The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) will provide a long-term loan of up to 102 billion tenge (US$224.2 million) to Alatau Zharyk Company (AZhC) to modernize its electricity distribution infrastructure and expand digitalization, writes Dana Omirgazy.
The financing will help AZhC, a regional electricity distribution company supplying around 4 million people and around 50,000 commercial consumers in Almaty and the region, procure automated metering and telemechanic equipment and upgrade its low- and medium-voltage electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure, the bank’s press service reported on Sept. 7. The project is part of Kazakhstan’s National Project for the Modernization of Energy and Utility Sectors (MEKS), a government-led program to modernize heat, electricity, water supply and sewerage networks and facilities.
The EBRD-supported investment will further digitize AZhC by installing smart meters at substations and piloting smart grid technologies. It will also strengthen the company’s cybersecurity and support related efforts at Samruk-Energy, AZhC’s parent company. The modernization is expected to generate annual electricity savings of approximately 22 gigawatt-hours (GWh) and reduce annual CO2 emissions by around 12,000 tons. It is also expected to support renewable energy growth in the Almaty Region.
As part of the five-year enhanced partnership framework between Kazakhstan and the EBRD, the project will also support Alatau city’s development by reconstructing the Zhetygen electricity substation and an associated 110-kilovolt (kV) transmission line. The EBRD has invested almost $13.6 billion in Kazakhstan through 358 projects, making the country the largest and longest-running recipient of EBRD investment in Central Asia.
“What stands in the way becomes the way,” Marcus Aurelius writes in Meditations. Nearly two millennia later, the idea captures Pakistan’s strategic dilemma with remarkable precision. Islamabad must convince Saudi Arabia that its defence commitment carries real weight without being drawn into another Middle Eastern war or rupturing its relationship with Tehran. That obstacle may itself have become Pakistan’s most useful instrument: strategic ambiguity, writes Dimitra Staikou.
On 10 September 2026, following Houthi attacks against Saudi targets, Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Sajjad Haider Khan said there was no discussion of an immediate military response under the new defence agreement. Yet only a day earlier, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif had warned that continued aggression against Saudi Arabia could make the pact operational.
The contradiction may be more calculated than accidental. On 13 September, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif expressed Pakistan’s complete solidarity with Mohammed bin Salman. Two days later, fresh missile and drone attacks against Saudi targets brought the question of collective defence closer to reality. Pakistan is trying to reassure Riyadh that it will not stand alone while avoiding any clear definition of when political solidarity becomes military involvement. At the same time, Islamabad is keeping channels with Tehran open and leaving Saudi Arabia’s adversaries uncertain about where Pakistan’s real red line lies. But September’s events suggest that the space for such ambiguity is narrowing. The central question is no longer whether Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are security partners, but how far Islamabad is actually prepared to go when deterrence is tested.
That question has become more urgent because the relationship has changed institutionally. On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, declaring that an armed attack against any one of the three would be regarded as an attack against all. On 31 August, their foreign and defence ministers and military chiefs met in Istanbul to begin institutionalising the arrangement, agreeing to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and deepen joint defence-industry cooperation, technology development and production. This is therefore more than another declaration of political solidarity. The Makkah Alliance is beginning to acquire the machinery designed to make collective deterrence credible.
The military relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia itself stretches back decades. Pakistani officers have trained Saudi forces, Pakistani troops have periodically been deployed in the Kingdom, and Riyadh has reciprocated with economic and political support. Yet the most important episode for understanding the limits of this relationship came in 2015. When Saudi Arabia assembled its coalition for the intervention in Yemen, Riyadh sought Pakistani military support. On 10 April, Pakistan’s parliament unanimously backed neutrality, effectively rejecting direct participation while pledging to defend Saudi Arabia if its territorial integrity were threatened. The distinction was crucial: Islamabad was prepared to defend the Kingdom, but not automatically to participate in its wars. In 2026, that very red line is being tested.
The Riyadh-Islamabad rapprochement does not mean that Saudi Arabia is abandoning the United States. It does, however, demonstrate that the Kingdom no longer wants its security to depend exclusively on Washington. The limited US response following the attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in 2019, followed by Washington’s 2021 decision to end support for offensive operations in Yemen, had already exposed the limits of American protection. That uncertainty resurfaced this September. Mohammed bin Salman sought military assistance from Donald Trump against the Houthis, but the US president declined to authorise direct American strikes, with Washington instead offering intelligence-sharing and targeting support. On 12 September, Trump said Iran was probably responsible for the attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and described Mohammed bin Salman as a “good friend”. The United States remains an indispensable Saudi partner, but not always a willing combatant. Pakistan gains importance in precisely this space: not as a replacement for America, but as an additional regional pillar of Saudi security.
If the American position explains why Riyadh is seeking more strategic options, China points towards the direction in which the wider security system may be moving. Beijing is one of Islamabad’s most important strategic and military partners, while simultaneously developing an increasingly close relationship with Saudi Arabia. In April 2026, Xi Jinping told Mohammed bin Salman that China wanted to deepen “mutual strategic trust” with the Kingdom. On 2 September, Xi argued that regional states should work towards “a new security architecture for the Middle East” and hold their future in their own hands. His remarks were not about the Makkah Agreement and should not be interpreted as Chinese endorsement of it. They do, however, reflect a broader shift: a Riyadh seeking greater strategic autonomy, an Islamabad deeply connected to Beijing, and a China seeking a greater role in shaping the regional order. The issue is not a secret trilateral alliance, but the potential convergence of Saudi capital, Pakistani military power and Chinese technological and strategic support.
There is also an unavoidable nuclear dimension. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Saudi Arabia is not a nuclear weapons state. Nothing publicly released about the Makkah Agreement establishes a Pakistani nuclear guarantee to Riyadh, and there is no evidence that Islamabad intends to deploy nuclear weapons on Saudi territory. Yet that absence of clarity is itself strategically significant. Pakistan’s nuclear capability sits behind a collective-defence commitment whose public language does not specify where conventional deterrence ends and strategic deterrence begins. For Iran, Israel, Washington and European capitals, the question is therefore not whether Saudi Arabia has suddenly acquired a Pakistani nuclear umbrella — it has not — but whether potential adversaries may now have to calculate against that possibility in an extreme crisis. Deterrence often depends as much on uncertainty as on declared doctrine.
For Europe, this shift is anything but distant. On 9 September, France expressed full solidarity with Riyadh following the Houthi attacks. In Berlin, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul assured his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan of Germany’s solidarity, while on 11 September the German Foreign Office warned that growing Houthi pressure around Bab al-Mandab could restrict oil and LNG supplies, with consequences for global markets. In Brussels, Kaja Kallas had already put “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea on the European agenda, asking publicly what more Europe could do. These concerns are tangible: energy security, maritime trade routes and regional stability are becoming intertwined in the same crisis. The attacks of 15 September have made the danger even clearer, with renewed strikes against Saudi targets adding to pressure on energy markets and further threatening the routes connecting the Gulf, the Red Sea and Europe.
There is another reason Europe cannot treat the Makkah Alliance as a distant development: Türkiye. Ankara is simultaneously a party to the new collective-defence architecture and a member of NATO. That does not mean the Makkah Agreement automatically engages NATO obligations, nor that the two systems are inherently incompatible. But it does create questions that European allies should address before, rather than during, a major crisis. What happens if Türkiye is asked to participate in collective action under the Makkah Agreement? How would Ankara manage parallel commitments if escalation involved Iran or another regional actor? And how much strategic consultation should occur within NATO before such a scenario materialises?
Brussels cannot afford to wait for the agreement to be activated for the first time before deciding how to respond. Europe needs deeper dialogue with Riyadh and Islamabad on non-proliferation and missile technologies, stronger protection for navigation in the Red Sea and a clear discussion within NATO about Ankara’s new defence commitments. It does not need to treat the emerging security architecture as hostile. But it does need to understand what happens when that architecture moves from declarations to action.
The real test of the Makkah Alliance will come when Riyadh asks Islamabad to demonstrate what it means for an attack on one to be treated as an attack on all. At that moment, the strategic ambiguity that today gives Pakistan room to manoeuvre may become the problem itself. And the question — whether Pakistan is genuinely prepared to fight for Saudi Arabia — will no longer concern Riyadh and Islamabad alone. The answer could reshape the security balance from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea all the way to Europe.
L'essentiel de l'actualité, passé au crible par les cinq plumes du Courrier. Dans votre boîte, chaque jour ouvré.
Gratuit. Vous restez libre de partir quand vous voulez.
JE M'INSCRIS lecourrierdesstrateges.frCommençons par un document, parce qu'il vaut mieux que tous les commentaires.
En avril 2025, un parlementaire dépose la question écrite n° 5957. Elle alerte le ministre de la Justice sur la « situation alarmante » du service public de la justice dans le département du Gers, confronté à « une pénurie de magistrats et de greffiers ». C'est écrit, c'est daté, c'est enregistré à l'Assemblée nationale, et c'est public.
Quatre mois plus tard, le 22 août 2025, une mère dépose plainte dans ce département contre un homme qu'elle accuse d'avoir violé sa fille de dix ans une cinquantaine de fois. L'homme ne sera jamais entendu.
Le 29 mai 2026, à Fleurance, Lyhanna, onze ans, disparaît. On la retrouve morte le 4 juin. Le principal suspect, mis en cause et présumé innocent tant qu'il n'a pas été jugé, est le même homme.
Entre la question écrite et la disparition, treize mois. Voilà le dossier.
Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.
Le monde commente. Vous, vous comprenez.
S'ABONNER lecourrierdesstrateges.frLe 8 septembre 2026, la commission des requêtes de la Cour de justice de la République a classé la plainte visant Gérald Darmanin pour mise en danger de la vie d'autrui et non-assistance à personne en danger. Décision annoncée le 14 par le procureur général près la Cour de cassation. Aucun recours n'est possible.
Disons-le tout de suite, parce que la suite en dépend : sur le droit, cette décision est correcte. La mise en danger d'autrui suppose la violation d'une obligation particulière de prudence imposée par un texte, et il n'en existe pas qui vise le garde des Sceaux dans la conduite d'un dossier départemental. La non-assistance suppose la connaissance personnelle d'un péril imminent, et un ministre qui n'a jamais eu le dossier entre les mains ne l'a pas. Un procureur ordinaire aurait classé de même. Crier à l'étouffement serait à la fois faux et stupide : ça se démonte en une phrase, et ça décrédibilise tout ce qu'on dira ensuite.
Mais il faut voir ce que ce classement ne dit pas. Il ne dit pas que la justice a fonctionné. Il dit qu'un homme n'est pas pénalement responsable. Ce sont deux questions différentes, et la seconde a déjà reçu sa réponse : le rapport de l'Inspection générale de la justice relève « une perte de temps cumulative et une absence de suivi de procédure », imputables au parquet comme à la gendarmerie. Le Premier ministre a parlé d'« une succession d'erreurs, de négligences, d'inactions et de mauvaises décisions ». Le garde des Sceaux lui-même a présenté, le 5 juin, des excuses « au nom de la Justice ».
On s'excuse rarement de ce qu'on n'a pas fait. Reste à savoir si des excuses valent réparation.
Elle tient en une phrase du code. L'article L. 141-1 du code de l'organisation judiciaire dispose que « l'État est tenu de réparer le dommage causé par le fonctionnement défectueux du service public de la justice », cette responsabilité n'étant engagée que par une faute lourde ou un déni de justice.
La faute lourde a été définie par l'assemblée plénière de la Cour de cassation le 23 février 2001, dans l'affaire Consorts Bolle-Laroche — l'affaire Grégory, autrement dit. La formule est large et elle est restée : « toute déficience caractérisée par un fait ou une série de faits traduisant l'inaptitude du service public de la justice à remplir la mission dont il est investi ». Notons ce qu'elle n'exige pas. Ni intention, ni faute personnelle nommée, ni malveillance. Une série de faits suffit, et le mot inaptitude fait le travail.
Techniquement, l'action se mène devant le juge judiciaire, y compris pour les défaillances de la gendarmerie agissant en police judiciaire. On assigne l'Agent judiciaire de l'État devant le tribunal judiciaire de Paris. Le délai est de quatre ans à compter du premier jour de l'année suivant le fait générateur.
La faute lourde n'exige pas qu'on ait voulu le mal. Elle exige seulement qu'on ait été inapte au bien qu'on avait promis.
La newsletter vous donne le matin. Le fil vous donne l'instant.
Gratuit, et en continu.
REJOINDRE LE FIL t.me/resterlibreCe n'est pas une construction d'école. Les décisions existent, elles sont récentes, et elles concernent des familles de victimes.
Le 3 septembre 2025, le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a condamné l'État pour les défaillances de l'enquête sur la disparition d'Estelle Mouzin, à la demande de son père. Le 4 juin 2025, le même tribunal a condamné l'État dans l'affaire Nathalie Debaillie, tuée par son ex-compagnon, en raison de l'absence de tout acte d'investigation malgré de multiples alertes. La famille de Chahinez Daoud, brûlée vive à Mérignac après trois plaintes restées sans effet, entend obtenir la même reconnaissance.
La voie n'est pas automatique pour autant : la cour d'appel de Cayenne a refusé de retenir la faute lourde le 17 février 2025. Mais sur un dossier où une inspection ministérielle a déjà écrit « absence de suivi de procédure », et où une plainte pour viol sur mineure de quinze ans n'a produit aucune audition en neuf mois, il est difficile d'imaginer quelle série de faits caractériserait l'inaptitude si celle-là n'y suffit pas.
Voilà pour la théorie. Maintenant la mauvaise nouvelle, et elle est d'une brutalité particulière.
La Cour de cassation restreint le bénéfice de l'article L. 141-1 aux usagers du service public de la justice — c'est-à-dire aux parties à la procédure dont on critique le traitement. Qui n'était pas dans le dossier ne peut pas se plaindre de la façon dont le dossier a été tenu.
La jurisprudence est constante et elle est glaçante. En 2011, une femme violée et séquestrée par un homme remis en liberté à la suite d'une erreur d'un juge d'instruction a été jugée irrecevable : elle n'était pas partie à la procédure où l'erreur avait été commise. En 2020, les parents d'un enfant tué par une personne condamnée pour violence avec arme ont été jugés irrecevables, faute d'avoir été « impliqués dans la première instance qu'ils critiquaient ».
Appliquez la règle à notre affaire. La mère de la fillette dont la plainte d'août 2025 est restée sans suite est recevable : elle est l'usagère de la procédure défaillante. Elle a d'ailleurs annoncé son intention d'agir, et elle a raison.
Les parents de Lyhanna, eux, ne le sont pas. Leur fille n'était partie à aucune procédure. Elle n'a même pas eu le temps d'en être l'usagère. Sauf revirement, ils sont irrecevables à demander compte de défaillances dont leur enfant est morte.
Le droit français indemnise celui dont on a perdu le dossier. Pas celui qu'on a tué avec.
Il faut la prendre au meilleur, parce qu'elle n'est pas absurde. Si n'importe quel tiers pouvait attaquer l'État pour une défaillance survenue dans la procédure d'un autre, toute remise en liberté suivie d'une récidive ouvrirait un contentieux sans limite. Le service public de la justice passerait son temps à se défendre au lieu de juger, et la crainte du procès pousserait les magistrats à la détention préventive systématique. La restriction à l'usager n'est pas une méchanceté de prétoire : c'est une digue.
Elle a pourtant un défaut que ce dossier met à nu. La procureure de la République a annoncé le regroupement des plaintes visant le suspect. C'est l'aveu, par le parquet lui-même, que ces procédures formaient un seul ensemble. L'État reconnaît d'une main que les dossiers n'en faisaient qu'un, et oppose de l'autre à la famille de Lyhanna qu'elle n'était pas dans le bon. On ne peut pas soutenir les deux.
Un média libre vit de ses lecteurs. Un pourboire ponctuel, sans compte ni engagement, quand le cœur vous en dit.
Vous donnez ce que vous voulez. Vous restez libre.
LAISSER UN POURBOIRE merci !Deux autres routes existent. La première : la responsabilité sans faute, sur le fondement de la rupture d'égalité devant les charges publiques, qui a déjà permis d'indemniser en 2011 la victime jugée irrecevable au titre de la faute lourde. Elle paie, mais elle n'impute rien — or ces familles ne demandent pas d'argent, elles demandent qu'on écrive que le service a failli.
La seconde : le recours structurel devant le juge administratif, dirigé non contre le traitement d'un dossier mais contre la carence de l'État à doter ses juridictions. C'est là que la question écrite d'avril 2025 reprendrait toute sa force. Mais le juge administratif répugne à s'immiscer dans la définition des politiques publiques — il l'a redit le 1er octobre 2025 à propos des déserts médicaux. On obtiendrait une déclaration, pas des greffiers.
Alors oui, il faut assigner. La mère de la fillette de dix ans doit aller devant le tribunal judiciaire de Paris, assigner l'Agent judiciaire de l'État, et faire dire par un juge ce qu'une inspection a déjà écrit et qu'un Premier ministre a déjà concédé. Non pour l'argent, qui ne répare rien. Pour qu'il existe quelque part une décision revêtue de l'autorité de la chose jugée qui porte le mot inaptitude. Un rapport se range ; des excuses s'oublient ; un jugement reste, et il se cite dans le suivant.
Et il faudra bien qu'un jour un avocat aille demander à la Cour de cassation de revenir sur la règle de l'usager. Non pour ouvrir les vannes, mais pour admettre qu'une plainte classée sans suite et un meurtre commis ensuite par le même homme ne sont pas deux affaires. Le parquet l'a reconnu en regroupant les dossiers. Il serait cocasse que la seule institution à continuer de les séparer soit celle qui juge.
Reste une chose qu'aucun tribunal ne réglera, et c'est celle qui nous regarde. Le Gers manquait de magistrats et de greffiers ; on l'avait écrit noir sur blanc treize mois avant. Nous avons tous lu, cette semaine-là, autre chose. Nous réclamons un État qui protège et nous n'avons jamais fait descendre un gouvernement sur une pénurie de greffiers — ça n'intéresse personne, un greffier, tant que le dossier ne disparaît pas. Il faudra dix jours pour que cette affaire quitte les conversations, et elle les quittera. C'est à ce moment précis que le service public se remettra à fonctionner comme avant, et il aura raison : personne ne le regardera plus.
On a écrit au ministre en avril 2025. L'enfant est morte en mai 2026. Entre les deux, il ne s'est rien passé — et c'est très exactement ce qu'il faudra faire juger.
Kazakhstan is developing Alatau City near Almaty as a new regional centre for manufacturing, logistics, technology and finance. Its investment pipeline has expanded to 67 projects worth nearly $6.9 billion, with the potential to create around 55,000 jobs. Projects involving PepsiCo, Sunny Paper, Mars Petcare KZ and several logistics companies are already at different stages of implementation. The project is supported by a special legal regime, but experts say its long-term success will depend on sustained investment, effective governance and the development of a competitive economic ecosystem.
https://astanatimes.com/2026/09/alatau-city-can-kazakhstan-build-regional-economic-hub-from-scratch
Astana is looking for more ways to move its oil. Russia, its principal export outlet, is rife with disruptions. Damage to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) Black Sea terminal in November 2025 suppressed exports into early 2026, while the recent July attacks on tankers threatened roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, writes Joseph Shumunov.
The vulnerability would not be so enormous if 80% of Kazakh oil exports did not move through the CPC terminal near Novorossiysk. But is Kazakhstan merely searching for emergency alternatives amid instability? Or is this a transformation it has been preparing for? The answer is consequential: Kazakhstan is attempting a wholesale upgrade of its oil-export strategy, one befitting a rising regional power. It is moving from rational efficiency toward strategic resilience, from accepting routes toward shaping them, and from concentrated dependence toward managed interdependence.
Although the CPC will remain dominant through 2030, Astana is seeking greater control over the risks, partnerships and infrastructure connecting its oil to international markets. From rational efficiency to strategic resilience The CPC transports Kazakh oil, particularly from Tengiz, to global markets, making it the most commercially attractive route. When it was created in 1992, a fledgling independent Kazakhstan was looking to enter international energy markets. The CPC was the rational choice. It, for instance, transported up to 1.3 million barrels per day back in 2021; avoided the additional loading, shipping and crossing costs of a Trans-Caspian route; and its 1,510-kilometer pipeline, according to area studies analyst Ilya Roubanis, would be extremely difficult to replicate. Astana selected efficiency while adjusting to a new geopolitical environment. Contrast this with Azerbaijan. According to Ken Moriyasu, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, Azerbaijan chose the expensive option.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Georgia and Türkiye required what he called an “insurance premium for strategic autonomy” to avoid dependence on competing producers. Kazakhstan captured the CPC’s immediate savings but accepted greater concentration risk. The stakes will rise alongside production. The KazEnergy 2023 National Energy Report anticipated high output from Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak, with national production potentially reaching 105 million tons. Higher output requires dependable market access; otherwise, its advantage can be undermined by one constrained route.
The lesson is simple: the cheapest route is not necessarily the least costly once the consequences of interruption are included. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev affirmed as much in 2024: “With unprecedented international turbulence, the priority is to further diversify export routes.” Diversification, however, requires more than identifying alternatives. It requires Kazakhstan to help shape the infrastructure and partnerships behind them.
From route-taker to route-shaper
As a landlocked, post-Soviet producer, Kazakhstan has historically been constrained by existing pipelines and neighboring states. Its role was simple: produce oil and insert it into available routes. But Kazakhstan does not have to remain a route-taker. Although it cannot independently control its export geography, it can shape the terms on which that geography operates. It can negotiate access to multiple corridors, invest in tankers, coordinate with transit states and treat infrastructure as an instrument of foreign policy. Nowhere is Kazakhstan assuming this route-shaper role more clearly than in the Caspian. Tokayev identified the Trans-Caspian route as a “priority” in 2022.
KazMunayGas and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR subsequently agreed to transport approximately 1.5 million tons annually through BTC, while Kazakhstan added the Caspian’s Taraz and Liwa tankers to its fleet, each with an 8,000-tonne capacity. This gradual Caspianization continues. KazTransOil supplied 155,000 tons of Kazakh oil to BTC through Aktau in July, an 11.5% increase over the previous year. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan plans to transport 2.2 million tons through BTC in 2026. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have also discussed using the idle Baku–Supsa pipeline for between three million and five million tons of Kazakh crude. But this role has limits. According to Andy Kuchins, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, major expansion would require high capital expenditure, long-term purchase commitments and several years of construction.
Oil majors like ExxonMobil and BP are “more reluctant now as compared to the 1990s” to finance large projects in remote markets. The direction is nevertheless clear: Kazakhstan is moving from accepting the routes geography provides toward assembling the infrastructure and partnerships it needs. It is not yet a fully fledged route-shaper, but it is steadily behaving like one—using new routes not to eliminate dependence, but to distribute it more strategically. From concentrated dependence to managed interdependence Every export option depends on another state, infrastructure operator, or external market.
Self-reliance is not realistic. Kuchins nevertheless argues that Astana can “reduce concentration of its dependence on Russia.” Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy reported 73.4 million tons of oil exports during the first eleven months of 2025. Separately reported full-year route data show 64.8 million tons transported through the CPC, 9.3 million through Atyrau–Samara, 3.5 million through Aktau, 1.1 million through Atasu–Alashankou toward China, and approximately 100,000 by rail. Of the 78.8 million tons accounted for in this route-level data, approximately 94% moved through the two Russian corridors. Kazakhstan therefore possesses several export routes, but its portfolio remains highly asymmetrical. Herein lies its greatest oil-policy shift: managed interdependence.
This means distributing export relationships so that no transit state possesses overwhelming influence over Kazakhstan’s market access. Each direction performs a different function. And at the moment, Kazakhstan is assessing four directions—some mainstay, some new. The Russian route The CPC will remain dominant because it offers unmatched capacity, established infrastructure and lower costs. Kuchins and Roubanis expect structural dependence to persist through 2030. Following the Tengiz expansion, Kazakhstan may become more dependent on the CPC in the short term even as its long-term strategy diversifies.
Diversification does not require abandoning the CPC; it requires making an interruption less damaging. The Trans-Caspian route BTC could absorb Kazakh crude as Azerbaijani production declines, while Baku–Supsa could provide another outlet. Neither would match CPC volumes, but together they would widen access to global buyers. Europe also has a stake in this. The European Union imported 52.4 million tons of Kazakh crude just in 2024, making Kazakhstan its third-largest external supplier. If Europe wants westward diversification, it must help make projects bankable through financing and long-term commitments. Brussels and its partners are therefore mobilizing 10 billion euros to improve transport connections with Central Asia. According to Roubanis, “building ties with the region in the short run is necessary for the EU’s long-term positioning.”
The push indicates that Trans-Caspian connectivity is not just a Kazakh interest, but one shared by the whole region. The Chinese route China may offer the easiest immediately available opportunity to reduce dependence on Russia. The Kazakhstan–China pipeline transported 19.5 million tons in 2025, but that included domestic deliveries and Russian transit. Direct Kazakh crude exports through Atasu–Alashankou were planned to be 1 million tons in 2025, compared to the more than 11 million tons per year flowing with non-Kazakh suppliers. China remains a credible expansion market and willing financier. Yet the fastest way to reduce Russian dependence could deepen dependence on China. Moriyasu similarly argues that Kazakhstan does not want to exchange one concentrated dependency for another.
Unlike the Trans-Caspian route, China provides access to one principal market rather than multiple global buyers. The Southern route A corridor through Iran—possibly toward Pakistan and India—could be compelling but faces formidable political and economic obstacles. But it should not be dismissed altogether. Moriyasu suggests that “Iran offers Central Asia one of its shortest routes to warm-water ports.” Although current geopolitical conditions severely constrain this option, he argues that “infrastructure Kazakhstan builds today will still be operating decades from now. Astana should therefore avoid making long-term infrastructure decisions on the assumption that today’s geopolitical map is permanent.”
The southern route’s present value lies in preserving a long-term option, not in providing a realistic alternative before 2030. From east to west and north to south, Kazakhstan is not moving from dependence to independence. It is moving from one dominant dependency toward a deliberately balanced portfolio of interdependence. A more advanced role, but not autonomy Kazakhstan’s transformation should not be measured by whether the CPC ceases to dominate. By 2030, it will likely remain the principal corridor as Trans-Caspian volumes rise incrementally and eastbound capacity becomes more important amid regional instability and escalation.
The resulting portfolio will be broader, though still asymmetrical. The strategy is itself an upgrade—a threefold one. Resilience is becoming the objective, route-shaping the emerging function, and managed interdependence the organizing principle. Looking forward, Kazakhstan’s strategic upgrade lies not in escaping geography, but in developing the infrastructure, partnerships and political leverage needed to manage geography more effectively.
The author is Joseph Shumunov, a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Topchubashov Center in Baku, Azerbaijan, and a Fellow at Nightingale Intelligence.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is steadily—and increasingly in a semi-official manner—sliding toward a formal division into two separate administrations. Occurring amid a prolonged political deadlock, parliamentary paralysis, and the breakdown of unified state institutions, this constitutional vacuum has created the conditions for a complete paralysis of national governance, writes Halo Hassan Saeed.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), headed by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, has operated in a caretaker capacity since 2023 following the expiration of its constitutional mandate. This comes after the failure of the winning Kurdish parties from the October 2024 parliamentary elections—principally the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—to form a new government.
De Facto territorial division
The KRG no longer exercises governing authority uniformly across the region. Amid escalating disputes, institution building has stalled, and the Kurdistan Parliament has been unable to perform its legislative or oversight functions for the past three years.
Consequently, two distinct de facto administrations have emerged, each backed by separate financial institutions and security structures:
• KDP Administration: Security, executive, and financial authority concentrated in Erbil and Duhok governorates.
• PUK Administration: Independent administrative and security control over Sulaymaniyah and Halabja governorates.
More than 30 rounds of negotiations between the two major parties have failed to yield a power-sharing compromise. The KDP remains determined to retain both the regional presidency and premiership, alongside the key Ministries of Interior and Natural Resources, and the Kurdistan Region Security Council. The PUK demands an equal power-sharing formula—either the presidency or premiership, alongside the Interior Ministry—or a full 50–50 executive split.
The PUK–New Generation coalition
The political dynamic shifted significantly with the formation of an alliance between the PUK and the New Generation Movement. Combined, the bloc commands 38 out of 100 parliamentary seats, directly challenging the KDP’s 39 seats. With remaining political factions holding 23 seats and refusing to join either bloc, the KDP's attempt to form a majority government has been effectively blocked.
Following the failure of recent domestic mediation led by Salahaddin Bahaaddin, Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the PUK and New Generation leadership—represented by Bafel Talabani and Shaswar Abdulwahid—agreed during a meeting in Sulaymaniyah to move forward with unilateral administration. Under this arrangement, Sulaymaniyah and Halabja will be managed independently of Erbil, utilizing monthly internal revenues to fund stalled public services and investment projects while strengthening political coordination directly in Baghdad.
Socioeconomic fallout
With Western international attention reduced and a lack of active external mediation, ordinary citizens are bearing the brunt of this administrative fracture:
• Economic stagnation: Record-high inflation, sharp fuel price increases, and elevated local taxes and fees.
• Public infrastructure: Severe electricity shortages and deteriorating basic services.
• Commercial contraction: Declining business activity and shrinking employment opportunities for youth.
Strategic implications for European security and policy recommendations
The institutional breakdown in Iraqi Kurdistan is no longer merely an internal political feud; it carries direct implications for European foreign policy and regional stability:
1. Migration risks: Economic paralysis and political hopelessness are creating fresh push factors for young Kurds to seek irregular migration routes toward Western Europe.
2. Energy security: Intra-Kurdish friction jeopardizes energy infrastructure and gas development projects that could otherwise contribute to European supply diversification.
3. Regional stability: A fragmented Kurdistan weakens federal stability in Iraq, creating security vacuums that hostile actors or extremist remnants could exploit.
Why this matters to Europe
The future of the Kurdistan Region is not solely a Kurdish or Iraqi domestic matter. Its institutional stability has direct implications for European interests in Iraq and the wider Middle East.The Kurdistan Region has long served as a relatively stable political and economic partner for European countries, while also playing an important role in regional security, counterterrorism, energy cooperation, trade, and humanitarian affairs. A prolonged division between competing administrations could gradually weaken these functions and create greater uncertainty for European engagement.For Europe, the concern is therefore not simply whether Kurdish political parties can resolve their differences. It is whether the institutional fragmentation of the Kurdistan Region could produce a less predictable partner, weaker governance, and greater instability along one of the Middle East's strategically important corridors.Preventing that outcome is in Europe's own interest. A stable, unified, and institutionally coherent Kurdistan Region provides European governments with a more reliable partner in Iraq and strengthens the broader framework of regional stability.
Halo Hassan Saeed is a Kurdish-Iraqi writer, journalist, and researcher.
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for deeper practical co-operation between Kazakhstan and BRICS countries in trade, logistics, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and water security, positioning the format as a platform for broader economic ties amid growing geopolitical fragmentation.
Speaking at the BRICS Plus plenary session in New Delhi on Sept. 13, Tokayev said Kazakhstan sees cooperation with the group as an opportunity to expand access to new markets, attract investment, strengthen transport links and advance technological development. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev during the BRICS Plus plenary session in New Delhi on Sept. 13.
Tokayev described the current global environment as an era of “great fragmentation,” a term used in the 2026 Global Peace Index to characterize geopolitical confrontation, rising militarization, weakening multilateral institutions and growing trade barriers. He noted that BRICS, representing nearly half of the world’s population and around 40% of global GDP, has both the capacity and responsibility to help overcome global divisions and deliver concrete results. “Peace and strategic stability are necessary conditions for economic and sustainable development,”
Tokayev said, calling for a shift from the de-escalation of individual conflicts toward long-term stability based on political dialogue and diplomacy. Against this backdrop, Tokayev positioned BRICS as a platform for practical cooperation rather than an alternative to the existing international system.
“As a partner country, Kazakhstan views BRICS as an open platform for practical cooperation that complements the multilateral system with the central role of the United Nations and connects peoples, regions and markets,” he said. He added that Kazakhstan always seeks to find a “common ground on every difficult issue,” describing the approach as consistent with the country’s “balanced, goal-oriented foreign policy.” Anastasia Golyakova, founder of the ThinkBricks YouTube channel, said the approach reflects BRICS’ broader focus on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, priorities that have gained greater relevance amid rising geopolitical tensions.
Anastasia Golyakova, founder of the ThinkBricks YouTube channel. said closer cooperation among BRICS members could help address shared challenges while giving partner countries such as Kazakhstan greater access to the bloc’s growing trade, investment and technological opportunities. “BRICS gives much support to each other. So, from this point of view, for Kazakhstan, it’s a prosperous future, in my opinion,” Golyakova told The Astana Times.
Ayanangsha Maitra, an editor and a geopolitics specialist, echoed this view, saying Kazakhstan’s BRICS partnership could open new opportunities for economic cooperation and market access. “Although Kazakhstan is not a full BRICS member, its partnership with the grouping adds value at a time of growing geopolitical tensions and economic uncertainty,” Maitra told The Astana Times.
“BRICS could offer Kazakhstan additional avenues for cooperation with countries beyond its traditional economic and political partners,” he added. Expanding trade and investment The economic dimension of Kazakhstan’s BRICS engagement was central to Tokayev’s address. According to him, trade between Kazakhstan and BRICS members and partners was around $72 billion in 2025. “Having significant industrial, transit and technological potential, we intend to diversify trade, economic and investment ties with all BRICS countries.
As chairman of the Eurasian Economic Union, Kazakhstan supports the expansion of economic cooperation with BRICS and the advancement of work on concluding a free trade agreement with India,” Tokayev said.
Tokayev also called on the New Development Bank, a multilateral development bank established by the group, to consider financing commercially viable projects in BRICS countries, including Kazakhstan.
Maitra identified critical minerals, jewelry, fashion and textiles as areas with potential to expand Kazakhstan-India trade. “Despite Kazakhstan’s relatively modest population of around 20 million, the country has a strong entrepreneurial spirit and growing commercial links with India,” he said, pointing to increasing connectivity between the two countries.
Turning geography into connectivity Transport connectivity was another central element of Tokayev’s vision. “Last year, transit cargo volumes through Kazakhstan approached 40 million tons. Our long-term goal is to increase that figure to 100 million tons annually. Overall, our transit network already handles up to 85% of overland freight between China and Europe,” he said.
As part of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, Kazakhstan serves as a link between Asia and Europe through the Caspian Sea. Tokayev called for greater synergy between the Trans-Caspian route, China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the International North-South Transport Corridor. Maitra highlighted that Kazakhstan’s position within the EAEU, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides access to major regional markets. Its participation in the International North-South Transport Corridor adds another layer of connectivity.
“BRICS could expand that network beyond Kazakhstan’s traditional regional partners. The partnership adds another dimension by opening access to markets across a wider group of countries,” he said. AI as a new layer of cooperation AI represents another area where Kazakhstan sees room for practical BRICS cooperation.
Tokayev said Kazakhstan is ready to use its computing infrastructure and national and UN digital centers to expand cooperation in AI and proposed establishing a BRICS Plus Partnership in Artificial Intelligence. The initiative, he said, could connect national AI centers, facilitate access to laboratories and research projects and support the development of multilingual AI solutions.
For Maitra, AI could also become an important area of Kazakhstan-India cooperation because the two countries bring complementary strengths. “India has a strong IT sector and a large pool of software engineers and technology professionals, while Kazakhstan has established connections across the CIS and wider Eurasian markets. That combination could help Indian technology companies reach markets where language and regional expertise remain barriers,” he said. Water security broadens the agenda Tokayev also linked sustainability to one of the country’s longstanding international priorities: water security. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s proposal to establish an International Water Organization as a specialized UN agency, arguing that global water governance remains fragmented and requires stronger international coordination.
“I invite the BRICS member states and partners to join the international consultations initiated by our country,” Tokayev said. Meeting with Narendra Modi On the sidelines of the summit, Tokayev also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, highlighting India’s growing economic and technological weight and the expanding relationship between the two countries. Modi highlighted the potential for closer ties in high technology and the creative industries, including cooperation between Astana Hub and Hyderabad’s Cyberabad technology ecosystem. He also invited Kazakh representatives, particularly young people, to take part in the WAVES creative industries summit in Mumbai next year. The two leaders also discussed prospects for expanding economic ties between India and the Eurasian Economic Union.
Tokayev said Kazakhstan, as the current chair of the EAEU, supports negotiations on a free trade agreement between the bloc and India and is ready to help advance the process. Tokayev said around 600 companies with Indian capital operate in Kazakhstan, while nearly 150,000 Indian citizens visited the country last year. He also cited the large number of Indian students studying in Kazakhstan and cooperation between Astana and New Delhi within international organizations.
Long constrained by its landlocked geography, Kazakhstan is seeking to turn its position between Europe and Asia into a source of economic and geopolitical leverage. As trade disruptions and competition drive demand for diversified supply chains, Astana is investing in new transport corridors to establish itself as an indispensable transit hub and translate connectivity into diplomatic influence.
The Middle Corridor route
“Transport diplomacy has long been a pillar of economic diplomacy. Today, efficient transport and logistics networks are becoming strategic assets that shape economic competitiveness, and a country’s role in regional economic cooperation,” Head of Research Department of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) Alexey Kuznetsov told The
Astana Times.
Alexey Kuznetsov, Head of Research Department of the Eurasian Development Bank. Photo credit: The EDB’s press service Located between China, Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan is developing railways, roads, ports and logistics hubs while expanding connections along several international transport corridors. The scale of the sector is reflected in recent figures. Kazakhstan transported 540.5 million tons of cargo in January-July, up 0.9% from the same period a year earlier, according to the Bureau of National Statistics.
Cargo turnover increased 1%, while road freight transportation grew 6.2%. Government data shows that transit freight reached 21.7 million tons in January-June, up 24% from 17.5 million tons a year earlier. Building Eurasian connectivity Kazakhstan is seeking to strengthen its role not simply as a transit country but as a major regional connectivity hub. “For Kazakhstan, modern transport, logistics, and warehousing infrastructure are essential for addressing the challenges of a landlocked geography.
"At the same time, the country has become one of Eurasia’s most important transit hubs,” said Kuznetsov. He said international transport and logistics partnerships are central to Kazakhstan’s connectivity diplomacy, positioning the country as an influential player in shaping Eurasia’s regional agenda. According to the EDB’s Transport Projects Observatory, Kazakhstan accounts for 53% of transport corridor investments planned or under implementation in Central Asia through 2035.
“More than $32 billion is expected to be invested in 55 major transport projects, including construction of the Center-West motorway, the Uralsk-Atyrau and Kyzylorda-Saksaulsk roads, and the Moiynty-Kyzylzhar railway. These investments will strengthen East-West and North-South trade routes and further position Kazakhstan as a strategic transport crossroads linking Europe and Asia,” Kuznetsov said. Road construction, reconstruction and repairs cover around 11,000 kilometers nationwide in 2026. Kazakhstan also plans to repair 11,000 kilometers of railway tracks by 2029. International financing is supporting part of the expansion.
In February, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee to mobilize $1.41 billion in commercial financing for a major railway connectivity project along Kazakhstan’s section of the Middle Corridor. However, Kuznetsov emphasized that infrastructure alone cannot determine whether a transport route succeeds. “Transport connectivity depends equally on ‘soft infrastructure’: harmonized regulations, efficient border-crossing procedures, coordinated corridor development, and digitalization of transport services and documentation,” he said.
The World Bank estimates cited by Kuznetsov suggest that cutting border delays by 50% through regulatory harmonization and digital solutions could increase exports from Central Asian countries along transport corridors by an average of 18%. For Kazakhstan, this means that the competitiveness of its routes will depend not only on the number of roads, railways and terminals built, but also on how efficiently they operate.
The Middle Corridor and geopolitics At the center of Kazakhstan’s connectivity strategy is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which connects China with Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Europe. For political scientist Tair Naumov, the importance of such routes extends beyond trade. “Investment in transit infrastructure requires a certain level of trust between countries, including confidence in political relations and the security of investments,” Naumov said in an interview with The Astana Times. Once a route becomes operational, however, it can also strengthen those relations by creating greater economic interdependence.
“When countries rely on the same transport routes, their interests become more closely connected. If a corridor becomes important to foreign trade, there is a stronger incentive to maintain stable relations and keep existing agreements in place,” he said. Naumov noted that this interdependence can eventually acquire a security dimension. “If a country becomes an important transit hub, its stability becomes an interest not only for the country itself but also for its neighbors and major trading partners,” he said. Damir Kayumov, PhD, with a bachelor’s degree in economics and law. Damir Kayumov, PhD, with a bachelor’s degree in economics and law, takes a similar view, emphasizing the economic interests created by shared logistics networks.
“Good logistics creates mutual interest between countries. The more participants there are, the safer it becomes. And the more economic ties pass through Kazakhstan, the greater its role in the region,” Kayumov told The Astana Times. The Middle Corridor illustrates this dynamic. While it does not yet account for a dominant share of Kazakhstan’s transit flows, its rapid growth could give it greater strategic importance.
From transit to economic value
For Kazakhstan, stronger economic ties along these routes are only part of the opportunity. The bigger question is how the country can turn growing transit flows into broader economic value at home.
“I would not reduce the transport strategy to transit alone. If a container simply passes through Kazakhstan, the country earns comparatively little. It is much more interesting when logistics centers, warehouses, manufacturing and service companies emerge alongside the route,” Kayumov said. Such an approach would allow Kazakhstan to capture more value from its position in Eurasian supply chains. “Then the transport corridor begins to work for the regions and for our industry. Kazakhstan receives much more income. The service model that develops around the entire flow allows us to earn more and create more jobs,” he said.
Kayumov noted that attracting cargo also requires competitive and predictable routes. Border delays, limited port capacity, container shortages and differences in procedures can increase costs and make a route less attractive to businesses. “A convenient route must be fast, clear and predictable. For business, it matters how long cargo remains at the border, how quickly documents are processed and how much railway capacity is available,” he said. According to Kayumov, digitalization can help address some of these challenges. Electronic document management, for example, can reduce corruption risks while speeding up operations.
TRIPP and the wider connectivity network
The development of new routes beyond Kazakhstan could expand the country’s connectivity options. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is a proposed transport link through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhchivan exclave. Kazakhstan has expressed interest in participating in the project and linking it with the Middle Corridor. “For the Trans-Caspian route, TRIPP provides an additional option for moving cargo after the Caspian Sea toward Türkiye and Europe. The more such branches there are, the more resilient and attractive the entire corridor becomes,” Kayumov said.
For Kazakhstan, the interest is largely pragmatic. As a landlocked country, it needs several reliable routes to major markets. However, Kayumov noted that the project’s value for Kazakhstan would depend on how effectively it is integrated into the country’s existing transport network. “What is more important for us is not formal participation in the project, but its integration with our existing transit hub. This means having unified tariffs, digital borders, digital document management and clear, predictable delivery times,” Kayumov said. “The more reliable routes connect Central Asia with Europe through Kazakhstan, the greater the economic and political value of our geography and our role in connecting different markets,” he added.
From L to R: WCO Secretary General Ian Saunders and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev Photo credit: Akorda.
Kazakhstan is stepping up its partnership with the World Customs Organization (WCO) as part of a broader strategy to strengthen the country’s position as a key Eurasian transit hub. But while digital customs reforms could significantly reduce trade costs and border delays, experts say their long-term economic payoff will ultimately depend on infrastructure, regional coordination and the changing geography of global trade, writes Ayana BirbayevaI.
The topic came into focus during a series of high-level meetings in Astana between President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and WCO Secretary General Ian Saunders on Sept. 8. During the meeting, Tokayev said Kazakhstan is consistently developing a “smart border” model by introducing digital solutions to optimize customs procedures and improve freight transit across Eurasia. Saunders praised Kazakhstan’s progress in customs modernization and its growing role in developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor.
Customs modernization becomes part of a wider logistics strategy
Beyond the diplomatic symbolism, the meetings reflect a longer-term economic objective: transforming Kazakhstan from a transit country into an internationally competitive logistics platform. Speaking in the meeting, Bektenov emphasized that resilient transcontinental trade has become one of the key drivers of Kazakhstan’s economic development. He noted that the WCO’s 2025–2028 strategic plan, Data-Driven Customs for a Connected World, closely aligns with Kazakhstan’s own digital reform agenda.
A central element of that strategy is the rollout of KEDEN, a unified customs system integrating declarations, transit procedures and border controls, alongside the Smart Cargo platform, which combines transport services, electronic permits and cargo tracking into a single digital ecosystem. According to official data, 14.6 million tons of transit cargo passed through Kazakhstan during the first seven months of the year. Freight volumes along the Middle Corridor reached approximately 350,000 tons, with around 24,000 vehicles using the route. Why digital borders matter Farkhad Kassenov, head of the A+ Analytics research center, political scientist and international relations expert, notes that cooperation with the WCO should be viewed not as an isolated initiative but as one stage of Kazakhstan’s much broader transport and logistics strategy.
“Kazakhstan has been systematically synchronizing customs procedures, tariffs and border regulations with the countries participating in the Middle Corridor. This cooperation with the WCO is one of the stages of that much larger project,” Kassenov told The Astana Times. The Middle Corridor has gained strategic importance as trade between China and Europe increasingly seeks alternatives to traditional northern routes passing through Russia. At the same time, Kazakhstan is also positioning itself within the developing North–South corridor, despite temporary disruptions caused by conflicts affecting the Middle East and maritime trade. According to Kassenov, removing bureaucratic barriers may prove almost as valuable as building new infrastructure.
“Digitalization can increase the speed of cargo movement by roughly 30% while simultaneously reducing logistics costs. When paperwork is synchronized and businesses use a single digital window, goods spend less time waiting at borders or in dry ports,” he said. Digital gains cannot replace physical infrastructure Yet customs reform alone will not solve every bottleneck. Kassenov notes that the Middle Corridor still faces structural constraints that digital systems cannot eliminate, including different railway gauges between China, Kazakhstan and Europe, as well as the natural limitations of crossing the Caspian Sea. “There are real physical barriers. Different railway gauges require cargo transfers, while navigation across the Caspian is limited during storms and seasonal ice. Digitalization improves efficiency, but it must be accompanied by major investment in transport infrastructure,” he said. Kazakhstan has already begun expanding ports in Aktau and Kuryk, while negotiations continue with Azerbaijan, Türkiye and China on improving rail connectivity across the corridor.
A changing geopolitical map of trade The renewed attention to Kazakhstan’s transit role is also being driven by geopolitical shifts beyond Central Asia. According to Kassenov, growing strategic competition between China and the United States has increased Beijing’s interest in secure overland trade routes. “The Middle Corridor was once viewed as an alternative route. By the end of this decade, it may become one of the principal land connections between East and West,” he said. That evolution creates opportunities extending beyond transit fees. Kazakhstan is seeking to develop domestic manufacturing, processing industries and exports of higher value-added products, including critical minerals and industrial goods, that can move along the same logistics network. A customs dilemma inside the EAEU At the same time, Kazakhstan’s customs policy faces another question that is less visible in discussions about digitalization: whether the existing distribution of import customs duties within the Eurasian Economic Union reflects the current structure of regional trade. Aidar Kurmashev, head of the Asian Studies Department at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, recently highlighted the issue in his Telegram channel.
According to him, under the EAEU system, duties collected on imports from outside the union are distributed among the five member states according to predetermined shares. Kazakhstan’s share is 6.955%, compared with 85.065% for Russia, regardless of where the duties are actually collected. “After 2022, trade flows changed significantly, the role of Kazakhstan in trade with China and other directions of foreign imports increased, while our share remained 6.955%,” Kurmashev wrote. He argued that the issue raises a broader question about whether the formula still corresponds to the current structure of trade within the EAEU. “If Kazakhstan previously benefited from the system, but now has been losing hundreds of billions of tenge for the third consecutive year, perhaps it is time to at least recalculate the economics of the existing mechanism,” Kurmashev said, highlighting that the figures refer specifically to distributed import customs duties and do not include import VAT. Trade routes are changing faster than institutions The EAEU perspective illustrates a broader challenge facing Kazakhstan as it tries to reposition itself within changing Eurasian trade networks.
The geography of imports and transit has shifted since 2022, while Kazakhstan is simultaneously trying to deepen direct trade links with China, expand the Middle Corridor and strengthen its position as a logistics hub between Asia and Europe. That makes customs policy increasingly relevant not only as an administrative function but as an element of economic strategy. Digitalization can make the movement of goods faster and more predictable. International standards can improve interoperability. Infrastructure investment can remove physical bottlenecks. But the economic payoff ultimately depends on whether these elements develop together. As Kassenov put it, the Middle Corridor is moving from being an alternative route from the global lens toward becoming a potentially central Eurasian connection.
The EU welcomes Cambodia’s decision to join the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) for WTO members, contributing to efforts to uphold a rules-based multilateral trading system.
With Cambodia’s participation, the MPIA now covers 62 World Trade Organization (WTO) members and 60.4% of world trade.
The MPIA brings together participants from all continents and at different levels of development, united by a shared commitment to upholding the rules-based trading system.
The MPIA preserves the right to appeal in trade disputes among participating WTO members, at a time when the WTO’s Appellate Body remains non-functioning. It helps ensure that disputes can continue to be resolved in an orderly and binding manner, avoiding appeals 'into the void'.
“I welcome Cambodia to the MPIA. The arrangement plays an important role in upholding the rules-based trading system. Each new participant helps reinforce the predictability, stability and credibility of global trade rules. I encourage other WTO members to join the MPIA,” said EU Trade and Economic Security Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.
The MPIA was established in 2020 and has proven its effectiveness in many WTO disputes.
Under the MPIA, appeals are heard by arbitrators randomly selected from a pool of 10 standing appeal arbitrators set up by the participating WTO members. These arbitrators are persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and WTO agreements.
The MPIA is open to all WTO members as a practical tool for appeal arbitration, pending the restoration of a reformed and fully functioning WTO dispute settlement system.
As of 1 June 2025, the MPIA has an updated pool of appeal arbitrators to ensure that appeals continue to be heard by independent arbitrators of the highest calibre.
At the WTO Ministerial Conference that took place earlier this year, MPIA ministers stressed the importance of the MPIA for the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.
The current MPIA participants are Australia, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the European Union (and its Member States), Guatemala, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Macao (China), Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Vietnam.
MC14: Supporting the rules-based multilateral trading system: the role of the MPIA
The Kazakh Government has announced the formation of a pool of 215 investment projects totaling 78.6 billion US dollars, marking the start of a new investment cycle, Qazinform News Agency cites the government’s press service.
Kazakhstan is launching a new investment cycle with a strong focus on manufacturing, deep processing, high-tech industries, and localization.
The country has a three-tier investment attraction system in place, where regions compile priority projects and conduct targeted investor searches.
Fast Track procedures were launched to accelerate approvals along with the National Digital Investment Platform.
The next step is to develop Kazakhstan Investment House on the basis of Kazakh Invest, following a “one-stop shop” principle.
66 investment agreements worth 17.8 trillion tenge in investments have been signed.
Since early 2026, 25 agreements worth 4.4 trillion tenge were concluded in pharma, energy, metallurgy, agriculture, infrastructure, and healthcare. Capital investment rose to 23.5 trillion tenge, nearly doubling since 2019.
In manufacturing, investments tripled to 3 trillion tenge, now accounting for 12.7% of total investment.
Foreign direct investments reached 20.5 billion US dollars in 2025, up 14.4%, with capital increasingly directed to non-resource sectors like manufacturing, finance, and communications.
173 billion US dollars invested in four new projects to localize 356 medicines and expand domestic production.
To note, agro-industrial projects by Dalian Hesheng Holdings, Fufeng Group, and Tiryaki Agro focus on deep processing of wheat, corn, and legumes for food, pharma, and biotech.
In Ekibastuz, a Data Center Valley is being developed near GRES-1, with 30 billion US dollars in planned investment and energy capacity from 300 MW to 1 GW. The project will integrate infrastructure for cloud services, processing capacities, and AI.
Earlier Qazinform reported Kazakhstan and Germany aim to implement new joint investment and industrial projects.
Government of Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
Economy
Pharmaceuticals
Agro-industrial complex development
Wheat
Digital Kazakhstan
Energy
Investments
Sovereign wealth is typically measured by the size of reserves that allow a country to weather periods of crisis. However, for future generations, it is not only the amount left in financial accounts that matters. Of equal importance is the state of the country they inherit alongside these savings: the quality of its schools and hospitals, the condition of utility networks, roads, energy, and other core infrastructure.
For Kazakhstan, this question holds special significance. Revenues from natural resources enable the country to build a substantial financial cushion. The National Fund accumulates a portion of commodity revenues and serves two primary functions: a savings function aimed at preserving assets for future generations, and a stabilization function designed to reduce the state budget's vulnerability to fluctuations in global commodity markets. It should be noted that by mid-2026, the fund's foreign-currency assets reached $65.5 billion. (1)
Sovereign wealth operates differently
There is no single global model for managing sovereign wealth funds. States strike different balances between intergenerational savings, fiscal stabilization, and deploying accumulated capital for development. However, international experience demonstrates that these goals are not inherently contradictory.
Norway adheres to one of the most disciplined models of sovereign wealth management. Its fiscal rule aligns withdrawals with the expected real return of the Government Pension Fund, while preserving the flexibility to use fiscal policy in response to major economic shocks. (2)
The stabilization function is even more pronounced in Chile. Funds from the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund have been drawn upon repeatedly during periods of economic stress. In 2009, withdrawals reached nearly $9.28 billion, with significant funds also deployed in 2019–2021. (3)
Other countries also utilize commodity revenues not only as a source of long-term savings, but as a catalyst for economic development. The experience of Kuwait is illustrative, where these responsibilities are divided between the Future Generations Fund, focused on preserving capital for future generations, and the General Reserve Fund, whose investment portfolio encompasses energy, industry, transport and logistics, healthcare, and infrastructure. This model allows Kuwait to preserve a portion of national wealth for upcoming generations while transforming another portion into assets that expand the country's economic potential today and build the foundation for long-term growth. (4)
Azerbaijan, whose sovereign wealth origins closely mirror Kazakhstan's, has utilized resources from the State Oil Fund to finance major projects of national importance, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, the Oguz–Gabala–Baku water supply system, and equity participation in major oil and gas transport initiatives. (5)
None of these models can be mechanically copied by another country. Together, however, they demonstrate that sovereign wealth management does not boil down to a binary choice between "saving" and "spending." What matters far more is the form in which national capital can deliver the greatest long-term return for the nation.
From financial capital to national capital
Savings from the National Fund are already being utilized directly in the interests of future generations. Since 2024, Kazakhstan has operated the "National Fund for Children" program: every young citizen of Kazakhstan is annually allocated a portion of the fund's investment income, and upon reaching 18 years of age, the accumulated funds can be used for education or housing improvement. This program has already entered the phase of practical asset utilization. Between February 2024 and August 1, 2026, payouts were received by more than 338,000 young Kazakhstanis, totaling approximately $67.8 million. Meanwhile, the funds belonging to minors remain within the National Fund's assets and continue to be invested until they reach adulthood. (6)
At the same time, Kazakhstan faces a challenge familiar to many economies that have accumulated significant revenues from natural resources: what portion of national wealth should remain in financial assets, and what portion makes sense to convert into capital working domestically.
Soon, Kazakhstan plans to deploy a portion of the National Fund's assets to finance major infrastructure projects of nationwide significance. In 2027, over $4 billion is planned for these purposes, followed by slightly over $3 billion annually in 2028 and 2029 (7).
According to several experts, the economic rationale for such a decision extends beyond mere financing. When funds are directed into long-term social and engineering infrastructure, national wealth does not disappear. The form in which it exists simply changes.
Money allocated to current consumption expires alongside the budget cycle. A school, hospital, utility network, road, or energy facility remains in the economy and operates for decades.
This is precisely why infrastructure investments differ fundamentally from covering operational expenses. A portion of financial capital is effectively transformed into physical and human capital within the country.
Such an approach yields economic benefits right from the project implementation stage. Construction generates demand for materials, equipment, transport, design, and installation work, providing orders for domestic enterprises and creating added value within the country. Once facilities are operational, another, far more sustained effect begins. Modernizing heating and water supply systems increases their reliability, reduces losses, and diminishes the need for costly emergency repairs. Roads enhance regional connectivity. Energy infrastructure removes bottlenecks for expanding existing production and launching new industrial capacity.
Investments in healthcare and education occupy a special place. Modern hospitals, clinics, and educational institutions represent both social infrastructure and direct investments in human capital. The accessibility of medical care, public health status, quality of education, and workforce qualifications are directly tied to labor productivity and the long-term potential of the economy. All social infrastructure is as much an element of national capital as transport or energy infrastructure, and its returns and effectiveness extend far beyond the construction timeline of any individual project.
The cost of deferred development
Utilizing accumulated capital carries an opportunity cost. However, delaying investments carries an opportunity cost as well. Insufficient capacity of transport networks, energy shortages, worn-out utility systems, and a deficit of schools or medical facilities impose costs today. The longer modernization is postponed, the longer the economy and population bear these costs.
Therefore, the pace of infrastructure development carries clear economic value. If a necessary facility opens today rather than ten years from now, the country gains additional years of its economic and social returns.
Moreover, the social and economic effects of infrastructure are largely inseparable. Reliable utility networks, modern healthcare, education, transport, and energy simultaneously elevate the quality of life and create an environment in which private economic activity can thrive.
A reserve that has already worked
Using the National Fund's resources to address strategic priorities is not a new practice for Kazakhstan. The fund's ability to provide supplementary resources when the economy needs them most has repeatedly served as a key factor in the country's economic resilience.
During the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, $10 billion was directed to stabilize the financial sector, support real estate, small and medium enterprises, and the agribusiness sector (8). In 2015–2017, an additional $9 billion was withdrawn (9). During the pandemic in 2020–2021, transfers from the National Fund helped preserve economic stability and support citizens. Thus, having an accumulated reserve allowed the state to act proactively—promptly directing additional resources where they were required to prevent more severe economic repercussions.
The existence of a large financial reserve enabled Kazakhstan to navigate periods of external shocks with an additional funding source without relying exclusively on current budget revenues.
Today, it is not the principle of using the fund that is changing, but the nature of the task. Previously, accumulated resources primarily served to mitigate the impact of global shocks. Now, a portion of the capital is intended to eliminate infrastructural bottlenecks that could constrain long-term development.
This expands the sovereign fund's role: resources accumulated during favorable periods are used not only after a crisis arises, but also to build assets that enhance the resilience and potential of the economy for years to come.
The account of future generations
Ultimately, the success of this strategy will be measured not by the volume of funds withdrawn from the National Fund, but by the value of the assets created with them and the overall effect they deliver to the economy and citizens.
This fundamentally shifts the evaluation criteria. If a financial asset worth one dollar is transformed into infrastructure that enhances productivity, lowers business costs, elevates human capital quality, and fosters conditions for new private investment over decades, the very structure of national wealth undergoes a qualitative transformation.
Therefore, the central question for the coming years is not whether to utilize National Fund resources, but the quality of the assets Kazakhstan creates in return. For future generations, this exact balance between preserved financial capital and the value of the domestic economy built in its place will stand as the primary legacy of today's decisions.
The Kazakhstani tenge has become the best-performing currency in Asia and Europe in 2026, according to the Financial Times. Since the beginning of the year, it has appreciated by nearly 10% against the US dollar, outperforming all other currencies worldwide except for several currencies of Latin American and African countries. This performance has been underpinned by economic growth driven by the transformation of Kazakhstan’s economic model. The country is rapidly evolving from a commodity-based economy into a financial and technology hub for Central Asia, amid growing inflows of foreign capital.
Growth factor
This year, the key factor behind the tenge’s significant 9.7% appreciation was not oil prices, which have traditionally been associated with Kazakhstan’s economic performance. This time, the appreciation of the Kazakhstani currency was driven by capital inflows, Dmitry Dolgin, Chief Economist for the CIS at ING, told the Financial Times. As of June, foreign investments in tenge-denominated government debt had reached $5 billion, 2.5 times higher than a year earlier, accounting for nearly one-tenth of the total volume of such securities outstanding.
Foreign investors seeking to diversify their portfolios are attracted by high yields — with the base rate at 16.75% — combined with a moderate level of risk, as confirmed by Kazakhstan’s sovereign credit rating. Another factor contributing to increased foreign capital inflows is the easier access for foreign investors to the country’s government debt. In April, the Kazakhstani authorities announced plans to connect local government bonds to the international clearing system Euroclear, and foreign investor activity has increased notably in recent months.
In addition, Kazakhstan expects to be included in the benchmark JPMorgan GBI-EM index of local-currency government bonds of emerging markets. The US bank is also preparing a separate index for frontier markets (a category of emerging markets — ed. note), in which, according to the National Bank, Kazakhstani bonds could account for an 8% share if included.
Foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan
The growth of foreign direct investment is providing additional support for the tenge. In the first quarter, FDI amounted to $6.3 billion. As the Financial Times notes, Kazakhstan is seeking alternative sources of income beyond oil, including by positioning itself as a transit and technology hub for goods moving from China to Europe. To this end, the country is investing heavily in infrastructure, the publication emphasizes.
In recent years, the country’s authorities have implemented reforms aimed at strengthening the national investment ecosystem, including tax, customs and other incentives. As a result, the total gross inflow of foreign direct investment into Kazakhstan from 2021 through 2025 amounted to approximately $114.3 billion. In 2025, the figure reached $20.5 billion, up 14.4% year on year. At the same time, the structure of investment has also changed, with capital increasingly flowing into manufacturing, trade, the financial sector, transportation and the IT industry.
The changes have resulted in record economic growth. In 2025, Kazakhstan’s GDP grew by 6.5%, the highest rate in a decade. Growth continued in the first five months of 2026, reaching 3.7% despite a decline in oil production. Meanwhile, the real sector of the economy grew by 4%, while services expanded by 3.6%, which can be seen as evidence of a qualitative transformation of the economy.
Statistical data illustrate the rapid expansion of the non-resource sector during this period. Construction recorded the strongest performance in 2026, growing by 13.4% in the first five months of the year compared with the same period in 2025. Manufacturing was also among the leaders, increasing by 9%. The highest growth rates were recorded in machinery manufacturing, which expanded by 23.3%, and pharmaceuticals, which grew by 35.2%.
According to the IMF, Kazakhstan’s economy measured at purchasing power parity is expected to reach $993.7 billion in 2026, effectively approaching the psychological milestone of $1 trillion. Over the past decade, this figure has nearly doubled.
Competitive economy
Based on its 2025 results, Kazakhstan ranked among the world’s most competitive economies, taking 34th place out of 69 countries in the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking, ahead of Japan, Kuwait, Portugal, India, Italy and other countries. Kazakhstan was also the only country from the CIS and Central Asia represented in the ranking. Analysts note that the country’s economy is becoming increasingly diversified. Today, manufacturing, logistics, energy infrastructure and investment projects are playing an increasingly important role.
Kazakhstan also ranked 53rd out of 150 countries in the Global Investment Risk & Resilience Index, achieving the highest result among Central Asian countries.
Focus on digitalization
Digitalization is one of Kazakhstan’s strategic priorities. In early June 2026, it was announced that an agreement had been signed with Firebird and Nvidia US companies to build data centers in the so-called “Data Center Valley.” According to Bloomberg, investments in the project could amount to $10 billion.
According to the Ministry of Artificial Intelligence, Kazakhstan’s IT services exports exceeded $1.142 billion in 2025. The sector has been growing at a rapid pace: five years ago, exports of high-tech solutions from Kazakhstan amounted to just $33.5 million. The strategic goal is to increase Kazakhstan’s IT services exports to $5 billion by 2030.
Fintech for export
Kazakhstan is expanding its export potential in the financial sector. In August, the subsidiary of one of the largest fintech holdings operating in Kazakhstan, Freedom, received a brokerage license from the local regulator in Turkey, becoming the first foreign broker in 34 years to obtain such a license. In late July, the company also completed the acquisition of a local bank. According to the holding’s founder, Timur Turlov, the company plans to invest $300 million in the Turkish market to create an integrated digital financial ecosystem built around its brokerage and banking businesses.
Freedom already operates in 24 countries worldwide. This year, the company applied for a banking license in France, viewing it as a gateway to the broader European market. The holding currently serves more than 600,000 brokerage clients in Europe and aims to increase that number to 50 million by exporting its ecosystem.
The total number of clients across all companies within the Freedom group stands at 14 million, while the holding’s assets exceed $14 billion and its market capitalization stands at $10 billion. Since Freedom’s listing on Nasdaq in 2019, the value of its shares has increased nearly 13-fold.
Another Kazakhstani fintech giant, Kaspi.kz, is also actively expanding its presence in Turkey. In July, the company announced the completion of a deal to acquire the Turkish subsidiary of Rabobank Dutch group. Earlier, in 2025, Kaspi.kz acquired a controlling stake in Turkish marketplace, Hepsiburada. The company’s shares are also traded on a US stock exchange, underscoring the high level of international confidence in Kazakhstani fintech companies.
Kazakhstan is also actively building its own financial infrastructure, while its stock market ranks among the largest in Eastern Europe. Trading volume on the Astana International Exchange (AIX), which officially began operations just eight years ago, amounted to $2.1 billion in 2025. Since its launch, AIX has facilitated the raising of $12.4 billion in debt and equity capital, while assets under management within the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) exceeded $5.4 billion at the end of 2025.
On the country’s oldest exchange, the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (KASE), trading volume in 2025 amounted to KZT 400.8 trillion ($769.1 billion). At the same time, the KASE Index has nearly tripled over the past four years, reaching 7,712.53 points by the end of June 2026. Combined trading volume on the two exchanges increased by nearly 50% in the first half of the year, while equity market capitalization rose by 18.8%.
Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has called on nuclear-armed states to engage in negotiations and accelerate efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force, reaffirming Kazakhstan’s commitment to the global anti-nuclear movement, Qazinform News Agency cites Akorda.
Tokayev made the remarks in a statement marking the International Day against Nuclear Tests, established by the UN General Assembly at Kazakhstan’s initiative.
The president noted that exactly 35 years ago, amid a difficult international situation, Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. For decades, the testing ground caused irreversible damage to people’s health and the environment, leaving a painful legacy for the Kazakh people, he said.
“Thirty-five years later, this date will serve as a reminder to all humanity of the tragic consequences of nuclear tests and as a call to prevent them from ever happening again,” Tokayev said.
He also highlighted Kazakhstan’s decision to voluntarily give up the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal following the country’s independence.
“By voluntarily renouncing the fourth-largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, Kazakhstan made a historic choice in favor of peace, security and sustainable development. This decision fulfilled the aspirations of the people of Kazakhstan and demonstrated our state’s responsibility for the fate of future generations,” Tokayev said.
According to the president, Kazakhstan’s commitment to peace and friendship with all states, enshrined in the preamble of the country’s new Constitution, remains an unwavering principle of its foreign policy.
“Our country’s position as one of the leaders of the global anti-nuclear movement remains unchanged. We call for negotiations among nuclear powers, the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and decisive multilateral action to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons use,” Tokayev said.
The president also stressed that nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful and constructive purposes.
He noted that the Kazakhstani people had firmly supported the country’s course toward developing nuclear energy in a nationwide referendum, laying a solid foundation for Kazakhstan’s economic, scientific and technological progress for decades to come.
Tokayev said this strategic choice forms an important part of the country’s transformation and opens a new stage in its sustainable development. He added that large-scale reforms across all areas of public life are aimed at building a Just, Progressive and Clean Kazakhstan.
“I am confident that together we will achieve this ambitious goal,” the president concluded.
Earlier, Qazinform reported President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev had offered condolences over passing Norway’s King Harald V.
Login