After two wars, Iranian lawmakers are pressing for an NPT exit. The argument now extends to whether a bomb would deter another attack.
By Fereshteh Sadeghi | The Cradle | October 2, 2026
After two rounds of US–Israeli attacks in the space of a year, pressure is mounting on Iran’s leadership to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Advocates say the treaty has failed to protect Iran’s civilian nuclear program or its scientists. Their opponents warn that withdrawal could provide Washington and Tel Aviv with a pretext for another assault. The argument now reaches well beyond the Majlis.
“A big decision in the offing” is one way to describe a motion that has sat with the Iranian parliament’s presidium for months. A group of lawmakers has now issued an open statement demanding that the Supreme National Security Council and Foreign Ministry begin the formal process of withdrawal from the NPT. They also want Tehran to end voluntary nuclear commitments beyond its treaty obligations.
The lawmakers argue that the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have failed to safeguard Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology. They accuse the agency of allowing information obtained through inspections to reach Iran’s enemies, exposing nuclear facilities and scientists to attack.
Their statement follows years of dispute over the agency’s access to Iranian sites and the use of its findings by western governments. They invoke Article X of the treaty, which permits withdrawal when a state decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests. A withdrawal would require three months’ notice to other parties and the UN Security Council.
A motion awaiting debate
In the wake of that open statement, Isfahan lawmaker Hussein-Ali Haji-Deligani revealed he and his colleagues submitted legislation on Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT months ago, and it is up to parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf to put it to debate on the parliament floor. Heji-Delogani reiterated:
“Considering enemies’ wars against Iran on two occasions, the continuation of Iran’s membership in the NPT has no use, especially after the IAEA’s Board of Governors sent Iran’s dossier to the UN Security Council. Therefore, Iran should exit from the treaty to prevent further damage.”
Other lawmakers have turned their criticism on the parliamentary leadership. Tehran representative Kamran Ghazanfari blamed the presidium for keeping the motion off the floor, an accusation aimed principally at Ghalibaf.
Ghalibaf has aligned himself with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on several questions of state policy, drawing fire from former allies among the Principlists. The NPT dispute has become another point of contention between them.
Another parliamentarian, Mohammad-Reza Sabaghian, stated:
“We must use the courage that was shown and the right strategy to close the Strait of Hormuz in the discussion of withdrawing from the NPT. This is the second step that will lead to the failure of America’s plans.”
Mohsen Sani, a member of parliament’s national security commission, went further:
“In our opinion, the NPT no longer has any meaning or significance, whether we want to stay in it or leave it. When one of the NPT member states attacks another member (Iran), it means withdrawing from all these commitments and treaties that have existed in this regard. Recent pressures suggest that we should reconsider enrichment.”
The case for staying
The call for withdrawal has met resistance within Iran’s political establishment. Tehran lawmaker Mohammad Seraj sees no benefit in leaving. Unless Iran intends to build a bomb, he argues, the step would only damage its relations with friendly states.
Khorasan, a newspaper close to Ghalibaf, has criticized lawmakers for “radicalizing the political ambiance of the country and forcing the Islamic Republic to make such a sensitive decision,” describing it as “a gift to Trump.”
The outlet maintains that “any moves towards leaving the NPT give enough justification to Trump and Netanyahu for their future strikes against Iran while it alienates friends such as China and Russia who have always supported Iran’s legitimate right to a non-military nuclear program.”
Rouydad24, a news site with strong ties with the Reformist camp, lambasted lawmakers as “radicals” who “have returned with a controversial and costly prescription.”
The Reformist news site charges that “Pezeshkian’s critics have turned withdrawing from the NPT into a political slogan without considering it is a complicated matter economically, militarily and internationally.”
Where the decision rests
The debate has become a challenge for Pezeshkian, whose government has defended Iran’s continued place in the treaty. But the president is not the only voice in the room. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has openly raised the possibility of withdrawal.
Rezaei said, “After the United States abandoned the post-war Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, we reached the conclusion that we must change course. We have yet to take a decision on withdrawing from the treaty, because our withdrawal totally depends on Washington’s behavior.”
The senior general admits that the Islamic Republic is still committed to the late supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s religious prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons and has not changed its nuclear doctrine; however, “nobody can guarantee the future,” he elaborates.
Is Iran seeking a nuclear weapon?
In an exclusive interview with the Republican Party’s mouthpiece, Fox News, Pezeshkian flatly denied Iran is seeking an atomic bomb, adding that his country is even willing to dilute the 440-kilogram uranium stockpile purified at 60 percent and allow the IAEA’s nuclear inspectors to supervise Iran’s nuclear program.
Pezeshkian made those claims while the Islamic Republic does not allow international inspectors to visit its nuclear facilities, which were destroyed by the US and Israel during two wars in June 2025 and February-March 2026.
Pezeshkian’s assurance contrasts with Rezaei’s warning that the country’s future course cannot be guaranteed. Reports in Tehran that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has ruled out nuclear talks with Washington remain unconfirmed; they offer no basis for treating such a ban as settled policy.
A decision above the Majlis
Iran’s NPT membership has moved from a technical and legal question into a wider argument over deterrence after the attacks on its nuclear facilities. The parliamentary bill gives that argument a public stage, but lawmakers alone will not settle it.
The final decision would be made at the highest levels of the Islamic Republic’s political and security establishment. A vote in the Majlis could put a formal stamp on a course set elsewhere, as earlier nuclear legislation did.
The 2020 Strategic Action Law to Lift Sanctions, for example, obliged the government to expand nuclear activity and restrict inspections if sanctions relief did not materialize. It sharply constrained the Rouhani administration’s room for maneuver over the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. The precedent is relevant because a bill presented as a parliamentary initiative can become a lever for policy agreed across the state’s security institutions.
For now, proposals to leave the NPT and calls to build a bomb circulate side by side. That does not establish that either has been adopted. It does show how far positions once kept at the edges of public debate have entered the argument over Iran’s security.
Lawmaker Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani has advocated building a nuclear weapon first and withdrawing from the NPT afterward, “because only in that case, it can guarantee deterrence against a renewed US-Israeli aggression.”
Even Khorasan, which warns against leaving the NPT now, does not rule out an exit. Its argument is that Iran should first build and test a nuclear weapon. Until then, it says, Tehran would bear the costs of a nuclear-armed state without possessing a nuclear deterrent.
The disagreement in Iran is no longer confined to whether the country should leave the treaty. It is also about when.
The volume of munitions expended in the course of U.S. operations against Iran this year has been and continues to be a hot topic of discussion, and there has been relatively little official data provided on this front. However, now we know that the F/A-18F Super Hornets of the U.S. Navy’s Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41), the “Black Aces,” launched 421 missiles and bombs during their time supporting Operation Epic Fury.
This new insight into VFA-41’s role in the conflict with Iran comes from a photo of a large board listing the squadron’s weapons expenditures during Epic Fury, via Jeff Rojas, who goes by the handle @jro_photography on Instagram. Rojas also shared pictures recently taken of VFA-41’s Super Hornets. The Black Aces were one of the squadrons assigned to the Nimitz class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, which has been on a marathon deployment since last year. The carrier only left the Middle East region last month and is now set to formally return home to San Diego, California, within days. Per the Pentagon’s official timeline, Operation Epic Fury began on February 28 and concluded on May 5, though U.S. forces have continued to conduct strikes on Iran, on and off, since then.
The complete tally of munitions employed as shown on the board, broken down by type, from greatest to fewest, is as follows:
The total cost of all of these munitions, using available data from U.S. military budget documents, is very roughly $43,646,000, at least. Unit costs fluctuate regularly due to a variety of factors. Furthermore, the exact price tag for different JDAMs can be somewhat difficult to calculate given how the individual components are budgeted.
The JDAM is really a family of kits that turn standard unguided ‘iron bombs,’ which can vary significantly in the kinds of effects they are designed to produce, into warheads for precision-guided munitions. This is exemplified by the (V)2 and (V)4 subvariants of the GBU-31/B mentioned here, which are built using standard high-explosive and bunker-buster bombs, respectively. No specific subvariants of the GBU-32, GBU-38, or GBU-54 were mentioned in the information provided. Standard JDAMs can also only be employed against static target coordinates. The LJDAM kits add a laser guidance component (akin to what is found on Paveway-series bombs) that enables strikes against moving targets.
No specific version of AGM-154 is mentioned, either, but the C and C-1 types, which have multi-stage bunker-busting warheads, are the only ones understood to be in service today. Remaining A variants, which were loaded with 145 small bomblets, were removed from U.S. service in 2008 as a result of new guidelines on cluster munitions issued under President George W. Bush. A planned AGM-154B, which would have contained six “smart” Sensor Fuzed Munition bomblets, was never produced. You can read more about the full JSOW family here.
— Guy Plopsky (@GuyPlopsky) March 8, 2026
We do not know exactly what targets any of these munitions were employed against. However, a picture that Jeff Rojas grabbed of one of VFA-41’s Super Hornets, seen toward the top of this story and in part below, shows a very interesting broken submarine kill marking, with the added text “Sub Buster.” The jet also has a number of more typical bomb-shaped kill marks.
Iranian naval vessels, including the country’s Russian-made Kilo class and other submarines, were top priority targets during Epic Fury. The U.S. military has previously confirmed that air-launched AGM-114 Hellfire laser-guided missiles (likely fired from MQ-9 Reaper drones) and ground-launched Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles were employed against submarines, specifically.
The video montage in the social media post below includes a clip, starting at 0:13 in the runtime, of a Hellfire missile hitting what looks to be a Ghadir class diesel-electric midget submarine in port.
U.S. forces are degrading the Iranian regime's ability to project power at sea and harass international shipping. For years, Iranian forces have threatened freedom of navigation in waters essential to American, regional and global security and prosperity. pic.twitter.com/gIBN02mowh
— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) March 10, 2026
Bunker-busting JDAMs are also known to have been key munitions employed during strikes on targets in Iran during Epic Fury. TWZ previously called explicit attention to the employment of JSOW in the opening phases of the operation, as well. Navy strike fighter squadrons made significant use of SLAM-ERs in strikes against Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen last year, too.
Honest Abe is burning through the JSOWs like crazy. https://t.co/rQMZPBnwAz
— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) March 1, 2026
1/ Aside from the launch of F/A-18E/Fs armed with JSOW C/C-1s, the video also shows F/A-18Es armed with SLAM-ER ATAs parked on the fligh deck. https://t.co/3TC4kKIn17 pic.twitter.com/OqQBbRrYGY
— Guy Plopsky (@GuyPlopsky) March 16, 2025
It is extremely likely that the AIM-9Xs and AIM-120s were fired at Iranian drones, though they could have been launched at incoming cruise missiles, as well. At the time of writing, there are no known or reported instances of U.S. military jets engaging crewed Iranian aircraft in the course of the conflict to date. In 2024, the Navy carried out a crash program that increased the total number of AIM-9Xs that F/A-18E/Fs could carry per sortie, specifically in response to Houthi drone threats. Super Hornets loaded with nine air-to-air missiles are now referred to as “Murder Hornets.”
Notably absent in VFA-41’s tally is any mention of 70mm laser-guided Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rockets. Air-to-air optimized versions of the APKWS II are now part of the arsenal available to U.S. Air Force F-16C Vipers, F-15E Strike Eagles, and A-10 Warthogs, and have become the service’s go-to aerial weapon for engaging drones. In February, the U.S. Marine Corps disclosed that it was working to integrate this capability onto its legacy F/A-18C/D Hornets. Whether the Navy has any such plans for the Super Hornet is unclear.
It is also important to remember that this is a discussion of the munitions expended by just one Navy strike fighter squadron. Lincoln‘s air wing includes four strike squadrons, three with Super Hornets and one with F-35Cs, as well as units flying other types of aircraft and helicopters. The carrier was just one part of a much larger array of air, naval, and ground forces that participated in Operation Epic Fury and subsequent operations against Iran. For additional context, consider that the entire Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group, including its entire air wing and escorting ships, fired off 770 munitions in total, by the official count, during very active combat operations in and around the Red Sea between November 2023 and June 2024.
All of this speaks to the larger matter of how many munitions the U.S. military has expended in the course of operations against Iran this year, which is now fueling concerns about the sufficiency of remaining stockpiles and what it will take to replenish them.
As such, the tally of munitions launched from VFA-41 Super Hornets offers a very interesting view into that squadron’s contributions to Operation Epic Fury, as well as the full scale and scope of the conflict with Iran.
Special thanks again to Jeff Rojas for sharing the details about VFA-41’s participation in Operation Epic Fury and his pictures with us.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post All The Weapons A Single Navy Fighter Squadron Launched During Operation Epic Fury appeared first on TWZ.
Germany is moving ahead with plans to give its unusually large F125 frigates a medium-range air-defense capability, helping address one of the most conspicuous weaknesses of a four-ship class that has long attracted attention for having relatively little combat power for its size.
Diehl Defense and Germany’s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) have signed a contract to adapt and develop the IRIS-T SLM surface-to-air missile system for operational use aboard the German Navy’s F125 frigates. Under the agreement, Diehl will build prototypes and conduct comprehensive test firings intended to validate the system’s integration and performance within the existing F125 architecture. Each frigate will be fitted with two new launchers, each capable of holding 16 missiles, for a total of 32.
“The aim is to make the system mission-capable on the German Navy’s F125 frigates,” Diehl said in today’s announcement. The company described the prototype construction and test-firing phase as necessary to ensure “the seamless integration and maximum performance” of IRIS-T SLM within the frigate’s existing architecture.
The program has moved notably quickly, reflecting the urgency of the requirement.
Germany began examining the feasibility of integrating IRIS-T SLM with the F125 in 2024, with BAAINBw and Diehl studying the technical risks and requirements of adapting the normally land-based system for shipboard use. That effort led to the development of a navalized demonstrator in 2025. In October of that year, the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg took part in a German Navy Maritime Firing Exercise off Andøya, Norway, carrying an experimental anti-air warfare module based on IRIS-T SLM. Diehl says the module went from concept to firing in less than 10 months and met all established test and evaluation objectives.
The Bundeswehr subsequently reported that Baden-Württemberg fired three live IRIS-T SLM missiles during the exercise. The ship’s radar supplied target data to the missile system, demonstrating the basic integration between the F125’s sensors and the navalized air defense architecture.
The exercise established that the concept could work at sea; the contract signed now is intended to turn that demonstration into a qualified fleet capability.
The German parliament’s Budget Committee approved the adaptation effort on September 23, with the German Defense Ministry describing it as a means of expanding the F125’s self-defense capabilities in response to the current air threat. The ministry also pointed to IRIS-T SLM’s combat experience in Ukraine.
The effort needs to be seen in the context of why the F125 has been such a controversial warship in the first place.
As TWZ examined in 2017, the F125 is a roughly 7,200-ton, 490-foot warship with an unusually small core crew and a concept of operations centered on long-duration deployments, stabilization missions, crisis management, conflict prevention, and international intervention rather than high-end fleet combat. The class was designed to spend long periods away from Germany and operate with relatively modest manpower requirements.
But its armament does not remotely match the size and sophistication of the hull. As completed, the ships were equipped with eight RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a 127mm gun, remotely operated guns and, for close-quarters air defense, two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers. The F125 has no medium- or long-range surface-to-air missile capability and no organic sonar or dedicated anti-submarine warfare weapon system.
At the same time, the TRS-4D/NR radar and other sensors can see far beyond the engagement envelope of the close-in air-defense weapons, but there is little the ship itself can do with that information against an aircraft or incoming missile at medium range.
Nearly a decade later, IRIS-T SLM is emerging as an answer to at least part of that problem.
Even with IRIS-T SLM, the F125 is well short of being an air warfare destroyer. It also still lacks an organic anti-submarine warfare capability or the kind of large vertical-launch missile battery found on Germany’s F124 frigates.
However, it does fill a gap between the F125’s original short-range defenses and the capabilities of other ships or aircraft operating around it.
IRIS-T SLM is designed as a medium-range surface-to-air system, with an engagement range of around 25 miles and an altitude envelope of approximately 65,000 feet. As shown in the 2025 demonstration, the F125’s radar can feed information directly into the missile system, exploiting the ship’s existing sensor capabilities.
Rather than rely heavily on escorts for protection against airborne threats outside the short range of RAM, an IRIS-T-equipped F125 could at least contribute to its own medium-range air defense. Recent operations in the Middle East have underscored the importance of this in contested maritime environments.
It also gives the ships a more useful role in a task group. The threat environment has changed substantially since the F125’s original concept was drafted. Cruise missiles, drones, loitering munitions, and increasingly sophisticated aircraft mean that even ships operating away from a major naval war can face threats well beyond the range of their existing close-in defenses.
In November 2024, Germany confirmed that the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg, returning from an Indo-Pacific deployment, would avoid the Red Sea and sail around Africa because of the Houthi missile and drone threat. The German Defense Ministry explicitly cited the ship’s limited air defense capability and its inability to provide an effective air-defense umbrella for itself or its accompanying replenishment ship.
Ironically, the F125’s large hull, extensive electrical power, sophisticated radar, substantial aviation facilities, long endurance and relatively spacious mission areas were always supposed to provide room for a flexible approach to future missions. Yet the class’s original weight and integration constraints made adding major weapons difficult, a concern TWZ also highlighted in 2017.
IRIS-T SLM offers Germany a way to add a meaningful capability without undertaking the much more invasive redesign associated with installing a conventional vertical-launch system. The 2025 demonstration used an AAW module mounted on the ship’s deck rather than a conventional VLS installation, and today’s program is focused on adapting the system to the F125 architecture.
Once IRIS-T SLM is installed, the F125 will still be an unusual frigate. It is enormous by the standards of its mission, optimized for endurance, and lacks some of the weapons traditionally associated with a high-end surface combatant. But it will bring more to a contested fight.
The program should give the class a credible medium-range air-defense role, and provide Germany with a way to get considerably more utility out of four ships whose original design philosophy was always somewhat controversial.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Germany Is Finally Giving Its F125 Frigates Some More Teeth With IRIS-T SLM Surface-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.
Ferries remain docked at several ports in Greece on Friday, October 2, due to gale-force winds reaching 9 and up to 10 Beaufort locally in the Aegean Sea. A sailing ban was imposed at the ports of Rafina and Lavrio in south-eastern Attica on Friday morning, while sailings from the port of Piraeus were also […]
The post Sailing ban for ferries due to gale-force winds in the Aegean Sea appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.
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La capacità di raffinazione del petrolio e dei suoi derivati si è ridotta progressivamente in Europa. Si tratta però di prodotti indispensabili per l’economia. In un contesto geopolitico sempre più instabile, diventa un problema di sicurezza energetica.
L'articolo Meno raffinerie, più dipendenza energetica proviene da Lavoce.info.
When a South Korean soldier stepped on a land mine in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on September 21, it might have been taken as a grim reminder of a war that never formally ended. Instead, the explosion has revealed something more unsettling: the Korean Peninsula’s old security order is shifting, even as Seoul tries to […]
The post To keep the peace, South Korea’s Lee must prepare for war appeared first on Asia Times.
On a hazy, humid Sunday morning, just before 9:30 a.m. local time, the USS Theodore Roosevelt sailed out of San Diego Bay for a much-anticipated but little-advertised deployment. The Nimitz class flagship of Carrier Strike Group 9 (CSG-9), nicknamed “The Big Stick,” departed on September 27 and is expected to head to the Middle East to relieve one of the two carriers on station supporting operations against Iran, according to USNI News. As is common with deployments from the West Coast, the departure was not announced by the Navy publicly, although there were several unconfirmed claims on social media that highlighted the impending cruise.
The three-ship Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), packed with thousands of Marines who specialize in expeditionary operations, followed Roosevelt’s path out of the harbor the next day. While the Makin Island ARGs ultimate destination is unclear, the Boxer ARG, currently operating in the Middle East, left the United States on March 18 and is due for relief.
Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed CSGs and ARGs, using publicly available open-source information. Check out last week’s report here.
USS Theodore Roosevelt keyed her Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder on at 9:10 a.m. Pacific Daylight Time on September 27, broadcasting her precise position publicly via MarineTraffic, and got underway less than 20 minutes later with the help of a few tugs. The supercarrier steamed past Point Loma at seven knots before sailing west and picking up speed, topping 24 knots, then made a hard turn south and stopped transmitting on AIS roughly three hours after departing. She briefly flipped AIS back on again, 55 nautical miles southwest of her previous location, but has been dark since.
Three guided-missile destroyers, USS Paul Hamilton, USS Decatur, and USS Carl M. Levin, are part of CSG-9 and will escort the flattop, a Navy official confirmed to TWZ. Rounding out the five-ship CSG is Ticonderoga class guided-missile cruiser USS Chosin, which will serve as the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) commander for the CSG. The IAMD warfare commander is responsible for coordinating air defense for the entire strike group − a vital role since Roosevelt will be entering an active combat zone. Tico cruisers have 122 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells, more than the 90 to 96 that Arleigh Burke destroyers are equipped with, and are being retired without a comparable cruiser lined up to replace the aging fleet; however, the newest Flight III Burke destroyers will take on the air warfare commander role.
The carrier has embarked, or is in the process of taking on, Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11 off the West Coast before beginning the long journey toward the Western Pacific. CVW 11 includes a squadron of stealthy fifth-generation F-35C Lightning IIs, in addition to three squadrons of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and one of EA-18G Growlers. Support squadrons of E-2D Hawkeyes, MH-60R Seahawks, and MH-60S Seahawks are also aboard, as well as a detachment of CMV-22B Ospreys.
USNI News was the first outlet to confirm the deployment and suggests the CSG is headed to the Middle East. “The Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group is expected to move to U.S. Central Command to relieve the Japan-based USS George Washington (CVN-73),” they wrote in a report published on Monday.
In response to a request to confirm the deployment, the same Navy official told us: “The Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. U.S. 3rd Fleet leads naval forces in the region and provides the realistic, relevant training necessary to execute our Navy’s role across the full spectrum of military operations – from combat operations to humanitarian assistance and disaster response. U.S. 3rd Fleet works together with allies and partners to advance freedom of navigation and overflight, the rule of law, and other principles that underpin security for the region.”
The underway was live-streamed on San Diego Web Cam, which had a few hundred viewers at the peak. TWZ was monitoring the feed at the time after rumors surfaced that a departure was imminent. Notably, Sailors were not spotted manning the rails, which is usually an easy tell that a warship is deploying rather than training. However, several public posts on social media by individual Sailors, as well as their friends and family, pointed to the ship heading on its long-awaited cruise.
Roosevelt has been preparing for the cruise for the better part of a year. The CSG last deployed from January 11 to October 15, 2024, to the U.S. 5th and 7th Fleet areas of responsibility (AOR) in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian. After arriving back home nearly two years ago, the carrier underwent an eight-month Planned Incremental Availability (PIA). Following the PIA, she completed flight deck certification and carrier qualifications from July 23 to July 29, 2025. In 2026, the carrier conducted Composite Unit Training Exercise (COMPTUEX) from April 14 to May 15, and then steamed to Hawaii for the large-scale, biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise from June 24 to July 28. Most recently, Roosevelt completed a brief pierside availability prior to deploying, as TWZ first reported.
In February, Vice Adm. Brendan McLane told reporters at WEST 2026 that a medium unmanned surface vessel (MUSV) would deploy with the strike group for the first time. During COMPTUEX and RIMPAC, the Roosevelt CSG drilled alongside Leidos’ MUSV Seahawk, which TWZ was the first to report. We asked the Navy to confirm whether an MUSV would accompany the group, but have not received a response. As of publication, Seahawk was still pierside in San Diego, and it’s unclear if the drone boat will operate with the CSG or remain in San Diego.
The three-ship Makin Island ARG, with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked, got underway for a deployment on September 28, a Navy official also confirmed to USNI News. In addition to the flagship Wasp class amphibious assault ship (LHD), USS Makin Island, two San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ships (LPD), USS John P. Murtha and USS Anchorage, left on the same day and round out the expeditionary group.
No destination has been formally announced. However, there is an obvious candidate for relief: the Boxer ARG. Currently on station in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR supporting blockade and interdiction operations in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, the group has been deployed since mid-March. The amphibious fleet is notorious for experiencing maintenance issues, and these ships have been pushed hard without a port call in months. Amphibious ships move slower than carriers, and if CENTCOM turns out to be the final destination, the Makin Island ARG would have to hustle to arrive before November.
Makin Island embarks short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B Lightning IIs, assigned to the “Wake Island Avengers” of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 211, and MV-22B Ospreys with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 364 (Reinforced). The Bravos recently conducted a simulated airstrike off the coast of California.
Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao flew out to the flight deck of USS Abraham Lincoln as she was sailing eastbound in the Hawaiian Islands operating area, en route to her homeport in San Diego. “Today, our warfighters aboard USS Abraham Lincoln demonstrated the overwhelming capacity and capability that they brought to bear on our adversaries for the last 10 months,” he wrote in a post on Sunday.
USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., a destroyer that escorted Lincoln throughout the 10-month deployment, peeled off and moored at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on Monday. “Over the course of 300 days, Frank E. Petersen Jr.’s crew conducted 45 replenishments-at-sea, sailed over 85,000 nautical miles, safely transferred over 7,544,486 gallons of F-76 fuel and 175,288 gallons of JP-5 fuel, and completed 1,094 hours of flight quarters,” according to a press release. The statement also confirmed that the warship served as IAMD commander for the group. The destroyer defended against more than 100 missile and drone attacks, Stars and Stripes recently reported.
Petersen Jr. and USS Michael Murphy became the first U.S. warships to transit the Strait of Hormuz since the war began when they entered the Persian Gulf in April in support of mine-clearance efforts.
Lincoln is now 314 days into her deployment and less than two weeks shy of surpassing the 326-day record USS Gerald R. Ford set in May. Approximately 2,000 nautical miles separate Hawaii from Naval Air Station North Island, but assuming a straight shot, it does not appear Lincoln will break the record.
Two crew members from an EA-18G Growler embarked on the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (Ike) were rescued after ejecting due to an arresting gear failure, the Navy announced in a statement. The incident took place on Monday around 6:18 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time as the vessel was underway off the coast of Virginia.
The aviators, assigned to the “Zappers” of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 130 and attached to CVW 3, “safely returned to the ship and are being evaluated by medical personnel,” according to the release. The “Dusty Dogs” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 7 recovered the crew using MH-60S Seahawk helos.
Four shipboard personnel “were also injured during the mishap and are receiving medical care,” the Navy said. “One Sailor is being transported to a Norfolk-area hospital for treatment of non-life-threatening injuries,” according to the original statement. In total, eight sailors were evaluated by the ship’s medical team.
The cause of the accident is still under investigation, and it’s unclear whether the aircraft was lost or if there was any damage to the carrier. TWZ has reached out to the Navy to find out more details.
Eisenhower wrapped an extended 15-month PIA earlier this year in April. The flattop had been pierside at Naval Station Norfolk since September 2 after being at sea for 12 days completing Fleet Replacement Squadron and Training Command Carrier Qualifications (CQ) in the Virginia Capes and Jacksonville operating areas. She got underway again on the afternoon of September 28, based on public AIS data, for Tailored Ship’s Training Availability, Final Evaluation Problem, and CQ, one of the final steps before onloading ammunition for COMPTUEX, where the full strike group certifies for deployment.
Ike is working up in preparation for a future deployment scheduled for the first half of 2027, TWZ previously reported.
Multiple news outlets in Thailand reported Tuesday that USS George H.W. Bush and destroyer USS Delbert D. Black, which have both been in the Middle East in support of operations against Iran, will make a port call in Phuket in early October. If such a transit occurs, this would leave one carrier, the USS George Washington, on station in the U.S. 5th Fleet AOR for the first time since April. The Navy has not formally made an announcement, and TWZ has not verified the accounts.
The reports are based on a meeting that representatives of the U.S. Embassy in Thailand allegedly held with the Patong police to discuss security protocols during the stop. “The visit has prompted coordination between Thai authorities and US officials over security, public order, and the movement of visiting military personnel during shore leave,” Phuket News wrote. According to the article, Patong police met with two deputy assistant defense attachés, Lou Pham and Robert Robinson, to discuss the visit. U.S. personnel were advised to comply with Thai laws during their stay, a specific request that may have been triggered by the recent visit of Lincoln.
There are conflicting accounts of when Bush would arrive in Phuket’s deep-sea port, but the visit will likely last five or six days, which is similar to Lincoln’s recent port call in the Southeast Asian country. If the timeline holds, it means Bush is likely already en route from her station in the Arabian Sea, where the CSG was most recently operating as of September 25, according to DVIDS. The Bangkok Post and Thai Examiner also reported the upcoming visit.
Notably, the reports do not mention any of the other warships that have been part of the Bush CSG in the past, including USS Donald Cook, USS Ross, USS Mason, or USS Princeton. The composition of the Bush CSG has shifted throughout the cruise.
Overall, four U.S. carriers are deployed (with one heading home), three are working up in various states of readiness, three are in current or upcoming maintenance, one is being used primarily for training before deactivation next year, and the future USS John F. Kennedy, the second Ford class carrier, has received preliminary acceptance ahead of delivery in spring 2027. Two amphibious ready groups are deployed, one is forward-deployed, three are working up or in port, and three are in maintenance.
Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.
Contact the author: ian@twz.com or @ianellisjones
The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers?: September 30, 2026 appeared first on TWZ.
The Houthi takeover of parts of the Red Sea gives the armed group a new platform to challenge global shipping. The group has taken over the port of Mocha, the island of Mayyun, and the Zuqar and Hanish archipelago about 160km north of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. These areas were previously controlled by Yemeni government […]
The post African Red Sea states’s risks grow as Houthi rebels expand reach appeared first on Asia Times.
Washington s'est toujours immiscé dans les affaires de Brasília. La campagne des élections générales des 4 et 25 octobre l'a confirmé. Une victoire du candidat d'extrême droite Flávio Bolsonaro, soutenu par l'administration Trump, provoquerait un basculement régional favorable au locataire de la Maison Blanche et à son projet de reprise en main de l'Amérique latine.
« Veuillez accepter mes vœux les plus sincères à l'occasion de votre accession à la présidence des États-Unis du Brésil. » Le 2 avril 1964, deux jours après le coup d'État militaire qui a renversé le président travailliste João Goulart, son homologue américain est le premier chef d'État étranger à reconnaître les nouvelles autorités (1). Le courrier empressé de Lyndon Johnson s'adresse alors au président de la Chambre des députés, Pascoal Ranieri Mazzilli, à qui le Congrès, sous la pression des militaires brésiliens, vient de confier la présidence de la République. Quinze jours après ces événements, Mazzilli cède directement la présidence au maréchal Humberto Castelo Branco. La dictature militaire s'installe au palais du Planalto à Brasília jusqu'en 1985. Avec la bénédiction de Washington.
Arrivé au pouvoir en 1961, Goulart souhaitait engager une réforme agraire et nationaliser massivement les entreprises stratégiques de plusieurs secteurs (pétrole et énergie, mines, télécommunications, etc.), ce qui impliquait l'expropriation de sociétés américaines dominantes. Il entendait aussi mener une « politique étrangère indépendante ». Brasília avait rétabli fin 1961 ses relations diplomatiques avec l'Union soviétique (rompues depuis 1947) et amorcé de premiers échanges commerciaux avec la Chine maoïste. Quelques mois plus tard, lorsque Goulart refusa de soutenir la politique américaine contre Cuba, c'en fut trop pour Washington.
Le succès des putschistes en 1964 doit beaucoup au travail de l'Agence centrale de renseignement (CIA) et de l'Agence des États-Unis pour le développement international (Usaid). Lors des élections législatives d'octobre 1962, elles financent les forces d'opposition au gouvernement de Goulart, préparant ainsi l'entrée en scène ultérieure des militaires. La victoire des conjurés s'explique également par l'activisme de l'ambassadeur américain Lincoln Gordon, ainsi que celui de son attaché militaire, le colonel Vernon Walters, ami personnel du maréchal Branco. Les deux diplomates suivirent pendant des mois les préparatifs des conspirateurs.
Une époque révolue, un autre monde ? Assurément. La guerre froide n'est plus. Depuis le début du XXIe siècle, le Brésil fait partie des nouvelles puissances mondiales. Champion économique de l'Amérique latine, le pays pourrait s'ériger en première puissance agricole exportatrice mondiale dans les années à venir, devant les États-Unis. Riche de ressources naturelles colossales (première réserve mondiale d'eau douce, deuxième de terres rares, hydrocarbures, minerais, etc.), il s'invite régulièrement, comme en 2026, dans le club des dix plus grandes économies.
Membre fondateur des BRIC (avec la Russie, l'Inde et la Chine, bientôt rejointes par l'Afrique du Sud), il l'est également du G20 et dispose d'un réseau diplomatique étendu à plus de deux cents pays. Depuis 2009, la Chine est devenue son principal partenaire commercial. Le Brésil y exporte désormais plus qu'aux États-Unis et en Europe réunis. Oléagineux (soja essentiellement), produits agricoles, viande, pétrole et minerais constituent les principaux produits que Brasília fournit à la deuxième puissance mondiale. En 2025, les échanges entre les deux pays ont atteint 171 milliards de dollars, un record historique (2), et le Brésil s'est converti en première destination des investissements chinois dans le monde (infrastructures, transition énergétique, etc.).
Les deux premiers mandats du président de gauche Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (dit « Lula ») — entre 2003 et 2011 —, ainsi que ceux de sa successeure Dilma Rousseff, interrompus en 2016 par sa destitution, ont encouragé ces évolutions dans le cadre d'une stratégie de diversification similaire, dans ses principes, à celle voulue par Goulart à son époque. Cette politique s'est trouvée favorisée par l'entrée de la Chine au sein de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) en 2001 et l'ouverture de son gigantesque marché aux produits brésiliens, nécessaires à son propre développement. Elle a aussi bénéficié de la perte d'influence des États-Unis dans la région, alors qu'ils s'empêtraient dans leurs croisades contre le terrorisme. Pourtant, le fil des ingérences de Washington au Brésil ne s'est jamais rompu.
En 2013, le lanceur d'alerte et ancien employé de la CIA Edward Snowden révèle que l'Agence nationale de sécurité (NSA) espionne les communications personnelles de Mme Rousseff, ainsi que celles de plusieurs ministres et de dirigeants de Petrobras, l'entreprise nationale des hydrocarbures. À l'époque, le Brésil vient de découvrir d'importants gisements de pétrole en eau profonde — dits « pré-sal » (pré-salifères) — dans le bassin de Santos, situé au large de l'État de Rio. Les réserves sont estimées entre huit et douze milliards de barils de brut. L'opération de guerre économique cherche ainsi à fournir au gouvernement américain un maximum d'informations sur les gisements (taille, composition, réserves, etc.) et sur le cadre réglementaire qui déterminera l'attribution des concessions d'exploitation. L'objectif consiste également à connaître par avance chaque décision stratégique de Petrobras et à savoir dans quelle mesure la présidente Rousseff entend favoriser les positions des entreprises chinoises et russes dans ce négoce. Ces révélations provoquent une crise diplomatique inédite entre Brasília et Washington.
Quelques années plus tard, dans le cadre de l'affaire de corruption dite « Lava Jato » (« lavage à haute pression »), le juge Sergio Moro, chargé des investigations, ordonne en 2018 la détention de l'ancien président « Lula ». Éliminé de la course à l'élection présidentielle, qui promettait un duel entre l'ancien syndicaliste et le candidat d'extrême droite Jair Bolsonaro, il est libéré en 2019 avant d'être définitivement blanchi en 2021 par la justice brésilienne (3). Le site d'information The Intercept révèle en 2020 les liens secrets entretenus depuis 2015 par les enquêteurs brésiliens avec le département de la justice et le Bureau fédéral d'enquête (FBI) américains (4).
À l'insu de la hiérarchie judiciaire brésilienne, les premiers communiquent aux seconds des informations sensibles du dossier, que ces derniers utilisent ensuite pour sanctionner les sociétés Odebrecht (rebaptisée Novonor en 2020) et Petrobras, liées au scandale, en application du Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Cette législation vise les pratiques de corruption d'agents publics à l'étranger que Washington considère comme une distorsion du marché lésant les intérêts de ses propres entreprises (5). Elle permet au gouvernement américain d'attaquer n'importe quelle société dans le monde. Odebrecht et Petrobras, pivots majeurs de la stratégie d'influence économique du Brésil en Amérique latine et en Afrique, doivent s'acquitter d'amendes s'élevant à environ 3,5 milliards de dollars. L'ancien fleuron du BTP, surendetté, déclare son insolvabilité en 2019 et entre dans un processus de restructuration financière toujours en cours auprès des autorités locales.
« Nous ne sommes pas une colonie et nous ne serons la colonie de personne. » Le 7 septembre 2026, à l'occasion de la fête de l'indépendance, le président « Lula », qui brigue un quatrième mandat, dénonce dans un message vidéo les « puissances étrangères qui veulent transformer le Brésil en nouvelle colonie » et prévient : « Aucun gouvernement étranger n'a le droit de dire à qui nous pouvons acheter et à qui nous pouvons vendre. » Les États-Unis sont, bien sûr, visés. Depuis le retour au pouvoir de M. Donald Trump en 2025, les offensives de Washington se multiplient en effet contre Brasília.
L'ancien président Bolsonaro (2019-2023) a été condamné en 2025 pour tentative de coup d'État. Son clan familial bénéficie de tout le soutien de M. Trump. Le 16 juin dernier, M. Eduardo Bolsonaro, troisième fils du « capitaine », a été condamné à quatre ans de prison par la justice de son pays pour avoir sollicité — et obtenu — des autorités américaines l'application de sanctions commerciales contre le Brésil en représailles au procès de son père : une surtaxe douanière de 40 % est appliquée entre les mois d'août et novembre 2025 sur de nombreux produits en provenance du pays.
Washington soumet ainsi Brasília à des droits de douane assouplis ou renforcés en fonction de la conjoncture. Quelques semaines avant le premier tour des élections générales du 4 octobre, l'administration américaine, qui dispose de son candidat en la personne du sénateur Flávio Bolsonaro, l'aîné des fils de l'ancien président, impose 37,5 % de taxes sur plusieurs produits agricoles et miniers (dont l'acier). En réponse, le gouvernement brésilien examine la possibilité d'appliquer une loi de réciprocité tout en maintenant un canal de négociation avec les autorités américaines.
Sur le plan politique, ces dernières ne retiennent plus leurs coups et poursuivent une stratégie visant à décrédibiliser les institutions de la démocratie brésilienne, notamment ses systèmes électoral et judiciaire. M. Trump accuse régulièrement le Tribunal suprême fédéral (STF) d'avoir injustement condamné son ami. Aujourd'hui, M. Alexandre de Moraes, le juge à l'origine de cette décision, se trouve au cœur d'une nouvelle affaire de possible scandale politico-financier déchirant l'institution. De quoi réjouir, en pleine campagne électorale, le fils de l'ancien président et l'extrême droite, ainsi que Washington, qui envisage de placer le magistrat sous sanctions.
Ces événements interviennent tandis que la doctrine « Donroe » (néologisme né de la contraction de « Donald » et « Monroe ») entre dans une nouvelle phase. Celle-ci assigne trois principaux objectifs à la politique extérieure de Washington à destination de son ancienne « arrière-cour » : réorienter les ressources stratégiques régionales vers les chaînes de valeur et de production des États-Unis, imposer aux gouvernements locaux la prise en compte dans leurs politiques intérieures des exigences américaines en matière de lutte contre le narcotrafic et l'immigration, refouler du continent les « concurrents non hémisphériques » (la Chine) (6). Fondé au mois de mars dernier, le « Bouclier des Amériques » réunit, de M. Javier Milei (Argentine) à M. Nayib Bukele (Salvador), les vassaux latino-américains de M. Trump au sein d'une nouvelle alliance sécuritaire officiellement nécessaire pour lutter contre le « narcoterrorisme », les interférences étrangères et l'immigration. Elle comporte dix-neuf membres depuis l'adhésion de la Colombie dirigée par le nouveau président Abelardo de la Espriella.
Washington a annoncé la création dans ce cadre d'une « force opérationnelle interarmées de l'hémisphère occidental », chargée d'étendre à tout le continent les missions de l'opération « Lance du Sud », toujours en cours dans la Caraïbe. Pour sa part, le département d'État a élargi la liste des cartels latino-américains désignés « organisation terroriste étrangère ». Cette dénomination justifie, sur le plan juridique, l'intervention des forces armées américaines en dehors du territoire national. Au mois de mai dernier, M. Flávio Bolsonaro s'est rendu à la Maison Blanche pour demander — et obtenir — qu'elle soit appliquée à deux organisations brésiliennes : le Comando Vermelho (CV) et le Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC).
Au cours de ses voyages réguliers dans la région, le secrétaire d'État américain Marco Rubio multiplie, lui, les mises en garde contre la présence chinoise en Amérique latine. Il annonce de nouveaux accords de coopération sécuritaire. « C'est formidable de constater qu'à l'exception du Nicaragua, de Cuba, du Venezuela (…) et, bien sûr, du Brésil — bien que ce dernier soit en pleine campagne électorale — (…), notre région est peuplée d'alliés des États-Unis, de dirigeants amis des États-Unis, et suit une orientation favorable aux États-Unis (7) », affirmait-il, le 2 juin dernier, devant la commission des affaires étrangères du Sénat américain.
Dans un tel contexte, alors que le Brésil est aujourd'hui, avec son voisin uruguayen, le dernier pays dirigé par la gauche en Amérique du Sud et le principal contrepoids au projet d'emprise américaine sur la région, son gouvernement a-t-il eu tort de refuser la délivrance, le 24 juillet, de visas à deux fonctionnaires du département d'État américain ? Ces derniers affirmaient vouloir rencontrer sur place des responsables des autorités électorales, des dirigeants religieux et des représentants d'organisations sociales. Cette décision a immédiatement conduit Washington à révoquer le visa de l'ambassadrice du Brésil aux États-Unis. Comme un symbole, elle est intervenue trois semaines avant le lancement d'une campagne officielle pour déterminer qui, du candidat soutenu par M. Trump ou du président sortant, dirigera la première puissance latino-américaine dans quelques mois.
(1) Lyndon B. Johnson, « Message to the new president of Brazil », 2 avril 1964, The American Presidency Project, université de Californie.
(2) « Brazil-China trade hits record in 2025, reaching $171 billion », Global Times, Pékin, 14 janvier 2026.
(3) Lire Perry Anderson, « Au Brésil, les arcanes d'un coup d'État judiciaire », et Fernando Morais, « Résister ou se rendre ? », Le Monde diplomatique, respectivement septembre 2019 et septembre 2024.
(4) Andrew Fishman, Natalia Viana et Maryam Saleh, « Keep it confidential. The secret history of US involvement in Brazil's scandal-wracked Operation Car Wash », The Intercept, 12 mars 2020.
(5) Lire Jean-Michel Quatrepoint, « Au nom de la loi… américaine », Le Monde diplomatique, janvier 2017.
(6) Lire « M. Trump, pirate des Caraïbes », Le Monde diplomatique, janvier 2026.
(7) « Secretary of state Marco Rubio before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the FY27 department of state budget request », département d'État, 2 juin 2026.
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