The Oregon Air National Guard’s 142nd Wing has taken another significant step toward turning the F-15EX Eagle II into a true multirole fighter, conducting the first live-bomb drops from operational F-15EXs during training at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The milestone came during a roughly three-week deployment to Nellis in late August and early September in support of the U.S. Air Force’s Weapons Instructor Course (WIC).

Photographs released by the Air National Guard yesterday show F-15EXs from the 142nd Wing carrying live bombs on the flight line and departing Nellis with the weapons loaded. Official imagery shows the jets armed with a single 500-pound Mk 82 freefall bomb on the fuselage centerline, while spotters also captured F-15EXs carrying a 2,000-pound Mk 84 freefall bomb in the same position.

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The 142nd’s F-15EXs are only now acquiring a capability that was deliberately absent from the wing’s previous F-15C fleet. The Portland, Oregon-based unit was an air-superiority organization when it operated the F-15C, while the F-15EX is ultimately derived from the F-15E Strike Eagle and has considerably more inherent multirole potential.

As we reported in July, the wing had already begun laying the groundwork for this transition. In May, 142nd personnel traveled to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, where they loaded and dropped inert BDU-50 and BDU-56 training bombs from their F-15EXs. Those weapons replicate the size and weight of 500-pound-class Mk 82-series and 2,000-pound-class Mk 84-series bombs. Over 10 missions, the crews dropped 24 BDU-50s and 12 BDU-56s.

While the F-15EX had already been tested in an air-to-ground role by the Air Force’s test community, the Mountain Home deployment was the first time an operational Eagle II unit had loaded and dropped bombs. The next step, the wing said at the time, would be live weapons employment at Nellis.

The Air Force has emphasized that the F-15EX’s primary mission remains defensive and offensive counter-air, particularly in the homeland-defense role. At the same time, the service’s plans call for the aircraft to provide combatant commanders with strike packages capable of operating in contested environments.

The F-15EX is inherently well suited to such a mission. Derived from the Strike Eagle lineage, it combines that aircraft’s large payload capacity and long range with substantially modernized avionics and electronic warfare systems. The aircraft’s design leaves considerable room for additional weapons and mission equipment, making an expansion into air-to-ground operations relatively straightforward compared with trying to add that capability to the F-15C.

The 142nd has been building the institutional knowledge required to make that transition. Three of its pilots underwent a nine-month course covering the science, tactics, and procedures associated with air-to-ground weapons employment before returning to help establish the wing’s training program. Weapons personnel also traveled to Nellis earlier this year to work with F-15Es assigned to the 59th Test and Evaluation Squadron and become certified in bomb loading procedures.

As well as teaching pilots how to release a weapon, the wing had to develop an entirely new air-to-ground training pipeline for pilots, maintainers, and weapons personnel at a unit that had not previously operated an aircraft with an operational bombing mission.

Nellis is home to the Air Force’s Weapons School and is central to the Weapons Instructor Course, making it one of the most important locations in the service for developing and evaluating advanced tactics. The 142nd’s participation therefore places its emerging F-15EX air-to-ground capability in an environment specifically focused on integrating advanced weapons, tactics, and mission planning.

The wing’s new live bomb-dropping capability also comes as the Air Force continues to explore how broadly the Eagle II can be employed.

Test and evaluation units have already demonstrated that the aircraft can accommodate sophisticated air-to-ground weapons. Earlier this year, an F-15EX from the 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron participated in a munitions-load training event at Kadena Air Base in Japan, where Air Force personnel practiced loading live GBU-53/B Small Diameter Bomb IIs onto the aircraft.

The F-15EX is also capable of carrying the conformal fuel tanks used by the F-15E, which can provide additional fuel as well as additional weapons stations. The operational F-15EXs delivered to the 142nd have so far been seen without CFTs, however, and the status of the plan to equip the Oregon aircraft with them remains unclear.

CFTs could become increasingly important if the Air Force moves toward more demanding air-to-ground missions for the Eagle II, particularly those requiring substantial weapons loads and long-range operations.

Another unresolved question is how the Air Force will ultimately crew F-15EXs when they are performing more complex multirole missions.

The Eagle II retains the F-15E family’s two-seat cockpit, although the Air Force’s initial operational concept has generally involved flying the aircraft with a single pilot. That leaves an unused cockpit that could potentially become an important asset as the mission set expands.

Former 142nd Wing commander Col. Michael Kosderka previously told TWZ that the addition of a weapons systems officer or other specialist in the rear cockpit could open the door to more air-to-ground capabilities.

“We can start talking about putting all kinds of air-to-ground capabilities into the airplane, potentially putting WSOs or other experts in the backseat as well to have us do any number of multi-role capabilities that it’s just physically not possible to in the C model,” Kosderka told TWZ in an interview back in 2024. “So the X has tremendous growth capability. It’s really exciting.”

Two crew would be particularly relevant to complex strike missions, where managing sensors, weapons, communications, electronic warfare, and other mission systems can place substantial demands on a single pilot. As we have discussed in the past, a back-seater would also be highly beneficial for the emerging drone controller role.

The Weapons School has also been associated with developing two-seat F-15EX operations, indicating that the second cockpit’s utility is already being considered at the tactical-development level.

For now, it would be premature to characterize the F-15EX as an operational replacement for the F-15E Strike Eagle in the air-to-ground role. The 142nd’s newly demonstrated bombing capability remains part of an ongoing training and development process.

Meanwhile, the Air Force is preparing to field substantially larger numbers of F-15EXs. Beyond the 142nd, additional Guard units are planned to receive the type, in California and Louisiana, as well as Michigan.

The Air Force has announced plans to base F-15EXs at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, where they will eventually replace older F-15Es, which, in turn, are slated to move to Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, as part of a broader realignment of the Eagle fleet.

Another two active-duty F-15EX squadrons are slated to replace the former F-15C force at Kadena. The first F-15EX for permanent assignment at Kadena recently departed Boeing’s St. Louis, Missouri, facility for the 142nd Wing, where it will undergo final preparations before its eventual deployment to sprawling Okinawa.

The operational implications of the air-to-ground training therefore extend well beyond Portland.

The Eagle II’s generous weapons payload, long range, modern sensors and electronic warfare systems, and ability to carry both air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons give the Air Force a platform that can potentially perform several missions without sacrificing the characteristics that make the F-15 attractive for homeland defense and counter-air operations. The same characteristics are also extremely relevant to any export operator, which would expect to operate the Eagle II in a multirole capacity.

As well as a weapons-training milestone, the first live-bomb drops by the 142nd Wing provide more evidence that the F-15EX’s mission is continuing to evolve.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Operational F-15EXs Drop Live Bombs For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

Russia is displaying some of its newest air-launched precision weapons in public for the first time at the El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt this week. The S-71K Kovyor and related S-71M Monokhrom, and the S8000 Banderol, reflect Russia’s effort to field larger numbers of relatively inexpensive standoff weapons alongside its more sophisticated and costly missile types. As such, their development and early employment are closely tied to the war in Ukraine, but they also reflect wider global interest in these kinds of weapons.

The weapons, seen in the tweet embedded below, comprise, clockwise from top left: S-71K Kovyor, an unknown smaller guided munition, S8000 Banderol, and S-71M Monokhrom:

Novel munitions for the Russian aircraft, on an expo. pic.twitter.com/L1UPTb8qhX

— krakek (@krakek1) September 6, 2026

For Russia, the requirement has become increasingly important as the war in Ukraine has evolved into a prolonged contest in which industrial capacity is as critical as technology. Russia has expended huge numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets while also developing an enormous strike-drone campaign. At the same time, Ukrainian air defenses have become progressively more capable, forcing Moscow to use combinations of missiles, drones, decoys, and different flight profiles to penetrate or saturate the defensive network. One lesson is the fact that a weapon does not necessarily have to be as capable as a high-end cruise missile if it can be manufactured in much greater numbers and still present a credible threat to the target.

The S-71M, which TWZ previously reported on in detail after Ukrainian intelligence obtained an example, is a compact, turbojet-powered weapon with a distinctly angular airframe intended to reduce its radar signature. Imagery from Egypt gives a better look at its front end, including a faceted nose flowing into a broad central fuselage. The nose has at least one optically flat transparency for an infrared or TV seeker. Its wings are sharply swept and fold against the belly of the weapon for carriage, while the rear of the weapon terminates in an inverted-V tail arrangement. The overall shape is notably different from Russia’s more conventional cruise missiles of the past.

Ukrainian analysis found that the S-71M incorporates an OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb as its warhead and relies primarily on inertial guidance, rather than carrying a sophisticated terminal seeker, although the seeker window raises questions about that.

Ukrainian intelligence also described its construction as being relatively straightforward, with fiberglass composite material making up much of the outer structure and no evidence identified of specialized radar-absorbing coatings.

As we noted previously, the weapon appears intended as a less expensive, but still survivable standoff weapon option that can be produced in significant numbers.

The S-71M has been tested from the Su-57 Felon fighter, also present at El Alamein. In a press release, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), responsible for the Su-57, said that the S-71M and the S-71K displayed alongside it “were designed for fifth-generation fighters,” although there is no reason why they couldn’t be launched from a wide variety of platforms.

A Su-57 performing at El Alamein, with one of its main internal weapons bays apparently loaded with Kh-69 standoff missiles:

T-50-9 in El-Alamein, opening both main weapon bays. Two, presumably, Kh-69 can be seen in the front one.

Source: @ T汪汪T pic.twitter.com/f6csKc6Y9D

— George N. (@GeorgeN28581) September 8, 2026

Regardless of launch platform, the nature of the war in Ukraine makes the S-71M particularly useful. Russia has increasingly relied on extemporized glide bombs for attacks against targets relatively close to the front, but those weapons require the launching aircraft to operate within a certain distance of Ukrainian defenses. At least in their earlier iterations, such weapons were also crude and prone to failure. Longer-range cruise missiles offer considerably greater standoff but are more complex and expensive. The S-71M sits somewhere between those categories, providing an air-launched, powered weapon with a relatively large warhead and some degree of low observability without the cost and complexity of a full-size, truly stealthy cruise missile.

The S-71K appears to represent a more capable version of the basic concept. Public information remains limited, but the weapon has been associated with electro-optical guidance and greater onboard processing, potentially giving it a capability to deal with targets in a more flexible manner than the largely pre-programmed S-71M. Exactly how that capability is employed, and how autonomous the weapon actually is, remain less clear from the imagery and information released to date.

As displayed at El Alamein, the S-71K retains the overall faceted, low-observable appearance of the S-71M but has a visibly different airframe and wing arrangement. Its body is notably broad and compact relative to its length, with folding wings that are relatively thick, and a more refined inverted-V tail giving it more the appearance of a small uncrewed aircraft than a conventional air-to-surface missile.

Meanwhile, the Banderol represents a somewhat different path to the same general problem. Ukraine’s intelligence service previously obtained and analyzed an example of the small jet-powered cruise missile, which TWZ reported on last year. The weapon is considerably smaller than Russia’s principal cruise missiles and has been associated with launch from drones and helicopters. Its reported range of around 500 kilometers (311 miles) and relatively small warhead make it something of a complementary system intended to provide another, more economical way of putting a precision weapon onto a target from the air.

In terms of its appearance, the Banderol is more conventionally missile-like, with an ogival central fuselage, a pointed nose, and sharply swept folding wings. Its proportions underline just how small it is compared with Russia’s better-known air-launched cruise missiles.

The Banderol is particularly relevant in the context of the economics of the Ukraine conflict. Russian forces have increasingly used combinations of relatively inexpensive one-way attack drones and more expensive cruise and ballistic missiles. The drones can be produced in large numbers and used to complicate air-defense operations, while the more capable missiles provide greater speed, range, payload, or penetration capability. A small turbojet-powered weapon such as Banderol offers another point on that spectrum.

At least one image has recently emerged showing a Banderol carried by a Russian Mi-28NM Havoc attack helicopter. This would be in line with unconfirmed reports from Ukraine last month that Russia was using the Mi-28 as an additional launch platform for the weapon, including firing them from over the Sea of Azov to attack targets around Odesa.

An S8000 “Banderol” (“Dan-T”) small cruise missile mounted on a Russian Mi-28NM attack helicopter. pic.twitter.com/Xcx3MmFK3B

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) September 6, 2026

Its reported use also illustrates how the distinction between a cruise missile and a large one-way attack drone is becoming increasingly blurred. The Banderol incorporates a conventional missile-like airframe and jet propulsion but has been associated with drone operations and makes extensive use of commercially available components. TWZ’s earlier examination of the weapon also highlighted the extent to which modern Russian weapons programs can combine relatively simple airframes with foreign-sourced electronics and propulsion technology.

Russia has revealed an Orion (Inokhodets) UAV carrying the S8000 Banderol air-launched cruise missile, marking the clearest Russian footage yet of the weapon integrated with the drone. #Russia #Orion #CruiseMissile #Defense pic.twitter.com/yLHb7h1oW9

— Drone Wars (@Drone_Wars_) July 13, 2026

Likely Banderol loitering munition on the ground (perspective exaggerates it's size) and under Orion drone.

Banderol has been reported as one of the munition used in recent strikes and appears to use a jet engine and a FAB-100 warhead or similar. pic.twitter.com/j50DUsNuVe

— krakek (@krakek1) April 27, 2025

Seen together at El Alamein, the three weapons provide an unusually useful snapshot of where Russian air-launched strike development is heading. They are presented alongside a fourth, so-far unidentified munition. This unnamed weapon is notably short and fat, with a cruciform tail, and an optical window in the nose. Its overall size and shape suggest it may have been developed specifically to arm drones.

The appearance of the weapons at an arms fair underscores the fact that Russia is not the only country confronting the problem of producing and fielding sufficient precision weapons at an acceptable cost. The growing interest in lower-cost cruise missiles, loitering munitions, attritable aircraft, and other forms of expendable precision strike is now evident well beyond Russia.

Russia is also clearly trying to make these weapons harder to intercept, an increasingly important consideration as Ukrainian air defenses have demonstrated an ability to shoot down even glide bombs in some circumstances. The S-71K in particular incorporates unusually pronounced low-observable shaping, suggesting that survivability was also a central requirement from the outset.

There is, however, a significant complication to Russia’s attempt to turn its wartime experience into an export opportunity. Buying any kind of weapons from Moscow has become considerably more difficult because of sanctions, restrictions on access to foreign technology and financing, and the wider political risks associated with maintaining a Russian defense relationship. Those factors matter just as much to a prospective customer as the performance of the weapon itself.

Author’s note: earlier reporting on the S-71 family appears to have transposed the S-71K and S-71M versions. Most authoritative accounts now indicate that the more refined, more stealthy version is the S-71K Kovyor (meaning carpet), while the simpler weapon is the S-71M Monokhrom.

Update, September 9:

Rostec, the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate, has provided more details of the weapon identified at El Alamein as the Banderol. Rostec calls this weapon the ‘Dan-T’ loitering munition, which is an export designation for Banderol.

According to Rostec:

The ‘Dan-T’ munition operates on a ‘fire-and-forget’ principle and is adapted for launch from Russian and foreign aircraft and helicopters. The munition is equipped with a compact jet engine and can strike targets at a range of hundreds of kilometers. The ‘Dan-T’ features a special flight mode designed to evade enemy air defence systems.

Rostec adds that the Dan-T has been combat-tested in the war in Ukraine, where it claims there have been “hundreds of successful launches” against enemy targets in the Special Military Operation zone. “We expect this munition to attract widespread interest from foreign customers,” said Rostec.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Russia’s New Stealthy Lower-Cost Air-Launched Standoff Weapons On Display In Egypt appeared first on TWZ.

Ukrainian F-16 pilots are facing such a severe shortage of air-to-air missiles that some daytime sorties have seen them rely solely on the fighters’ internal guns to engage Russian aerial threats, according to a journalist who recently spoke with a senior Ukrainian Air Force commander. Meanwhile, the lack of air-to-air missiles means that the available weapons stocks are now being rationed.

The disclosure provides a remarkable glimpse into the day-to-day reality of Ukraine’s F-16 operations. While the aircraft may be available, the pilots may be ready, and Russian drones and cruise missiles may be approaching, there may simply not be enough missiles on hand to arm the jets.

According to Newsmax journalist Shelby Wilder, the Ukrainian Air Force can find itself monitoring missile shipments as they cross the country’s border, with personnel counting not just the hours but the minutes until those weapons reach the aircraft. The concern is whether the missiles will arrive in time for the next major Russian aerial attack.

The Ukrainian commander, who identified himself by the callsign “Phantom” and as commander of the country’s 107th Wing, confirmed the underlying problem when asked directly whether Ukraine was severely short of missiles for its F-16s.

“Yes, that’s true. Any aircraft without weapons is … useless,” Phantom said.

That blunt assessment is particularly striking given what Ukraine is asking its F-16s to do, and the relentless nature of Russian bombardments against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

The moment when a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet shot down a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile at extremely low altitude pic.twitter.com/7zVujRkYaG

— MilitaryNewsUA (@front_ukrainian) June 1, 2026

The fighters have become an important part of Ukraine’s layered air defense network, hunting Russian drones and cruise missiles while also providing a potential counter to Russian combat aircraft, and conducting air-to-ground sorties. Ukraine has operated the F-16 since the summer of 2024.

“We are focusing on defending our skies against Russian unmanned drones to protect our infrastructure inside the country,” Phantom said. “Our target priority is cruise missiles.”

Destroying as many incoming threats as possible before they reach Ukrainian cities and infrastructure requires missiles, with the F-16 primarily armed with the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the shorter-range AIM-9 Sidewinder.

According to the new disclosure, those missiles have become a commodity whose availability can determine how a sortie is flown.

The F-16 carries an M61A1 Vulcan 20mm rotary cannon, but using the gun against an aerial target is fundamentally different from engaging it with a missile, and comes with its own risks, as we have explored before. This tactic is especially hazardous when going after small targets and especially slow ones, and it becomes even more dangerous at night.

Ukraine has already demonstrated that its F-16s can use their guns in combat. In May 2025, the Ukrainian Air Force said an F-16 pilot had destroyed three aerial targets and was engaging a fourth with the aircraft cannon before an emergency forced him to eject.

One air-to-air weapon not mentioned by Phantom is the laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rocket, now apparently also part of the arsenal. These rockets would offer the Ukrainian Air Force an extremely valuable, lower-cost option for engaging drones and subsonic cruise missiles. 

Regardless, Phantom specifically called for additional air-to-air missiles, as well as interceptors for ground-based Patriot batteries.

“We require more means of protection, such as Patriot missiles and air-to-air missiles, AIM-9s or AIM-120s to our fleet,” he said.

Phantom’s message is that simply delivering more aircraft is not enough. Ukraine needs a sustainable weapons pipeline to keep those aircraft combat-effective.

Ukrainian Air Force F-16AM Fighting Falcon departing Belgium after receiving depot-level maintenance earlier this year. pic.twitter.com/Hy35iUZd8P

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) August 28, 2026

This is increasingly becoming a wider problem across Ukraine’s air defense network. Patriot interceptors have been heavily consumed, with relatively few replacement missiles now trickling in, leaving Ukraine with limited ability to defend against ballistic missiles in particular. The strain is now spilling into the lower tiers, including the air-to-air missiles carried by F-16s. Ukraine’s continued consumption of interceptors is a major driver, but it is competing with the enormous demand generated by ongoing wars in the Middle East and a broader surge in demand for advanced air defense weapons around the world. With production struggling to keep pace, scarce interceptors are effectively being rationed across an increasingly crowded global battlefield.

“At least we need to try to increase the production, or at least to allow Ukraine to localize the production in Ukraine or other European countries,” he said.

That proposal reflects the fundamental vulnerability of a relatively small fleet operating in a high-intensity air war. Every missile fired at a Russian cruise missile or drone is one less available for the next engagement. A finite inventory therefore has to cover both routine air-defense missions and the possibility of much larger Russian attacks. At the same time, both the AIM-9 and especially the AIM-120 are used for Ukrainian ground-based air defenses too. The AMRAAM, in particular, is the effector for the NASAMS, which protects Kyiv, and other key objectives against cruise missiles and drones.

The problem becomes even more acute because Ukraine cannot know precisely when the next major Russian strike will arrive.

That is why, according to Wilder’s account, the arrival of missile shipments is being followed with extraordinary urgency.

At the same time, Phantom welcomed the major technological leap that the F-16 represents over the Soviet-designed MiG-29s and Su-27s that formed the backbone of Ukraine’s fighter force.

“The F-16s in comparison with the legacy aircraft like MiG-29 or Su-27? This is kind of like a new technology,” Phantom said.

But sophisticated aircraft are only as useful as the weapons available to them.

Ukrainian F-16s have reportedly destroyed huge numbers of Russian drones and cruise missiles, and in July a Ukrainian F-16 was publicly identified by the U.S. Joint Chiefs chairman as having shot down a Russian fighter.

CONFIRMED!
On July 8, 2026, a Russian Su-35 multi-role fighter was shot down on the eastern sector!

Glory to Ukraine!
Together to victory! pic.twitter.com/r8S9fgQaC5

— Ukrainian Air Force (@KpsZSU) July 8, 2026

Phantom also asked Ukraine’s Western partners to think beyond individual weapons transfers and toward production capacity.

He also urged the United States and European countries to do more to prevent Russia from acquiring components used in its own missile production through third party countries.

“We need to make as much as we can to stop providing the parts, most technological parts to Russians, bypassing the direct sales, of course, through the third party,” he said.

Phantom argued that Russia continues to obtain sophisticated components through intermediaries and even ostensibly civilian products.

“It would not be a surprise that Russians [are] using the washing machine that they’re buying from the third party to use those smart details for building missiles,” he said.

His recommendation is tighter sanctions and enforcement designed to cut off Russia’s access to those components.

“Important is to sanction to stop Russia from being able to have access to those parts,” he said.

That, combined with missile shortages, could become an even bigger problem when Russia conducts another major aerial campaign against Ukraine, particularly as Moscow traditionally intensifies attacks against the country’s energy infrastructure during the winter months.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Missile Shortage Has Now Hit Ukrainian F-16 Force appeared first on TWZ.

For about a month, the United States had refrained from attacking Iranian targets as the Trump administration turned toward economic warfare against the Islamic Republic. However, that changed last night when U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) struck what it said were Iranian rocket launchers preparing to fire naval mines into the Strait of Hormuz. The problem is that mine-deploying rockets are not a common capability, so much so that the statement seemed bizarre at first glance. But it just turns out that Iran does claim to have such a system and that system would have a glaring application in the current state of play of the conflict. In fact, it would be absolutely critical to do exactly what CENTCOM did, blowing them up prior to launching, because if they didn’t, the final and very fragile energy lifeline between the Persian Gulf and the world could be severed at the worst possible time.

“I can confirm that earlier today U.S. forces struck two Iranian launchers on Larak Island,” Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, CENTCOM’s spokesman, told us Sunday evening. “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces were observed preparing to launch rockets with sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz.”

The U.S. strikes against the launchers on Sunday spurred Iran to respond with ballistic missile attacks on a Jordanian air base housing U.S. troops. Jordanian officials said all eight missiles were intercepted, and no casualties or damage was inflicted.

#JORDAN INTERCEPTS 8 MISSILES

Jordan's @ArmedForcesJO say air defense systems intercepted eight missiles that entered the Kingdom's airspace early Monday.

The military said the missiles were destroyed before posing a threat to civilians or property.

Details:

A…

— Dana Zureikat Daoud دانا زريقات (@DanaZkat) August 31, 2026

Hawkins did not specify what exact type of rocket launcher was struck or whether this was the first time CENTCOM had seen Iran use this type of system to launch sea mines.

Though CENTCOM won’t comment on what kind of system was attacked, Iran did tout just this kind of a system last year with exactly the kind of range needed to be a huge problem for the U.S. and its allies. This system uses a variant of the Fajr-5 rocket that is converted with a sea mine warhead.

You can see a video of that system below.

Video of the Iranian rocket deployed naval mine system which is claimed to be able to deploy hundreds of mines in the sea from the coast in an hour. pic.twitter.com/ba897On0nV

— Mehdi H. (@mhmiranusa) January 24, 2025

The clip shows the rockets being fired from a truck-mounted multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). The video later cuts to nose cone-shaped mines that appear to float on the surface above the spent missile body, however, little is known about the Fajr-5 sea mine warhead conversion process that allows them to be delivered by rocket.

We also don’t know the full extent to which Iran has developed and/or fielded this particular capability, or whether it has other options for similarly deploying naval mines by rocket. Neither Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) think tank, nor the Ambrey maritime security firm has seen any indication that Tehran has used an MLRS to launch sea mines in the past.

At the same time, “the Fajr-5 is an Iranian calling card, a 333mm caliber rocket that can reportedly travel 75 km carrying between an estimated 90 to 170 kg warhead, depending on the payload,” Taleblu, an expert on Iranian weapons systems, told TWZ.

The Fajr-5 is an established design that traces its roots back to the 1990s and has been evolving since then. “The Fajr class was initially designed as unguided artillery rockets, though Iran claims to have developed a guided version,” Taleblu added.

In general terms, being able to seed naval mines via artillery rockets would offer several advantages for Iran, most immediately by offering an alternative to traditional maritime mine-laying platforms. The destruction of Iran’s naval forces was a top stated objective for the U.S. military during the opening phases of the conflict earlier this year. Iranian vessels, including ones capable of laying mines, were heavily targeted. Still, Iran has retained a large number of its smaller boats that can be used for seeding minefields.

Regardless of what boats they have left, mining the area that actually matters most would be impossible to do as any vessel approaching the southern coast of the Strait of Hormuz would be destroyed. It’s through these tight and complex littorals that a reduced flow of commercial vessels are still traveling, under the kinetic umbrella of the U.S. and its Gulf state allies. The Fajr-5, fired from Iranian controlled islands in the strait, has the range to land in these waterways, seeding mines without risking any boat crews or other platforms. If the rocket-delivered mines splash down, the de-mining process would have to begin, which can be arduous and last weeks, potentially shutting down all shipping.

With that in mind, Iran’s weapon is remarkably relevant to the situation, assuming it works. But even if it doesn’t, it could still pose a risk to mariners even if its efficacy is questionable.

Furthermore, being able to turn any launcher for Fajr-5s (and/or potentially ones for other types of artillery rockets) into a naval mine layer rather than having to rely on specialized systems would be a boon unto itself. Artillery rockets and launchers are something Iran had deep stockpiles of before the war with the United States and Israel started earlier this year. How many naval mine rockets Iran might have, and whether it might be possible to convert existing types to that configuration, are open questions.

Using a road-mobile launcher would also give Iranians a ‘shoot-and-scoot’ option for deploying naval mines where the launch could be exposed only for a short period of time. This, in turn, would create additional targeting challenges for U.S. forces. It is possible that, as it does elsewhere, Iran has constructed tunnels under Larak Island to hide these systems, as well. 

Overall, the “deployment of naval mines by missile significantly speeds up the deployment process, improves the ability to penetrate airspace, and increases the standoff distance between the minelayer and the field, making it the least risky minelaying method,” a piece published by the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) think tank last year, which also highlighted Iran’s apparent demonstration of the Fajr-5-based capability, noted.

While the Fajr-5’s estimated payload capacity is “light compared to U.S. or Chinese naval mines,” the mines the rockets could deliver “are still heavier than diver-delivered limpet mines and could conceivably disable a ship if struck by enough mines from the field,” the piece added. “Most importantly, this field could be delivered rapidly and with little warning. Even though the explosive capacity of this mine individually is small, the psychological impact from inflicting minor damage on a small number of merchants could still be enough to force shipping companies to avoid the area.”

“Though it’s a bit unconventional, using a rocket launcher again signals that the regime is sensitive to cost and risk, and is trying to deploy mines in a way that doesn’t put as much personnel at risk as by dropping them overboard,” Taleblu posited. “It was reported in the military exercise over a year ago that the regime had used an MLRS system like the Fajr to deploy these, but I haven’t seen significant video confirmation of this most recent round.”

With all this in mind, the point about “psychological impact” mentioned in the CIMSEC piece could be particularly relevant in this case. By launching the attacks on Larak Island, CENTCOM has in a way given credence to Iran having a real capability to launch mines via rocket into the Strait of Hormuz. That threat by itself could be enough to cause commercial ship crews, their corporate operators, and insurance companies to think twice about attempted transits.

This is exactly the issue that President Trump, among others, has repeatedly sought to downplay, including multiple times just within the past week.

“We’re taking them in,” Trump told Glenn Beck last week. “The mines are gone. You probably saw that, we put it out yesterday, all the mines. We got rid of the mines. But the strait, it’s functioning, it’s a functioning strait. Uh, yes, every once in a while, there’ll be a drone or a rocket or something shot, but it is a very functioning strait.”

“Last week, CENTCOM completed clearing sea mines from the strait’s international shipping routes,” Hawkins, the CENTCOM spokesman, told us yesterday. “U.S. forces are monitoring the area closely and remain prepared to protect the free flow of commerce through this essential waterway.”

“The U.S. military has achieved a major milestone in the Strait of Hormuz,” Adm. Brad Cooper, CENTCOM’s commander, stated last week. “We have successfully cleared sea mines in the strait’s international shipping lanes that were laid months ago by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Internationally recognized transit routes in the strait are free of Iranian sea mines, thanks to the incredible work of the U.S. military.”

Update from CENTCOM Commander: pic.twitter.com/osPbltjJ1C

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) August 28, 2026

CENTCOM pushed back Monday on Iranian claims that an oil tanker was hit by mines in the command’s preferred transit route.

“CLAIM: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claims that a supertanker passing through the southern route of the Strait of Hormuz struck two mines and was brought to a complete stop. This is FALSE,” the command stated on X. “FACT: No ships have hit mines in the Strait of Hormuz. This is yet another IRGC attempt to intimidate regional commercial shipping through disinformation.”

CLAIM: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claims that a supertanker passing through the southern route of the Strait of Hormuz struck two mines and was brought to a complete stop. This is FALSE.

FACT: No ships have hit mines in the Strait of Hormuz. This is… pic.twitter.com/spkaogBx81

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) August 31, 2026

Still, the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) — a group of international navies which provides timely information to the shipping industry — sees mines as an ongoing risk in the strait.

“Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels, with a modest uptick from recent lows, still far below baseline,” JMIC stated on Sunday. “Independent tracking data indicated suppression with single-digit numbers transiting in both directions. There remained a continued risk of drifting or uncharted mines in and near the TSS, with mine danger areas still active.”

JMIC Advisory Note Update 091

Released by UKMTO on behalf of the Joint Maritime Information Centre.

Click here to view the full advisory note https://t.co/jHInhBdVRt#MaritimeSecurity #MarSec pic.twitter.com/T6VzzxSdPD

— UKMTO Operations Centre (@UK_MTO) August 30, 2026

The combination of ongoing dangers in the strait continues to result in reduced traffic, the global trade intelligence firm Kpler noted on X.

“Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb declined on 25 August, while the IMO [International Maritime Organization] verified no additional attacks,” Kpler added. “Five vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz, down 28.6% day on day from seven. All five used the Iranian Unilateral Scheme, with two entering the Middle East Gulf and three exiting. Four were classified as shadow vessels and one as sanctioned.”

Strait crossings remain subdued

Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb declined on 25 August, while the IMO verified no additional attacks. Five vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz, down 28.6% day on day from seven. All five used the Iranian Unilateral… pic.twitter.com/BI9cFAaJRy

— Kpler (@Kpler) August 26, 2026

The latest flare-up in fighting came after the Trump administration last week unleashed the threat of harsh new sanctions to further isolate Iran. However, that failed to move Tehran to change its position on maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, its nuclear ambitions or support for proxies like the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Monday morning, Trump told Fox News reporter Trey Yingst that he was going to retaliate for Iran launching ballistic missiles last night after the U.S. strike on Larak Island.

“We’re going to hit them hard,” Trump told the network. “There will be a response.”

President Trump says the United States will respond to the Iranian missile attack on U.S. forces overnight.

"We're going to hit them hard," President Trump told Fox News. "There will be a response." pic.twitter.com/sjLOLSxm4g

— Trey Yingst (@TreyYingst) August 31, 2026

Trump and his senior aides “have been considering waging limited strikes in the Strait of Hormuz to prevent Iran from reconstituting its radar and missile capabilities to attack ships,” Axios reported, according to three U.S. officials. 

“One U.S. official said the idea behind the plan is to reduce the risk of Iranian attacks on oil tankers, U.S. Navy ships and Air Force aircraft — to ‘mow the lawn,’ as this person put it.”

It is unclear if Iran has used rockets to mine the strait or how well this system works if it did. However, the fact the U.S. resumed hostilities just to attack sea-mine-launching rocket systems shows the level of concern they engendered and the options Iran may still have to threaten the strait.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Iranian Launchers Struck By U.S. Held Exotic And Highly Concerning Rocket-Delivered Sea Mines appeared first on TWZ.

A new Ukrainian intelligence report details the complex production chain behind Russia’s shadowy 3M22 Zircon missile and identifies U.S.-origin electronics inside one of Russia’s most advanced weapons. New details also add weight to the theory that the weapon is a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile rather than a true hypersonic cruise missile.

The unusually detailed new breakdown of the Zircon missile identifies 70 enterprises and 84 individuals involved in its development and production while providing a component-by-component look at one of Moscow’s most closely watched — and least-understood — weapons.

DIU exposes details of russia’s 3M22 Zircon ballistic missile — including its components, production chain, 70 companies involved, key personnel, and foreign equipment used to manufacture the weapon: https://t.co/oOBqjUb8dS pic.twitter.com/VqRSSA41iV

— Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (@DI_Ukraine) August 31, 2026

The first evidence of Zircon’s combat use emerged in February 2024, when Ukrainian officials displayed recovered debris after a Russian strike. The wreckage included distinctive engine and steering-system components that Ukrainian specialists used to identify the weapon.

Russia has since employed the missile on other occasions. Ukrainian authorities reported that a Zircon was launched from occupied Crimea during a major missile and drone strike in January 2026, as we reported at the time.

While initially developed for use from warships and submarines, Zircon is understood to have been employed from ground-based launchers against Ukraine, with modified launchers from the K-300P Bastion coastal defense system considered the most likely candidate.

The new entry on Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) War & Sanctions portal includes an interactive 3D model and identifies systems ranging from the missile’s radar seeker and onboard computer to its propulsion system and warhead. It also identifies foreign-origin electronics, including components associated with U.S. manufacturers.

Among them, according to the GUR report, is a TGA2704 amplifier associated with TriQuint Semiconductor, now part of U.S. company Qorvo. The GUR also identifies an Altera Cyclone II EP2C5T144I8N field-programmable gate array (FPGA) associated with Altera Corporation, now part of Intel, and lists it as originating in the United States.

The alleged findings do not establish that either company knowingly supplied Russia’s defense industry, nor do they explain precisely how the components reached Russian production lines. The GUR says it’s seeking additional information on their origins and supply chains. Bearing in mind previous precedents, China could potentially be one source, being a known vector globally for recycled chips.

Nevertheless, the disclosure highlights the continued presence of Western-origin electronics in Russia’s advanced weapons programs despite sanctions and export controls.

The GUR lists the Zircon as approximately 26 feet long, with a body diameter of 2.2 feet, and a warhead weighing about 265 pounds.

The agency gives a maximum speed of Mach 8-9, a flight altitude of approximately 19-25 miles, and a separate “maximum fixed speed” (presumably, sustained cruising speed) of Mach 6.8. These are Ukrainian intelligence assessments and cannot be independently verified.

The database identifies the 3B222 active radar-homing head, manufactured by NPP Radar MMS, and a Baget-83 onboard digital computer produced by KB Korund-M.

It also identifies the 3B915 guidance units, the 3G22 warhead, and the 3L2211 solid-fuel rocket motor manufactured by NPO Iskra. Other Russian companies provide altimeters, control systems, power supplies, and other components.

The reported propulsion information is particularly significant.

Russian and other sources have consistently described Zircon as a hypersonic cruise missile, implying an air-breathing propulsion system burning liquid propellant, capable of sustaining hypersonic flight.

However, the physical evidence for such a propulsion system has always been less clear.

Open-source analysis by Fabian Hinz has highlighted the apparent absence of a conventional air intake on Zircon. A scramjet- or ramjet-powered missile requires an intake to bring atmospheric oxygen into the engine, yet available imagery does not clearly show one. A Russian patent associated with the missile’s jettisonable launch cap likewise does not reveal an obvious intake arrangement.

Just published my new OSINT investigation into Russia's secretive Zircon missile whose combat use has risen sharply in 2026.

Available evidence suggests that Zircon is not a hypersonic cruise missile but rather a quasi-ballistic system.

Link: https://t.co/8DoQePRpX3 pic.twitter.com/bIBS532FUB

— Fabian Hinz (@fab_hinz) June 17, 2026

More significant is evidence from recovered missile debris.

Material examined by Ukraine’s Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise included a circular metal structure interpreted as part of a solid-propellant rocket motor. The hardware appeared to be associated with Zircon’s second stage rather than simply its launch booster (which would be used on a true hypersonic cruise missile to bring it up to operating speed). This suggests a two-stage weapon, with a solid-propellant rocket in each. This would match with what we have seen during shipboard launches.

That finding is consistent with Russian patent activity involving NPO Mashinostroyeniya and NPO Iskra. Patents associated with the companies describe solid-propellant rocket motors incorporating arrangements for aerodynamic-control equipment around the motor’s exhaust system.

There is also evidence that Russian engineers developed advanced composite solid propellants specifically for Zircon.

None of this conclusively proves the missile lacks an air-breathing engine, but it certainly raises more questions about its classification. It should be noted that there are also some solid-fuel ramjet concepts, but these are much rarer applications.

If Zircon is primarily rocket-powered, it may be better understood as a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile that nonetheless reaches hypersonic speeds.

Such a weapon would use rocket propulsion to accelerate rapidly and climb to high altitude before descending toward its target along a trajectory that is partly ballistic but incorporates aerodynamic maneuvering — a so-called ‘porpoising’ or ‘skip-glide’ trajectory. It could therefore reach hypersonic speeds without requiring sustained cruise under the power of an air-breathing system. The combination of high speed and unpredictable trajectory also makes it notably difficult for air defenses to deal with, characteristics shared with the air-launched Kinzhal, another Russian quasi-ballistic missile.

That interpretation could also help explain reports of a highly variable Zircon speed profile.

Russian officials have claimed that the missile can reach approximately Mach 9. During a 2020 test, Russian military leadership said Zircon reached more than Mach 8 while flying to an altitude of roughly 17 miles.

A Russian Ministry of Defense video that claims to show the Zircon test in the White Sea on Oct. 6, 2020:

Ukrainian assessments have described a more complicated profile, with the missile reportedly flying at around Mach 5.5, accelerating to approximately Mach 7.5 near the target, and then slowing before impact. Those figures cannot be independently confirmed, but a boost-and-glide or quasi-ballistic trajectory could produce such a profile more naturally than sustained powered cruise.

Ru MoD released a somewhat better Zircon launch footage. pic.twitter.com/bxHa6DsFG7

— krakek (@krakek1) December 3, 2024

At the same time, it should be recalled that ‘hypersonic’ does not necessarily imply a ‘hypersonic cruise missile.’ A ballistic or quasi-ballistic weapon can travel well above Mach 5, which appears to be the case here. The characteristics of the Zircon, as presented by the GUR, would also help explain official Ukrainian claims that the missiles have been intercepted successfully by Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems.

There is also a relevant technological precedent. NPO Mashinostroyeniya has previously patented solid-propellant missiles using quasi-ballistic trajectories, including designs intended to maneuver at high-supersonic and hypersonic speeds. That does not establish a direct lineage to Zircon, but it does show that the concept is consistent with the company’s history.

The other major takeaway from the release is the scale of Zircon’s production network.

One of Russia’s leading missile houses, NPO Mashinostroyeniya is identified as the missile’s main designer and manufacturer and prime contractor for Russian Ministry of Defense contracts covering its development and production.

But the weapon depends on dozens of other organizations. NPO Iskra supplies the solid-fuel motor; NPP Radar MMS provides the radar seeker; KB Korund-M produces the onboard computer; and other enterprises supply guidance systems, altimeters, control electronics, warheads, power systems, and other specialized equipment.

Another video, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense in May 2022, is said to show the Gorshkov launching a Zircon, although the missile is seen only at a distance with no details visible:

The U.S.-origin electronics claimed to have been identified by GUR are particularly notable because they demonstrate how Russia’s sophisticated weapons production remains connected to international semiconductor supply chains.

By linking specific enterprises and individuals to individual missile components, Ukraine has provided governments and investigators with new information that could be used to pursue sanctions, export-control enforcement, and efforts to disrupt Russia’s supply chain.

The report also adds weight to continued open-source assessments of what kind of missile Zircon actually is.

Regardless of its classification, Zircon remains a formidable weapon. A rocket-powered missile capable of reaching hypersonic speeds, flying at high altitude, maneuvering, and potentially accelerating during its terminal approach presents a serious challenge to missile defenses. With Ukraine’s ability to intercept even more conventional ballistic missiles already severely eroded, the weapon further complicates the country’s troubling air defense picture.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Russia’s Zircon May Not Be A Hypersonic Cruise Missile After All appeared first on TWZ.

The first of Japan’s two new cruiser-sized Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV) is continuing to take shape, recently receiving its huge main integrated mast, giving the vessel a new and remarkably imposing silhouette. The four very large fixed arrays for the ship’s powerful AN/SPY-7(V)1 radar will eventually be integrated onto this structure. The ASEV’s stated primary mission is missile defense, but Japanese authorities plan to give the vessels additional counter-drone, anti-ship, and land attack capabilities in the future. Tomahawk cruise missiles are notably set to be added to the ship’s arsenal down the line.

The ASEVs are large surface combatants, set to be some 620 feet long, have a beam (the widest point of the hull) of some 82 feet, and a standard displacement of 12,000 tons. For comparison, Japan’s largest surface combatants today, its Maya class destroyers, are just over 557 feet long, have a beam of some 73 feet, and a standard displacement of around 8,200 tons. It is worth noting here that the size of new and advanced destroyers, often optimized for anti-air warfare missions, has been trending upward globally in recent years. This, in turn, has caused the line between destroyers and what have more historically been categorized as cruisers in certain cases.

The first ASEV was laid down at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ (MHI) shipyard in Nagasaki in July 2025. The second was laid down in February of this year at Japan Marine United Isogo shipyard, which is situated in Yokohama City near Tokyo, according to a past report from Naval News. The Japanese Ministry of Defense is currently aiming to have the first of these vessels in service before the end of the country’s 2027 Fiscal Year, which runs from April 2027 to March 2028. The second is expected to follow in the 2028 fiscal cycle, which extends into 2029.

Significant progress in the overall construction of the first ship has been made just this year. The addition of the main mast structure, installed on top of the main superstructure, as seen in pictures at the top of this story and below, has drawn particular attention in recent weeks.

Japanese are very fast with ship building.

March 26 and today. ASEV-class destroyer.

190 m hull, SPY-7 Aegis, 128cell Mk 41 VLS. SM-3 for ballistic missiles, SM-6, plus Japan’s long range Type 12 SSM. pic.twitter.com/RQZixtqWwe

— 信濃 Æýà (@Shinano_AEya) August 30, 2026

The especially large size of the ASEV’s integrated mast is driven by that of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar from Lockheed Martin. Each one of the radar’s four rectangular arrays is reportedly around 14 feet (nearly 4.3 meters) tall. This would put them in the same general size category as the arrays for Raytheon’s AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) found on U.S. Navy Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyers. That being said, the pictures we have now raise the question of whether the AN/SPY-7(V)1 arrays are bigger than previously assessed. The AMDR is another notably large design heavily optimized for missile defense.

The size and location of the mast provide a centralized, elevated position for the AN/SPY-7(V)1’s large arrays, which will also require significant power generation capacity and thermal management to keep everything cool. This is a notable departure from the placement of the arrays on the main superstructure on existing Japanese destroyers, as well as the U.S. Arleigh Burke class, and offers an unobstructed, elevated line-of-sight to the horizon. Beyond the ballistic missile defense mission, this view farther out over the horizon would be important for tracking and engaging low-flying drones and cruise missiles, which might be targeting the ship itself. This is something we will come back to later on.

“With five times the tracking capability of the SPY-1, it [the AN/SPY-7(V)1] counters lofted trajectories and simultaneous multiple ballistic missile threats,” according to a machine translation of a section of the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s 2026 defense policy white paper, which was released earlier this month.

The passive electronically-scanned array (PESA) AN/SPY-1 was the first radar to be paired with the Aegis Combat System, and both were first introduced in the 1970s. Variants of the SPY-1 are still found on a variety of U.S. and foreign Aegis-equipped warships, including Japan’s Kongo, Atago, and Maya class destroyers.

The AN/SPY-7(V)1 is also a derivative of the U.S. military’s static, land-based Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Alaska. Japan also originally planned to employ the AN/SPY-7(V)1 on land at a pair of Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. However, that effort was subsequently cancelled, with the ASEV emerging to fill the resulting gap.

Additional versions of the AN/SPY-7 with much smaller arrays are also being integrated onto new F110 Bonifaz class frigates for the Spanish Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy’s forthcoming River class destroyers (also known as the Canadian Surface Combatant). The use of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 on the ASEV could impact decisions regarding new radars for other future and existing Japanese warships. Raytheon is also pitching versions of its increasingly popular AN/SPY-6 family for use on a successor to the Kongo class and for refit on the Maya class, according to a recent report from Naval News.

When it comes to the ASEV, as already noted, the AN/SPY-7(V)1 is central to the ship’s main stated missile defense mission. As the name makes clear, the ship will also feature the Aegis Combat System. The vessel will be capable of “remote engagement and guidance against anti-air targets tracked by other vessels” via a “Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC),” per the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual defense white paper.

The video below provides details about the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) developments, which are likely very similar to what Japan has planned for the ASEV.

In terms of armament, when the ASEVs first enter service, their main weaponry is expected to be a mix of variants of the Standard Missile-3 and -6 (SM-3 and SM-6). The SM-3 family is designed to engage ballistic missile threats during the mid-course portion of their flights while they are traveling outside of the Earth’s atmosphere. The SM-3 also has a demonstrated anti-satellite capability. The SM-6 is a multi-purpose missile that was originally designed with an anti-air focus. It can be used to target incoming ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight and also has at least a degree of capability for engaging hypersonic weapons. SM-6 can be used in a surface-to-surface mode, including against ships, as well. Japan is also a partner in the U.S.-led development of a new Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), which is being designed specifically to intercept unpowered, but highly maneuverable hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.

SM-3, SM-6, and future GPIs will be loaded into either of the ASEV’s two Vertical Launch System (VLS) arrays, one at the bow end and another toward the stern. Each one of the ships will have a total of 128 VLS cells. For comparison, Japan’s Maya class destroyers, as well as the U.S. Navy’s Flight IIA and III Arleigh Burke class destroyers, have 96 VLS cells apiece. The U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga class cruisers each have 122 VLS cells, and 128 is also the number of VLSs currently expected to be found on the future Trump class battleships.

At the time of writing, Japanese authorities do not appear to have explicitly mentioned plans to arm the ASEVs with other missiles when they first enter service. That being said, any VLS array capable of accommodating SM-3s and SM-6s should be able to fire a variety of other weapons, including shorter-ranged SM-2s and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), which the ship could use for more localized air and missile defense, as well as protecting the ship itself.

Renderings and models of the ASEV do show the design also armed with a five-inch naval gun in a turret on the bow, along with two Phalanx Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) and other automatic cannons for point defense.

As mentioned, while missile defense is the immediate focus for the ASEVs, there are already plans to significantly expand their capability to engage other ships and targets on land. Tomahawk cruise missiles and a new, extended-range version of the Type 12 anti-ship cruise missile are set to be added to the arsenal of these vessels in the 2032 timeframe, according to the latest official Japanese defense white paper.

Japanese authorities want the ASEVs to eventually be able to help fend off waves of enemy drones, too. High-energy laser-directed energy weapons are set to be integrated onto the ships down the line to help address those threats. The overall size and other general characteristics of the ships would leave the door open to the possible addition of high-power microwaves and other capabilities in the future.

TWZ has long noted that the ASEVs will bring huge new boosts in naval air and missile defense and long-strike capability to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces. The vessels also reflect a significant evolution in post-World War II Japanese doctrine, toward what officials currently frame as a “stand-off defense” construct that remains within the bounds of the country’s current pacifist constitution.

Just with SM-3, SM-6, and GPI, the ASEVs will offer an important addition to the air and missile defense bubbles around Japan’s home islands and outlying territories in the face of growing geopolitical friction with China and Russia, two countries that are increasingly cooperating militarily. The vessels will also add to Japan’s deterrent against long-standing and still evolving threats posed by the regime in North Korea, which has its own close ties to the Chinese and Russian governments. All three of these nations continue to expand their arsenals of ever-more capable ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. Long-range one-way-attack drones are another growing part of the equation, with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and fighting in the Middle East in recent years underscoring just how real a threat they pose.

With the addition of Tomahawks, the ASEVs, along with other Japanese warships, will gain the additional ability to threaten counterstrikes against targets on land (and potentially at sea) at least around 1,000 miles in any direction. As part of the broader stand-off defense strategy, the Japan Self Defense Forces is developing new land-based long-range strike capabilities, including hypersonic missiles, as well.

It is worth noting that with current plans to acquire only two ASEVs, these will be high-value but also low-density assets, which will have to be very deliberately deployed for maximum effect. They will also stand out as top-priority targets in any future conflict, and will need to be protected as such.

It is possible that the roles and missions of the ASEVs, just like their designs, could evolve further as time goes on. The threat ecosystem facing Japan will continue to evolve, likely more rapidly, in the coming years. The country is also expanding its naval capabilities in other ways, and with an eye toward more blue water operations. This includes expanded light carrier capabilities through refits of existing Izumo class ships. Anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles, among large volumes of more traditional threats, could see the ASEVs used as escorts, even if experimentally. While just two hulls are barely enough to keep one on patrol to protect Japan, more could be built for expeditionary applications.

Regardless, the ASEVs are set to be a major addition to the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s fleets that will have big ramifications. From the progress that is visible at the shipyard in Nagasaki, MHI looks to be well on track to deliver the first of these ships next year or two.

Special thanks to @kensakai9310 on X, who also goes by “Sakai,” for sharing recently taken pictures of the first ASEV under construction at MHI’s yard in Nagasaki with us.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Japan’s First Dedicated Missile Defense Warship Is A Monster appeared first on TWZ.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense has included an intriguing description of the ASM-3 Kai missile in its record fiscal year 2027 defense budget request, referring to the weapon as an “air-to-surface/anti-air missile.” Until now, the ASM-3 family has been publicly associated with the air-launched anti-ship (anti-surface) mission, and the wording potentially hints at an additional capability or intended role for the upgraded weapon.

The reference appears in Japan’s FY2027 defense budget request, submitted today, which seeks a record ¥8.89 trillion (approximately $56 billion) for the fiscal year beginning in April 2027. The request is part of a broader push by Tokyo to expand standoff strike, air defense, uncrewed systems, and other advanced capabilities.

The reference appears under a sub-section entitled Durability and Resilience, which calls for funds to “secure ammunition and fuel, increase the number of operational units (by addressing parts shortages, etc.), enhance the resilience of facilities (through facility upgrades associated with the formation of new units and the introduction of new equipment, etc.), and strengthen the operational infrastructure (by enhancing manufacturing capabilities, etc.).”

https://t.co/ntiASteLJx
というわけで概算要求ですが、個人的にはずっと導入を訴えてきたAARGM-ERの導入決定が嬉しい。あとは、ASM-3（改）がまさかの「空対艦/対空ミサイル」とは。 pic.twitter.com/XX09mrx2cE

— 因幡のよっちゃん（稲葉義泰 Yoshihiro Inaba） (@japanesepatrio6) August 31, 2026

In terms of securing ammunition, the document highlights the breadth of weapons systems involved, ranging from 5.56mm small arms ammunition and 30mm cannon rounds, via 155mm precision artillery rounds, up to advanced missiles including the Type 23 ship-launched air defense missile and the ASM-3 Kai.

The Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) ASM-3 is Japan’s domestically developed supersonic air-launched anti-ship missile, originally intended to arm the Mitsubishi F-2 fighter. The improved ASM-3 Kai (“Kai” meaning modified or revised) represents a significant evolution of the weapon, although the full nature of its capabilities and performance have not been officially revealed. The missile has already been observed undergoing testing on F-2s.

2年半振り以上？に飛んでいる102号機を撮影しました
ASM-3改にカメラポット吊してありがたや

2026.06.01
岐阜基地 RJNG
F-2B 102 pic.twitter.com/oUJImUagsI

— ボボ・AKEBOVO (@AKEBOVO) June 1, 2026

The ASM-3 program has also gone through a number of different configurations over its development history, with at least five distinct external configurations identified in previous reporting. The existence of multiple iterations leaves open the possibility that the newly identified “anti-air” designation could ultimately correspond to a dedicated air-to-air variant or derivative of the ASM-3 family, rather than simply a secondary capability of the baseline ASM-3 Kai.

Reportedly, the ASM-3 Kai is capable of flying more than 400 kilometers (about 250 miles), although the exact range of the operational weapon remains classified. It is powered by a ramjet engine, giving it sustained high-speed performance — reportedly around Mach 3. If it indeed has an air-to-air capability, this would be an advantage in some scenarios, compared to relying solely on a brief but very powerful rocket boost as many air-to-air missiles do.

The weapon is also understood to employ an active/passive radar seeker, providing it with both an active radar mode for detecting and engaging targets and a passive mode that can home in on their electromagnetic emissions. While an active radar seeker is common on long-range air-to-air missiles, the latter passive capability could also be of extreme value in an air-to-air application.

岐阜基地
九州から岐阜へ移動しました。
F-2 101号機、ASM-32発
スペマと離陸しました。#岐阜基地　#ASM3 pic.twitter.com/oFjetR3rWZ

— K.otani (@kotaken8022) December 9, 2025

The ASM-3 is also a substantially larger missile than typical fighter-launched air-to-air weapons. While that imposes obvious carriage and aerodynamic penalties, it also allows for a larger propulsion system, seeker, and warhead than would be practical in a smaller missile.

A weapon capable of traveling hundreds of miles at high speed, while carrying an active/passive radar seeker, could potentially be especially useful against high-value airborne assets such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. These platforms provide vital wide-area surveillance, battle management, and targeting capabilities. At the same time, their powerful radars are necessarily emitting, potentially making them detectable and trackable by a missile employing a passive seeker.

China’s rapidly expanding AEW&C fleet is an increasingly important part of its ability to generate situational awareness, coordinate fighters, and extend its sensor coverage well beyond its immediate borders. The force, which already numbers dozens of increasingly capable fixed-wing aircraft, is a growing operational challenge for Japan and other regional air forces.

The ability to threaten such aircraft from well beyond the range of conventional air-to-air engagements could force an opponent to operate its AEW&C fleet even further from contested airspace, reducing the effectiveness of its sensors and command-and-control architecture. Although a passive seeker could also offer an avenue for homing in on relevant radar emissions, exactly how the ASM-3 Kai’s seeker would operate against airborne targets is not publicly known. Equally, a different variant of the missile, optimized for anti-air missions, could incorporate both passive and active seekers specially adapted for that mission set, although it is very possible a single configuration can accomplish both missions. As well as AEW&C aircraft, such a missile would be just as relevant for other high-value, non-maneuvering targets at long ranges, including intelligence-gathering platforms, tankers, and other support aircraft.

The budget language by itself falls short of establishing whether the ASM-3 Kai has been tested or validated against aircraft. The designation could reflect a broader classification within the budget documents, or it could point toward a genuine expansion of the weapon’s intended target set.

Such a weapon would not necessarily be a replacement for Japan’s existing air-to-air missile arsenal. Instead, an “anti-air” ASM-3 Kai could occupy a specialized niche focused on high-value or otherwise particularly important airborne targets at extended ranges.

The possibility is consistent with Japan’s broader effort to expand the flexibility and reach of its air-launched weapons. Tokyo is pursuing a growing family of standoff weapons as part of a major expansion of its counterstrike and deterrence capabilities, including longer-range missiles capable of striking targets well beyond the immediate vicinity of Japan.

Other air-to-air missiles mentioned in the same section of the document comprise the U.S.-made AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the domestically developed AAM-4B, another medium-range weapon, thought to be the first of its kind to be fitted with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) antenna.

Between the exclusive AESA radar and Japan's labour cost, Mitsubishi's AAM-4B might be the most expensive air-to-air missile on the planet pic.twitter.com/rfBnXB8RzS

— Lia Wong (@LiaWong__) May 3, 2022

The FY2027 defense budget request also mentions another apparently new air-launched weapon for Japan, the AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range (AARGM-ER). Japan has not previously been publicly documented as an international AARGM-ER customer, but the weapon would be an obvious candidate for integration with its F-35 fighters if it wishes to bolster their suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) capabilities.

In terms of F-2-related developments, the document calls for the upgrade of an initial 10 of these aircraft to make them compatible with the air-launched version of the Upgraded Type 12 anti-ship guided missile, a significant new weapon that you can read more about here.

TWZ has contacted Japan’s Ministry of Defense seeking clarification on the “air-to-surface/anti-air” designation and what it means for the ASM-3 Kai’s intended capabilities and target set. It could also be the case that the description is an error in the budget document.

However, the emergence of such a capability would also come at a time when very-long-range air-to-air weapons are becoming increasingly important as anti-access/area-denial challenges make it harder for fighters to get close to enemy aircraft and the high-value assets supporting them. China has fielded weapons such as the PL-15 and the much larger PL-17, while the United States is developing the AIM-260 and has just revealed the AIM-424 Malice, a U.S. Navy missile reportedly capable of reaching more than 250 nautical miles. The U.S. Navy is also fielding the AIM-174B, a very-long-range weapon developed very much with the Chinese threat in mind, and which we discuss in the video below.

For now, exactly what prompted the “air-to-surface/anti-air” designation for the missile is unclear, but if it reflects a genuine expansion of the ASM-3 Kai’s mission set, it would represent a particularly interesting development in Japan’s rapidly evolving air-launched weapons portfolio.

Hat-tip to Yoshihiro Inaba for bringing this development to our attention.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Japan’s ASM-3 Kai Supersonic Cruise Missile May Have An Air-To-Air Capability appeared first on TWZ.

Europe is entering an interesting, and potentially highly consequential, period in the development of beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air weapons. While the public emergence of new U.S. weapons in this class has unsurprisingly grabbed the headlines in recent months, Europe is meanwhile working on several projects that ultimately seek to field its next generation of far-reaching air-to-air missiles.

As in the United States, the immediate catalyst is the rapid evolution of Chinese air-to-air missiles, particularly the PL-15 and newer systems that are emerging around it. The India-Pakistan air combat experience from last year has brought the issue into sharper focus, demonstrating the operational consequences of underestimating an opponent’s long-range air-to-air capabilities. However, while Pakistan said its Chinese-made fighters and missiles shot down several Indian aircraft, the precise circumstances, numbers, and tactics involved remain the subject of competing claims and outside analysis.

For Europe, the MBDA Meteor is currently the state of the art in terms of BVR air-to-air missiles, and its unique set of capabilites is something we have discussed in depth in the past. The question is increasingly not simply how to improve the Meteor, but what should come after it, and what kind of weapons architecture (or ‘kill chain’) will be needed for the next generation of crewed and uncrewed combat aircraft and their weapons.

One of the most intriguing current developments is France’s Comet program, which appears to be led by the French side of the pan-European MBDA consortium. Very little is publicly known about the weapon, and its exact specifications remain unclear. It nevertheless appears to represent an effort to provide a significant step beyond the current MICA family, offering greater range and speed. If the apparent timeline of around 2030 is correct, Comet could be viewed as a relatively near-term response to an increasingly demanding threat environment.

Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) research institute in London, told TWZ that Comet looks like “a response to the exchanges between the Pakistanis and the Indians, where, on day one, the Indians underestimated how aggressive the Pakistanis were going to be, particularly with PL-15. It seems coincidental at the very least that this kind of thing has just popped up onto the horizon.”

That would distinguish Comet from the U.K.’s Future Air Superiority Effectors, or FASE, program which appears to be associated much more closely with the longer-term requirements of the U.K.’s Future Combat Air System and GCAP/Tempest.

Talking to TWZ, Justin Bronk, a research fellow for airpower at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), explained that FASE “is likely aimed at providing significantly better combat capabilities by the early-mid 2030s than a mid-life upgrade of the Meteor missile would be able to offer within the bounds of its basic layout and size.”

Creating an interesting overlap with FASE and Comet is a joint Franco-British study looking at what comes after Meteor. In April, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding launching the 12-month effort that will assess future air-combat threats and potential next-generation missile concepts. The study is intended to identify the technologies required for a successor weapon and establish a development roadmap. While the two countries are at least formally examining the same post-Meteor problem, their longer-term combat air priorities appear to be diverging.

Beyond Meteor

Meteor remains one of Europe’s most capable air-to-air weapons. Its ramjet propulsion system gives it an important advantage over conventional solid-rocket missiles by allowing it to retain propulsion and energy much further into an engagement.

However, the threat environment that Meteor was designed against is changing. Meteor’s requirements were established in an environment dominated by the Soviet/Russian air-to-air missile threat. Today’s planning increasingly has to account for Chinese weapons such as the PL-15 and newer systems that may combine very long range with substantially greater speed.

“Since the Meteor is still more than a match for current Russian air-to-air missiles in air-to-air engagements, it is likely that the capability goals for the FASE program will use far more capable Chinese air-to-air missiles, aircraft, and sensors as pacing threats,” Bronk ​​​​added.

That raises the uncomfortable question of what happens when both sides can launch extremely capable BVR weapons against each other?

Simply put, higher speed now matters more, because it reduces the target’s reaction time and can make the terminal engagement substantially more demanding. One of Meteor’s advantages is the considerable energy it retains when it reaches the terminal phase, but the tradeoff is a slower average speed across the entirety of its flight envelope.

Barrie explained: “Meteor’s fly-out speed is somewhere between Mach 3.5 and somewhere below Mach 4. If you launch a PL-15 off a J-20, which is doing Mach 2, that weapon probably stays above Mach 5 for an awfully long time, which is one of the issues. It’s that risk of a mutual kill. Obviously, if the weapon against the J-20 is coming out at Mach 3.5 to Mach 4, then you have a bit an issue there.”

At the same time, a missile’s effectiveness depends on many other factors, including launch conditions, flight profile, midcourse guidance, seeker performance, electronic warfare environment, and target maneuvering.

However, the nature of the threat may push the next generation of European weapons toward a combination of greater range, substantially higher speed and greater terminal energy rather than simply another incremental improvement to Meteor. Indeed, the United Kingdom has dropped its plans for a Meteor mid-life upgrade, presumably to focus its efforts on an altogether more ambitious and capable successor, or successors.

Does the next weapon need a ramjet?

The Meteor was designed around a ramjet motor, especially since it was expected to face a ramjet version of the Russian R-77 (AA-12 Adder) missile. This was never fielded, and, as far as we know, China doesn’t have a weapon in this class either. A Meteor successor therefore won’t necessarily use the same kind of propulsion.

Meteor demonstrated the advantages of air-breathing propulsion, but there are trade-offs involved in using a ramjet or another air-breathing system. Achieving very high speeds while maintaining useful range and maneuverability can become increasingly difficult, and propulsion complexity adds cost and potentially consumes valuable internal volume.

The performance being attributed in open sources to Chinese solid-propellant weapons like the PL-15 suggests that another approach is possible.

Barrie would not be surprised if the ramjet is dropped. “The issue with a ramjet is it’s not impossible to get above Mach 5, but it’s difficult, and there are lots of compromises you probably have to make … I wonder if they may just look at energetic solids.”

A future European missile could therefore use a substantially larger solid-propellant motor, potentially coupled with a different boost and sustain architecture, to achieve the required combination of speed and range. Using more than one stage, or a multi-pulse solid rocket motor could be other solutions to the issue.

The size problem

Perhaps the biggest opportunity for a new European BVR weapon comes from the aircraft that will carry it.

Meteor was developed within the physical constraints imposed by existing fighter aircraft and their weapons-carriage arrangements, including internal carriage in the F-35. A future combat aircraft such as Tempest is expected to have significantly greater internal volume available for weapons.

“One of the drivers for Tempest is internal carriage, obviously, but lots of it,” Barrie continued. “A big main bay, and then probably sizeable side bays as well. That lets you carry a considerably larger weapon mass internally than an F-35. If you look at size of the platform in terms of what they’ve released, it’s a big aircraft, and one would assume it has a very significant internal weapons bay.”

A larger missile can carry more propellant, potentially support a more powerful propulsion system, accommodate a larger or more capable seeker, and provide additional volume for electronics and other subsystems.

As we have explained in the past:

There are different ways of increasing the range of an air-to-air missile, but this process is always easier if the weapon can be made larger. Bigger dimensions can translate to a bigger engine, more fuel, multi-stage rocket motors, and air-breathing engines, like the ramjet used in the Meteor. Other range-extending options that the United States has examined include throttleable “multi-pulse solid rocket motors” and more exotic “propellants, grain configurations, cases, and liners,” all of which would also be able to ensure greater range — as well as higher speed — compared to existing weapons.

The result could be a weapon that is considerably larger than Meteor but still fully compatible with the aircraft for which it was designed.

This reality, and the use of the plural effectors in the U.K.’s FASE terminology raises the possibility that the future European BVR requirement may not be for one missile, but for a family of weapons — at least as far as the British are concerned.

Why “effectors” may matter

If FASE ultimately refers to multiple effectors rather than a single missile, that could point to the broader direction of future air combat, involving crewed aircraft as well as various uncrewed wingmen.

Tempest is expected to operate as a so-called quarterback, supported by a number of uncrewed combat aircraft, remote carriers, or other systems operating considerably farther forward. Those uncrewed systems will have different size, payload and weapons-carriage constraints from the crewed aircraft.

This means that not every platform will need the same BVR weapon, or even be able to accommodate them, when it comes to the larger missiles.

Instead, a future force might require something resembling a family:

• A large, long-range, high-speed weapon for the crewed Tempest aircraft, optimized for the highest-end air-superiority engagements.
• A medium-sized weapon suitable for existing fighters and potentially future aircraft with more constrained weapons carriage.
• A smaller weapon optimized for CCAs or other uncrewed systems where internal bay dimensions, payload and cost are more restrictive.

A modular missile could possibly cover two of these categories at once. More broadly, these weapons could share technologies without necessarily being identical missiles. Common seekers, electronics, datalinks, software, guidance technologies or other subsystems could potentially be reused across the family.

The result would be a fundamentally different approach from simply developing a single Meteor replacement.

The seeker may be as important as the motor

The front end of a future European BVR weapon is another area where significant change is likely.

An active electronically scanned array (AESA) seeker would seem a logical baseline for a next-generation weapon. The United Kingdom’s previous work with Japan on the Joint New Air-to-Air Missile program, or JNAAM effort was particularly interesting in this regard, given Japan’s experience with active electronically scanned air-to-air seekers.

A future weapon could also incorporate a passive radio-frequency capability alongside its active radar. That would provide another means of detecting or tracking emitting targets and could increase the weapon’s resilience in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment.

For its PL-17 ultra-long-range air-to-air missile, China appears to have chosen a combination of active and passive seekers, although, as Barrie points out, it also appears to have been designed around a very specific target set: E-7 Wedgetail, E-2 Hawkeye, other airborne early warning and control platforms, and support assets, like tankers and strategic electronic surveillance and attack aircraft.

Whether such a capability is worth the additional cost and complexity is another question. A highly sophisticated multimode missile will inevitably be expensive, however, the same technologies could potentially provide utility against a broader range of targets than conventional fighter-on-fighter engagements. An air-to-surface capability should also not be ruled out, with a passive seeker potentially bestowing an anti-radiation missile (ARM) capability on the weapon.

Another passive seeker alternative could be based on an imaging infrared (IIR) sensor. This could provide an interesting complement to an active-radar seeker, making use of the same kind of two-way datalinked midcourse guidance system already included in Meteor. It could be especially relevant for engaging small or low-signature (stealthy) targets and in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment.

The weapon is becoming part of the network

Perhaps the biggest change will be the extent to which future BVR missiles exploit the wider kill chain, becoming much more than weapons guided by the aircraft that launches them.

The key requirement is for the missile to be track-source agnostic. This means a future long-range air-to-air missile could receive targeting information from a CCA, an airborne early warning aircraft, another fighter, a naval platform, or potentially space-based sensors.

For example, with Tempest operating alongside forward-deployed CCAs, the sensor that initially detects a target could be the CCA. The launching aircraft could then receive the track, launch a weapon, and continue receiving updates from multiple platforms.

Alternatively, a CCA could launch the weapon using targeting information generated by the crewed aircraft or another sensor elsewhere in the force, provided it is on the network.

Two-way datalinks, midcourse guidance, electronic warfare resilience, and the ability to accept high-quality third-party targeting information become central requirements. Some of this functionality is available, to varying extents, on some current air-to-air missiles, but it will be even more important as air combat becomes increasingly reliant on distributed sensor networks and crewed/uncrewed aircraft teaming.

If it can rely on offboard sensors, the missile’s engagement range no longer needs to be constrained by the organic sensor range of the launching fighter. Faced increasingly by the realities of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment, this could enable weapons that fly far beyond what the launch platform could independently detect and engage. The A2/AD threat is already pushing research into much farther-reaching air defense missiles, potentially with a range of up to 1,000 miles.

This also opens the door to more exotic propulsion concepts, including multi-stage weapons designed to combine very high-speed boost with a separate sustain or terminal stage.

The next generation of long-range air-to-air missile may therefore be defined as much by the kill chain they plug into as by the architecture and performance of the missile itself.

What happens to Meteor?

Meteor is one of Europe’s strongest examples of a successful multinational defense program. Six European nations participated in its development, and the program eventually produced a weapon that is widely regarded as a highly capable system.

Now, however, the countries that developed Meteor do not necessarily have identical requirements for the next generation.

The United Kingdom is moving toward GCAP/Tempest with Japan and Italy. Its future combat air requirements will increasingly be shaped by that program and by the threat assessment driving it.

The United Kingdom appears to want a very large, very high-performance weapon optimized for Tempest and the future air-superiority mission, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan likely needs very much the same.

Meanwhile, other Meteor users may prioritize a weapon that can be integrated onto existing fighters and remain affordable in larger numbers.

France’s Comet effort could meet that requirement, since it appears to be a comparatively rapid response to the emerging threat. With that in mind, France could eventually find itself with a near-term weapon, a future clean-sheet requirement, and a continuing relationship with the Meteor family, all while pursuing its own future combat air requirements.

Overall, it is far from clear whether the Meteor consortium will survive for another generation, at least in its current form.

Could Japan become part of the answer?

Given that it’s a partner in GCAP/Tempest, and based on its previous air-to-air missile studies with the British, Japan is particularly interesting in this context.

Japan faces a threat environment in which long-range air combat is of obvious importance, and Japan has already demonstrated advanced capabilities in active electronically scanned air-to-air seekers. The Japanese-developed Mitsubishi AAM-4B became the first air-to-air missile to feature an AESA seeker.

Although earlier air-to-air missile cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom did not evolve into an operational program, the two countries are now developing a combat aircraft together through GCAP.

With Britain and Japan designing the future combat aircraft together, they could eventually develop some of its principal weapons together as well, although Italy’s requirements are likely very different.

Thinking beyond the missile

Europe can almost certainly build a faster missile than Meteor, but there are plenty more questions about what kind of air combat system that missile — or missiles — will fit into.

A future BVR weapon will have to operate from multiple types of platforms (crewed and uncrewed), receive targeting data from offboard sensors, communicate with CCAs, function in a highly contested electromagnetic environment, engage maneuvering targets at extreme range, and retain enough energy to remain dangerous in the terminal phase.

Increasingly, it seems that, rather than a single weapon, a family of effectors will be the solution.

For the United Kingdom, FASE may become one of the most important programs to watch because it could reveal how Britain intends to bridge the gap between Meteor and the weapons of the GCAP/Tempest era. At this stage, FASE appears to be ‘for U.K. eyes only,’ although Japan and Italy would appear to be likely beneficiaries, due to their teaming on GCAP.

Elsewhere, Comet could provide an early indication of how France intends to respond to the emerging long-range missile threat while maintaining flexibility for a future system.

And for the wider Meteor consortium, it remains to be seen whether the program’s success can be carried forward into another multinational weapon, or whether the emergence of GCAP/Tempest and increasingly divergent national requirements marks the beginning of the end for the Meteor model.

Either way, the next generation of European BVR weapons is likely to be larger, faster, more networked, and more deeply integrated with the combat air system around it. At the same time, the need to create a family of effectors designed around a distributed force of crewed aircraft, CCAs, and offboard sensors will bring some formidable challenges.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post What Europe Needs Next In Beyond-Visual-Range Air-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.