highly likely that this is not a technical problem but a response to a request from the Trump administration, since otherwise the Ukrainian army would have received an explanation — which, according to Ukrainian sources, did not happen.
According to our observations, communications may have been interrupted for 10 to 20 seconds during drone flights,even at speeds of 110 to 120 kilometres per hour,” Oboronka news outlet quoted a military source.
A technical problem is unlikely, as the Ukrainian military would have received an explanation in that case, which,according to Ukrainian sources, did not happen. The question now is how long the outage will last. It is also unclear to what extent the decision was made by Musk and to what extent by Trump.
“Our defence forces received no warning of such a restriction, which led to the cancellation of several missions. It is clear that this is no coincidence and is connected to the current political situation,” wrote Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, for example.
He described as an even more serious problem than the restriction of medium-range attacks the fact that Starlink is now crucial to intercepting Russian air raids on Ukrainian cities.
“Through their actions, our partners are depriving us of one of the few means of protecting the country against jet-powered Shahed drones,” said Beskrestnov, a leading drone expert.
Among European politicians, Poland’s foreign minister responded by asking Musk whether he was once again engaging in politics, and reminding him that his European customers were watching him closely.
Naturally, the Russians are delighted.
However, the change will not affect Ukrainian long-range air strikes. The drones carrying them out are not guided using Starlink, so the restrictions will not affect their operations.
Hey, @elonmusk, big man, are you playing politics with your products again? As your European customers, we are watching you. https://t.co/T385xpUEUu
The Russians are making a mockery of Trump’s energy ceasefire. The US president characteristically announced with great fanfare that he had brokered an energy ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.
Although the Russian army did not observe it for a single day, the Ukrainians stayed away from Russian refineries for 48 hours. That is no longer the case after today, but before then the Russians carried out a massive air raid, including on the capital.
They used as many as 39 ballistic missiles and more than 100 drones. Since Trump had earlier deprived Ukraine of effective air defence in the form of missiles for Patriot systems, it has nothing with which to defend itself against such attacks. As a result, the Russians struck three Kyiv thermal power plants on Wednesday.
Overnight, the Russians used 39 ballistic missiles and more than 120 attack drones and loitering munitions against our energy and critical infrastructure in Kyiv, the Kyiv region, and Kharkiv. A targeted Russian ballistic missile strike specifically against energy infrastructure…
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) October 14, 2026
The Kremlin does not even conceal that a Trump ceasefire means nothing to it.
“Tonight, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation carried out a massive strike using precision-guided weapons and long-range strike drones against communications and energy infrastructure facilities in Kyiv, Kyiv region and Kharkiv region,” said a statement by the Russian defence ministry.
It also included a list of the power plants hit. The Russians boasted that they had struck six of them. For each one, they used the formula that it was “supplying electricity to military logistics facilities, weapons depots and military equipment”.
Mike Pence, who served as Trump’s vice-president during his first term, wrote that Putin did not want peace but Ukraine, and that Trump should impose harsh sanctions rather than strike a deal with Putin. None of this, however, will happen.
Putin doesn’t want peace. Putin wants Ukraine. Enough is enough.
President Trump should rescind the diesel deal with Russia and return to the strong policies of our four years in the White House; use the Lindsey Graham Sanctioning Russia Act to impose harsh sanctions on any… pic.twitter.com/uw11mEkh0x
The Russians are pushing towards Dobropillia. All analysts agree on this. Their advance is slow, but persistent. It is enabled by the mass deployment of Russian soldiers.
The Kremlin has currently concentrated its largest number of forces in this sector. It therefore appears that the capture of Dobropillia is the Russian command’s main objective in these weeks.
“The Russians here have a seemingly endless pool of manpower and a clear numerical advantage, allowing them to significantly increase the flow of infiltrators and thus the likelihood that some will penetrate Ukrainian defences,” wrote the OSINT account Playfra, whose map can be found below. However, the price of the unceasing waves of infantry is, according to it, “colossal losses” on the Russian side.
Dobropillia sector.
In the same way, this sector is also worsening.
The Russians have a seemingly infinite manpower pool here and a clear numerical advantage, which allows them to significantly increase the flow of infiltrators and, as such, the chance of some passing through… https://t.co/BoiqRuCRs5pic.twitter.com/pKBIhHZW3d
French analyst Clément Molin published a time-lapse map of the past four months based on DeepStateUA data. Its latest version is not the most accurate and does not correspond to other sources, but it illustrates the slow pace of the Russian advance.
During the last 4 months, Russia 🇷🇺 made a slow but steady progress in the direction of Dobropilla
Russian forces continue to advance and capture villages and small towns south of Dobropilla. Shevchenko and Bilytske fell, Russian forces are now attacking Dobropilla from the… pic.twitter.com/mTDRo4DcPf
The Polish analytical account Thorkill examined the situation north-east of Dobropillia in greater detail. It sees a significant Russian advance there.
It bases this assessment on Sentinel satellite data which, it said, showed no signs of Russian bombardment in the areas of Zolotyi Kolodiaz, Novotroitske and Andriivka — an indication, in its view, that they are under Russian army control.
Sytuacja w rejonie: Zołote Kołodiazi – Nowotroickie – Andrivka (Dobropole).
Mniej więcej miesiąc temu we wpisie o bardzo dużej liczbie FAB-ów z modułami UMPK zrzucanych przez rus w rejonie Andrivki, sygnalizowałem że sytuacja 1 Korpusu "Azowa" GN na płn od Dobropola jest dużo… pic.twitter.com/KihWWAuI7u
Playfra sees the situation far less negatively. It did confirm Russian infiltration in Andriivka, which lies as much as 20 km behind the notional front line, but said that around eight Russian groups of two to four soldiers were moving throughout the area and did not pose a threat.
For easier orientation: Zolotyi Kolodiaz is at the tip of the green salient on Playfra’s map. On Thorkill’s map above, it is located in the lower centre, within the red area.
The two depictions of the situation therefore differ radically. However, there is agreement that the Russians are currently exerting the greatest pressure near Dobropillia and are advancing slowly.
Dobropillia direction.
The situation is quite peculiar tactically:
South, after the clearing conducted since August, some Russian groups still remain in the dotted square, mixed with some new infiltrators, but they aren't significant.
The 3rd Army Corps reported on the next phase of Operation Vivaldi, but we learned nothing new. Andrii Biletskyi, the commander of what is perhaps the strongest component of Ukraine’s army, published a new video confirming the liberation of another 101 square kms north of Lyman. Since the start of Operation Vivaldi, this brings the total to 277 square km.
Четвертий сезон операції «Вівальді»: Білецький оголосив про взяття ще 101 км²
Третій армійський корпус та придані підрозділи звільнили ще три населені пункти — Зелену Долину, Липове й Колодязі, — повідомив у своєму зверненні бригадний генерал Андрій Білецький. Протягом… pic.twitter.com/0Msxrau6yw
The Ukrainian project DeepStateUA, which is close to the army and respects the operational silence it has declared, also published its map of the area.
The latest version includes the liberation of the villages of Kolodiazi, Zelena Dolyna and Lypove. However, this is not new information but merely reflects changes that have been discussed since August.
Russian sources, especially Rybar, have also repeatedly reported that fighting is actually taking place further east. According to them, Ukrainian soldiers have already reached several locations, including the village of Terny on the Zherebets River. This area is marked red on DeepStateUA’s map, indicating that it is under Russian control.
Poland’s Thorkill has more recent data. Over the weekend, it published a map consistent with Rybar’s claims that Ukrainians had reached the Zherebets near Terny and further north.
Sytuacja w rejonie Nowego (Łyman), część IV.
Po blisko miesięcznej przerwie wczoraj w Donbasie była w końcu bezchmurna pogoda i można było przyjrzeć się na Sentinelu co się mniej więcej dzieje na tych najciekawszych odcinkach frontu. Jeżeli chodzi o rejon na płn od Łymanu -… pic.twitter.com/2yods3H3Yk
A Ukrainian drone pursued and caught up with a Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter in Kharkiv region. The Russians were on a combat mission; the footage clearly shows a missile being launched. The outcome of the attack is not yet known.
Ukraine's 115th Mechanized Brigade "Aliens" struck a Russian Mi-28 with drone, downing it pic.twitter.com/wefYKaMDk4
The following photographs are related to the previous video. The image on the left appeared on the Russian internet at the beginning of the month, described as the result of an FPV drone strike. It is currently unknown whether this is the same incident or another, as yet unidentified one.
In early October, Russian sources published photos showing damage to the right side of a Mi-28 attack helicopter, specifically the pneumatic emergency escape ladder just below the pilot’s cockpit, claiming it had been hit by an FPV drone.
A 12.7mm US heavy machine gun being fired. The close-up footage shows what the trigger looks like, but above all reveals the tactics for using the weapon. The machine gunner fires a short burst at Russian positions, then reports over the radio that the task has been completed.
A confirming “plus, plus” is heard twice from the other end — “plus” is used in radio communication to confirm receipt of a message — after which the soldier covers the machine-gun position with a camouflage net and goes into hiding to avoid being detected by Russian drones.
Ukrainian soldier supresses Russian assault with a Browning M2 from WW2.
Only the Ukrainian version of events is known about the footage below. It shows civilians from the Kupiansk area attempting to move to safety. However, they are struck by fire while on the move — the number of casualties is unknown and they cannot be seen in the footage.
According to the Khartiia unit, which published the video, the Russian army subjected the group to artillery and mortar fire. The claim cannot be verified. In any case, it illustrates that it is a mistake to remain in areas affected by fighting.
Цивільні – живий щит росіян, а потім – їхня мішень для інформаційної провокації.
У Купʼянську вранці 13 жовтня росіяни прикривалися мирними жителями, виводячи їх до труби газогону, й самі ж накрили групу мінометним та артилерійським вогнем. Серед людей були жінки та дитина. pic.twitter.com/lB6AGd7fFk
By Tuesday (13 October), Russia had verifiably lost 24,192 pieces of heavy equipment (24,170 on Monday, 5 October). Of these, 19,155 (19,133) were destroyed by Ukrainians, 1,002 (1,003) were damaged, 1,194 (1,194) were abandoned by their crews, and 2,841 (2,840) were captured by the Ukrainian army. This includes 4,453 (4,452) tanks, of which 3,358 (3,357) were destroyed in combat.
Ukraine lost 12,259 (12,238) pieces of equipment, of which 9,652 (9,633) were destroyed, 713 (711) damaged, 695 (695) abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) captured. This includes 1,471 (1,466) tanks, of which 1,131 (1,126) were destroyed in combat.
Note: Neither side regularly reports on its own dead or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. This overview uses data from the Oryx project, which has compiled a list of equipment losses documented exclusively by photographs since the start of the war.
The European Union has continued its scientific cooperation with Israeli firms and institutions implicated in genocide and apartheid throughout Israel’s three-year old assault on Gaza. Such complicity must stop.
Israel has been associated with the €95.5bn Horizon Europe research and innovation programme (2021-2027), and, according to the European Commission’s detailed Horizon dashboard, the EU’s net contribution to Israel amounts to €1.02bn.
While much of the funding supports legitimate research, the programme also channels substantial resources to Israeli universities and companies, some closely connected to Israel’s military and security apparatus.
Pointing to just such EU-Israel collaboration, Francesca Albanese’s UN report “From economy of occupation to economy of genocide” published last year, estimated EU research funding to Israeli entities at over €2.12bn since 2014.
Horizon Europe funds collaborative projects and European Research Council grants.
But it is the European Innovation Council (EIC) and schemes which include the EIC Accelerator, the EIC STEP Scale-up and the Scaleup Europe Fund which are especially relevant to the question of EU complicity in Israel’s ongoing assault on Gaza.
Horizon Europe is formally limited to civilian research, but Israeli companies with links to Israel’s military and security establishment have received funding through these schemes.
In March 2026, for example, members of the European Parliament tabled a written parliamentary question asking the European Commission specifically about such companies including Sightec, an Israeli drone-navigation firm that received almost €2.5m through the EIC Accelerator and whose chief executive has described its technology as “combat-proven and deployed on over 3,000 drones in critical missions”.
The issue is not confined to overtly military applications. EU-funded civilian technologies can also serve Israel’s settler-colonial project.
Should European public money finance, for example, orange-harvesting robots that help Israel manage what it euphemistically calls a “labour shortage” in settlements built on occupied Palestinian land?
The EIC also goes beyond grants. Through the EIC fund, the EU can take equity in companies it supports; the new Scaleup Europe Fund is explicitly designed to make direct equity investments in strategic technology firms, and is open to companies based in countries associated with Pillar III of Horizon Europe, including Israel.
The EU can therefore not only subsidise Israeli technology firms but also acquire a financial stake in them and potentially profit from their future growth.
And it could get worse.
The EIC’s 2026 work programme expands the type of projects that can be funded by including ‘dual use’ applications that are both civilian and military.
This opens the door for the EU to fund nuclear-related Israeli projects although Israel is not a member of the European Atomic Energy community (Euratom).
But none of this is inevitable.
Next EU budget and credibility at stake
Israel’s association with the current Horizon Europe programme runs only until 2027 and the shape and scale of the EU’s next Horizon programme will be decided during ongoing negotiations on the bloc’s seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).
There are also clear signs that Israel is likely to participate in the next Horizon programme (2028-2034).
Only a few weeks ago, Ekaterina Zaharieva, European commissioner for startups, research and innovation, met with the head of the Israel Space Agency, Shimrit Mama.
European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and her team must ask themselves if the EU should be building an innovation architecture in which Israeli firms and state institutions, which are already deeply integrated into Israel’s military-industrial ecosystem, could receive European support for technologies explicitly framed as dual-use or defence-related.
Are they comfortable with funding companies that help develop the type of violent technologies described in the award-winning documentary NAZA, which exposes the systems and AI technology used during the military campaign in Gaza?
Audience members hold signs supporting Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor’s documentary Naza after it wins the European Film Audience Award at the 74th San Sebastian Film Festival in Spain, 26 September 2026 (Source: EPA/JUAN HERRERO)
Last year, under public pressure, von der Leyen proposed a partial suspension of Israel’s participation in Horizon Europe by specifically excluding Israeli entities from new EIC Accelerator grants and investment support.
The proposal was modest: it would have affected future funding only, not existing agreements, and covered roughly 20 percent of EU financial flows to Israel under the programme.
It required a qualified majority in the Council but did not secure the necessary votes. It is, however, technically “still on the table”, according to commissioner Zaharieva.
Nobel Peace Prize winner Navi Pillay concluded in 2025 that Israel’s actions have “consistently pointed toward a singular, harrowing objective – the destruction of Palestinian life in Gaza”.
The EU has done little so far to stop the genocide in Gaza and ethnic cleansing in the occupied West Bank, and arguably – through trade and weapons’ exports – is actually contributing to it.
Now the EU faces a clear choice. It can continue to fund, co-invest in and deepen research ties with an Israeli innovation sector increasingly oriented towards dual-use and defence technologies.
Or it can stand with the winner of the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize, draw a line and decide that there will be no Israeli participation in the next Horizon programme, no EU equity in Israeli firms, and no public money for technologies that may be used to sustain genocide, occupation, surveillance and war.
The credibility of the EU and the values it proclaims depends on the choice it makes.
The Irish text, known in Brussels as the negobox, keeps all three of the commission’s borrowing programmes that sit outside the budget’s normal limits: Catalyst Europe, a €150bn lending facility; a crisis mechanism of up to €395bn for major unforeseen shocks; and support for Ukraine of up to €100bn.
Add loans for defence and lending to other non-EU countries and, by our estimates, joint borrowing could still equal around 44 per cent of the new budget, about €800bn at current prices, up from 41 per cent under the Commission’s proposal. The budget shrinks, but the borrowing hardly changes.
Ireland’s proposed budget is too small for Europe’s mounting common challenges, and its borrowing approach is too ad hoc and risky.
Excluding the distorting effects of NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the Covid recovery fund, the Commission’s budget proposal is already far smaller than the headline figures suggest, and Ireland’s proposal would make it smaller still.
That matters because, as the Draghi report argued, Europe’s shared challenges such as Ukraine, rearmament and competitiveness require European public goods because no single member state captures their full benefits.
A budget worth just over one percent of the EU’s gross national income (GNI) is a poor match for that responsibility.
By comparison, total government expenditure across EU countries comes to close to half of their combined GNI. Keeping most fiscal capacity at national level, while expecting such a modest EU budget to finance increasingly vital continental priorities, is a bad use of public resources.
A stronger common budget needs more of its own revenue, at least what the Commission proposes in its Own Resources Decision, which Parliament broadly supports and which would raise nearly €60bn extra a year.
The Irish plan’s acceptance of five new resources is encouraging. But it has to survive the negotiations, and the details of the final reform will decide whether it means anything.
The Council’s approach to common borrowing remains haphazard, lacking a permanent framework and relying on crisis-driven compromises. Governments may not like it, but a more European approach is coming, and the €800bn is likely to grow.
And a successor to SAFE, the EU’s defence loan scheme, is widely expected, since €150bn has proved far from enough for Europe’s rearmament.
France has just shown what it costs to borrow alone. Its yields recently hit a 24-year high, and the state now pays more to borrow than some major French companies. Sharing the effort through the common budget, including prudent joint borrowing, would help spread that risk.
Yet Europe has no clear, sustainable plan for borrowing. To date, EU governments have reluctantly signed up to each new borrowing instrument and called it an exception.
European borrowing capacity has been assembled one crisis at a time, starting with the euro area crisis and accelerating since the pandemic.
NGEU was accepted by fiscally cautious states as a one-off decision to deal with the Covid-19 emergency. Then the war in Ukraine and the need to fund rearmament produced new exceptions.
This year, EU governments used enhanced cooperation, a procedure that lets a subset of member states go ahead without the rest, to approve the €90bn Ukraine Support Loan, the EU’s largest foreign loan ever.
For defence, they reached for Article 122, the treaties’ emergency clause, to set up SAFE. Parliament, which felt sidelined, decided to sue the Council before the European Court of Justice.
There is a catch though.
These exceptional programmes are guaranteed by the so-called budget headroom, the margin between the EU’s revenue ceiling and the spending limits in the seven-year budget, rather than by money set aside in advance.
In barely five years, headroom-backed exposure has climbed to €681bn (see Figure 1), 82 percent of all EU debt.
The European Court of Auditors has warned that if a Ukraine loan guaranteed this way goes bad, future EU budgets, and the national contributions that fund them, would have to cover the loss.
Frugals vs Friends of Cohesion
EU capitals remain divided over the new budget and over joint borrowing. Net contributors, sometimes referred to as the Frugal Six, want deep cuts in the commission’s proposal, argue that new common borrowing is not the solution and have misgivings about the creation of new own resources.
By contrast, a group of sixteen southern and eastern countries, that call themselves the “Friends of Cohesion”, are much more open to joint borrowing and back an approach closer to the Commission and Parliament on the budget and own resources.
Ireland’s plan largely reflects the influence of the frugal countries, yet one diplomat has already dismissed it as “not even close to a landing zone.”
Europe needs an ambitious budget, backed by at least the Commission’s proposed new own resources, so it relies less on national contributions based on GNI. Joint borrowing should become a permanent, predictable part of it, with safeguards.
First, it should fund loans, not grants, as the Commission suggests. Second, riskier exposures, especially to non-EU countries, should be at least partly backed by money set aside in advance, as the Court of Auditors recommends.
Where it makes sense, the headroom guarantee could be topped up with national guarantees in proportion to each country’s size, as under SURE, and like-minded partners outside the EU could sometimes take part.
Stronger capital at institutions such as the EIB, or at any future defence-financing vehicle, would also let Europe borrow more together without putting its creditworthiness at risk.
Governments should also consider deferring repayment of the NGEU bonds, as the Draghi report suggested, especially if the own-resources reform falls short. It would protect priority spending when it is needed most.
Sustained joint borrowing brings a bonus: more common safe assets in euros, which strengthens the euro’s international role. The demand is already there.
Wobbles in US bond markets, which partly reflect doubts about America’s fiscal health, its reliability as a partner and the dollar’s safe-haven status, give the euro an opening.
But it can only take it if EU governments put their own fiscal houses in order.
Ongoing tensions in the French bond market provide a clear warning. Putting France’s finances on a sustainable path would do more than reassure markets about the euro. It would restore French debt as a safe euro asset.
EU leaders meet on Thursday and Friday in Brussels. Whatever they discuss (and later decide) on the budget, Europe should keep borrowing together, and in large amounts.
The task now is to give that borrowing a coherent plan: a permanent framework, money set aside in advance and safeguards that cautious capitals can accept.
Belgium’s foreign minister has called on the EU to deepen its economic, trade, and defence ties with Turkey, amid concerns from Ankara that it risks being shut out of the bloc’s new rules on industrial supply chains and multi-billion euro defence procurement scheme.
Speaking at a Turkey-EU business forum in Brussels on Tuesday (13 October), Belgian foreign minister Maxime Pévot said that European manufacturers were increasingly looking for reliable partners closer to home as they seek to reduce their reliance on Chinese inputs.
“We should make values of its proximity, particularly in sectors where Europe needs to reduce strategic dependencies,” he added.
“Our economic relationship should no longer be limited to buying and selling goods. We should also be developing, producing, and investing together,” he said.
For his part, following talks with Ankara’s trade minister, Ömer Bolat, EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič told reporters that the two sides had agreed on reforms to Turkey’s import control system to make the system easier for EU exporters to use and a mutual recognition pact on trusted traders.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.
Find the full transcript below:
Two ships have been hit by drones in Bulgarian waters in the Black Sea on Monday. Several other ships have been targeted in recent weeks, at a time when Russia is intensifying its attacks on Ukraine.
So, at what point does a hybrid attack become an attack on Nato? On Monday, two ships were hit by drones in the Bulgarian economic zone in the Black Sea.
One of them sank, with 11 crew members missing. The second vessel, which belonged to Ukraine, was damaged but did not sink, and all 15 people on board were rescued.
A week earlier, two other cargo ships had been attacked by drones in the same area, killing 10 people. And on 5 October, a Turkish cargo ship carrying grain was sunk by drones shortly after leaving Ukraine.
There is currently no evidence proving that Russia was behind these attacks, and Moscow has not claimed responsibility.
But that did not stop Bulgarian Prime Minister Roumen Radev from summoning Russia’s ambassador. Radev said that, while there was no conclusive evidence, the outcome of these attacks clearly benefited Russia more than anyone else.
Russia’s ambassador to Bulgaria, Eleonora Mitrofanova, said she had received no information from the Russian defence ministry about the attacks. She also suggested that they could have been provocations carried out by a third party.
And that uncertainty is important, because it makes it much harder for Nato countries to decide when an incident should be treated as an attack.
So how do Europeans cope with these attacks? We’ve already seen several Russian drones end up inside EU territory in recent months. And in some cases, they have been clearly identified.
Take the Russian drone that crashed on a residential building in the Romanian city of Galați in May and injured two people. Or the two drones found at Leipzig airport in Germany this summer, charged with explosives. They were all identified as Russian.
So far, however, the response has consisted mainly of diplomatic measures and political statements. Neither Bulgaria nor Germany has requested formal consultations under Article 4 of the Nato treaty.
Article 4 allows a Nato member to ask for consultations when it believes its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened.
Bulgarian Prime Minister Radev has spoken with Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte about the incidents, which are serious enough to be discussed at Nato level. But Bulgaria has not gone as far as triggering Article 4.
One reason is precisely the ambiguity surrounding all these drone attacks: who is controlling them, whether they were deliberately sent into EU territory, and whether they were jammed or diverted.
But if an attack were clearly attributed to Russia, how would Nato respond? That’s one of the questions currently being discussed within the alliance.
On Monday, Nato’s top military commander, US General Alexus Grynkewich, said he did not believe a conflict between Russia and Nato was imminent or inevitable.
But he also presented what Nato calls a “theory of victory”: a plan designed to ensure that the alliance could rapidly neutralise an enemy attacking one of its members.
The strategy rests on several pillars. One is establishing clear red lines that an adversary should not cross. Another is investing in new military technologies, with drones playing a central role. And the third is maintaining the ability and readiness to fight at short notice.
The idea is not only to be able to respond if a direct attack happens, but also to deter Russia from continuing what Nato describes as hybrid activities against its members.
Last month, a coalition of economists, politicians and AI experts released a report entitled Transformative AI Strategy for Europe. It provides yet more disturbing analysis of Europe’s deep dependency on overseas providers of essential AI. The concept of ‘Transformational AI’ is clearly gaining currency among policy elites as are the dangers it represents.
Co-signatory of the report, ex vice president of the European Commission, Margaret Vestager rightly comments: “We cannot allow Europe to become a playground for foreign powers. Our citizens are already bearing the economic and social consequences of decisions taken elsewhere. AI will accelerate this development, transforming our personal lives and relations, learning and jobs at an unprecedented pace.”
Unrelated to the report, European Central Bank chair Christine Lagarde has also said: “A withdrawal of access [to AI models], or a change in its terms, would … reach every sector at once … That is leverage of a kind no trade partner has ever held over Europe, and it could be used in any negotiation, on tariffs or on digital taxes, for example.”
This is going to be expensive
Yet the solutions proposed by this assembly of experts would exacerbate, not mitigate, the control over European economy and society currently wielded by a handful of ultra-dominant, mainly US-headquartered, corporations.
Two approaches are outlined by the signatories of the report. One is to invest and build European frontier models to compete and participate as equals in the transformation AI economy. This, however, is almost immediately written off as too costly and too high risk to undertake.
The second, strongly recommended route, suggests trading power and land for access to frontier models – Europe will fast-track Big Tech build out on European soil in exchange for “guaranteed” preferential access to their frontier models.
This is little more than capitulation to the dominance of that handful of mega corporations under the control of foreign regimes. It is ironically resonant, in times when we speak of frontier models, of Native Americans trading land for a few trinkets – and we know how well that worked out.
Naïve expectation
It is naïve in the extreme to expect to negotiate lasting privileged access to frontier models in return for power and land in Europe. For one thing – Big Tech already has this access. Europe has a weak hand if trying to extract conditions in return for inward investment to build capacity that it needs.
In addition, current behaviours suggest that corporations and nation states already appreciate and are leveraging the economic and political power that possession of leading frontier models confers. Export restrictions on latest models are already in place, as are mark-ups of 20-50 percent to run models within defined jurisdictional boundaries, like EU clouds.
This clearly illustrates that OpenAI, and surely others, are keeping the best models to use internally. It is therefore inconceivable that Europe, or anyone, will really be able to negotiate access to the true frontier – we would be paying more for a worse model. This is not how you get ahead.
Surrender is not an option
Europe needs sovereign capacity and models to benefit from, rather than become subject to, transformational AI. Europe does not have to accept the Big Tech narrative on what or where the frontier is. Deciding for ourselves how AI can and should be deployed to have the most beneficial impact and best support European values is within our control and is our responsibility.
Regulation gets a bad rap, but one reason we have regulation is to enforce the values we share as Europeans. We care about product safety, fairness, and personal freedom. We do not accept intellectual property theft at massive scale in the name of technological innovation.
We may never catch-up to the US or Chinese frontier Large Language Models, but perhaps we should not blindly accept this as the right race to run. Asking ourselves how can AI positively transform what we already value in Europe must be the first question: what do we really want AI for? Then, perhaps Europe can work on its own large but focused AI models to leapfrog and create AI transformation that matters to us and conforms to our ideals and values.
First, stop digging!
Action is clearly needed, and urgently. But the first step cannot be to negotiate away our assets be they land, power, data or values as part of a surrender to the status quo ante bellum.
The saying goes that when you find yourself in a hole (as Europe most surely is) stop digging. That means, as of now, stop giving new workloads to overseas AI and cloud giants by default.
We already have European alternatives for the majority of cloud services, and for AI, there are both European and open weight models that run with European providers – why are we not using them? Where there are gaps, we can develop bespoke European solutions with European providers. This creates reliable demand for homegrown AI models and compute capacity. It allows sovereign models to train and improve on sovereign data. Crucially, it deprives oversees models from using our data, resources and energy to further cement their control and dominance.
Buy or build European
Nudging public procurement towards European players grows the market and creates reliable demand against which venture capital and corporate funds can invest.
Only by flipping the paradigm – so that the default action is to consider how can we use or create a European solution first – can we fully prepare for the AI transformation and maintain our sovereign control.
If the day should ever come where Islamophobia gets concrete legal backing in Europe, it could be soon.
The European Parliament (EP) just voted to “condemn the strategies of Islamist entryism” and to develop ways to disrupt Muslim political movements in a resolution on 8 October.
Some 381 out of 720 MEPs worry Muslims are seeking to infiltrate democratic institutions, weaken European rule of law, gender equality, and what they deemed “European values”.
And almost every one of the centre-right and rightwing MEPs in the house voted to surveil EU funding for anti-racism organisations, so as to ensure none of it gets into the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The brotherhood is a transnational Muslim group founded in 1928 in Egypt, involved in religious revival, social welfare, and political activism.
But according to a French government memo from May 2025, as well as the EP resolution, it is guilty of “entryism”, to sabotage French democracy.
The EP resolution and French memo were dubbed “a political witch-hunt targeting racialised people – particularly Muslim, migrant and refugee communities” by academics and civil society, like the European Network Against Racism (ENAR).
The group called the EP motion “a stain” on the EU Parliament, belonging “within the tradition of discredited far-right conspiracy theories.”
ENAR is among those the EU has sought to defund, due to rightwing views that its work aligns with Islamist threats.
The Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO), a pan-European anti-Islamophobic group, which also risks EU defunding, said it had faced “relentless targeting and demonisation.”
Young Muslims in Europe were being forced “to choose between their identity and their right to belong,” FEMYSO president Hiba Latreche told EUobserver.
And the EP “witch-hunt” resolution, which was drafted by the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) group and authored by its French MEP, Céline Imart, comes at a bad time for this demographic.
Advocacy group Collective Against Islamophobia in Europe (CCIE) recently looked at 876 incidents of anti-Muslim hatred in Europe in 2025.
Four out of five incidents targeted Muslim women, 41 percent of which involved discrimination or violence linked to their headscarves.
Disturbingly, the documented episodes “occur predominantly in public or institutional spaces, highlighting the persistence of forms of institutional racism.”
But seeing as the EU Commission’s own anti-Muslim hatred group has been inactive since 2024, the prevailing view in Brussels appears to be that rampant Islamophobia in the EU is less of a problem than the imputed influence of a nebulous Islamic movement from Egypt, which is better known for providing social care to deprived communities, than aiming to overthrow French president Emmanuel Macron.
The EP motion did not legally bind the European Commission to propose new anti-Muslim Brotherhood measures.
But it did enforce a stereotype of Muslims “as acting in a nefarious, dangerous, anti-democratic manner, until proven otherwise,” said Omran Shroufi, a political science researcher at the Free University of Brussels.
Rightwing EU politics is pushing young European Muslims into a lose-lose, or Catch 22 situation.
The notion of “entryism holds Muslims to an impossible standard, where non-participation in public life is a sign of disinterestedness, a lack of civic duty and the growth of parallel societies, whilst active engagement in civic life is treated with suspicion,” Shroufi told EUobserver.
The centre-right EPP group used to represent a moderate EU mainstream.
But now it had joined with open racists on Europe’s far right to be “effectively calling for an institutionalised form of discrimination, where Muslim communities need to prove their European and democratic values – whatever these are supposed to mean – before being allowed a seat at a table,” Shroufi said.
Almost half of workers helping families care for children, older people, and people with disabilities, who provide vital domestic support in Europe, have considered quitting due to low pay and bad working conditions, a labour-union report found on Tuesday (13 October).
The 2026 personal and household services (PHS) employment monitor drew on more than 8,000 responses from workers, service users, and employers in 36 countries.
Around one in four respondents worked between 35 and 40 hours per week.
Meanwhile, six in 10 workers reported work-related musculoskeletal disorders, including back pain and tendon inflammation.
One in four also said they had experienced or witnessed verbal abuse, while nearly 15 percent had experienced either sexual harassment, physical, and/or sexual violence.
Care poviders’ mental health is impacted, with around six out of 10 reporting sleeping issues.
But these same workers play “an essential role in providing a dignified life for everybody in our ageing European societies,” Oliver Roethig, regional secretary of UNI Europa said in a statement.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
Russia is estimated to be recruiting 10 percent fewer soldiers this year than last, despite regions raising signing bonuses.
There is growing talk that criminal gangs have begun to take part in recruiting “volunteers”.
According to the Ukrainians, Russia is losing large numbers of soldiers, and October could be a record month.
Attacks on the land route to Crimea continue, reportedly prompting Russia to transport fuel in jerry cans in smaller vehicles.
Map of the day: Where Russia is advancing and where Ukraine is advancing
Videos of the day: Ukrainians hit a Russian radar; a man surfed on a Russian drone near Odesa; speculation spreads that Iran is supplying Russia with fuel.
Many Russians have left Russia in recent months. They feared the mobilisation that had been so widely discussed. Ukrainians said Russian president Vladimir Putin might resort to it after the September parliamentary elections. Many Russians fled to Armenia and Georgia, affecting rental prices in the capitals of these Caucasus states.
So far, no mobilisation has taken place. Russia continues to rely on its existing system of voluntary — and, in some places, involuntary — recruitment of new soldiers in Russian regions.
German economist Janis Kluge, who tracks regional data, wrote last week that Russia recruits around 1,000 new soldiers a day (30,000 a month). That is less than last year — down six percent in September and 10 percent over the year as a whole.
Nor did it help that, by his estimate, the sum paid by regions as a signing bonus had risen from $16,000 (€14,000) to $22,000.
In some places, recruitment is also beginning to move into the illegal sphere. Kluge wrote that local criminal gangs were now becoming involved in the system.
He mentioned the case of a prosecutor in Nizhny Tagil, a city of 400,000 in the Urals. In September, he appealed to the budget committee of the local duma.
He complained that signing bonuses for Russian soldiers were leading to an increase in crime in the city. He called for payments to agents who find volunteers willing to sign an army contract to be stopped.
According to Kluge, the prosecutor complained that criminal elements had become involved in recruitment in the city. He said an agent received $4,500 for finding one person to sign a contract.
Many turned to gangs to help them, with the assistance of corrupt police officers or military recruiters who are part of the scheme. “And this ‘persuasion’ may also involve violence, as another case from Sverdlovsk region shows: two criminals forced their victims to sign contracts and then seized their bonus payments,” Kluge wrote.
In Nizhny Tagil, 580 new soldiers were recruited last year, compared with 330 this year. It is not known how many of them criminal gangs helped to “persuade” in exchange for payment. In any case, the city does not want to change its system of rewards for agents because, in the words of the deputy mayor, it helps “fulfil our tasks”.
Overall, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Russia to supply enough manpower to the front. Moreover, it is currently losing large numbers of soldiers there, and October’s losses could even be record-breaking.
Ukraine publishes daily figures for killed and wounded Russian soldiers. These figures cannot be verified and may be inflated, but the trend suggests that the situation is worsening for Russia.
The table below also shows this. According to it, Russia lost around 46,000 soldiers in September — more than 1,500 a day — making it, according to Ukrainian data, the second-worst month since the start of the war. The figure was higher only in December 2024.
This October is on course to become Russia’s worst month in this respect. By the 12th day of the month, Russia had been losing an average of 1,620 soldiers per day. If Ukraine maintains this pace, it will be a record.
Number of Russian military casualties per month, according to Ukraine. Source: minfin.com.ua
Naturally, the question is how much these figures can be trusted. However, the Unmanned Systems Forces, a unit commanded by Robert Brovdi, known as Magyar, also publish figures for killed and wounded Russian soldiers.
The Ukrainian units under its command compete with one another over which can strike more Russian targets. They receive points based on this, which they can then use to buy more drones. Individual strikes should therefore be confirmed by video.
Given this, the data published by the Unmanned Systems Forces can be considered credible. They too indicate that October could be a record month, although their data cover only one-third of Russia’s total losses.
Number of Russian soldiers killed and wounded by SBS drones
The total number of Russian soldiers hit by Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS), and the number of those killed. These figures should be verified by video evidence. Red: killed; Orange: wounded; Pink: expected killed; Yellow: expected wounded. Source: Datawrapper/SBS.
Record-high losses and less substantial numbers of newly recruited soldiers suggest that Russia may have difficulties replenishing its units and, consequently, advancing further in Donbas or elsewhere.
Attacks on the land route to Crimea continue. Last week, French OSINT analyst Clément Molin published a table according to which the number of Russian lorries and trucks struck had reached a record 770. Several videos show that the number of attacks on vehicles heading to Crimea or to the front in southern Ukraine remains high. They are simply not discussed as much because this is no longer new.
I continue, on my side, to gather statistics on these mid-range strikes against logistics, not only in southern Ukraine, but also near Donetsk or Luhansk.
In September, at least 770 trucks/vehicles were targeted, only on the videos published by Ukraine more than 20km from the… pic.twitter.com/w9DrQTnGEM
Ukraine also destroyed the Chonhar bridge, which connects Ukraine with the Crimean peninsula. Russia has used a pontoon bridge there instead. This video shows Russian cargo vehicles crossing the pontoon bridge.
Russian truck drivers crossing into Crimea via a pontoon crossing at Chonhar, with a view of the damaged Chonhar Bridge and its support structures, before one of its spans collapsed. September 2026. https://t.co/YLDiB7lJQupic.twitter.com/3oU4GVylDd
The commander of Ukraine’s 41st Pilum Unmanned Systems Regiment, part of the 1st Azov Corps, recently provided interesting information on this issue. In an interview with Radio NV, he confirmed that the number of medium-range strikes was not declining and was increasing in some areas.
He said that the operational zone overseen by Ukraine extended from 30 to 300 km.
According to him, Russia is trying to bring as much fuel as possible to the front. Soldiers need generators to charge equipment, power radios and drones, and keep warm.
However, Ukrainian attacks on fuel tankers are reducing Russia’s ability to bring fuel to the front. According to the commander, in the Dobropillia direction, where his unit operates, Russia began transporting fuel in convoys this summer and switched to distributing it in passenger cars or small trucks, carrying the fuel in jerry cans.
This does not, of course, apply to all directions. However, an ongoing stream of new videos also confirms the destruction of fuel tankers.
Map of the day
Russian president Vladimir Putin’s latest — though certainly not final — deadline for capturing Donbas is by the end of this year. As on 14 previous occasions, it will not be met.
Unlike in previous years, however, it appears entirely possible that by the end of the year the territory of the free part of Donetsk region could be even larger than it is now. This is suggested by a map published by French OSINT analyst Clément Molin. It highlights areas where Ukraine is advancing and areas where Russia is pushing forward.
As can be seen, Russian forces largely hold the initiative in the north of Kharkiv region and at one location in the south of Zaporizhzhia region.
In the crucial Donetsk region, however, the situation is balanced; indeed, it could be said that Ukraine holds the initiative in more places. More specifically, it is clearing the northern area above Lyman and pushing further south towards Velyka Novosilka.
Ukraine’s 15th Reconnaissance Artillery Brigade published a video showing it striking a Russian 96L6 radar. This is a key component of the S-300 and S-400 air-defence systems.
The radar can be seen moving and hiding in a tree line. Nevertheless, a Ukrainian drone struck it. It is unclear whether it was actually destroyed, as the accompanying text claims.
Ukraine’s 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Brigade “Black Forest” located and destroyed a Russian 96L6 radar, a key detection component used with S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. The radar is valued at around $50 million and has a stated detection range of up to 300 km. #Ukrainepic.twitter.com/1K4BUZXZrg
A man near Odesa decided to surf on a downed Russian drone floating on the water off the coast. It hardly needs to be said that this is a fairly risky pastime. However, it indicates how at least some residents of Odesa view the daily Russian attacks.
❗️In 🇺🇦Odesa, a man decided to go surfing on a downed Russian kamikaze drone “Geran”. pic.twitter.com/l3MG3YkQiz
This could be a potentially rather interesting plot twist. The United States is at war with Iran, which has raised petrol and diesel prices at US filling stations. Donald Trump therefore agreed with Putin to import diesel from Russia. Russia itself, however, does not have enough diesel and has to import it.
This video shows a tanker truck with Iranian registration plates in Russia. Some infer from this that Iran is importing diesel — or other fuels — into Russia, which then sends diesel to America, despite America being at war with Iran.
However, it is too early to draw conclusions: we do not know what is in the truck or how many such Iranian tankers are heading to Russia. In any case, Russia is helping Iran in other ways.
A Western official told Bloomberg that Russia was supplying Iran with missiles that it uses in the war against the US and Israel. It was also previously reported that Russia was helping Iran target US bases in the region.
⚡️BREAKING: Convoys carrying Iranian Diesel Fuel are on their way to Russia, where there is a Fuel Shortage
This also raises the question of whether the fuel Russia exports to the United States might originate from Iran pic.twitter.com/J9Fzk7LVDa
By Tuesday (13 October), Russia had verifiably lost 24,192 pieces of heavy equipment (24,170 on Monday, 5 October). Of these, 19,155 (19,133) were destroyed by Ukraine, 1,002 (1,003) damaged, 1,194 (1,194) abandoned by their crews, and 2,841 (2,840) captured by the Ukrainian army. The total includes 4,453 (4,452) tanks, of which 3,358 (3,357) were destroyed in combat.
Ukraine lost 12,259 (12,238) pieces of equipment, of which 9,652 (9,633) were destroyed, 713 (711) damaged, 695 (695) abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) captured. The total includes 1,471 (1,466) tanks, of which 1,131 (1,126) were destroyed in combat.
Note: Neither side regularly reports its dead or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. This overview uses data from the Oryx project, which has compiled a list of equipment losses documented exclusively by photographs since the start of the war.
The European Commission is promising more support to Egypt, even as Egyptian warplanes reportedly bomb in Sudan and authorities carry out a campaign of violence against the refugees it hosts.
The civil war in Sudan includes reports of genocide, chemical-weapons use, mass rape, and starvation, forcing some 1.2 million Sudanese people into Egypt, which was described as a priority migration-busting partner by commission president Ursula von der Leyen on Tuesday (13 October), who also promised continuing support for Cairo.
In a letter sent to the 27 heads of state and government ahead of an EU summit on Thursday in Brussels, she spoke of “offering protection and durable solutions in … host countries”, as well as further aid for Sudanese people who had returned to parts of the country, now deemed relatively safe.
But her warm words stand in sharp contrast to internal EU documents on Sudan, released by the London-based group Statewatch earlier this month, and which speak of an Egyptian-led campaign of violence against the Sudanese it is tasked to help.
“The Egyptian authorities have continued arbitrary arrests, detention and deportation campaign against migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, with a sharp escalation of forced deportations being observed since January 2026,” said the Irish EU presidency, in an internal document written in September.
Estimates suggest Egypt hosts over nine million migrants and refugees.
Some 80 percent are Sudanese, Syrian, Yemeni, and Libyan nationals. Of those, just over 1 million are officially registered as refugees. Most come from Sudan.
And Egypt’s crackdown also comes amid a massive 74 percent funding cut for the UN’s refugee agency in the country, even as the EU’s financial support to Cairo increases, already totalling €5bn.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
Britain is expected to push for a new post-Brexit trade deal and increased information-sharing on immigration at a UK-EU summit in Brussels next month.
This comes as Andy Burnham, the country’s prime minister, says the post-Brexit “status quo is not good enough for Britain”, in a hint that he might seek to rejoin the European Union.
And, more than a decade after the Brexit vote, he also accused Russia of having meddled in the 2016 British referendum.
The UK leader will meet European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and European Council president António Costa in Brussels on 20 November.
And Costa has also said that European and British security and prosperity are “closely intertwined”, while a closer relationship could “promote stability in Europe and beyond”.
Made in Europe and immigration
The November summit will be an opportunity to “raise concerns” about ‘Made in Europe,’ Burnham told members of UK MPs on Monday (12 October).
The ‘Made in Europe’ proposal in the Industrial Accelerator Act would require companies to source a certain number of parts from within the EU to be eligible for public money in strategic sectors.
But UK officials are worried the law could hurt British manufacturers, with Burnham expected to seek concessions.
But the British premier also wants to go further in renegotiating his country’s ties with the EU.
“On the table is a trade deal on food and drink products, a deal on emissions trading, progress towards linking our energy systems, a new youth experience scheme, and deeper cooperation on immigration,” he said.
Burnham aims to address an EU import ban on UK meat, seed potatoes, and shellfish and wants to reduce costs for shipping other goods to mainland Europe.
He also hopes for closer work between European and UK border forces on immigration.
“On immigration, we could link up our law enforcement efforts once again [since brexit], sharing more data and criminal records of foreign nationals,” Burnham said.
He may aim to rejoin the Schengen Information System, a database for border management and law enforcement cooperation in Europe.
And he could also pursue greater freedoms for UK citizens to live in the 27 member states.
“It would be a major dereliction of duty to turn away [from the EU]” the UK leader told parliament.
10 years on from Brexit vote
The last EU-UK summit, held in London in 2025, was already branded as a reset in relations across the English channel, with a new defence and security partnership, reciprocal access to fishing waters, and expansion of student exchanges.
And leaders are expected to build on the previous agreements by discussing defence, energy, and climate, as well as trade and migration, at their meeting next month.
But under the terms of the EU and UK’s legal divorce in 2020, the two sides remain bound by complex limitations.
And Burnham told MPs on Monday that renegotiating Britain’s relations with the EU could add over £10bn (€11.8bn) per year to the UK economy by 2040, “with the potential to add significantly more,” even if it did not rejoin.
Russian meddling?
Burnham also told a podcast on 11 October that Russia had meddled in the country’s Brexit vote 10 years ago.
Upon assuming office in July, Burnham asked officials if there had been Russian interference in the 2016 referendum, he told The Rest is Politics, and officials gave him a “clear answer that yes, there was.”
“We haven’t informed people [the general public] sufficiently,” he added, amid similar Russian electoral interference in France, Germany, and further afield in Europe.
For his part, British foreign secretary Stephen Doughty subsequently told the LBC broadcaster: “I don’t think [Russia] succeeded in their efforts to undermine our election”.
And Burnham also rowed back in the parliament debate on Monday when pressed by opposition MPs, by saying the outcome of the Brexit vote remained legitimate.
But he added that Russia’s meddling in the UK’s 2019 general election was a matter of record and that it was “inconceivable that this was the first time”.
Appetite for EU re-entry
Burnham also dropped hints on Monday that Britain could rejoin the European Union.
“One thing I think is true is that public opinion has moved more quickly than political opinion. I think the political class is behind the public on this issue,” he said.
“At every stage, the British public will be the boss,” he added, while promising a “pragmatic approach” to the hot-button issue, which has the potential to enflame right-wing anger in England.
“We need to draw a line on a decade of drift and division [from Europe],” he said.
But questions of a holding second referendum were “jumping ahead too far” according to Burnham.
The Westminster debate came after YouGov polling commissioned by Best for Britain, a pro-EU lobby group, indicated that pushing for closer EU ties would be politically advantageous for Burnham’s ruling Labour party.
The organisation also claimed Britain could reenter the union within five years.
Brexit was “not a sacred cow”, said Emily Thornberry, a fellow Labour MP, on Monday.
Sandro Gozi, an Italian liberal MEP and chair of the UK-EU parliamentary partnership assembly, also said in a statement: “As a former member, and with much of the regulatory framework already in place, I personally do not see any serious reason why an application from the UK would not be achievable.”
“When countries are already closely aligned to EU rules, such as was the case for Sweden and Finland, the process for accession is faster than for applicants essentially starting from scratch,” he said.
Centre-left MEPs are trying to convince the European Commission to withdraw its proposal to pause EU methane rules, if parliament or member states try to delay them for more than one year.
Last week, energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen announced that the commission would propose delaying the import rules, due to kick in on 1 January 2027, by a year, following months of pressure from member states, the White House, and oil and gas companies.
But in a letter sent on Monday (12 October) to commission president Ursula von der Leyen and three of her commissioners, five Socialists and Democrats (S&D) MEPs said any postponement must be “strictly limited to a single year.”
The letter, seen by EUobserver, was signed by S&D vice-president Mohammed Chahim, Tiemo Wölken, Jens Geier, Günther Sidl, and Thomas Pellerin-Carlin.
If parliament or member states try to push for a longer delay, the commission should “make full use of its right to withdraw the proposal,” they wrote, “as such changes would distort its purpose.”
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
“I’m okay.” That was the last message I sent my mother before an Israeli strike hit us, a group of seven journalists reporting in southern Lebanon.
Three years ago, on 13 October 2023, my colleague Dylan Collins and I headed to the southern border of Lebanon to cover the situation following cross-border shelling between Israeli forces and Hezbollah. We spent the morning filming UN peacekeeping force patrols along the blue line dividing Lebanon and Israel. The atmosphere was calm and nothing suggested that the day was about to change and upend our lives. We went to a coffee shop near a UN post where journalists from different outlets had gathered and there we met our friend and Reuters colleague Issam Abdallah.
Around 4:50PM, we heard a bombardment in a nearby town so we moved to an exposed hill in Alma Al-Shaab, where Al-Jazeera journalists Carmen Joukhadar and Elie Brakhya were positioned. Together with colleagues from Reuters, we were a group of seven journalists, all wearing press vests, reporting next to a car marked “TV”. We were clearly identifiable as press and spent about an hour filming while an Israeli drone hovered above us. At 5:57 I finished filing my photos and sent a message to my mother to tell her I was okay. Seconds later, I found myself on the ground, bleeding and screaming for help. Dylan rushed over with a tourniquet, but before he even had the time to put it, another strike hit.
Everyone disappeared and I was left alone, unable to move and the heat of the flames creeping closer to my face. I was terrified of burning alive, so I started crawling away with the camera still hanging from my neck and its strap tightening around my neck with every move. Two weeks later, I woke up from an induced coma with one leg missing, the other severely damaged, and Issam dead.
Not an isolated attack
What followed was as horrific and brutal as the attack itself and it didn’t stop there. What happened to us was not an isolated incident — for three years I watched journalists being killed in Lebanon and Gaza by Israeli forces in ways that felt painfully familiar.
In October 2024, Israeli forces struck a compound in Hasbaya where journalists were staying and killed media workers Ghassan Najjar, Mohammed Reda and Wissam Kassem, while they slept.
Human Rights Watch found no evidence of military activity at the site and concluded that the strike was deliberate and should be investigated as war crime.
Then in April 2026, journalist Amal Khalil was killed in southern Lebanon after an Israeli strike hit the building where she had taken shelter with her colleague Zainab Faraj, leaving both women trapped under the rubble. Investigations found that Israeli forces repeatedly obstructed rescue efforts.
Since our attack, dozens of journalists have been killed in Lebanon, and nearly 200 journalists have been killed in Gaza by Israeli forces.
Many have been mired by Israel with the same false allegations that they were “terrorists.” The dead can’t defend themselves against such accusations, but I survived and I can speak about what happened to us.
In June 2026 in an interview on France 2, Israel’s ambassador to France described the 13 October attack as a “mistake” saying that we were not targeted because we were journalists, but because Israeli forces had mistaken us for “terrorists.” The evidence tells a different story.
Five independent investigations by Agence France-Presse, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Reuters, and UNIFIL found no indication of fighters or military activity at the site, and no cross-border exchange of fire for more than 40 minutes before we were struck with a 120mm tank shell.
These investigations matter because they establish with certainty evidence beyond my own personal account.
What remains unanswered is who gave the order, who fired the double-tap strike, and why no one has been held accountable. These are basic questions that can be answered by Israel if they were sought by EU member states.
Three years on, Issam’s family and the survivors of this attack deserve to know: Who gave the order?
Evidence alone cannot deliver justice, someone must be willing to act on it. In the face of this attack, including the targeting of four of its own citizens on Lebanese soil, the Lebanese government has failed us.
Neither Lebanon nor Israel are party to the Rome Statute, meaning that the International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for the attack.
In 2024, Lebanon approved a special declaration that would have allowed the Court to investigate war crimes committed after 7 October 2023, only to later reverse its decision for political reasons.
And now, making our legal path even more complicated, in June 2026 Lebanon signed a new framework agreement with Israel whereby Clause 13 commits both sides to cease “all hostile and adverse actions in international and legal fora.”
EU urged to act
I have no hope left that we will ever get justice for what we lost, but I will not rest before I know the names and faces of those responsible.
Our case is the most documented instance of Israeli forces targeting the press on record. The October 13 targeted attack was perpetrated by Israeli forces on a group of journalists clearly identifiable as press.
If we cannot get answers in the face of such overwhelming evidence, what does it mean for the hundreds of journalists killed by Israeli fire throughout the region for which there is no such evidence?
This is where the European Union must act. The EU has repeatedly said that journalists must not be attacked and that violations of international law must be met with accountability. Today, we demand actions not just words and statements. The EU must demand that Israel provide a full account of the 13 October attack, including who ordered, authorized and carried out the strikes.
For me, this is not an abstract question of foreign policy. Issam was my friend. I survived that attack with one leg missing. I know what it means when the people responsible for an attack are allowed to remain unnamed and unaccountable.
I am asking the EU not simply to stand with journalists in words, but to stand with us in action.
The EU has political, diplomatic, and legal leverage. It should use it. If Israel refuses to fully explain what occurred and disclose those responsible for killing and maiming journalists who were visibly identifiable as press, EU member states should use every available mechanism to pursue accountability, including further targeted sanctions or suspending trade with Israel.
I refuse to believe that a military with advanced surveillance could have simply mistaken us for fighters and attacked us in a double-tap strike, a tactic repeatedly used by Israel in this war. But, if that’s truly what happened, then Israel must still answer for how such incompetence and failure was possible.
For now, justice evades us, but the truth of who gave the order is within reach and we must demand it.
EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.
Find the full transcript below:
The United States has imposed new sanctions on the International Criminal Court, this time targeting the institution itself. While the EU insists on its firm support for the ICC, it is still not using the one tool designed for this kind of situation: the blocking statute.
So, why is the EU holding back? First, a quick reminder of what we’re talking about. The International Criminal Court, or ICC, is based in The Hague. It tries people accused of the gravest crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
With one important limit: It can act when a crime is committed on the territory of a state that is party to the Rome Statute, or by one of that state’s nationals. The United States is not a party. Neither is Israel or Russia.
And Washington’s goal is clear: dismantling the court. The Trump administration considers it politicised and without legitimacy.
It is particularly opposed to the arrest warrant against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That’s why, since 2025, the US has imposed several rounds of sanctions, targeting judges and, more recently, the court’s president, the Japanese national, Tomoko Akane.
On Friday, Washington went a step further, targeting the court as an institution.
So what does that mean in practice? All of the court’s assets in the United States are frozen. And, crucially, American companies and citizens can no longer provide services to the court or its members.
You might remember the case of the ICC judge Nicolas Guillou, who has been under sanctions for some time. We’ve talked about him in a previous Briefed episode.
He has explained that he can no longer use basic services such as Mastercard, or online platforms like Airbnb. He has also been warning that these sanctions are meant to intimidate, and that they undermine judges’ independence.
In a state governed by the rule of law, judges must not be put under pressure. This explains why the court’s reaction is so strong. It speaks of an obstruction of justice and an attack on the rule of law. And it is now calling on its members to take concrete action to protect its independence.
In response, the European Commission and the European Council have expressed their support for the court and its work. But without going too far.
They say the EU is ready to take measures so that the court can keep functioning. Yet when the Commission is asked what those measures are, and this has happened several times in recent months, it sidesteps the question.
Because beyond negotiations and diplomatic pressure, there is a tool created for precisely this kind of situation: the so-called blocking statute. It protects Europeans against the extraterritorial reach of sanctions imposed by third countries.
It doesn’t concern American actors. It concerns European companies and individuals who, under the threat of secondary sanctions, may become overly cautious.
In the case of the ICC, it’s about the court’s European banks, insurers and service providers.
Several European countries have called for the blocking statute to be activated. Yesterday, at the Foreign affairs council in Luxembourg, the Belgian and Dutch ministers asked the Commission to start analysing whether to do so.
But for now, they are still waiting for an answer. The Commission believes the priority is to use the six months before the sanctions take effect to negotiate with Washington, possibly to get them withdrawn.
This approach was backed by several EU foreign ministers yesterday. Let’s see whether that window for dialogue is enough, or whether the pressure to activate the blocking statute keeps growing.
More than half of Europeans believe hens should no longer be caged, according to new data released on Tuesday (13 October).
And 75 percent of Europeans wanted the last hen in the EU out of its cage by 2035 at the latest, according to a poll conducted by Savanta on behalf of Humánny pokrok, an animal rights non-profit.
Pollsters asked 25,080 adults across 25 member states for their views on keeping hens in cages.
The results show that 16 percent of people were not sure when or if putting hens in cages should be banned, while 7 percent of Europeans supported hen-caging until at least 2045.
The survey comes five years after 1.4 million citizens signed the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) to ‘End the Cage Age’ and the European Parliament voted to endorse it.
‘Now is the time’
“This data shows millions of Europeans care about animal welfare,” said Barry Andrews, an Irish Renew MEP.
“Over 1.4 million signed the ECI, which was also supported by MEPs. Now is the time for the Commission to finally make a legislative proposal,” he added.
The delay in tabling legislation came after Copa Cogeca, a farming lobby group, insisted that banning hen cages could take up to 15 years.
But the new data says 52 percent of Europeans wish a hen cage ban was already in place.
The country most supportive of a hen cage ban was Austria, where 65 percent of people believed the last hen should have already left its cage, and 2 percent said cages for hens should never be banned.
Thomas Waitz, an Austrian Greens-group MEP, said an EU ban on animal cages is “long overdue” and urged Olivér Várhelyi, commissioner for health and animal welfare, to deliver an “ambitious timeline”.
“This long period of indecision is not just an affront to the European consumers who want better Animal Welfare, it also harms European farmers and producers who need reliable information for their investments,” Waitz said.
In Bulgaria, the member state which polled as least supportive, 33 percent of people believed the last hen should have already left its cage whereas 9 percent said cages should never be banned.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
On 15 September, the European Commission proposed a Skills Portability Act, a regulation designed to make qualifications digital, comparable, and easier to recognise across borders. It forms part of the Fair Labour Mobility Package and must still be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council before any of its measures can take effect.
It is a welcome step. But it leaves open a question that deserves more attention in Brussels: what happens to the skills young people develop every day but their diplomas and CVs do not capture?
Communication, teamwork, critical thinking, adaptability and resilience shape how people work with others and keep learning throughout their careers. Employers say they need these skills. According to the Commission’s 2023 Flash Eurobarometer, 74 percent of small and medium-sized enterprises reported shortages affecting at least one job role. Meanwhile, Eurostat found that in 2024 only 56.4 percent of people aged 15–34 in the EU with medium or high educational attainment reported a high or very high match between their field of education and the requirements of their current or last main job.
These figures measure different things and should not be read as pointing to a single cause. Together, though, they show that having qualified people and having the right capabilities in the right place are not the same thing. Young people build those capabilities in classrooms, vocational training, volunteering, creative projects and first jobs. Yet they struggle to show them in a form that an employer, particularly one in another country, understands and trusts.
The stakes are not abstract. In 2025, 11 percent of Europeans aged 15–29 were neither in employment nor in education or training. Skills recognition cannot resolve that on its own, but stronger links between learning and work are part of the answer.
In effect, we are asking young Europeans to cross borders with incomplete passports.
This is where micro-credentials can make a difference if they are built with credibility in mind. JA Europe coordinates EMPASS (Employment Skills Pass), an Erasmus+ Forward-Looking Project co-funded by the European Union. It brings together education providers, industry partners and Junior Achievement organisations to develop and validate an employability micro-credential covering 11 employability skills, from communication and teamwork to resilience and critical thinking.
The micro-credential was designed to be piloted with 1,500 students in Greece, Romania and Spain. According to the project’s latest monitoring figures, 2,700 young people now hold an EmPass certificate.
Beyond the pilot, the EMPASS approach is already demonstrating potential for wider uptake. The methodology has informed implementation and exploration activities in other countries, including Ukraine and Lithuania, and has been incorporated into wider youth employability initiatives such as the Global Alliance for Youth mentoring programme. This suggests that employability micro-credentials can be integrated into different learning and workforce-development contexts while maintaining a common framework for skills recognition.
A micro-credential does not replace a diploma, and no single certificate can capture everything a person brings to a job. Its value lies in complementing formal qualifications with clearer, validated evidence of what someone can do. The aim should not be another certificate that employers overlook.
Europe does not need more initiatives that show promise but struggle to reach scale. It needs bridges: between education and employment, between national systems, and policy ambition and lived experience. That means asking practical questions. Can a young person show the same verified capabilities to employers in different countries? Can employers see what microcredential assesses and how it was validated? Can schools and universities build it into existing pathways without adding administrative burden?
The answers will decide whether skills portability becomes opportunity or remains a policy ambition. They are also the focus of From Skills to Opportunity, a JA Europe forum in Brussels on 14 October, bringing together policymakers, employers, educators and youth organisations, including speakers from the European Commission, the World Employment Confederation and the European Vocational Training Association.
As the Skills Portability Act moves through parliament and council, Europe has a chance to put employability skills into the conversation from the start: not only how qualifications are recognised, but how capabilities developed through formal, non-formal and experiential learning can carry meaning across borders.
Employability skills are not an abstract policy debate. They are part of the foundation for participation, mobility, and opportunity in Europe’s labour market. The task now is to ensure that every young person carries a passport that employers recognise, wherever their learning and career take them.
Co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are, however, those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
EMPASS (Employment Skills Pass) is an Erasmus+ Forward-Looking Project, project no. 101132916.
Media contact: Irina Ilieva, Head of Marketing, Communications and Policy, JA Europe · irina@jaeurope.org · JA Europe aisbl, Victor Oudart 7, 1030 Brussels, Belgium
Login
