If Europeans need any reminder of the real impact of climate change, they should simply look out of the window. This summer, a few extra degrees of sustained heat have forced school closures, disrupted railways and cut nuclear power plant output. More than 25,000 excess deaths across Europe have been attributed to extreme heat so far, while wildfires are causing over €15bn of economic damage.
The increasing intensity of heatwaves is generally attributed to climate change as a result of the global reliance on fossil fuels. While cutting carbon emissions remains the focus of EU climate policy, European governments also need to ensure that their societies can better adapt to extreme weather. Many households have already taken matters into their own hands by turning to portable air conditioners—often Chinese-made—for relief.
And China’s air-conditioner export boom points to a broader challenge: whether confronting extreme weather or fragile economic dependencies, Europeans need to adapt to the consequences while also addressing underlying sources of vulnerability. They should not just accept the status quo; here, some answers may lie in the lessons of China’s own industrial transformation.
Once again, when Europe looks for a climate solution, China has one ready to ship. China is a powerhouse in technologies used to mitigate climate change, from solar panels to wind turbines; it is also a vital player in helping Europe adapt to warmer temperatures. China produces over 80% of the world’s air conditioners: exports of Chinese AC units to the EU rose by 43% year on year in the first half of 2026. Chinese brands now account for 41% of the European market, up from 27% in 2023.
This success is not only about price and scale. Chinese manufacturers have adapted their products for the European market: for example, Midea’s PortaSplit model is tailored to overcome cumbersome building regulations and high installation costs. Chinese manufacturers were also early adopters of refrigerants less harmful to the climate, ensuring their products meet Europe’s strict environmental rules.
Chinese state media and officials were quick to present the boom in AC unit sales as a success for EU-China trade: it is a “natural result of complementary advantages” and demonstrates the mutually beneficial nature of the EU-China economic relationship. China’s industrial specialisation, supply-chain efficiency and technological competitiveness, they argue, mean manufacturers respond swiftly to shifts in global demand. AC is an example of China acting as an “enabling superpower” in providing efficient and affordable products that respond to climate change—as Beijing would say, a win-win.
But this is not all. Chinese commentators say that Europe should not only adapt to the hotter climate—it should adapt to the patterns of EU-China trade. They portray the EU’s de-risking and trade-defence measures to tackle economic imbalance with China as economically self-defeating, arguing that Europe lacks confidence in its own industries. European policymakers, they say, are approaching trade as a game of “cold statistics” that will ultimately hurt ordinary consumers.
This is a fatalistic prescription for industrial policy from a country that refuses to accept that its position in global supply chains or its existing competitive advantage is fixed. For decades, Beijing has made industrial upgrading a central policy objective that has reoriented global trade patterns. Europeans are experiencing this firsthand in the AC boom, where China’s position reflects decades of deliberate industrial upgrading. And now Beijing is advising Europe to be content with trade patterns as they stand: strange advice, given that this would not pass the political sniff test in Zhongnanhai.
Since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders have not simply passively adapted to their inherited competitive advantages. Neither do they treat the existing global division of labour as an efficient market outcome to be preserved. This is especially the case when such patterns risk constraining China from developing the sectors it considers strategically important—robotics, clean technology or aviation, for example.
China’s industrial transformation did not happen through market forces alone. Its latest five-year plan emphasises “self-reliance and controllability” as a guiding principle for technologies underpinning critical infrastructure, including energy systems. Over the years, under the banners of Made in China and Dual Circulation, the country has deployed large-scale subsidies, preferential financing from state banks, government-guided investment funds, public procurement, favourable access to land and infrastructure, and requirements around joint ventures, localisation and technology transfer.
These policies helped Chinese firms “import, digest and absorb” foreign know-how, build scale, and create globally competitive and innovative companies across supply chains. But while the European debate on competitiveness centres on many of the same concepts, European politicians, industries and member states are divided over future industrial policy. One prevailing idea is that Europe should pull a “reverse Deng” by ushering in a new era of industrial policy capable of matching the scale of support and protection that China extended to its domestic industries during the 1990s and 2000s.
Europeans should preserve their ability to source and scale critical technologies through viable alternatives, ensuring they have options should conditions change
But Europe should be cautious in trying to beat China at its own game. It has no centralised state to direct capital and help companies navigate commercial losses in pursuit of their goals. The main lessons from China’s industrial policy lie in the assumptions behind it: Europeans should minimise dependencies that could be strategically constraining; industrial competitiveness is not only about efficient production; Europeans should preserve their ability to source and scale critical technologies through viable alternatives, ensuring they have options should conditions change.
This logic is becoming more relevant as climate shocks intensify and geopolitics grows more volatile.
Europeans need to consider what such options would look like in practice. To borrow the question posed by Chinese commentators: what could Europe do right now without Chinese air conditioners?
Cooling is becoming essential infrastructure. Much like heating and water, Europe will need a broader portfolio of solutions to meet demand. AC is part of the answer, alongside low-energy and passive-cooling technologies such as evaporative cooling, reflective roofs and building retrofits, and stronger building standards. But Europe does not need to develop every solution itself; it could build a network of alternative suppliers and production capabilities.
For example, Singapore and the Gulf states are confronting many similar challenges and could be potential partners in deploying more efficient solutions such as district cooling. Europe can build similar partnerships in clean-tech supply chains. South Korea, the second-largest battery manufacturer globally, holds 78% of installed battery capacity in Europe. It can learn from countries such as Japan, which has diversified its rare-earth supply through partnerships with Australia and Malaysia, as well as Vietnam. India doubled solar-cell manufacturing capacity in the first half of 2026 alone, backed by localisation incentives extending to upstream components like ingots and polysilicon.
China will remain part of Europe’s clean-tech supply chains. For Europe, preserving its options does not mean that it needs to produce every critical technology in the clean-tech supply chain. But it should work with external partners to maintain commercially viable alternatives at scale. This can be done through reciprocal access to public procurement markets, targeted incentives and shared product standards.
Fundamentally, having options means being able to adapt to a problem while tackling its cause. Climate policy offers a useful framework: Europeans have concluded that the impact of heatwaves or floods are not inevitable; they are not relying on AC, seawalls and floodgates as their only response. Instead, they are tackling the cause of climate change by pursuing adaptation while mitigating the underlying problem through cuts in fossil-fuel emissions.
Europe should dare to do the same with its competitiveness and economic dependencies. Rather than simply adapting to change, its governments should invest in Europe’s capacity to innovate, work with partners and build alternatives, with the aim of reducing vulnerabilities and helping preserve its choices.
The summer heat of 2026 is a reminder of the cost of delayed climate action. The same lesson applies to economic security: adapting to today’s dependencies in the name of efficiency will leave Europe with fewer options—and come with a larger bill—tomorrow.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey recently signed the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement”. Many analysts believe this trilateral pact is aimed at checking Iranian and Israeli “hegemony” in the tumultuous Middle East region.
Meanwhile, the biggest question running through India’s nearly 1.5 billion people is how this trilateral defense pact will impact India, which has fought multiple wars with Pakistan and maintains a tense relationship with Islamabad.
Despite hogging global media limelight for playing the role of mediator in the ongoing Iran war, Pakistan’s position back home looks scary with relentless terror attacks and a deteriorating security situation.
Pakistan continues to face tremendous domestic pressures. Protests in Pak-controlled Kashmir have intensified since mid-2026, with scores of innocent protesters killed by the security forces.
Islamabad imposed a communication blockade, ordered foreign journalists to leave the region, and limited access to international media outlets, including Al Jazeera’s digital platform.
This is no ordinary region. India claims the Pak-controlled Kashmir as its own and has vowed to integrate it with Jammu and Kashmir. Reportedly, pro-India slogans and flags were seen in the demonstration.
Then, regions like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) are Pakistan’s Achilles’ heel. Separatism in these two regions appears to have gone beyond the control of the Pakistan Army, and looks as volatile as East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) during 1971. The question is how long Pakistan can hold these two regions, and at what cost.
Dismal economic conditions, disgruntled population, and heightened tensions with neighboring India and Afghanistan have intensified Pakistan’s problems. The question is: does Pakistan have the financial muscle or resources to fight a five-front conflict — Balochistan, KPK, Kashmir, India and Afghanistan, simultaneously?
On top of it, Pakistan has signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which means they should be prepared to fight outside the country as well, probably against Houthis in Yemen. That would open a sixth front.
Indian military exposed Pakistan’s defense architecture during Operation Sindoor last year in May. India not only managed to breach Pakistani defenses to hit multiple terror targets in the first wave of attacks, but India also launched precision strikes that impaired critical Pakistani military infrastructure across the country.
Indian military targeted multiple airbases including Nur Khan (Chaklala) near Rawalpindi, Mushaf (Sargodha), Murid, Rafiqui, Rahim Yar Khan, Sukkur, Jacobabad, Bholari, and others—using supersonic BrahMos and other precision munitions.
Satellite imagery confirmed the heavy damage, including destroyed runways, hangars, command-and-control centers, and loss of up to 14 aircraft (as per IAF) and scores of personnel on the ground. Pakistan also claimed downing multiple Indian jets, but it could hardly penetrate the Indian air defense network, led by the S-400.
Operation Sindoor demonstrated that Pakistan’s defenses could be easily penetrated and its Air Force could be crippled even with limited, restrained strikes.
Meanwhile, Turkey is already a member of NATO, arguably the most powerful Islamic country in terms of military. It does not really need Pakistan or Saudi Arabia to defend itself. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has been battered by Iran and Houthi rebels. But when the US could not completely defend it, what can Pakistan and Turkey do?
In the case of Pakistan, it is the most vulnerable of the three.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, assumes utmost importance for Islamabad. The pact’s core clause treats an armed attack on any one party as an attack on all three.
It directly follows the September 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
For Riyadh, it’s another insurance policy, but for Pakistan—still repairing airbases more than a year later—the pact is aimed at sending a strong deterrence message to India, which has pledged a devastating response to any terror attack on the country.
Collective defense commitments from Riyadh and Ankara are sure to boost Pakistan’s morale, but Turkey (and Saudi Arabia) have been supporting Pakistan since 1947 and have never managed to turn the tide against India.
For instance, during the 1971 war, Turkey provided critical military and diplomatic support to defend Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Operating under the CENTO defense pact, Ankara provided substantial material support to Pakistan by providing aircraft assistance and military hardware, but to little avail.
Even politically, Turkey refused to recognize the newly independent state of Bangladesh for over two years. It only recognized Bangladesh in February 1974 after Pakistan did.
Meanwhile, India has already established strong military ties with Ankara’s adversaries, Greece, Cyprus, and Armenia. India also shares robust military ties with Israel. There might not be a formal agreement on paper, but India-Israel ties go beyond any melodramatic pact.
No doubt, the Mecca pact embeds Pakistan in a broader Islamic-world security architecture at a moment when its conventional defenses have been publicly tested while the country’s biggest province, Balochistan, continues to fight for its liberation, just like East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
For a country simultaneously battling insurgencies in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistan-administered Kashmir while managing tense borders with both Afghanistan and India, the Mecca defense pact is far more valuable to Pakistan than it is to either Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
The post Pakistan’s “Six-Front War”: Why Mecca Defense Pact Helps Islamabad More Than Turkey or Saudi Arabia? OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
India appears poised to overlook Russia’s Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter and opt for a sixth-gen aircraft instead.
Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh recently clarified that New Delhi has “not thought about” new Sukhoi variants, prioritizing the upgrade of the Su-30MKI fleet under the ‘Super Sukhoi’ program and the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) instead.
Moscow’s aggressive pitch—including local production, full source codes, and a two-seat variant—has failed to sway planners wary of diverting resources from self-reliance goals.
With AMCA still a far away and China fielding growing J-20 numbers, India is actively exploring partnerships in sixth-generation programs.
India’s Ministry of Defense has reportedly initiated efforts to join the French-led sixth-generation fighter program. This was stated in a report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense, presented in Parliament, according to news agency PTI.
The ministry has sought a roadmap from the French side for acquiring such aircraft. The panel noted that two major consortia are developing sixth-generation fighters: one involving the UK, Italy, and Japan; another involving (now-defunct) France and Germany.
The Indian Air Force plans to partner with one of these groups so that India does not fall behind in advanced combat aircraft technology.
In 1962, the USSR agreed to transfer technology to produce nearly 800 MiG-21 jet fighters for India, which it had earlier denied to China. They helped India set up factories for the aircraft, aero-engines, and avionics.
India’s relationship with the Soviet Union grew strategically, culminating in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
Through the 1971 India-Pakistan War for the liberation of Bangladesh, the Soviet Union stood by India against US and Chinese intimidations.
During the Cold War, India and the USSR maintained a “special and privileged strategic partnership” that was built on five major components: politics, defense, civil nuclear energy, anti-terrorism cooperation, and space.
Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India maintained warm relations with Russia’s successor state. The first major political initiative after the dissolution was the Strategic Partnership signed by the two countries in 2000.
The IRIGC (India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission) is the main body responsible for conducting official affairs between the two countries at the governmental level. Both countries are members of international bodies, including the UN, BRICS, G20, SCO, and Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping. Russia supports India’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
India is one of the largest markets for the Russian defense industry. Approximately 60 percent of the Indian military’s hardware today is of Russian origin. Military hardware supplies and, more recently, joint-venture production have been key pillars.
The Soviet Union was the first to support Make in India defense production.
The MiG-21 factories set up in the early 1960s later produced the MiG-27 (170) and the Su-30 MKI (230). Su-30 MKI was a joint D&D project. Russia also learned a lot from the Su-30 MKI project and imbibed some of these ideas for its Su-30SM aircraft.
222 Su-30 MKI were produced under license at HAL’s Nashik plant since 2004. An estimated 920 AL-31FP turbofans were manufactured at HAL’s Koraput Division. The Su-30MKI is the backbone of the IAF’s fighter fleet.
In 1965, Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) was set up at Avadi, Chennai, with Soviet assistance. HVF products included Russian-designed T-72 Ajeya and T-90 Bhishma tanks.
In September 1965, the Soviet Union and India signed the first contract for the delivery of naval equipment, including four Project I641 diesel-electric submarines, five Project 159E corvettes, and five Project 368P motor boats. The Agreement also envisaged rendering Soviet technical assistance for the construction of a submarine naval base in Vishakhapatnam.
Recently, two frigates, the INS Tushil and INS Tamala, were built by Russia at the Yantar Shipyard, while the remaining two are under construction at Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) in India through technology transfer.
Russia is reportedly expanding its shipbuilding cooperation with India, with two Indian shipyards being considered for the construction of four non-nuclear icebreakers. Russian shipbuilding officials have reportedly offered New Delhi their nuclear-powered design for an Indian Navy aircraft carrier.
GSL is also constructing 24 river-sea class cargo ships for Russian clients in the Caspian Sea by 2027. Cooperation with India in shipbuilding has its benefits for Russia, as the unit cost per vessel is projected to be half of what it would cost Russian shipbuilders.
Between 2012 and 2016, Russia accounted for 68% of India’s defense imports. Russia and India’s cooperation is not limited to a buyer-seller relationship but includes joint research and development, training, service-to-service contacts, and joint exercises.
India and Russia have a strong success story with Joint Ventures (JVs). The BrahMos is a medium-range ramjet supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarines, ships, and fighter aircraft. BrahMos Aerospace is a joint venture between the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The missiles are already being exported.
Under an over ₹5000 crore contract signed in July 2021, over 610,000 AK-203 assault rifles are to be manufactured in India with technology transfer from Russia, by the JV Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL).
Indian companies hold a controlling 50.5 percent share, and Russian companies hold 49.5 percent. The level of indigenous content has already reached 50% and is rising rapidly, with a target of 100% in the near future.
India and Russia have also agreed to expedite the delivery of spare parts of Russian-origin military platforms by setting up a JV in India.
Notwithstanding the above, some JVs did not take off. India had withdrawn from the joint Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program due to technical issues. Finally, Russia continued the project and today has a successful Sukhoi Su-57 ‘Felon’ 5th generation fighter.
Following the selection of the Ka-226T to meet an Indian requirement for 197 helicopters, an agreement was signed in December 2015 to create a JV between Rostec, Russian Helicopters, and HAL to build the helicopters at a new factory in Tumakuru, India.
Later, India decided to make its own Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) based on the indigenous ‘Dhruv.’ India’s LUH is delayed, and Russia has been pushing the case for Ka-226T again.
Similarly, India canceled the Indo-Russian program to develop a new Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA) for both countries through a JV between Russia’s UAC and India’s HAL.
In February 2023, on the sidelines of the Aero India 2023 air show, the Russians offered to jointly develop the Il-276. However, India would prefer the aircraft to be powered by a European engine rather than a Russian one.
India has operated a wide range of Soviet and Russian combat jets that formed the backbone of the Indian Air Force for decades. Key types include the prolific MiG-21 (in multiple variants including Bison), MiG-23 (BN and MF), high-altitude MiG-25, ground-attack MiG-27, and air-superiority MiG-29 (including upgraded versions).
From the Sukhoi stable came the Su-7 fighter-bomber and the highly successful Su-30MKI, which remains the IAF’s primary multi-role platform that India is looking to upgrade.
India’s decision to effectively rule out the Su-57 marks a noticeable shift. After decades of reliance on Russian fighters—from the MiG-21 to the Su-30MKI—New Delhi is prioritizing the AMCA program and partnerships in sixth-generation projects.
While the historic Indo-Russian defense ties remain strong in other domains, the rejection of Moscow’s most advanced stealth jet signals a clear preference for next-generation technology.
With China rapidly expanding its stealth fleet and AMCA still years away, India appears to be choosing long-term capability over Russian platforms.
The post Su-57 OUT For India, 6th-Gen Aircraft In! After MiG-21, MiG-29 & Su-30 MKI, IAF Appears Set For Non-Russian Jets appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Adriana Abdenur, a Brazilian policy expert and co-president of the Global Fund for a New Economy, and Jorge Castañeda, former foreign minister of Mexico and professor at Sciences Po, to explore debates about development and ideas of strategic autonomy across Latin America.
Jorge explains why China’s role is varied across the region, arguing that Mexico and much of Central America remain deeply constrained by their economic ties to the US. Adriana discusses Brazil’s long tradition of strategic autonomy, describing how policymakers engage with China as both an economic partner and a source of ideas on development, technology and global governance.
Together, Mark, Adriana and Jorge explore how intensifying US-China competition is reshaping the region’s choices. Can Latin American countries balance relations with both powers? Is China a model, a market or simply another partner in a multipolar world? And what does strategic autonomy look like in an increasingly coercive geopolitical environment?
This podcast episode was recorded on July 31st 2026.
Bookshelf
Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option, by Carlos Ominami, Jorge Heine and Carlos Fortín
Manifesto Antropófago (Cannibal Manifesto), by Oswald de Andrade
If anything, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s call on August 3 for greater “military-civil integration” to create “a robust defense ecosystem to tackle emerging challenges” implies that there is still a structural mismatch between generalist bureaucrats (critically called Babus) and uniformed personnel within the Ministry of Defense (MoD).
In other words, in India’s higher defense reforms, integration between the military and civil components of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is being seen as important as greater jointness among the three armed services (army, air force, and navy).
For decades, the relationship between civilian staff and military personnel within the MoD has been described by experts as both a strength and a fault line, particularly at the level of defense management.
Therefore, as India moves toward theatre commands, self-reliance under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-reliant India) scheme, and faster procurement of defense components, the question is: how has this synergy worked in retrospect, and what should it look like in the future?
Addressing the 85th Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) Civilian Services Day celebrations in New Delhi on Monday, Singh emphasised that both the uniformed and civil services cannot proceed along separate paths, adding that, as joint and integrated structures develop, there will be a need for continuity and expertise across all areas – policy, administration, human resource management, financial processes, logistics, and institutional knowledge.
He highlighted the importance of further enhancing structured cross-exposure between civilian and military officers, suggesting joint training programs and developmental assignments for both sides to learn from each other’s experiences.
“Military officers bring operational experience, a command perspective, and an understanding of warfare, while civilian officers contribute through administrative continuity, policy experience, an understanding of government processes, and institutional memory. When these strengths combine, decision-making becomes more informed, balanced, and effective,” stated the Defense Minister.
As things stand today, there are nine major participating groups dealing with India’s defence – three military services, and the non-military six – Department of Defence(DoD), the Department of Military Affairs(DMA), the Department of Defence Production ( DDP), the Department of Defence Research and Development (DDR&D), the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW), and Defence Finance.
While these nine groups are — three military services, and the non-military six – inside the MoD, there are three others outside the domain having considerable influence on defense matters – the Ministry of Finance (controlling the defense spending), the Cabinet Secretariat (policy matters that have implications for other ministries) and the Prime Minister’s Office (which can always intervene or arbitrate selectively).
However, we will focus here only on the MoD, particularly on the integration of the military services with the non-military ones.
To begin with, one is reminded of what late Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara had said: each of the major participating groups in Indian defense is known for “jealously guarding its turf and mistrustful of the others”.
Incidentally, the Admiral was talking of eight groups, because the DMA was a later creation. But the spirit behind his comment remains intact.
It may be noted that the total workforce under the MoD stands at approximately 2.92 million (29.2 lakh) personnel, making it the largest employer in the world. Expenditure on salaries and pensions for both civilian and non-civilian personnel is fully integrated into the official MoD budget.
The total strength encompasses active military personnel, reservists, and defense civilians. Approximately 1.43 million active-duty personnel serving across the Army, Navy, and Air Force are complemented by roughly 1 million reserve personnel.
Approximately 400,000 defense civilians are distributed across administrative services. They come mainly from the Indian Defense Accounts Service, Indian Ordnance Factories Service, Defense Research & Development Organization scientists, and the Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Service, the Defense Accounts Department (DAD), Border Roads Organization (BRO), DRDO, and top bureaucracy.
The apex bureaucratic positions like the Defense Secretary, Secretary (Defense Production), and Secretary (Ex-Servicemen Welfare) are often held by IAS officers.
The last 5 years have seen some important defense reforms in India. For the first time, a serving 4-star General became Secretary in MoD as Chief of Defense Staff. DMA handles procurement, tri-service matters, and jointness. This is said to have broken the wall between the civilian secretariat and the military.
Service HQs have been integrated with the HQ of MoD. Joint Secretaries from the military now sit in the MoD and sign files. This means operational officers are now part of the procurement and policy process.
Before this reform, the MoD was entirely dominated by generalist civilian bureaucrats under the Department of Defense (DoD), led by the Defense Secretary. The Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters operated merely as “attached offices,” meaning military files had to be routed through junior civilian desk officers for approval.
However, there are still well-documented latent and reported mutual resentment between military and civilian personnel in the MoD, which analysts and scholars refer to as “civil-military dissonance”.
The friction does not stem from opposition to the constitutional principle of political/democratic civilian control, which the military fully accepts. Instead, the resentment focuses on “bureaucratic control,” where career civil servants are perceived to act as a barrier between the uniformed leadership and the political executive.
A primary driver of public friction involves rank parity and protocol equivalence between military officers and civilian cadres. As Admiral Arun Prakash points out, the three Chiefs have been accorded “no locus standi in the structure of the GoI, so much so that the Secretary of the Department of Defense is deemed to represent the three Services in most forums”.
According to the “Government of India Allocation of Business Rules” (AoB Rules) and the “Government of India Transaction of Business Rules” (ToB Rules), the Secretary of DoD (a IAS officer) is allocated the responsibilities of “(a) Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective Demobilisation; (b) The Armed Forces of the Union, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force; (c) Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence comprising of Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters and Defence Staff Headquarters”.
This looks particularly strange as, in terms of protocol, the Defense Secretary ranks at 23 in the order of preference, along with “Army Commanders/ Vice-Chief of the Army Staff or equivalent in other services”. In contrast, a Service Chief of Staff holding the rank of full General or equivalent rank is at number 12.
Even at 16, Officiating Chiefs of Staff holding the rank of Lieutenant General or equivalent rank are higher in protocol than the Defense Secretary.
Similarly, the Military officers are said to have resented the equation of lower-tier civilian administrative posts of Joint Secretary with senior military ranks like Major Generals. It is argued that a Major General has significantly more operational responsibility and seniority (often over 32 years of service) compared to an IAS officer reaching Joint Secretary level in roughly 18 years.
Military officials often point out that allowances, non-functional financial upgrades, and pension structures have favored civilian bureaucracies over the unique hazards of military service. Successive Central Pay Commission awards have frequently triggered military dissatisfaction.
In other words, there is an underlying perception of hierarchical degradation that persists within the armed forces.
Secondly, there are gaps between the military and civilian officials over what is called “Policies vs Operations”. While civilians are accused of lacking operational understanding, the military is accused of not understanding procurement rules. This really leads to delays in equipment purchase.
Perhaps, realizing these deep-seated systemic silos, Defense Minister Singh said on Monday that the military and civilian wings can no longer afford to operate in isolated silos to build an effective national defense ecosystem.
As he underscored, the civilian officials should read Indian military history, examining it from a civilian perspective, thereby fostering fresh ideas and new perspectives. He called upon the Civilian Services to evolve into the “strategic brain” of India’s defence management architecture by developing a comprehensive understanding of the defence sector, functioning effectively in a joint environment, and continuously enhancing its expertise to face the emerging challenges.
Notably, when one talks of dissonance between the military and civilian officers, it is perhaps more to do with purely civilians like IAS and other central services within the MoD rather than the non-military technical and scientific personnel.
There has been relatively smoother synergy in areas like defense production and infrastructure building. For instance, Defence Public Sector Undertakings like the HAL, BEL, BDL and OFB, which are run with a mix of civilian managers, engineers, scientists and military users, have produced platforms and ammunition like Tejas, Arjun, BrahMos. succeeded because civilian scientists in DRDO worked with military feedback loops.
Similarly, the BRO, a civilian-led organization with military engineers, has built highly acclaimed critical roads in the country’s northern and north-eastern border (Line of Actual Control) with China.
However, it is with the civilian officials working within the MoD that military officials have some issues, such as policy decisions, pay, and ranks.
But then, it is also to be noted that while services may all agree on their fight against the civilians, when it comes to “promoting jointness” in military matters, they do not have the same ideas. There is an intense rivalry amongst them. Although the situation has improved of late, there are differences over whether the country should have theater commands, and if it will have them, then how those will be operated.
In other words, there are, overall, challenges in building better “Civil-Military Synergy”. There seem to be merits when some experts argue that National Defense College (NDC) and the College of Defense Management (CDM) could bridge strategic and administrative silos, fostering deeper synergy, mutual understanding, and coordinated policy-making between senior civilian bureaucrats and military leadership.
There are also ideas like extending the DMA model to have military officers in all key procurement and policy wings, and civilian officers in Integrated Theatre Commands. Defense civilians should have tenures in field formations and military officers in MoD finance and policy.
Another interesting suggestion is to extend the synergy beyond the MoD and involve the private sector, startups, academia and state governments. Of course, in a way this is happening with projects like defence corridors, and through collaboration in the space, cyber and AI sectors.
Viewed thus, the core challenge to the synergy that the Defense Minister has talked about is removing what is said to be the “Trust Deficit” between the civilian and military wings within the MoD, due to decades of suspicion.
The synergy does not mean the dilution of civilian supremacy at the policy-making level, be it the MoD, or the Union cabinet, or the Parliament. But it means the military’s voice is heard in policy-making. The military does not grudge civilian control; it opposes “the bureaucratic control”.
Synergy does not imply that civilians are made into soldiers, or soldiers into ‘babus’. Its goal is to make both into “defense managers”
The post Biggest Weakness Emerges in India’s Military Setup: Rank, Power & Toxic Rift Between “Babus” & Soldiers appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Her voice is that of a frail, elderly woman, but ousted Bangladesh leader Sheikh Hasina still has the power to incite from exile, vowing to return home despite facing the gallows.
Analysts say her defiance is not a death wish, but a desperate bid to remain politically relevant, claw on to her supporters, and revive an outlawed party which once dominated Bangladesh.
To her enemies, Hasina is evil incarnate — a convicted fugitive sentenced to hang for crimes against humanity over her failed bid to crush the 2024 revolution that toppled her.
The 78-year-old told AFP in July from India that she wanted to return to Bangladesh by the year’s end.
“I may be killed. I may be arrested. I may be sent to prison,” Hasina wrote in an email sent from hiding.
“I am fully aware of my fate. Still, I want to go back because my people are calling me.”
On Wednesday, marking two years since she fled by helicopter to old ally India, she is due to address by telephone a New Delhi event entitled “Sheikh Hasina’s homecoming”.
“Sheikh Hasina’s return is important for the survival of the party — she is still a symbol,” said Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder, a political science professor at North South University (NSU) in Dhaka.
One senior member of her Awami League (AL) party said he believed she was genuine in wanting to return.
“She feels obligated because party members are being arrested left and right, despite having no involvement in any crimes,” he said, too fearful himself to speak on record.
“Her return is a way of repaying the party’s loyalty.”
Dhaka’s Prothom Alo newspaper suggested her vow was “part of a strategy to energize party members, build pressure for the lifting of the ban on the party, and reclaim political space”.
But former senior Awami League member Mahmudur Rahman Manna, now a fierce critic of Hasina, dismissed the vow as self-serving.
“There are people in the AL who have some degree of public acceptance. Sheikh Hasina could have given them a little space to help bring the party back after the ban. She didn’t,” he said.
“The idea that she would come back for the sake of the party is absurd.”
Hasina also knows that simply threatening to return will needle Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, who swept February’s elections in which the Awami League was barred, Sikder said.
Political imprisonment has a long history in Bangladesh.
Under Hasina’s rule, Rahman’s mother, former leader Khaleda Zia, spent years in jail in Dhaka on graft charges that her party said were politically motivated.
“The Bangladesh government isn’t ready to accept her, even if she lands in jail directly from India,” Sikder told AFP.
“Her return will create political instability… I doubt the government can handle that.”
Not so, says Zahed Ur Rahman, an adviser to Bangladesh’s prime minister.
“We want her back — please return,” he told reporters. “We have written to India. The individual we want to bring back intends to return. We are ready — let her come, and we will ensure justice.”
Hasina refused to attend her trial in Dhaka, where she was found guilty of incitement, ordering killings and failing to prevent atrocities.
Her vow to return comes as Bangladesh and India seek to repair strained ties, with Hasina remaining a persistent point of friction.
Dhaka has repeatedly requested her extradition, while New Delhi has said only that the request is being examined through the legal process.
But relations have improved since Rahman, leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, became leader, and India has invited him to a BRICS summit in September.
India’s foreign ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal, speaking to reporters on Tuesday, sought to distance New Delhi from Hasina’s “homecoming” speech.
“The government has no involvement whatsoever in it, nor does it endorse any views that may be expressed at the forum,” he said.
But some in Bangladesh see India’s hand in using Hasina’s return threat as leverage.
Mahmudur Rahman, editor of Dhaka’s Amar Desh newspaper, told AFP he saw her threat as part of a power struggle between New Delhi and Dhaka. “Delhi wants to gain the upper hand,” he said.
“India is just playing the ‘Hasina card’ to put pressure on the government.”
By Agence France-Presse
The post The “Hasina Card”: Bangladesh Critics Say India is Using Exiled PM Sheikh Hasina to Pressure Dhaka appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) held a week-long counter-drone exercise to strengthen its capabilities against low-cost unmanned aerial systems.
The primary goal of the exercise, dubbed “Rotor Clap-III”, was reportedly to assess and refine operational principles to address emerging aerial threats from unmanned systems. The exercise concluded on August 2.
The Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) drill was held at the Pokhran Field Firing Range in the Thar Desert.
The site is best known as the location of India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998, but its vast, sparsely populated expanse near the India-Pakistan border supports secure live-fire practice, helicopter operations, and high-intensity training while closely matching the terrain, climate, and conditions of the western theatre.
The drills were also aimed at improving the IAF’s helicopter fleet’s operational capabilities against threats posed by drones.
#IAF Helicopters undertook, Exercise ROTOR CLAP III themed "Counter-UAS" in Rajasthan.
The exercise brought together helicopter units of the #IndianAirForce to validate operational concepts against emerging aerial threats#ExerciseRotorClapIII #CounterUAS@DefenceMinIndia… pic.twitter.com/8nFwAQGm5T
— Indian Air Force (@IAF_MCC) August 1, 2026
Several IAF helicopter units participated in the exercise, conducting tactical missions such as coordinated actions against both aerial and ground-based threats, soldier insertion, reconnaissance, precision attacks, battlefield support, and casualty evacuation.
The drills evaluated integrated helicopter tactics, procedures, and coordination in simulated combat conditions.
Moreover, the aircrew and operational units had the opportunity to test and validate mission planning, inter-unit coordination, quick response, and cooperative operations in near-war scenarios throughout the exercise. According to reports, special emphasis was placed on ensuring smooth coordination among multiple helicopters in the desert terrain.
Notably, helicopters are increasingly being employed worldwide in counter-UAS roles, especially against slower, low-cost loitering munitions and reconnaissance drones. Russia and Ukraine, for example, routinely use military helicopters for this purpose, whereas Gulf countries have recently started deploying their own choppers to down Iranian drones.
In general, helicopters make good counter-UAS platforms because many of them cruise at speeds similar to those of propeller-driven drones such as the Shahed class, enabling them to close the distance, match altitude, and make repeated engagement passes—advantages not available to fast jets, which are limited to a single high-speed pass.
Typically, helicopters can also operate from dispersed or improvised sites, fly low and slow, and loiter over threat areas. Equipped with thermal or electro-optical sensors and night-vision systems, they are effective at detecting and engaging low-flying drones after dark.
Once the helicopter matches the drone’s path, gunners or automated systems use proximity-fuzed rockets or brief bursts of cannon or machine-gun fire to neutralize a drone.
Therefore, these armed helicopters form one mobile layer alongside ground-based guns, electronic warfare, interceptor drones, and high-end surface-to-air missiles (SAM).
Using helicopters as counter-drone platforms is also cost-effective, given that machine guns, cannons, and rockets are far cheaper per engagement than surface-to-air missiles or fighter sorties. In fact, the US has now integrated its Apache helicopters with APWKS laser rockets to further reduce the cost of hunting drones.
The IAF operates a range of different military choppers—AH-64 Apache, the aging Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters, the LCH Prachand, Chinook Heavy-lift transport helicopter, the Mi-17 Medium utility helicopter, and the ALH Dhruv
Sources said the exercise reaffirmed the IAF’s commitment to high operational readiness and adaptation to new security challenges. It forms part of India’s broader push to strengthen counter-UAS capabilities at a time when inexpensive small drones, loitering munitions, and sophisticated unmanned systems have upended the cost calculus of conflict and changed the face of conventional warfare that India has participated in.
India’s heightened focus on counter-drone measures is driven by global trends, persistent cross-border drone activity, and, most significantly, experience gained during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, which it launched against Pakistan-based terror infrastructure.
Pakistan retaliated almost instantly and employed large numbers of drones as a core element of its response codenamed Operation Bunyan al-Marsus.
Indian official briefings stated that Pakistan launched swarms of drones in major coordinated waves. According to the Government of India’s official press briefing, Pakistan launched 400–500 drones in a coordinated reconnaissance and SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) operation. These were intended to clutter Indian radars, force air-defense systems to expend ammunition and attention, probe for gaps, and mask the presence of a smaller number of more capable surveillance or attack drones.
Pakistan has invested heavily in drone manufacture using indigenous capabilities acquired from allies like Turkey and China, as previously explained in detail by the EurAsian Times. During the conflict, it used Turkish Asisguard Songar, Turkish Yiha-III, Bayraktar TB2 drone, and Chinese drones like the CH-4 and Wing Loong II, to name a few.
India stated that the large majority of incoming drones were neutralized by a combination of kinetic systems (anti-aircraft guns, including the L-70, ZU-23, and Schilka, as well as surface-to-air missiles such as Akash), and non-kinetic measures (spoofing and jamming).
While India has significantly expanded its own inventory of drones, many of which were used successfully and decisively against Pakistani targets during the war, the intensity of drone use by the Pakistani military during the four-day intense conflict has accelerated Indian investment in counter-drone programs and tactics.
For example, counter-drone grids are being incorporated into Mission Sudarshan Chakra, a long-term, AI-enabled, multi-layered national air-defense shield announced last year.
In early July 2026, the Defense Acquisition Council granted Acceptance of Necessity for procurement proposals worth approximately ₹52,000 crore. These include the indigenous Akash Tarang anti-UAV electronic-warfare system for the Army, Very Short-Range Air Defense Systems (V-SHORADS) to bolster low-altitude defense against drones, and jet-powered kamikaze drones, underscoring the priority now attached to both unmanned systems and counter-UAS capabilities
A range of new counter-drone systems developed jointly by public- and private-sector entities are at various stages of testing.
Last year, for instance, India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) unveiled the D4 (Drone Detect, Deter, Destroy) anti-drone system, which is now being deployed along key border areas. This integrated counter-drone solution is designed to detect and neutralize rogue unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with precision.
Earlier this year, the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of development trials of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile-V3 (ULPGM-V3) in air-to-ground and air-to-air modes. The ULPGM is designed for UAV integration to destroy soft and hard targets, on the ground and in the air.
Similarly, India-based Zen Technologies launched an enhanced variant of its counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) that is already in service with the Indian Armed Forces in May 2026. The new variant of the system reportedly has increased detection and jamming ranges and is integrated with AI for improved threat detection.
These are just a few examples of India’s counter-drone effort.
The armed forces are also conducting dedicated counter-drone exercises based on lessons from Operation Sindoor. In October 2025, for instance, India’s largest drone and counter-drone warfare drill, Exercise Cold Start, was conducted in Madhya Pradesh to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing air defense
Therefore, the recently concluded Rotor Clap-III, focused on the IAF’s helicopter fleet, is another step in preparing for operations on a battlefield increasingly dominated by drones.
The post At India’s Nuclear Testing Site — IAF Helicopters Train as Low-Cost Drone Hunters in Rotor Clap-III Drills appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
The United States (US) floated a pitch to supply India with advanced Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighter jets. US President Donald Trump publicly stated that Washington was paving the way to provide India with the fifth-generation aircraft.
In February 2025, during Indian PM Modi’s visit to the US, Trump told a joint news conference, “Starting this year, we’ll be increasing military sales to India by many billions of dollars. We’re also paving the way to ultimately provide India with the F-35 stealth fighters.”
Later, Vice President JD Vance said: With regular joint military exercises, it’s only natural for India to buy more of our defense equipment, including the F-35s,” pitching the stealth aircraft to cement US-Indian defense relations.
Some believe that the statement(s) were meant to please India, but much more, the American arms lobby.
Meanwhile, some new prospective customers of F-35 have emerged. Qatar has reportedly begun exploratory talks with Washington. Saudi Arabia has pursued the acquisition of up to 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters to modernize its air force and counter regional threats. Turkey is lobbying hard to get back into the F-35 program.
Turkey was earlier removed from the program in 2019 and hit with CAATSA sanctions after purchasing the Russian S-400 missile defense system, but renewed diplomatic push and potential shifts in U.S. policy have reopened discussions.
However, the US is insisting that Turkey will have to dispose of the S-400 units, which Ankara could sell, as per reports, to either the UAE or Qatar.
While countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey, among others, have been desperately trying to seek the F-35 stealth jets, why did India not aggressively pursue the US aircraft?
The IAF is already down to 29 fighter squadrons. Pakistan could possibly receive its first initial batch of Chinese Shenyang J-35 stealth fighter jets by 2027.
Reports indicate an expected first delivery of 4 to 12 export-grade J-35 (or J-35E/A) aircraft. Pakistan plans to acquire up to 40 units by 2029. However, there are some reports that the timelines may slip.
Notwithstanding, this could change the air-combat dynamics in the subcontinent.
There are reports that China has already built nearly 500 J-20 fifth-generation fighters, and over 350 are in service with the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Some have been deployed close to India’s Ladakh, in Xinjiang.
They have also been exercising over Tibet. Both Pakistan and China operate in collusion.
There will thus be pressure on India’s security establishment to acquire interim fifth-generation aircraft. The Sukhoi Su-57 has been offered with full technology transfer, and the F-35 is still at the “mind-games” stage.
The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II is widely considered the best fifth-generation multirole fighter because it combines extreme, low-observable stealth with revolutionary sensor fusion, acting as a flying computer and “quarterback of the skies” that networks data seamlessly with friendly platforms.
The low radar cross-section lets it bypass modern air defense networks undetected, as demonstrated in Iran. Around 1,400 F-35s have been built. 12 countries already operate them. Another eight countries have ordered them.
The U.S. and its major international partner nations have already committed to acquire over 3,100 F-35 stealth aircraft through 2035. The United States intends to purchase 2,456 jets.
Undoubtedly, it is the best fifth-generation fighter currently.
For India, the F-35 proposal faced almost immediate hurdles due to subsequent tariff frictions and India’s core push for technology transfer for domestic manufacturing of its own Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and the aero-engines.
There have been tremendous delays by GE Aerospace on its 2021 contract to supply 99 F404-IN20 engines to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for the Tejas Mk1A fighter program. Only six out of the promised engines have been delivered instead of the targeted 12-plus a year, prompting HAL to invoke contractual penalty clauses.
The tariffs on “friend” India and delayed engines for AMCA badly strained the Indo-US ties.
India also operates Russian-supplied S-400 systems, a factor that previously caused frictions between the US and Turkey.
India already operates the S-400 and Su-30MKI. The U.S. fears these networks could compromise classified F-35 stealth data. The jet relies on the U.S.-controlled Operational Data Integrated Network for software and logistics.
The US is perhaps already accessing such data through many other American platforms on Indian soil.
Meanwhile, introducing a complex new Western platform adds severe maintenance challenges to an already diverse military fleet. Even in the US, there are very few airbases where the stealth coatings can be serviced.
Buying foreign fifth-generation jets risks diverting funds from India’s indigenous AMCA project. Putting too many military aviation eggs in the unreliable US basket will also be an issue. Americans can be “very unreliable” when it comes to putting sanctions and freezing spares and maintenance support.
While operationally, the F-35 could present major strategic advantages for the IAF, any potential deal involves deep geopolitical, logistical, and financial complexities. Acquisition costs range from $80 to $110 million per jet alongside very high hourly operational expenses, creating budgetary issues for New Delhi.
Russia has been aggressively marketing and bidding for India’s interim fifth-generation fighter. Due to Western sanctions, its military sales have slowed down considerably in the last few years.
It has offered India complete technology transfer and local licensed production of the Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter jet.
Russian leadership has pitched the deal with no restrictions. The full technology offer includes access to stealth design, engines, AESA radar, optics, and AI elements. A phased transfer of production to Indian facilities, using existing Su-30MKI infrastructure, is proposed.
There is willingness to co-develop a twin-seat variant and integrate Indian weapons. As the IAF faces a growing stealth gap, the offer looks attractive.
But unfortunately, only 42 Su-57 have been built to date. Even the Russian Air Force has ordered only around 72 aircraft. Yearly production is still around 10-12 aircraft.
Unlike the F-35, Su-57 is unlikely to get large orders. Russia is still in a major war, and its military industrial complex is busy producing for its front lines. Delivery of Su-57 could be 5-6 years after signing the contract, as not many fly-away units are available.
There is normally a big gap between publicly stated offers of technology vis-à-vis when being penned on paper or actually delivered. While the Su-57 is very impressive during displays, some are questioning the quality of its stealth.
Not many Su-57s have been heard of attempting to penetrate the Ukrainian air defenses. The Indian establishment has thus not made any statements on Su-57 acquisition.
Su-57 For IAF: India Rules Out New Sukhoi Fighter Jets, To Prioritize Su-30 MKI Upgrades
India’s AMCA program is in the critical stealth validation and prototype manufacturing preparation phase. The three consortiums led by private sector conglomerates have been short-listed. These include Tata Advanced Systems, Larsen & Toubro, and Bharat Forge. Bids are being prepared for the ₹15,000 crore ($1.57 billion) development-cum-production contract.
A full-scale engineering model recently underwent specialized Radar Cross Section (RCS) testing at the ORANGE facility in Dundigal, Hyderabad. The prototype rollout is anticipated around late 2026 or early 2027, with the first flight planned roughly within 30 months of contract finalization. Serial production and initial induction into the Indian Air Force (IAF) are targeted for the mid-2030s.
A clean internal stealth layout would involve carrying about 1.5 tons of weapons for initial penetration, and a non-stealth “beast mode” payload carrying up to 7 tons across 14 stations. The Twin-engine, all-weather platform is built for deep strikes, electronic warfare, and low radar cross-section operations.
Considering that the IAF has still to receive the first LCA Mk1A, due to delayed GE-404 engine deliveries and some integration issues, the timelines for the very technology-intensive AMCA are very optimistic.
To accelerate the AMCA, India has shifted from a single-agency monopoly to a competitive public-private consortium model, engaging shortlisted private industrial heavyweights such as L&T with BEL, Tata Advanced Systems, and Bharat Forge, alongside the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), to build five prototypes.
All these consortia have industrial and project management capability and have been in the defense production ecosystem for quite some time. They will handle development, manufacturing, and future series production with dedicated capacity and speed.
Core specialized flight-testing and integration centers have been established (such as the facility in Puttaparthi, Andhra Pradesh), and dedicated airspace commitments have been secured from civil aviation authorities to streamline flight trials. Procuring interim GE-414 engines for prototype testing while simultaneously engaging with global partners like France’s Safran and Rolls-Royce for high-thrust indigenous engine development to avoid power plant bottlenecks.
India has set up high-level monitoring committees chaired by top defense officials to shrink timelines from the drawing board to the first scheduled prototype flights. However, I feel that a national project of this kind must be monitored directly by the PM Office.
The decision-making has to be much faster. Some risks will have to be factored and taken. More funds would have to be put on the table. Private sector commercial connections and national diplomacy must be used to acquire critical technologies. Reverse-engineering must no longer be a taboo word. AI needs to be extensively used for design and manufacturing to cut timelines.
Supply chain redundancy and diplomatic, secure sourcing are required. Aero-engine has to be a national priority project. India needs to invest more in critical minerals and special metals manufacturing.
Our manufacturing excellence has to reach the levels to make single-crystal blades with high-precision cooling ducts. The best talent has to be nurtured. The exodus of the kind that happened from ISRO must be prevented through more attractive opportunities. A few dedicated aerospace universities should be set up. A skilled manufacturing force has to be built.
After two decades of relationship ascendancy, in the last two years, there has been a level of distrust between the largest and oldest democracies of the world.
While it is hoped that it is a transitory phase, it is becoming clear that the US is not interested in India’s rise as a global power. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau stated at the last Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi that Washington will not repeat its past approach (read mistake) with China by granting India unfettered market and tech access that could lead to strong commercial competition.
The US wants India to be strong enough only to be a bulwark against China and not become an independent power center or a technology and economic power.
The US seems keen only to supply platforms to India through large contracts. Even for aero-structures and smaller components, they prefer make-in-India “Build to Print” and not any significant technology sharing.
Even the proposed India-USA deal to co-produce GE Aerospace F414 engines with HAL faces major hurdles. The primary complications involve a nearly threefold cost surge, alongside intense disputes over sensitive hot-end technology transfer and the risk of delays to India’s Tejas Mk2 and AMCA programs.
Many Indians are wondering if we have invested too much in a partner with whom there is a high trust deficit and who has a vacillating foreign policy. US is known to have “dumped” friends and allies for immediate national interests. The way the Trump administration has publicly threatened or admonished its own NATO allies in the recent past further strengthens Indian concerns.
USA has already gotten deep into India’s airborne platforms and supplied India with transport aircraft (C-17, C-130), maritime patrol aircraft (P-8I), UAVs (MQ-9), and helicopters (Chinook, AH-64 Apache, and MH-60R).
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For a long time, the US was trying to sell the F-16 ‘Viper’ (renamed F-21) and the F-18 Super Hornet as part of India’s Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) proposal. Later, it offered the F-15EX. The F-35 was never officially on offer.
Despite being the oldest democracy, the US finds it easier to deal with dependent military Generals, and West Asian Sheikhs, rather than growing democracies. The US has a poor opinion of India’s “Non-Alignment” and “Strategic Autonomy.”
Washington continues to prefer unstable Pakistan, which helps it connect with China and West and Central Asia, and is willing to toe the American line for a few bucks. This Pakistan connection causes further distrust in India.
Most analysts feel that allowing the USA into India’s fighter aircraft ecosystem is not a great idea. Any F-35 deal, like the other aircraft deals, will be just a supply and support contract. There will be no transfer of technology, and no “Make-in-India” element.
While India pushes its own AMCA program, if at all, the better choice for an interim fighter may still be the Su-57.
The post F-35 For India: Delhi Quietly Ignored Trump’s Soft Pitch For U.S. Stealth Fighters That Turkey & Saudi Chase appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
For decades, Kashmir’s mainstream political parties have been accused of using separatist rhetoric as a tool for electoral mobilization while shaping narratives that, critics argue, benefited Pakistan’s propaganda
Recently, Mehbooba Mufti, the president of the Jammu and Kashmir People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, announced that the party will hold protests across all district headquarters in Jammu and Kashmir on August 5, demanding the return of special status and asserting that the Kashmir issue must be resolved.
At a time when many people in the Valley have moved on from such issues, Mufti appears to be trying to keep separatist ideology and sentiment alive by once again raising these themes and playing the separatist card to achieve her political objectives.
Her latest remarks become even more striking when viewed against the backdrop of the ongoing violence in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. (PoJK).
As the Pakistani forces are killing innocents in PoJK, the situation has worsened drastically, with 80 people killed since June, including a brutal escalation in which over 20 civilians were gunned down in just 24 hours.
During the long march, Pakistani forces, Rangers, and snipers deployed across Rawalakot and Mirpur have been directly firing live ammunition at unarmed civilians, leaving hundreds critically injured. The Pakistani forces have also reportedly occupied hospitals, cut off electricity and water supplies, and are not allowing the wounded to receive treatment while enforcing a total communication blackout.
There are also reports that the bodies of those killed are being taken from hospitals and that injured civilians are being removed from medical facilities by security forces. But in Kashmir, no mainstream political party, so-called activists, or others will condemn these Pakistani atrocities because they do not want to upset or openly criticize Pakistan.
More importantly, many Kashmiris on social media, instead of condemning these actions, are justifying them by saying that similar things happen in Yemen and other conflict zones, thereby trying to dilute the impact of the atrocities taking place there. In reality, the atrocities committed by Pakistani forces against innocent civilians have severely damaged their evil agenda and their larger game plan to undermine India. Therefore, they cannot condemn these killings or show solidarity with the victims, choosing instead to deflect attention away from Pakistan’s brutality.
Earlier also, Mehbooba Mufti made highly controversial statements painting a false picture of peace in PoJK, claiming that the people there were happy under Pakistan’s administration. Her dangerous rhetoric was instantly weaponized by Pakistani intelligence agencies and state media for anti-India propaganda.
Former Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto even directly cited her statements on the floor of the National Assembly to fuel Islamabad’s false narrative on Kashmir on the global stage, explicitly quoting her claims to argue that “even India’s own elected leaders acknowledge the satisfaction of the people under our administration.”
Likewise, earlier, Srinagar Member of Parliament Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi, while referring to the recent atrocities in PoJK, deliberately drew a moral equivalence by comparing the situation in Indian Kashmir with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Speaking in Budgam, Mehdi claimed that people on both sides of the Line of Control have “suffered” equally and have been rendered “powerless”.
By stating that the situation is essentially the same “there and here,” his remarks explicitly serve to downplay the horrific atrocities, live ammunition firing, and brutal crackdowns that the Pakistan Army and Rangers are committing against innocent civilians in PoJK.
Instead of directly and unequivocally calling out Islamabad’s severe state-sponsored violence, his deliberate attempt to equate India’s democratic governance with Pakistan’s oppressive military occupation reveals a calculated agenda to dilute the gravity of Pakistan’s human rights violations, showing that certain mainstream leaders are more interested in deflecting for Pakistan than standing up for the truth.
Recently, he also went to Jantar Mantar when hundreds of students, backed by the Cockroach Janta Party movement, were holding major demonstrations demanding examination transparency over national exam controversies like the NEET-UG paper leaks. Instead of talking about the examination irregularities, addressing the plight of the distressed aspirants, or showing genuine solidarity with the students demanding accountability, he hijacked the platform to preach about the restoration of Article 370—an agenda that had absolutely no connection to the education crisis at hand.
He asked the crowd, “Did Article 370 come from Pakistan’s constitution or India’s constitution? These were the constitutional guarantees of this country.” He further shifted the focus by stating, “Kashmir has lived through this silencing for years. Today, the same is happening to you. This chain must break.” This blatant exploitation of a student-led grievance to push his own regional political narrative proves that his priorities lie entirely in keeping his separatism-tinted propaganda alive.
Similarly, earlier, when the Jammu and Kashmir Union Territory Budget was announced, and grants were provided by the Central Government, PDP youth leader Waheed-ur-Rehman Para launched a malicious attack on India’s financial system by explicitly comparing the budget allocation to “colonialism.”
Speaking aggressively against the central funding framework, Para claimed that the financial package and the extension of market-linked SASCI (Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment) loans were a deliberate plot to trap Jammu and Kashmir in a massive debt cycle, even comparing the situation to the economic collapse of Sri Lanka.
By labeling the central government’s development grants as a tool of colonial exploitation, his toxic rhetoric deliberately treated Kashmir’s integration into the national fiscal framework as an external imposition. Through this narrative, he acted as if Kashmir were a separate, occupied nation rather than an integral part of India, proving once again that these leaders will shamelessly manipulate financial data to fuel their anti-India propaganda.
Repeatedly, many mainstream leaders have used separatist language in Kashmir, such as making highly dangerous and unsubstantiated claims about demographic change, and making other rhetorical statements against India.
For instance, PDP president Mehbooba Mufti explicitly targeted central welfare initiatives like the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY), aggressively claiming that providing land plots to the homeless was a disguised attempt to “import slums and poverty” and deliberately alter the Muslim-majority demographic composition of the region.
She went as far as tweeting that state-backed infrastructure and urban township proposals were part of a “deliberate state engineering” plan for mass settlements. Similarly, National Conference MP Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi has continuously used high-profile platforms to push a toxic narrative of systematic “disempowerment,” claiming that the post-2019 administrative framework is causing forced demographic changes and local alienation.
By generating these toxic domestic narratives, these leaders directly fuel the anti-India propaganda machinery operated by Pakistan, proving that their rhetoric is perfectly aligned with Islamabad’s agenda to undermine India’s sovereignty.
Who can forget the Assembly elections in J&K when some of these regional parties used to orchestrate a highly calculated booth-capturing tactic? They would deliberately instruct their dedicated voters and cadre to cast their votes early in the morning, within a strict, specific timeframe right as the polling booths opened.
Immediately after securing their own voter base, their party workers and mobilized miscreants would launch heavy, pre-planned stone-pelting campaigns directly targeting the polling stations to enforce a terror-induced shutdown. This violent strategy effectively blocked the general public and voters supporting other nationalist or mainstream parties from ever reaching the booths.
Later, instead of exposing this local voter suppression, these same regional leaders and separatist elements would project the dismal voter turnouts at the global level as a voluntary political “election boycott” by the people of Kashmir.
This deceptive narrative was instantly grabbed and weaponized by international forums and Pakistani state networks to run an extensive, malicious propaganda campaign against India, falsely claiming that Kashmiris had completely rejected the Indian democratic process when, in reality, their democratic rights had been violently hijacked by local party-backed stone-pelters.
If Pakistan has been responsible for spreading terrorism in J&K, these certain local mainstream parties, through their rhetoric and political strategies, have also been equally responsible for perpetuating and sustaining this separatism. Even during elections, and even today, they repeatedly use the separatist card and raise such issues as if Kashmir were a distinct territory. Whenever they ask for votes, they use separatist rhetoric to achieve their political objectives.
They have exploited the unrest in Kashmir in the past while amassing immense wealth, building massive private empires through rampant corruption and nepotism. For decades, they constantly provided misinformation to the Central Government, deliberately painting J&K as an unmanageable powder keg and keeping New Delhi in a permanent state of fear by misrepresenting the actual ground situation to sustain their own political monopolies.
Even when India historically abrogated Article 370 on August 5, 2019, they shamelessly resorted to the exact same fear-mongering and provocative statements. Most notoriously, PDP president Mehbooba Mufti explicitly declared that if Article 370 were ever removed, “there will be no one left in Jammu and Kashmir to hold the Indian tricolor,” a highly inflammatory claim designed to spark mass violence.
Even during the 1990s and afterward, some of these regional parties and their leaders actively worked with separatists, maintaining close ties with them and with Pakistan to play both sides against each other.
During the height of terrorism in the 1990s, political figures repeatedly maintained backchannel links with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference and Hizbul Mujahideen commanders to secure political leverage while simultaneously drawing administrative resources from New Delhi.
The credit goes to the Central Government after 2019 for bringing monumental changes by dismantling the ecosystem of subversion, but much more still needs to be done. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) Jammu and Kashmir, which remains banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), must be subjected to round-the-clock surveillance, especially as its proxy elements continue trying to operate through covert networks.
There must be a razor-sharp focus on the massive inflow of funds coming into the region through fake charities, hawala routes, and cross-border shell entities. At the same time, social media platforms should be closely monitored for coordinated influence operations, disinformation campaigns, or content that unlawfully incites violence or supports terrorism, including attempts to downplay or justify Pakistani atrocities.
The comment sections of social media posts related to these incidents should also be closely watched, as they may reveal coordinated campaigns to deflect attention from or justify such violence.
At the higher education level, the politics and history of Jammu and Kashmir taught in universities and colleges should also be reviewed to ensure that the curriculum does not reinforce narratives portraying the region as inherently separate from the rest of India by overemphasizing notions of a “distinct identity,” “special status,” or political exceptionalism in a manner that fosters feelings of separateness.
Specifically, modules covering the Dogra period, the 1947 Instrument of Accession, and post-independence constitutional history should be re-examined. Instead, academic content should be factually rigorous, balanced, and aligned with constitutional values and the broader objective of national integration. Such vigilance should extend beyond educational institutions to the wider information ecosystem.
Furthermore, the state must implement rigorous audits and oversight mechanisms over all regional publications. The radical literature and ideological publications of any organization—including JeI’s propaganda materials or local newspapers in Jammu and Kashmir that may act as mouthpieces for Islamabad—must be strictly monitored and checked.
Allowing local platforms to subtly print soft-separatist columns or spread Pakistan’s twisted narrative under the guise of free press directly fuels radicalization.
Those seeking to undermine India’s unity and sovereignty must not be permitted to exploit the civil rights and democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Indian Constitution to propagate separatist or anti-national narratives. Freedom of expression cannot be used as a shield for promoting ideologies that threaten the constitutional order and national integrity.
Enforcing the J&K Media Policy with zero-tolerance penalties is essential to ensure that no platform is ever weaponized to promote separatism or undermine national sovereignty.
The post OPED: While Pakistan Guns Down Civilians in PoJK, Mainstream Politicians Play the Separatist Card in Jammu & Kashmir appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
For the first time, an Indian Air Force (IAF) Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft was refueled by a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Airbus KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) taking part in Exercise “Pitch Black” 2026.
The refueling of the Indian Rafale—making their debut at “Exercise Pitch Black”—was conducted during the second week of the exercise, which began on 20 July and runs through August 7, 2026. The jets that refueled mid-air have been identified as a single-seat Rafale EH and a twin-seat Rafale DH, as noted by Janes.
According to the Australian Department of Defense, the KC-30A, operating from RAAF Base Darwin, refueled 14 fighter aircraft from partner nations during a five-hour sortie over Australia’s Northern Territory. Meanwhile, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) highlighted the mission on X with video footage that also showed RAAF Super Hornets, Republic of Korea Air Force F-15Ks, and German Eurofighter Typhoons being refueled mid-air.
Flight Lieutenant Sara Whitehead, commander of the KC-30A, said, “The first to visit the aerial bowser were two IAF Rafales, completing fuel transfers by wing-mounted hose-and-drogue before returning to their missions.”
Before this, the RAAF KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transports refueled IAF Su-30MKIs during Exercise Pitch Black 2018 for the first time.
A RAAF KC-30A delivered fuel to Indian Rafales @IAF_MCC, RAAF Super Hornets, Republic of Korea Air Force F-15Ks @ROK_MND and German Eurofighter Typhoons @Team_Luftwaffe, demonstrating seamless multinational interoperability at #PitchBlack26. pic.twitter.com/5u7F4U29bs
— Royal Australian Air Force (@AusAirForce) July 28, 2026
Notably, the latest refueling event was the visible execution of an agreement signed by Australia and India in November 2024, enabling RAAF KC-30As to refuel aircraft of the Indian Armed Forces. It is, however, noteworthy that the KC-30s refueled the IAF’s most advanced fighter jet, which has now become the cornerstone of its air power.
Interestingly, the Rafales arrived in Australia a little over a year after the May 2025 India–Pakistan crisis, in which Indian fighters engaged Chinese-origin Pakistani aircraft, and at a time when India is advancing plans for the acquisition of 114 additional Rafales.
This is not the first time that a refueling aircraft of a partner nation has refueled Indian Rafales. Earlier, for instance, the first IAF Rafales were mid-air refueled by French Air Force Airbus A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft during their ferry flight from Merignac (Bordeaux), France, to Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE.
Separately, the UAE Air Force Airbus MRTT tankers provided in-flight refueling for several subsequent ferry flights of IAF Rafales from France to India, enabling non-stop flights.
Having said that, the latest long-range deployment to Australia tested the Rafale’s strategic reach and ability to sustain operations far from home bases.
The Indo-Pacific is a vast theater where combat aircraft need extended range and endurance. Therefore, this kind of mutual support strengthens collective readiness, deterrence, and the ability to sustain operations far from home bases — goals repeatedly highlighted in India–Australia statements about a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
The IAF Rafale’s debut in Pitch Black comes at a time when India and Australia are strengthening their defense ties. For the ongoing drills, the IAF sent at least four Rafales, two Boeing C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft, one Ilyushin Il-78 Midas aerial refueling aircraft, and an estimated 120 troops to RAAF Base Darwin.
The IAF Rafales were expected to fly alongside the F-35 stealth fighters during these keenly watched multinational drills.
Fielding Rafales for the first time in 2026 and successfully receiving Australian tanker support underscores deepening air-power cooperation. It complements other engagements, including maritime patrol aircraft interactions and joint exercises, and signals growing ability to operate together in coalition settings.
Earlier this week, Australian High Commissioner Philip Green stated that India has become a “top-tier” security partner for Australia, noting that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent trip to Melbourne has strengthened security ties.
India and Australia have developed one of the fastest-growing defense partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, based on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in 2020. This core framework is apparently built on shared democratic values, economic ties, and a common vision of a free, open, peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific
After this, the two sides signed the Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement to provide reciprocal logistical support and facilitate more complex exercises and deployments. Subsequently, New Delhi and Canberra inked the Air-to-Air Refueling Arrangement in 2024.
The defense ties received a further boost this month as Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed the Joint Declaration on Defense and Security Cooperation during the third Annual Leaders’ Summit in Melbourne. It renews and expands the 2009 framework, committing the two sides to deeper strategic consultations, more complex exercises, faster interoperability and information sharing, expanded aircraft deployments from each other’s territories, and greater personnel exchanges.
Not just that, the two sides agreed on a Maritime Security Collaboration Roadmap focused on operational coordination, information sharing, and capability development in the maritime domain—the area of greatest geographic and strategic overlap.
Beyond Bilateral defense frameworks, India and Australia are bound by a host of institutional mechanisms, such as the QUAD, which also includes the US and Japan.
Meanwhile, the military cooperation spans all three services and has grown in frequency and complexity. In addition to Air Force-focused Pitch Black, India and Australia have participated in naval exercises such as Exercise Malabar, AUSINDEX, Milan, and Kakadu.
Additionally, the two sides have participated in AustraHind, an exercise that brings together the armies of the two countries, which now appears to be expanding to include amphibious or littoral elements.
India has also reportedly participated in Talisman Saber, hosted by Australia in 2025, and is looking forward to an enhanced role planned for the 2027 edition.
In his latest interview, Green also highlighted the value of common platforms such as the Boeing P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, bolstering interoperability.
A key driver of this close defense partnership is the shared concern about regional stability, freedom of navigation, and the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Although maritime security has been the strongest pillar of alignment amid shared threats and China’s rapid expansion in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the defense industrial collaboration is expanding through trade missions, industry roundtables, and efforts to build resilient supply chains and co-develop capabilities.
The Rafale’s debut in Pitch Black and the refueling exhibit the strength of ties between the two states.
The post Historic First for Indian Rafale Jets: Australian KC-30A Refuels IAF Fighters During Pitch Black 2026 appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by LuHan Gabel, associate director of the Ideas Workshop at the Open Society Foundations; Ooi Kee Beng, political historian and executive director of the Penang Institute; and Chelsea Nguyen, research assistant in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics.
LuHan highlights how young people in China are increasingly questioning the meaning of development and modernity beyond material progress. Kee Beng reflects on Malaysia’s complex relationship with China, arguing that their growing engagement is reconnecting South-East Asia to older historical patterns of regional interaction. Chelsea explains how, in Vietnam, attitudes towards China have shifted dramatically since the covid-19 pandemic, with young people becoming more curious about Chinese technology and society.
Together, Mark, LuHan, Kee Beng and Chelsea explore whether a post-Western, rather than anti-Western, generation is taking shape across the region. How did the covid-19 pandemic reshape perceptions of China in South-East Asia? Which aspects of Chinese modernity resonate most with younger generations? Is China becoming a new reference point for development and aspiration? And what do these shifts mean for Europe’s role in an increasingly multipolar world?
This podcast episode was recorded on July 10th 2026.
Bookshelf
A Maritime Vietnam: From Earliest Times to the Nineteenth Century, by Tana Li
State Building in Cold War Asia: Comrades and Competitors on the Sino-Vietnamese Border, by Qingfei Yin
Border Country, by Raymond Williams
The Scythian Empire: Central Eurasia and the Birth of the Classical Age from Persia to China, by Christopher I. Beckwith
Adrift in the South, by Xiao Hai
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Loubna El Amine, lecturer in political theory at King’s College London and affiliate of the Lau China Institute, and Cobus van Staden, head of research at the China-Global South Project. They draw on insights from Africa and the Middle East to examine how younger generations in these regions view China, Europe and the US, and together they discuss the new “China-native generation”.
Cobus explains why many young Africans increasingly associate China with modernity, technological progress and economic opportunity, while Loubna posits that, in the Middle East, China is often viewed less as an aspirational model. Instead, China has become more of a counterweight to US influence—it is a relatively neutral actor and potential balancing force in the Middle East’s changing geopolitical landscape.
Together, Mark, Cobus and Loubna explore whether a new post-Western, rather than anti-Western, generation is emerging. They discuss the political consequences of China’s growing presence, the legacy of colonialism and the challenges of building intellectual and economic connections beyond traditional Western frameworks.
How is China changing ideas of development across Africa? Why does it occupy such a different place in the Middle Eastern political imagination? Can South-South partnerships create new pathways for growth and influence? And what do these changes mean for Europe’s relationships throughout the world?
This podcast episode was recorded on July 10th 2026.
Bookshelf
How China Escaped the Poverty Trap by Yuen Yuen Ang
Fire in Every Direction by Tarek Baconi
A senior official from the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has indicated that New Delhi is not currently planning to buy new Sukhois. The statement comes as Moscow has been aggressively pushing to export its Su-57 fighter jets to the IAF
In a recent interview with Moneycontrol, Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh stated that India has no plans to acquire a “new version of the Sukhois.”
“No, we have not thought about Sukhois. If you are asking about the new version of the Sukhois, the answer is no. But we are actively considering upgrading the existing Sukhois… It is a success story. It is a very important platform with the induction of BrahMos missiles, and we hope to further upgrade and improve it,” Singh said when asked whether there are any plans to buy a fifth-generation aircraft outside of the AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft), India’s own indigenous fifth-generation fighter program.
While he did not name either aircraft, the remarks have been widely interpreted as referring to Russia’s Su-57 fifth-generation fighter. In fact, the statement marks a clearer official signal against a near-term Su-57 acquisition, in contrast to previous signals.
In April 2026, for instance, Chairman and Managing Director of the state-run Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Dr. D.K. Sunil, said, “A committee of Russians has also studied and said that roughly 50% of the facilities can be used for producing this aircraft, but some new investments will be required.” Thus, hinting that, while India was neither committing to nor rejecting the offer, it was merely in a pre-decision, information-gathering phase.
Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force (IAF) chief, Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh, indicated last year that the service might have to opt for an off-the-shelf purchase of a fifth-generation stealth aircraft.
“As far as the Su-57 is concerned, I just want to say that we have to weigh all the options, and we in the defense ministry and the Indian Air Force have a very set process for the induction of any weapon system, and that process will be followed. So what comes will depend on what meets the requirement and what is best for us,” he stated.
Singh’s latest comments also align with the IAF’s upgrade program for the Su-30MKI fleet aimed at modernizing avionics, sensors, and other systems while increasing domestic content.
“We are processing an upgrade program for the existing Su-30 MKI fleet. This will be the first time an indigenous upgrade of any fleet is being planned,” the IAF chief told Prakash Nanda, the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times.
Russia first publicly offered the Su-57E export variant to India at Aero India in February 2025. This was followed by a “golden deal” that included the supply of off-the-shelf aircraft, the production of the Su-57 in India, and assistance in developing India’s fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).
Later, the Russian state arms exporter Rosoboronexport expanded it to include the use of existing Su-30MKI infrastructure to facilitate local manufacturing of the Su-57E in India, as previously reported by the EurAsian Times.
In June 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly renewed the pitch, citing the former FGFA (Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft) collaboration between the two allies and calling it the world’s best fifth-generation aircraft. Additionally, he stated that Russia was ready to work with India “without any issues or limitations.”
Notably, India and Russia had earlier collaborated on the Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program under a 2007 agreement. However, India later withdrew from the program, amid shortfalls in stealth performance, engine capability, insufficient access to design data and source code, and concerns that the aircraft did not fully meet the Indian Air Force’s requirements for independent upgradeability and maintenance, as explained in a detailed EurAsian Times report you can read here.
In fact, doubts about the aircraft’s stealth characteristics and the extent to which Moscow would be willing to part with technology persist to this day, and are believed to be one of the reasons why India has been reluctant to acquire the Su-57.
Moreover, critics have expressed skepticism that the purchase or joint production of the Russian fighter may divert attention from India’s AMCA fifth-generation fighter program and put the indigenous aircraft on the back burner, as has happened in the past.
However, the situation has become increasingly complex, as AMCA appears to be farther away than initially anticipated. Defense observers and veterans predict the first flight may slip to 2032, as private manufacturers may not meet tight deadlines.
This would leave the IAF with a major stealth gap vis-à-vis the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), which has two operational fifth-generation fighters, the J-20 and the J-35. In fact, it has expanded its J-20 inventory to 500 fighters, according to recent reports.
Not just that, China has been testing two different sixth-generation prototypes: the J-36 and the J-50, both of which are regularly spotted in flight, suggesting that development is taking place at an unprecedented pace. In fact, Beijing may be ready to induct a sixth-generation fighter by the time India inducts its first AMCA.
The situation can become overly dangerous if Pakistan acquires the Chinese J-35A stealth fighters, as consistently noted by media reports.
Staring at a dwindling squadron strength, the IAF is currently inching closer to signing a deal for 114 Rafale fighter jets, 94 of which will be produced locally.
While this acquisition will help add the numbers needed for a large-scale two-front war, it will not arrest the growing technological gap between India and its adversaries.
Some veterans have argued that a limited off-the-shelf purchase of Su-57s could serve as an interim measure, provided it does not divert resources or attention from the AMCA.
“The 114 Rafales will address the quantitative requirement but not the qualitative enhancement requirement. That leaves only the Su-57 as the only available near-term option, though it is not perfect,” the IAF veteran and ex-Vice Chief of IAF, Air Marshal Anil Khosla, earlier told the EurAsian Times. “A deal for a limited number may be considered, provided it advances the AMCA program rather than curtails it.”
Others emphasize viewing large-scale commitment to a foreign fifth-generation platform as carrying industrial, sustainment, and strategic risks.
For example, IAF veteran, Air Marshal Anil Chopra, told EurAsian Times: “India should focus on producing the Rafale locally, advance work on AMCA and its variants, accelerate production of the indigenous Tejas fighters, and buy about 40 Su-57 fighters off-the-shelf from Russia as an interim solution instead of getting into local production.
Earlier this year, the Indian MoD informed the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense of its interest in joining a sixth-generation fighter. India has two options: join the UK-Japan-Italy GCAP program or team up with France for their potential 6th-gen aircraft.
The post Su-57 For IAF: India Rules Out New Sukhoi Fighter Jets, To Prioritize Su-30 MKI Upgrades appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Three years after signing a broad defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, Kuwait has reportedly ratified the pact with Islamabad.
The agreement was approved through decree-law no. 73 of 2026 and published in the official gazette Kuwait Al-Youm on July 26.
The pact establishes a framework for cooperation between the two armed forces, focusing on military training, education, intelligence sharing, logistics, defense technology, research and exchanges of expertise, with the aim of strengthening institutional military ties between the two countries, Kuwait Times reported.
The agreement also includes cooperation in military manufacturing, electronic communications systems, scientific research, military media and cultural and sports activities. A joint military committee will oversee implementation, including organizing exercises, official visits and other joint programs.
It also includes provisions governing the protection of classified information exchanged between the two sides, preventing the transfer of confidential documents or materials to third parties without prior written approval.
According to reports, the agreement will remain in force for five years and will be automatically renewed unless either country chooses to withdraw.
The agreement was ratified at a time when all Gulf countries, including Kuwait, are facing renewed security challenges due to the ongoing US-Iran War.
Notably, just one and a half years ago, Pakistan signed a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, which also included a mutual defense clause on the lines of NATO’s Article 5, wherein an attack on one country is considered an attack on both countries, obliging the other country to provide military, economic, intelligence, and diplomatic support to the attacked country.
Earlier, Pakistan had suggested that Turkey and Qatar are also considering joining the Pakistan-Saudi Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SDMA).
Pakistan-aligned strategic thinkers even quipped that the agreement will bring in Turkish arms, Pakistani nuclear weapons, and Saudi and Qatari Petro-dollars and energy security.
While the Pakistan-Kuwait defense agreement does not include a mutual defense clause on the lines of NATO’s Article 5, the signing of the agreement will nevertheless further ignite speculation about an Islamic NATO in the making, which will seek a collective security arrangement outside traditional Western frameworks and independent of the United States.
However, talks of an Islamic NATO are largely symbolic rather than substantive, constrained by deep-seated internal rivalries, enduring structural dependence on the United States, and broader geopolitical calculations that render it operationally unviable and impractical.
In fact, the narrative of an Islamic NATO, largely driven by Pakistan, echoes the earlier rhetoric of an “Islamic bomb” that Islamabad promoted throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a vision that ultimately came to nothing.
For decades, all West Asian countries, with the sole exception of Iran, have depended on the US for their defense and security.
In fact, the US has as many as 18 military bases in the region.
The US has strategic security partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar.
Turkey, meanwhile, is a NATO member. It also hosts American nuclear weapons at the Incirlik Air Base as part of a NATO nuclear-sharing agreement. An estimated 20 to 50 B61 nuclear gravity bombs are stored there under US control, though Turkey has no independent authority to use them.
However, ever since the Hamas terror attacks on Israel in October 2023, the West Asian region has been going through a churning.
In the aftermath, Israel declared its goal of ‘Total Victory’ and has since attacked six regional countries, including Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, Yemen, and Iran. While Israel has often had brief wars and skirmishes against the first three (Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria), it attacked Yemen, Qatar, and Iran for the first time.
The Israeli “belligerence” is believed to have fueled collective insecurities and made Gulf states look for new security guarantees and new partners.
In September 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SDMA) on the lines of NATO’s collective defense clause. The most important clause of the agreement states, “Aggression against one country shall be considered aggression against both.”
While not explicitly stated, some Pakistani leaders, including Defense Minister Khwaja Asif, had suggested that the agreement extend Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella protection to Saudi Arabia.
Notably, the agreement was signed just weeks after an Israeli airstrike on Qatar on September 9, 2025, which reportedly took even Washington by surprise.
Qatar hosts the largest US military base in the region, but that was not enough to deter Israel.
In the same month, Doha signed a new security pact with the US, in which Washington explicitly pledged Qatar’s security.
“The United States shall regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States,” it said, adding, in the event of such an attack, the United States shall take all lawful and appropriate measures — including diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military — to defend the interests of the United States and of the State of Qatar and to restore peace and stability.
However, the US-Iran War that began earlier in February this year once again destabilized the entire region and demonstrated the inability of the US to provide foolproof security in the region.
In the aftermath, Iran attacked Jordan, Iraq, Israel, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
The US’s inability to thwart these attacks is further pushing Gulf countries to explore new security partners. In this atmosphere of geopolitical upheaval, Pakistan is pushing itself as a credible security partner that can fill the vacuum left behind by the US.
Since Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed their much-publicized mutual defense agreement, Pakistan has been fighting a war with Afghanistan, whereas Saudi Arabia was repeatedly attacked by Iran.
Last week, Yemen’s Houthi rebels launched attacks on Saudi Arabia and have now declared a naval blockade of the country.
As per the terms of the agreement, by now Pakistan should have declared a war on Iran and the Houthis, and Saudi Arabia should have declared a war on Afghanistan. However, neither has this happened, which highlights that the mutual defense clause has loopholes.
In fact, far from attacking Iran, Pakistan was hosting the US-Iran peace talks on its territory, even when Saudi oil fields were under Iranian attacks.
Security analysts have already highlighted that Riyadh is unlikely to come to Islamabad’s aid if there is war between India and Pakistan.
In fact, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia is pursuing economic transformation and requires strong partnerships with major economies. Riyadh views India as a long-term economic partner as it diversifies away from oil dependence.
Islamic NATO a Myth?
Despite the rhetoric from Islamabad, the fact remains that all these countries of the prospective Islamic NATO are heavily dependent on the US for their defense and security.
Turkey is already part of NATO, and Qatar has also signed a mutual defense agreement with the US.
It is beyond comprehension why these countries will swap US security guarantees for Pakistani ones.
Meanwhile, Pakistan, often portrayed as a central pillar of this imagined alliance because of its nuclear capability, itself operates under severe constraints, as its economic, financial and military dependence on the US remains overwhelming.
Pakistan needs Washington’s blessings for constant IMF bailouts that keep its economy afloat.
Washington’s influence over the Pakistani military establishment and its decision-making process can hardly be overestimated. It is inconceivable that in any potential conflict between Israel and any Gulf state, Pakistan would launch an attack on Israel.
In fact, the very term NATO is misleading as NATO is not just a mutual defense agreement signed between various states; rather, it is a deeply institutionalized military bloc, with integrated command structures, regular joint training, shared military doctrines, common and interoperable weapons systems, and decades of coordination.
This structure can not be replicated by merely signing an agreement.
Additionally, deep-seated internal rivalries between Islamic states – Saudi Arabia vs Iran, Turkey vs Arab states, Egypt vs Turkey, the new emerging axis of Saudi Arabia against the UAE, and the aspirations of Pakistan itself to portray itself as the natural leader of the Islamic world- make any Islamic NATO alliance a non-starter.
And, lastly, the biggest myth is that the US is withdrawing from the Middle East, and the Gulf States are looking for partners to replace US security guarantees.
While Gulf states are actively seeking to diversify their security alliances and signing defense pacts with new partners, they aim to complement rather than replace their existing arrangements with the United States.
In fact, there is an argument that the recent military pacts, such as the Saudi-Pakistan and Pakistani-Kuwaiti defense pacts, enjoy tactical US support.
The US and Israel will not tolerate an Islamic NATO forged in opposition to Western domination, and an Islamic NATO, forged with the tactical support of Washington and Jerusalem, will have no strategic autonomy to formulate an independent security policy.
The post After Saudi Arabia, Pakistan Formalizes Defense Pact with Kuwait Amid Gulf Security Crisis and US-Iran War appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
After Canada became the first country to join the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) as its first observer nation, Lorenzo Mariani, CEO of Leonardo, said at Farnborough that if a nation wishes to join the GCAP program, it must do so by the end of 2026, with a final deadline of 12 months
The tri-national Global Combat Air Program, launched in 2022, aims to develop a supersonic sixth-generation stealth fighter by 2035 to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon used by some European countries and Japan’s Mitsubishi F-2.
Earlier this week, Canada confirmed it is joining GCAP as an observer country. While Canada’s observer status does not make it a full program partner, it will still provide Ottawa with greater visibility of GCAP’s governance, capabilities and industrial structure, as it looks to diversify its defense partnerships away from the US.
Meanwhile, following the collapse of the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS), Germany is also exploring its options for joining the GCAP.
On July 22, Germany’s largest fighter jet manufacturer, Airbus Defense and Space, said at the Farnborough Air Show in the UK that it was open to joining forces with Britain, Italy and Japan on the GCAP program.
The head of Airbus’s defense division in Munich, Michael Schoellhorn, said the company could collaborate with the UK on developing the new aircraft if it had sufficient control over the program and work share.
“What we’re ready to do is to join something or to build something where we have a significant portion of the work and the leadership. That’s currently being explored,” Schoellhorn told reporters.
Separately, Leonardo chief executive Lorenzo Mariani said on the sidelines of the Farnborough airshow that German participation in GCAP would be “beneficial”.
Mariani said “strong competence of the German industry, debt funding capability from the German state and joint experience within the community” on previous fighter jet projects would be beneficial for all partners.
“The only real risk is disruption in timescales and work share,” he said.
While the FCAS Collapsed, GCAP gained momentum after receiving a major funding boost this month with the award of a £4.6 billion (approximately US$6.1 billion) contract from the UK-Japan-Italy to continue its development.
On July 3, the GCAP awarded the 18-month contract to Edgewing, the trinational joint venture of BAE Systems (UK), Leonardo (Italy), and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement (JAIEC).
This came shortly after the UK’s Defense Investment Plan committed £8.6 billion (US$11.5 billion) in UK funding to GCAP over four years, ending months of uncertainty and delays.
The momentum gained by GCAP, the recent funding boost, and Canada’s accession as an observer country will definitely enhance GCAP’s appeal to countries seeking to join a sixth-generation project.
In fact, after the collapse of FCAS, GCAP is the only practical option available to countries, as both the US (F-47) and China (J-36 and J-50), which have sixth-generation fighter jets under development, are not looking for international partners.
France’s Dassault has announced plans to pursue a next-generation fighter jet development program and is seeking partners, but the program is still in its infancy, and Paris has been an “unreliable partner” in joint fighter jet development programs.
In its presentation of its half-year results, Dassault Aviation stated that “discussions are under way with the French government to launch an alternative, either on a purely French basis or through cooperation, involving a demonstrator for a future combat aircraft.”
Éric Trappier also said that the aim would be to secure “a demonstrator, based on French requirements, which could fly in 2031 or 2032.” However, he also clarified that Dassault would not be interested in an arrangement in which the French aircraft manufacturer would be lead contractor without sufficient industrial control.
This non-compromising attitude, single-minded focus on French requirements, and France’s previous unreliable role in joint fighter jet development programs, including FCAS, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Tornado, mean that any country seeking to join a reliable sixth-generation fighter jet program has only one credible option: the GCAP.
In March this year, India announced that it is considering joining one of Europe’s ambitious ‘sixth-generation’ fighter jet programs.
The 20th report of the Standing Committee on Defense said the IAF is exploring collaboration with one of two European consortia currently working on sixth-generation fighters.
“The committee has been informed that two consortia are working on the sixth-generation aircraft. One is a consortium of the UK, Italy and Japan and the other is a consortium of France and Germany, and both are developing aircraft. The committee has also been informed that Air Force (IAF) will try to join forces with one of the consortia and begin considering a sixth-generation fighter right away with a view to ensure that they do not lag behind in achieving the target for advanced aircraft.”
The IAF is in a dire state now as not only is it critically short on squadron strength, but it is also trailing behind China in next-generation fighter jets. Though the IAF’s authorized strength is 42 fighter squadrons, it now has only 29 active fighter squadrons.
Also, China already has over 300 fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter jets and is on its way to operationalizing a second stealth fighter, the J-35. China is also testing two sixth-generation fighter jets, the J-36 and the J-50.
Reportedly, Pakistan is also planning to buy J-35A jets from China.
“The committee understands that in view of technical advancement of fighter aircraft globally and to meet the present security scenario, technical upgradation of aircraft is required on top priority for enhancement of its combat capability. The committee recommends the ministry to chalk out a trajectory in this regard and step forward the planning process for development and acquisition of sixth-generation (6G) aircraft which would eventually enhance India’s air domain capabilities in today’s highly air-centric modern warfare,” it said.
The standing committee shortlisted two consortiums: GCAP and FCAS.
However, since the FCAS has already collapsed, the only realistic option for India is to join GCAP.
Also, India has already received an invitation from GCAP to join the program. Japan reportedly approached India to join the GCAP program earlier this year.
Japanese officials visited India in February. They explained the Japan-UK-Italy “Global Combat Air Program (GCAP)” to Indian officials and proposed their participation.
Following the reports of Japan’s offer to India to join GCAP, an editorial in Japan Times in June 2025 said that “the idea of including India, one of the world’s fastest-growing economies and an increasingly assertive geopolitical actor, makes strategic sense.”
It further said that including India in GCAP could re-energize the Japan-India relationship by offering a “high-stakes, high-visibility partnership that aligns with India’s long-term security and technological ambitions.”
“Including India could bring financial investment, manufacturing capacity and political clout to the initiative,” it said.
However, it suggested that India should join GCAP around 2027-2028, when the project has already passed the foundational design and industrial division phases.
Earlier, the UK had also reportedly invited India to join its Tempest program, the predecessor to GCAP. “We are looking for international partners to access the best assured capability [for developing the Tempest],” Nik Khanna, the head of BAE Systems India, was quoted as saying by the Business Standard. As to India’s specific role in the Tempest project, Khanna said: “A big cost driver for a futuristic aerospace system is going to be the requirement for more and more software engineers. India has a huge capability in that area.”
Several military experts and veterans who have spoken to the EurAsian Times in the past have said: buy Rafales to manage squadron strength and bolster numbers, develop the fifth-generation AMCA for long-term capability, buy off-the-shelf Su-57 fifth-generation fighters to bridge the current stealth gap with China, and join a sixth-generation fighter program to stay ahead of the curve.
The GCAP has set a very ambitious target: to fly its first demonstrator by 2027 and field the aircraft by 2035.
If India joins GCAP, it could have a sixth-generation fighter jet by 2035, bridging the widening capability gap with China.
Furthermore, participation in a sixth-gen fighter jet program could also help India in its own underdevelopment fifth-generation fighter jet program, the AMCA.
Retired Air Marshal Sanjeev Kapoor (former Director General, Inspection and Flight Safety, IAF) said, “India should Look East in fighter jet manufacturing. Japan runs the F-35 final assembly line and is working on FX platforms; India must partner with Japan on #GCAP (fresh MoD invite, Mar 2026) & South Korea on KF-21-style programs to set up full co-production & final assembly right here in India… To fast-track, we must use the model of global tech + distant local manufacturing, which leads to jobs, tech sovereignty & Atmanirbharta. Added advantage, Asian Value System which is different.”
The post GCAP For India: Leonardo CEO Says Join 6th-Gen UK-Japan-Italy Fighter Jet Program by End-2026 or Miss the Boat appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
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