Taking a break from fighting Russians in the Kostiantynivka sector of the eastern Donetsk region, the commander of a Ukrainian uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) unit spoke with us about innovations in the use of these systems. One was the first deployment of a UGV specifically designed for amphibious operations to deliver supplies to frontline troops in areas impeded by water obstacles. Large areas of the front line are bisected by rivers and wetlands, and the country has many other small waterways and marsh areas. As we have frequently reported, the use of UGVs by both Ukraine and Russia has exploded as the ubiquity of aerial attack drones makes it far too dangerous for human battlefield movements.
In an exclusive interview with TWZ, the commander of the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade’s “Alter Ego” UGV unit, who goes by the call sign “Electric,” offered us unique insights into the challenges of developing amphibious UGVs and how they were deployed.
In the first of two parts, Electric talks about why Alter Ego developed amphibious UGVs – including modifying a Triton variant for this – and how the unit made them work. The second part features his insights into using heavy ‘bomber drones’ to drop UGVs behind enemy lines for kamikaze raids. In addition, a representative of Brave1, Ukraine’s weapons technology accelerator, spoke about developing these systems at scale.
Some of the questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.
Q: How did the need for amphibious UGVs for logistics operations first come up?
A: We had this idea for a long time, but recently one of the units of the Armed Forces asked for our help to solve this problem, so that the UGV could overcome water obstacles.
There was a crucial need for this kind of means at certain parts of the front, but the units that are located there didn’t have the capacity by themselves to solve this task. So our battalion was asked to solve this problem because we are one of the most experienced units in terms of UGVs.
A first-ever logistics mission on an amphibious UGV: the robot covered 40 kilometers across land and water.
Operators of the "Alter Ego" unit (93rd Brigade) deployed the robotic system across mixed terrain. Facing water obstacles, the UGV seamlessly switched to swimming mode to… pic.twitter.com/rH8waq04a4
Q: How long did it take to design and test the amphibious UGV, and what went into that process?
A: The whole process from development to battle deployment took less than three months.
Q: What did you have to do to make this work?
A: First of all, we looked at amphibious solutions that were on the market, not only in Ukraine, but in the world, and we took two separate approaches. One was taking one of the main UGVs that our unit is using on the ground, and we made it amphibious. And the other approach was that we took one of the solutions that was on the market that already had amphibious capabilities, and we solved several disadvantages that it had. And at the moment, we are using both.
Q: What did you have to do to make the UGV amphibious, and then what were some of the obstacles that had to be overcome to get this operational?
A: First of all, we have to explain that there are different solutions on the market that kind of work on the testing ground — like they can swim, they can drive on the ground, and in the vision of the manufacturer, they are working. But the fact is that these solutions are not ready for the reality on the front line, which is often very different from what is on the testing ground.
And the second point is that the unit has its own workshops where people work near the front line, and the experts, the engineers that work there, they have a very high level of competence to evaluate different solutions and select the one that has potential. And that’s what’s completely different between this unit and everyone else, like manufacturers and others who are working on these solutions, because they don’t understand what’s needed on the battlefield.
The Alter Ego unit’s uncrewed amphibious ground vehicle (UGV). (Brave1)
Q: So what did you have to change to make it work?
A: Regarding the amphibious one, basically the unit changed almost everything that that UGV had, starting from electronics, the software, the waterproofing, the communications – we basically changed everything. Regarding the one that we already used on the ground, we basically tried to retain what was allowing it to be an effective UGV on the ground, and we added waterproofing and specific mechanics, so that it can work in the water environment.
Q: You mentioned communications. What kind of communications did you add?
A: The communication means that was installed on the UGV by the manufacturer was not sufficient at all. Basically, it didn’t have enough quality for the battlefield situation. It was not working. But we already have our own communications that we were working on, and we have a lot of experience because we have been working for a long time in this UGV area. So we basically helped to install a sufficient level of communications on this UGV.
Q: So how does the amphibious UGV communicate with the controller? Does it use Starlink or some other satellite communications system for navigation?
A: This is satellite navigation, but not only. Satellite navigation is a part of this communication system.
Q: What are the other parts?
A: It’s better not to talk in detail about the other part of the communication system.
Triton amphibious UGV communications and camera systems. (Brave1)
Q: There were probably a lot of different missions that could have been used for this first amphibious UGV logistics delivery. Why was this particular mission chosen?
A: The Alter Ego unit has so much experience in terms of UGVs, and not just experience of using UGVs, but the experience of being the first in the world. We had one of the first evacuation missions, we had one of the first strike missions using UGVs, the paratrooper UGV, and now the amphibious UGV. So basically, we have the systems to make it work for the first time when nobody knows how to conduct this mission.
Q: No, I mean why did this particular mission get chosen to be the first one?
A: There are certain places on the front line where we have water obstacles that prevent logistics from being done by UGV. At the moment, UGVs are carrying hundreds of tons of logistics, probably the most compared to any other means on the front line, but before this, these water obstacles would prevent UGVs from providing logistics for those parts of the front, and that need can’t be fully satisfied by UAVs or other means. That’s why we did this mission with the amphibious UGV, and now our task here is to scale this technology and provide this logistics system for other similar parts of the front where there are water obstacles.
Kostiantynivka, Ukraine. (Google Earth)
Q: Tell me about where and when this mission took place and what it was like to watch it unfold.
A: So unfortunately, we can’t provide information about when and where this operation took place. But regarding how it went and what we felt, this was another big challenge, because this is something that wasn’t done before, and nobody thought this is real. So this was quite difficult, and to tell the truth, the mission didn’t succeed on the first try, actually, and it required a lot of effort in terms of planning, preparing, engineering, and basically it required 100% effort from everyone involved in that mission.
Q: How many times did it fail before, and what went wrong?
A: We had one failed attempt. The reason for failure was a certain technical problem. After that, we analyzed what went wrong, and we worked on solving those issues. Basically, it’s something that nobody had tried to do, it’s kind of hard to know what can go wrong before you actually try it. So the best way to find a solution like that is to try and then iterate on that attempt and make it better and better and better.
Also, I would like to add that although this was the first successful mission regarding an amphibious UGV, it’s not that there was no work on that before that. We were actively talking to and collecting the experience of everyone who was working on these kinds of missions before, and that was also a reason why this mission succeeded.
Q: How far did the amphibious UGV go for this mission?
A: So the UGV went 40 kilometers one way, and then it returned. So probably around 70 kilometers in total, and it carried food and other supplies.
Q: Did this UGV come under Russian fire on this mission?
A: Yes, and it survived.
Q: How does the UGV switch from water to land operations?
A: So the UGV has two separate control systems, one for water and one for land, and basically it switches to the one that is required at the moment. That’s how it can operate in both environments.
The Alter Ego unit’s uncrewed amphibious ground vehicle (UGV). (Brave1)
Q: Is that autonomous, or is that something that the controller at the base has to do as they watch the UGV on its mission?
A: At the moment, the operator fully controls the UGV manually. And basically, before, the operators of UGVs only knew how to move them on land, but now they also had to learn how to move them in the water. So not only was the technology itself developed, but we also had to prepare the operator and come up with tactics for this UGV.
Q: Did you use AI on this mission in any way, and if so, how?
A: We didn’t use AI.
Q: Have there been other missions using amphibious UGVs?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you say how many and what was delivered?
A: No.
Q: Is this designed only for logistics missions, or will it be used in the future for strike missions, either as a one-way attack system or as a platform for machine guns or other weapons?
A: We can use it in different ways in the future.
Q: Mud season is fast approaching, when much maneuvering becomes impossible or severely degraded because of how difficult it is to move in the thick, oozing slop. Will your amphibious UGVs work in the mud?
A: I think it can operate in the mud in the same way it operates in the water.
In the next segment of our interview, Electric talks about using bomber drones to deliver UGVs behind the lines, and a Brave1 representative talks about how the organization is working to develop these systems at scale for wider use.
Ukraine is now using a fence-like device designed to snag and cut the cables of fiberoptic drones, weapons that have confounded militaries throughout the world.
“What is remarkable is that Ukraine and Moldova, despite finding themselves in a very tense situation regarding their security, are extremely keen to move closer to the EU and have therefore already begun negotiations and opened the first cluster.”
These are the words of the deputy director of the European Council on foreign relations (ECFR), Vesela Cherneva, and they come just as the official negotiation process for the two countries’ accession to the European Union has begun.
With this, the EU embarked on a truly geopolitical enlargement – driven not only by the pursuit of shared values, a larger market, and stronger common institutions, but also by the need to safeguard the continent’s security in a shifting environment.
Ukraine: a battle-hardened nation’s journey from the post-Soviet world to the EU
According to Cherneva, the EU’s upcoming enlargement is the only way to institutionally anchor Ukraine within a serious and lasting framework, given that the US position has remained clear under both presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden: Nato enlargement to include Ukraine is not possible.
“Currently, EU membership is the only way to integrate Ukraine’s and Europe’s security systems. This is an entirely different discussion from negotiations on chapters, clusters, sanitary standards and other accession requirements. We are talking about security guarantees, but also about the transfer of military technologies from Ukraine to Europe and, more broadly, about how Ukraine – which currently possesses the strongest and most combat-capable army in Europe – can, while defending Europe, also become part of the European security debate,” Cherneva says.
Ognyan Minchev, political scientist, professor and executive director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies, an independent think-tank in Bulgaria, also believes that Ukraine’s importance is substantial and that the questions surrounding its integration are highly complex.
“Ukraine currently possesses the only genuinely combat-capable army on the European continent. Western European armies have very limited personnel numbers and, until recently, received extremely low levels of funding. The lack of real resources, including weapons, to address the challenges of military security makes Ukraine a more attractive partner,” he says.
Although many experts would point to Ukraine’s contribution to European security as the greatest benefit of its accession to the EU, the country can also contribute to development in other areas. There is undoubtedly great potential for development in the fields of agriculture and farming.
The country has a vast area of cultivated land and is among the world’s leading producers of a number of cereal crops such as wheat, maize, barley, rice, and others. It exports these products to third countries, and membership would increase the EU’s economic influence in these regions.
Ukraine’s accession could also lead to cooperation between different sectors and result in an increase in meat and dairy production as a consequence of increased cereal production.
Beyond agriculture, Ukraine’s pharmaceutical industry could offer the EU an opportunity to reduce its reliance on imports of generic medicines from China and various Asian countries. Thanks to its favourable climate, Ukraine also has great potential for various types of renewable energy.
Deposits of gallium, rutile, graphite, magnesium ores, lithium and other minerals vital to the green transition could contribute to European production and help the EU compete with China.
According to Minchev, integrating Ukraine represents a major challenge because it involves a large country that is institutionally weak, with high levels of corruption, poor economic organisation and significant shortcomings in the functioning of public life.
“Ukraine has been forced to transform itself into an effective fighting machine, but in other respects it remains a post-Soviet society with serious problems in the areas mentioned above. This makes its rapid integration into the EU extremely difficult,” Minchev says.
Moldova: a key piece in Europe’s security architecture continues to struggle under Russia’s shadow
“For Moldova, we can say that it is a small but significant element in the broader domino effect of Black Sea security, which is becoming an increasingly crucial aspect of overall European security. This is because the confrontation between the Kremlin regime and Europe is effectively unfolding along the line of a new Iron Curtain being formed across Ukraine and the Black Sea region,” Minchev says.
According to Cherneva, Moldova’s accession is also crucial precisely because the country is a buffer state, and Russia has demonstrated that it does not tolerate buffers.
“Russia seeks to conquer and control such buffer zones. If Moldova does not want to share the fate of Belarus or Georgia, it must take rapid steps towards European integration,” Cherneva says.
For years, Moldova has served as a testing ground for Russia’s hybrid warfare. As Western European countries are only now confronting the full scale of Russian hybrid attacks, Moldova has already spent years developing its own resilience and countermeasures.
The country brings to European security valuable expertise gained from combating Russian disinformation and resisting repeated attempts by the Kremlin to interfere in its domestic political processes.
Yet Moldova’s accession would have implications extending far beyond security. Although it possesses far less agricultural land than Ukraine, the country has the potential to make a meaningful contribution to the European agricultural sector. Moldova has been gradually integrating into the EU’s Single Market through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).
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Oleshky, a Ukrainian city occupied by Russian forces 9 kilometers from Kherson, is on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe. Since 2023, the city has been without electricity, gas, or drinking water. Now, Ukrainian teams are airlifting food supplies into the embattled area.
More rearmament talks are underway in Brussels as European politicians continue building an increasingly tense anti-Russian discourse. On Wednesday, September 30, defense ministers and industry representatives joined the Euronews Defense and Space Summit, focusing on the bloc’s growing defense expenditure and member cooperation.
The summit took place after weeks of allegations of hybrid attacks on EU members, which pushed the already tense rearmament narrative permeating the European political establishment up a couple more notches. It also followed, by only a couple of days, the Council of the EU’s announcement of the next phase of five European Defense Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs) – projects that “allow EU countries to work together on major defense initiatives that are too large or too complex for individual countries to develop on their own.”
While separate, the two events shared several points in common, starting with a focus on increasing coordination between EU countries to arm more efficiently – and spend the billions of euros planned for defense over the coming years. They also emphasized sections of the military sector to receive the most attention – including drones and military capacities in Eastern Europe.
This geographical focus goes beyond EU members, expanding to – at least – Ukraine and Moldova. Most EDPCIs – like the Drone and Counter-Drone European Resolve (DECODER) and the Eastern Flank Watch – list Ukraine as a partner. Ukrainian arms entrepreneurs were also present at the summit in Brussels, including leading figures from Fire Point, one of the country’s most prominent arms companies.
Very imminent investments into arms
While NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated in his summit intervention that there is “no imminent danger” to the alliance members’ territories, he and others did not hold back in offering anticipations of an unstable period.
Belgian Minister of Defense Theo Francken, for one, anticipated “more hybrid threat actions” and an overall “dark winter for Europe” – a scenario he seems to want to address by spending more on arms and cutting social services, as he has explicitly stated on numerous occasions.
“Europe has been very good in investing in soft power, in social security,” Francken said. “And it’s beautiful to have a pension system, to have social welfare systems when someone gets sick, when somebody loses his job – we have everything. But when there’s a war or there’s hybrid threats, we don’t have anything.”
Considering the significant amount of money European countries have already invested into armament, his assessment that “we don’t have anything” is inaccurate at best.
It also remains contested on a regular basis on the streets of many European cities, where trade unions, students, and peace movements continue to protest against austerity budgets that aim to provide for war.
Europe needs a policy that builds security with its neighbors
In addition to large-scale demonstrations against social security and labor cuts in France’s proposed 2027 budget and student strikes against conscription in Germany last week, mobilizations are expected to grow over the coming months – including an international youth strike in November.
“We reject the militarization of our societies and support the young people who are refusing it,” the Stop ReArm Europe coalition wrote on September 23. “Thousands of high school students and university students across Europe are rising up to refuse militarization and the return of conscription.”
“Nearly 20 million children in the EU – one in four – live at risk of poverty or social exclusion,” the group added. “Meanwhile, governments have committed to military spending that the EU’s own Defense Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, puts at €7 trillion by 2035.”
“The trillions earmarked for militarized security will leave us staring down the barrel of a gun and indebted to global financiers,” Stop ReArm wrote, calling for a solidarity- and care-based alternative. “This must go hand in hand with a non-aligned foreign policy that resolves conflicts through diplomacy, upholds international law and human rights, and builds common security for all: security with our neighbors, not against them.”
The Ukrainian army stays in control of front lines, but safety in cities deteriorates.
Kyiv was on fire again as Russian attacks on cities intensify.
Rubikon published stats on destroyed Ukrainian drones, decoys being the second most prominent.
Russia’s defence ministry will not let go of the Armata: it wants to turn it into an air-defence system, drawing ridicule.
Maps of the day: Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction; Orikhiv direction, Oleksandrivsk direction, Kupiansk direction.
Videos of the day: a burning Tu-95MS strategic bomber; a Ukrainian firefighter showed how they extinguished the Academy of Sciences building.
The Ukrainian army stays in control of front lines, but safety in cities deteriorates. The war has reached a stage in which two separate conflicts appear to be taking place simultaneously.
While Ukraine is currently losing the battle in the air and its cities are continually suffering missile and strikes by jet drones, the situation on battlefields is far better.
Last week, Denník N spent time in Ukraine with former chief of the general staff Daniel Zmeko. During the trip, reporters met commanding officers from several brigades and battalions operating from the Izium area to Zaporizhzhia, and all of them said they had the situation under control.
The officers spoke about the accuracy of Russian maps, which they said did not correspond to reality. In some places, Russian soldiers are as far as 20 km from the locations where, according to the Kremlin, they are supposed to be.
Northern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration: This is a specific section of the front where the Ukrainian army has been reporting its advances only very slowly, while Ukrainian analysts have remained silent so as not to disclose anything sensitive. Russian bloggers, by contrast, are depicting the situation more closely to reality.
Yet official Russian maps persist with utterly nonsensical lines. We do not know to what extent this is an effort to deceive domestic and foreign audiences, and to what extent they genuinely believe it in Moscow. It is worth looking at how the regime wants the situation to appear, and what it is really like.
The first map in the overview was produced by the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti and depicts the area around Lyman, on the northern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction, as of 29 September. Lyman is shown as occupied in the middle of the map. The map’s author also continues to insist that the Russian army had captured Sviatohirsk — at the tip of the red salient in the centre of the map — and that Russia controls the entire, now non-existent salient with the village of Novoselivka at its centre. Yet Russian outlets Rybar and Two Majors write that fighting is taking place on the Zherebets river around the villages of Terny — on the far right of the map — and Yampil.
The following map is much closer to reality. According to it, the front line roughly follows the Zherebets river, which corresponds to Rybar’s claims.
In the Lyman direction, in Donetsk region, Ukrainian defenders successfully repelled three attempts by the russian fascist invaders to advance near the settlements of Ridkodub, Novoselivka and Drobysheve.
Kupiansk direction: The city of Kupiansk is a similar case to Sviatohirsk. Putin declared it captured in August last year. And once the commander-in-chief had declared this, his news agency continued to draw the map as though it were true. Kupiansk is shown as occupied in its centre, but there are further inaccuracies.
For example, the Kremlin agency claims that the Ukrainian bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Oskil river south of the city no longer exists. Ukrainians do face major difficulties supplying it, and various analysts have repeatedly warned of an impending disaster, but the Russian map is nevertheless hopelessly inaccurate.
Also note the small town of Borova at the bottom centre. RIA Novosti also shows it as occupied, although this is not the case.
This time, we will compare the Russian agency’s data with a map by Ukrainian analysts at DeepStateUA, because they updated it on Tuesday to reflect a new advance by Ukrainian units north of Kupiansk — again in the centre of the map — near the village of Dvorichne. In recent weeks, they have succeeded in reducing the Russian bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil; the change since the end of August is marked in blue. Borova is again at the bottom centre, while below Kupiansk is the Ukrainian bridgehead that Russia claims does not exist.
Orikhiv: This is one of the places where Ukrainian officers said during reporters’ trip to Ukraine that Russian maps were particularly inaccurate.
The Russian map is again from RIA Novosti and again ignores reality along the entire length of this section of the front. Its main target is the city of Zaporizhzhia, with a population of three quarters of a million, in the centre left, while the small town of Orikhiv, at the bottom centre, is a defensive hub.
Putin’s news agency places soldiers roughly 12 km from the southern edge of Zaporizhzhia; in reality, they are around 24 km away. It shows Orikhiv as occupied and the Russian army advancing from the east towards the village of Novorozivka, north of Orikhiv.
The OSINT project Playfra covers this area in the greatest detail. Its map appears to depict a different war altogether. Everywhere, Russian positions are significantly shifted compared with those shown by RIA Novosti.
The differences have a simple explanation. On the western flank near Zaporizhzhia, the Kremlin agency simply ignores the successful counterattacks carried out by Ukrainians there this year. On the eastern flank, it uncritically accepts every claim by the Russian defence ministry and, with equal lack of scrutiny, considers captured every small village where a Russian soldier raised a flag during a suicidal mission, even several months ago. Although those soldiers have since been killed or captured, RIA Novosti acts as though they still control the village.
Playfra also offers a more detailed view of the current fighting around Orikhiv, drawing on analyses by Ukrainian analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets.
Orikhiv direction.
Factually, no changes. Clearings are conducted constantly, but the Russians also continue to infiltrate: the global situation doesn't change. The stalemate situation that I had reported some weeks ago, as well as the gray zone, remains both actual as of the… https://t.co/6rau9f7wcKpic.twitter.com/5uIK3K78Bm
Of course, Russians too occasionally notice that they are living in a parallel reality. Most recently, the influential Aleksandr Kharchenko wrote about it:
“Comparing our maps with Ukrainian ones can be shocking. The zones of control differ by dozens of kilometres,” he acknowledged, adding that both sides lie, although he focused specifically on false Russian reports.
He described Russian soldiers who are the first to break into a village as heroes. But, according to him, wars are not won through heroism, but through a functioning system.
“Errors in our maps and information arise because they rely on heroes. Everywhere a Russian soldier is sitting is considered our territory,” Kharchenko argued that this had to change because “our territory is only where a Russian soldier is sitting with food, water and ammunition. This is territory from which we can fight the enemy”.
Kyiv was on fire again as relentless Russian attacks on cities intensify. In the capital, Russians particularly targeted energy infrastructure. “Not a single day has passed since the summer without the enemy attacking energy infrastructure. But this is the first such massive and complex attack since the end of the previous heating season,” Ukrainian PM Serhiy Koretskyi told NV.
In addition to causing serious damage, the attacks on Kyiv and other cities killed at least five residents and injured another 14.
President Volodymyr Zelensky also said that, thanks to the delivery of new surface-to-air missiles, five Russian ballistic missiles had been shot down.
Since last night, emergency services and repair crews have been working to address the aftermath of the Russian strike. It was a difficult attack – nearly 190 attack drones, as well as ballistic missiles. And the main target was energy infrastructure in the capital and the Kyiv… pic.twitter.com/wUNWEUdpTL
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) September 30, 2026
Rubikon published stats on destroyed Ukrainian drones, decoys being the second most prominent. Ukraine’s response is continuing in parallel with the Russian offensive against cities. But the stats currently weigh against Ukraine.
While the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defence has fallen dramatically since the arrival of Russian jet drones, Russia has successfully shot down Ukrainian ones. For example, the recent large-scale drone raid on Moscow involved several hundred drones — and, according to some sources, more than 1,000 — but only 10 penetrated the airspace above the Russian capital.
In this context, the Russian Rubikon unit published interesting statistics. Although it operates at and near the front, its data for September show that, of 827 Ukrainian drones hit, as many as 247 were Maya-type drones — unmanned decoys intended to deceive Russian air defences. They look very similar to FP-1 attack drones but, unlike them, carry no warhead.
For context, the top two most frequently intercepted Ukrainian UAVs by Russian forces are both decoy drones — the “Maya.” This suggests that Ukraine’s deception strategy is working, as the Ukrainian Defense Forces have increasingly begun deploying decoy UAVs to mislead Russian… https://t.co/NKPvbzm38U
Russia’s defence ministry will not let go of the Armata: it wants to turn it into an air-defence system, drawing ridicule. Zvezda News is a media outlet directly controlled by the Russian defence ministry. On Monday evening, it published technical news on the long-forgotten T-14 Armata tank, which Russian propaganda had claimed would revolutionise tank warfare.
Today, it is beyond any doubt that the project is dead and new information confirms this, but its authors presumably intended to convey precisely the opposite.
“Rostec has upgraded the Russian T-14 Armata tank into a short-range air-defence system,” the report stated, citing military expert Oleg Shaladin.
The list of new features appears impressive at first glance. The new version of the Armata has received new electronic equipment; its 125 mm main gun is to be replaced by a 152 mm gun, allowing the tank to fire Kornet anti-tank missiles with a range of 10 km. The new Armata will also be able to use Krasnopol guided artillery shells, which are used by more modern howitzers, while the tank is also to gain the ability to operate as the aforementioned short-range air-defence system.
Further changes have already been made to the project, but even the brief list above makes it clear that the Armata is no longer intended to be a tank, but rather some kind of hybrid capable of fighting everything and nothing at the same time.
Among others, the Russian Telegram channel Military Informant commented on the report, openly mocking it. It said Rostec had mixed together “all the old tales from 10 years ago” in its list of changes, but that in practice “the tank never got beyond parades and training grounds, because it was created for an entirely different war, which ultimately never happened. It became conceptually obsolete from the outset, without even having had the chance to fight”.
Videos of the day
Russia has lost another Tu-95MS strategic bomber. This is the 12th confirmed loss of this type — the Oryx website has not yet updated its figures, so it records only 11. According to available information, the aircraft crashed shortly after taking off from a base in Amur region. Six crew members were reportedly killed, while one survived with injuries. Armed with cruise missiles, the aircraft was probably heading for Olenya air base, from which Russia attacks Ukraine.
A Russian Tu-95MS Bear heavy bomber crashed on takeoff in Amur this evening during a training flight.
Denník N wrote on Tuesday about the attack on the headquarters of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. A video has since emerged from the helmet camera of one of the firefighters involved in the rescue operation.
Helmet-cam footage of Ukrainian firefighters tackling the blaze at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in Kyiv on Monday after a Russian drone strike. pic.twitter.com/DqEcz3wPlK
By Tuesday (22 September), Russia had verifiably lost 24,138 pieces of heavy equipment, compared with 24,098 on Monday (14 September). Of these, 19,105 (19,065) were destroyed by Ukrainians, 1,000 (1,000) were damaged, 1,194 (1,194) were abandoned by their crews and 2,839 (2,839) were captured by the Ukrainian army. This includes 4,448 (4,447) tanks, of which 3,353 (3,352) were destroyed in combat.
Ukraine lost 12,175 (12,143) pieces of equipment, including 9,579 (9,551) destroyed, 702 (698) damaged, 695 (695) abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) captured. This includes 1,464 (1,462) tanks, of which 1,125 (1,120) were destroyed in combat.
Note: Neither side regularly reports its own deaths or equipment losses. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. In this overview, we use data from the Oryx project, which has compiled a list based exclusively on photographically documented equipment losses since the start of the war.
The United States has new powers to increase economic pressure on Russia, but their impact will depend on whether the Trump administration uses them consistently and makes clear what it wants Moscow and other governments to do, former US diplomat Daniel Fried told RFE/RL.
Le débat géopolitique semble clos. L'Ukraine doit entrer dans l'Union européenne dès la guerre terminée. En réalité, cette promesse inquiète toute la région et comporte des risques pour la cohésion du Vieux Continent. En Pologne, alors que les élites soutiennent une telle adhésion de longue date, de plus en plus de citoyens renâclent devant ses conséquences économiques et sociales à court terme, comme face à l'arrogance de Kiev sur les questions mémorielles.
Michal Dyjuk. – Manifestation d'agriculteurs et de chasseurs réclamant l'arrêt des importations agricoles depuis l'Ukraine décidées par l'Union européenne, Varsovie, 2024
« J'espère ne pas voir l'adhésion de l'Ukraine de mon vivant, et j'espère vivre longtemps. » Agriculteur à Pińczów, dans la voïvodie de Sainte-Croix, à quatre-vingts kilomètres au nord de Cracovie, M. Jerzy Płachta se tracasse. Sa femme, Renata, qui gère leur exploitation de céréales et de légumineuses, tempère : « Nous n'avons rien contre les Ukrainiens, qui s'adaptent bien. En 2022, nous avons proposé d'accueillir des réfugiés et nous avons donné de l'argent aux associations caritatives ou pour l'achat de drones. Nous les soutenons, mais leur pays est dangereux pour l'agriculture polonaise. »
Les blés sont déjà hauts et les premiers haricots rouges commencent à germer en cette fin mai dans les champs ouverts parsemés de petits bois de pins et de chênes noirs. Depuis l'entrée de leur pays dans l'Union européenne, en 2004, les Płachta vendent leurs produits à des groupes français implantés en Pologne : Auchan, Casino, Carrefour et surtout Leclerc, qui en importe également en France. M. Płachta raconte son parcours du combattant pour en arriver là : « Les entreprises françaises réclament un certificat IFS Food, une norme de sécurité et de qualité dont nous devons respecter toutes les exigences. Pour avoir les subventions européennes, il faut expliquer combien de fois on retourne la terre, nous conformer au type de semence, au rythme des semis, etc. Nous avons de plus en plus de choses à consigner dans des registres que les contrôleurs vérifient sur place chaque année. »
Jusqu'ici, le jeu en valait la chandelle, « mais, depuis la guerre en Ukraine, tous les prix ont baissé de moitié, souligne M. Płachta. Avec l'arrivée des produits ukrainiens, on a dû réduire nos coûts et le nombre de nos employés. Nous en avions dix en 2014… et plus que deux aujourd'hui. Dans le tiers des exploitations de notre région de Sainte-Croix, il y a des problèmes financiers. Beaucoup abandonnent. » En revenant vers son village, le paysan s'arrête devant le chantier de la maison que le couple fait construire pour l'un de ses enfants. Le confort de la bâtisse projetée démontre leur réussite. Il se lamente pourtant, car leur fils ne veut pas de cette vie à la campagne, préférant la ville, Cracovie.
Des coûts de production bien moins élevés
À quelques kilomètres de là, M. Marcin Biesaga a hérité de l'exploitation de ses parents, qui cultivaient tabac et tomates. En une vingtaine d'années, il est passé de 10 hectares à 200, ajoutant blé, céleri et pomme de terre à sa production. Son propos est plus radical : « La Pologne a trop donné pour l'Ukraine, aux dépens de notre économie. On importe beaucoup d'aliments ukrainiens non contrôlés, du colza ou du miel par exemple. » Lui aussi déplore l'effondrement des prix qui a suivi les exemptions de droits de douane pour les produits agricoles ukrainiens en 2022. En s'arrêtant devant un tas de tubercules, il nous explique que les intermédiaires lui achètent 0,75 euro le sac de quinze kilos… qu'il retrouve à 6 euros dans le commerce. Pour lui, « une adhésion rapide de l'Ukraine provoquerait une crise totale ».
Comme les Płachta, M. Biesaga a participé en mars 2023 au blocage du terminal de Złote Ziarno, où passe la seule voie de chemin de fer à écartement large du pays (1,52 mètre dans l'ex-URSS contre 1,435 dans le reste de l'Europe, hors Espagne, Finlande et Irlande). Cette ligne a permis d'acheminer les céréales ukrainiennes dans le cadre des « corridors de solidarité » improvisés par l'Union européenne au début de la guerre et des combats en mer Noire (1). Les grains devaient en théorie seulement « transiter » par l'Europe centrale, mais ils ont submergé les marchés régionaux. En urgence, la Pologne a interdit ces importations, suivie par la Roumanie, la Hongrie, la Slovaquie et la Bulgarie. Ancien président du Parti paysan, passé au parti Droit et justice (PiS, conservateur), M. Janusz Wojciechowski était à l'époque commissaire européen à l'agriculture. Il a géré la crise depuis Bruxelles. « C'était très difficile, nous confie-t-il. Mais la Commission a de facto légalisé l'embargo que la Pologne avait imposé en avril 2023 et qui était illégal, en autorisant cinq pays à interdire les produits ukrainiens sur leurs marchés. Il faut noter que Varsovie n'a jamais levé son embargo unilatéral, et la Commission n'a rien entrepris contre… »
À cinq kilomètres de la frontière ukrainienne, on sent l'air de la guerre. Cultivateur à Żniatyn, M. Mieczysław Sroda a perdu deux amis en 2022, tués par la chute d'un missile de défense aérienne dans le village voisin de Przewodów. Lui aussi a hérité de l'exploitation de son père, qu'il a agrandie en rachetant un sovkhoze (ferme d'État) pour produire blé, betteraves à sucre, colza et haricots. « La base serait que les Ukrainiens respectent les normes européennes ; ce n'est pas le cas aujourd'hui, assure M. Sroda en évoquant notamment l'usage de pesticides interdits. Mais, même s'ils se conformaient aux normes, ils sont trop concurrentiels, grâce à leurs sols de grande qualité [les fameuses terres noires ou tchernoziom] et à des conglomérats géants contrôlés par des étrangers. C'est d'ailleurs parce que des sociétés européennes y ont des intérêts qu'il a été difficile de lutter contre les importations déloyales. »
Maciek Nabrdalik. – Le dirigeant de l'Association des terres frontalières, qui fait un travail mémoriel sur les massacres perpétrés par les nationalistes ukrainiens dans les années 1940, 2023
« Contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait penser, l'agriculture ukrainienne est plus mécanisée qu'à l'Ouest. La taille des exploitations fait la différence et permet d'amortir le coût des machines ultra—modernes », complète M. Krzysztof Nykiel, président de l'Union nationale des cultivateurs de betteraves à sucre. « Si les prix restent à ce niveau, il y aura énormément de casse en Europe, s'alarme-t-il. Lorsque nous en parlons à Bruxelles avec les Français et d'autres, on s'inquiète d'être pris en étau par les accords passés également avec le Mercosur, l'Australie ou l'Inde, autant de pays qui cultivent une canne à sucre très bon marché. »
L'Ukraine est le premier pays agricole du continent après la Russie, avec 32,9 millions d'hectares de terres arables particulièrement riches en humus, soit le double de la France (16,9) et le triple de la Pologne (11,2) (2). Elle pourrait prétendre à une portion considérable du budget de la politique agricole commune (PAC). En 2021, l'Ukraine a produit 85 millions de tonnes de céréales ; la France, 53 ; et la Pologne, 35. En outre, plus de la moitié de la surface agricole utile (57 %) est gérée par des entreprises de plus de 1 000 hectares, tandis que la moyenne des exploitations est de 11 hectares en Pologne. Les conglomérats sont particulièrement imposants dans le grain et la betterave sucrière, avec une moyenne de 23 700 hectares par exploitation (1 763 fois la moyenne européenne). Conséquence : des coûts de production bien moins élevés.
En 2023, les agriculteurs n'étaient pas les seuls à manifester leur mécontentement. Fin novembre, les transporteurs routiers polonais ont bloqué la frontière avec l'Ukraine, immobilisant des milliers de camions dans le sud-est du pays. Ils dénonçaient l'accord de libre circulation entre l'Ukraine et l'Union européenne, qui a supprimé à partir de juin 2022 le système de licences régulant jusqu'alors l'entrée des routiers ukrainiens. « Nous avions eu la promesse du gouvernement polonais qu'il ne serait pas reconduit », se souvient M. Waldemar Jaszczur, meneur des manifestations à l'époque. Mais, trois ans plus tard, le Parlement européen a voté pour une prolongation de l'accord. Le secteur s'enfonce dans la crise.
Au premier rang sur le continent, avec environ 20 % du marché évalué en tonnes-kilomètres, dont les deux tiers hors du pays (3), le transport routier polonais perd du terrain au profit des entreprises ukrainiennes. Celles-ci offrent des tarifs bien plus attractifs grâce à des salaires deux fois plus bas et à l'absence de certains coûts liés aux normes européennes. Cette concurrence se ressent particulièrement dans les activités dites de « cabotage », soit les livraisons à l'intérieur d'un pays dont la compagnie n'est pas originaire. Bien qu'en théorie interdit aux entreprises ukrainiennes, il se répand au détriment des entreprises polonaises, qui réalisaient 44 % du cabotage au sein de l'Union avant 2022.
Outre les difficultés dans le transport vers l'ouest, les camionneurs polonais voient leurs perspectives se boucher à l'est. La Russie, ancienne direction prioritaire pour M. Jaszczur, est désormais sous sanctions. Le commerce avec l'Ukraine leur échappe aussi. « Nous ne sommes plus rentables », lâche Mme Marzena Fik, qui travaille pour l'entreprise de son père. Établie à Zamość, à une cinquantaine de kilomètres de la frontière ukrainienne, la compagnie disposait en 2022 d'une flotte de dix camions livrant des fruits depuis les ports néerlandais vers Lviv, la ville principale de l'ouest de l'Ukraine. Aujourd'hui, il n'en reste plus que cinq. « Au début de la guerre, nos chauffeurs ne voulaient plus aller en Ukraine. Ils avaient peur », explique-t-elle. Ces semaines de flottement ont coïncidé avec une perte du marché. Les transporteurs polonais représentaient 38 % du trafic à la frontière en 2021, seulement 8 % en 2023, selon la douane polonaise.
Le premier bénéficiaire de fonds européens
À cette conjoncture délicate, il faut ajouter la hausse constante des salaires, des prix de l'énergie et la pénurie de main-d'œuvre, syndromes d'une économie de plus en plus comparable à celle de ses partenaires occidentaux. Conscient qu'il ne peut recruter qu'à l'étranger, M. Jaszczur réclame au gouvernement de « simplifier les demandes de visas ». Neuf de ses chauffeurs sur dix sont biélorusses. « Notre seule perspective : cesser notre activité d'ici à la fin de l'année », déplore de son côté Mme Fik. L'entreprise familiale subira le même sort que 1 500 autres du secteur depuis le début de 2025.
À ces préoccupations économiques et sociales s'ajoutent les querelles mémorielles, attisées par les réhabilitations par le président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky de nationalistes ayant collaboré avec l'Allemagne nazie durant la seconde guerre mondiale, massacrant Juifs et Polonais (4). Après la dernière provocation ukrainienne — le baptême d'une unité militaire en hommage à l'Armée insurrectionnelle ukrainienne (UPA), responsable de crimes de masse en Volhynie —, le président polonais Karol Nawrocki a retiré le 19 juin à M. Zelensky l'ordre de l'Aigle blanc — la plus haute distinction du pays, qui lui avait été attribuée en 2023. Une crise diplomatique d'une ampleur inédite s'ouvre entre les deux pays, en dépit des gestes d'apaisement du président ukrainien, qui a ouvert les archives sur les massacres de Volhynie et autorisé des exhumations.
Résultat, les Polonais, qui célébraient la proximité des deux langues, des deux peuples, et figuraient parmi les appuis les plus fervents à l'Ukraine, s'en éloignent. Une enquête d'opinion montre qu'entre février 2024 et novembre 2025 les opposants au soutien militaire à l'Ukraine sont passés de 26 % à 39 %, ceux qui y sont favorables n'étant plus que 44 %. Par ailleurs, 47 % pensent que « l'État polonais aide trop les réfugiés ukrainiens », et seulement 7 % « trop peu » (5). L'intégration de l'Ukraine à l'Union européenne ne recueillait plus que 50 % de soutien fin juillet 2026 (9 % des Polonais la souhaitant « dès que possible » et 41 % considérant que « rien ne presse »). Cette approbation était de 74 % en mai 2023 et de 90 % en mars 2022. Les opposants sont désormais 40 %, contre seulement 2 % après l'invasion russe de février 2022 (6).
Ce scepticisme ne cesse de grimper au fil des sondages, au point qu'à la droite du PiS, déjà très conservateur, émergent deux partis qui surfent sur ce mécontentement : Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość (Confédération liberté et indépendance, réunissant le Mouvement national et Nouvel Espoir) et Korona (Confédération de la Couronne polonaise). « On assiste à une montée du sentiment antiukrainien, nous assure par exemple M. Michał Wawer, vice-président du Mouvement national et député de Konfederacja. Je suis presque certain que l'idée d'une adhésion de l'Ukraine serait perçue comme une anticipation d'une immigration encore plus importante et plus problématique. L'autre souci, bien sûr, est la crainte que cela n'entraîne la Pologne et toute l'Europe dans une guerre contre la Russie. »
Maciek Nabrdalik. – Exposition d'affiches de graphistes ukrainiens et polonais en soutien à l'Ukraine, Wrocław, 2023
Signe d'un malaise grandissant, alors que les prochaines élections législatives auront lieu à l'automne 2027, tous les autres partis ont, en pratique, décliné notre invitation à s'exprimer sur le sujet. Même trouble du côté du vice-ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Marcin Bosacki, toujours ouvert à… différer le rendez-vous proposé. « L'Ukraine ne peut pas être admise dans l'Union européenne tant qu'elle ne rejette pas complètement le courant qu'elle suit aujourd'hui », écrivait le 4 juillet le chef du PiS, M. Jarosław Kaczyński, aux membres de son parti, en leur demandant d'utiliser tous les moyens disponibles pour « bloquer les actions du gouvernement [de M. Donald] Tusk visant à intégrer l'Ukraine à des conditions privilégiées ». Ce renversement prend des allures de paradoxe, alors que le gouvernement de Varsovie, dirigé à l'époque par le PiS, a encouragé l'Ukraine à déposer sa demande d'adhésion au début de la guerre. « La Pologne s'est souvent retrouvée isolée dans ses propositions successives visant à offrir explicitement une perspective d'adhésion à l'Ukraine, alors que l'Europe occidentale se montrait réticente », rappelle l'historien et politiste Łukasz Adamski. Le directeur du Centre Mieroszewski, consacré à l'étude des sociétés d'Europe centrale et orientale, ajoute : « Le courage avec lequel l'Ukraine défend sa souveraineté contribue à notre sécurité. Cependant, la pression exprimée par certains responsables ukrainiens en vue d'une adhésion au plus vite reste inacceptable pour l'opinion publique polonaise. Celle-ci se souvient des efforts considérables que la Pologne a dû déployer pour se conformer aux normes européennes. »
En 1990, le produit intérieur brut de la Pologne (en parité de pouvoir d'achat) représentait moins de la moitié de celui de l'Ukraine (7). En 2024, il représentait trois fois plus. Le « rattrapage » économique saute aux yeux, des gratte-ciel de Varsovie aux autoroutes flambant neuves qui sillonnent le pays. Il se voit jusque dans le moindre village aux maisons cossues et bien entretenues. Depuis son adhésion à l'Union européenne en 2004, la Pologne connaît la plus forte croissance des Vingt-Sept. C'est aussi le premier bénéficiaire net de fonds européens, avec 261 milliards d'euros perçus les vingt premières années, soit trois fois plus que sa contribution (8).
Le maire de Zamość, M. Rafał Zwolak, nous propose de grimper sur le beffroi de l'hôtel de ville pour visualiser tout cela. À 52 mètres au-dessus de la place du marché et ses façades colorées, il fait le tour du propriétaire : « Au début, notre ville de 57 000 habitants faisait partie des trois qui recevaient le plus de dons, jusqu'à 50 % de notre budget. Cela a permis de restaurer de nombreux bâtiments. Voyez l'Académie, la seconde plus vieille université de Pologne, puis la cathédrale, l'église franciscaine, les remparts… Grâce à ces restaurations, le tourisme a beaucoup progressé. Pour le zoo, par exemple, le nombre de visiteurs est passé de 20 000 personnes en 2004 à 250 000 aujourd'hui. »
Une fois la guerre terminée, le coût de la reconstruction de l'Ukraine dépasserait les 500 milliards d'euros, selon une évaluation internationale datant de février dernier (9). Dans une hypothétique Europe à trente-six, qui intégrerait tous les pays des Balkans, la Géorgie, la Moldavie et l'Ukraine, cette dernière capterait 41 % des fonds européens, selon une étude prospective (10).
Pour les plus optimistes, la réussite polonaise pourrait servir d'exemple à l'Ukraine tout en profitant à leur pays. « C'est le grand voisin de la Pologne avec la culture la plus proche, une zone d'extension naturelle pour nos activités », explique M. Jakub Karnowski, président-directeur général de KredoBank, une banque polonaise opérant sur le marché ukrainien. Il est aussi un ancien chef de cabinet de M. Leszek Balcerowicz, ministre des finances au sortir du communisme et principal artisan de la « thérapie de choc ».
Dans les couloirs en verre de la prestigieuse École des hautes études commerciales (SGH) de Varsovie, les étudiants ukrainiens portent tous la vyshyvanka, une broderie colorée et traditionnelle célébrée à la fin mai. Les discussions au tableau portent sur les défis macroéconomiques du pays. Diagrammes et recommandations à l'appui, l'Association étudiante pour la reconstruction de l'Ukraine présente son rapport. M. Karnowski encadre leurs travaux et suit leurs parcours. Selon lui, « la majorité de ces jeunes vit en Pologne depuis plusieurs années et restera ici ». Certains jeunes hommes ne sont pas retournés au pays depuis le début du conflit, pour éviter un enrôlement dans l'armée. C'est le cas de Danylo. « Je ne sais pas, ça dépendra de l'évolution politique », dit-il en hésitant quand on lui pose la question du retour.
En proie à des perspectives démographiques inquiétantes, l'Ukraine espère voir sa diaspora revenir. « Les deux pays se retrouveront en compétition pour la main-d'œuvre », prédit M. Karnowski. Car, de son côté, la Pologne fait face à des dynamiques similaires, avec une fécondité tombée à 1,03 enfant par femme. De nombreux chefs d'entreprise voient une occasion dans l'adhésion promise à l'Ukraine. « Nous pourrions en profiter, comme l'Allemagne en a profité avec nous », dit en souriant M. Dariusz Szymczycha, vice-président de la chambre de commerce polono-ukrainienne. Communiste durant toutes les années 1980, il a ensuite conseillé l'ex-président social-démocrate Aleksander Kwaśniewski et organisé le référendum sur l'adhésion à l'Union. « Nous préparons déjà la reconstruction. Nous pouvons nous placer dans les secteurs du BTP, de l'énergie, de la banque ou des produits agricoles transformés », énumère M. Szymczycha.
Consciente que la compétition sera féroce, la Pologne veut croire en ses arguments. « Depuis le début de la guerre, très peu de nouveaux acteurs sont apparus sur le marché ukrainien. Les gagnants seront ceux qui étaient déjà là, et c'est notre cas », avance M. Karnowski. « La seule acquisition financière majeure en temps de guerre vient d'une entreprise polonaise », note M. Szymczycha, en référence au rachat récent de la branche ukrainienne de MetLife par le géant des assurances PZU.
Outre l'aide humanitaire et des livraisons de matériel militaire, les liens économiques entre les deux pays se resserrent. La Pologne est le deuxième partenaire commercial de l'Ukraine et son premier marché d'exportation, selon la chambre de commerce polono-ukrainienne. Une partie du pétrole et du gaz transite notamment par les ports polonais. Certains travailleurs pourraient bénéficier de l'arrivée de l'Ukraine, reconnaît M. Bartosz Rydliński, professeur de science politique et responsable de la branche éducation de l'OPZZ, la principale confédération syndicale du pays. « Pour les autres travailleurs, la logique du capitalisme mondial demeure, complète-t-il. Mes compatriotes polonais ont offert une main-d'œuvre bien moins chère au Royaume-Uni, à la Suède ou à l'Irlande lorsque nous avons rejoint l'Union européenne. Les Ukrainiens feront de même. C'est pourquoi les syndicats polonais et européens doivent s'engager à l'avenir pour informer les travailleurs ukrainiens sur leurs droits. Il faut les syndiquer et leur expliquer que le dumping social ne profite à personne en définitive. »
Alors que M. Zelensky souhaite que son pays adhère à l'Union européenne dès 2027, le constat qu'il faudra du temps fait consensus… même chez les étudiants ukrainiens rencontrés à la SGH, qui estiment de concert que leur pays a d'abord besoin d'importantes réformes, notamment pour lutter contre la corruption et adopter les normes européennes. Ils regrettent les divisions récentes au sein de la Rada (le Parlement) qui ralentissent l'adoption des mesures attendues par la Commission européenne. « Nos négociations ont duré quatre ans », rappelle M. Szymczycha. Il espère que l'ouverture du premier chapitre de négociations le 15 juin (lire « La tentation du coupe-file »), après la levée du veto hongrois par le gouvernement de M. Péter Magyar, « donnera de l'air au camp réformateur à Kiev ».
Un climat de défiance grandit en Europe centrale
« L'Ukraine a les moyens de dominer le marché européen, notamment dans les céréales et la production animale », reconnaît M. Wojciechowski, qui plaide pour que les conglomérats ne puissent jamais toucher d'aides européennes. Mais l'ancien commissaire européen à l'agriculture souligne la tâche qui incombe aux pays de l'Union : « Pour nous préparer, nous devons muscler notre agriculture en suivant le modèle italien : des petites exploitations, souvent familiales, mais avec beaucoup de transformations locales, des agriculteurs très intégrés dans la chaîne de valeur, avec des labels, un investissement dans la qualité, du bio, etc. » Selon lui, la Commission de Bruxelles devrait promouvoir une telle approche, en mesure de résister au modèle agro-industriel ukrainien. Mais c'est là que le bât blesse. « Le prochain budget de la politique agricole commune prévoit de réduire la voilure de 30 %, déplore-t-il. Si c'est comme ça qu'on prépare l'avenir, on va perdre notre agriculture. »
Réunie fin juin à Gdańsk, la cinquième conférence sur la reconstruction de l'Ukraine accordait à son intégration à l'Union européenne une place centrale. Dans son discours d'ouverture, M. Tusk, le premier ministre polonais, voyait dans le rattachement de son voisin au camp occidental « une mission civilisationnelle ». À cette occasion, la Commission européenne a par ailleurs acté le versement de la première tranche du prêt de 90 milliards d'euros, destiné à boucler le budget lourdement déficitaire de l'État ukrainien en guerre.
Mais, derrière la centaine de contrats et de lettres d'intention signés — sous réserve que la guerre prenne fin —, la conférence illustrait le climat de défiance qui grandit en Europe centrale. Ni le président Zelensky ni son homologue polonais n'ont fait le déplacement. Plusieurs accords entre les entreprises publiques des deux pays ont été annulés à la dernière minute, malgré les appels à la désescalade venus des milieux d'affaires. Aucun apaisement n'apparaîtra à l'horizon sans un travail sérieux sur les défis que posent l'adhésion de l'Ukraine et le retour de ses démons ultranationalistes.
(6) « Komunikat z Badań n° 80 », sondage à propos de « l'opinion des Polonais sur l'aide internationale à l'Ukraine en guerre » publié par le Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (SBOS), Varsovie, 28 juillet 2026.
On avait d'abord cru à une brouille banale, du type de celles qui déchirent bien des familles à travers le monde. Comme souvent dans ces cas-là, on s'était dit qu'avec une petite incitation amicale une simple discussion permettrait de mettre les choses « à plat ». Et de repartir du bon pied. Mais derrière la fâcherie, une fracture. Non pas celle d'une famille : celle d'un pays.
Nanna Heitman. – Préparation d'un défilé de mode sous une affiche de propagande de l'armée russe, Moscou, 2023
Vladimir et Nikolaï étaient deux cousins complices. Que leurs évolutions de carrière respectives les aient séparés n'y avait longtemps rien changé. Le premier était « monté » à Moscou pour devenir consultant auprès de grandes sociétés étrangères ; le second était resté dans leur ville natale de Volgograd. Il dirigeait une petite entreprise individuelle fournissant des pièces de rechange aux industries locales.
Il y a vingt ans, on les avait accompagnés sur les traces du village d'origine de leur grand-mère, dans les environs de Saratov. Juché sur une colline, l'ancien kolkhoze où survivaient une dizaine d'habitants — sur les trois mille qu'avait comptés la localité dans les années 1980 — disparaissait sous la végétation. On y comptait encore un maire qui balayait chaque matin le « coin rouge », une ancienne salle des fêtes en parquet avec son estrade où les paysans faisaient autrefois du théâtre. Une fois tous les quinze jours, la camionnette d'un postier remontait la colline par le chemin de terre, pour y livrer le courrier et quelques produits de première nécessité. Les deux cousins avaient évoqué les souvenirs de leur enfance soviétique, comme on parlerait d'un pays perdu. Ce soir-là, ils avaient bu et beaucoup ri, à moins que ce ne soit l'inverse. Leur lien semblait indéfectible.
Au printemps 2026, toutefois, on comprend qu'une brouille les a éloignés, que nos discussions au téléphone ne permettent pas d'éclaircir. En pensant qu'il suffit parfois de l'intervention d'un proche pour apaiser les colères, on décide de leur rendre visite. C'est ainsi que nous atterrissons à Moscou, en dépit de la menace des missiles et drones ukrainiens.
« Cela nous renvoie à notre impuissance »
La ville ne ressemble pas à la capitale d'un pays mis à genoux par les sanctions occidentales. Alors qu'on la traversait auparavant tête baissée et bardé de courage, le promeneur peut désormais s'arrêter sur les trottoirs élargis sans gêner le passage, lever la tête, admirer la façade Art nouveau d'un bâtiment qu'il connaissait, sans l'avoir jamais vu. Entre 2015 et 2023, la municipalité a rénové 14 000 immeubles résidentiels et 380 bâtiments historiques (1). Les berges aménagées de la Moskova s'intègrent depuis 2022 dans un parcours piéton de quinze kilomètres reliant le quartier d'affaires Moscow City au Kremlin puis au parc Sokolniki, dans le nord-est de la ville.
Certes, quelques semaines plus tard, à la mi-juin, une attaque de drones ukrainiens fera exploser la raffinerie de Kapotnia, à une trentaine de kilomètres du centre de la capitale ; puis le ciblage à grande échelle des entrepôts et des infrastructures pétrolières du pays conduira à des pénuries locales de carburant et à des perturbations dans l'acheminement des marchandises dans presque toutes les régions à partir du mois de juillet. Mais, en ce jour de printemps, le rythme de la ville est plus apaisé que dans nos souvenirs d'avant la pandémie de Covid-19. Travaux de réaménagement, développement du métro… Ce calme tient aussi à l'effondrement du tourisme. Moins de 630 000 visiteurs étrangers se sont rendus en Russie au premier semestre 2025, soit trois fois moins qu'en 2019. Le nombre d'Allemands, d'Italiens, de Français a été respectivement divisé par sept, douze et vingt-deux… Autour du Kremlin, les grosses cylindrées chinoises Haval, Chery ou Tank ont remplacé les marques occidentales. Sur la place Rouge, on n'entend parler qu'en russe, même en tendant bien l'oreille.
Vladimir nous attend dans un parc de la capitale, à l'heure de promener son chien. Après les embrassades, on évite d'abord de se précipiter sur la question de la dispute, dont on pressent qu'elle est profonde. « Alors, comment vas-tu ? » Tout de suite, la guerre, dont on aurait pu oublier le fracas depuis notre arrivée, refait son apparition. Depuis l'annexion de la Crimée en 2014, le nombre des contrats de Vladimir avec les sociétés étrangères a baissé, avant de se tarir en 2022. Il tirait de sa position de pont entre la Russie et l'Occident des revenus confortables et un statut social envié. Les études de marché qu'il réalise désormais pour le compte de sociétés russes ne compensent pas le manque à gagner.
« Lorsque l'invasion a commencé, j'ai passé quelques heures en état de choc, littéralement. Je suis resté prostré à l'idée qu'on puisse se lancer dans une folie pareille. » Plusieurs années ont passé, mais Vladimir est resté marqué. Pendant que son chien observe les canards barboter, il poursuit : « Tu te souviens qu'on a une tante en Ukraine ? Je l'ai tout de suite appelée. J'étais dévasté… Elle aussi, évidemment. » Il reste en contact avec elle et lui téléphone deux fois par semaine. « Nous parlons de la vie quotidienne, des coupures d'eau et de chauffage, mais très peu de politique. C'est ma manière de la soutenir. »
On commence alors à deviner que la brouille n'est peut-être pas sans rapport avec la guerre. « Et Nikolaï, tu sais ce qu'il en dit de la guerre, lui ? — Nikolaï ? Il est pour ! Lui aussi, il a appelé notre tante, mais pour lui dire de rester calme, que tout rentrerait bientôt dans l'ordre. C'était il y a quatre ans ! » Vladimir avait alors appelé son « frère » pour manifester son désaccord, comme on le fait entre cousins proches. La dispute a été mémorable. « Notre tante ne veut plus lui parler, et je la comprends. »
Vladimir tente de se persuader que la lassitude gagne des couches de plus en plus larges de la société. Les motifs, aussi nombreux que contradictoires, qui justifient cette guerre — défendre les russophones du Donbass, empêcher l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN) d'avancer ou lutter contre le nazisme supposé du gouvernement ukrainien — ne convaincraient plus personne. Mais, au fond, il se sait isolé dans une société qui, majoritairement, accepte ce conflit sans le désirer. De la fatigue de la guerre, perceptible en effet dans les sondages, à la critique publique de sa poursuite, il y a un pas. Et plus personne, ou presque, ne souhaite le franchir. « Ceux qui comme moi étaient contre cette guerre se sont tus : pourquoi ressasser les mêmes plaintes ? Cela nous renvoie à notre impuissance. » Les deux enfants de Vladimir ont quitté le pays.
La gare de Paveliets, dans le sud-est de Moscou, est bondée en cette fin de journée du mois d'avril. Une colonne de jeunes appelés serpente entre les voyageurs, avant de s'aligner le long du quai, où le train couchettes pour Volgograd est déjà garé. Dans la cabine de quatre places, un couple de retraités occupe les banquettes du bas. Il ne faut pas échanger plus de trois phrases avec eux avant qu'ils évoquent leur fils, qui a combattu sur le front ukrainien entre 2022 et 2024. « Il est revenu traumatisé, avec des problèmes psychologiques, nous confie la femme. Quant à moi, je n'ai pas dormi pendant deux ans. » En veut-elle à son gouvernement ? « Non, qu'est-ce qu'il pouvait faire ? En Occident, vous ne connaissez qu'une chose de ce conflit : c'est Poutine l'agresseur », conclut-elle, d'un ton plus affligé qu'agressif.
Passé Tambov, le train traverse des paysages de steppes monotones qu'on aperçoit par intermittence entre les arbres qui bordent la voie ferrée. La désolation des villages frappe : isbas en bois effondrées, maisons aux carreaux cassés. Entre les deux recensements de 2010 et 2021, la population rurale a chuté de 15 % au bénéfice des métropoles régionales et de la capitale (2).
Après vingt heures quarante-trois minutes et mille kilomètres, le train ralentit à l'approche de la gare de Volgograd. Les historiens racontent que ce nœud de communication stratégique changea quinze fois de mains durant la bataille de Stalingrad, l'ancien nom de la ville, qu'elle reprend à l'approche des célébrations du 9-Mai. Par la fenêtre, on aperçoit le kourgane Mamaïev, colline où se dresse l'Appel de la Mère-Patrie. Construit entre 1959 et 1967, ce monument du réalisme socialiste de 85 mètres de haut, tout de béton et d'acier, est devenu le symbole de la ville. On retrouve cette sorte de déesse de la victoire tenant un glaive en l'air, regardant derrière son épaule, comme invitant à la suivre, sur les aimants ou les mugs vendus aux touristes.
La guerre d'aujourd'hui, qui se déroule à cinq cents kilomètres de là, demeure peu visible dans l'espace public. À l'exception d'une réclame pour l'armée sur la façade d'un bâtiment promettant à celui qui s'engagera pour le front 3 millions de roubles (environ 30 000 euros) à la signature du contrat et une solde mensuelle de 215 000 roubles (plus de 2 000 euros), aucune campagne d'ampleur n'insiste sur les besoins de recrutement. Contrairement aux villes de province ukrainiennes qu'on avait visitées en 2023 (3), on ne croise dans les rues ni militaires en permission ni mutilés. Le choc de la guerre semble amorti dans la masse démographique russe.
Alors qu'à Moscou le gros des travaux de rénovation est achevé, Volgograd vient de commencer sa mue. Les abords de la gare ainsi que la place centrale qui la jouxte (dite « des combattants tombés ») sont barrés de palissades. « On ne peut se garer nulle part », se plaint Nikolaï en prenant notre valise. Il a cousu sur sa veste un carré orange et noir, les couleurs du ruban de Saint-Georges, devenu un symbole national après l'annexion de la Crimée. « Il y avait un drapeau finlandais au départ, c'est une veste étrangère, explique-t-il en souriant. Mais j'ai préféré recouvrir avec ça. » Nikolaï exprime toutefois davantage un patriotisme conventionnel qu'un nationalisme militant. Il se tient spontanément du côté de l'armée de son pays, acceptant une guerre qu'il déplore tout en l'estimant inévitable. « Poutine n'avait plus le choix à cause de l'expansion continue de l'OTAN à nos frontières », explique-t-il. À ses yeux, il s'agit d'une « guerre civile » que les Occidentaux ont provoquée entre « “frères” russes et ukrainiens » pour affaiblir Moscou.
Avec sa femme, Katia, Nikolaï habite une maison individuelle dans un quartier périphérique de la ville, dans le nord de l'arrondissement Vorochilovski. En bifurquant depuis l'avenue, la voiture s'engage d'abord entre des tours d'habitation. Les espaces verts sont jonchés d'ordures et d'encombrants ; on y circule au pas sur des chemins défoncés, qui contrastent avec le supermarché flambant neuf où l'on s'arrête pour acheter quelques provisions. Plus loin, le lotissement de Nikolaï semble presque avoir surgi par erreur. Sur les rues non goudronnées, les roues du véhicule s'enfoncent dans des mares d'eau stagnante jusqu'aux jantes : le semi-remorque de graviers que lui et ses voisins ont fait venir en se cotisant n'a pas suffi… Depuis, Nikolaï et Katia attendent que la mairie réponde à la pétition que les habitants lui ont adressée pour qu'elle réalise des travaux.
Obliger des conscrits à signer des contrats d'engagement
Autour de la table, Katia fait défiler sur son iPhone dernier cri les photographies de ses vacances avec une amie à Dubaï. Avant la guerre, elle avait conservé quelques copines d'une enfance passée à Jitomir, en Ukraine soviétique, où son père, militaire de carrière, avait été muté dans les années 1980. Elle s'était promis d'y retourner, mais la guerre a rompu les liens. « J'ai essayé de ne pas aborder les questions qui fâchent, mais elles se sont mises tout de suite en colère, comme si on leur avait mis dans la tête que les Russes étaient des affreux, tous sans exception. » Le couple appartient à cette classe moyenne supérieure qui s'accommode d'un conflit qui lui semble lointain. Mais le restera-t-il longtemps ?
Leur fils Viktor achève son lycée technique. Ce cursus ne lui permet pas d'accéder à l'université, et donc de repousser son service militaire. A-t-il peur ? Oui, répond sans hésiter l'adolescent. Dans son établissement, des récits circulent au sujet d'intimidations qu'exercerait la hiérarchie « les armes à la main » pour obliger des conscrits à signer des contrats d'engagement. Sa mère s'inquiète de certaines dates de naissance sur les tombes de soldats au cimetière. « 18, 19, 20 ans, ce sont des enfants. » Parmi les soldats russes morts formellement identifiés par le site Mediazona (en partenariat avec le service russe de la BBC), la part des 18-20 ans atteint à peine 3 % (4). Mais ce chiffre, établi plusieurs mois après le décès des intéressés, pourrait être en réalité plus élevé. Avec l'enlisement du conflit et la crainte d'une nouvelle mobilisation forcée, les pressions pourraient s'être accentuées au cours des derniers mois.
En dépit du fossé qui sépare les deux cousins, la visite d'une amie commune leur impose d'échanger quelques messages. Nikolaï semble disposé à faire un pas. De retour à Moscou, on sonde son cousin. « Ce que Nikolaï a dit en 2022, la position qu'il a prise, il faut qu'il l'assume, tranche-t-il. Nos liens sont abîmés. » Car Vladimir est sans doute celui qui a le plus perdu. Sa thèse en sciences sociales, sa vie dans la capitale, ses voyages fréquents en Europe ou aux États-Unis, ses accès à certains cercles du pouvoir même, tout cela le plaçait en haut de la hiérarchie sociale. La guerre l'a privé de cette position. Nikolaï, lui, a vu sa situation économique continuer à s'améliorer en dépit du conflit. Il n'accable pas Vladimir de mots trop durs, mais lui attribue la responsabilité de la rupture et regrette que ce dernier se soit mis en marge du consensus patriotique que lui épouse.
On voulait tenter de contribuer à la réconciliation de deux cousins. On a trouvé un pays marqué par la guerre et des familles déchirées par les renversements qu'elle impose. Dans le domaine des valeurs comme dans celui des hiérarchies sociales.
« Il est désormais temps de faire avancer avec audace l'intégration de l'Ukraine à l'Union européenne grâce à des solutions innovantes constituant des étapes immédiates. » Le 21 mai dernier, le chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz proposait un statut intermédiaire pour l'Ukraine. En tant que « membre associé », elle pourrait participer de manière accélérée à toutes les institutions, mais sans avoir le droit de vote. Elle bénéficierait ainsi de la clause de défense mutuelle prévue à l'article 42 du traité de l'Union, en court-circuitant l'épineux processus d'adhésion prévu à l'article 49 du même traité. L'initiative de M. Merz rejoint les pressions de l'exécutif européen à Bruxelles. Ainsi la commissaire européenne chargée de l'élargissement, Mme Marta Kos, déclarait-elle le 17 mars qu'elle ouvrait tous les chapitres de la négociation de « manière informelle », avant même que les États se prononcent.
Inédit, un tel raccourci balaierait le débat sur les réformes jugées par beaucoup nécessaires avant tout nouvel élargissement, après les sept précédents qui ont fait passer l'Union de six à vingt-huit membres — vingt-sept depuis le retrait du Royaume-Uni en 2020. Le dispositif comprend normalement trois grandes étapes : la candidature, les négociations puis l'adhésion. Pour être candidat, il faut être un État situé en Europe (au sens géographique large, jusqu'en Transcaucasie), respecter et promouvoir les « valeurs européennes » et recueillir l'unanimité des membres. Aujourd'hui, neuf pays ont ce statut, dans l'ordre suivant : Turquie, Macédoine du Nord, Monténégro, Serbie, Albanie, Ukraine, Moldavie, Bosnie-Herzégovine et Géorgie. La candidature déposée par le Kosovo en 2022 n'a pas reçu l'approbation des Vingt-Sept, dont cinq pays ne le reconnaissent pas comme État indépendant. Le 29 août dernier, les Islandais ont rejeté par référendum la reprise des discussions avec l'Union, qui avaient été interrompues en 2013. Les Suisses ont refusé de rejoindre l'Union par une votation de 1992, ainsi que les Norvégiens à deux reprises, lors des référendums de 1972 et 1994.
Débutent ensuite les pourparlers, entamés par exemple par la Turquie dès 2005, mais officiellement au point mort depuis 2019. Avec l'Ukraine, le lancement formel des négociations a été possible fin 2023, lorsque le premier ministre hongrois a quitté la salle du Conseil européen afin de ne pas briser le consensus requis sans perdre la face. Mais jusqu'à sa défaite aux élections d'avril dernier, M. Viktor Orbán s'opposait à l'ouverture de discussions concrètes par « chapitres ». Son successeur, M. Péter Magyar, y a consenti en échange de l'engagement de l'Ukraine à rétablir les droits linguistiques et culturels de sa minorité hongroise. Le 15 juin dernier, les échanges ont commencé sur le premier groupe de chapitres : appareil judiciaire et droits fondamentaux, marchés publics, statistiques et contrôle financier. À cela s'ajoute, depuis le 14 juillet, celui concernant les relations extérieures. M. Magyar a toutefois déclaré vouloir prendre le temps nécessaire et ne pas autoriser les négociations sur tous les points en même temps.
La Commission mène les débats tout en informant le Conseil et le Parlement européens. On considère un chapitre « clos » lorsque le pays candidat a montré qu'il appliquait bien l'« acquis communautaire » ou que celui-ci serait mis en œuvre avant la date de l'adhésion. Des dispositions transitoires sont en général mises en œuvre par l'adoption de lois dans le pays concerné, encouragée par des subventions européennes suivant divers programmes que l'Union promeut pour les candidats. Plusieurs appréciations de la Commission suscitent des controverses. Par exemple quand celle-ci considère le système électoral ukrainien comme « équitable et libre » alors qu'aucune élection n'a pu avoir lieu depuis l'invasion russe en février 2022, ce qu'a récemment déploré le ministre de la défense démissionnaire Mykhaïlo Fedorov.
Une fois tous les chapitres clos, l'adhésion requiert encore l'approbation du Conseil (à l'unanimité des gouvernements) et du Parlement. Elle fait l'objet d'un traité qui doit être signé puis ratifié par le candidat et chacun des pays membres. En France, depuis 2005 (article 88-5 de la Constitution), le président peut choisir une ratification par référendum ou la convocation du Congrès, l'approbation du traité d'adhésion devant réunir dans ce cas une majorité de trois cinquièmes de l'Assemblée nationale et du Sénat réunis.
A Russian missile and drone strike killed at least three people, including a child, in Kyiv and the surrounding region, Ukrainian authorities reported.
Im Spiegel ist ein Artikel mit der Überschrift „Unter russischer Besatzung – In Oleschky essen sie Unkraut, um zu überleben“ erschienen, der durch seine Dreistigkeit hervorsticht. Die Geschichte des Artikels ist schnell erzählt: Der Spiegel berichtet über den Ort Aljoschkin, für den der Spiegel den ukrainischen Namen Oleschky benutzt, in dem die Menschen angeblich hungern […]
Im September gab es in deutschen Medien einige Schlagzeilen, die zeigen, wie sehr die Ukraine in den letzten Wochen geschwächt wurde. Im Spiegel erschien am 23. September beispielsweise unter der Überschrift „Schläge gegen Stahlwerke und Apothekenlager – Russlands neues Kriegsziel? Die Vernichtung der ukrainischen Wirtschaft“ ein recht guter Artikel, in dem der Leser erfuhr, dass […]
Is Ukraine becoming an “Eastern European Israel” for the EU? Sociologist and author Volodymyr Ishchenko joins Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra to discuss Ukraine’s eroding sovereignty, who profits from keeping the fighting going, and whether an off-ramp still exists to a war with Russia now costing Ukraine 27,000 casualties per month, according to Poland’s prime minister.
Europe is pushing record defense budgets and warning that Russia could test NATO within months. But this month Ukraine launched its largest drone attack yet on Moscow, Washington approved a $2.68 billion air defense sale, and the EU unblocked €6.6 billion in military aid. Is Europe readying to defend itself from a Russia with imperialist ambitions? Or preparing for a forever war, where profiteers abound and working-class Ukrainians do the fighting and dying at the direction of a state they’ve come to hate?
Ishchenko describes an emerging vision for Ukraine amongst Kyiv’s power brokers: a militarized, ethnonationalist frontier state serving as outsourced security for the European Union against Russia. Sound familiar?
“Maybe NATO at this point is not an alliance for security, but actually a source of insecurity in Europe.”
The Geran-4 appeared last May, according to the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR). Unlike the Geran-3, which largely used a modified Shahed-136 airframe, the new drone has one purpose-built for higher-speed flight because “the structural strength [of the older model] was insufficient for high-speed flights, and even less so for maneuvering under high G-loads,” GUR noted.
A Geran 4 attempting to be intercepted by a Ukrainian drone. (Via X) (GUR)
The Geran-4’s new airframe features a blended air intake and overall “improved aerodynamic efficiency, a reinforced structure, and a turbojet engine with increased thrust,” GUR stated. “The wings are now permanently integrated into the center wing section. To reduce air resistance, the number of technological hatches on the fuselage has been minimized.”
In an overnight attack across Ukraine that lasted until Monday, “Russia launched 165 drones overnight, 79 of them jet-powered, the Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 112, and hits were recorded at 14 locations.” You can see the aftermath of one of those attacks in the following video.
We’re under constant attackUnfortunately, just a few minutes ago, a jet-powered Shahed drone hit a residential building . #Odesa Burn in hell, ruzzianspic.twitter.com/EXTWM1yVIN
Recently,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) got its hands on one of these weapons. Its report offers the best view yet of what makes these drones so dangerous.
The Geran-4 is “a new, faster version of the attack drone that is proving harder for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept,” the report states. “We were given a rare opportunity to literally take this surviving drone apart and find out what makes it so much faster, more maneuverable, and more accurate.”
“The first part we uncover is the turbojet engine. It is one of the Geran-4’s most significant upgrades, allowing the drone to fly at altitudes of up to eight kilometers,” the report explained. “That’s twice as high as the older propeller-powered drones. According to specialists, drones equipped with this type of engine have already flown from Russia-occupied Crimea to Lutsk in northwestern Ukraine, a distance of more than 700 kilometers.”
RFE/RL takes apart a Russian Geran-4 drone to uncover what makes the jet-powered unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) faster, harder to intercept, and capable of operating deep inside Ukraine — from its turbojet engine and advanced camera to foreign-made communications and navigation… pic.twitter.com/WGNdlpS9w1
“This engine allows it to fly at speeds of up to 450 to 500 kilometers per hour over Ukrainian territory. Sometimes even faster,” RFE/RL proffered. “It flies fast and high, which is why it is still difficult to intercept.”
As the camera pans down over the engine, the reporters noted that while it is made in China, “we have investigated cases where these engines were assembled in Russia using Chinese components.”
The next component examined was the drone’s camera.
“It has several modes: daylight, night vision, and infrared,” the report stated. “The camera offers 10-times optical zoom and up to 32-times digital zoom, allowing the drone operator to view terrain from an altitude of eight kilometers.”
“If there is a relay station and it is connected to the network, an operator sitting in an automated workstation somewhere in Bryansk, Oryol, or Crimea can control the drone and guide it to its target,” RFE/RL stated.
“Once the drone is inside Ukraine, regular cellular SIM cards can help keep it connected,” the report continued. “We also found two GSM modems inside this drone. Using SIM cards, they can transmit the Geran-4’s location over mobile networks, allowing the operator to track it in real time.”
Back in 2024, we explained how Shaheds fitted with 4G modems and SIM cards from Ukrainian telecom firms, combined with a camera installed on the drone and the ability to use wireless networks, could be one of a number of avenues that would transform the Shahed into a relatively long-range reconnaissance and strike asset capable of beyond-line-of-sight real-time operations. This could help plug what at the time was a glaring gap in the Russian arsenal, although the stability of its connectivity is still unknown and providing man-in-the-loop guidances in real-time for strikes may be beyond the capabilities of this configuration, at least consistently.
Regardless, most of these drones do not have cameras or modems, they fly to a specific set of coordinates and dive on a target before detonating.
The following images offered a glimpse into that system.
Drone specialists who have investigated the remains of these weapons told the outlet that they had found SIM cards “from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and even some European Union countries. And the deeper we go inside the drone, the more foreign-made components we find.”
The RFE/RL team also found a Chinese mesh modem the Russians use to help guide the drone.
“It’s responsible, among other things, for radio and video communications. Essentially, this device allows the drone operator to see the video feed from the Geran-4 almost in real time,” RFE/RL stated. “The modem has a range of up to 300 kilometers and can also act as a signal relay. That means several drones flying near each other can relay and strengthen the signal, making it possible to control them over much greater distances.”
The discovery of the Chinese mesh modem illustrates something we reported earlier this year: “For some time now, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, a feature that was confirmed when they started to appear with cameras and cellular modems, something TWZ explored in detail at the time. These developments allow the drone to be connected to an operator. Standard Shaheds fly autonomous routes to pre-planned targets on autopilot with no man-in-the-loop control. They are ‘fire and forget’ weapons.“
“Meanwhile, the range at which MITL can be achieved has been steadily increased. At first, the drones were adapted to exploit patchy cellular networks to provide additional connectivity when available. More recently, Shaheds have been flying with antennas allowing for direct line-of-sight control close to the front lines. This allows them to hit targets dynamically like an FPV drone, while packing a much heavier punch and being able to loiter for long periods of time. You can read all about this development here. Now, the datalink range is being extended using airborne signal relays, possibly creating a mesh network with multiple line-of-sight links.”
درون”Geran-4“ توقف محرك الـMicro-turbojet قبل الانقضاض على الهدف، وتتَّخذ وضعية الانزلاق البطيء، ربّما لتوفير الوقود او لدقة افضل اثناء البحث بالعدسة البصرية. ايضاً يظهر بوضوح هوائيات الارسال Mesh Antennas اثنان مثبَّتان على الذَّيل، أحدهما موجّه الى الاعلى والاخر الى الاسفل. pic.twitter.com/cQIyHhvbmm
Finally, the Ukrainian journalists found something else we have long reported on. Like many other Russian weapons, the Geran-4 even contains components made in America.
“Despite international sanctions, a significant portion of its components are still coming from abroad, highlighting gaps in global export control enforcement,” RFE/RL showcased. “We just opened up the drone’s onboard computer, and these circuit boards contain components made by a U.S. company. The markings on this component are partly worn off, but you can still see the manufacturer, Texas Instruments.”
“According to the specialists, what is actually Russian-made here is mainly the drone’s body and its assembly. This particular drone was manufactured and assembled at Alabuga, a major Russian drone production site. According to Ukraine’s military intelligence, Russia is now producing around 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month at Alabuga and other facilities across Russia.”
Satellite images of the site first emerged in 2023, which you can see below.
As if the Geran-4 drones were not challenging enough for Ukraine, Russian Geran-5 jet-powered drones are equipped with “a DSMAC (Digital Sensor Module for Autonomous Navigation) module for navigation using reference images of the Earth’s surface, similar to the X-101 missile,” the Ukrainian technology monitoring channel Polkovnyk GSh reported on Telegram. DSMAC allows for a weapon to navigate without any external help from global positioning satellites. The Tomahawk also uses this system. You can read all about it and how AI embedded in Shahed models will be the next leap in true autonomy far beyond the front lines, even for hunting and killing targets of opportunity, in our special feature linked here.
In addition, Russia has installed mesh repeaters on these weapons for radio signals so that video of the attacks can be “recorded (and immediately transmitted),” presidential adviser on defense technology Serhii Beskrestnov, known as Flash, said on Telegram.
The Russian military is now capable of acquiring real-time, high-quality BDA of its strikes with Geran-type OWA-UAVs/cruise missiles in downtown Kyiv.
In the footage below, we can see the moment of a Russian strike with Geran-5 cruise missile on the "Inkom" business center… pic.twitter.com/mPx4Kf9tmH
The Russian jet-powered drones were largely outrunning the drone interceptors Ukraine began using with great success against the piston-driven Shaheds. Those interceptors were not only saving lives, but they were also saving money because they cost a tiny fraction of far more expensive, higher-end munitions like the PAC-3 MSE fired by the Patriot system or the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile variants fired from the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) air defense launchers.
Seeking a more efficient and effective defense, Ukraine adapted by fielding higher-performing interceptor drones that are purpose-built to take on the jet-powered Russian munitions. Still, the engagement window for hitting the Russian drones is small, and these are more expensive to build. However, they will remain far less costly and faster to acquire than surface-to-air missiles.
In his speech earlier this week at the U.N. General Assembly, President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that “our soldiers have already successfully tested four new jet-powered interceptor drones against Russian jet-powered Shaheds. So we are scaling up production.”
It is unclear exactly which interceptors the Ukrainian president was talking about; however, other types designed to take on Russian jet-powered Gerans have become public. One of them is the Sting S, a variant of the bullet-shaped Sting interceptor drone made by the Ukrainian Wild Hornets drone company.
On Sept. 19, the company posted a video on X claiming that “a crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment took down a Russian Geran-5 using the new STING S. This drone is faster and carries a larger explosive payload than other Geran variants.”
TWZ cannot independently verify these claims.
STING S takes down a Geran-5 jet-powered drone-missile
The crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment took down a Russian Geran-5 using the new STING S. This drone is faster and carries a larger explosive payload than other Geran variants.
When we asked for more details, Wild Hornets told us “that the tests are going well. About a dozen enemy ‘Geran-4′ jet-powered strike UAVs have already been shot down, as well as several ‘Geran-5’ models, just in the last few days. We should note that at this stage we are talking about only the first results of combat testing within a few select units.”
The Sting S “is a high-speed quadcopter-type interceptor,” the Wild Hornets spokesperson added. “When choosing this model, we took into account that the solution should be inexpensive, easy to use, and quickly scalable.”
“Furthermore, most of the targets during combat testing have been destroyed using ‘Hornet Vision Ctrl’ remote control technology,” the spokesman stated. Wild Hornets claims the system provides low-latency image transmission, long-range communication, and resistance to electronic warfare.
100 remote interceptions in 100 seconds: Hornet Vision CTRL in action
Since deployment, Ukraine’s Defense Forces have remotely destroyed 1,000+ enemy targets using the system.
All thanks to the skill of crews taking down enemy drones with STING interceptors every day pic.twitter.com/9sUthdjsvF
“We expect this will allow us to rapidly scale up the deployment of the new interceptor once mass production begins,” the spokesperson noted.
As we have frequently noted, Russia and Ukraine continuously create new weapons and ways to defeat them. The jet-powered Russian drones, and Ukraine’s newest interceptors designed to destroy them, are the latest examples of a seemingly endless weapons evolution cycle in this war.
Kyiv is currently in a worse situation than Kharkiv when it comes to air-raid alerts.
The Russians struck the National Academy of Sciences, forcing scientists to flee through windows. Why did they target it?
What upgrades they are testing on their Geran-5 drones.
According to Rybar, Russia’s goal in attacking Kyiv is also to persuade Europe to stop helping Ukraine.
Maps of the day: The situation near Lyman and the gap between the Russian ministry and reality.
Videos of the day: an attack on the border crossing with Poland; footage from the cockpit of an Su-25; a robot avoids a drone; Russians flee among a crowd of civilians.
Kyiv has experienced its worst attacks since the start of the war in recent weeks. According to an analysis by French OSINT analyst Clément Molin, the capital was hit by 155 Russian missiles and drones in September, compared with 113 in August and 21 in March.
Denník N reporter Mirek Tóda, who visited Ukraine last week, said that Kyiv was currently worse off than Kharkiv in terms of air attacks, even though Kharkiv lies just 30 km from the front line.
Even smaller, FPV (first-person view) drones have recently begun flying on Kharkiv’s outskirts, hunting cars, but the number of air-raid alerts and air strikes there has still been far lower than in Kyiv in recent weeks.
Molin added that the Russians had struck the heart of the capital 10 times a day in recent days.
The Russian independent group Conflict Intelligence Team wrote that Kyiv and its surroundings would probably account for the highest number of civilians killed and injured anywhere in Ukraine in September — more than in the Donetsk, Kherson, or Kharkiv regions.
An at a time when attacks causing casualties occur every day, it is becoming harder for foreign journalists to engage readers with reports about an attack on the Ukrainian capital.
But on Monday, however, the Russians managed to do so.
During the working day, they struck the historic building of Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences. It caught fire, and footage of scientists and other employees attempting to climb out through smoke-filled windows circulated around the world.
A Russian strike against the building of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. A rescue operation is underway: crews are putting out the fire and searching for people who may have been trapped inside. All services are deployed. Today in Kyiv, a pharmaceutical company and… pic.twitter.com/ccfIHnGFNg
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) September 28, 2026
The images of people standing on a ledge may have recalled those seen after the 11 September attacks, although the terrorists then struck skyscrapers more than 100 storeys high in New York.
Horrific scenes out of Kyiv this morning as Russia used a jet-powered drone to blow up Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences. People are escaping through windows as the building burns. Just like they target kindergartens and schools, now they are bombing science. pic.twitter.com/yvwzLz9DXe
🚨 BREAKING: Terrifying footage captured people climbing out of windows after a Russian attack struck the National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv in broad daylight.
The attack killed one person and injured at least three others, triggering a massive blaze. pic.twitter.com/wiWTU51QaL
The historic building had only three floors. Thanks in part to this and the firefighters’ rapid response, only one person was killed and six were injured.
It is quite likely that the attack on the Academy of Sciences was not accidental and that the Russians were targeting an important individual.
Ukrainian analyst Viktor Kovalenko believed that the Russians had wanted to kill 86-year-old Volodymyr Horbulin. He is one of the architects of Ukraine’s missile and space programme.
He headed Ukraine’s space agency in the 1990s and, for five years under President Leonid Kuchma, served as secretary of the National Security Council. Despite his age, he remains active: he is vice-president of the National Academy of Sciences and focuses on security issues.
And the elderly scientist was in the building at the time of the attack. The drone hit a room one floor above his office. He sustained only minor injuries, but his assistant was killed.
A few hours later, the Russians struck the building of the Dobrobut medical centre, which caught fire. Several people were reported injured there.
Russia bombed the Dobrobut Medical Center in Ukraine's capital, Kyiv, this afternoon, setting the facility ablaze. pic.twitter.com/gs0d1X3eB5
These attacks took place in the wider city centre and were felt by the EU ambassador to Kyiv, Slovakia’s Katarína Mathernová.
“Just moments ago, an explosion jolted me out of my chair in my Kyiv office. It was the loudest blast I have experienced here in three years. A jet-powered drone struck a building around 200 metres from the EU delegation. It happened in broad daylight. The target was a hospital,” Mathernová wrote.
While the Russians once attacked Kyiv mainly at night, attacks are now also taking place during the day. Although they target military and industrial sites as well, they frequently hit civilian facilities where many people are present during daytime.
“Today in Kyiv, a person can be killed in a supermarket, at a university, at a petrol station, on the street or at work. The campaign of indiscriminate attacks targeting the centre of the capital is unprecedentedly violent. The Russians are targeting data centres and regularly miss their targets,” French analyst Clément Molin wrote.
“What Russia is doing is pure terrorism. And we should treat neither its state leadership nor its military forces any differently. Why should we continue pretending that it is possible to negotiate with such terrorists on equal terms?” German analyst and former journalist Julian Röpcke wrote.
“Nothing expresses the ‘fight against Nato expansion’ quite as clearly as bombing the historic building of Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv, forcing ordinary scientists to jump from windows to escape death in the flames,” Ukrainian journalist Illia Ponomarenko added.
The Russians are attacking the capital virtually constantly. It is not merely one or two attacks a day. As Ukrainian analyst Bohdan Myroshnykov wrote on Sunday, Kyiv had been without an air-raid alert for only 5 hours and 55 minutes in the previous 24 hours.
“The current alert has lasted 8 hours and 20 minutes. The enemy deliberately launches drones in order to prolong the alert. Once they arrive in Kyiv, they begin circling over the city and its suburbs to keep people on edge for even longer,” he wrote.
According to him, the main weapons currently used by the Russians to attack Kyiv are Geran-5 jet drones. These are essentially smaller — though still six-metre-long — cruise missiles. By contrast, Geran-4 jet drones have the classic delta-wing shape of older Shahed drones.
Myroshnykov wrote that Ukrainians had more or less learned how to shoot down Geran-4 drones, but were having difficulties with the fifth series. While they intercept Geran-4s with an effectiveness of 70 to 80 percent, the rate for Geran-5s is only 50 to 65 percent. “The fourth series is intercepted en masse while approaching the Kyiv agglomeration, whereas the fifth is only intercepted within it,” the analyst wrote.
Last week, we wrote that Ukrainians had released the first videos showing them shooting down jet-powered Geran drones, including Geran-5s, using jet-powered interceptor drones capable of matching their speed. A video has now emerged of another new drone that apparently can already do this.
The problem, however, is that none of these drones is yet being mass-produced. Ukrainians therefore do not have enough of them to counter the growing number of jet-powered Gerans that the Russians are launching at Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities — as well as other targets.
“There are prototypes that have delivered varying results, but considerable effort is needed to bring a prototype into large-scale serial production. Sometimes this is impossible because access to certain components is limited,” former adviser to Ukraine’s defence ministry Serhii Sternenko wrote.
“It took us 3.5 years to find a more or less reliable anti-drone defence against conventional Shaheds. We began this path five months ago in the case of jet-powered drones. It may take us eight to 10 months to find a reliable anti-drone defence,” Myroshnykov wrote.
Ukraine’s defence minister, Yevhen Khmara, called on European partners at a meeting of his EU counterparts to help finance these interceptor drones, which have proved to be the best defence against conventional Gerans.
The Russians are also becoming increasingly creative in their efforts to strike targets in Ukraine. Serhii Beskrestnov, another former adviser to the defence minister, shared a video showing the Russians striking Incom’s office building in Kyiv. What is notable is that they filmed the strike themselves using a drone with a high-quality camera.
“The enemy attacked Incom’s office with a Geran-5 missile, while at the same time a jet-powered Shahed flew over Kyiv, circling above the attack site at an altitude of almost three km. It served as a radio-signal relay for the Geran-5 missile while also recording — and immediately transmitting — video of the attack on Incom. This Shahed then flew out of Kyiv and destroyed a McDonald’s warehouse,” Beskrestnov wrote.
He added that he was convinced the two operators had been sitting next to one another.
The Defence Express website also published an article about the Russians fitting their newest Geran-5-K5 jet drones with the Susanin navigation system, first reported by a Russian Telegram account. The system works by comparing current camera images with pre-recorded imagery.
“This enables the Geran-5 K5 to determine its coordinates even when satellite navigation is unavailable,” Defence Express wrote.
However, it works better during the day than at night, as it needs current images of objects on the ground.
It is often said that the Russians attack Ukrainian cities because they are unable to advance at the front. The aim may be to lower Ukrainians’ morale, degrade their economy and force them to surrender and accept Russian terms.
Although the attacks on Kyiv have been the worst since March 2022, they do not yet appear to have shifted Ukrainian public opinion. According to one recent poll, people were most concerned about government corruption (50 percent), with Russian air attacks only in second place (40 percent). Naturally, the poll was conducted not only in Kyiv but also in places where attacks are less frequent.
Recent polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) indicates that the most worrying issue for Ukrainians right now is government corruption (at 50%), followed by Russian missile and drone attacks (40%) and unprofessionalism and incompetence of the authorities… pic.twitter.com/OvEbFz5jNQ
The attacks are often compared to the “war of the cities”, during which both countries attacked each other’s cities in the 1980s Iran-Iraq war. According to the Russian propaganda channel Rybar, they are also intended to undermine support from Europe.
This may be a somewhat far-fetched theory, but it is worth mentioning because it may indicate that people in the Kremlin think along these lines as well.
Rybar asks what the attacks mean for Ukraine’s “sponsors”. In its view, it is time for them to write off Ukraine, because there is no point pouring money into such a country. A “Marshall Plan”, it says, would be “pointless”.
“The more effective the strikes by the Russian armed forces in the framework of the ‘war of the cities’, the more likely the scenario in which the EU, even in the event of a ‘freezing’ of the situation, will ‘write off’ so-called Ukraine because further support for it is unsustainable. And without sponsors, the Kyiv regime cannot survive,” Rybar wrote.
This might perhaps apply if it were a war on the other side of the world, in which the EU was supporting one side. But the war over Ukraine is a conflict on the EU’s border, and there is a high likelihood that, if Ukraine does not stop the Russians, scientists will be fleeing from burning windows in Tallinn, Vilnius or Warsaw.
Maps of the day
On Monday, we wrote about how Ukrainians were gradually releasing parts of Operation Vivaldi, which is liberating territory north of Lyman. Russia’s defence ministry, as well as the Russian state agency Ria Novosti, continue to maintain their claims that the front line lies much further west.
This map compares official Russian claims with reality. At the point of greatest divergence, the maps differ by 40 km. For comparison, that is roughly the distance between Trnava and Bratislava. Overall, the Russians claim to control 1,360 square km more in this area than they actually do.
The yellow line on this map shows what the current official Russian maps portray the situation in the Lyman direction as (or what they would now consider the Izyum direction).
At it's furthest point, their claimed frontline is 40 km (!) west of my frontline. This was achieved… pic.twitter.com/Nd2SP3HJur
Russian Z-bloggers and propagandists are, however, closer to reality. The Two Majors channel wrote that the situation was “continuing to deteriorate”.
“The enemy is conducting counterattacks and trying to push Russian troops back beyond the Zherebets. (…) The Russian foothold west of the river has shrunk,” it said.
According to the channel, Ukrainians had entered the village of Zarichne from several directions, while fighting was also under way for Yampil.
According to Two Majors, this sector remains one of the most problematic parts of the front from the Russian perspective. The Russians’ aim is to stabilise it and retain at least some units on this bank of the river.
The Rybar channel wrote that Ukrainians had intensified fire on the few places where the river can be crossed, as well as attacks on logistics far behind the front line.
“Despite the stabilisation measures that have been launched, the situation remains extremely difficult and tense. The enemy’s gradual release of footage is a tool of information pressure, but it conceals a very real deterioration of the situation in the Lyman sector,” Rybar wrote.
Videos of the day
In addition to Kyiv, the Russians are attacking other parts of Ukraine. They again struck the Yahodyn border crossing on the Polish-Ukrainian border. A Geran-5 drone landed in a car park, around one km from Polish territory.
Recently, after a similar attack in which they hit a train, they also struck a petrol station 800 metres from the crossing. These are the attacks closest to Polish territory since the start of the war, not counting drones and a Kh-101 missile that have already entered Poland.
An enemy UAV struck near the "Yagodin" checkpoint on the border with Poland, according to social media posts pic.twitter.com/COrcYKrUoJ
Footage from the cockpit of a Ukrainian Su-25 military aircraft during a mission in the east. The pilot flew low over the ground, then climbed higher, released a French AASM guided bomb and turned away.
Rare cockpit view from a Ukrainian Air Force Su-25 Frogfoot on a strike mission over the eastern front, screaming low over the ground before pitching up, clawing for altitude, and launching a French AASM guided bomb at a Russian target. pic.twitter.com/DmX2Pvfftw
Ukrainian robot operators are also assisted by aerial reconnaissance drones during missions. This apparently helped the operator in the video skilfully evade a Russian drone at the last moment.
Ukraine’s Khartia Brigade released a video which it said showed Russian soldiers in civilian clothes, mixed in with actual civilians, trying to escape through a pipeline.
🚨 BREAKING: Drone footage from Ukraine’s Khartia Brigade reveals likely Russian soldiers disguised in civilian clothing, attempting to escape alongside elderly hostages and children.
By Tuesday (22 September), Russia had verifiably lost 24,138 pieces of heavy equipment, compared with 24,098 on Monday (14 September). Of these, Ukrainians destroyed 19,105 (19,065) pieces, 1,000 (1,000) were damaged, crews abandoned 1,194 (1,194), and the Ukrainian army captured 2,839 (2,839). These included 4,448 (4,447) tanks, of which 3,353 (3,352) were destroyed in combat.
Ukraine had lost 12,175 (12,143) pieces of equipment, of which 9,579 (9,551) were destroyed, 702 (698) damaged, 695 (695) abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) captured. These included 1,464 (1,462) tanks, of which 1,125 (1,120) were destroyed in combat.
Note: Neither side regularly reports its own casualties or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. In this overview, we use data from theOryx project, which has compiled a list of equipment losses documented exclusively by photographs since the start of the war.
In this week's Wider Europe, Rikard Jozwiak drills down on whether the EU could drop some of its Belarus sanctions and the road map for the most advanced EU candidates.
Ukraine’s reconstruction is being planned from a map of destruction. Financing its private assets instead follows a map of earnings.
Since the full-scale invasion, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has lent $131m [€115.3m] to Nova Post, Ukraine’s largest parcel and courier network — an established business with visible demand, revenue, and an owner able to put up around a quarter of the cost itself.
Shipments grew 16 percent in 2024 as traffic reoriented towards western and central Ukraine and across Ukraine’s borders with the EU. Part of the financing paid for more than 600 safety capsules and shelters at its premises. A wartime resilience need met an earnings stream, and a lender followed.
Three sets of records show where else those conditions hold.
The first is what the international financial institutions have financed. Over four years the EBRD, European Investment Bank (EIB), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Bank announced some $19bn (€17bn) of project-level finance for Ukraine, more than two-thirds of it to public authorities and state-owned companies.
Guarantees to banks, some $1.8bn of them, are meant to reach smaller and mid-sized firms. Yet bank lending accounts for under four percent of Ukrainian capital investment. Mid-sized companies appear to be underserved.
The second is what foreign investors have done. They put around $2.9bn of new equity into Ukraine from 2022 to 2025, most of it into services rather than industry or energy.
Across 134 EBRD financed projects, announced third-party equity appears in three, all of them technology companies incorporated outside Ukraine. A growing number of international venture funds are entering Ukrainian defence technology, whose assets can travel with global demand. A food processor in Vinnytsia, for instance, has neither that pull nor that mobility.
The third is what companies in Ukraine do with their own money, and it dwarfs the other two. Capital investment runs at around $18bn a year, and companies’ own funds finance 71 percent of it.
In construction, the pattern is starker still: unfinished apartment blocks in Kyiv are going up without bank debt, paid for by the people buying the flats.
That money is heavily concentrated. Kyiv and its surrounding region take 54 percent of it; the eight western regions 16 percent. The eight frontline and border regions, which hold 78 percent of the damage and 62 percent of the projected cost of rebuilding, take seven percent.
Three kinds of financing, one pattern. Lenders and investors follow earnings, not destruction.
The limits of private money
Much of reconstruction will therefore remain publicly financed. International funding flows to public entities which meet urgent needs and will likely not go bankrupt. For the most part, this is right. A large share of the damage sits in assets that never earned or whose earnings the war has interrupted, and repairing schools, de-mining fields, or restoring homes whose owners cannot pay will remain public spending.
But the balance matters beyond making public funds reach further. State-led reconstruction creates revenue-generating assets in public hands. EU accession will subject them to competition and state-aid rules they do not currently face, and some will have to be restructured or sold.
Expanding the overlap between the two maps means mitigating the externalities of war more effectively. Energy infrastructure was hit 4,500 times in 2025, drones striking transformers and substations and interrupting the cash flows of otherwise functioning power plants.
When the Kakhovka dam was destroyed in 2023, up to 1 million people lost access to drinking water, and water supplies across four regions, including Kryvyi Rih’s, have had to be replaced or rebuilt — and the municipal utilities involved are counterparties private investors are reluctant to contract with.
The Kakhovka dam’s spillways in use in 2013. It was destroyed in 2023 (Source: Wikimedia)
Despite around $200bn of international public non-military support to Ukraine since 2022, the instruments addressing those externalities are patchy at best. A solar developer financing a projec against a Ukrainian public buyer needs a payment obligation it can rely on, and insurance that covers both capital and cash flow.
Closing those gaps is a political decision, not a technical one. European decision-makers need to mandate the EBRD and the EIB to stand behind public buyers of services, widen the guarantees and risk cover available to private investors, and take more risk on their own balance sheets. Of the €9.6bn EU Ukraine Investment Framework, only €220m is equity, anchoring a fund meant to reach €1bn over time. That pool of public risk capital should be larger.
Export credit agencies are a separate lever, and it is national governments that set how far they can reach. Denmark’s agency has backed more than €450m of financing for Ukrainian wind farms built with Vestas turbines, but uptake of a broader European export credit scheme administered by the EIB has been slow.
None of this fully aligns the destruction and earnings maps. It widens the ground on which they meet — the part of the rebuilding that can keep earning when the public money stops.
The most important finding is that part of this network was said to have operated from Slovakia.
We do not yet know all the details of the ongoing investigation, and I trust that Slovak security authorities will thoroughly examine the circumstances of the case and determine the true scope of the entire operation.
However, according to the German security services’ findings so far, the Slovak connection is not marginal.
Slovakia may have served as one of the hubs of a wider network linked to Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU.
According to German security sources, two Bulgarian nationals detained after the arson attack in Munich on 3 September were part of a GRU-linked group operating from Slovakia. Incendiary devices were thrown near Rohde & Schwarz and Helsing, companies linked to the defence industry and support for Ukraine.
The same wider network was said to have been preparing an arson attack on Skyeton’s plant near Prešov, which produces reconnaissance drones for Ukraine. Slovak authorities thwarted the plan and detained Latvian and Ukrainian nationals. Another suspect was detained in Germany.
The nationality of those carrying out the attacks is not decisive.
The current model of Russian operations uses nationals of different countries, often recruited through intermediaries. A professional GRU officer can therefore remain several layers removed from the attack itself. Recruitment may take place via Telegram, payments through cryptocurrencies, and those carrying out the attacks may not even know precisely who the real instigator is.
German investigators argued there was also a link to an attempted attack using an explosive drone at Leipzig-Halle Airport on 4 August.
The target was reportedly a Ukrainian cargo aircraft used to transport material. The German government subsequently publicly attributed responsibility for the incident to Russia.
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