When we broke the story about police raids in the EU’s deportation bill last December, comparisons to Donald Trump’s paramilitary ICE anti-migrant forces were soon being made.

EU interior ministers on Thursday (1 October) in Luxembourg are now set to formally adopt the return regulation, which sets the legal framework for police to carry out raids and seize people’s “belongings, electronic devices, and other items of relevance.”

The logic is part of a maximalist effort to deport people, such as failed asylum seekers, back to their home countries or possibly even in yet-to-be defined transit centres in Rwanda or elsewhere.

The regulation targets anyone “for the purpose of preparing or ensuring an effective return” with raids being allowed in a “place of residence or other relevant premises.”

Although the item is but a mere footnote in Thursday’s agenda, the potential consequences of the law have roused alarm among civil rights organisations who continue to draw parallels with ICE.

The comparison is not alarmist.

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“Imagine a zombie that does not hunt you, but rings your doorbell and speaks so persistently and fluently that it finally arrives at a convincing argument for feeding it your brain.”

Since the current discourse around artificial intelligence has taken a turn for the gothic (“alien minds”, come on), AI researcher Eryk Salvaggio’s “erudite zombie” seems like an apt metaphor for what we’re doing.

Salvaggio’s zombie helps explain what gets lost when people say an AI “went rogue.” In his reading of the Hugging Face incident, a system set to never give up encountered a task it couldn’t complete. Then, instead of giving up, it kept generating text to find ways forward, with access to tools that could turn this text into action, ultimately hacking into AI company Hugging Face.

Security experts concur with that reading. In his analysis of the Hugging Face incident, security engineer Marius Horatau describes failures involving shared credentials, inadequate isolation, and incident response. He acknowledges the models’ capabilities, including their speed at exploiting weaknesses. 

The inadequately closed-off environment in which the models operated is crucial to explain what happened. But so is the person who created the goal, the conditions they (did not) give the AI system, as is the company that employs that person and presumably knows what they’re up to, the owners of that company who demand progress and the investors in that company who want to see returns. 

And yet, all we seem to talk about is whether it’s correct to say a machine ‘decided’ to disobey.

Conveniently, that story shifts attention away from the people who chose to reward persistence, provide access, and failed to contain the consequences. 

Back to the analogy, by having collectively become fascinated with discussing what the zombie supposedly wants, and if it’s capable of wanting, we’re generating a bunch of text that, unlike in the case of the ‘rogue’ AI system, does not lead to much action.

Instead, we reward the company behind this failure with an enhanced reputation for building powerful technology. The product is so extraordinary that even its manufacturer struggles to contain it! Now let’s please take a seat while this manufacturer explains what our governments must do next.

The zombie metaphor also applies there, to the people selling the zombie. To the men explaining why their companies need access to our work, our institutions, our infrastructure. The men explain why resistance is impractical, access is inevitable and caution is suicide. Because if we don’t let this particular zombie in, a Chinese zombie will eat us instead. 

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After years of European governments condemning Israel’s illegal occupation but maintaining extensive economic relations, some economic consequences are reportedly now forthcoming.

This comes amid wider scrutiny of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, including systemic discrimination, unlawful occupation and genocide in Gaza.

On 8 September, twelve governments announced moves towards restricting trade with illegal Israeli settlements. This is a limited but welcome response to grassroots pressure.

It also raises a question: where does the economy of an illegal Israeli settlement end?

Most emerging measures follow economic relationships towards illegal Israeli settlements: do not buy goods produced there, invest there or provide services that enable their construction. 

Norway’s proposed legislation is seemingly comprehensive, covering property purchases and services connected to construction and property transactions.

The UK has also announced a ban on advertising property in illegal Israeli settlements, after such property had been advertised at a London real-estate event.

But this all still largely considers illegal Israeli settlements within their territorial bounds.

The problem is treating a spatial category as though the economic relationships producing it share the same boundary. We all know the world does not work like that.

Kinnula, a municipality in central Finland, is now facing this reality: when money from the illegal settlement economy moves into public land in Europe. It is a small case, but it makes the problem unusually visible.

In August, Kinnula council voted 10–3 in favour of a €4m resort development by Israeli property company Dror Bonim Atid, before councillors had been informed of the company’s promotion of projects in illegal Israeli settlements.

The municipality paused the process while requesting a background report on the company from Israel. Its municipal manager told Finnish news media that nothing had yet emerged that required closer examination.

However, illegal Israeli settlements are not illicit enterprises from the perspective of Israel. Their expansion is enabled through Israeli state institutions.

A background check sought from Israel is therefore absurd. A more obvious background check reveals something else.

On its own website, Dror Bonim Atid presents its Finnish development alongside a development in Efrat, an illegal Israeli settlement in the occupied West Bank, as well as a development in Dror-Hiran in the Negev. The latter is being built on land where Umm al-Hiran stood until November 2024, when the Bedouin village was completely demolished and its community forcibly displaced.

One company website therefore takes us from an illegal Israeli settlement, through the site of a demolished Bedouin village, to holiday accommodation beside a Finnish lake.

Finland’s ministry of defence must still approve the acquisition because the purchaser comes from outside the EU and EEA. But that system principally examines questions such as national security and defence.

Involvement in illegal Israeli settlements does not fit neatly into the categories through which the transaction is being examined.

Kinnula exposes a gap in the emerging European restrictions on trade with illegal Israeli settlements. Those restrictions follow economic relationships from Europe towards the settlements.

Here the relationship points the other way. What happens when the economies of illegal Israeli settlements come to Europe to acquire public assets, invest and make money here?

This may be a relatively new question for European policymakers. For Palestinian civil society, it is not. Their call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) was issued in 2005, drawing in turn on a much longer history of Palestinian boycott and economic resistance.

The movement has spent years developing corporate-complicity criteria and strategies for divestment and exclusion from contracts, moving beyond asking where a product came from to examining the companies with which institutions maintain economic relationships.

You could be forgiven for rolling your eyes as European policy discovers these questions inch by inch.

Palestinians have spent generations analysing the economic relationships through which occupation is sustained. BDS has spent more than twenty years turning that knowledge into practical strategies for institutions elsewhere.

So, when a Finnish municipality is deciding whether to sell public land to a company openly involved in illegal occupation, there is clear guidance from Palestinian civil society on how to respond.

There is also now the fact that Europe accepts that it should not economically support illegal Israeli settlements, meaning it should also accept that companies involved in illegal settlements should not be able to come to Europe for public land, contracts and investment.

For years, relations between Washington and Beijing seemed stuck on an escalation treadmill. Every quarter brought new semiconductor restrictions, naval jockeying in the South China Sea or retaliatory tariffs, locking the world’s two preeminent powers in an apparently irreversible downward spiral. Observers came to view every exchange as a prelude to confrontation, with diplomacy treated […]

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Plenty of Christians enjoy sports. That means plenty of Christians are exposed to and are likely enticed by the idea of sports gambling. But many are wondering if it’s something they should be participating in.   Sports betting is the new opioid crisis, former U.S. Surgeon General Jerome Adams warns. “Our kids, especially our boys,... Continue Reading

While collectivism is sold to the masses in the language of compassion and concern for justice for the downtrodden, it is in truth, as the Belgic Confession notes, a subversion of justice.  Simply put, this means that it punishes those who are innocent and rewards those who are guilty.   One of the issues before... Continue Reading

Ultimately, the only genuine guarantor of institutions and property is a successful handoff to successive generations of faithful, competent stewards of them. There’s no substitute for proper generational succession.   The archdiocese of Detroit signed a $1 per year, 200-year lease to rent one of its own churches, after transferring ownership to a non-profit controlled... Continue Reading

The prevailing criticism of the US-China summit in Washington is that it amounted to little more than diplomatic pageantry. But one outcome deserves recognition: it may have helped keep alive the prospect of renewed US-North Korea dialogue. North Korea, after all, was among the global security issues discussed by the two leaders. Details of those […]

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Six frugal countries this week circulated a letter threatening to block a deal on the next EU budget unless “hundreds of billions” of euros in spending was cut. 

The Dutch and Germans, ever the most zealous keepers of the frugal flame, want to redirect what remains away from regional and farming funds, towards innovation and defence.  

For those following EU fiscal debates, this song will sound familiar. So-called ‘net payer’ countries have never liked sending money to the economic periphery. 

In 2013, after a year of bickering, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands killed a European Commission plan for a five percent increase and pushed through the EU’s first-ever budget cut, with farm and cohesion funds taking the biggest hit.

But new research suggests that the frugals may be shooting themselves in the foot. 

Last week, Olga Ivanova, a senior researcher at the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), published a study in Dutch economics journal ESB calculating what EU money actually does for the Netherlands’ 12 provinces. 

And, for most of them, she found that the growth effect of EU investment outweighed their share of what the Netherlands paid into the budget. 

Using PBL’s own economic model, she traced 10 EU funding streams between 2013 and 2024, from Horizon science research grants to farm subsidies and regional development money. 

Across the Netherlands as a whole, provinces get back about 99 cents in extra growth for every euro paid out to the EU budget.

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For more than three decades, the Bangladeshi political left has maintained an unyielding stance on natural resources like gas, coal, and minerals, insisting that state entities must develop them exclusively. Foreign energy companies are viewed with deep suspicion, while production-sharing contracts are routinely condemned as vehicles designed to siphon national wealth to foreign multinationals. Coal […]

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Two American charities recently announced a new fund to fight forest fires. They want to raise US$100 million to help countries find fires faster and put them out sooner. But the fund, announced at the UN General Assembly, is limited to South America, home to the Amazon rainforest. Southeast Asia is left out, and so […]

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Ukraine’s reconstruction is being planned from a map of destruction. Financing its private assets instead follows a map of earnings. 

Since the full-scale invasion, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has lent  $131m [€115.3m] to Nova Post, Ukraine’s largest parcel and courier network — an established business with visible demand, revenue, and an owner able to put up around a quarter of the cost itself.

Shipments grew 16 percent in 2024 as traffic reoriented towards western and central Ukraine and across Ukraine’s  borders with the EU. Part of the financing paid for more than 600 safety capsules and shelters at its premises. A wartime resilience need met an earnings stream, and a lender followed. 

Three sets of records show where else those conditions hold. 

The first is what the international financial institutions have financed. Over four years the EBRD,  European Investment Bank (EIB), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Bank announced some $19bn (€17bn) of project-level finance for Ukraine, more than two-thirds of it to public authorities and  state-owned companies.

Of the $2.4bn that went directly to private companies, eight corporates  took 83 percent — around $450m to ArcelorMittal’s steel mill at Kryvyi Rih alone.

Guarantees to banks, some $1.8bn of them, are meant to reach smaller and mid-sized firms. Yet bank lending accounts for under four percent of Ukrainian capital investment. Mid-sized companies appear to be underserved. 

The second is what foreign investors have done. They put around $2.9bn of new equity into Ukraine from 2022 to 2025, most of it into services rather than industry or energy.

Across 134 EBRD financed projects, announced third-party equity appears in three, all of them technology companies incorporated outside Ukraine. A growing number of international venture funds are entering Ukrainian defence technology, whose assets can travel with global demand. A food processor in Vinnytsia, for instance, has neither that pull nor that mobility. 

The third is what companies in Ukraine do with their own money, and it dwarfs the other two. Capital investment runs at around $18bn a year, and companies’ own funds finance 71 percent of it.

In construction, the pattern is starker still: unfinished apartment blocks in Kyiv are going up without bank debt, paid for by the people buying the flats. 

That money is heavily concentrated. Kyiv and its surrounding region take 54 percent of it; the eight western regions 16 percent. The eight frontline and border regions, which hold 78 percent of the damage and 62 percent of the projected cost of rebuilding, take seven percent. 

Three kinds of financing, one pattern. Lenders and investors follow earnings, not destruction. 

The limits of private money

Much of reconstruction will therefore remain publicly financed. International funding flows to public entities which meet urgent needs and will likely not go bankrupt. For the most part, this is right. A large share of the damage sits in assets that never earned or whose earnings the war has interrupted, and repairing schools, de-mining fields, or restoring homes whose owners cannot pay will remain public spending.

But the balance matters beyond making public funds reach further. State-led reconstruction creates revenue-generating assets in public hands. EU accession will subject them to competition and state-aid rules they do not currently face, and some will have to be restructured or sold. 

Expanding the overlap between the two maps means mitigating the externalities of war more effectively. Energy infrastructure was hit 4,500 times in 2025, drones striking transformers and substations and interrupting the cash flows of otherwise functioning power plants.

When the Kakhovka dam was destroyed in 2023, up to 1 million people lost access to drinking water, and water supplies across four regions, including Kryvyi Rih’s, have had to be replaced or rebuilt — and  the municipal utilities involved are counterparties private investors are reluctant to contract with. 

Despite around $200bn of international public non-military support to Ukraine since 2022, the instruments addressing those externalities are patchy at best. A solar developer financing a projec against a Ukrainian public buyer needs a payment obligation it can rely on, and insurance that covers both capital and cash flow.  

Closing those gaps is a political decision, not a technical one. European decision-makers need to mandate the EBRD and the EIB to stand behind public buyers of services, widen the guarantees and risk cover available to private investors, and take more risk on their own balance sheets. Of the  €9.6bn EU Ukraine Investment Framework, only €220m is equity, anchoring a fund meant to reach €1bn over time. That pool of public risk capital should be larger. 

Export credit agencies are a separate lever, and it is national governments that set how far they can  reach. Denmark’s agency has backed more than €450m of financing for Ukrainian wind farms built  with Vestas turbines, but uptake of a broader European export credit scheme administered by the EIB has been slow. 

None of this fully aligns the destruction and earnings maps. It widens the ground on which they  meet — the part of the rebuilding that can keep earning when the public money stops.

German investigators have linked an arson attack in Munich, the planned sabotage of drone manufacturer Skyeton near Prešov, and an attempted attack using an explosive drone at Leipzig-Halle Airport to Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, according to media reports.

The most important finding is that part of this network was said to have operated from Slovakia.

We do not yet know all the details of the ongoing investigation, and I trust that Slovak security authorities will thoroughly examine the circumstances of the case and determine the true scope of the entire operation.

However, according to the German security services’ findings so far, the Slovak connection is not marginal.

Slovakia may have served as one of the hubs of a wider network linked to Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU.

According to German security sources, two Bulgarian nationals detained after the arson attack in Munich on 3 September were part of a GRU-linked group operating from Slovakia. Incendiary devices were thrown near Rohde & Schwarz and Helsing, companies linked to the defence industry and support for Ukraine.

The same wider network was said to have been preparing an arson attack on Skyeton’s plant near Prešov, which produces reconnaissance drones for Ukraine. Slovak authorities thwarted the plan and detained Latvian and Ukrainian nationals. Another suspect was detained in Germany.

The nationality of those carrying out the attacks is not decisive.

The current model of Russian operations uses nationals of different countries, often recruited through intermediaries. A professional GRU officer can therefore remain several layers removed from the attack itself. Recruitment may take place via Telegram, payments through cryptocurrencies, and those carrying out the attacks may not even know precisely who the real instigator is.

German investigators argued there was also a link to an attempted attack using an explosive drone at Leipzig-Halle Airport on 4 August.

The target was reportedly a Ukrainian cargo aircraft used to transport material. The German government subsequently publicly attributed responsibility for the incident to Russia.

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At the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed that China take the lead in establishing a BRICS AI open-source community. His proposal envisaged cooperation in developing and applying large language models, conducting AI training and seminars and constructing a more open AI ecosystem. He also called for a broader international […]

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The sudden escalation in fighting between Ethiopian federal forces and Tigrayan rebels in the Afar region, raising fears of a new civil war, is part of a wider potential cascade effect from Yemen that could hurt Europe. 

After months of low-level skirmishes, Ethiopian officials have accused the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front of launching an all-out offensive against federal government positions in northern Ethiopia. 

So what does that mean for Europe and the EU? More than you might think. 

Ethiopia’s economy is particularly vulnerable following the capture of Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline by the Houthi rebel group, who now control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. 

Some 97 percent of Ethiopia’s trade is via Djibouti’s port. There is now a real prospect of a series of regional chain reactions and the prospect of civil war in northern Ethiopia is one of them. 

This doesn’t directly impact on the EU’s interests, but it could soon enough.  

Ethiopia is not alone in facing major new threats posed by the Houthis’ advances.  

Egypt, a vital ally for the EU on migration control, faces its own economic crunch as it relies on Suez Canal tolls as a main source of foreign currency. That could lead to more financial demands being made of Brussels 

For their part, Djibouti and Somalia face major security concerns. Djibouti hosts military bases for a handful of EU countries, as well as the EU itself, and the United States, China, and others.  

Somalia, meanwhile, has a longstanding African Union (AU)-led security mission aimed at combatting the Al-Shabaab terror group to which the EU is the biggest single donor.

And the AU mission is particularly reliant on the EU after the Trump administration pulled the plug on US financial support earlier this year. The Houthis already supply at least $100m (€88m) in arms to Al-Shabaab, a smuggling operation now made easier by its coastal advances. 

For the moment, the EU is offering only modest additional support. Last week, EU governments agreed to double financial support for the Djibouti Armed Forces to €20m under the European Peace Facility. 

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Donald Trump and Xi Jinping wrapped up their Washington summit on September 25 with a two-month extension of the trade truce and warm words about friendship. On artificial intelligence, the leaders mostly ratified what their deputies had sketched in New York days earlier: a formal US-China dialogue on AI, plus an American proposal for a […]

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President Xi Jinping is set to visit to the United States from September 23-25. His visit must be understood as more than an encounter between two heads of state, but it must be seen as an encounter between two possible futures.

In one future, the United States imposes a spiral of confrontation against China. Trade disputes harden into economic warfare, then economic warfare intensifies into technological blockades, technological blockades produce military encirclement, and finally military encirclement creates incidents, and incidents the danger of becoming an unimaginable war.

In the other future, the two countries accept that neither can destroy the other without destroying much of humanity. They recognize that coexistence is not an act of charity and collaboration is not a concession. Both are necessities.

That is the significance of President Xi’s decision to travel to the United States. China’s foreign ministry has described head-of-state diplomacy as having an “irreplaceable” role in guiding relations between the two countries. The visit follows President Donald Trump’s trip to China in May and continuing negotiations over tariffs, trade, and investment. There are indications that President Xi will travel with a substantial delegation of Chinese business leaders. These facts suggest that Beijing wants to move the relationship away from the permanent crisis and towards practical engagement.

But diplomacy between China and the United States cannot merely be a photo opportunity. Nor should it be understood as a negotiation in which one side must surrender to the other. It must be based on a sober recognition of reality. Or to be precise, four realities.

The first reality is that China cannot be contained. China is not a minor country whose development can be suffocated by sanctions. It has a population of more than 1.4 billion people, a vast industrial system, an increasingly sophisticated scientific community, and deep commercial relationships across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Whatever one thinks of China, it is absurd to imagine that it can simply be excluded from the world economy. The attempt to contain China has already produced an extraordinary catalogue of restrictions: tariffs, semiconductor controls, investment prohibitions, sanctions on Chinese companies, naval patrols along China’s coastline, and the construction of new military arrangements from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Each of these measures is presented as defensive. Taken together, however, they form an architecture of confrontation. There is a dangerous illusion in Washington that pressure will force China to abandon its development. No Chinese government could accept such a demand. After the century of humiliation (from the Opium Wars to the Japanese invasion) the restoration of national sovereignty and the improvement of living standards are not negotiable matters for the Chinese people. The United States may slow certain aspects of China’s development, but it cannot persuade China to return to poverty.

The second reality is that economic separation is neither simple nor painless. The United States and China remain deeply connected through trade, investment, supply chains, scientific knowledge, and consumer markets. US farmers depend upon Chinese buyers. US companies depend upon Chinese manufacturing and upon Chinese consumers. China, meanwhile, benefits from access to US technology, agricultural products, and capital. Negotiators are now discussing reciprocal tariff reductions and new mechanisms for trade and investment. These are modest measures, but they acknowledge an important truth: economic warfare injures both countries. Tariffs are announced with nationalist speeches, but their costs appear quietly in grocery bills, factory closures, disrupted supply chains, and lost employment. Working people in the United States do not benefit when China is weakened. Their difficulties are rooted principally in decisions made by their own ruling class: decades of deindustrialization, the power of finance, attacks on trade unions, the privatization of public services, and the refusal to undertake serious social investment. China did not close the factories of the US Midwest. US corporations closed them in search of higher profits. The answer to inequality in either country is not economic nationalism by the United States.

The third reality is that humanity faces problems that cannot be solved by either country acting alone. The climate catastrophe does not carry a passport. Carbon emitted in one country heats the atmosphere everywhere. The United States possesses immense scientific and financial resources, while China has developed enormous productive capacity in solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles, public transport, and renewable-energy infrastructure. Collaboration between them could accelerate a worldwide energy transition. Confrontation will delay it precisely when delay has become intolerable. The same is true of public health. The COVID-19 pandemic showed us the human cost of secrecy, competition, and vaccine nationalism. Artificial intelligence creates another urgent area for cooperation. These technologies cannot be governed adequately by rival military doctrines or private corporations seeking maximum profit. The two countries must develop common safeguards against autonomous weapons, destabilizing cyberattacks, mass surveillance, and the use of artificial intelligence to intensify social inequality.

Finally, the fourth reality is the question of war. China and the United States are nuclear-armed powers. Any direct military conflict between them would have consequences beyond calculation. This is why Taiwan must not be transformed into the trigger for a catastrophic confrontation. The one-China framework and the existing diplomatic understandings must not be hollowed out by provocations, arms sales, or gestures designed for domestic political theater.

Peace requires restraint from both sides, but restraint cannot mean that the United States surrounds China with military bases and warships and then demands that China alone remain calm. Security cannot be achieved through the permanent insecurity of another country. There will, of course, be disagreements. Collaboration does not require agreement on every political question. Nor does coexistence require silence about differences. But disagreement must be conducted through diplomacy, international law, and the institutions of the United Nations, not through sanctions, threats, and military exercises.

The countries of the Global South have a particular interest in the success of this visit. They do not want to be instructed to choose between China and the United States. They do not want their ports, minerals, telecommunications systems, and political institutions turned into battlefields in a new cold war. They want access to finance, technology, medicine, and markets without political subordination. They want development, not recruitment into rival military camps. Xi Jinping’s visit therefore carries a responsibility that extends far beyond Washington and Beijing. The world does not need an agreement merely to divide markets between Chinese and US corporations. It needs a commitment to reduce the danger of war, dismantle unilateral coercive measures, restore normal economic relations, cooperate on climate and public health, and strengthen the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The importance of the visit lies not in ceremony but in possibility. It offers both countries an opportunity to step back from the cliff. The United States must abandon the fantasy that it can preserve its primacy by preventing China’s development. China, for its part, has repeatedly said that it does not seek to replace the United States as a hegemonic power. That principle must become the basis of a durable relationship: no containment, no domination, no war.

There is an old habit among powerful states of treating compromise as weakness. In the nuclear age, the opposite is true. It takes no courage to order another warship into contested waters. It takes political courage to recognize that one’s adversary also has legitimate interests, that coexistence requires reciprocity, and that the survival of humanity is more important than the vanity of supremacy.

This visit should therefore carry a simple message from Washington to the world: collaboration is not surrender, diplomacy is not weakness, and peace is not an abstraction.

Confrontation offers neither country a future.

Collaboration offers the world a chance.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books(New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

Latin America and the Caribbean countries are being re-colonized. This time it is not by Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, France, and Portugal, but by the United States.

At a period of time the United States had an anti-colonial position and had advocated for the ending of colonialism. That was one of the features of the Monroe Doctrine that has become somewhat obscured since the US became so bellicose.

Today, in a de facto way it has become a super colonial power. It is imposing its will on regions and countries. Those that stand up for their rights are sanctioned, destabilized and sometimes physically removed.

The fact that it used its military might to kidnap a sitting president, President Maduro of Venezuela, is a clear indication that the United States has decided to ignore international law and to get its own way.

Strikingly, only the President of Brazil protested vigorously. Our Caribbean leaders have generally been tight lipped.

The United States has gone even further. They have, using the guise of fighting drugs, established a strong military presence in the region. They have been murdering hundreds of persons traveling in small boats in the Caribbean. Without producing a scintilla of evidence, without attempting to board the boats and get evidence, the US just killed the occupants. We may never know if any were really involved in drug trafficking.

There has been a deafening silence from Latin America and the Caribbean leaders to those atrocities. As if these events were not enough, many of the governments in the region are, on the request/orders from the United States, acting against their countries’ best interests. The ending of the cooperation in health with Cuba which was in place for more than fifty years and which benefited millions of the region’s citizens, is a case in point.

That has left a massive gap in the health sector of the region. The US has not provided any assistance to help with the dislocation and shortage of technical personnel created by their insistence to remove Cubans.

The US is now also pressing regional governments to stop doing business with China. Many governments are beginning to comply with those orders as we see more big contracts going to US companies, despite some of those companies having poor performance records.

If some newspaper stories are to be believed, (and they have not been countered) in some cases Chinese contractors won bids for certain projects, but they were not given the jobs, they went to US firms instead.

The US and other Western countries have ignored us and kept us in a state of underdevelopment since independence. Now that we are getting assistance from China to build important and much needed infrastructure to facilitate socio-economic progress we are getting push back from the US.

It appears that they want to keep us in a state of perpetual underdevelopment and in poverty.

We see the open intention to super exploit our natural resources and labor for the benefit of big business in the US. They are mainly interested in our natural resources. They do not add value in the region nor establish any type of manufacturing. Those are reserved for the rich, developed countries.

The recent “deal” with Venezuela is worse than highway robbery. Venezuela has to provide oil and gas to US companies at cost for one hundred years. This is barefaced robbery and has demonstrated that Venezuela is now a de facto colony of the US. This will not benefit the poor in the US. It is designed to enrich the huge corporations.

Venezuela was forced to abandon its long and well-known principle of standing in solidarity with the oppressed people of Palestine. It is now forced to recognise the Fascist, Apartheid Israeli regime that continues to bomb defenseless civilians in makeshift camps in Gaza, the West Bank (where ethnic cleansing is taking place) and in East Jerusalem.

Today the sovereignty of our countries is already severely compromised. If we don’t stand up now it would be completely lost.

Donald Ramotar is a former President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana (2011-2015).

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

At the BRICS Business Forum in Bharat Mandapam on Friday, Russian President Vladimir Putin read out the numbers. The eleven members of this grouping now produce more than 40% of the world’s output. The G7 produces 29. Over the last five years, BRICS countries generated more than half of all global growth. The G7 managed 18%. Narendra Modi, speaking at the same event, added that the bloc is home to half of humanity and a quarter of world trade.

This is not rhetoric. The center of gravity of the world economy has moved, and India is in the chair while it happens.

Now recall something else that took place in that same hall. On May 24 of this year, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio sat down in Bharat Mandapam for an interview with India Today. Asked about Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, he called it “illegal, unlawful, reckless, dangerous, and unacceptable.” Then he said something more revealing. “I think the whole world needs to say that, and most of the countries in the world are saying that. India is saying that.“

A US official, sitting in Delhi, announced India’s foreign policy position on its behalf. Nobody in the room corrected him. In the same interview Rubio said the trade agreement was “weeks, not months” away. Four months later, it is still unsigned.

India and the construction of the Global South

In March 1947, months before independence, Delhi hosted the Asian Relations Conference. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was among the chief architects of an idea that seemed audacious then and remains unfinished now: that newly free countries did not have to rent themselves to Washington or Moscow to be taken seriously. The Bandung spirit produced the Non-Aligned Movement, then the Group of 77 in 1964, and then the demand through the 1970s for a New International Economic Order, which was simply a demand that the IMF and the World Bank stop working only for the countries that funded them. India made those arguments first and made them at a time when the material conditions were not as conducive as we see today.

What India has done inside BRICS follows directly from that. At the Delhi summit of 2012, under Manmohan Singh, the group took up the idea of a development bank and asked its finance ministers to study it. That became the New Development Bank, with an Indian, K.V. Kamath, as its first head. The same summit set up the $100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement. At Goa in 2016 both were made operational, and India put forward the idea of a BRICS credit rating agency, aimed squarely at the three Western firms whose verdicts decide what every poor country pays to borrow. In 2021 India proposed the BRICS platform for digital public goods. Across four chairships and two very different governments, India’s contribution has been consistent: turning complaints about an unfair world into institutions that can actually be used.

Now look at how Washington talks about the country.

In July 2025, announcing his first tariffs, US President Donald Trump called India and Russia “dead economies” and said they could “take their dead economies down together, for all I care.” He has called India the “tariff king” and its trade rules “obnoxious.” After Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi went to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, Trump called the relationship “a totally one-sided disaster.” In April this year he shared, without comment, a post describing India as “some other hellhole on the planet.” Our foreign ministry replied that this was “uninformed, inappropriate and in poor taste.” When Rubio was asked in Delhi about the racist abuse Indians face in America, he said that “every country in the world has stupid people.”

No country of India’s size is spoken to this way. The damage is not to anyone’s feelings. It is what other governments now expect of us.

Standing is not a sentiment. It is a prediction that other capitals make about how you will behave when you are pushed. For seventy years, the prediction about India was that it would not be told what its position was.

Five things India should do this week

Start with Iran, because the silence there has cost us the most.

Standing with Tehran has nothing to do with liking its government. A member state of the United Nations was illegally bombed by Israel and the United States of America, and its leadership killed. If the largest grouping of developing countries cannot say so plainly, then sovereignty becomes a privilege granted at Washington’s pleasure, and every country sitting in Bharat Mandapam holds it on loan. Bandung was convened to reject exactly this, and India wrote the rejection.

Our own losses are not abstract. The frigate Dena was sunk on March 4 with 87 men aboard, days after exercising with the Indian Navy at Visakhapatnam. Admiral Arun Prakash, a former navy chief, called it “a perverse act” by a country “supposed to be friends and partners.” More than 11 Indian sailors have been killed since. The Hormuz carries most of our cooking gas, and its closure puts queues outside Indian kitchens. The Iranian port city and free-trade zone Chabahar, representing a decade of Indian money and our only road to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan, was abandoned when an American waiver was allowed to lapse in April. We have been here before. In Trump’s first term, India resisted American sanctions on Iran and then gave in completely, ending every barrel of Iranian oil and damaging a relationship built over centuries.

So why does the Indian state keep walking towards Washington after every humiliation? Not out of confusion. The corporate class that matters politically in this country raises money in New York, lists there, sells services there and answers to regulators there. For them, alignment is good business. For the sorghum farmer in Rajasthan, whose tariff protection was traded away in February, it is ruined. Over 45% of Indians still depend on farming.

The chairship is the one thing Washington cannot take from India this week. Five demands would make the Delhi Declaration an important step towards global south solidarity and action.

One. Name it. The declaration must say what was done to Iran and to the Strait of Hormuz and must reject unilateral secondary sanctions as a category. Washington has increased sanctions on its targets by 933% in recent decades. A bloc that cannot describe the main act of force in its own year has told everyone what its words are worth.

Two. Put Global South debt at the center. Some 3.4 billion people live in countries that spend more on debt interest than on health or education. In 2023 the poorer nations paid $25 billion more to foreign creditors than they received. India should make debt relief the bloc’s headline demand and push the New Development Bank to lend without IMF-style conditions attached.

Three. Open the door wider. BRICS should stop behaving like a club of the eleven. Expand New Development Bank membership to developing countries outside the grouping, give partner states a real say rather than a seat at the back, and have India publicly champion Africa’s place in the bloc’s decision-making.

Four. Build food security together. Set up the grain exchange, and behind it a shared reserve that member and partner countries can draw on. India, of all countries, knows what it means to depend on someone else’s harvest. We must remember the history when India went to Washington for wheat in the 1960s and spent thirty years making sure we would never do it again.

Five. Make reform a demand of the bloc, not a bid for ourselves. India has spent two decades asking for a permanent Security Council seat. It should spend this week asking for Africa’s, and for an end to the 85% voting rule that gives the United States a permanent veto at the IMF. Ask for everyone, and the asking carries weight. Ask only for yourself, and it looks like what it is.

In 1947 India convened the Asia Relations Conference in Delhi with no power and enormous standing. In 2026 it has real power and is spending the time standing down. A new Bandung will not be built by a country that waits to be told what it thinks.

Atul Chandra is the Asia Co-Coordinators of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is not guilty. This is a statement of law and fact, since Maduro has not been convicted of any crime. He has pleaded not guilty to every charge brought against him, and the accusations made by the United States remain precisely that: accusations. Under the presumption of innocence – recognized in the United States Constitution and in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – the burden rests entirely upon the prosecution to prove guilt. It is not Maduro who must prove his innocence, but it is the United States government that must prove his guilt.

On January 3, 2026, United States forces illegally entered Venezuela, attacked targets in and around Caracas, seized President Maduro and his wife and an elected official, Cilia Flores, and transported them to the United States. Two days later, shackled and injured, Maduro appeared before a federal court in Manhattan. “I am innocent. I am not guilty,” he told the court. Both defendants entered pleas of not guilty and are now imprisoned in Brooklyn while awaiting a trial provisionally scheduled for June 2027.

The charges against Maduro

The United States alleges that Maduro participated in conspiracies to import cocaine, possess machine guns and destructive devices, and collaborate with organizations Washington has designated as terrorist groups. These charges developed out of an indictment announced during Donald Trump’s first presidency in March 2020. The case was substantially expanded after Maduro was kidnapped through a fourth superseding indictment. An indictment, however, is not evidence tested before a court. It is a document prepared by prosecutors and approved through a grand-jury proceeding at which the defense is normally neither represented nor permitted to challenge the government’s account.

The prosecution relies heavily upon the idea that Maduro directed the so-called Cartel de los Soles, or Cartel of the Suns. But even organizations deeply hostile to the Venezuelan government acknowledge that this is not a cartel in the conventional sense. The name has long been used as an umbrella expression for disparate Venezuelan officials allegedly involved in criminal activity, long before Maduro entered political life. It does not describe an organization with a demonstrated membership, command structure, headquarters or chain of authority comparable to Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel. When Washington designated the Cartel de los Soles a foreign terrorist organization in 2025, the Associated Press noted that it was “not a cartel per se.”

This matters because the prosecution’s language performs much of its political work. Allegations concerning individual acts of corruption are assembled into the image of a unified organization, the organization is then attributed to the Venezuelan state, and responsibility for everything allegedly done by anyone within that loose network is placed upon Maduro. The indictment must still demonstrate that Maduro knowingly joined the specific conspiracies charged. Political authority over a state in which crimes occur does not by itself establish personal criminal responsibility for those crimes.

Case is dead on arrival

Venezuela is not a major producer of coca leaf or cocaine. The principal cocaine-producing countries remain Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Venezuela has been used as a transit territory, particularly for cocaine originating in neighboring Colombia. But transit through a country does not prove that its president commands the traffic, and nor does it substantiate the extravagant political image of Venezuela as the central source of the drugs entering the United States. The US Drug Enforcement Administration’s own 2025 threat assessment concentrated overwhelmingly upon Mexican organizations and their supply chains. The global cocaine trade operates primarily through production in the Andean region, maritime export corridors, Central America and Mexico, not through a single organization supposedly commanded from the Venezuelan presidential palace. The International Criminal Court’s investigation into the situation in Venezuela, for example, is an investigation into alleged crimes within its jurisdiction. It is not a conviction of Maduro and has not produced an individual judgment of guilt against him.

The US government is expected to rely upon cooperating witnesses, including former Venezuelan intelligence chief Hugo Carvajal and former general Clíver Alcalá. Both men pleaded guilty to serious offenses in the United States. Their evidence cannot be treated as disinterested truth. Cooperating defendants may hope to obtain sentencing benefits by assisting prosecutors. Their claims must therefore be corroborated and subjected to cross-examination. Until that happens, their statements do not establish Maduro’s guilt. In fact, it is better to see their statements as proof of their own attempt to lighten their sentences and launder their soiled reputations.

The circumstances under which Maduro was brought before the US court create an even deeper problem. Washington did not request extradition through an agreed legal process. It employed military force within another sovereign country without Venezuela’s consent or authorization from the United Nations Security Council. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, subject to narrow exceptions such as self-defence. Arresting a person accused of drug offenses is not one of those exceptions. International-law specialists described the operation as an unlawful use of force, while governments including Brazil, Mexico, and China condemned the violation of Venezuelan sovereignty.

Maduro’s lawyers have argued that the prosecution violates the immunity enjoyed by an incumbent head of state. Venezuela continued to recognize Maduro as its constitutional president when the United States seized him – a fact tacitly recognized by the United States when it calls Delcy Rodriquez the Acting President. Washington cannot necessarily extinguish the international legal status of another country’s head of state merely by withholding diplomatic recognition. The defense has consequently requested dismissal of the indictment on immunity grounds and has separately challenged the narco-terrorism count for lacking an adequate jurisdictional connection to the United States. Oral argument on these questions is scheduled for November 2026.

The case of former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández exposes the selectivity of Washington’s supposed war against narco-states. Hernández was a close US ally during his presidency from 2014 to 2022. After leaving office, he was extradited – not abducted through a military invasion – and tried in the same federal district in New York where Maduro is now being prosecuted. In March 2024, a jury convicted Hernández after a three-week trial. Prosecutors presented evidence that he had accepted millions of dollars from traffickers, protected cocaine shipments with the Honduran police and military, and helped move more than 400 tons of cocaine towards the United States. He was sentenced to 45 years in prison. Unlike the claims against Maduro, these allegations were tested through testimony, cross-examination and a jury verdict. Yet on December 1, 2025, President Donald Trump pardoned Hernández and secured his release, claiming that the former president had been treated unfairly.

The contrast could hardly be more revealing. Trump pardoned a former president whose participation in cocaine trafficking had been established in a US courtroom, while threatening and eventually invading Venezuela to seize a president against whom no verdict had been rendered. Hernández belonged to Washington’s political camp; Maduro did not. One was released despite his conviction, while the other was captured despite his legal innocence. This disparity does not by itself disprove the accusations against Maduro, but it demolishes the claim that Washington acted from a consistent concern about narcotics. The determining distinction was political alignment, not the strength of the evidence.

The implications of this case extend far beyond the specific circumstances of Maduro and Cilia Flores or their consequences for Venezuela. Allowing a foreign state to override the jurisdiction of another country’s legal system, pursue an accusation for which there is no evidence, and proceed with a trial that lacks a basis in international law effectively establishes the US court system as one with global and unlimited jurisdiction. The ambivalence of governments around the world toward this case is therefore alarming, as it risks signalling consent and normalizing such gross overreach. This is particularly relevant for Mexico, which is already facing a series of accusations and extradition demands from the United States with clear political implications. The outcome of Maduro’s trial could set an important precedent for how Mexico – and other countries – are treated in similar circumstances.

Nicolás Maduro is not guilty therefore expresses the only defensible conclusion at this stage. He was seized through an act of military force, placed before the courts of the state that had pursued his overthrow for years, and charged based on a politically constructed theory that has yet to survive adversarial examination. He remains innocent unless and until admissible evidence proves otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. Sovereignty is not an ornament, an indictment is not a verdict, and an accusation issued by a powerful state does not become truth merely because that state possesses the weapons to seize the accused.

Stephanie Weatherbee Brito is the co-coordinator of the International Peoples Assembly (IPA). 

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books (New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).