The EU’s border force Frontex is getting overhauled next Tuesday (27 October) by a European Commission determined to give the Warsaw-based agency a larger role in deportations, more resources, and more agility to deploy.

The Brussels-executive has already proposed increasing the agency’s budget to €12bn, spread out over seven years. The money is being discussed as part of a larger drawn out EU budget fight among EU states.

Budget tussles aside, the commission has already dropped clues into what it wants from the new agency, following demands from its political masters at the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP).

The EPP had wanted to expand the border force to 30,000 from the proposed 10,000. But it is unlikely the 30,000 will be met given the difficulty of finding recruits.

Frontex currently has around 1,250 officers, who are directly employed by the agency. Its standing corps also includes officers provided by member states on long- and short-term assignments. That means they are not all on the Frontex payroll.

European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, ahead of this month’s EU summit, instead spoke of a “substantial increase” of the Frontex standing corps, without committing to a number.

She also called for European Border and Return Reserve, a Quick Reaction Force for crisis deployment, a Return Coordination Centre to accelerate and improve returns including from foreign states, and social media snooping to gauge any possible Ceuta-like mass arrivals.

The agency is also likely to get more personal data sharing powers with the EU police force Europol.

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Twelve migrants, including an infant, have died in two separate incidents involving boats travelling from Turkey towards the Greek islands of Lesbos and Samos, prompting investigations into the circumstances of the deaths and the activities of suspected people smugglers.

The incidents occurred on Monday, 19 October, in the northeastern Aegean Sea. Six people died when a speedboat collided with a Greek coastguard vessel near Lesbos, while another six were killed after a separate boat overturned north of Samos.

The deaths coincided with the publication of new figures from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, showing that irregular crossings into the EU fell by almost one-third during the first nine months of 2026.

According to the latest border monitoring figures, approximately 91,000 irregular crossings were detected between January and September, although the eastern Mediterranean remained the busiest migration route into the Union.

Two incidents under investigation

According to information released by the Greek authorities, the first fatal incident occurred near Agrilia on Lesbos when a speedboat carrying migrants struck a coastguard patrol vessel before overturning.

Six people died, while eight survivors were taken to hospital. The authorities subsequently arrested a 37-year-old Turkish national, identifying him as the suspected operator of the migrant boat.

Greece’s Maritime Affairs Minister Vassilis Kikilias said the available evidence indicated that the speedboat had struck the left side of the coastguard vessel. The precise circumstances remain under investigation.

In the second incident, approximately four nautical miles north of Samos, a boat reportedly overturned after making a sudden manoeuvre while being pursued by the coastguard.

Five men and one woman died, while 14 people were rescued. An Iranian national was arrested on suspicion of involvement in migrant smuggling.

The arrests do not establish criminal responsibility, and the circumstances surrounding both incidents remain subject to investigation.

Greek authorities have attributed the dangers of the crossings to trafficking networks operating between Turkey and the Aegean islands. The government has reiterated its policy of pursuing smugglers and restricting unauthorised maritime arrivals.

Fewer crossings, continued fatalities

Frontex recorded approximately 31,800 detections along the eastern Mediterranean route during the first nine months of this year, representing a decline of around 15 per cent compared with the equivalent period in 2025.

Across the European Union’s external borders, the agency reported an even larger reduction, with overall detections down by almost one-third.

The Central Mediterranean route experienced a particularly substantial fall, while the Western Mediterranean recorded an increase, reflecting changes in departure points and migration patterns.

These figures count detected border crossings rather than individual migrants and do not necessarily capture every unauthorised arrival.

The latest data also have to be considered alongside exceptional developments elsewhere on Europe’s borders. In July, large-scale movements through Spain’s Ceuta enclave created additional pressures on Spanish authorities and raised questions about the application of the EU’s new asylum arrangements.

The eastern Mediterranean figures encompass several routes, including crossings from Libya towards Crete, movements through the Aegean islands and arrivals across the land border with Turkey.

Consequently, the total recorded for the wider region should not be interpreted solely as the number of people arriving on the Greek islands.

Greece remains central to European border policy

Greece has occupied a central position in EU migration policy since the 2015–2016 crisis, when hundreds of thousands of people arrived from Turkey, many travelling onwards through the Balkans.

The subsequent EU–Turkey migration arrangements were intended to reduce unauthorised crossings and establish procedures for returning certain migrants who did not qualify for protection.

Athens has also faced persistent criticism from human rights organisations concerning allegations of unlawful returns at sea and land borders. Greek authorities deny operating an unlawful pushback policy and maintain that their border operations respect domestic and international law.

The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, which entered into application in 2026, has introduced common procedures for screening arrivals, processing asylum claims and managing people who do not have permission to remain.

Its implementation has placed greater emphasis on border identification, biometric registration and cooperation between national authorities and Frontex.

However, the two disasters demonstrate the continued risks associated with maritime crossings, even during a period of declining arrivals.

Investigators must now establish precisely how both boats overturned, whether criminal offences were committed and what occurred during the encounters with coastguard vessels.

The findings will be relevant not only to the prosecutions of those arrested, but also to continuing scrutiny of maritime enforcement along one of the European Union’s principal external borders.

Spain’s government has declared that the first phase of its emergency response to the Ceuta migration crisis has been completed, following the arrival of an estimated 80,000 migrants from Morocco at the end of July.

Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska said on Friday, 16 October, that approximately 12,000 people had returned voluntarily to Morocco since August, while the authorities had expanded facilities to process asylum applications and return decisions.

Nevertheless, substantial administrative and humanitarian challenges remain in the Spanish enclave, particularly concerning people awaiting decisions on their legal status and unaccompanied minors. The situation has become an important test of the European Union’s revised migration and asylum legislation.

Unprecedented crossings at the African border

The crisis began on 30 July, when tens of thousands of people entered Ceuta from Morocco by land and sea following the circulation of misleading information on social media about access to Spanish territory.

According to an October briefing by the European Parliament’s Research Service, approximately 80,000 people crossed into the enclave during the incident, overwhelming local reception facilities and creating an emergency at one of the EU’s few land borders with Africa.

A subsequent European Parliament resolution referred to at least 141 deaths associated with the crossings, although the initial figure reported by Spanish authorities was lower. The exact number of people who crossed and the final death toll have remained subjects of uncertainty.

Most entrants returned to Morocco within days. However, thousands remained, leaving Spain responsible for assessing individual claims, arranging lawful returns and providing appropriate accommodation.

Ceuta’s geographical position complicates these procedures. Although the enclave is Spanish and forms part of the EU, travellers departing for mainland Spain remain subject to specific controls at its ports and airports.

Spain expands its processing capacity

During a visit to Ceuta on 16 October, Grande-Marlaska defended the government’s management of the emergency and announced that additional police resources would substantially increase administrative capacity.

The expanded temporary reception and processing facilities at El Tarajal are intended to handle at least 100 files daily, including applications for international protection and return procedures.

According to figures presented by the Interior Minister, approximately 1,200 applications for international protection had been formally submitted, with around 700 decisions already issued.

He also rejected allegations that the authorities had conducted concealed or involuntary returns, insisting that departures to Morocco had followed voluntary decisions or the appropriate legal procedures.

The minister said more than 500 expulsions had been executed through judicial or administrative decisions in recent months. These are distinct from the approximately 12,000 voluntary returns recorded since August.

The treatment of unaccompanied minors remains contentious. The European Parliament’s research briefing estimated that around 1,100 such minors were in Ceuta, including some who arrived before the July emergency.

Responsibility for their care has generated disagreement between the Spanish central government and Ceuta’s autonomous administration, particularly over guardianship, identification and the distribution of minors to other regions.

New EU asylum system faces a practical test

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which began applying in June 2026, was designed to strengthen external border procedures while establishing clearer responsibilities for Member States.

Its provisions include identity and security screening, accelerated procedures for certain asylum applications and a solidarity mechanism allowing countries to support those facing disproportionate migration pressures.

Under the screening rules, the authorities generally have up to seven days to complete the initial checks required for people apprehended after irregular entry.

However, the Ceuta emergency demonstrates the difficulty of applying individual administrative procedures when arrivals occur in exceptionally large numbers within a short period.

The geographical concentration of arrivals means that adequate staffing, interpretation, legal assistance and reception facilities become essential to ensuring the system operates within its prescribed deadlines.

Spain requested assistance from Frontex, Europol and the European Union Agency for Asylum in August. The Commission subsequently announced €114.7 million in emergency assistance in September.

Political dispute over migration policy

The crisis has widened divisions between European governments over border enforcement and the regularisation of migrants already living within the EU.

Italy and several other Member States have questioned whether Spain’s separate regularisation programme could encourage further irregular migration. Madrid rejects the suggestion that the programme caused the Ceuta crossings.

The Spanish scheme covers only people who met the residence requirements by the end of 2025. Those who arrived during the July 2026 crisis are not eligible.

European Parliament members also adopted a resolution in September calling for stronger protection of the EU’s external borders and greater cooperation with Morocco. The resolution characterised the crisis as involving the possible instrumentalisation of migration, although Spain has said it has no evidence establishing Moroccan government involvement.

The continuing administrative backlog, the position of minors and the effectiveness of EU assistance will determine how quickly Ceuta can return to ordinary border operations.

Beyond Spain, the episode raises a practical question for Brussels: whether Europe’s new asylum framework can maintain border controls and individual legal safeguards simultaneously during an exceptionally large and sudden influx.

Russia has placed five foreign-owned businesses under compulsory administration, including Belgian manufacturer Ontex and French flooring group Tarkett. The latest seizures deepen the confrontation over sanctions, frozen Russian assets and the future of European investment in Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the transfer of five Western-owned businesses into compulsory Russian management, extending a campaign of asset seizures targeting European companies that continued operating in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The decree, signed on 15 October, affects businesses with combined annual revenues exceeding 53 billion roubles, approximately €530 million. They include French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, Belgian hygiene products group Ontex, German packaging producer Menshen, Kappa Rus and Eviosys Packaging Kuban, now linked to American group Sonoco.

Under Presidential Decree No. 738, operational control has been transferred to Centre Capital, a little-known Moscow company established in February 2026 with registered share capital of just 10,000 roubles.

The decision follows similar interventions against Nestlé, Auchan, FM Logistic and Metro in September. Together, the measures demonstrate how Moscow is using foreign-owned businesses as instruments of economic retaliation against countries supporting Ukraine.

Foreign businesses placed under Russian control

Centre Capital is headed by Marat Mirkhaydarov, a former senior official in Russia’s Zabaykalsky region who reportedly served with the Akhmat military formation during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The scale of the companies placed under his management contrasts sharply with the financial standing of the administrator.

Tarkett’s Russian operations generated approximately 19.3 billion roubles in revenue during 2025, while Kappa Rus recorded 16.5 billion roubles and Ontex RU another 10.3 billion. Eviosys Packaging Kuban and Menshen Packaging CIS reported approximately 6.1 billion and 1.4 billion roubles respectively.

The decree does not formally transfer ownership of the companies to Centre Capital. It does, however, remove the foreign shareholders’ effective control over management, operations and commercial decisions.

For Belgian manufacturer Ontex, the consequences are immediate.

In an official statement issued on 16 October, the Aalst-based company confirmed that a government-appointed administrator had assumed operational control of its Russian subsidiary.

Ontex Russia employs approximately 350 people, operates a manufacturing facility in Noginsk and maintains a sales office in Moscow. The subsidiary accounts for around five per cent of the group’s total revenue and between seven and eight per cent of adjusted EBITDA.

The company said it was examining measures to protect its assets and maintain business continuity.

Tarkett likewise confirmed that it was losing effective control of its Russian operations.

A mechanism established in 2023

The legal framework for such interventions dates to April 2023, when Putin introduced Decree No. 302, allowing the Russian authorities to place assets associated with countries designated as unfriendly under temporary external management.

The appointed administrator can exercise extensive ownership-related powers, although the formal right to dispose of the assets remains excluded.

Crucially, the arrangement can be terminated only by presidential decision. There is no automatic deadline for returning operational control to the original owners.

Moscow maintains that the measures are reversible. Nevertheless, the loss of management authority raises questions about whether businesses could eventually be returned with their financial position, organisational structure and commercial value intact.

The latest decree extends the process already documented by EU Today following the September takeover of Nestlé and Auchan’s Russian operations.

The Kremlin’s approach also serves domestic economic objectives. Keeping factories, retail networks and distribution facilities operating under Russian management helps preserve employment, production capacity and established supply chains.

At the same time, appointing Russian administrators allows the authorities to exercise greater influence over businesses originally developed through foreign capital, technology and expertise.

European companies caught in sanctions confrontation

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has explicitly linked the seizures to the nationality of the affected companies and the policies of their governments.

He accused European states of participating in the unlawful seizure of Russian property through sanctions and financial restrictions.

Moscow’s argument centres partly on approximately €210 billion in Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the European Union, most of them held through Belgium-based securities depository Euroclear.

The European Union has used extraordinary revenues generated by those assets to support Ukraine, while further proposals involving the underlying funds remain subject to legal and political debate.

Belgium has been particularly concerned about potential financial exposure and legal claims. As EU Today reported in September, a Belgian Council of State judgment raised additional questions about the administrative procedures governing certain frozen assets.

The dispute has also moved into the European courts, with the Bank of Russia challenging EU measures intended to protect Euroclear against the enforcement of Russian judgments.

Moscow’s treatment of European businesses adds another dimension to this confrontation. By retaining control over foreign-owned industrial and commercial assets, Russia possesses a means of exerting pressure on companies whose governments support sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine.

The implications are particularly serious for Western banks that still maintain substantial Russian operations.

Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International and Italy’s UniCredit remain exposed to Russia through local subsidiaries. Any extension of compulsory administration to financial institutions could create additional difficulties involving deposits, capital and banking supervision.

The cost of remaining in Russia

The seizures also expose the financial risks faced by Western companies that delayed their withdrawal after February 2022.

Many initially sought to protect their investments, employees and commercial infrastructure. Others reduced operations but retained ownership, expecting that conditions might eventually permit an orderly sale or renewed business activity.

Russian restrictions have progressively complicated that calculation, requiring foreign investors from designated countries to accept substantial discounts on asset sales and obtain official approval for transactions.

Companies remaining in the country now face the additional possibility that the government will appoint administrators without their consent.

The consequences extend beyond the businesses immediately affected. Russia is establishing a precedent under which foreign investment can remain legally owned by its original shareholders while its economic benefits and operational management are placed beyond their control.

For European governments, the latest decree illustrates the increasing connection between commercial interests and geopolitical decisions.

The Kremlin has demonstrated that sanctions imposed over its invasion of Ukraine can be answered not only through diplomatic or financial measures, but also through direct intervention in European-owned businesses operating on Russian territory.

Any eventual negotiation over sanctions relief and the restoration of economic relations will consequently have to address the status of these assets, the rights of their original shareholders and the question of compensation.

Until then, Western companies remaining in Russia face an investment environment in which the ultimate authority over their businesses rests increasingly with the Kremlin rather than their shareholders.

The European Commission says asylum seekers arriving at EU borders are now being screened, but it makes no mention of the independent rights monitors that EU law requires to oversee those procedures, even as spending on border surveillance surges.

“Screening of people arriving illegally and the border procedures are being carried out,” said European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, in a letter addressed to the 27 heads of state and government meeting at an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday (15 October).

An annex to her letter, obtained by EUobserver, highlights broad outstanding issues when it comes to implementing new EU-wide asylum laws that kicked into force this past June.

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The EU’s border agency, Frontex, shared coordinates of an overcrowded and partly deflated boat in the Mediterranean sea with the Libyan coastguard and then watched them run it over.

The boat was carrying 27 people, including children.

The findings, by Frontex’s own fundamental rights officer, described an incident that took place on 19 June 2026.

And this was just a tiny part of a wider pattern of violence by the EU-backed Libyan coastguard, which has also shot at or near civil rescue vessels.

No one was killed in the June event. But people were tossed into the water. Others, pulled onto the Libyan vessel, were then beaten by Libyan uniformed officers.

Frontex had issued a Mayday relay and then shared the sightings by email with the Libyan rescue centre.

No vessels were reported to be in the vicinity, but the Libyans showed up 90 minutes later.

The internal Frontex findings highlight ongoing tensions in the agency over sharing rescue coordinates with the Libyans in the name of saving lives.

“Saving lives is the absolute sort of absolute right that people have,” Hans Leijtens the agency’s director, told EUobserver earlier this year.

“And it’s our job to contribute to that, and if that sort of starts with looking at which part of the Mediterranean ship is sailing, and if it’s a north African country, we all have to inform the authorities there,” he added.

But his own rights officer also notes that the botched rescue on 19 June amounted to a violation of the right to life, citing article six of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

He says the standard is not simply whether the migrants were ultimately rescued, but if the operation was planned and executed to minimise risks to human life.

In this case, the Libyans violated that right among others, he says. Frontex did not reply to the findings in the report, as of publication.

Let the court decide

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Brussels (European Newsroom) – The European Union should improve how it detects and connects early warnings at its external borders after the mass arrival of migrants in the Spanish autonomous city Ceuta in July, said the chief of the EU border agency Frontex, Hans Leijtens, while insisting that responsibility for border protection must remain with member states. 

“I think we should improve our situational awareness as Europe, and Frontex can play an important role in that,” Leijtens told journalists of the European Newsroom network in Brussels. 

He said a broader picture could be built from satellites, aircraft, observers on the ground and information from social media. Much of the information was already available, he said, but needed to be better connected. 

The remarks come as the European Commission floated plans for a Frontex rapid-response team that could deploy within 24 hours in a crisis. The team would still be sent only at the request of a member state, according to an action plan presented by EU migration commissioner Magnus Brunner in late September. The plan also envisages a larger role for Frontex in returns. 

Leijtens said he did not expect a new Frontex mandate to change the basic division of responsibility. “There I would find it difficult because not only in our mandate but in general protecting European borders is a member state responsibility and we can’t take over responsibility,” he said. 

He described the events in Ceuta as more of a public-order issue than a conventional border incident. Ceuta, a Spanish exclave in northern Africa, saw a sudden mass crossing from Morocco on July 30–31, 2026, triggering a diplomatic dispute among EU countries. Spanish estimates rose from about 72,000 to 80,000 arrivals, while Morocco cited about 40,000. Many people returned before being registered, making the final total uncertain. According to news reports, some 83 people died, and the crisis reignited debate over EU border control, asylum rules, solidarity and Frontex’s role. 

The episode raised a further question for the EU’s early-warning debate: whether the challenge was detecting the signals, sharing them or responding to them. 

Leijtens said the deaths were horrifying and should be prevented. “The fact that so many people lost their lives is absolutely horrifying and something we should prevent.” 

The European People’s Party leader Manfred Weber had called for Frontex to take command in a crisis such as Ceuta. The Commission’s rapid-response plan, by contrast, retains the requirement that a Member State request assistance.  

The Commission’s proposal for a revised Frontex mandate is expected by the end of October. 

Warsaw (dpa) – The number of irregular border crossings into the European Union fell by more than a quarter in 2025 compared to the previous year, according to figures from the EU border control authority Frontex.

The Warsaw-based EU agency said on Thursday it had registered just under 178,000 crossing attempts last year, the lowest number since 2021.

Frontex described the decline as a significant development, but also warned that the situation at the EU’s external borders remains uncertain. “The trend is moving in the right direction, but risks do not disappear,” said Frontex Director Hans Leijtens.

He said that Frontex’s close cooperation with governments and partners in countries outside the EU has yielded good results.

According to Frontex, last year there were significantly fewer irregular attempts to enter the EU on the West African route (down 63 percent), on the Western Balkans route (down 42 percent) and on the EU’s land border with Belarus (down 37 percent).

Frontex attributed the decline on the Western Balkans route to improved security measures and cooperation with EU candidate country Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Many migrants from Egypt, Bangladesh and Afghanistan

Most of those registered by Frontex trying to make irregular border crossings have Bangladeshi, Egyptian or Afghan nationality. The most frequently used migration route into the EU therefore remains across the Mediterranean, which accounted for almost a third of all irregular border crossings in 2025, with the Libya-Italy route being the most common.

There was hardly any change on the Mediterranean route overall compared to the same period last year: Frontex recorded 66,328 attempts to enter the EU over the sea in 2025 – 1 percent fewer than in the previous year.

Looking only at the eastern Mediterranean, the number of irregular border crossings fell by 27 percent. However, Frontex recorded three times as many attempts to enter the EU from eastern Libya to the Greek island of Crete compared to 2024.

From Algeria to Spain, the numbers increased by 14 percent in 2025.

In contrast, there was a slight decrease in crossings to the United Kingdom. The number of attempts to cross the English Channel fell by 3 percent compared to the previous year. (15 January)