Poland wants to transfer missiles for the Patriot system to Ukraine, with Warsaw reportedly consulting with NATO to implement this plan. The plan is proving controversial due to the global shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles which have been rapidly depleted due to the war in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict between the United States and Israel against Iran and its proxies.
Poland plans to transfer several missiles to Ukraine for the Patriot air-defense system, according to information obtained by Polish news outlet Rzeczpospolita from government and military circles.
Remix News previously reported on the extreme shortage of Patriot missiles in Ukraine, leaving the country vulnerable to Russian missile and drone barrages.
However, it is a small number of missiles, not a large delivery. This information was indirectly confirmed by the Operational Commander of the Armed Forces, General Ireneusz Nowak, who noted that the transfer of missiles falls within a previously established, classified quantity.
“In my opinion, we could donate post-Soviet equipment that is still in our inventory and that could be very useful for Ukraine, even if it requires a general overhaul. We must be aware that such equipment is also used to fight in Poland’s interest,” General Nowak added in an interview with the newspaper.
How many missiles will Poland donate? The Polish Ministry of National Defence does not want to say.
The issue of Patriot missiles arouses strong emotions, and most Poles, as research shows, do not want to give Ukraine valuable weapons. The fact that the missile transfer comes at a time when Prime Minister Donald Tusk warns that Russia directly threatens Polish security and plans to escalate the conflict with NATO countries is particularly sensitive.
Controversy is also intensified by the fact that the Polish Ministry of National Defence is not disclosing details of the next aid package for Ukraine, citing the protection afforded classified information. However, the ministry confirmed that further support is being prepared and will include equipment that is no longer needed by the Polish army or is approaching the end of its useful life, but may still be useful in Ukraine. Details regarding specific types of weapons remain confidential.
The planned donation is part of broader Polish military aid to Ukraine. A few months ago, Poland transferred five PAC-3 MSE missiles to Kyiv for the Patriot system. Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz argued at the time that combating Russian missiles over Ukraine could increase Poland’s security because it would reduce the risk of them reaching Polish airspace. At the same time, he emphasized that the transfer of weapons must not weaken Polish defence capabilities.
Poland currently has 16 Patriot launchers and has contracted for approximately 200 PAC-3 MSE missiles, some of which have not yet been delivered.
Debris from a Chinese-made ballistic missile found in Yemen could have inadvertently revealed a previously undisclosed addition to Saudi Arabia’s secretive ballistic missile arsenal. Imagery circulating online appears to show the wreckage of a Chinese DF-15A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), potentially marking the first known Saudi combat use of a weapon in this class, although both the identification and ownership remain unconfirmed.
The booster stage of a Chinese-made DF-15A (Dong Feng-15A) ballistic missile operated by Saudi Arabia fell in Raghwan District, Marib Governorate, northern Yemen. pic.twitter.com/dfSXMOiCzQ
It is also unclear what happened to the missile itself. The debris suggests a stage separation or the missile broke apart or crashed before reaching its target. The Houthis are not known to possess any weapons that could have intercepted it.
A screenshot from a video clearly shows the DF-15A name applied on the side of the missile. via X
The development comes amid a sharp escalation in the long-running Saudi-Houthi conflict. After years of relative de-escalation following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks as Houthi forces have dramatically overrun Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around strategically important Marib and Taiz. The Houthis have also escalated missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while threatening the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The group has declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, adding a direct threat to one of Riyadh’s critical energy-export routes.
You can catch up with our latest coverage of the fighting here.
As for the DF-15, also known by its NATO designation CSS-6, this is a road-mobile, solid-fueled SRBM developed by China during the 1980s. The system formed part of Beijing’s effort to develop a new generation of conventionally armed mobile ballistic missiles, including systems primarily intended for export.
As you can read about here, the DF-15 family has evolved through several variants, although open-source information concerning their capabilities remains inconsistent.
The DF-15A reportedly entered Chinese service in the mid-1990s. Estimates of these missiles’ maximum range vary substantially, from roughly 600 kilometers (373 miles) for the original DF-15 to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles) for later versions.
Among the later versions of the DF-15 family is the DF-15B. A more substantial redesign, its most obvious external change is its triconic reentry vehicle fitted with control fins, a configuration widely interpreted as incorporating a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) warhead. Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP via Getty Images GREG BAKER
China is the only confirmed operator of the DF-15 family. There have been longstanding reports of Chinese transfers of the DF-15 or the related M-9 export version to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, but in each case, the export record is heavily disputed, with some reports likely conflating the DF-15 with the broadly similar DF-11.
While Saudi Arabia has never publicly acknowledged operating the DF-15 family, it has a well-established history of acquiring Chinese ballistic missiles.
In 2013, Prince Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed, Deputy Minister of Defense, visited the Strategic Missile Forces of Saudi Arabia, and was given this model. YEARS of speculation on the smaller missiles (The large is DF-3). Now we know – they are DF-15 and DF-15A. pic.twitter.com/oOn8qiCgye
Saudi Arabia imported Chinese ballistic missiles to expand its long-range strike options. Its desire for a land-based strategic deterrent was initially driven by concerns over Iran, regional missile proliferation, and nuclear hedging. More recently, however, it shifted toward fielding more accurate, mobile systems with greater conventional military utility.
Riyadh secretly obtained DF-3A missiles from China beginning in the late 1980s, establishing a strategic ballistic-missile capability that remained largely outside public view.
The kingdom has also subsequently been linked to the DF-21 family. Satellite imagery and other open-source intelligence have provided evidence of Chinese-designed ballistic-missile infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.
While the Houthis have their own ballistic-missile arsenal, this is principally associated with Iranian technology, captured Yemeni systems, and locally produced or modified weapons.
Saudi employment of an SRBM in the current fighting would represent a notable expansion of the kingdom’s response options. If Saudi Arabia did indeed do this, its main advantage would be speed and responsiveness. A solid-fueled ballistic missile could reach targets deep inside Yemen within minutes while keeping Saudi aircraft and crews out of the immediate engagement area, providing Riyadh with a rapid strike option against fixed Houthi targets. That could be particularly valuable as the conflict expands and Saudi forces face pressure to respond quickly to Houthi attacks on military and energy infrastructure.
Previous losses at the hands of Houthi ground-based air defenses could also dissuade Riyadh from relying on crewed aircraft to strike targets on the ground deep inside Yemen. Houthi air defenses, while pathed together in many ways, are capable enough to give even U.S. airpower a serious run for their money.
At the same time, a conventional SRBM like the DF-15A can deliver a large warhead at very high speed, imparting significant kinetic energy, making it particularly useful against fixed, high-value, or hardened targets.
Use of an SRBM would also be in line with the current pattern of escalation, with the Houthis conducting missile and drone attacks against Saudi military and energy targets while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are engaged in renewed ground fighting. Riyadh’s demonstration of an SRBM capability in this campaign would also signal that it is is willing to draw more heavily on its strategic missile inventory as the conflict intensifies, potentially further raising the stakes of the confrontation.
Such a move would carry a message beyond Yemen. Using a previously unacknowledged ballistic missile capability in combat would signal to Iran that Riyadh is now willing to employ this arsenal, after decades of keeping it very much in the shadows.
If the evidence ultimately points to a Saudi DF-15A launch, the discovery would offer a rare look at the operational use of an extremely secretive part of the kingdom’s arsenal, and add a significant new dimension to the rapidly escalating Saudi-Houthi war.
The German Navy has demonstrated the launch of Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) LORA ballistic missile from an F125 frigate, with at least two missiles fired from the Sachsen-Anhalt during a test in the North Atlantic last night. The demonstration points to a potentially significant new long-range strike capability for Germany’s surface fleet, should it be adopted.
A LORA missile leaves the launch canister on the flight deck of the frigate. German Ministry of Defense/screencap
Video released by the German Ministry of Defense alongside the test shows two LORA launch canisters positioned on the frigate’s flight deck, followed by a missile launching from each container.
Die Fregatte „Sachsen-Anhalt" (Klasse 125) hat im Nordatlantik mindestens zwei ballistische Raketen vom Typ LORA (IAI) verschossen – gestartet aus Kanistern auf dem Flugdeck. Die Erprobung erfolgte im Rahmen der OPEX-Serie.
The launches were conducted as part of the Bundeswehr’s operational experimentation (OPEX) program in cooperation with the Bundeswehr Innovation Center in Erding. Reportedly, two German frigates were deployed to the waters between Ireland and Iceland for the test, and a warning was issued to maritime and air traffic 45 days beforehand.
The test marks a notable expansion of the weapons capabilities demonstrated by Germany’s F125 frigates and could provide a pathway toward a new long-range naval strike capability.
A LORA canister is raised into the launch position. German Ministry of Defense/screencap
German Navy Inspector General Vice Adm. Jan Christian Kaack described the event in a statement distributed through the Bundeswehr’s official WhatsApp channel:
“With the successful launch of a ballistic missile last night in the North Atlantic, we have made naval history. I am extremely pleased with this achievement. The system can be successfully deployed by our units, and its potential range exceeds anything we have seen before. For the protection of Germany and our allies, this test marks a new chapter in deterrence and defense readiness at sea.”
IAI also confirmed the results of the test, stating that both missiles followed their planned trajectories and struck their targets with high precision.
The exact targets, engagement ranges, flight profiles, and missile configurations used during the test have not been disclosed.
There is no possibility that Sachsen-Anhalt will retain the launchers in their current location, since they mean the F125’s flight deck cannot be used, depriving it of a critical capability. Potentially, they could be installed elsewhere on the vessel, but, moreover, it is unclear if the current experiment will lead to a formal acquisition program.
The two LORA canisters on the flight deck of the frigate. German Ministry of Defense/screencap
At the same time, LORA is a substantially different weapon from the anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles normally associated with modern surface combatants.
Available for ship- and ground-launch, the missile is approximately 17 feet long, 25 inches in diameter, and weighs around 3,500 pounds. It follows a quasi-ballistic trajectory and has an officially stated range of approximately 60 to 270 miles. An air-launched derivative has also been developed.
A weapon capable of reaching targets hundreds of miles away would give German surface combatants a long-range strike option extending far beyond the range of traditional naval guns and many shorter-range precision weapons.
Its quasi-ballistic flight profile also differentiates LORA from a conventional cruise missile. A ballistic-style trajectory allows the weapon to cover distance rapidly and presents an air-defense challenge different from that posed by a low-flying cruise missile. This type of missile also impacts its target with much greater kinetic energy, making it especially useful for striking more hardened target sets.
LORA uses a navigation architecture combining GNSS satellite navigation with an inertial navigation system and can achieve a circular error probable, or CEP, of approximately 33 feet. IAI also says LORA can be launched within minutes, including from unprepared positions, and can attack a target within its range in less than 10 minutes after a decision to launch.
Back in 2017, as you can read about here, IAI successfully test-fired LORA from a containerized launcher on the back of a truck sitting on the deck of a cargo ship. The missile successfully struck a target on land.
What is less clear is its ability to strike targets at sea.
A long-range anti-surface application would be particularly interesting for the German Navy, although the weapon, in its basic form, has no terminal seeker. This limits the missile to use against targets with a fixed location, rather than autonomously finding and tracking a maneuvering warship during the terminal phase of flight.
In a 2020 test, IAI demonstrated firing two LORA missiles from a ship before hitting separate floating targets at approximately 60 miles and 250 miles. However, striking a static floating target is different from an enemy warship that is maneuvering and potentially employing electronic warfare and air defenses.
Regardless, Germany has an even clearer requirement for land attack capabilities, which LORA is fully capable of fulfilling, as we will return to later.
As for Germany’s F125 frigates, these were designed primarily for long-duration deployments, maritime security, stabilization operations, and other missions requiring a persistent naval presence. Their overall lack of firepower is something we have examined in detail before now.
The frigate Sachsen-Anhalt (F 224) arrives in port. Photo by Hauke-Christian Dittrich/picture alliance via Getty Images picture alliance
The latest test involving the Sachsen-Anhalt is in line with the Bundeswehr’s OPEX framework, which is intended to evaluate emerging technologies and operational concepts under realistic conditions before decisions are made about wider adoption.
There is precedent for such experimentation leading to operational capabilities. Israeli-developed systems, including IAI’s Blue Whale autonomous underwater vehicle, have previously been evaluated through German naval experimentation efforts and subsequently moved toward formal adoption.
As well as the four F125 hulls, Germany might look to incorporate LORA from the start on its future F127 multi-purpose frigates and/or its planned Large Remote Missile Vessels (LRMV), uncrewed vessels that will serve as arsenal ship ‘wingmen,’ supporting conventional surface combatants.
A highly provisional diagram shows the F127 frigate (top) and the LRMV (below). German Navy
It is worth noting that Germany has recently acquired various other Israeli-made missile and rocket systems. These include the Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system — the largest-ever Israeli defense export deal — and the PULS multiple rocket launcher. A German purchase of the land-based version of LORA would also be an option, with the truck-mounted system also able to be launched from ships at sea.
The LORA test also reflects a broader European push toward longer-range precision fires.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of ballistic and cruise missiles, while NATO countries have increasingly sought weapons capable of holding targets at greater distances at risk.
Key German Navy operating areas, including likely Russian attack routes. German Navy
Germany has historically possessed comparatively limited deep-strike capability. The Bundeswehr is now working to expand its ability to conduct long-range precision engagement, both independently and within NATO structures. This includes planned procurement of land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles, with a range exceeding 1,000 miles depending on the exact configuration.
Very deliberate NATO messaging right here – interesting to see the alliance using this kind of signalling https://t.co/BYvpzkq0Vq
A naval LORA capability could add another layer to that effort and would allow Germany to distribute long-range fires across surface combatants, complicating an adversary’s targeting problem while giving its naval forces a more meaningful role in high-end combat operations. With the security situation in Europe deteriorating, the potential deterrence factor that such a weapon would bring to Germany, and to NATO, should also not be underestimated.
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A new Ukrainian intelligence report details the complex production chain behind Russia’s shadowy 3M22 Zircon missile and identifies U.S.-origin electronics inside one of Russia’s most advanced weapons. New details also add weight to the theory that the weapon is a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile rather than a true hypersonic cruise missile.
The unusually detailed new breakdown of the Zircon missile identifies 70 enterprises and 84 individuals involved in its development and production while providing a component-by-component look at one of Moscow’s most closely watched — and least-understood — weapons.
DIU exposes details of russia’s 3M22 Zircon ballistic missile — including its components, production chain, 70 companies involved, key personnel, and foreign equipment used to manufacture the weapon: https://t.co/oOBqjUb8dSpic.twitter.com/VqRSSA41iV
— Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (@DI_Ukraine) August 31, 2026
The first evidence of Zircon’s combat use emerged in February 2024, when Ukrainian officials displayed recovered debris after a Russian strike. The wreckage included distinctive engine and steering-system components that Ukrainian specialists used to identify the weapon.
Russia has since employed the missile on other occasions. Ukrainian authorities reported that a Zircon was launched from occupied Crimea during a major missile and drone strike in January 2026, as we reported at the time.
While initially developed for use from warships and submarines, Zircon is understood to have been employed from ground-based launchers against Ukraine, with modified launchers from the K-300P Bastion coastal defense system considered the most likely candidate.
A standard Bastion-P mobile coastal defense missile system. Photo by Maxime POPOV / AFP MAXIME POPOV
The new entry on Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) War & Sanctions portal includes an interactive 3D model and identifies systems ranging from the missile’s radar seeker and onboard computer to its propulsion system and warhead. It also identifies foreign-origin electronics, including components associated with U.S. manufacturers.
Among them, according to the GUR report, is a TGA2704 amplifier associated with TriQuint Semiconductor, now part of U.S. company Qorvo. The GUR also identifies an Altera Cyclone II EP2C5T144I8N field-programmable gate array (FPGA) associated with Altera Corporation, now part of Intel, and lists it as originating in the United States.
An Altera Cyclone II Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), a type of microchip, which the GUR says was found in Zircon wreckage. GUR
The alleged findings do not establish that either company knowingly supplied Russia’s defense industry, nor do they explain precisely how the components reached Russian production lines. The GUR says it’s seeking additional information on their origins and supply chains. Bearing in mind previous precedents, China could potentially be one source, being a known vector globally for recycled chips.
Nevertheless, the disclosure highlights the continued presence of Western-origin electronics in Russia’s advanced weapons programs despite sanctions and export controls.
The GUR lists the Zircon as approximately 26 feet long, with a body diameter of 2.2 feet, and a warhead weighing about 265 pounds.
The agency gives a maximum speed of Mach 8-9, a flight altitude of approximately 19-25 miles, and a separate “maximum fixed speed” (presumably, sustained cruising speed) of Mach 6.8. These are Ukrainian intelligence assessments and cannot be independently verified.
The database identifies the 3B222 active radar-homing head, manufactured by NPP Radar MMS, and a Baget-83 onboard digital computer produced by KB Korund-M.
Reported 3B222 active radar homing antenna recovered from Zircon wreckage. GUR
It also identifies the 3B915 guidance units, the 3G22 warhead, and the 3L2211 solid-fuel rocket motor manufactured by NPO Iskra. Other Russian companies provide altimeters, control systems, power supplies, and other components.
Reported remains of a 3L2211 solid-fuel rocket motor manufactured by NPO Iskra. GUR
The reported propulsion information is particularly significant.
Russian and other sources have consistently described Zircon as a hypersonic cruise missile, implying an air-breathing propulsion system burning liquid propellant, capable of sustaining hypersonic flight.
However, the physical evidence for such a propulsion system has always been less clear.
Open-source analysis by Fabian Hinz has highlighted the apparent absence of a conventional air intake on Zircon. A scramjet- or ramjet-powered missile requires an intake to bring atmospheric oxygen into the engine, yet available imagery does not clearly show one. A Russian patent associated with the missile’s jettisonable launch cap likewise does not reveal an obvious intake arrangement.
Just published my new OSINT investigation into Russia's secretive Zircon missile whose combat use has risen sharply in 2026.
Available evidence suggests that Zircon is not a hypersonic cruise missile but rather a quasi-ballistic system.
More significant is evidence from recovered missile debris.
Material examined by Ukraine’s Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise included a circular metal structure interpreted as part of a solid-propellant rocket motor. The hardware appeared to be associated with Zircon’s second stage rather than simply its launch booster (which would be used on a true hypersonic cruise missile to bring it up to operating speed). This suggests a two-stage weapon, with a solid-propellant rocket in each. This would match with what we have seen during shipboard launches.
That finding is consistent with Russian patent activity involving NPO Mashinostroyeniya and NPO Iskra. Patents associated with the companies describe solid-propellant rocket motors incorporating arrangements for aerodynamic-control equipment around the motor’s exhaust system.
There is also evidence that Russian engineers developed advanced composite solid propellants specifically for Zircon.
None of this conclusively proves the missile lacks an air-breathing engine, but it certainly raises more questions about its classification. It should be noted that there are also some solid-fuel ramjet concepts, but these are much rarer applications.
In February 2024, evidence emerged that Russia had, for the first time, used the Zircon in attacks on at least one target in Ukraine. Ukrainian scientists showed a video of the Zircon wreckage — “fragments of the engine and steering mechanisms [with] specific markings,” seen here. via X
If Zircon is primarily rocket-powered, it may be better understood as a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile that nonetheless reaches hypersonic speeds.
Such a weapon would use rocket propulsion to accelerate rapidly and climb to high altitude before descending toward its target along a trajectory that is partly ballistic but incorporates aerodynamic maneuvering — a so-called ‘porpoising’ or ‘skip-glide’ trajectory. It could therefore reach hypersonic speeds without requiring sustained cruise under the power of an air-breathing system. The combination of high speed and unpredictable trajectory also makes it notably difficult for air defenses to deal with, characteristics shared with the air-launched Kinzhal, another Russian quasi-ballistic missile.
That interpretation could also help explain reports of a highly variable Zircon speed profile.
Russian officials have claimed that the missile can reach approximately Mach 9. During a 2020 test, Russian military leadership said Zircon reached more than Mach 8 while flying to an altitude of roughly 17 miles.
A Russian Ministry of Defense video that claims to show the Zircon test in the White Sea on Oct. 6, 2020:
Ukrainian assessments have described a more complicated profile, with the missile reportedly flying at around Mach 5.5, accelerating to approximately Mach 7.5 near the target, and then slowing before impact. Those figures cannot be independently confirmed, but a boost-and-glide or quasi-ballistic trajectory could produce such a profile more naturally than sustained powered cruise.
At the same time, it should be recalled that ‘hypersonic’ does not necessarily imply a ‘hypersonic cruise missile.’ A ballistic or quasi-ballistic weapon can travel well above Mach 5, which appears to be the case here. The characteristics of the Zircon, as presented by the GUR, would also help explain official Ukrainian claims that the missiles have been intercepted successfully by Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems.
There is also a relevant technological precedent. NPO Mashinostroyeniya has previously patented solid-propellant missiles using quasi-ballistic trajectories, including designs intended to maneuver at high-supersonic and hypersonic speeds. That does not establish a direct lineage to Zircon, but it does show that the concept is consistent with the company’s history.
The other major takeaway from the release is the scale of Zircon’s production network.
One of Russia’s leading missile houses, NPO Mashinostroyeniya is identified as the missile’s main designer and manufacturer and prime contractor for Russian Ministry of Defense contracts covering its development and production.
But the weapon depends on dozens of other organizations. NPO Iskra supplies the solid-fuel motor; NPP Radar MMS provides the radar seeker; KB Korund-M produces the onboard computer; and other enterprises supply guidance systems, altimeters, control electronics, warheads, power systems, and other specialized equipment.
Another video, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense in May 2022, is said to show the Gorshkov launching a Zircon, although the missile is seen only at a distance with no details visible:
The U.S.-origin electronics claimed to have been identified by GUR are particularly notable because they demonstrate how Russia’s sophisticated weapons production remains connected to international semiconductor supply chains.
By linking specific enterprises and individuals to individual missile components, Ukraine has provided governments and investigators with new information that could be used to pursue sanctions, export-control enforcement, and efforts to disrupt Russia’s supply chain.
The report also adds weight to continued open-source assessments of what kind of missile Zircon actually is.
Regardless of its classification, Zircon remains a formidable weapon. A rocket-powered missile capable of reaching hypersonic speeds, flying at high altitude, maneuvering, and potentially accelerating during its terminal approach presents a serious challenge to missile defenses. With Ukraine’s ability to intercept even more conventional ballistic missiles already severely eroded, the weapon further complicates the country’s troubling air defense picture.
The first of Japan’s two new cruiser-sized Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV) is continuing to take shape, recently receiving its huge main integrated mast, giving the vessel a new and remarkably imposing silhouette. The four very large fixed arrays for the ship’s powerful AN/SPY-7(V)1 radar will eventually be integrated onto this structure. The ASEV’s stated primary mission is missile defense, but Japanese authorities plan to give the vessels additional counter-drone, anti-ship, and land attack capabilities in the future. Tomahawk cruise missiles are notably set to be added to the ship’s arsenal down the line.
The ASEVs are large surface combatants, set to be some 620 feet long, have a beam (the widest point of the hull) of some 82 feet, and a standard displacement of 12,000 tons. For comparison, Japan’s largest surface combatants today, its Maya class destroyers, are just over 557 feet long, have a beam of some 73 feet, and a standard displacement of around 8,200 tons. It is worth noting here that the size of new and advanced destroyers, often optimized for anti-air warfare missions, has been trending upward globally in recent years. This, in turn, has caused the line between destroyers and what have more historically been categorized as cruisers in certain cases.
The first ASEV under construction in Nagasaki, as seen from the stern. This picture was taken earlier this month. Sakai/@kensakai9310
The first ASEV was laid down at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ (MHI) shipyard in Nagasaki in July 2025. The second was laid down in February of this year at Japan Marine United Isogo shipyard, which is situated in Yokohama City near Tokyo, according to a past report from Naval News. The Japanese Ministry of Defense is currently aiming to have the first of these vessels in service before the end of the country’s 2027 Fiscal Year, which runs from April 2027 to March 2028. The second is expected to follow in the 2028 fiscal cycle, which extends into 2029.
Another view of the first ASEV under construction in Nagasaki. Sakai/@kensakai9310A rendering of what the finished ASEV is currently expected to look like. Japanese Ministry of Defense
Significant progress in the overall construction of the first ship has been made just this year. The addition of the main mast structure, installed on top of the main superstructure, as seen in pictures at the top of this story and below, has drawn particular attention in recent weeks.
Japanese are very fast with ship building.
March 26 and today. ASEV-class destroyer.
190 m hull, SPY-7 Aegis, 128cell Mk 41 VLS. SM-3 for ballistic missiles, SM-6, plus Japan’s long range Type 12 SSM. pic.twitter.com/RQZixtqWwe
The especially large size of the ASEV’s integrated mast is driven by that of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar from Lockheed Martin. Each one of the radar’s four rectangular arrays is reportedly around 14 feet (nearly 4.3 meters) tall. This would put them in the same general size category as the arrays for Raytheon’s AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) found on U.S. Navy Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyers. That being said, the pictures we have now raise the question of whether the AN/SPY-7(V)1 arrays are bigger than previously assessed. The AMDR is another notably large design heavily optimized for missile defense.
A close-up look at the main superstructure and integrated mast on the first ASEV under construction in Nagasaki, at left, and a stock picture of an AN/SPY-7(V)1 array at right. Sakai/@kensakai9310
The size and location of the mast provide a centralized, elevated position for the AN/SPY-7(V)1’s large arrays, which will also require significant power generation capacity and thermal management to keep everything cool. This is a notable departure from the placement of the arrays on the main superstructure on existing Japanese destroyers, as well as the U.S. Arleigh Burke class, and offers an unobstructed, elevated line-of-sight to the horizon. Beyond the ballistic missile defense mission, this view farther out over the horizon would be important for tracking and engaging low-flying drones and cruise missiles, which might be targeting the ship itself. This is something we will come back to later on.
“With five times the tracking capability of the SPY-1, it [the AN/SPY-7(V)1] counters lofted trajectories and simultaneous multiple ballistic missile threats,” according to a machine translation of a section of the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s 2026 defense policy white paper, which was released earlier this month.
The passive electronically-scanned array (PESA) AN/SPY-1 was the first radar to be paired with the Aegis Combat System, and both were first introduced in the 1970s. Variants of the SPY-1 are still found on a variety of U.S. and foreign Aegis-equipped warships, including Japan’s Kongo, Atago, and Maya class destroyers.
The first-in-class destroyer JS Maya. Japanese Ministry of Defense
Additional versions of the AN/SPY-7 with much smaller arrays are also being integrated onto new F110 Bonifaz class frigates for the Spanish Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy’s forthcoming River class destroyers (also known as the Canadian Surface Combatant). The use of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 on the ASEV could impact decisions regarding new radars for other future and existing Japanese warships. Raytheon is also pitching versions of its increasingly popular AN/SPY-6 family for use on a successor to the Kongo class and for refit on the Maya class, according to a recent report from Naval News.
When it comes to the ASEV, as already noted, the AN/SPY-7(V)1 is central to the ship’s main stated missile defense mission. As the name makes clear, the ship will also feature the Aegis Combat System. The vessel will be capable of “remote engagement and guidance against anti-air targets tracked by other vessels” via a “Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC),” per the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual defense white paper.
The video below provides details about the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) developments, which are likely very similar to what Japan has planned for the ASEV.
In terms of armament, when the ASEVs first enter service, their main weaponry is expected to be a mix of variants of the Standard Missile-3 and -6 (SM-3 and SM-6). The SM-3 family is designed to engage ballistic missile threats during the mid-course portion of their flights while they are traveling outside of the Earth’s atmosphere. The SM-3 also has a demonstrated anti-satellite capability. The SM-6 is a multi-purpose missile that was originally designed with an anti-air focus. It can be used to target incoming ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight and also has at least a degree of capability for engaging hypersonic weapons. SM-6 can be used in a surface-to-surface mode, including against ships, as well. Japan is also a partner in the U.S.-led development of a new Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), which is being designed specifically to intercept unpowered, but highly maneuverable hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.
A briefing slide breaking down details about the various existing SM-3 variants. Work on the further evolved Block IIB variant seen here was cancelled in 2013. MDA A briefing slide breaking down details about the various SM-3 variants, including the SM-3 Block IIA. Work on the further evolved Block IIB variant seen here was canceled in 2013. MDAAn SM-6 missile seen being launched from a U.S. warship. USN
SM-3, SM-6, and future GPIs will be loaded into either of the ASEV’s two Vertical Launch System (VLS) arrays, one at the bow end and another toward the stern. Each one of the ships will have a total of 128 VLS cells. For comparison, Japan’s Maya class destroyers, as well as the U.S. Navy’s Flight IIA and III Arleigh Burke class destroyers, have 96 VLS cells apiece. The U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga class cruisers each have 122 VLS cells, and 128 is also the number of VLSs currently expected to be found on the future Trump class battleships.
At the time of writing, Japanese authorities do not appear to have explicitly mentioned plans to arm the ASEVs with other missiles when they first enter service. That being said, any VLS array capable of accommodating SM-3s and SM-6s should be able to fire a variety of other weapons, including shorter-ranged SM-2s and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), which the ship could use for more localized air and missile defense, as well as protecting the ship itself.
Renderings and models of the ASEV do show the design also armed with a five-inch naval gun in a turret on the bow, along with two Phalanx Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) and other automatic cannons for point defense.
A Japanese language graphic from the country’s 2026 defense white paper discussing the planned features of the ASEVs. Japanese Ministry of Defense
As mentioned, while missile defense is the immediate focus for the ASEVs, there are already plans to significantly expand their capability to engage other ships and targets on land. Tomahawk cruise missiles and a new, extended-range version of the Type 12 anti-ship cruise missile are set to be added to the arsenal of these vessels in the 2032 timeframe, according to the latest official Japanese defense white paper.
Japanese authorities want the ASEVs to eventually be able to help fend off waves of enemy drones, too. High-energy laser-directed energy weapons are set to be integrated onto the ships down the line to help address those threats. The overall size and other general characteristics of the ships would leave the door open to the possible addition of high-power microwaves and other capabilities in the future.
With the addition of Tomahawks, the ASEVs, along with other Japanese warships, will gain the additional ability to threaten counterstrikes against targets on land (and potentially at sea) at least around 1,000 miles in any direction. As part of the broader stand-off defense strategy, the Japan Self Defense Forces is developing new land-based long-range strike capabilities, including hypersonic missiles, as well.
The Kongo class destroyer Chokai fires a Tomahawk cruise missile during a test earlier this year. This was the first-ever launch of a Tomahawk from a Japanese warship. Japanese Ministry of Defense
It is worth noting that with current plans to acquire only two ASEVs, these will be high-value but also low-density assets, which will have to be very deliberately deployed for maximum effect. They will also stand out as top-priority targets in any future conflict, and will need to be protected as such.
It is possible that the roles and missions of the ASEVs, just like their designs, could evolve further as time goes on. The threat ecosystem facing Japan will continue to evolve, likely more rapidly, in the coming years. The country is also expanding its naval capabilities in other ways, and with an eye toward more blue water operations. This includes expanded light carrier capabilities through refits of existing Izumo class ships. Anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles, among large volumes of more traditional threats, could see the ASEVs used as escorts, even if experimentally. While just two hulls are barely enough to keep one on patrol to protect Japan, more could be built for expeditionary applications.
Regardless, the ASEVs are set to be a major addition to the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s fleets that will have big ramifications. From the progress that is visible at the shipyard in Nagasaki, MHI looks to be well on track to deliver the first of these ships next year or two.
Special thanks to @kensakai9310 on X, who also goes by “Sakai,” for sharing recently taken pictures of the first ASEV under construction at MHI’s yard in Nagasaki with us.
Russia used a longer-range Iskander ballistic missile for the first time in an attack on Kyiv, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) said on Thursday. Missiles fired from deeper inside Russia would present additional challenges to Ukraine’s new campaign to attack the systems before they launch.
“In one of the combined missile strikes on the capital this summer, the enemy first used the updated 9M723-2 ballistic missiles, also known by the code name ‘Iskander-1000,’” GUR stated. “The updated missile, due to the increased engine and, accordingly, the increased launcher, is capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 550 km (about 341 miles).”
According to GUR, the range of the previous Iskander variant, the 9M723-1, is 390 km, or about 242 miles.
A Russian Iskander-M series ballistic missile. (Russian MoD) Russian MOD
In its statement about the new Iskander, GUR included photos of what appear to be recovered components of the weapon. However, the agency did not provide any specifics about what the components were, where they were found or when.
GUR GUR
While GUR states that the new Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) was only recently fired at Ukraine, unconfirmed reports emerged in January that this weapon may have been introduced back then. Reports also began to appear last year that Russia was poised to start mass-producing a new version of the Iskander SRBM, with a range of about 600 miles and improved accuracy. Talk of the development of this new missile emerged after the termination by the United States of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019. This had previously prohibited the Soviet Union (later Russia) and the United States from fielding any ground-launched conventional or nuclear-capable missile of any type that can hit targets between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,420 miles) away. Russia formally abandoned the treaty a short while after the U.S pulled out.
We have reached out to GUR for details.
A Telegram channel operated by Russian paratroopers lauded the development.
“Now, rearward facilities that were previously considered relatively safe are within range,” gloated the Paratrooper’s Diary. “The missile retains its ballistic trajectory, which means it can maneuver throughout its flight path, making interception more difficult for air defense systems.”
“According to preliminary data, the increase in the fuel compartment may have allowed for adjustments to the warhead mass, but the missile is still capable of carrying both cluster and high-explosive warheads with increased power,” the paratroopers continued. “The deployment of the ‘Iskander-1000’ indicates that the Russian defense industry is not only replenishing stockpiles but also scaling up a major modernization of missile weaponry.”
Reducing the size of the warhead and increasing fuel storage is a well proven way of extending the range of certain missiles without drastically chaining its outer mold line. Other improvements, such as new motors and guidance capabilities can also help in this regard.
(Paratrooper’s Diary Telegram)
Russia produces dozens of these weapons a month, noted missile expert Fabian Hoffmann.
“Recently, Ukrainian intelligence provided an updated estimate of Russian missile production capacity, stating that Russia produces around 60 9M723 ballistic missiles per month,” he pointed out in May.
“Based on recent employment trends, this figure is not entirely implausible (at least compared to when this number was first mentioned in 2024), though it should be treated as an upper-bound estimate,” Hoffmann added. “More realistically, Russia’s combined 9M723 and Kh-47M2 production capacity in mid-2026 may be between 600 and 800 units annually, with monthly production potentially fluctuating significantly depending on the availability of internationally sourced components. This would allow Russia to sustain an average employment rate of roughly 50 to 70 monthly ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine, with greater peaks possible if part of the production is stockpiled in a given month.”
To bolster its stocks of short-range ballistic missiles, Russia is receiving more KN-23 and KN-24 missiles from North Korea, which are loosely akin to the Iskander-M. Russia has also asked Pyongyang for an additional tranche of KN-30 missiles, also known as the Hwasong-11C, according to a separate GUR report issued today.
“The new KN-30 ballistic missiles, which are three times more powerful than the KN-23/24, were requested by Moscow from Pyongyang, but so far, the transfer of these missiles from North Korea to Russia has not been recorded,” GUR added.
GUR
The KN-30 is an enlarged derivative of the original Hwasong-11 and designed to carry larger warheads. North Korea has previously said it has tested subvariants of the Da/C type with 2.5-ton and 4.5-ton conventional high-explosive warheads, and that it can also be fitted with a nuclear warhead.
Ukraine has had to absorb a lot of damage because it ran out of Patriots months ago. However, President Volodymyr Zelensky recently said an unspecified number of additional interceptors would be delivered. Evidence has also emerged that a new supply of Patriots is being used against Russian missiles, including Iskanders. Still, the concern stands because of the precarious nature of Ukraine’s interceptor supply and Russia’s ability to make new and improved missiles.
On the night of August 27, Ukrainian air defenses shot down seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles.https://t.co/ROasoQ78WT
As we noted earlier in this story, Ukraine has a new campaign, recently announced by Zelensky, to go after Russia’s ballistic missiles prior to launching to offset a dearth of interceptors. However, Russia’s ability to launch missiles another 100 or so miles further away from Ukraine will make them harder to find and hit.
“When our anti-ballistic missile stocks are at a minimum, there is another tactic,” Zelensky commented. “It is more difficult, and we developed it. It is hunting their nearby positions from which ballistic missiles are launched.”
Zelensky offered no details about how the campaign would be carried out. However, “Ukraine has already targeted Russian ballistic missile infrastructure in several operations this year” in Crimea and Rostov, Russia, with drones, Euromaidan Press reported.
Zelensky says Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander-M missile launcher on Russian territory near Ukraine's border. He called it another success and said operational details cannot be disclosed because of the mission's sensitivity, but confirmed the launcher was hit. #Ukrainepic.twitter.com/Ao0ooa8JYt
It is always preferable to shoot the archer not the arrow, but doing so reliably is very challenging as the Iranians proved again in Epic Fury. Despite a concerted campaign by the U.S. and Israel to go after Iranian missile launchers, the Islamic Republic was still able to fire off numerous volleys, creating a swath of destruction across the region.
For Ukraine, this kind of effort would have to mirror its mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics using longer-range drones. Ukrainians told us they are hitting targets up to 250 km away in the occupied territories. However, that’s been aided in no small measure by the use of Space X Starlink systems.
Carrying out a similar campaign in Russia would be challenging, because Space X owner Elon Musk is reluctant to allow their use deep inside Russia. As we previously noted, Ukraine is asking Musk for permission to “use Starlink-equipped drones against ballistic missile launchers up to 200km inside Russia,” the Financial Times reported last week.
GUR is calling for increased efforts to cut off the supply of foreign assistance Russia receives.
“To counter the aggressor’s plans, it is crucial to consolidate efforts aimed at limiting Russia’s program for the development, production, and modernization of ballistic weapons,” the directorate proffered.
The Ukrainian intelligence information about the new Iskander was part of a report on the amount of foreign components found on these missiles. The information is published on the directorate’s War & Sanctions portal, which identifies foreign assistance to Russia’s weapons programs.
“Only a quarter of the 140 components published today are manufactured by Russian enterprises,” GUR stated.
Almost half – 63 – were manufactured by American firms, GUR explained. The Iskanders also contained components from Switzerland, Belarus, Germany, Taiwan and China.
“In one of the most important components of the missile guidance system — the flight information processing unit obtained from the laser gyroscope — only 5 out of 43 components are manufactured in the Russian Federation,” GUR added.
A U.S. defense official said the most concerning shortfall involves Patriot missile interceptors, which can shoot down Russia’s high-speed ballistic missiles.
A U.S. defense official said the most concerning shortfall involves Patriot missile interceptors, which can shoot down Russia’s high-speed ballistic missiles.
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