The more technology distances the actor, the more responsibility must increase.

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From person to target

What becomes of humanity when technology becomes capable of recognising, classifying, tracking and ultimately killing human beings without those carrying out the strikes ever having seen them? My friend Mohammad Reza Dehshiri asked this very question, and his answer is a powerful one. The danger, he writes, is not artificial intelligence but artificial inhumanity – that is, the possibility that machines will become more accurate precisely as humans cease to feel responsible for what those machines do in their name.

With this article, I am launching a series that takes Dehshiri’s analysis as its starting point and attempts to take it further. If the problem is ‘artificial inhumanity’, the answer cannot lie in a ‘more ethical’ AI, as if ethics were a module to be installed as an afterthought to a system that has already been designed. We need to reclaim a category that technological jargon has rendered almost unmentionable: human intelligence, understood not as a remnant to be protected amidst the complexities of automation, but as a form of knowledge with its own distinct characteristics, which no increase in computing power can replace.

I shall call it Human Intelligence, and the ambiguity is deliberate. In intelligence service jargon, HUMINT refers to the oldest of the intelligence disciplines: that which relies on people, sources, languages and the patient frequenting of places. In philosophical terminology, the expression denotes the faculty of understanding. The thesis of this first contribution is that these two meanings now converge, and that their convergence has geopolitical implications that extend far beyond the debate on the ethics of weaponry.

We can describe the operational chain of contemporary warfare in seven stages: detect, identify, classify, predict, prioritise, target, strike. Each link can be technically refined without the sequence, taken as a whole, being morally refined. The resulting phenomenon is called the ‘datafication of human life’: the individual reduced to an identity, a location, a behavioural pattern, a threat score.

This is no abstraction. In April 2024, an investigation by Yuval Abraham for +972 Magazine and Local Call described ‘Lavender’, a system used by the Israeli armed forces in Gaza to assign tens of thousands of people a probability of affiliation with armed groups. According to internal sources cited in the investigation, the human verification of each name often amounted to no more than twenty seconds – the time needed to ascertain that the target was male. The Israeli Defence Forces have disputed this account and described Lavender as a database designed to support analysts. Even if one accepts the official version, however, the crux of the matter remains: a human operator was present, and their presence was not sufficient to transform the system’s recommendation into a judgement.

Cognitive psychology has a name for this phenomenon, automation bias: the tendency of those working with an automated system to treat its recommendations as a substitute for their own verification, and to fail to seek out the information that might contradict them. Back in 1976, Joseph Weizenbaum – who had built one of the first conversational programmes in history – already distinguished between the ability to calculate and the ability to judge, and argued that there are tasks that should not be entrusted to a computer even if the computer were capable of performing them. Half a century on, this distinction has become even more pressing. Computation works on what has already been translated into data. Judgement must decide whether that translation has been faithful.

Dehshiri drives the point home with four distinctions: technical precision is not ethical precision; accuracy is not justice; automation is not responsibility; technological superiority is not moral superiority. I would add a fifth, of an epistemic nature, upon which the others depend: correlation is not understanding. A machine-learning system recognises statistical patterns in a dataset. It does not know what a school is, because it does not know what a child is, and it does not even know that it does not know this.

L’iraniano cites an interesting case study: On 28 February 2026, in the early hours of the war, the Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school in Minab, in Hormozgan province, was struck several times during school hours. The figures provided by the Iranian authorities range between 150 and 175 deaths, the vast majority of whom were girls, along with dozens of teachers and a few parents; the district prosecutor put the final death toll at 156. Washington has never directly acknowledged its responsibility nor published the findings of the Pentagon’s investigation. Amnesty International has described the incident, at best, as a serious intelligence failure.

There is one detail, revealed by satellite imagery, which shifts the analysis from the moral to the factual plane. According to Western media, the school stood next to a naval base belonging to the Revolutionary Guards and had previously formed part of it; among the explanations circulating in US circles is that of out-of-date targeting data. If this hypothesis were confirmed, Minab would not be a case of a machine making a mistake, but of a database that had ceased to correspond to reality. The building had changed. The data had not.

No classification algorithm, however sophisticated, can detect that an old military building has become a school if no one has recorded the change. Everyone living in Minab knew this: the parents who took their daughters to school every morning, the schoolbus driver, the teachers. This is precisely the kind of knowledge that HUMINT gathers and that remote warfare tends to regard as superfluous, because it is slow, costly and difficult to scale. Based on publicly available sources, US responsibility appears highly probable, whilst the exact circumstances remain unclear and confidence on this point is low: a database error, a classification error, or a conscious acceptance of the risk. The three hypotheses, however, all converge on the same question. Who, prior to the strike, checked whether there were people in that building?

Beyond ‘human-in-the-loop’

The international debate has long been content with the principle of human-in-the-loop, whereby a human being is part of the decision-making loop.

This formula is insufficient: a person may be present in the loop yet merely rubber-stamp the algorithm’s recommendation. He proposes replacing it with a more demanding principle, which he calls humanity-in-command: the effective ability to question, reject, override and halt the automated process.

The history of the Cold War offers two examples that clarify what this means in practice. On 26 September 1983, the Soviet early-warning system Oko signalled the launch of five ballistic missiles from the United States. The officer on duty, Stanislav Petrov, dismissed the alarm as a false alarm and did not report it as an ongoing attack, reasoning that a first American strike would never consist of just five missiles. He was right: the satellite had mistaken the sun’s reflection off the clouds for missile launches. Twenty-one years earlier, on 27 October 1962, in the Caribbean Sea, the Soviet submarine B-59, isolated and under fire from signal depth charges, was on the verge of launching a nuclear-tipped torpedo. The launch required the consent of the three senior officers on board, and Vasily Arkhipov refused to give it.

In neither case did the man approve a recommendation from the system. He contradicted it. And he did not do so because he had more data: indeed, the data were the problem. He did so because he knew how to ask himself a question that no procedure required him to ask, namely whether what he was seeing made sense in the context of everything else he knew about the world. Petrov was familiar with American nuclear doctrine; Archipov knew the difference between an attack and a threat. It is this ability to compare the signal with the bigger picture, the detail with what is plausible, that I call Human Intelligence. It is worth noting that the Dena was sunk by a submarine. We do not know what its officers were asked, nor what scope they had for judgement.

This proposal needs to be clarified, as there is a risk of reducing it to a generic humanistic appeal. Human Intelligence, as I understand it, is structured across three distinct levels, each of which marks a structural – rather than contingent – limit of artificial intelligence.

The first level is epistemic. The scholastic tradition distinguished between intellectus, the act by which the mind immediately grasps a truth, and ratio, the discursive process of moving from one element to another: for Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 8), the two are not distinct faculties but aspects of a single intellect, in which reasoning begins with an understanding and returns to an understanding. Current machine learning systems realise a ratio of unprecedented power, capable of inferring, combining and predicting on scales inaccessible to the human mind. They lack the aspect of intellectus, that is, a grasp of the meaning of what they process. This is a philosophical thesis and must be presented as such, but it has precise practical consequences: a system devoid of understanding cannot know when its own model of the world has become false.

The second aspect is practical. Prudentia, in the Thomist definition, is right reason applied to action, and its specific task consists in applying the universal principle to the particular case. The machine generalises: its value lies in mapping the individual case back to a class. Prudence does the opposite, because it must recognise what, in this particular case, falls outside the class. War, which is the realm of the singular and the unforeseen, is the arena where this difference carries the most weight. The Vatican’s Antiqua et nova note of January 2025 took up this line of thought, emphasising the embodied and relational nature of human intelligence and its irreducibility to a mere processing function.

The third level is relational, and it is here that philosophical meaning meets that of the intelligence services. Sherman Kent, who effectively founded the field of intelligence studies in the post-war United States, defined it first and foremost as knowledge, even before organising or activity. HUMINT is the form of this knowledge that passes through the other as a person: someone who speaks their language, knows their customs, can read a neighbourhood, and can distinguish a festival from a rally. Over the last three decades, the major powers have progressively shifted resources towards technical disciplines, from signals intelligence to satellite surveillance, right through to data fusion platforms. Minab illustrates the cost of this imbalance.

None of this implies a rejection of technology. Human Intelligence does not stand in opposition to AI in the same way that a manual stands in opposition to a mechanic. It establishes a hierarchy: the algorithm as a tool subservient to a judgement it cannot produce on its own. And from this it derives a principle, formulated by Dehshiri, which deserves to become an operational criterion: the more technology distances the actor from the consequences of their own actions, the more the conscious responsibility of the decision-maker must increase, not decrease.

Geopolitically speaking

So far, the issue might seem to be one of moral philosophy. It is not merely that. The distribution of algorithmic warfare capability is a distribution of power, and the rules governing it will be written – if they are written at all – by those with an interest in limiting them as little as possible.

The state of international law confirms this. The group of government experts established under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has been discussing lethal autonomous weapons systems since 2017 without having reached a binding instrument. In November 2023, the United States promoted a political declaration on the responsible military use of AI, which is by definition non-binding; in December of the same year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the first resolution dedicated to these systems, whilst the International Committee of the Red Cross has been calling since 2021 for a ban on unpredictable autonomous systems and those designed to target human beings. In June 2024, speaking at the G7 summit in Borgo Egnazia, Pope Francis called for no machine ever to be placed in a position to decide on a person’s life. The gap between these positions and the reality on the battlefields of 2026 is measured in casualties.

There is also a deeper asymmetry. Those who control the data decide who is a target, and the victims of algorithmic warfare are largely found outside the West: in Gaza, Iran, the Sahel and Yemen. For states that do not produce the platforms or control their databases, human intelligence thus becomes a matter of sovereignty. A country that maintains linguistic expertise, regional knowledge and human intelligence networks retains its autonomy of judgement; a country that entrusts its worldview to systems designed elsewhere – often by private companies – surrenders it along with its data. In an order tending towards multipolarity, this distinction will separate the actors who judge from those who are judged.

This leads to a concrete proposal, which I shall develop in future articles. Alongside the general principle of meaningful human oversight, international humanitarian law could codify a specific obligation for human verification of the civil status of every fixed infrastructure included on a list of targets, with an expiry date beyond which the information becomes invalid and must be renewed using direct sources. This is a minimum standard. Applied to Minab, it would have required someone to ask whether that building was still what the records stated it to be.

Technology can determine how a weapon reaches its target, whilst it is up to humanity to decide whether that target should be struck. The question underlying all this is who, in practical terms, exercises that humanity, with what tools of knowledge and within which institutions. In Minab, someone should have known that there was a school there. The fact that nobody knew, or that nobody asked, is the point from which we must start again.

By Kit KLARENBERG

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Private messages show show Hamish De Bretton-Gordon, a top British pundit on the Salisbury poisoning incident, was a close associate of the MI6 officer who handled the Russian intelligence defector at the center of the scandal — and reaped considerable benefits from his proximity to the case.

This September, a former British Army officer named Hamish De Bretton-Gordon filed a column with the UK Telegraph complaining that “Russian bots” had “tried to make out that I’m part of a security service conspiracy.” Having shot to prominence as a media commentator on chemical and biological weapons after the alleged poisoning of turncoat Russian spy Sergei Skripal, De Bretton-Gordon dismissed accusations that he collaborated with UK intelligence as the product of the “Kremlin’s malign tactics.”

Despite his fervent denials, leaked emails reviewed by The Grayzone indicate that De Bretton-Gordon has spent years privately coordinating his public statements with senior British military and intelligence figures. The correspondences show him training operatives in Turkey and instructing Israeli military figures on Syria’s still-elusive stockpile of chemical weapons, “and a bit of Novichok,” referring to the Russian toxin supposedly used to poison Skripal.

They also suggest he stood to profit personally from exaggerating the threat posed by Russia. In the emails, De Bretton-Gordon described his day job as “flogging gas masks” to British military and law enforcement. He seemingly grew his firm’s business with outlandish warnings of imminent Novichok hand grenade attacks by Russian agents. As his prominence grew, the BBC hired De Bretton-Gordon to serve as an advisor on a drama about the Skripal poisoning.

His principal contact listed in the emails is Pablo Miller, an MI6 officer and veteran of the Royal Tank Regiment. Miller is widely believed to have recruited and handled Skripal before the Russian GRU defector was allegedly poisoned in Salisbury, England in March 2018 under questionable circumstances.

After the Salisbury incident, the British government issued a D-notice to prevent mainstream reporters from investigating Miller’s relationship with Skripal. Despite being an obvious subject of interest, Miller went completely unmentioned during the rolling coverage that dominated British media for months as a result.

The emails show Miller was nonetheless following that coverage closely. In June 2018, he wrote to De Bretton-Gordon thanking him for his “sterling media work” during what he called the “dark days of March and April.” During that period De Bretton-Gordon appeared in British newspapers and television reports on the poisoning on a near-daily basis, consistently attributing blame to the Kremlin without evidence and emphasizing the chemical weapons threat he claimed Russia posed.

The next month, De Bretton-Gordon sent his MI6 pal a lengthy Telegraph article warning of potential all-out chemical and biological wars with “rogue” states. De Bretton-Gordon’s commentary featured extensively in the piece, which framed Britain as a sitting duck in the event that Moscow were to target the country with missiles equipped with nerve agents or other toxic weapons.

When not hyping up De Bretton-Gordon’s apocalyptic warnings of potential Russian chemical weapons attacks, the article functioned as a long-form infomercial for his then-employer, Avon Protection Systems. The firm, which manufactures protective equipment for military, law enforcement and fire personnel, stood to profit handsomely from inflated perceptions of what governments call Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. De Bretton-Gordon’s email signature at the time identified him as the company’s Managing Director for CBRN.

De Bretton-Gordon’s big break

The Telegraph noted the company’s business was “booming,” with orders “flooding in” from government clients the world over, supposedly reflecting how “a new age of poison weapons is upon us.” Later in the piece, an Avon executive boasted that the Salisbury incident and other recent alleged CBRN usage had “been good for us.” Britain’s elite SAS were among the cited customers for the “sinister looking” gas masks sold by Avon Protection Systems, which were said to be “worthy of Darth Vader.”

At no point did the Telegraph article mention De Bretton-Gordon’s employment by Avon.

But thanks to his newfound media prominence, De Bretton-Gordon wouldn’t have to stay with the company much longer. In January 2020, he emailed Pablo Miller bragging that he had “been offered a fellowship” at Cambridge University. De Bretton-Gordon wrote that he’d decided to accept the role because, in his words, “it beats flogging gas masks!”

Four months later, De Bretton-Gordon founded a dedicated personal “CBRN and bio security” consulting firm, in an apparent attempt to derive profit from his talent for stoking public fears of looming chemical and biological catastrophe.

De Bretton-Gordon helps MI6 officer avoid media scrutiny

The leaked emails show De Bretton-Gordon quickly emerged as a preferred adviser for the BBC, and repeatedly served as a go-between for Miller and the British broadcaster, whose journalists had apparently become aware that Miller was an MI6 officer.

Correspondence from November 2018 shows De Bretton-Gordon was also rewarded for his relentless media appearances with a position as a “senior CBRN mentor” in Britain’s Ministry of Defence. Though the work was unpaid, he received an MOD ID card and Ministry railcard, saving him substantial sums on train travel. De Bretton-Gordon wrote Miller to inform him of his new title, noting that he was currently advising the BBC on what he derided as “CBRN ‘pisch’” for a forthcoming “drama on Salisbury.”

“I’ve been asked by the writer if you would be interested in contributing,” he mentioned to Miller, adding that he’d told the British broadcasters that the spy was unlikely to agree. The MI6 veteran responded, “you correctly guessed my answer to the BBC question… it would not be appropriate for me to comment in public on the issue.”

Miller lamented that the British state broadcaster’s cognizance of his clandestine involvement with Skripal indicated his “true professional provenance” had “long ceased to be much of a secret.” But he wished De Bretton-Gordon good luck, telling his colleague that he was sure the drama would succeed given his “expert guidance.”

The next January, De Bretton-Gordon explicitly described Skripal as Miller’s friend when forwarding him a Forces News article on the removal of the roof of the Russian defector’s former home, excitedly informing him, “I see your mate is in the news again!”

De Bretton-Gordon was quoted liberally in the report, explaining it was necessary to remove the roof as it had allegedly accumulated “enough Novichok to kill thousands of people.” The chemical warrior claimed British authorities were now “much better prepared to deal” with future CBRN attacks in the aftermath of the incident.

Weeks later, De Bretton-Gordon emailed Miller to warn him Salisbury “will be awash with journos” on the March 4 anniversary of Skripal’s poisoning. In response, Miller thanked his friend for the “heads-up,” and wrote that he’d likely be leaving the country to ensure he was far away from the city while it filled up with reporters.

The correspondence also reveals how close the two men had become, and how their relationship had begun to blur into commercial territory. In October 2019, Miller asked De Bretton-Gordon to help publicize a Kickstarter for his daughter’s theatre production — a personal favor suggesting a friendship rather than a purely professional engagement. But Miller refused to let media contacts anywhere near it, explaining that following the Salisbury incident his daughters were forced to close their social media accounts after being relentlessly hounded by the press.

During the same exchange, De Bretton-Gordon reminded Miller he’d been contracted for an upcoming BBC drama on Salisbury, and once again offered him a role. Miller declined, saying he was firmly opposed to playing “any part for any BBC show. Ever.” De Bretton-Gordon defended his participation in the project by revealing that the MOD had specifically requested he “help on the Salisbury piece… to make sure the military bit looks right.”

The production in question was a three-part BBC One series that aired in 2020 called “The Salisbury Poisonings.” The project’s IMDB page lists De Bretton-Gordon as a “military advisor.”

De Bretton-Gordon wants critics “prosecuted for treason”

As The Grayzone previously revealed, De Bretton-Gordon played a deeply malign, multifaceted role throughout the Syrian dirty war. On top of endless media appearances as a bogus “expert” on CBRN matters, he was part of a covert MI6 effort to smuggle soil samples out of opposition-controlled areas in an effort to prove the Syrian government used chemical weapons. A report on this initiative in the Mirror tabloid made clear the purpose of British intelligence was prodding the US into military intervention against Assad.

It seems plausible whatever samples De Bretton-Gordon gathered in Syria were concocted, perhaps by his own hand. He provided evidence to a number of official investigations into purported chemical attacks during the conflict. In at least one instance – an OPCW/UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) probe into an alleged April 2014 toxic gas strike in Talmenes – videos submitted by an opaque NGO De Bretton-Gordon founded called CBRN Taskforce were found to show clear signs of falsification.

De Bretton-Gordon’s communications with his spy buddy contain references to him visiting Turkey, “to do a bit of training.” The country was the central hub for MI6 and CIA operations during the dirty war on Syria. It is an open question whether his training sessions covered staging chemical weapons attacks, and if other states in the region were taught in this dark art.

 

The self-styled CBRN expert also bragged about sharing his purported expertise with the Israeli military. In an email sent in December of 2018 De Bretton-Gordon boasted to Miller that he’d just returned “from Israel,” where he said he’d been “briefing the IDF (and no doubt others!) on Syrian [chemical weapons] and a bit of Novichok.”

He was clearly impressed by the Israelis, crowing, “Those boys don’t mess about!”

De Bretton-Gordon’s work overseas was apparently taking a toll on his day job, however. In an email that month to Miller, he explained how he was “always on the edge of sacking with all my ‘extra’ activities.” These machinations also put him in conflict with Peter Ford, Britain’s ambassador to Syria from 2003 to 2006, who’d become an outspoken critic of the dirty war against Damascus.

After De Bretton-Gordon authored an op-ed for The Telegraph in May 2019 demanding the West intervene to prevent Syrian government forces from recapturing Syria’s Idlib, Ford issued a response nailing his failure to acknowledge that the province was at the time under the control of the MI6-supported Al Qaeda affiliate, Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham.

In response, De Bretton-Gordon emailed Miller a note deriding Ford as a “complete See You Next Tuesday” who parroted “Assad and Putin propaganda.” He called for Ford – and the members of a now-defunct collective of antiwar academics known as the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media – to be “prosecuted for treason.” De Bretton-Gordon seemed particularly piqued that the academic collective had poked holes in the narrative he’d spun about Syrian chemical attacks.

De Bretton-Gordon cheers as his enemies “exposed”

In August that year, De Bretton-Gordon contacted Miller to celebrate The Times publishing a hit piece on David Miller, a member of the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media.

“Glad to see that some of Assad’s and Putin’s ‘useful idiots’ who try and give me a hard time are being exposed,” De Bretton-Gordon cheered, before suggesting “must get more of them out in the open.”

This prompted a wider discussion about the so-called “stooges” who publicly challenged established, MI6-approved media narratives on Syria and Russia.

For his part, Pablo Miller expressed disgust over a recent “fawning evaluation” of Putin’s 20 years in power by dissident journalist Mary Dejevsky. Miller derided Dejevsky as one of many media figures who foolishly believed “Putin was the answer to Russia’s woes,” and suggested without evidence that she was likely “taking Moscow gold.” Thankfully, he added, events “Crimea, Syria, and Salisbury” had managed to “wake the twits up.”

The slanted manner in which these events were framed in the media did indeed coincide with a perceptibly negative shift in public sentiment towards Russia throughout the West, helping make a world-threatening standoff with Moscow a fait accompli. At every step, De Bretton-Gordon and other intelligence-aligned commentators acted as military and intelligence propagandists, ensuring the media and popular culture was constantly deluged with paranoia over a multi-spectrum Russian “threat.” Those who question the narrative are denigrated as “useful idiots,” and much worse.

This August 6, De Bretton-Gordon based an entire op-ed for the Telegraph on a conversation he’d recently had with an unnamed “Western intelligence officer” of his acquaintance. Could that anonymous spy have been Pablo Miller?

The self-styled chemical warfare expert was clearly not keen to discuss his relationship with the MI6 man. De Bretton-Gordon immediately hung up the phone when I reached him and identified myself as a journalist.

Original article:  thegrayzone.com

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Russian forces appear to use AI to plan air attacks and recognize targets amid raids on Ukrainian cities. This may include recent air attacks on Odesa that have come in waves with short gaps, Deputy Air Force Commander for Air Defense Colonel Yurii Cherevashenko says, Ukrinform reports.

Russia has already equipped its jet-powered Geran-4 drones with machine vision, allowing them to recognize and track targets on their own in the final seconds of flight. Recently, a single jet drone hit a locomotive in Odesa Oblast in late September and killed two railway workers.

The scale of Russia's AI use is hard to measure, Cherevashenko continues, but Ukrainian specialists already see its elements in how attacks are organized. The long, wave-by-wave strikes on Odesa would be far harder to plan and coordinate without it, he believes.

"Russian forces use AI to lay out attack routes and to recognize targets," Cherevashenko says, framing it as his own assessment rather than a confirmed fact.

The sea is harder to defend than land

Odesa Oblast is home to the biggest port in Ukraine, "Southern". Protecting it is a challenging task as guarding the airspace over water is tougher than over land, Cherevashenko says. Some air defense assets do not perform as well at sea, and in some cases, crews can intercept a target only as it approaches.

Weather adds to the problem, with storms and fog, while the open sea gives Russia more freedom to choose drone routes and launch points. To protect ports and the coast, Ukraine uses drone motherships, platforms that carry other drones aloft to extend their flight time and keep watch over set areas.

Ukraine answers AI with AI

Ukraine is also building its own AI for air defense. Automated turrets using machine vision now help counter Russian drones. According to Army Media, the Air Force says such turrets have scored their first shoot-downs, including of Geran-5 jet drones, with one soldier saying 50 rounds were enough to bring down a Geran.

Ukraine's Defense Ministry is going further. In late September, it unveiled an AI system called SPECTR, built by its A1 Artificial Intelligence Center and already in testing with several combat units, to analyze battlefield data, predict Russian moves, and suggest options to commanders.

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Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has applied to register her voice as an EU trademark, seeking an additional legal tool against artificial-intelligence systems capable of cloning politicians’ voices and producing convincing fake recordings.

Giorgia Meloni has applied to register her voice with the European Union Intellectual Property Office as governments and public figures look for new ways to counter increasingly convincing AI-generated deepfakes.

The Italian prime minister submitted a short audio recording in which she says “Io sono Giorgia Meloni” — “I am Giorgia Meloni” — to the EUIPO on Monday.

The four-second recording forms part of an application for a sound trademark intended to strengthen legal protection against unauthorised use of her voice.

The application filed with the EU intellectual-property system is currently listed as under examination. It is linked to categories including downloadable multimedia material, cultural activities and the organisation of political events.

Registration would not give Meloni ownership over every recording or imitation of her voice, nor would it automatically prevent AI systems from reproducing it.

It could, however, provide another legal basis for challenging certain commercial or misleading uses where the protected sound mark is employed without authorisation.

The distinction between a trademark and copyright is important in this case. Meloni has applied to protect a sound identifier through EU trademark law rather than to establish general copyright ownership over the natural characteristics of her voice.

Her application comes as voice-cloning technology becomes increasingly accessible.

Modern generative-AI systems can create convincing synthetic speech from relatively small samples of recorded audio. The technology is used legitimately for dubbing, accessibility and media production, but it can also be used for fraud, impersonation and political disinformation.

Meloni herself has previously been targeted by manipulated images and other deepfake material. She has also taken legal action in Italy over sexually explicit deepfake images created using her likeness.

The problem has acquired additional importance for politicians because synthetic recordings can be produced and circulated rapidly during election campaigns.

A false recording no longer requires sophisticated audio-editing equipment or extensive access to the target. Public figures provide large quantities of clean audio through speeches, television appearances, podcasts and social-media video — precisely the material needed to train voice-cloning systems.

The EU has already begun imposing specific transparency requirements on synthetic content.

EU Today reported in August that new provisions under the EU AI Act require certain AI-generated or manipulated audio, images and video to be marked in machine-readable form and impose disclosure obligations for deepfake material.

Those rules address transparency rather than ownership.

Trademark law potentially offers a different route by allowing an individual or organisation to claim rights over a specific sound used as a commercial or identifying mark.

Sound trademarks are not new. Companies have long registered jingles, tones and other distinctive audio signatures. What is unusual in Meloni’s application is the attempt by a serving head of government to use the system partly as protection against AI impersonation.

The phrase chosen for the application is itself closely associated with Meloni’s political identity.

“Io sono Giorgia” became widely recognised following a 2019 speech in which she described herself as a woman, mother, Italian and Christian. The phrase subsequently became the basis of online remixes before being adopted as the title of her autobiography.

Other performers have also sought stronger protection for their voices as generative AI improves.

Italian singer Giusy Ferreri has filed a similar application, while actors and musicians internationally have pressed governments and technology companies to prevent unauthorised voice cloning.

Meloni’s filing is unlikely on its own to settle the broader legal question of whether an individual can effectively control AI reproductions of his or her voice.

It does, however, illustrate how existing intellectual-property law is being tested against technology that can reproduce personal characteristics that were previously difficult to copy convincingly.

The EUIPO must now determine whether Meloni’s application satisfies the requirements for registration. Until that process is completed, the filing remains an application rather than an approved EU trademark.

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In the first half of 2026, UK AI companies raised €12.6 billion, which is more than the rest of the European Union combined. If the UK were to re-enter the EU, as Prime Minister Andy Burnham suggested last week, it would join a regulatory regime that makes a large part of those investments obsolete.

AI was one of the rare Brexit success stories, precisely because the UK chose regulatory divergence. After Brexit, the EU embarked on a frenzy of tech regulation: on AI, crypto, digital services and digital markets. The UK pursued a softer regulatory approach in all of these sectors, especially AI. On re-entry, the country would have to accept the EU’s AI regulation lock, stock and barrel, in what is known as the acquis communautaire. This is not a negotiation between UK regulation and that of Brussels. There may be transitional periods, but any new entrant has to adopt the entirety of the EU regulatory framework.

Continental Europe’s AI ventures have been mostly disappointing. Companies such as Germany’s Aleph Alpha and France’s Mistral started out with the ambition to produce frontier models and challenge global market leaders. Both are still around, albeit with reduced ambitions. They are now focused on implementation, with Mistral the more successful of the two, having raised some $3 billion in a funding round earlier this month. Still, this pales in comparison to the US, whose AI industry has invested over $500 billion so far this year.

The European commentariat has been insisting for some time now that the global AI investment boom will hit a wall, in doing so underestimating the technology’s economic significance and overestimating its dangers. These journalists share a lack of interest in a capital markets union as a precondition for making large AI investments possible. If AI succeeds, Europe will not partake fully.

In a parallel universe, there might be a situation where the EU, under more strategic leadership, would regard a Brexit reversal as an opportunity to accomplish two tasks at once. These would involve building an EU-wide capital market on top of the UK’s financial sector, and piggy-backing on Britain’s more successful regulatory regime for AI, quietly dropping its own AI Act in the process.

This is unlikely to happen, with a more probable outcome being that AI emerges as an unexpected obstacle during re-entry negotiations, as tech companies warn the UK Government that their investments are at risk in a more restrictive regulatory environment. Britain, in turn, would be shocked to find out that the EU is not ready to accept its regulatory regime as the more successful one.

If the issue of Britain rejoining the EU came up today, Rejoiners would no doubt argue that the benefits of the single market outweigh the costs of losing an edge in AI. A snapshot of current economic activity might go some way towards vindicating this assessment. But in three or four years’ time, the situation will be quite different. In any case, it is never a good idea to base economic judgements on snapshots. The dynamic interactions are far more important.

This story ties in with speculation around a coming financial crisis. The rise in US bond yields this week reflects worries about future inflation and interest rates. What weighs against this negative sentiment is the hope of a positive productivity shock due to AI. An EU that does not invest in AI will not benefit from higher productivity, but will suffer the consequences of a global sovereign debt crisis. One need only remember how the global financial crisis, which had its origins in the US mortgage market, ended up almost killing the EU’s monetary union. Static Rejoiner thinking could have very serious consequences indeed.

Original article: unherd.com

Brazil’s alignment with Europe amid current geopolitical tensions poses a serious threat to Brazil’s traditional policy of neutrality.

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On September 30, all major Brazilian newspapers published a report stating that the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) had allegedly warned European authorities about supposed simultaneous interference by the United States and Russia in Brazilian elections. The case raises questions that go far beyond the 2026 electoral dispute. The central issue is the accusation against Moscow, as well as the political and institutional circumstances in which it was presented.

Within Brazil’s intelligence system, Abin is institutionally linked to the Presidency of the Republic, while the Federal Police, another intelligence-related institution in the country, has stronger links to the Judiciary. Its function is to produce strategic information to assist the Brazilian government. Therefore, when representatives of Brazilian intelligence inform foreign authorities that Russia is interfering in the electoral process, it is inevitable to ask to what extent this assessment reflects the political position of the government that controls the agency.

The issue becomes even more significant because, according to the information released, the European delegation received an accusation concerning Russian interference without substantial details about its nature being made public. No agents, operations, funding mechanisms, propaganda structures, or specific campaigns attributed to Moscow have been identified, at least in the material made public so far. There is therefore an accusation, but its foundations remain largely unknown.

This creates a particularly convenient situation for certain political actors. Europe – which is hostile toward both Russia and Trump – receives information suggesting that Washington and Moscow are attempting to influence the Brazilian elections. This would allow Brussels – and especially France and Germany, currently Lula’s key “friends” – to potentially “support” Brazil in “counter-intelligence” efforts aimed at combating alleged US and Russian influence. In other words, the accusation of interference, even in the absence of evidence, could serve as a pretext to justify actual interference (by Europe).

There is also a broader political issue. A significant portion of the Brazilian left has consolidated in recent years an unfounded interpretation according to which Vladimir Putin belongs to a kind of “far-right international movement,” alongside Donald Trump and other Western conservative leaders. This interpretation places Russia, Trump, and the Brazilian right within the same international political camp, despite profound differences between their respective positions and interests.

Within this framework, associating Russia with a potential Flávio Bolsonaro candidacy becomes politically convenient. Flávio is identified with Trump, the Republican Party, and the American right. The existence of an alleged Russian connection would allow the Brazilian electoral dispute to be incorporated into a broader international narrative in which different conservative forces are presented as parts of the same network of influence.

However, it is absolutely obvious that Russia has no interest whatsoever in interfering in the Brazilian elections to favor either side. Furthermore, the majority of pro-Russia activists in Brazil identify with the left or remain neutral regarding both sides of national politics. The accusation appears to be made simply to please the European Union, given that Europeans prefer Lula to Flávio (as the latter is subordinate to Trump). The lack of details substantiating the accusations only reinforces this point.

The truly relevant question is different: why did an intelligence agency subordinate to the Presidency of the Republic present European authorities with an accusation against Russia without its foundations subsequently being clarified? And why is this happening precisely during preparations for the Brazilian elections and at a time of extraordinary deterioration in relations between Russia and Europe?

The answer to these questions matters because Brazil is operating in an increasingly polarized international environment. Russia occupies a central position within the BRICS and maintains strategic relations with Brazil, while Europe is going through a period of growing confrontation with Moscow. In this context, any official Brazilian information associating Russia with an electoral interference operation carries serious diplomatic consequences.

Moreover, tensions between Russia and Europe are increasing, and there is a real risk of conflict due to Europe’s continued provocations. Clearly, in such a context, it is not in Brazil’s interest to become part of either side of the crisis. But nothing could be more damaging to Brazil’s policy of neutrality than reporting a formal accusation against Russia to the European Union.

In theory, it is possible that the report was delivered to European authorities without prior communication to the Brazilian president – although this seems highly unlikely. If Lula wants to preserve Brazil’s neutrality, the appropriate course of action would be to publicly disavow Abin and apologize for the incident. The question, however, is whether he would actually be willing to do so, considering that the European Union is currently the Lula government’s main international “ally”.

Alinhamento do Brasil à Europa em meio às atuais tensões geopolítica cria uma ameaça grave à política tradicional de neutralidade do Brasil.

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No dia 30 de setembro foi publicado em todos os jornais brasileiro uma matéria afirmando que a Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (Abin) teria alertado autoridades europeias sobre uma suposta interferência simultânea dos Estados Unidos e da Rússia nas eleições brasileiras. O caso levanta questões que vão muito além da disputa eleitoral de 2026. O problema central está na acusação contra Moscou, bem como nas circunstâncias políticas e institucionais em que essa acusação foi apresentada.

No sistema brasileiro de inteligência, a Abin é vinculada institucionalmente à Presidência da República – enquanto a Polícia Federal, outro órgão de inteligência do país, tem mais vínculos com o Poder Judiciário. Sua função é produzir informações estratégicas para assessorar o governo brasileiro. Por isso, quando representantes da inteligência brasileira comunicam a autoridades estrangeiras que existe interferência russa no processo eleitoral, é inevitável perguntar em que medida essa avaliação corresponde à posição política do governo que controla a estrutura da agência.

A questão ganha ainda mais importância porque, segundo as informações divulgadas, a delegação europeia recebeu uma acusação sobre interferência russa sem que fossem apresentados publicamente elementos substanciais sobre sua natureza. Não foram identificados, ao menos no material tornado público, agentes, operações, mecanismos de financiamento, estruturas de propaganda ou campanhas específicas atribuídas a Moscou. Existe, portanto, uma acusação, mas seus fundamentos permanecem praticamente desconhecidos.

Isso produz uma situação particularmente conveniente para determinados atores políticos. A Europa, que é hostil à Rússia e a Trump, recebe uma informação segundo a qual tanto Washington quanto Moscou estariam tentando influenciar as eleições brasileiras. Isso permitiria a Bruxelas – e ainda mais especialmente à França e à Alemanha, que são os principais “amigos” de Lula atualmente – eventualmente “apoiar” o Brasil em ações de “contrainteligência” para combater a suposta influência estadunidense e russa. Em outras palavras, a acusação de interferência, mesmo sem provas, pode vir a servir como argumento para justificar uma interferência real (da Europa).

Há ainda uma questão política mais ampla. Uma parcela significativa da esquerda brasileira consolidou nos últimos anos uma interpretação segundo a qual Vladimir Putin pertence a uma espécie de “internacional de extrema direita”, ao lado de Donald Trump e de outros movimentos conservadores ocidentais. Essa leitura transforma Rússia, Trump e a direita brasileira em elementos de um mesmo campo político internacional, apesar das diferenças profundas entre suas respectivas posições e interesses.

Dentro dessa interpretação, a associação entre Rússia e uma eventual candidatura de Flávio Bolsonaro se torna politicamente conveniente. Flávio é identificado com Trump, com o Partido Republicano e com a direita americana. A existência de uma suposta conexão russa permitiria inserir a disputa eleitoral brasileira em uma narrativa internacional mais ampla, na qual diferentes forças conservadoras seriam apresentadas como partes de uma mesma rede de influência.

Contudo, é absolutamente óbvio que a Rússia não tem qualquer interesse em interferir nas eleições brasileiras a favor de qualquer dos lados. Ademais, a maior parte dos ativistas pró-Rússia no Brasil é identificada com a esquerda ou neutra em relação a ambos os lados da política nacional. A acusação parece ser feita com o simples intuito de agradar a União Europeia, já que os europeus preferem Lula a Flávio (por este ser subordinado a Trump). E o fato de não haver detalhes que substanciem as acusações apenas reforça este ponto.

O ponto realmente relevante é outro: por que uma agência de inteligência subordinada à Presidência da República apresentou às autoridades europeias uma acusação contra a Rússia sem que seus fundamentos fossem posteriormente esclarecidos? E por que isso ocorre justamente durante a preparação das eleições brasileiras e em um momento de deterioração extraordinária das relações entre Rússia e Europa?

A resposta a essas perguntas importa porque o Brasil está inserido em um ambiente internacional cada vez mais polarizado. A Rússia ocupa posição central nos BRICS e mantém relações estratégicas com o Brasil, enquanto a Europa atravessa uma fase de crescente confronto com Moscou. Nesse contexto, qualquer informação oficial brasileira que associe a Rússia a uma operação de interferência eleitoral possui consequências diplomáticas graves.

Ademais, as tensões entre Rússia e Europa crescem cada vez mais e há risco real de conflito devido às constantes provocações europeias. É óbvio que em tal contexto não interessa ao Brasil se tornar parte de qualquer lado da crise. Mas não há nada pior para a política de neutralidade brasileira do que reportar à União Europa uma acusação formal contra a Rússia.

Em tese, é possível que o relatório tenha sido entregue à Europa sem comunicação prévia ao presidente brasileiro – embora isso seja muito improvável. Se Lula quiser preservar a neutralidade brasileira, o correto a ser feito é desmentir a Abin publicamente e pedir desculpas pelo incidente. Contudo, resta saber se ele estará realmente disposto a fazer isso, considerando que a União Europeia é o principal “aliado” internacional do governo Lula atual.

A group of 119 members of the European Parliament is pressing the European Commission and national governments to ensure that a new EU ban on artificial-intelligence  ‘Nudifier’systems used to generate non-consensual sexual images can be enforced as soon as it takes effect.

The prohibition on so-called AI “nudifier” systems becomes applicable on 2 December 2026 following changes to the EU Artificial Intelligence Act approved earlier this year.

The legislation prohibits AI systems designed to create child sexual abuse material or realistic images, video or audio depicting an identifiable person’s intimate parts or sexually explicit activity without that person’s consent.

Providers cannot place systems intended for such use on the EU market. Systems capable of producing the material must have adequate safeguards intended to prevent it, while deployers are prohibited from deliberately using AI systems for that purpose.

The final agreement on the AI Act amendments gave companies until 2 December to bring their systems into compliance.

The latest intervention is intended to ensure that regulators are ready to enforce the prohibition rather than simply having the legislation on the statute book.

The letter supported by 119 MEPs was initiated by Green MEP Lena Schilling and Greens/EFA co-president Terry Reintke.

Its signatories include members from several political groups.

They want the Commission and member states to ensure that national authorities are designated to enforce the ban and that people targeted by non-consensual AI-generated sexual imagery know which authority to contact.

The letter also calls for stronger enforcement of the Digital Services Act against online platforms and search engines carrying or facilitating access to such material.

The initiative follows research cited by the organisers which identified 147 European politicians appearing on websites containing sexualised AI deepfakes.

Of those identified, 138 were women.

Schilling was among those affected and has used her own case to argue that the December prohibition needs an operational enforcement system from its first day.

The prohibition emerged during the EU’s broader revision of its AI legislation.

In March, the European Parliament adopted its negotiating position by 569 votes to 45, with 23 abstentions.

Parliament and Council subsequently reached agreement on the revised text, and the measure completed its formal legislative process in June.

EU Today reported at the time that the Council’s final approval combined delays to some high-risk AI requirements with new restrictions on non-consensual sexual imagery.

The issue is distinct from the wider transparency requirements applying to AI-generated content.

Under Article 50 of the AI Act, transparency obligations have applied since 2 August.

Providers of generative systems must in relevant cases make AI-generated or manipulated material machine-readable and detectable, while deployers face disclosure obligations covering deepfakes and some AI-generated material dealing with matters of public interest.

EU Today examined those changes when chatbot and deepfake disclosure rules entered into application in August.

There is, however, a transitional period for some AI systems that were already on the market before 2 August. Their machine-readable marking obligations take effect on 2 December.

That means the same date will bring both the new nudifier prohibition and the end of the transitional period for certain AI-content marking requirements.

Enforcement is divided between national regulators and EU institutions.

National market-surveillance authorities carry much of the responsibility for enforcing the AI Act. The Commission’s AI Office has direct enforcement responsibilities in more limited areas, including certain systems built on general-purpose AI models and systems integrated into very large online platforms or search engines.

The Commission’s guidance on Article 50 is intended to provide regulators and companies with a common interpretation of those transparency requirements.

The nudifier prohibition raises an additional problem because distribution of non-consensual intimate images also intersects with the Digital Services Act, national criminal and civil laws and EU legislation addressing violence against women.

The 119 MEPs are therefore seeking action beyond the AI Act itself.

Their letter asks for stricter use of the Digital Services Act against platforms and search engines, faster implementation of the EU directive combating violence against women and clearly identifiable national authorities able to respond to complaints.

The legal gap surrounding nudifier systems had previously been acknowledged by the Commission.

Its review of prohibited AI practices concluded that the original AI Act’s provisions on manipulation and exploitation of vulnerabilities did not adequately cover systems producing child sexual abuse material and non-consensual sexually explicit images.

That finding contributed to the explicit prohibition subsequently added during the Digital Omnibus negotiations.

The legislation is now settled. The immediate issue before the 2 December deadline is whether regulators across the 27 member states have the mechanisms in place to identify prohibited systems, investigate providers and respond when people report AI-generated intimate material produced without their consent.

The artificial intelligence (AI) race between the United States and China has accelerated in model protection, supply chains and talent controls, even as the two nations’ leaders agreed last week to open a new dialogue on AI safety. A string of moves announced or uncovered this week shows that both sides are now guarding their […]

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