“The issue is, do we have another leader to replace Pedro Sánchez?”.

Former Spanish congresswoman Hana Jalloul Muro is among her prime minister’s closest allies in the European Parliament.

“It has not been an easy mandate. Every day is a survival day, all the challenges that prime minister Pedro Sánchez has faced have been unprecedented,” the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) MEP told EUobserver.

They had faced the Covid pandemic, a volcanic eruption in the Canary Islands in 2021, and the migrant crisis in the Ceuta enclave in north Africa in the summer of 2026, she said – not to mention the corruption allegations levelled at his close relatives.

And he now risked being unseated in a snap election on 5 October, called after nationwide protests against lack of affordable housing.

Sánchez’ PSOE party is trailing behind the centre right people’s party (PP) in the polls, which is also growing closer allied to the increasingly successful far-right Vox party. 

“These elections will pit two models against each other,” Jalloul said.

“On the one hand, a progressive government that defends public services, improves wages and pensions, expands rights and protects the social majority. And on the other, a model represented by the PP and Vox, which, wherever they govern, have opted for privatisations and policies that risk widening inequalities,” she said.

Ceuta-linked election

Jalloul, who spoke to EUobserver at the European Parliament (EP) in Brussels, used to lecture on international terrorism at the University of Madrid, before she became vice-chair of the EP’s foreign affairs committee.

And she recalled the heated debate on the Ceuta incident on 31 July, including accusations that Morocco had engineered it to gain leverage over Spain. 

“This is a crisis that we could not expect,” she said.

But had there not been a “good relationship with Morocco, [we] would never be able to return 90 percent of the 70,000 people that came in less than 72 hours,” she added.  

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

• They looked like Russian “porcupines” and fought where the Kremlin considers Russian rear territory. They were protected by their own drone.
• Drones also struck Yandex’s third data centre.
• The battle for Dobropillia on a new type of map.
• Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles caused the largest single massacre of senior Russian officers of the entire war in August.
• Maps of the day — Dobropillia, Kharkiv region
• Videos of the day — Abrams as a porcupine; MANPADS against a Geran; Russian port during an air raid; nighttime FPV drone combat; Kyiv resident narrowly escapes death at a playground

They looked like Russian “porcupines” and fought where the Kremlin considers Russian rear territory. They were protected by their own drone. Both the Russian and Ukrainian armies are continuing their efforts to return tanks and combat vehicles to the battlefield.

Russia recently attacked near Dobropillia with tanks fitted with upgraded Arena-M active protection systems.

The system itself proved effective, but was ultimately unable to withstand the flood of drones, and the attack ended in defeat and the destruction of the tanks deployed.

Last week, we also wrote about a successful operation by Ukrainian tanks from the 475th Assault Regiment.

And the same Ukrainian unit, also known as CODE 9.2, demonstrated a new use of heavy armoured equipment over the weekend.

Compared with the first case, this one revealed an important detail about the operation of accompanying drones and, thanks to geolocation, can also be used to verify the accuracy of Russian maps.

The battle took place in the Kharkiv region and involved a US-made Bradley combat vehicle as well as a tank. According to one source, it was an Abrams of Australian origin, although the appearance of its gun barrel does not suggest this.

In a video released by the unit, the Bradley advances first towards Russian positions and begins laying down covering fire. The tank joins it later, firing directly at the target.

While the Bradley’s turret has retained its mobility, the tank has effectively become an assault gun of the type known from the Second World War.

Its turret does not appear to be capable of moving, and the crew must aim the entire tank at the target. This reduces the effectiveness and speed of firing, while increasing its chances of survival.

A tank modified in this way is virtually indistinguishable from similar Russian adaptations. What distinguishes these attempts is, once again, the involvement of accompanying drones.

Aside from the heavy Vampire, first seen at 1:30, this primarily includes an FPV drone which, at 1:58, neutralises in an aerial duel the same type of Russian weapon that had attempted to strike the tank.

This is another example of how heavy equipment must be accompanied by drones at this stage of the war if it is to remain combat-capable.

Despite air support, another drone strikes it at 2:16 — after another had narrowly missed earlier. The tank remained mobile and withdrew successfully.

Beyond the operation itself, its location is also noteworthy: near the village of Anishchyne in the north-eastern part of the Kharkiv region, on the axis Russia calls the Velykyi Burluk direction.

The Ukrainian Telegram account Petrenko, which also provided the map below, precisely identified the site of the battle.

“The video reveals a discrepancy between reality and Russian claims of an alleged massive advance, the encirclement of Ukrainian units and the capture of more than 65 settlements,” the author wrote.

He noted that both vehicles operated in territory that most Russian maps mark in red — as a “Russian” zone.

This is the same area about which we have written repeatedly. For comparison, below is a map by the Russian state agency Ria Novosti. The village of Anishchyne does not appear on it, but the settlement of Vilkhuvatka — Olkhovatka in Russian — serves as a reference point in the centre-right.

The tank and Bradley were fighting around five km north of a location that Russia marks as securely captured.

Drones also struck Yandex’s third data centre. Graphs circulated online, particularly on Sunday, suggesting that Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s largest internet provider had restricted the operations of Russian bots around the world.

However, this has not yet been objectively proven. Russia has indeed reported outages affecting various internet-based services after each attack, but that is so far the only confirmed effect.

On this occasion, French analyst Clément Molin pointed out that the Russian Varyag drone brigade had attacked data centres in Ukraine in recent weeks and had boasted, among other things, of damaging Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest operator.

The situation has now been reversed, as it was previously with attacks on ships and warehouses. This time, however, to Russia’s disadvantage.

Russia 🇷🇺 bombed multiple data centers in Kyiv, Dnipro or Odesa these last few weeks and proudly showed footage about it

Now, Ukraine is bombing Yandex data centers and causing much more harm to Russia than Russia did to Ukraine.

This is another example of symmetrical war. In… pic.twitter.com/yAXzcUN3FQ

— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) October 12, 2026

The first centre hit was in Sasovo, in the Ryazan region, followed by a second in Kaluga, in the Kaluga region. On Sunday, the third of Yandex’s four largest centres was struck, this time in Vladimir, in the Vladimir region.

“This complex houses one of the company’s Galushkin supercomputers, which is among the most powerful in Russia,” Kommersant wrote, adding that the facility had been taken out of service, affecting 10 core Yandex services, including its email service.

The situation is serious enough that, according to digital development minister Maksut Shadayev, “Yandex is facing an unprecedented attack on its data centres”.

The defence ministry is also working on the issue in an effort to protect the company’s remaining facilities. Citing its sources, Kommersant said replacing the damaged capacity could take up to six months.

The battle for Dobropillia on a new type of map. As the war evolves, so do the ways it is mapped. This Ukrainian OSINT profile, for example, has depicted the fighting for the important Donbas town — which protects the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the south-west — on a dynamic map.

Among other things, it shows that Russian forces are infiltrating the town through the village of Hanivka from the Nove Shakhove area.

Mashovets Dobropillia
Russia wants Kramatorsk, to the north-east. Its strongest attack here heads west, into Dobropillia: up to 40 men a day along the Byk river.

If Dobropillia and Druzhkivka hold to late December, Russia would have to replan the offensive. pic.twitter.com/OXg8F1WYXy

— Vitaly (@M0nstas) October 8, 2026

For a clearer picture, we are also including a static DeepStateUA map, as the previous one is rotated and does not follow the usual compass orientation.

The two maps are rotated by around 90 degrees in relation to each other. On the following one, Dobropillia is in the centre-left. Nove Shakhove, from where Russian infiltrators are advancing, is almost at the centre, exactly 10 km to the east as the crow flies. A small arrow directly next to the settlement’s name indicates the direction of Russian attacks.

The green area in the upper part of the map is the so-called Dobropillia salient, which was fought over a year ago.

Russia reported nothing significant concerning Dobropillia after the weekend. “On the Dobropillia axis, our forces continue to push forward, but Ukrainian units retain the ability to counterattack. Heavy fighting is under way,” the Two Majors wrote, for example.

The Ukrainian Telegram channel Petrenko published a map over the weekend showing sites of new infiltrations. Its interpretation differs considerably from DeepStateUA’s version. Russian forces are shown closer to the town, but the direction of their advance is the same as in the two previous sources.

The sites of the recorded incursions were established on the basis of videos showing drones killing Russian soldiers attempting to advance further west.

Storm Shadow missiles caused the largest single massacre of senior Russian officers in August. On Friday (9 October), a joint project by Russian exile newspaper Meduza and the BBC’s Russian service added another 17,124 names to its list of Russian war casualties. This was the number it had counted since 21 September. In total, 276,113 Russian soldiers killed in the war are now known by name.

On the same day, the project’s authors published a detailed analysis of events in Donetsk on 26 August. The Ukrainian air force had attacked a building in Donetsk with Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles.

The strike was so intense that the target must have been something significant. Almost immediately, there was speculation that the building housed an important Russian headquarters.

Meduza and the BBC counted 20 high-ranking Russian military personnel killed during a joint meeting of the headquarters of the Centre group of forces and its subordinate 41st Army — 18 at the scene and another two from their injuries in the following days.

This week, in our update of Russian losses in Ukraine:
– 17,000 names added to our list since September 21https://t.co/lBGxPNvv8z

– one Ukrainian strike takes out more Russian officers than ever during the entire war; we reveal their nameshttps://t.co/BU4B66hwTN pic.twitter.com/X9l0o5MGkz

— Mediazona (@mediazona_en) October 9, 2026

They included seven colonels, six lieutenant colonels, five majors, one captain and one senior non-commissioned officer. They were identified thanks to access to nominal lists of headquarters staff as of 25 July and after that date.

It also emerged that this was not the first time officers of the 41st Army had had a bad day. During an attack on 8 September 2025, it lost a lieutenant colonel, two majors and a lieutenant. The toll on 4 August 2026 was even worse, when the army lost two lieutenant colonels, three majors, two captains and one lieutenant at once.

The following images illustrate the scale of destruction caused by the strike on 26 August:

Some of the aftermath of the today’s mass missile strike on Donetsk. https://t.co/rymUEYGOc5 pic.twitter.com/Bv2jUrIuhj

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) August 26, 2026

Videos of the day

As Russian jet-powered drones become more widespread, videos are also appearing more frequently of Ukrainian soldiers shooting them down with man-portable air-defence systems, known by the English acronym MANPADS. This is one of them.

A Ukrainian soldier shot down a Russian jet-powered Geran-4 drone using an Igla-1 MANPADS over Ukraine’s Rivne region this morning. pic.twitter.com/4onx7UNclQ

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 11, 2026

Despite its best efforts, air defences at one of Russia’s ports were unable to shoot down a Ukrainian drone, which subsequently struck a Black Sea Fleet vessel. Note the beams of light used to assist with targeting.

Один из Z-блогеров опубликовал видео работы ПВО в гавани (Новороссийск?) и попадание дрона ВСУ в военный корабль. Дата съемки неизвестна, однако, уже видны те самые синие лучи, которые пару лет назад решили ввести как лучшее средство подсветки цели. Покупали их военные обычно за… pic.twitter.com/WvDuR369Z3

— IanMatveev (@ian_matveev) October 10, 2026

The Russian soldiers in this nighttime video appear relaxed. They were probably moving through an area they still considered relatively safe. But a waiting drone equipped with a thermal camera was tracking them.

A Ukrainian FPV drone lying in ambush at night spots a passing Russian assault group of four soldiers on a quad bike, waits for the right moment, then takes off and strikes them. pic.twitter.com/MD83B4RkKk

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 10, 2026

A Kyiv resident narrowly avoided a Russian drone at the last moment as it crashed into a playground.

A man narrowly escaped a Russian drone strike on the grounds of a kindergarten in Ukraine’s Kyiv region yesterday. pic.twitter.com/aOwWNAa6Vj

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 9, 2026

Student protests in France are an expression of the country’s deep political and economic crisis, says Jan Rovný, a Czech professor at Paris’s Sciences Po.

Students from elite schools and universities have joined secondary-school pupils from deprived suburbs in protesting for education reforms. Rovný explains how these young people protest in solidarity with less fortunate peers, invoking ideals of equality embedded in French minds.

He explained how traditionally violent protests in the republic are often met by disproportionately heavy-handed policing.

The French government has tried to hide students’ dissatisfaction by blaming far-left groups.

What do the protests say about French society? Are they a revolt by young people against poor conditions or part of broader woes?

It is important to realise that the situation in France does not concern only young people and education, it goes deeper than that. The era of French president Emmanuel Macron is coming to an end. For several years now, the country has been run by unstable minority governments, which all face one key problem: how to draft a budget, unveiled on October 1, and push it through parliament.

It is clear that the country is in a very difficult economic situation, because its debt stands at around 117 percent of GDP. The interest rate is rising and approaching five percent. Every day, newspapers write that France cannot bear this burden.

French society is realising that it is at an impasse both politically and economically, that the current elite has no answer, and that savings must be made in various areas. People from many sectors are now speaking out to say they do not want cuts. Or that they have problems that are not being addressed. And young people have a clear view of this, and that is why they are mobilising.

The protest began with specific demands from secondary-school pupils, who clearly identified shortcomings in education — notably missing teachers, overcrowded classrooms and schools in poor condition, some with rats running around and no running water. Yet the protest quickly grew into a nationwide movement. Why have these particular issues proved so powerful?

Partly because they underscore this whole situation, and partly because this is a young generation that represents France’s future. Young people are protesting to say: look at the future we are facing. And parents and teachers largely agree with them.

The protests began in the Paris suburb of Saint-Denis and did not arise as a result of a new government reform, but from the everyday experiences of students. What does this tell us about how young French people view the state and its ability to provide public education?

France generally has relatively low trust in political institutions. Young people tend to feel this even more strongly, because they are generally less politically engaged and therefore feel they are, in some way, discriminated against. They see the state as failing to care sufficiently for them and unable to cope.

This is compounded by the approaching elections. We know that the current government is fragile, and we also know that society, as well as the political establishment as a whole, is deeply polarised, with the extremist camps in particular set to enter the elections strengthened.

Staying with the protests, it is interesting that private secondary schools have joined state schools. On Tuesday, the French daily Le Monde showed protests outisde Paris Lycée Henri-IV attended by children from elite families – and where Macron studied. How do you explain the involvement of private schools unlikely to experience the same problems as public ones?

Exactly. That is my situation as well. I teach at a very prestigious university with a beautiful campus a short distance from the Louvre.

Yet our students are protesting. They are protesting because they recognise that French society has major inequalities affecting young people in suburbs like Saint-Denis or Val-de-Marne where conditions are worse.

Better off students are mobilising in solidarity – the concept of equality has been part of France’s political consciousness since the French Revolution. Those privately educated pupil therefore see it as their duty to join protests even though they enjoy far better conditions.

France is described as a strong state where education is regarded as a public service and a fundamental pillar of the French Republic. Could frustration over lack of basic conditions in schools be a reason for current anger?

Of course, and it has several dimensions. The French Third Republic was based on the idea that public education was the means through which modern citizens are created. State schools, established by law at the time, were seen as a fundamental pillar of the new, young democracy.

When you walk around Paris or anywhere else in France, you notice that every school has both the French and European flags above its entrance, along with the words “liberty, equality, fraternity” — the motto of the republicand revolution. Historically, schools drew children out of traditional families, which at that time were highly Catholic, and turned them into modern citizens. That is the country’s foundation.

Another factor is that the French state is very powerful: public spending accounts for more than 50% of GDP. The state is hierarchical, yet it seeks to show that it can do everything, including providing schooling for all. That position is increasingly hard to defend, particularly when money is short and public spending must be cut.

France has a long history of street protests. Is the current situation different in any way from previous social conflicts?

It is difficult to say. What is interesting is that secondary-school students are mobilising. That is relatively unusual, though not entirely unprecedented. It has happened in the past too, but was less visible. Teachers’ unions are now joining these students, as are broader trade unions and public-sector employees generally. University students are also already on strike. There is talk that farmers could join them. It may gather momentum and, as with the yellow vest protests, everyone who criticises the government may take to the streets. That is essentially the majority.

What is interesting about the current protests is that they are led by underage young people who are not yet able to vote, yet can still place the government under enormous pressure. How do you explain this?

They are young and have the time and ability to mobilise. They are able to sustain it and have their own internal organisation. Certain political forces, primarily from the far left, are helping or supporting them, but only to a limited extent. I think the protest is genuinely organic, rather than being directed by a political party or political agitators.

Young people feel they have something to say, and they can mobilise with the support of some teachers, some parents and now also broader sections of society — both university students and some trade union organisations. It may last for some time.

The French government may fear protesting young people more than other protest groups. Why do protesting young people carry such particular political weight in France?

It is probably a memory of 1968 when student mobilisation shifted the entire country to open up certain issues. Sudents are able to mobilise and persevere because they do not lose income when they strike, whereas workers who go on strike do not receive pay for those days, which can be a serious problem for some.

There is also a significance of young people being the future, who say: no, we simply want this country to be different, because it will be ours and we will be responsible for it when you are no longer here.

On Monday, a 15-year-old boy lost his hand after a police grenade exploded, with several other injuries caused by police being investigated. Could this fundamentally change the public mood?

Protests in France tend to be more violent than others are used to. I think it works both ways. I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of protesting students are peaceful, but some people with somewhat different intentions join them. They are called ‘casseurs’ (wreckers)who simply exploit the situation to throw stones at police or set bins on fire.

On the other side are the police, who can become highly aggressive quickly. There is now a major debate over whether the police response is proportionate. These responses divide the left and the right quite clearly with the government and the right wing supporting police, while the left argues that police brutality is pervasive.

It is quite shocking to see footage of armed police officers beating children in the street.

Exactly. And the police will have to be careful not to lose control of the situation. The response of the education minister, who has told students that he will listen to them, is also interesting. The interior minister and the prime minister have instead responded that the police are doing their job and that the interventions are proportionate.

The government is blaming radical left-wing groups for the violence, accusing the far-left party La France Insoumise (France Unbowed) of inciting riots. Do you find this political explanation convincing, or does it take attention away from students’ genuine demands?

It is difficult to say. I would not be at all surprised if extremist groups of any kind joined the protests, although left-wing groups are probably more likely. It is difficult to speculate on the extent to which this is directed from the leadership of France Unbowed. However, I do not think it is to any great extent.

Representatives of this left-wing party, including its MPs and local politicians, joined student, thereby legitimising these protests. But I very much doubt that the party would seek to organise greater violence in order to draw attention to the situation. That suggestion seems somewhat extreme to me.

France is only a few months away from presidential elections. Could this discontent become one of the issues in the election campaign?

Everyone is trying to gain political advantage from it in some way. It is quite clear that the typical Jean-Luc Mélenchon voter supports the students and government criticism more generally.

Ordinary citizens do not want to see violence or rubbish being set on fire, and this sentiment is probably much stronger on the right, which automatically sees Mélenchon as an instigator of unrest.

Mélenchon needs to be careful. To win a larger number of voters, he must also appear as someone who is trying to prevent violence. That is what he attempted to do. A few days ago, he addressed students, saying: mobilise, but your actions must be non-violent. He specifically added that they must be disciplined.

In your view, what could be the boiling point at which governments will no longer be able to calm the situation through promises or concessions?

That is a difficult question. These protests cannot go on forever, since many students realise what they want is better teaching conditions, so that they can prepare better for the baccalaureate examinations, which are approaching in the spring for those in their final year. So they may want to sit down and study.

If the government manages to offer at least some concrete solutions to the fundamental problems — above all, on timetables and teacher allocation on lycées — it may calm the situation. If it does not, I do not know.

Can we therefore understand the current protests as an expression of a crisis in French society, or as evidence that some form of civic mobilisation and the belief that protest can change something still function in France?

It is both. From young people’s perspective, the positive aspect is that they are able to mobilise, take their future into their own hands and say: this is a problem. We told you this, you did not listen to us, so now we are changing tactics and will protest visibly. I think that is fundamentally positive — without the violence.

On the other hand, French society is in deep crisis, and overcoming it will require an explicit change in the narrative – a change in the system. There will need to be some recognition that France is no longer what it used to be; while it remains one of the larger countries of the EU, it is now more or less an ordinary country and it must behave accordingly and see itself in that way.

Understanding this is quite difficult, and it will certainly require political courage and a political figure capable of turning frustrations into something positive.

First published in Deník N.

Until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Czech Vanadium was among the European companies which clearly had Russian owners.

Since 2007, the company has been controlled through the Evraz group by Russian businessman Roman Abramovich, who is close to Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

The ferrovanadium producer was part of a chain through which vanadium ore mined in Russia reached Europe before being sent on to Abramovich’s factories in the US. Ferrovanadium is an alloy added to steel to help improve its properties. And Czech Republic accounts for six percent of global production.

But sanctions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the oligarch to sell up.

Evraz, the holding company in which Abramovich is the largest shareholder, supplied the Russian army, according to media reports. But Evraz denied this.

In 2024, the Abu Dhabi-based company Metco (now ‘Metco Holding’) became the sole shareholder in the Czech factory, but it is not clear who controls it.

Czech authorities and police suspect the transfer of the vanadium factory to a new parent company in the UAE may conceal the true owner. They are seeking to establish who is really behind the opaque company in the Persian Gulf, and whether it is still Roman Abramovich.

According to Deník N sources familiar with the investigation, specialists from Czech police bodies for organised crime (NCOZ) and the financial intelligence unit (FAÚ) are involved.

“Yes, we are investigating who is behind the company. There are many leads and the suspicion is clear that the company may still be backed by its former owners from Russia,” a source close to the investigation confirmed.

NCOZ spokesperson Jaroslav Ibehej declined to comment in more detail on the search for Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner. “As a rule, we neither confirm nor deny what we are working on,” he said.

According to documents in the Czech judicial database, the company is formally controlled by one owner — a Dubai-based lawyer of Indian origin who provides nominee services for beneficial owners. The lawyer has been linked to money-laundering investigations in Ukraine and Moldova.

Apparent fake owner scheme

The officially declared owner of Czech Vanadium is Nikhil Skariah Kolekunnel. According to the ADGM free zone business register in the UAE, he is both the sole shareholder and director of Metco Holding.

However, the Gulf state’s database does not disclose so-called beneficiaries, who are entitled to the company’s profits and may also secretly control it.

Although the Czech judicial register lists Skariah as Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner, this does not necessarily indicate the person exercising control in the background. For example, trustees of trust funds are also listed in the registers as beneficial owners.

The nature of Skariah Kolekunnel’s business suggests that he performs the specific role of an administrator, a so-called fiduciary — someone who accepts an ownership mandate and effectively manages another person’s assets.

He is a lawyer originally from India who founded two law firms in the UAE years ago. His companies represent large corporations and businesspeople who do not wish to publicly acknowledge ownership of a business.

“South Bridge Legal is an advisory firm for comprehensive business establishment in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and the UAE. Our highly experienced team has been active in the sector for more than 10 years, providing services tailored to the unique needs of every ambitious entrepreneur setting up companies in Dubai,” the company wrote on its website.

“We have all activities, which is tax management, tax consulting, accounting, corporate services, offshore company formation, free zone company formation…everything,” Skariah said in a recently published video on YouTube.

Metco Holding’s address in Abu Dhabi suggests it may be a shell company. And it is headquartered from a WeWork.

Moldova and Ukraine links

‘Skariah’, the name of the Indian administrator, had already emerged eight years ago in connection with the concealment of ownership structures during an investigation into the privatisation of Moldova’s national airline. At the time, Skariah appeared as the owner of the opaque company Gold Craft FZE, established in Dubai in 2015.

“On Monday 1 October 2018, one day before the privatisation agreement for Air Moldova was signed, a plane from Istanbul landed at Chișinău International Airport. One of the passengers, a 39-year-old man, was carrying nearly €2.6m in cash in his luggage. He declared the money to customs officers, which, according to the Office for the Prevention and Fight against Money Laundering, he had borrowed four days earlier from Gold Craft FZE in the United Arab Emirates,” the investigative outlet RISE Moldova reported.

It finds that Andrei Ianovici brought cash from Dubai, equivalent to tens of millions of Czech crowns. Later that day, he deposited the money in a bank, and it ended up in the accounts of Civil Aviation Group SRL. That company privatised Air Moldova, and Ianovici was one of its partners.

The true origin of the money was never established, leading local investigators to suspect that the money had not been earned legally. No charges were brought, however.

According to court records, Skariah was also involved in disputes in Ukraine, where Gold Craft FZE claimed ownership of an Ilyushin aircraft which the company allegedly purchased in 2017.

Skariah’s Russian-linked empire

However, the UAE-based lawyer was not the only individual to have emerged as an administrator of Czech Vanadium. Another is Sergei Gushchin.

A man of this name was formerly a prominent Russian businessman in rail freight transport and, although he withdrew from Russia three years ago, he appears on Ukrainian sanctions lists for supporting the Russian army.

Gushchin became a senior manager at PJSC TransContainer, a Russian rail freight carrier, after Evraz sold its stake. In the past, a quarter of the company was owned by the holding company of Abramovich.

Meanwhile another of Gushchin’s companies, Rail Service, formed a joint venture with Evraz in 2019 focused on the production of railway wheels.

According to a UAE register, Gushchin was a director and shareholder of Metco, which became Czech Vanadium’s parent company from 2022-23.

US credit-rating agency Moody’s shared data with Deník N that listed Gushchin as a recent beneficiary of Metco Holding and as the company’s director.

Russia’s ferrovanadium monopoly

Czech Vanadium’s revenues regularly exceed €81m, and in 2024 the company reported profits of more than €8m. This summer, the company sent over €0.6m of that sum to the Dubai company, the remaining funds staying in its retained earnings account.

Last year, the company recorded a modest €0.2m loss. Its accounts retained more than €12m in undistributed profits in total.

Czech Vanadium’s business remains closely tied to Russia. Last year alone, vanadium oxides or hydroxides worth nearly €82m were imported into the Czech Republic from the Russian Federation. Russia is effectively the sole supplier of the raw materials needed to produce ferrovanadium. According to the statistical office database, exports mainly go to the United States, as well as Germany and Taiwan.

Czech Vanadium did not reply to requests for comment or an explanation of its ownership structure.

It also did not answer the question of how a Dubai lawyer had bought the Czech company, which, according to some estimates, is worth more than €40m.

Company representatives have not responded to questions about its owners since 2024, when the company left the Evraz group structure.

Fake owner model in US

Jiří Skuhrovec, an analyst at Datlab, specialises in the global vetting of business partners. He says Abramovich uses a similar model for concealing ownership in the United States.

Sanctions also forced the Russian oligarch, who became better known through his former ownership of the British football club Chelsea, to withdraw from US companies. But Skuhrovec concluded that they were probably still controlled by people linked to Abramovich just like the factory in Czech Republic.

“We mapped the entire chain, from the Russian ore supplier through the Czech smelter to the final recipient: the US company Strategic Alloys LLC. Until recently, all three companies officially belonged to Abramovich, and all three are now controlled by people with links to his Evraz group. Abramovich may therefore still secretly control the entire supply chain for this strategic raw material. This would be a textbook case of sanctions circumvention, as well as an obvious security risk,” Skuhrovec said.

Findings led Datlab and Transparency International to submit a complaint to police. “We believe that the 16m Czech crowns (around €655,000) in distributed profit may have gone to Abramovich, who is on a sanctions list. That would constitute a criminal offence,” the analyst explained.

The European Parliament in Strasbourg has been adorned with a grotesque vision of American power in a 2.5-metre-high statue of a naked and obese US president Donald Trump covered in 23-carat gold.

While some MEPs describe it as an expression of freedom and courage in the face of Trump, Slovak prime minister Robert Fico has said the statue is a symbol of a declining European Union and called for its removal.

Fico said the statue reflects a profound misunderstanding of the times we live in, and reminded his X followers that he and Trump are close.

“At a time that calls for dialogue and mutual respect, insulting our partners on official premises demonstrates a profound failure to understand the times we live in,” he said on social media.

“It is sad that the leadership of the European Parliament, in its blindness, can no longer distinguish between the legitimate right to hold a different opinion and the actions of spiritually bankrupt individuals, adventurers and lunatics,” he added.

Jens Galschiøt is the artists behind the Orange Plague sculpture. The Danish artist says his installation served as a warning that Donald Trump is destroying democracy.

Why call it ‘Orange Plague‘?

“I depicted Donald Trump as an ‘orange plague’ because he is destroying everything I believe in. I believe in democracy and the rule of law. All this needs to be cared for, and Trump is destroying it, as well as the debate on the environment,” Galschiøt said.

The artist chose to portray the US president as a grotesque figure hoping that people would laugh at it. “When you laugh at a dictator, you take away his power,” he said.

And Trump is also naked because of Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tale The Emperor’s New Clothes. In it, the emperor walks through the streets with no clothes, while people tell him how beautifully dressed he is, but no one dares tell him the truth. Only one small child cries out that the ruler is naked.

Galschiøt sees parallels the story and treatment of the US president.

“I think many of us laugh at Donald Trump, but he does not know it. He thinks he is a great leader. He thinks he is an intelligent person. He thinks he gives good speeches. But few people take him seriously. Even if you do take him seriously, it is because he is something like a gang leader, not because of what he says. Most of us actually think he is a ridiculous figure,” Galschiøt said.

His sculpture consists not only of a naked and obese Trump, but also of a slender figure.

“The little man carries the big man, and the big man tells him: ‘Oh, I really want to help you. I really love you, but I do not want to get off your back.’ It is also a story about hypocrisy and double standards, which I combined,” the artist said.

He covered the sculpture in gold because Trump is known to like the precious metal.

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• Montenegro detained Mikhail Zvinchuk, the founder of the Rybar Telegram channel.
• Key directions according to Rybar, Ukrainian and independent analysts.
• Forget Sloviansk: its capture is currently unrealistic.
• Ukrainian pressure continues towards Velyka Novosilka, with fighting already under way near Komar on the eastern bank of the Mokri Yaly river.
• Russians are infiltrating Dobropillia, but a Ukrainian counteroffensive is pressing against their flank from the north.
• The battle for data centres is now two-way, with Ukrainians attacking Russia’s ‘Google’.
• Maps of the day — Sloviansk direction; Velyka Novosilka direction; Dobropillia direction.
• Videos of the day — a scene from the Second World War: a MiG-29 shoots down a drone with its cannon; soldiers clear a network of Russian bunkers; Himars destroys an artillery radar; what the R-280 road to Crimea looks like.

Montenegro detained Mikhail Zvinchuk, the founder of the Rybar Telegram channel, who occupies one of the leading positions in the ecosystem of Russian media supporting the war. His wife and several associates were arrested alongside him. Colleagues in Moscow issued a statement saying they had been planning to film a report on one of the local monasteries, but the authorities of the Nato member state suspected them of conducting a hybrid operation.

At the top of Russian propaganda are the traditional state media, under the Kremlin’s complete control. They have almost no informational value, as they merely repeat the regime’s propaganda.

Below them, however, is a complex structure of Telegram channels that provide more varied reporting, including critical coverage. However, criticism is permitted only of mistakes in the conduct of the war, not of the war itself.

These channels, too, spread propaganda and keep Russian society in a state of war, but they also provide information that helps in analysing the course of the fighting. Rybar is among the largest and most influential of them.

In this case, it is not the work of an individual author but a media outlet with an editorial team and extensive content for 1.5m readers, so Zvinchuk’s arrest does not mean the end of publishing under this brand.

Yet through him, we can follow the fascinating story of a man who came from Russia’s defence ministry to spread its propaganda in the years that followed.

Paradoxically, however, he has recently been one of the few sources in Russia to report regularly on the Russian army’s failures at the front. And the preceding 48 hours were particularly rich in such assessments.

We will therefore gradually describe events in three different directions where, according to Rybar, the Russians are either retreating or at risk of doing so. Coincidentally, these are currently the most important directions of military operations.

We will compare all of its information with independent or Ukrainian sources.

Forget Sloviansk: its capture is currently unrealistic. “The situation is worsening; Sloviansk is being postponed,” Rybar wrote in the first sentence of its latest analysis of the Sloviansk direction. It explained why at length.

According to it, Ukrainian units in the area are increasing the pressure and exploiting their successes near Lyman, which lies north of Sloviansk. The Russian army has suffered a serious defeat here in recent months, losing a large salient from which it had hoped to bypass the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the north.

Rybar listed the ensuing complications: according to it, Ukrainians have concentrated fresh drone units around the village of Dibrova; the Russians had to withdraw from the village of Piskunivka and are now trying to save Kryva Luka. Ukrainians are also pressing into the village of Ozerne.

Ukrainian formations are increasing their activity, exploiting successes in the Lyman area, where fresh forces of drone operators have been concentrated around Dibrova.

Russian troops were pushed out of what remained of the village of Piskunivka and are now defending the approaches to Kryva Luka. The enemy is trying to break through there both from the west and across the river from Ozerne.

Moreover, heavy fighting is under way west of the village of Kalynyky, while fighting for Rai-Oleksandrivka is “fierce”, “although it was under the Russian army’s full control only recently”.

Nor is this the end of Rybar’s bad news. An “equally difficult situation” persists on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal, where Russian soldiers are “for now” holding positions in the villages of Malynivka, Tykhonivka, and Yurkivka.

Taken together, all of this means that the prospect of an “attack on the agglomeration has receded considerably”.

“Without control of the forests below Lyman, the offensive is doomed, if not to failure, then to high losses from attacks on its flank,” Rybar added.

Its map fully matches the verbal description. The red arrows running from east to west along the entire stretch have been replaced by blue, Ukrainian arrows pointing from west to east.

Paradoxically, the local Telegram channel Mikolaivka-Sloviansk Online provides a far less optimistic picture.

While Rybar no longer even mentions Mykolaivka, which directly borders Sloviansk, according to this source — which has repeatedly provided highly accurate and widely cited information — Russians are still managing to infiltrate it. On Wednesday, it wrote that “the Russian army is applying pressure from the direction of Rai-Oleksandrivka”, while the village itself is in the grey zone.

The explanation may be simple. Most of the names refer to villages the Russians never fully captured, although they claimed they had — including Rybar itself. This is why its map looks as though a small counteroffensive were under way east of Sloviansk. In reality, it mainly makes its previous misleading claims more realistic.

Far more accurate is the map by the Finnish Black Bird Group. Rai-Oleksandrivka is in the middle of the image — no credible analysts have ever considered it occupied by the Russians. Further north are Ozerne and Kryva Luka. Ozerne is particularly interesting.

According to Rybar, the Russians are trying to prevent the Ukrainian army from entering the village; independent analysts show it partly in the grey zone and partly under Ukrainian control. Rybar therefore correctly sees Russian problems, but at this point this is more its usual cartographic “retreat” from unrealistic positions.

Ukrainian pressure continues towards Velyka Novosilka, with fighting already under way near Komar on the eastern bank of the Mokri Yaly river. This is not entirely new either, but several Russian sources are writing about fighting in this direction with new urgency and, from the Russian perspective, scepticism.

“The situation remains extremely tense. There is mounting evidence that the enemy is seeking to advance around the village of Komar,” Rybar wrote.

This is an important village. When the Russians captured Velyka Novosilka last year after taking Vuhledar, Komar was a significant obstacle to their advance into Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

Fierce fighting took place over the village at the time, and the Ukrainian army lost it in June 2025. The front then moved another 15 to 20 km deeper into Ukrainian territory, but it is now moving back after months of slow advances.

Here, too, Rybar’s map appears more dramatic than the situation actually is. It depicts territory being liberated since February. However, it claims that the situation is worsening and the outlook is negative.

But the information about movements near Komar is genuinely fresh. Other sources agree on it almost metre for metre.

The Russian mapping project Slivochny Kapriz showed the exact location at the northern end of Komar, across the Mokri Yaly river, where Russian drones struck a Ukrainian video.

The Ukrainian Telegram account Petrenko also geolocated the incident at the same location.

Alexander Radov, another pro-war Russian, claimed that testimony from Ukrainian prisoners in this direction indicated that the Ukrainian command’s objectives were Bahatyr, 12 km east of Komar, and Velyka Novosilka itself, 13 km to the south.

This claim cannot be verified, but if it were true, Ukrainian objectives in this sector would be becoming ambitious. (Both Bahatyr and Velyka Novosilka are in the lower-right section of Rybar’s map at the beginning of this section.)

Russians are infiltrating Dobropillia, but a Ukrainian counteroffensive is pressing against their flank from the north. The fact that Russians are already operating in the town has been objectively confirmed by both sides. However, an earlier Russian claim that it had been encircled is false.

Rybar’s map again reflects what was written. In the town itself and its surroundings, red arrows show Russian attacks, while northeast of it, Ukrainian counterattacks are shown against the flank.

The Ukrainian channel Petrenko again serves as a source from the other side. Its map of Dobropillia has three circles, each marking a location where drones spotted Russian soldiers.

A Ukrainian soldier writing under the name Bakhmut Demon also confirmed Russian infiltrations into the town. However, he said they were being eliminated and that Russian losses would rise from November. He probably meant the period when the leaves fall and the terrain begins to turn muddy. Both will make the attackers’ advance more difficult.

Bakhmut Demon also warned that vigilance needed to be increased, as Russians are changing into civilian clothes and trying to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions in them.

Soldiers on the Zaporizhzhia direction described the same practice to us during a recent trip to Ukraine. There, too, they said that men in civilian clothing are sent ahead of infiltration groups in order to deceive drone operators.

Finally, another map by Black Bird Group. It, too, confirms the Russian advance towards Dobropillia, but does not show Ukrainian attacks in the north. The explanation is the same as in the previous cases: Rybar had drawn Russian positions much further forward than they actually were.

The battle for data centres is now two-way, with Ukrainians attacking Russia’s ‘Google’. Yandex is a technology giant that underpins the Russian internet. Its search engine, for example, is used by two-thirds of Russians. But its services are far broader. Among other things, it provides cloud storage to its clients.

The company provides its services through five main data centres. On Thursday, drones attacked the first of them. They struck the facility in Sasovo, in Ryazan oblast.

“This data centre is one of the key and largest data centres in Yandex’s Russian infrastructure. It contains tens of thousands of servers, and the company’s cloud services and computing capacity for machine learning operate on its equipment,” the Russian Telegram channel Military Informant explained the significance of the target.

As a result of the attack, outages in various internet-connected services were reported throughout the day.

The exile website Meduza listed several affected media outlets whose websites either could not be loaded at times or loaded slowly: RBC, Vedomosti, RIA Novosti, Kommersant, Vesti, Interfax, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

On Friday, another Yandex data centre was attacked, this time in Kaluga. The company acknowledged damage to equipment and announced that “some Yandex services may experience outages”.

Videos of the day

The events in the following video are almost identical to those witnessed by people in south-east England in 1944. Nazi Germany had then begun using V-1 flying bombs, and the most effective weapon against them was fighter aircraft, which shot down hundreds of these “wonder weapons” just above the sea while flying at the limit of their maximum speed.

Ukrainian pilots are now using the same tactic because of a shortage of air-to-air missiles. In this case, a MiG-29 shot down a Russian Geran-4 jet drone with fire from its 30mm cannon.

The MiG-29 is 17.4 metres long. The distance between it and the drone when firing began was around eight times its length — just under 150 metres. The risks to the pilot are obvious: the cloud of debris endangers the aircraft itself.

Spectacular destruction of a Shahed drone with the autocannon of a MiG-29. pic.twitter.com/CMUOpUKjLr

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) October 7, 2026

Once a common sight, now more of a rarity. A Himars multiple-launch rocket system destroyed a Russian artillery radar.

💥A rare sight these days: a HIMARS strike, apparently using a GMLRS rocket, destroys a Russian Irbis counter-battery radar after it was detected and tracked by reconnaissance drones of Ukraine’s 43rd Artillery Brigade.

The Irbis is a relatively new Russian multifunctional radar… pic.twitter.com/sYl3jRcD5i

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 8, 2026

The war has moved underground to an even greater extent than was previously customary. Soldiers at the front are building interconnected underground bunkers. A video by the 5th Assault Brigade shows the clearing of what were probably abandoned Russian positions.

Soldiers throw explosives into the openings. The footage then allows viewers to see, from plumes of smoke and dust pouring from underground, how many entrances the bunker had and how they were arranged.

🇺🇦2nd Assault Battalion of the 5th Assault Brigade clearing a collapsed bunker system, #Huliaipole sector
at south eastern front pic.twitter.com/OoVU6x7PIH

— C4H10FO2P ☠️ (@markito0171) October 9, 2026

The R-280 road to Crimea remains a deadly trap for Russian logistics.

Days after days, the same videos are coming from southern occupied Ukraine.

Large truck convoys, protected by many truck-mounted air-defense, ride at full speed on key roads.

Full of goods, fuel or military hardware, they are constantly attacked by Ukrainian drones. pic.twitter.com/tSDMe8VRwd

— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) October 7, 2026

More than a year ago, we launched our Hungary Briefing, a weekly round-up of the election campaign. Since the historic vote in April to remove Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government, the series has followed the new Tisza administration and its first moves in office. This week’s topics:

• How Viktor Orbán used Lőrinc Mészáros.
• According to Orbán, they deliberately did not give money to the liberals.
• Orbán’s brother also has a gold-convoy case.
• A wealth tax is coming.
• Support for Hungarian media beyond the borders.
• This week’s opinion polls: slight drop for Tisza, strong support for the Olympics

How Viktor Orbán used Lőrinc Mészáros.

The investigative outlet Direkt36 revealed important details about the links between Lőrinc Mészáros’s companies and Orbán-era propaganda in a new series of articles. The investigators obtained internal documents from a company called V-Híd, which showed that the firm belonging to the Mészáros portfolio paid out several billion forints between 2022 and 2026 to influencers in the Megafon network.

The oligarch was not stingy.

V-Híd is one of the most important and most profitable companies in the Mészáros empire, primarily engaged in railway construction. It owes its success almost entirely to the fact that it won huge public procurement contracts under Fidesz governments.

In recent years, V-Híd has become the dominant player in railway construction in Hungary, pushing out its competitors. Enormous dividends have been taken out of the company by the Mészáros clan (most recently, despite weaker results, 10 billion forints, or around €25m).

The Direkt36 article also reveals that Orbán-era propaganda was financed directly from the company’s revenue. Donation contracts were leaked showing that V-Híd regularly sent hundreds of millions of forints as “gifts” to Megafon. In 2024 alone, they sent 3 billion forints (around €7.6m at the time) in support to the influencer network.

The path of public money to propaganda

The formula was very simple: through public procurement, the government stuffed the Mészáros group’s companies with public money, and part of the revenue generated was channelled to the propaganda machine.

From 2020, Megafon was a key communication channel for Fidesz, where well-known influencers conveyed the party’s messages and huge sums were spent on online advertising.

The money won through public tenders did not only go towards financing propaganda. Direkt36 also uncovered luxury perks V-Híd and other Mészáros companies offered their staff.

Many would envy V-Híd’s team-building events. In 2024, nine employees of the company travelled by private jet to a château in south-western France, at a cost 62 million forints, or about €150,000, including €500 spent on cigars.

According to Direkt36, V-Híd has spent more than 1 billion forints in total – roughly €2.5m – on foreign trips in recent years.

On one trip to Tajikistan, V-Híd paid out €46,000 – the Central Asian country is a popular destination for exotic hunting excursions, and Mészáros also took part in such a hunting tour.

The Mészáros clan were also keen on yachting and spent money on private jets. One private jet linked to the Mészáros family was used at least once by Orbán himself.

The money did not go to the liberals

Fidesz has tied itself in knots after the arrest of culture minister Balázs Hankó. Hankó is suspected of aggravated breach of fiduciary duty causing particularly significant financial loss, committed in a criminal conspiracy, and the court has placed him in pre-trial detention.

The Hankó case blew up shortly after the elections, when activist Áron Molnár revealed that the National Cultural Fund had disbursed more than 17 billion forints (around €44m) to artists close to Fidesz for the purposes of the party’s campaign.

After a few months of investigation, the authorities reached the former minister, now a member of parliament, who said the allocation of grants had been lawful and that a politically-motivated show trial had been launched against him.

Shortly before he was taken into custody, Hankó told HírTV, a Fidesz-friendly channel, that being a Fidesz member or linked to Fidesz had never been a precondition for receiving NCA funding.

Orbán, however, explained the Hankó case differently in a speech at a closed-door event, from which former state secretary Péter Takács shared a clip. According to Orbán, Hankó was the only culture minister since 2010 who did not give support to the “liberals in Budapest”, and that is why, in his view, he was locked up.

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First published in Respekt, adapted by EUobserver

Unsavoury news comes from Russia often these days. But the latest unexpected development is the spread of a deadly disease.

Behind the mysterious death of a young woman in Siberia in early October was reportedly pneumonic plague – a disease so contagious it is considered as bad as anthrax, smallpox, and Ebola.

Local authorities in Russia have denied the plague as cause of death, but despite this, they have implemented anti-epidemic measures.

Eva Hrncirova, a spokesperson for the European Commission, said on Thursday (8 October): “Russia should make information about the plague available as soon as possible. This is what we need”.

“We had a meeting with the member states yesterday within the [EU Commission’s] Health Security Committee, and with the WHO [World Health Organization], who are in contact with our delegation in Moscow,” she said.

Russia was asked by the WHO to share “timely, precise, and exact information” about the possible plague in Siberia, she also said.

“We don’t have enough information to assess the epidemiological situation,” she added.

Nothing to see here, says Russia

Pneumonic plague disease can be treated with antibiotics if detected early, but officials beyond Russia’s borders are left with worrying questions.

Did an Irkutsk Anti-Plague Institute lab technician in Shelekhov (Siberia) really die of plague?

If so, was it a natural version of the disease, or a more dangerous bacterium modified in military labs?

And what is the risk of the Middle Ages-era disease spreading?

Pneumonic plague is caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis — the same one that once brought devastating plague epidemics known as the Black Death.

The pneumonic form of plague, a disease that killed up to half of Europe’s population in the 14th century, spreads through droplets by coughing or sneezing.

It manifests as severe, rapidly developing pneumonia that almost always ends in death if left untreated. But if antibiotics are administered in time (ideally within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms), the disease is treatable.

Independent Russian-language media say that Darya Shipilova, a 28-year-old laboratory technician at the research and hygiene institute in question, accidentally broke a test tube containing plague bacteria in late September, became infected and died in hospital several days later, on 2 October.

Authorities have not confirmed the cause of the woman’s death, letting on only that she died of pneumonia and claiming that no microorganisms connected with her work had been found in her body.

Some 200 of her contacts were subsequently put into quarantine with medical supervision.

Authorities also ordered a three-week quarantine at several hospitals in the wider area, and facemasks for the wider population – even for schoolchildren.

Russia’s neighbours, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, have all introduced border controls.

Russia said the epidemic situation in the area was stable, that none of the deceased woman’s contacts had shown signs of infection, and that there was no cause for concern.

However, the head of Russia’s public health authority reportedly travelled to Irkutsk to attend a meeting with local officials, while residents of Shelekhov report that people in protective suits are moving around the town.

And epidemiologists say it is simply not possible that Russia’s public health service would resort to such dramatic measures, including closing hospitals, over a single case of ‘pneumonia of unknown origin’ .

The institute where the laboratory technician worked is said to be a civilian facility that, among other things, researches and monitors the incidence of plague.

In Siberia, especially near the borders with China and Mongolia, the bacteria in question still circulate among animals and occasionally infect humans, as they do in some parts of Africa, where the disease is most common.

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• Horrifying stories from the occupied Ukrainian town are mounting.
• Two clans have emerged in Oleshky — those who support Putin can get food.
• According to experts, Russia is fundamentally violating international law and using residents’ vulnerability as a weapon.
• Putin’s tragic gift: the death toll in Pryluky rose to 22; 12 people were killed on a bus the following day.
• Maps of the day: Operation Vivaldi continues to make gains in Donbas.
• Videos of the day: an FPV drone attacked a fully occupied quad bike; a refinery is on fire.

Horrifying stories from the occupied town are mounting. The situation in Russian-occupied Oleshky, in Ukraine’s southern Kherson region, has long been extremely tense.

Around 2,000 residents have long faced a severe humanitarian crisis and isolation. Before the Russian invasion, 24,000 people lived in the town.

And the situation of local residents left behind shows how Russia, as an occupying power, treats civilians brutally and deliberately violates international agreements.

“There is a lack of food and healthcare. Since the destruction of the hydroelectric power plant, there has been no drinking water, electricity or gas. They do not even have wood for heating. Not only is it impossible to live with dignity, it is also impossible to bury people with dignity, because the occupiers even prohibit the burial of the dead,” Tetiana Hasanenko, head of Ukraine’s military administration for Oleshky, told Denník N.

Russia is also using Oleshky to shell the right bank of the Dnipro, especially the city of Kherson, just nine km away. Fierce fighting is under way over the surrounding islets. This turns Oleshky residents into human shields and prevents their safe evacuation.

According to the BBC, Oleshky is trapped by both geography and war. “To the north and west, it is cut off by the river and destroyed bridges, while to the south and east it is cut off by dangerous or impassable roads,” the report said.

The situation in the town had already been dramatic in 2023, when the destruction of the Kakhovka dam caused flooding.

A few days ago, special units of the SBU security service and Ukraine’s National Guard launched, according to the RBK-Ukraine website, a new operation to deliver humanitarian packages containing food, water and medicines across the Dnipro.

The aid totalled around four tonnes, with each package weighing 19 kg.

Footage from the mission can be viewed in this video by Suspilne television.

In these difficult conditions, heavy Vampire drones — dubbed Baba Yaga by Russians — are, according to a Ukrainian website, one of the few ways of providing aid to people on the occupied side of the river. Ukrainian soldiers often deploy them at the front for their own logistics in areas that are extremely dangerous.

Last year, the drone was even described as the most effective combat vehicle changing the course of the war.

According to Hasanenko, Ukraine’s armed forces have regularly dropped food by drone into the occupied area since March.

“They did it, but not on such a large scale. And every time drones fly over, the occupiers punish local people for it,” said the Ukrainian woman, who is in contact with people from Oleshky.

She said people try to immediately transfer the aid into unmarked containers to avoid punishment. “The occupiers believe that if people accept help from the Ukrainian armed forces, they supposedly have some connection with them and are betraying the country — which is not actually their country. And that is why they punish them,” Hasanenko explained.

In recent months, Oleshky residents have relied mainly on their own harvests, but at the end of the season they face a critical food shortage.

There have even been reports that residents were forced to eat dogs. A BBC report from late September revealed shocking findings from the town: people had learned to cook even with weeds.

Some, according to Ukrainska Pravda, caught pigeons or pheasants, while others cooked borscht “in a new way” — from eggs, courgettes, tomatoes and herbs.

“Prices there are not merely high but almost astronomical. Eggs sell for 800 hryvnias a dozen (€19), potatoes and onions for 500 (€11.90), courgettes for 250 (€5.95), and tomatoes for 200 (€4.76), because there was a good harvest,” the website wrote.

Despite the risk of being killed by a mine, residents travel along a “road of death”, lined with burnt-out cars, to the nearest town, Radensk, for food. This was also confirmed by Reuters, which spoke to people who still have relatives there.

“The choice Russia imposes on civilians every day: stay and die of hunger, or leave and risk being blown up by a landmine,” the agency quoted Ukrainian ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets as saying.

Two categories of people and harassment over humanitarian aid. In the hospital, where dead bodies have been lying in the basement for four months, people have been divided into two clans, according to witnesses.

“Those loyal to the Russian regime have some food, sometimes even meat and alcohol. The people they call Ukraine-lovers have nothing. The hospital director took everything from the latest deliveries provided as humanitarian aid and handed it out to his own people,” Ukrainska Pravda quoted the son of a man who remained in Oleshky as saying.

When Ukrainians succeeded in dropping humanitarian aid into Oleshky, a new phase of psychological warfare by the Russian Federation began.

Under normal circumstances, an operation to drop humanitarian aid would not attract so much attention, but according to Ukraine’s SBU security service, the Russian response reached particularly absurd proportions.

According to its information, Russian soldiers were ordered to arrange a series of interviews aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian side.

The recorded interviews were meant to include claims that Ukrainians were shelling Oleshky, positive views of Putin’s regime and expressions of gratitude. The SBU therefore urged Ukrainians to treat such reports cautiously and not spread unverified information.

According to information from the Ukrainian resistance movement in the Kherson region, which cannot be independently verified, those who received the aid faced abuse during interrogations.

According to Hasanenko, the most important thing now is to evacuate people from the town.

“Even what humanitarian missions are doing now, dropping food, will not solve their problems. I have reports in which people wrote that they had food left for two days and that this saved them. But it will not save them forever. Many people are dying there because of drones and artillery shelling. We need to establish a humanitarian corridor,” said the head of Oleshky’s military administration, adding that last winter had already been difficult and that they might not survive this one.

She herself has received reports that people have lost 10, 20 or even 40 kg. “There is one case: a woman wrote that she weighed 110 kg and now weighs 67. She has lost 40 kg and writes to me that she is dying.”

Violations of international law. During the recent UN General Assembly session, Ukrainian foreign minister Andrii Sybiha spoke about Oleshky. Ukraine’s main aim, he said, was to establish a humanitarian corridor in the area and safely evacuate people who have not accepted the Russian occupation.

It is precisely because of this stance, Kyiv says, that the Russian army is retaliating by blockading the town, where tourists had before the war come for its unique natural environment of pine forests and Dnipro inlets.

“There is no supply of electricity or gas. Over the past month, the delivery of food, medicines and other basic necessities has been completely blocked. Horrifying testimonies are coming from occupied Oleshky about how people are trying to survive under a blockade imposed by Russia: they are looking for scraps of food and gathering grass because there is simply no other food,” Ukrainian website NV quoted the foreign minister as saying.

Another dimension of Russian terror, he said, is the hunting of civilians. Russian FPV drones pursue and attack people, turning even an attempt to leave one’s home or move around the town into a deadly risk.

According to TSN, Russia is artificially creating food shortages in Oleshky, selling an ordinary food package for 50,000 hryvnias — nearly €1,000 — compared with a standard price of up to 2,000 hryvnias (€40). When people have no money, they offer their jewellery in exchange for food.

Food was last delivered to the town at the end of May, and according to Ukrainska Pravda, no further attempt to bring in food was made. When locals tried on 2 June, their four cars were blown up by anti-personnel mines, killing two people.

Legally, the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky, as well as the use of the population as human shields, constitutes, according to Ukrainian website Rubryka, a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention — on the protection of civilians in time of war — and a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

An occupying power is responsible for those living in occupied territory. “It must provide people with food, medical care and proper sanitation. But Russia is indifferent to all international requirements,” Ukrainska Pravda wrote.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, Oleshky has become a test of Russian dominance in an area “characterised by population decline, damaged infrastructure, chronic insecurity and growing isolation from the rest of Ukraine”.

Rather than reversing these conditions, the think tank said, Russia governs through them.

“Oleshky demonstrates that the humanitarian crisis unfolding across many Russian-occupied communities is not merely a byproduct of war but increasingly appears to be the result of an occupation system that tolerates, exploits, and sustains civilian vulnerability as a means of maintaining control,” wrote US experts.

According to Hasanenko, Russian fears of Ukrainian operations are also behind this. “I think they are simply trying to prevent the Ukrainian armed forces from crossing the Dnipro, because they could begin liberating the left bank. And people simply serve as human shields for them, while they mine everything completely,” she told EUobserver.

A tragic toll on Putin’s birthday. At least 22 people were killed, including five children, in a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile attack on an apartment building in Pryluky, in the Chernihiv region, on 7 October. Rescue workers pulled many people from the rubble of the destroyed building. According to local authorities, Russia fired as many as six cruise missiles at the town.

“This is the ‘gift’ Putin gave himself for his birthday. Killing children, killing people. There were new attacks with Shahed drones and aerial bombs during the day. It is important that leaders do not remain silent about what happened,” said Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, calling on the West to help with air defence.

Brutal Russian attacks continued the following day. As many as 12 people were killed after Russia hit a bus in the Donbas city of Kramatorsk. Putin’s regime is currently facing a crisis at the front, which it is trying to address through massive shelling of Ukrainian cities.

Maps of the day

Ukraine’s successful Operation Vivaldi continues. According to a report by the Institute for the Study of War, Ukrainian forces are continuing counterattacks towards the eastern bank of the Zherebets River, northeast of Lyman. The numerical superiority of Ukrainian forces and drones there is preventing Russian forces from consolidating their positions in the town.

According to September statistics, which we wrote about a few days ago, Russia has just had its worst month in Donbas for the past three years. The US newspaper The New York Times also charted this on its map.

Ukraine Claws Back Land in the Donbas, Thwarting a Russian Push – via @NYTimes using control of terrain data from @TheStudyofWar Link ⬇️ pic.twitter.com/Kcn0dN2wSd

— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) October 7, 2026

Videos of the day

Smoke over a distant refinery. Ukraine continues to launch drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Most recently, it caused a fire at the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat plant in the Bashkir region, one of Russia’s largest refineries. It is located around 1,300 km from the front line.

A fatal quad bike ride. The Hornets of Dovbush, from the 68th Brigade, released a video showing five Russian soldiers on a quad bike coming into view of their FPV attack drone. The location of the attack is unknown.

Two-weeks long protests by French high-school students demanding better education conditions risk getting more heated due to the French government’s lack of response.

For his part, French prime minister Sébastien Lecornu told parliament on Wednesday (7 October) the first proposals on education reform would be published at the end of the month.

He spoke after 250,000 demonstrators took to the streets across the country on Tuesday (6 October), according to interior ministry fiigures.

But the High School Student Union (Union Syndicaire Lycéenne, USL) said the number was as high as 450,000, including solidarity protests in most universities.

Pupils, joined by parents, teachers, and labour unions, want an end to teacher shortages and urgent renovations of run-down school buildings.

“Today, the balance of power is in our favour,” said Marius Mesnil, the USL’s co-general secretary, on Monday. 

The secondary school teachers’ union (Syndicat National des Enseignements de Secondaire, SNES) also called Lecornu’s inaction “unacceptable.”

Some 715 police officers, 215 students and 85 school staff members have been injured during the protests, with 18 internal probes were launched to investigate police brutality since 21 September, when the movement first erupted, after being sparked by a teachers’ protest.

A school in Nantes, in the west of the country, was set on fire, and protesters regularly light trash bins and make barricades in city centres.

The minister of interior has suspended the use of stun grenades after a 15-year-old’s hand was blown off in a violent confrontation with police on Monday.

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An annual conference on foreign information manipulation opened in Vilnius this week with a sensitive question on its agenda: Can the United States be considered a threat to Europe’s information space?

And the question caused a diplomatic incident.

EU DisinfoLab’s annual #Disinfo2026 conference, held in Vilnius on 7 and 8 October, brings together researchers, journalists, civil society groups, technology specialists and policymakers working on “foreign information manipulation and interference”, known as FIMI in EU jargon.

The programme was to look at moving beyond analysis of disinformation to practical responses, including disruption, deterrence, and litigation. 

But shortly before the conference several of its government supporters withdrew their official backing.

The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the European External Action Service (EEAS) all disappeared from the conference’s list of sponsors.

The dispute centred on a panel entitled “USA as a FIMI threat: acknowledge, adapt, push back”.

According to the published programme, the session asked how the European counter-disinformation community could build resilience without Washington and what solidarity should look like in a fractured transatlantic relationship. 

Reuters reported that the US State Department had lobbied Canada and European allies over their support for the conference.

Three US officials familiar with the matter and correspondence reviewed said American officials had contacted counterparts in Lithuania, Canada and France.

And the US diplomats persuaded the Canadian and Lithuanian foreign ministries to distance themselves.

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The Alfa Watan, a ship sailing under the flag of Togo, and the Able, a vessel flying the flag of Palau, were targeted by naval and aerial drones on Tuesday (6 October) morning in the Black Sea near the Bulgarian coast.

The Alfa Watan sank, and rescuers at the scene found only an overturned boat, life jackets, and fragments of the ship’s equipment, according to Bulgarian prime minister Rumen Radev.

The 18-member crew of the Able caught fire, but was successfully evacuated to the port of Varna.

“This is an unacceptable attack in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone,” Radev said after an emergency government meeting on Tuesday.

Bulgaria had discussed the drone attack inside the EU and Nato, he added.

It came after a drone also sank a Turkish-owned grain ship, the Royad Mammadov, killing two sailors, on Monday.

But even though Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky was quick to blame Russia, the perpetrators have not been formally identified yet, in a grey-zone conflict in which deniability is a tactic.

Russia and Ukraine have been escalating attacks on ships for several months in an effort to disrupt each other’s export economies.

And Moscow’s attacks have largely halted Ukraine’s maritime exports of agricultural products, while Kyiv’s attacks have forced Russia to seek alternative routes for exports.

“The situation in the Black Sea is increasingly concerning,” said EU Commission’s president Ursula von der Leyen on X on Tuesday.

Ukraine has “proposed concrete steps to de-escalate the situation”, also said Zelensky.

But for all his good will, the attacks were just part of a broader deterioration in Europe’s security environment, covering also Nato’s eastern and southern borders.

‘Shadow war’

For Czech president Peter Pavel, speaking to Czech daily Deník N on 22 September, the most imminent danger came from a false-flag attack in Estonia or Latvia, to test Nato’s resolve.

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• What Ukrainian officers say about the changes brought by the new commander-in-chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi.
• He has appointed people in their thirties and forties to important positions, often those who did not suit Syrskyi.
• According to Ukrainska Pravda, Ukrainians are preparing a war plan to clarify the Ukrainian army’s long-term objective.
• Russians attacked Ukrainian cities during Putin’s birthday, damaging apartment blocks and killing at least 11 people.
• Charts of the day: How far production at Russian refineries has fallen; exports of oil and oil products have declined, but Trump is indirectly keeping profits from them high.
• Videos of the day: a blazing sunset in Sochi; the music plays on; an unmanned Humvee; a robot’s duel with a drone; what the road to Crimea looks like.

Two and a half months have passed since major general Mykhailo Drapatyi became commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces. That may not be enough time for major reforms. But in recent days, articles have begun to appear about how the new commander is trying to change the Ukrainian army.

Unlike his predecessor, Oleksandr Syrskyi, Drapatyi does not promote himself much on social media. He has not made a single Facebook post since July, and his Telegram profile has similarly remained silent.

Ukrainska Pravda journalist Olha Kyrylenko tried to fill this “information vacuum”. She spoke with around 20 senior officers in the Ukrainian army.

Based on their anonymous testimonies, she sought to convey how Drapatyi had changed the Ukrainian army over those two and a half months.

The army is currently performing well at the front: Russians are suffering heavy losses and advancing very slowly, if at all. The protection of military, industrial and civilian sites in the rear against Russian air attacks is worse.

The article she wrote presents Drapatyi in a very positive light. According to Kyrylenko, the first word brigade and corps commanders use to describe the changes he has brought is “freedom”.

Drapatyi gives units considerable freedom and does not seek to micromanage everything at the front, as Syrskyi did.

“Unlike his predecessor, who told some brigade commanders how and where they should fight — and even specified the coordinates where they should establish a position — Drapatyi chose a different approach. He decided to decentralise command and abandon ‘micromanagement’,” Kyrylenko wrote.

Drapatyi is not as concerned with what is happening on each section of the front. He is more interested in statistics, analyses and the broader picture of the war.

“Syrskyi listened to reports from everyone every day and could give specific instructions on how to respond to developments, including where units should advance. Drapatyi does not do this; it is the task of the commanders of military groupings. Drapatyi focuses on strategic and systemic issues,” an unnamed senior military officer told Ukrainska Pravda.

The newspaper also adds that Drapatyi travels to visit units less frequently.

After taking up the post of commander-in-chief, he made several personnel changes. Broadly speaking, he is promoting younger commanders proven in the current war to replace older officers of the old Soviet school.

By contrast, he is moving the latter to rear-area and training roles, or they are retiring.

They are being replaced by younger commanders; Drapatyi himself is only 43. For example, Denys Prokopenko, a general with a far-right past, was put in charge of the important area near Dobropillia, where Russians are currently exerting the greatest pressure, despite being only 35.

Drapatyi has also rehabilitated some commanders who fell out of favour with the command under Syrskyi because of their criticism. One example is Serhii Sobko (42), who resigned last year from command of a brigade after the high command refused to send him reinforcements and would not allow his units to withdraw from a threatened area. Drapatyi appointed him as his deputy.

Emil Ishkulov (39), meanwhile, was sidelined after criticising the previous command over the campaign in the Kursk region, which ultimately ended with the withdrawal of Ukrainian soldiers. Drapatyi made him commander of the 11th Army Corps.

Ukrainska Pravda mentions an example from early summer under Syrskyi, when the 7th Corps was moved from Dobropillia to the Belarusian border in the Volyn region. The command said this would deter a possible Russian attack from Belarus.

After taking office, Drapatyi reversed this decision and sent the corps to defend the Zaporizhzhia region. The units themselves said they had had nothing to do at the Belarusian border for two weeks.

Ukrainska Pravda writes that a war plan is being prepared under Drapatyi. It is intended to define the Ukrainian army’s real long-term objectives and how to achieve them in this war.

“We need a grand strategy for 30 years, so that we as commanders know where we should be heading,” one of the corps commanders said, according to Ukrainska Pravda. The National Security and Defence Council is currently working on the plan.

Journalist Kyrylenko says this is probably the first such plan. However, the Thornpill account wrote that similar plans had already been prepared in 2017 under General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.

The Kyiv Post also published an article headlined that Ukraine’s army is winning under Drapatyi.

“Drapatyi is reshaping Ukraine’s armed forces to focus on drone-intensive warfare, decentralised command and younger combat commanders,” it wrote.

However, the steps taken by the previous command have also had a major influence on the current situation. For example, Operation Vivaldi, through which Andrii Biletskyi’s 3rd Army Corps has been liberating territory north of Lyman, has been under way since May, although its results are only being published now.

Ukrainska Pravda also recalls that Syrskyi handed Drapatyi an army in a better position than the one he had “inherited” in 2024 from the dismissed General Zaluzhnyi. At that time, the Russians were advancing rapidly and captured Avdiivka, for example.

The current commander-in-chief had an “easier start” in July.

“Drapatyi took office at a time when the front had been relatively stabilised, with Ukrainian armed forces even holding the advantage on the battlefield in some places. According to Ukrainska Pravda’s sources, the corps reform initiated by Syrskyi played a key role in this. Not all corps managed to develop into strong units, but the 3rd Corps, for example, substantially strengthened and literally retrained the relatively weak brigades it had received for combat duty,” Ukrainska Pravda added.

Nevertheless, several Western analysts shared the current reports about Drapatyi’s initial changes, especially his granting greater freedom to commanders. “It is a pity that Syrskyi was not replaced by Drapatyi much earlier — Ukraine would be in a better position now,” said Jakub Janovský, an OSINT analyst at Oryx, for example.

Russia again attacked Ukraine overnight into Wednesday. This time, it deployed at least five ballistic missiles, nearly 50 cruise missiles and 130 drones, 46 of them jet-powered. The fairly respectable 83-percent interception rate for jet-powered drones is noteworthy.

However, Russian missiles and drones also struck several locations and residential buildings. “Today, on Putin’s birthday, the Russian army ‘gave’ him the destruction of a residential building in Pryluky, in the Chernihiv region. It was an ordinary five-storey building. Unfortunately, according to current information, five people were killed and 26 injured, including five children. People may still be trapped beneath the rubble,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said.

The Russian attack damaged five apartment blocks in Dnipro and four in the city of Kremenchuk. This is what the situation in Kremenchuk looked like.

This is my hometown in the video, and today it suffered too. This is Kremenchuk – a city in Ukraine whose name doesn't pop up in news feeds very often, but tonight it got hit as well. One of the missiles hit a courtyard between high-rises: windows, cars parked in the yards, and… pic.twitter.com/PeeUkU19dZ

— Katerina Horbunova (@blue_eyedKeti) October 7, 2026

Overall, according to Zelensky, at least 11 people were killed and dozens were injured.

As can be seen in these photographs, a ballistic missile fell in Kyiv but did not explode; Ukrainian bomb disposal experts tried to render it harmless.

An unexploded Russian Iskander 9M723 ballistic missile lies among residential buildings in Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district, where Ukrainian bomb disposal teams are conducting a complex operation to neutralize it.

The missile was launched at Kyiv during last night’s Russian attack. pic.twitter.com/1MKddYRJyO

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 7, 2026

Chart of the day

Ukrainians claim that their attacks on refineries have put more than 50 percent of Russia’s oil-processing capacity out of action. Michael Bohnert, an analyst at the RAND think tank, wrote on X that this was not entirely accurate. According to his calculations, current fuel production at Russian refineries stands at 3.22 million barrels per day. Before the war, it was usually around 5.5 million barrels per day, meaning a fall of about 40 percent.

There has also been a monthly decline of 0.36 million barrels per day, apparently owing to the latest attacks on refineries, for example in Moscow and Samara.

Ukraine says its strikes have taken out more than half of Russia’s refining capacity. Live crude runs do not show that.

My bottom-up tracker (41 refineries plus the mini-tail, version 2) puts national throughput at about 3.22 mb/d as of 6 Oct. That is down 0.36 mb/d over the… pic.twitter.com/RhXrzGlnJS

— Michael Bohnert (@mbohnert) October 6, 2026

According to Bohnert, this is the third time Ukrainians have managed to reduce Russian oil processing so substantially. There was a drop of around 40 percent last autumn and in July this year. “3.2m barrels per day is roughly the point at which things start becoming uncomfortable for Moscow,” he wrote.

Unlike last year, however, Russia is helping itself through imports. The country, once the world’s third-largest fuel exporter, has sharply curtailed its exports. At the same time, it is partially making up for the shortfall in domestic production through imports.

South Korea is also helping it in this respect. According to information from the Guardian, 176,000 tonnes of fuel, mainly diesel, arrived from South Korea at Russian ports in the Far East in July and August. Seven tankers made a total of 14 voyages to Russia. Three of the tankers are on the European Union’s sanctions list.

Overall, Russia imported 368,000 tonnes of petroleum products by sea in August, a third of them from South Korea. The country, which once supported Ukraine not only verbally but also through non-military aid, is now helping Russia cope with Ukrainian attacks on refineries.

High petrol prices are also working in Russia’s favour. Analysts at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute published a chart showing that Russia exported the least oil and petroleum products in August since 2018. As the final bar in the left-hand chart shows, this was mainly due to a decline in petroleum-product exports.

Nevertheless, revenue from sales remains at last year’s level (the purple line in the left-hand chart). This is mainly due to the rise in their prices on global markets as a result of the US-Israeli war against Iran.

1/9 🛢️ Russia’s crude oil and oil product exports fell to their lowest level since 2018 in August. Despite higher prices, oil export revenues increased by just $0.3B to $13.9B. September Russian Oil Tracker by @KSE_Institute 👉 https://t.co/Rk4hd5OiA6 pic.twitter.com/KdVMj4QjVV

— KSE Institute 🇺🇦 (@KSE_Institute) October 6, 2026

Videos of the day

This was the sunset seen by residents of the Russian coastal city of Sochi on Tuesday. A tanker sailing under the Liberian flag was burning close to shore. Footage showed that it was ablaze along virtually its entire length.

The Russian Rybar channel wrote that it had been hit by naval drones. It was therefore probably a Ukrainian attack on Russia’s shadow fleet, which exports oil around the world and thereby finances the war.

The oil-laden tanker was travelling from Novorossiysk to India. Local residents reported an explosion and feared that oil would spill into the sea.

🔥🚢 A dramatic view from the Russian Sochi right now, where the burning oil tanker off the port has turned into a massive wall of fire pic.twitter.com/oFKrLRTIuw

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 6, 2026

This is a rather surreal continuation of the previous video. A man is playing guitar on the promenade in Sochi while an oil tanker burns behind him, sending up an enormous plume of smoke.

Recorded on October 6, 2026, in Sochi, Russia. A street musician continues to play music on the waterfront while an oil tanker burns offshore in the background. pic.twitter.com/5lcfiOqZD2

— Директор✖️Кладбища (@directklad) October 7, 2026

Ukrainians are experimenting with remotely controlled vehicles. This video shows how a US Humvee off-road vehicle was converted into a remotely operated ground drone. It was loaded with wooden beams, which it delivered to soldiers building fortifications.

A Ukrainian HMMWV converted into a remotely controlled UGV is being used for frontline logistics, delivering timber for the construction and reinforcement of defensive positions. pic.twitter.com/NxQnuoa6Xf

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 7, 2026

This video shows a duel between a Ukrainian robot and a Russian FPV drone. In this case, the robot ultimately won, neutralising the drone by ramming it.

A Ukrainian ground robotic system rammed and destroyed a Russian FPV drone on the Pokrovsk axis. The UGV, operated by the 25th Sicheslav Airborne Brigade of Ukraine’s 7th Air Assault Corps, was returning from a combat mission when the FPV began pursuing it. The operators… pic.twitter.com/dIPGuEMVVC

— NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) October 6, 2026

Ukrainian attacks on the land route to Crimea continue. This is what one of the roads to Crimea currently looks like, with numerous damaged and destroyed lorries visible.

This is only part of the road now referred to as the land corridor to Crimea. Another road has turned into a "road of death" for the Russians. pic.twitter.com/D0fKAXQdGo

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) October 6, 2026

US prosecutors say an American forensic tool concealed its Russian owners and its development in Russia.

Used by numerous security agencies in Europe, Oxygen Forensics helps investigators worldwide access data from mobile phones and computers.

Many bodies are now suspending use of the software following recent revelations.

The Slovak interior ministry bought the software in 2018 when links to Russia were not yet publicly known, then renewed the license multiple times. Now, the ministry said IT department officials are investigating the issue.

The tool was also sold to other government bodies across Europe.

Russian ownership via Cyprus

In the US, Virginia-based Oxygen Forensics CEO Lee Reiber was arrested at the end of September, along with Oleg Davydov, one of the Russian owners.

The company was headquartered in the US state of Virginia, appearing American.

According to federal prosecutors in the US, the company hid its Russian ownership through a shell company in Cyprus and that its software was developed in Russia.

Allegedly, this scam helped secure contracts for the forensic tool in the US, UK, Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia.

Reiber, a 55-year-old American, was arrested in Idaho on Sunday. On Tuesday (22 September), he appeared before a federal court there and was released on bail. He is expected to appear before a federal court in Los Angeles soon.

Davydov, a 52-year-old from Moscow, was arrested on that same day at London Heathrow before he could board a flight to Istanbul. And the US plans to seek extradition. Both face charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

The group of five also owned a Russian company co-founded by Davydov in 2000. Until September 2022, it was called Oxygen Software and now operates under the name MKO Systems.

Its programmers worked in Russia, where the company sold the software under other names. According to investigative files, its clients included Russia’s secret service (FSB), investigative committee (SKR) and interior ministry.

Davydov, the company’s technical director, was responsible for software development. In 2013, he helped establish Oxygen Forensics in Virginia with Reiber joining the company in August 2015.

Prosecutors say that following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and US sanctions after, the duo agreed to hide both the real owners and that it was developed in Russia. In March 2022, Reiber became CEO and director.

Then, Russian owners were removed from public company records.

However, investigators said the Russians continued to control the company, making key decisions, determining Reiber’s pay, and outvoting him on the board.

The charges concern the concealment of the software’s ownership and origin in securing public contracts.

A network of deception

Two companies were found to have supplied the Slovak interior ministry with Oxygen Forensic tools.

In 2018, the sale was part of a broader procurement by the ministry for computers, laptops, servers, monitors and printers, ordered from the Czech company Risk Analysis Consultants for €125,000, the forensic tool itself costing €10,000.

The Prague-based company did not respond for comment.

An invoice issued to the Slovak interior ministry in 2022 by the Slovak company Microcomp–Computersystém indicates the renewal of a licence for this software. At the time, the minister responsible was Roman Mikulec.

The Slovak ministry also ordered a licence renewal in July 2024, under his successor Matúš Šutaj Eštok. Microcomp–Computersystém did not respond for comment.

Authorities warned

On Friday (2 October), the Slovak national security authority (NBÚ) warned of the risks posed by using software from Oxygen Forensics and connected companies such as MKO Systems and Prostranstvo IT.

Their software helps investigators search for and examine data from digital devices. It can process vast amounts of information, including evidence, which makes it important who owns, controls and develops it. According to the NBÚ, this is important both for data protection and for the reliability of analysis results.

The warning came after the US case was made public.

The NBÚ considers links to Russia significant in assessing the security risk, also in view of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.

However, the warning itself does not mean that data leaked through the software. US prosecutors explicitly stated that the charges did not concern malicious code or unauthorised access to customer data.

The case concerns the alleged concealment of the software’s ownership and origin. And no court has yet ruled on the case.

“The ministry will proceed in accordance with the recommendations of the National Security Authority,” the Slovak interior ministry said.

The NBÚ recommended that public bodies identify this company’s presence and report it to the authority.

Belgian Green MEP Saskia Bricmont also called for the use of Oxygen to be stopped immediately and for an inquiry into whether sensitive information could have reached Russia after it was found that Romania, Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland and Hungary had purchased the software.

European police shed tool

Several European security agencies are suspending the use of Oxygen Forensics software or taking steps to terminate their contracts after the company’s Russian ties came to light.

The tool was also used by Czech police. Czech security agencies continued to purchase licences for the computer software after 2022, when the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. Czech authorities are awaiting further information from the United States. For now, they have prohibited software updates.

London’s Metropolitan Police has suspended the use of Oxygen tools and launched a comprehensive review. British police forces, including specialised units, had used the software.

And Latvian police suspended its use and is assessing whether it will continue using it.

Romania’s anti-corruption agency, too, took steps to terminate its contract with the Russia-linked tool.

A case of treason on an unprecedented scale is emerging at Germany’s foreign intelligence service, in what German media say could shake the entire agency.

According to the investigative team of WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), August Hanning, the former head of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), is being investigated for alleged espionage detrimental to the state and intelligence activities.

Hanning’s tenure at the BND ended in November 2005.

But he is accused of having illegally obtained secret information for several years after he left the service, which gathers and assesses information on foreign, security, and economic threats.

He was arrested at his home in Nordwalde, near Münster in western Germany, on Tuesday (6 October).

Der Spiegel reported that police arrived at 6.41AM and took him away in a black minibus at 8.58AM.

Another former senior BND employee was also detained in the Bavaria region — apparently the former head of Hanning’s office, who worked for the intelligence service until spring 2026.

Neither German authorities nor Hanning’s representatives had commented on the case by Tuesday noon.

What investigative journalists found

According to investigative journalists, Manfred D. leaked top-secret information from within the BND to Hanning until 2022.

According to Der Spiegel, which cited investigators’ findings, Hanning and Manfred D. agreed, as early as spring 2010, that the latter would, in return for payment, gather intelligence from the BND for his former boss, which Hanning could use in his private security consultancy work.

Investigators are working on the assumption that, in at least one case, Hanning prepared a security analysis for a foreign intelligence service.

According to WDR, NDR and SZ, it was not for Russia.

In another case, he allegedly used information from internal BND documents when communicating with a foreign agent.

According to information from security circles obtained by WDR, NDR, and SZ reporters, Hanning came under scrutiny after his home and offices were searched in September last year, when the State Criminal Police Office (LKA) was investigating the case of steak empire heiress Christina Block.

Abduction of children

Hamburg prosecutors accused her of commissioning the abduction of her two youngest children in late 2023 amid a custody dispute.

According to investigators, Hanning was involved in an earlier attempt to abduct them, accusations he denies.

While assessing material seized from Hanning last year, LKA officers found an electronic data storage device with explosive contents, according to the investigative journalists.

The former official apparently had access to top-secret BND documents from the recent past which, under no circumstances, should have been in his possession.

In total, he obtained around 2,000 documents. In many cases, these were briefings for the so-called intelligence situation meeting at the federal chancellery, where the heads of security agencies exchange information every week.

They included highly sensitive reports, for example, on Iran’s nuclear programme or the Russian military. According to security sources, they also included reports from foreign partner services.

A leak of such material is regarded by intelligence services as an absolute catastrophe. Friendly intelligence services could lose trust in the BND and cut off the institution from crucial information.

After assessing them, the LKA Hamburg police team handed the seized documents over to federal authorities.

And in May 2026, the Federal Public Prosecutor General’s Office ultimately opened confidential proceedings against Hanning and his alleged BND informant. It remains unclear over what period the former intelligence chief was supplied with secret internal information.

According to security sources, the most recently discovered documents date from June 2022.

It also remains unclear how the alleged BND mole managed to remove material from the secured agency. The BND was asked for a statement on the case.

Hanning’s lawyers have not yet responded to a brief request for comment on the allegations.

An affair of historic proportions

For the BND, this is already the second serious incident in the space of a few years.

In 2022, the espionage case involved Russia, when a former head of a BND unit was accused of spying for Moscow together with another man.

It concerned top-secret information on BND cyber operations that was leaked from the service.

As the Tagesschau website noted, if the suspicions against Hanning are confirmed, this would be an espionage affair of historic proportions.

German history has never before seen an alleged case of treason involving such a senior former top official.

According to Der Spiegel, this is unprecedented. This is particularly so because, for many years after leading the intelligence service, Hanning remained among the most important officials in Germany’s security apparatus.

Before becoming BND president, he was responsible for protecting classified information at West Germany’s representation in East Germany.

After serving at the chancellery, including as coordinator of the federal intelligence services, the lawyer, who holds a doctorate, took over the leadership of the BND in 1998.

At the end of 2005, after leaving the intelligence service, Hanning became a state secretary at the interior ministry. He retired four years later.

Questionable business

According to German media, his subsequent activities were seen as problematic. He became known as a businessman and security consultant with a company in Switzerland.

Its German subsidiary was hired for a time in the custody dispute between Block and her former husband.

According to prosecutors, in 2023 he allegedly planned, together with an associate, to “discredit Block’s former husband through false allegations of paedophilia”.

Hanning and his alleged accomplice apparently tried to plant a hard drive containing child sexual abuse images and videos on the father of Block’s children.

The investigation has not yet been concluded. Hanning has previously denied all allegations in the case.

• Russia continues to pressure cities, while the first autonomous counter-drone turrets have been deployed in Kyiv.
• Ukraine is maintaining pressure on Russia’s oil industry, reporting that it has disabled 51 percent of refinery capacity.
• Russia still sees a large pocket of encircled Ukrainians in Kharkiv region, but no such pocket exists.
• Ukraine says it destroyed a Russian Su-34 and Su-35 on the ground. Satellite imagery provides no clear evidence.
• Maps of the day – Kharkiv region
• Videos of the day – intense trench fighting; Russians shot down a balloon carrying an FPV drone; Russia has revived the idea of a barrage of tethered balloons; ground drones repelled an FPV drone attack using a counter-drone net – views from both sides.

Russia continues to pressure cities. Ukraine has begun testing AI-controlled machine-gun turrets in them. The new autonomous weapon is intended to protect key sites from drone attacks, typically bridges and similar infrastructure. Air force spokesperson Yuri Ihnat said on Monday that the AI turrets, which receive information from other air-defence components, had achieved their first shoot-downs, including of Geran-5 drones.

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky reported on Saturday, before Ihnat’s announcement, that 12 turrets of the kind shown in the military video below had been installed in the capital by that date. Another eight are planned.

They are armed with a 12.7mm heavy machine gun, which is not effective against a Geran flying high and fast, but becomes effective during the final phase of its flight, when it comes within the weapon’s range. The soldier in the footage said 50 rounds were sufficient to shoot down a Geran with AI assistance.

AI is entering Ukraine’s air-defense fight — and it is already helping shoot down Russia’s jet-powered Shaheds.

Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat said AI-assisted turrets using machine vision have already successfully engaged Russian Geran-5 jet-powered UAVs.

“I was a big… pic.twitter.com/zixvpliQuN

— Army Media 🇺🇦 (@armyinformcomua) October 5, 2026

Details of the turrets’ precise deployment are, understandably, not yet known. However, both Russian and Ukrainian sources commented on them in interesting ways. Ukrainian expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi told the NV website, among other things, about the risk that fully autonomous turrets pose to civilians. Serhii Beskrestnov was the first to warn about it on Monday: “I warn you that, for your own safety, you should not stand by windows during an air-raid alert.”

Khrapchynskyi noted that this rule has applied to any weapon since the start of the war. People should not stand by windows during air raids precisely because air defences or debris from downed weapons can damage buildings and injure people. There is a two-wall rule: if you cannot get to a shelter, hide somewhere in your flat protected from a potential blast by two walls, such as in a corridor.

“This does not mean that robotic turrets will fire at windows. They will target moving aerial targets, but they could hit civilian infrastructure,” Khrapchynskyi conceded.

The Russian Telegram channel Two Majors complained that while Ukraine was already using AI turrets in practice, and although promising projects of the same kind existed in Russia, bureaucracy and high costs were holding back their introduction into service.

The same Russian source was among those that published a video showing an entire bridge across the Dnipro in Kyiv being wrapped in a counter-drone net.

But after several days in which Russian Gerans targeted only Kyiv’s bridges, they attacked Zaporizhzhia in the same way overnight from Monday to Tuesday. Russia injured five city residents, including two Red Cross workers, and halted or restricted traffic on several bridges in Zaporizhzhia, causing traffic jams in the city during the morning.

Zaporizhzhia lies about 30 km from the front and is a natural supply route for fighting units. Taking the bridges out of action would create a serious logistical complication, but the same applies as in Kyiv: their complete destruction is unlikely. Russia will also be satisfied with constant attacks causing minor damage, but sufficient to halt traffic.

A bridge across the Dnipro in city of 🇺🇦 #Zaporizhzhia bombed by 🇷🇺 during the night
There are victims pic.twitter.com/wTFl60IA1o

— C4H10FO2P ☠️ (@markito0171) October 6, 2026

Among other sites hit by Russian weapons was one of the hospitals in Kryvyi Rih, which was struck by two missiles. Two people were injured during the air raid.

Ukraine is maintaining pressure on Russia’s oil industry, reporting that it has disabled 51 percent of refinery capacity. “More than half of the enemy’s capacity has been taken out of operation. This is the result of carefully planned, methodical and systematic work aimed at exhausting Russia’s war machine and destroying its military-economic potential,” new minister Yevhen Khmara said.

His statement cannot currently be verified, but footage of another fire at oil infrastructure in Russia emerged on Tuesday morning. It was at the Volodarskaya production and distribution centre in Moscow region. It lies just under 40 km southeast of central Moscow in a straight line, and its premises contain a large oil depot. It is also a pipeline junction through which fuel flows to Moscow, including aviation fuel for Moscow’s airports.

Ukrainian attack drones successfully struck Russia's Volodarskaya LPDS tonight, a major storage and distribution hub supplying jet fuel, diesel, and gasoline for the Russian capital, Moscow.

Seen here, the facility burns. pic.twitter.com/bmtqTUD6xF

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) October 6, 2026

Ukraine says it destroyed a Russian Su-34 and Su-35 on the ground. Satellite imagery provides no clear evidence. The attack targeted Khanskaya airfield in Krasnodar region, from which a training unit normally operates.

The incident took place over the weekend. Satellite images showing clear traces of explosions and fire appeared relatively quickly, but it is not possible to identify what exploded and burned.

The usual Russian source, Fighterbomber, did not comment on the matter at all.

📍Satellite imagery of the aftermath of the UAV attack on "Khanskaya" airfield.

1× Su-34;
1× Su-35S.

Source: @avivector https://t.co/fYZej288A8 pic.twitter.com/CU6JD9ft22

— Oko Gora (@oko_gora_tg) October 4, 2026

Russia still sees a large pocket of encircled Ukrainians in Kharkiv region, but no such pocket exists. The image below shows a map of the part of Kharkiv region where active military operations are under way. It was produced by the Russian defence ministry and shown by Two Majors on its Telegram account.

Alongside the image, the same source again cited Kremlin claims in listing alleged Russian successes in this sector: “In the Kharkiv direction, the Northern Group of Forces reported further advances. In the Lyptsi sector, our troops advanced near Tokarivka and captured several enemy strongpoints. In the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk directions, advances were reported in the areas of Prykolotne, Kotivka, Varvarivka, Reznikove, Mykolaivka, and Annopil.”

We have already written in Ukraine Battlefield update that no pocket exists, and that Ukrainian and independent sources follow the northern part of the front only marginally, because far less is happening there than Russia claims.

Among respected OSINT projects, Playfra most recently covered this battlefield on Saturday. The first map from this source shows the section of the front located at the top right of the Russian map. This is where the alleged encirclement is supposed to be, which various Russian sources have been reporting for almost a month.

The fighting here consists of Russian infiltration attempts, which are “chaotic and unorganised”. Playfra unequivocally rejects any encirclement.

Bilyi Kolodyaz-Velykyi Burluk directions.

No particular changes.
The Russians continue infiltration attempts to encircle Ukrainian units in the Dehtiarne salient, though, once again, for now there is definitely no encirclement of the Ukrainians here.
Russian infiltrations remain… https://t.co/ZlzDhwdMDh pic.twitter.com/GZz4lHkxSp

— Playfra (@Playfra0) October 4, 2026

The following map from Playfra shows the same section of the battlefield as that seen in the Russian defence ministry’s version. The gap between reality and Russia’s claimed successes here is among the largest along the entire front, from Sumy to Kherson:

For comparison, the same area according to Finland’s Black Bird Group:

And according to the Russian project Slivochny Kapriz, which is relatively reliable. In all cases, Kharkiv is at the bottom left and the village of Dihtiarne, directly on the Ukrainian-Russian border, is at the top right:

Three-quarters of Ukrainians support peace talks. In the second half of September, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology asked respondents whether they supported peace negotiations with Russia.

Exactly three-quarters — 75 percent — said they supported peace talks, 21 percent were against, and the remainder could not give a definite answer. This was virtually identical to the result in February 2025, when 74 percent of respondents answered the same question positively.

This is also shown by the Kyiv polling agency’s graph, whose analysts stressed that willingness to negotiate does not equal willingness to accept Russian terms.

Views on who will win the war have shifted more significantly. As the next graph shows, the difference between February 2025 and September 2026 is again almost zero, but there has been a significant change compared with July this year.

At the beginning of the summer, 60 percent of Ukrainians were certain they would win the war (dark blue), while 25 percent considered it more likely than not. Now, only 47 percent are certain, but 79 percent of respondents in total still expect a Ukrainian victory.

The change was probably driven by optimism in July, when Crimea was almost completely isolated and a successful campaign of medium-range strikes began. Although it continues, the one-off shift in public mood has since returned to its original level.

There have been minimal changes in views on how long Ukrainians are prepared to fight. The largest group — 62 percent — said (dark blue) they were prepared to do so for as long as necessary. Four percent (light blue) said one year, while 23 percent (orange) said they could endure only a few more months. However, the number who say resistance should continue for only months has fluctuated around 20 percent for more than two years.

Videos of the day

Videos like this were common in 2023. It is unclear when this one was made, because the prevailing nature of the fighting is different today. The Ukrainian squad in the footage clears Russian trenches.

In the more than seven-minute recording, views from the ground alternate with those from a reconnaissance drone hovering above the battlefield, which gave the Ukrainians an overview of the enemy. The fighting is confused, but the basic orientation is simple: Ukrainians with green identification markings attack from right to left.

Full video.

Original combat POV footage documenting a tactical operation to clear fortified positions in a contested tree line. The video shows real-time close-quarters maneuvers, tactical coordination, and direct trench combat.

The coordination between the infantry and the… https://t.co/4BxTfnwdwu pic.twitter.com/5olByLJ2li

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 🦩🇬🇪🇺🇦🇺🇲🇬🇷 (@TheDeadDistrict) October 5, 2026

A Russian drone destroyed a balloon carrying a Ukrainian FPV drone beneath it. Ukraine is trying to use favourable wind currents in this way to extend the range of its small drones, which can then operate deeper in the Russian rear.

Video of a Ukrainian FPV carried by a balloon intercepted by Russia’s 50th Varyag Unmanned Systems Brigade.https://t.co/2Xb9UZGyRV https://t.co/L0waDkbokK pic.twitter.com/ir5FbmUTXP

— Rob Lee (@RALee85) October 5, 2026

Twenty-first-century warfare in Moscow. A Russian soldier with a man-portable air-defence system shot down a Ukrainian drone by firing over a busy road.

Russian channels have released previously unseen footage from a drone attack on Moscow-area refineries.

The footage reportedly shows a mobile air-defense team using 9K38 Igla-series MANPADS engaging a Ukrainian FP/Liuity-type drone moments before it struck an oil storage… pic.twitter.com/9dJXPTZ6XG

— SILENT BRIEF (@SilentBriefHQ1) October 5, 2026

Tethered balloons saw their greatest use during the Second World War, when they were deployed by armies on both sides. Balloon barrages protected London in the summer of 1940 and the Normandy landing fleet in June 1944, as well as German cities.

The principle was the same as in this Russian propaganda video. Balloons tethered to the ground by cables floated above cities and militarily important targets to prevent enemy aircraft from flying low. Ideally, they would hit the cables and crash. This principle may now be applied against drones.

👀 Russia has begun producing aerostats to protect oil refineries from drones.

Similar aerostats were actively used during World War I. pic.twitter.com/H3h8HQykqX

— MAKS 26 🇺🇦👀 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) October 4, 2026

A Russian FPV drone was targeting a Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicle. Just before impact, it successfully deployed a defensive launchable net.

Footage from a Russian FPV drone shows it diving toward a Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicle. Moments before impact, the UGV fires an anti-drone net from its rear section, catching and bringing down the attacking FPV. pic.twitter.com/MednUTUs45

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 3, 2026

This was not an isolated case. Another video from a different location shows a similar situation, but this time from the perspective of a camera on the ground drone.

Se me acaban las palabras para describir esto.

Las imágenes proporcionadas por la cámara instalada en un sistema terrestre no tripulado ucraniano 🇺🇦 muestran su sistema de red anti-drones “KARAKURT” funcionando en condiciones reales de combate.

El robot terrestre ucraniano 🇺🇦,… pic.twitter.com/xgJ1YiNbkQ

— SergioLR🪖 (@CasetaBosque) October 3, 2026

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s election, held on Sunday (4 October), has reinforced the country’s deep ethnic and political divisions, with nationalist parties retaining a strong grip on power and low turnout underscoring voters’ growing disillusionment with a political system that has long frustrated the country’s ambitions to join the European Union.

Public support for EU membership remains strong. According to a 2026 survey by Bosnia’s directorate for European integration, 74.4 percent of citizens said they would vote for EU membership in a referendum. Even in Republika Srpska, the ethnic Serb component, where support is lower, 54.1 percent said they would back joining the bloc.

And Bosnia became an EU candidate in 2022, but its path towards membership remains stalled.

The European Commission has identified 14 priorities that the country must address before it can move towards opening accession negotiations. So far, it has not opened a single accession-talks chapter and does not have a chief negotiator for EU membership.

Meanwhile, Bosnia’s complicated political system, built around three constituent ethnic groups, continues to hamper the adoption of reforms.

Forgotten elections

The Bosnian nationwide turnout was just 42 percent, reflecting political apathy, but the complexity of its system also means few people in the EU followed what went on.

Instead of a single president, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a tripartite presidency comprising one Bosniak (South Slavic ethnic group), one Croat, and one Serb.

Voters registered in the federation may vote for either the Bosniak or Croat member, but not both. Voters in Republika Srpska elect the Serb member.

From the provisional results, on Sunday, Denis Becirović won a second term as the Bosniak member of the presidency with 38.12 percent.

He is to be joined by Darijana Filipović (46.55 percent) of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) as the Croat member, and Željka Cvijanović of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) as the Serb member (55.37 percent).

The Bosnian system excludes citizens who do not identify as Serb, Croat, or Bosnian from standing for the presidency.

And the post-war power sharing agreement includes 14 parliaments and governments in total for the country of some 3.1 million people, making reforms hard to push through.

But amid the complexities, the biggest winner from Sunday’s elections could be Serb nationalist politician Milorad Dodik, while the big loser could be the EU, according to Adi Ćerimagić, a senior analyst on the Western Balkans at the European Stability Initiative think tank.

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After years without being able to pass a budget, a coalition that wavered over every major proposal, the Ceuta crisis, a string of corruption cases and people taking to the streets over the housing crisis, Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez has called snap elections for 29 November — just as a rightwing victory appears increasingly unstoppable.

Monday’s (5 October) move is barely a surprise. Sánchez’s gambles have proven effective in the past to keep his grasp on power. 

Even before the summer, an early election wasn’t considered a far-fetched possibility. Sources in Sánchez’s centre-left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and its allies linked it to the budget vote anytime from October onwards, with some analysts pointing to November 2026 as a politically attractive date.

Spain now faces a 54-day sprint to the polls, the shortest window the law allows, with Sánchez betting that the housing issue can turn the campaign in his favour.

But why now?

The eviction of an 87-year-old woman from her rental home after 70 years on 23 September prompted people across the country to take to the streets against Spain’s ongoing housing crisis.

And last Friday, the Spanish lower house in parliament rejected two new housing decree-laws. It was the centre-right People’s Party (PP), far-right Vox, Catalan pro-independence party Junts and Navarrese regional party UPN who voted them down, exposing once again how fragile Sánchez’s parliamentary coalition is.

But with parliament dissolved, a political manoeuvre could now see similar housing decrees approved anyway – helping Sánchez make the housing crisis his main election motto.

Housing bet

In Spain, when parliament is dissolved ahead of an election, responsibility for ratifying government-approved laws passes to a smaller standing committee of 69 lawmakers, known as the Diputación Permanente [Permanent Deputation], which continues to operate until the new parliament is sworn in.

The maths in that body favours Sánchez. His socialist party and the left-wing and regional parties that backed the original housing decrees hold 35 seats, against 34 for the opposition.

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Two human rights defenders are facing a Greek court in Rhodes and 20 years in jail over allegations they belong to a criminal organisation.

The hearing targets Norwegian activist Tommy Olsen and Panayote Dimitras, a legal administrator and representative of the NGO Greek Helsinki Monitor.

“They want to shut me up because what I’ve been doing over the last six to seven years is revealing their wrongdoings,” Olsen told EUobserver on Monday (5 October).

The hearing, which is taking place on Tuesday, is years in the making, following repeated attempt by Greek authorities to punish the pair for helping people seek asylum on the island of Kos in 2021.

Both deny any wrongdoing and Amnesty International earlier this year said the two were being prosecuted for their human-rights work of documenting serious rights violations.

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• Russia is making no progress at all on the front, and September was among its worst months.
• Russia wants to cause Kyiv’s economic collapse, and pontoon bridges are being prepared in the city.
• Ukraine’s air defences neutralised 83 percent of drones launched in September, compared with 92 percent in May.
• Videos of the day – attacks on Kyiv’s bridges; what a TM-62 anti-tank mine can do; what anti-drone protection for the Kerch Bridge looks like; Russian communists shouted “Down with the tsar!”, and frontline sounds from a Russian soldier’s video.

Russia is making no progress at all on the front, and September was among its worst months. Russian president Vladimir Putin claimed in Valdai at the beginning of the month that his subjects had captured 1,300 square km of territory in September. This is further evidence that he is either being given completely fabricated figures or is deliberately lying himself.

If Putin were right, his army would have experienced its most successful period since the first two months of the invasion. Defence ministry reports reflect this. Almost every day, they report the capture of more and more villages. In reality, the situation is different. Russian forces became bogged down in every direction even before the rains arrived, and throughout the year they have failed to achieve any operational success that would justify the further hundreds of thousands killed and wounded.

As every month, various analysts have again published their calculations of how the front line moved. Not even estimates from Putin’s own Z channels agree with his figure.

“The average daily rate of advance by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the SVO zone [special military operation] in September 2026 was +5.9 km². The average rate of advance over the entire offensive up to October 2026 is +9.92 km² per day,” Russian project Slivochny Kapriz wrote about September.

It, too, is an unreliable source that regularly overestimates the significance of “flag operations”, but even its data makes it clear that 2026 is lagging significantly behind the previous year.

Even if this author’s figures were correct, the Russians advanced by 177 square km during September’s 30 days, more than seven times less than Putin claims.

Ukrainians from DeepStateUA also published an estimate very close to Slivochny Kapriz’s figures. According to this OSINT project, Ukraine lost 154 square km in September.

However, the Ukrainian analysts treat their own data cautiously and warn their readers that “the operational security of our forces remains the highest priority in our work”.

In other words, during Ukrainian counter-offensives, DeepStateUA only reports successes after a delay so as not to jeopardise the operations’ success.

They therefore now recall that their statistics do not yet include 270 to 320 square km of liberated Ukrainian territory in various sectors. “July will therefore also end as a month in which the Armed Forces of Ukraine have the upper hand, while for August and September this will only become clear when official announcements of successes are available. In the meantime, part of the liberated territories may be lost again,” DeepStateUA wrote on Friday (2 October).

The most optimistic by far are currently Finnish analysts from the Black Bird Group, who see a balance of 190 square kms in Ukraine’s favour in September.

Over the month of September, the Russian net gains were negative 190 km2. This marks the greatest monthly net territorial loss for Russia in our dataset since the June of 2023.

(1/12) pic.twitter.com/SKRSWbIrzo

— Black Bird Group (@Black_BirdGroup) October 3, 2026

Emil Kastehelmi, one of the project’s authors, pointed out that the sharp change for the better stems from the fact that it also captures some changes that DeepStateUA has not yet taken into account. Nevertheless, he said: “Russia has failed to reverse a situation that has persisted for almost the entire year. The results of the major Russian offensive are minimal, and this is likely to remain the case for the rest of 2026.”

Among Western analysts, the most sceptical is Konrad Muzyka of Rochan Consulting, who credits the Russians with even more gains than Slivochny Kapriz — as much as 235 square kms of advance. Yet this figure still does not come close to Putin’s. Even if it were the most accurate of all, which cannot be determined, it would amount to an area roughly equivalent to the size of Košice, including all its suburbs, forests and agricultural land within the city’s administrative boundaries.

The plan for this year, meanwhile, was to capture the rest of Donetsk region, including the remaining large cities of Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. The Russians are closest to doing so in Kostiantynivka, but Ukrainian soldiers remain there too.

Here is a short summary of territorial changes in Ukraine for September 2026.
Our dataset shows an overall Russian territorial gain in September, but a sharply uneven pattern: gains around Dobropillia, Velykyi Burluk, Kramatorsk and Komyshuvakha coincided with substantial losses… pic.twitter.com/jrq0zXiqri

— Konrad Muzyka – Rochan Consulting (@konrad_muzyka) October 1, 2026

Russia wants to cause Kyiv’s economic collapse, and pontoon bridges are being prepared in the city. There is now no doubt that the Russian army has begun a systematic effort to disrupt transport between western and eastern Kyiv. Over the weekend, further drones struck several bridges across the Dnipro.

They included the Northern Bridge, which a Russian drone attacked during the day amid heavy traffic.

🚨 BREAKING: Russian forces launched a drone strike hitting the Northern Bridge in Kyiv, damaging the road surface.

The strike coincides with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s unannounced visit to the capital to meet with Ukrainian leadership. pic.twitter.com/j1UHYoBMa7

— UNITED24 Media (@United24media) October 4, 2026

One drone is not enough to destroy a bridge, but the explosion left a large hole in the road surface.

Такий вигляд зараз має Північний міст у Києві після атаки російського безпілотника.

На дорожньому покритті утворилася велика вирва, навколо пошкоджений асфальт.

Через наслідки удару фактично перекрита одна смуга руху. Автомобілі та громадський транспорт об’їжджають пошкоджену… pic.twitter.com/h73gJCSAHa

— hromadske (@HromadskeUA) October 4, 2026

Ukraine’s transport minister Mykola Kalashnyk said 600,000 cars cross Kyiv’s bridges every day. In an interview with Suspilne, he announced that construction of embankments and pontoon bridges would begin this week. If the existing bridges become impassable, they are intended to maintain as much traffic as possible between the river’s two banks. Kalashnyk said the temporary crossings should have at least half the capacity.

However, this will take around three months; in the meantime, work will also be carried out to improve the resilience of road bridges.

Transport expert Dmytro Bespalov is sceptical. As he said in an interview with NV, Kyiv’s bridges are irreplaceable, and the only thing that can keep traffic moving across the Dnipro is the military.

However, the task of keeping the bridges operational is complicated by their poor technical condition. Because of their age and the lack of maintenance funding, Bespalov rates the Southern and Northern bridges at four on a scale of one to five, where one is ideal condition and five is emergency condition. He says two other bridges are at level five.

Even in this condition, such large structures are not easy to destroy, but they are certainly more vulnerable. Like many others, Bespalov believes that Russia lacks the means to destroy the bridges completely and is seeking to disrupt traffic during the winter. “The aim is probably an economic blow. I fear it will be very painful. It will not kill us, but I am very concerned about the economic consequences it will have,” he added.

Air defences neutralised 83 percent of drones launched in September, compared with 92 percent in May. This follows from data by the Shahed Tracker project, which recorded 6,732 Russian drones launched against Ukraine over the month, of which 5,561 were shot down or disabled through electronic jamming.

Shahed type OWA-UAS stats Sep2026 [per UA Air Force Reports]

Total: 6732
Claimed Intercepted: 5561
Hits: 1171 Not Intercepted
Interception Rate: ~83%

Median Attack: 171 drones pic.twitter.com/gA8eMj02r9

— Shahed Tracker (@ShahedTracker) October 5, 2026

As the same source’s chart for August shows, the effectiveness rate did not change, but the number of drones launched by Russia rose sharply month on month by almost 1,600.

Shahed type OWA-UAS stats Aug2026 [per UA Air Force Reports]

Total: 5155
Claimed Intercepted: 4188
Hits: 867 Not Intercepted
Interception Rate: ~83%

Median Attack: 143 drones pic.twitter.com/NEp1U8vDW0

— Shahed Tracker (@ShahedTracker) September 3, 2026

Russia launched even fewer drones in July, when the defence effectiveness rate stood at 87 percent.

Shahed type OWA-UAS stats Jul2026 [per UA Air Force Reports]

Total: 4951
Claimed Intercepted: 4299
Hits: 479 (652 Not Intercepted)
Interception Rate: ~87%

Median Attack: 134 drones pic.twitter.com/Tevv4huwI8

— Shahed Tracker (@ShahedTracker) August 3, 2026

In June, the effectiveness rate was 90 percent.

Shahed type OWA-UAS stats Jun2026 [per UA Air Force Reports]

Total: 5749
Claimed Intercepted: 5173
Hits: 464 (576 Not Intercepted)
Interception Rate: ~90%

Median Attack: 148 drones pic.twitter.com/EVERgPNF2k

— Shahed Tracker (@ShahedTracker) July 3, 2026

In May, when Russia used a record 8,150 drones, it was as high as 92 percent. At that time, the Russian army began a mass transition to jet-powered drones, leading to a temporary slowing of the pace of attacks. The trend is now unfavourable: monthly attack statistics have begun to rise sharply, while the effectiveness of countermeasures is declining, as Geran-4 drones and especially Geran-5 drones still present a serious problem.

Shahed type OWA-UAS stats May2026 [per UA Air Force Reports]

Total: 8150 (New Record)
Claimed Intercepted: 7476
(Official: 5053 Shahed type OWA-UAS)
Hits: 508 (674 Not Intercepted)
Interception Rate: ~92%

Median Attack: 209 drones pic.twitter.com/4k3szZZvcd

— Shahed Tracker (@ShahedTracker) June 2, 2026

As another video showing the moment a Geran-5 was hit demonstrates. Technical solutions already exist, but faster interceptor drones are not yet available in sufficient numbers.

Another Geran-5 drone shot down by a STING S interceptor drone from Wild Hornets. Combat work by pilots of the 1020th ZRP. pic.twitter.com/kkPHaCIrKG

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) October 4, 2026

Videos of the day

One TM-62 anti-tank mine contains seven and a half kilograms of explosives. This is enough to destroy the remains of a building used as a shelter by Russian soldiers.

❗️A Ukrainian heavy Baba Yaga-type drone destroys a building with Russian soldiers inside by dropping a TM-62 anti-tank mine. pic.twitter.com/XClgIqMvwe

— 🪖MilitaryNewsUA🇺🇦 (@front_ukrainian) October 4, 2026

A video recently circulated online showing Kyiv residents protesting against tree felling. It was widely used as alleged evidence that Ukrainians have had enough of the government. However, their protest was civic, not political. These Muscovites are communists and dared, very timidly, to chant “Down with the tsar!” Police intervened immediately.

У Москві комуністи зібралися на погоджений мітинг, почали скандувати «Долой царя», і після цього їх побили й розігнали мусора. pic.twitter.com/MD6MVxSBPS

— Serhii Sternenko (@sternenko) October 5, 2026

This video must be watched with the sound on. It illustrates the saturation of the battlefield with drones. The Russian soldier who recorded it says he counted five drones.

"I’ve already counted five. It’s a damn swarm."
position of 🇷🇺1199th Motorized Rifle Regiment
(probably occupied south 🇺🇦)
🍂 is coming pic.twitter.com/K9H3wcRdse

— C4H10FO2P ☠️ (@markito0171) October 3, 2026

Three lines of anti-drone barriers protect the Kerch Bridge, which links Crimea to Russia, from attacks from the sea.

Exilenova+ says Russia has set up layered defenses around the approaches to the Crimean Bridge, with multiple lines against Ukrainian surface and underwater USVs plus FSB patrol ships. The stated aim is to shield the bridge’s vulnerable elements. pic.twitter.com/rxMPPe6gXW

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) October 4, 2026