Egypt’s Civil Democratic Movement rejected any involvement of the Egyptian armed forces in a regional war on behalf of any side, insisting that Cairo make its decisions independently of foreign influence.
The movement said Monday that no outside party should dictate Egypt’s position, arguing that the country’s most important role lies in pursuing “wise mediation to establish peace.”
Turning to domestic affairs, the movement called on civilian opposition groups, its own members included, to begin preparing for the presidential election scheduled for 2030. The call follows President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s recent statement that his presidency will end in 2030 and that the matter of constitutional changes to alter that timeline is “completely settled.”
Parliament postpones debate on troop deployment
The statement comes as Egypt’s parliament has yet to take up a proposal to authorize the president to send troops abroad. Lawmakers adjourned an emergency session devoted to discussing support for Saudi Arabia, and deliberations were due to resume on Monday. The debate was postponed again on Monday, this time until October 26.
The session was convened at el-Sisi’s request after he said Cairo would take any action Saudi Arabia asks of it to defend its security and sovereignty.
Yemen’s Sanaa-based Parliament Speaker Yahya Ali al-Ra’i had urged Egypt’s parliament on Saturday not to let the country be drawn into the Saudi escalation, saying such a step would contradict Egypt’s historical role in defending Arab causes.
Yemeni scholars welcome Al-Azhar initiative
Separately, Al-Azhar urged the urgent formation of a mediation committee bringing together respected figures from across the Muslim world. It said the committee should start work immediately to end conflicts and wars in the Arab region, defuse crises, and bridge differences between the parties involved.
The Association of Yemeni Scholars, in turn, reaffirmed its commitment to engaging constructively and in good faith with the invitation extended by the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, expressing appreciation for the Islamic values and principles it conveyed.
The association also declared Sanaa’s readiness to host the committee proposed by the Grand Imam, comprising respected and wise figures from across the Arab and Islamic worlds.
France’s fuel shortages persisted Monday, with roughly 14 percent of the country’s service stations reporting at least one product out of stock and hundreds completely dry, as diesel prices hovered near multi-year highs and President Emmanuel Macron began a Gulf tour aimed at securing additional supplies.
Official data from the Economy Ministry showed 14 percent of stations nationwide facing shortages of diesel or gasoline as of 9 a.m. Monday, up from 10 percent on Saturday.
Independent trackers drawing on the same government feed reported more than 1,600 stations with at least one temporary shortage and several hundred that had run completely out of the fuels they normally sell. Diesel was among the products affected, with median prices around €2.35–€2.36 per liter.
The disruptions have been most acute at TotalEnergies stations, which have capped prices at €1.99 per liter for gasoline and €2.25 for diesel since July.
More than half of the company’s roughly 2,300 sites have reported shortages in recent days, according to data analyses, as drivers seek the cheapest fuel and inventories run low. Regions including the Grand Est, Île-de-France and Normandy have been among the hardest hit.
The shortages are rooted in global market tightness linked to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz amid conflict involving Iran, which has constrained refined product flows, particularly diesel. However, Ukraine’s ongoing strikes against Russian refineries have also played a key role.
France and other G7 members agreed earlier this month, under French chairmanship and with International Energy Agency coordination, to release up to 100 million barrels of emergency oil and diesel stocks. France is drawing down 10 million barrels of its own diesel reserves over three months, with the government estimating the move could cut pump prices by 12 to 18 cents per liter starting around Nov. 1.
TotalEnergies has separately pledged reductions of roughly 8 to 12 cents at its stations over the same period.
Macron arrived in Kuwait on Monday for a three-day tour that also includes the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar. The Élysée said the goal is to secure additional diesel and oil volumes and explore alternative shipping routes, with senior executives from TotalEnergies and Engie accompanying him.
A presidential adviser said that the aim is “additional volumes and more supplies for the French people, which will indirectly have an effect on prices.” Macron has linked the price surge to the Hormuz disruptions and maintained the trip despite the weekend’s violent cost-of-living protests, during which fuel prices were among the grievances cited by demonstrators.
Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has said the reserve release should begin easing prices from Nov. 1 and that electricity bills will not rise this winter. Opposition figures have called the plan insufficient or a “scam,” arguing it does little to address longer-term vulnerabilities or the immediate empty pumps. The government has maintained that strategic stocks remain adequate and that the main issue has been logistics and distribution under high demand.
Drivers across multiple regions reported long searches for open pumps over the weekend, with some stations posting “out of stock” signs for diesel. The combination of high fuel prices and shortages has added to broader cost-of-living pressures that [have fueled] large demonstrations and mass riots on Oct. 17, which turned violent in several cities.
The United Arab Emirates has reportedly agreed to resume funding selected forces in southern Yemen fighting the Yemeni Armed Forces, while Saudi Arabiahas agreed to provide air cover for those forces, according to sources in Yemen.
The reported arrangement signals a possible thaw in relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi after months of disagreement over the scope of each other’s political influence in Yemen.
The renewed coordination comes as the Yemeni Armed Forcescontinues to make gains and Saudi Arabia faces repeated drone and missile attacks targeting its territory, airports, and energy infrastructure.
Gulf rivals reconsider their positions
Southern forces, particularly the Giant Brigades, were previously trained and funded by the UAE and are considered among the more effective formations in the fragmented coalition opposing the YAF. Abu Dhabi withdrew its involvement in Yemen in January, cutting off financial support to forces it had backed, following pressure from Saudi Arabia.
The reported agreement suggests that advances by the YAFare prompting rival Gulf powers to reconsider their differences. However, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE has responded to a recent demand by southern separatists for an independence referendumthat would restore the borders in place between 1967 and 1990, when Yemen was divided into two states.
The Southern Transitional Council (STC) has also yet to agree to deploy its forces beyond the boundaries of the former South Yemen. Saudi approval of a referendum could potentially remove that restriction, although no such agreement has been announced.
Attacks on Aden intensify pressure
The Aden government announced a counteroffensive last week aimed at retaking Sanaa. The campaign achieved limited gains around Majzar near Marib and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, but was met with a sizeable retaliation by Sanaa’s forces.
On Friday, two missiles struck Aden airport;Information Minister Moammar Al-Eryanisaid the missiles landed about 500 meters from the Yemenia Airways aircraft and roughly 100 meters from the runway’s midpoint. No casualties were reported.
The attack followed a strike on a presidential palace in Aden that killed at least five people and wounded 16, further underscoring the risks facing the Gulf-backed south.
Relations between the STC and Riyadh remain strained. STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi fled to Abu Dhabi in January after an unsuccessful attempt by the council to assert control across southern Yemen and announce a referendum on independence within two years.
Saudi Arabia subsequently bombed UAE arms shipmentsintended for STC forces. Abu Dhabi then announced its withdrawal from Yemen, while the Saudi-backed government said it would seek to prosecute Zubaidi for treason.
Egypt and UK face decisions over military support
Regional involvement is also expanding beyond the Gulf rivals. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisihas called for an emergency parliamentary session to authorize possible military action to “defend” Saudi Arabia if requested, while emphasizing that Egypt would not undertake offensive operations.
Sanaa’s Parliament Speaker Yahya Ali al-Ra’i warned Egypt against a potential involvement in the Saudi military aggression against Yemen, urging Cairo not to allow itself to be drawn into a confrontation that serves Riyadh’s policies.
In an urgent letter to Egyptian Parliament Speaker Hisham Badawi, al-Ra’i expressed serious concern that developments could lead to Egyptian military participation alongside Saudi Arabia, stressing that such a move would contradict Egypt’s historical role in defending Arab causes.
In the UK, discussions continue over a Saudi request for additional military assistance. London has deployed an RAF Voyager aerial refueling aircraft, but some Arab officialsare pressing for further support.
The prospect of deeper British involvement raises legal concerns. In 2019, the UK Court of Appeal ruled that the government had acted unlawfully in granting arms export licenses during the previous Saudi bombing campaign in Yemen in 2015–2016. The Campaign Against Arms Trade argued that officials had failed to properly assess potential violations of international humanitarian law, prompting revisions to export licensing procedures.
Sanaa’s resistance against Saudi aggression followed a brutal, years-long siege that caused one of the worst famines in modern history. The Ansar Allah government has made clear that their fight against Saudi Arabia will not cease so long as Riyadh continues to escalate it even further.
The Yemeni Armed Forces forces have remained firm in their resistance under the banner of a military equation: blockade for blockade and escalation for escalation.
The two-week exchange of fire between the United States and Iran, triggered by Washington’s attempt to force open an illegal southern corridor through the Strait of Hormuz, represented the most consequential direct military confrontation between them since the 40-day war.
The Iranian response to the unprovoked and illegal American aggression was not a chaotic escalation but a methodical, layered military campaign that drew on years of doctrinal development, weapons investment, and operational planning.
The efforts of the Islamic Republic’s armed forces, spearheaded by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) aerospace and naval branches, executed a decisive and swift response.
What unfolded was a layered operation with nine distinct but interlocking lines of effort. Each line reinforced the others. Infrastructure degradation reduced American operational tempo; area denial forced repositioning that compounded the effects of that degradation; extended-range precision strikes demonstrated that repositioning offered no sanctuary; ISR attrition blinded American targeting systems; terrorist suppression closed the land flank, while strikes on utility infrastructure imposed costs on host nations and denied services to American bases.
One can employ the open-source reporting, satellite imagery, and the observable pattern of strikes to examine each dimension of Iran’s military response in detail, and construct a coherent operational picture. It is getting exceedingly clear that the ceasefire period has very likely translated to a window for reconstitution and preparation in Iranian strategic calculus.
The primacy of solid-fuel tactical ballistic missiles
Iran’s decision to anchor its retaliatory campaign in solid-fuel tactical ballistic missiles was not accidental. It reflected a decade-long investment in a specific capability designed precisely for this kind of confrontation. Solid-fuel ballistic missiles offer decisive operational advantages over their liquid-fuel predecessors. They require no fueling time at the launch site, dramatically compressing the window between a launch order and missile departure.
This matters enormously in a sensitive environment where adversary assets, particularly MQ-9 Reaper drones and maritime patrol aircraft, are actively hunting for launch preparations.
A liquid-fuel missile requires a visible, time-consuming fueling sequence that creates a detectable signature. A solid-fuel missile can be transported, erected, and fired in a fraction of that time, often before a targeting solution can be developed and a strike authorized.
These missiles are road-mobile, launched from transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that can disperse across Iran’s mountainous terrain, making pre-emptive targeting extremely difficult.
Having destroyed much of the air defense systems belonging to the US and its Arab allies using the older, less sophisticated liquid fuel missiles in previous wars, Iran’s strikes this time primarily relied on its tactical solid-fuel ballistic missile inventory, meaning the various variants of the Fateh family.
Simply put, the choice of solid-fuel systems reflected a calculated assessment of the adversary’s weakened interception capacity, an assessment that proved accurate.
The air defense inventory crisis
Perhaps the single most consequential factor shaping the operational environment was the state of US and allied air defense missile inventories.
The United States entered this round of military aggression with critically depleted stocks of its most capable interceptors. The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), which arm Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers and provide the American Navy’s primary ballistic missile defense capability at sea, have been drawn down through a combination of expenditure in the Red Sea campaign against Yemen, the costly defense of Israel during two previous wars, and the simple reality that production rates have never kept pace with consumption.
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which provides upper-tier defense against medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, is similarly constrained.
The decision not to employ Aegis and THAAD at full capacity was therefore a forced one. The United States simply could not spend its remaining meager inventory of SM-3 and THAAD interceptors against Iranian tactical ballistic missiles, which, while accurate and damaging, are not the only threats to American interests.
Doing so would have left the United States strategically exposed against another serious contingency in East Asia or Europe. The calculus was that American military bases had to absorb more hits to preserve the interceptors.
Moreover, the Patriot system, which bore the brunt of terminal-phase defense in recent weeks across the region, was in no better condition. Years of expenditure across Ukraine, the occupied territories, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea mission have drawn PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE stocks to extremely low levels.
The Pentagon’s response was telling. Rather than accelerating full-capability PAC-3 MSE production, it has chosen to pursue the cheaper, less capable PAC-3ACE Cost Reduction Initiative variant. More revealing still were the recent PAC-2 GEM-T orders, an older interceptor not procured by the US in decades, signaling just how severely stocks had been exhausted.
That the world’s most sophisticated air defense enterprise was compelled to resurrect a 1990s-era design to sustain basic readiness is the starkest indicator of the American munitions crisis that Iranian planners appear to have understood, measured, and exploited with precision.
The situation among Persian Gulf states was equally dire. Saudi Arabia and the UAE had expended substantial portions of their Patriot PAC-3 interceptor stocks during years of Yemeni military missile and drone attacks, and entered the 40-day imposed war with depleted inventories. The situation is even direr in Kuwait and Bahrain, with the Persian Gulf microstates effectively running out of Patriots, being forced to solely rely on American-operated systems.
PAC-3, the most capable variant of the Patriot system against ballistic missiles, has effectively been exhausted in several batteries. PAC-2, the older and less capable variant, is the only available option in certain areas against Iranian missiles, and even that missile is running low as well. The collective air defense architecture of the Persian Gulf states, which had appeared formidable on paper, has been effectively hollowed out.
Iranian operational planners were aware of these facts. The sequencing and volume of Iranian missile salvos during the exchange reflected a deliberate attempt to exploit the gap between what the defense could theoretically intercept and what it could actually intercept given real-world inventory constraints.
Iran’s multi-layered operational strategy
What distinguished Iran’s response from a simple missile barrage was its architectural coherence. Iranian planners did not merely fire missiles at American targets; they executed a phased, multi-domain retaliatory campaign with distinct operational objectives at each stage, each phase creating the conditions for the next.
The campaign can be understood as having five interlocking lines of effort: infrastructure degradation, area denial and operational displacement, precision strike at extended range, ISR and logistics attrition, and proxy terrorist force suppression.
Together, they constituted a campaign design far more sophisticated than most Western analysts had publicly credited Iran with possessing.
The overarching logic was one of progressive operational constriction. Rather than attempting to destroy US forces – an objective beyond Iran’s reach given American conventional superiority – the campaign aimed to degrade, displace, and exhaust them.
Each successful strike reduced American operational capacity; forced repositioning that consumed time and resources, and demonstrated to regional partners that proximity to American occupation forces carried real costs.
Infrastructure degradation
The first phase of the Iranian retaliatory campaign targeted the physical infrastructure of American military power in the Persian Gulf region. This was not indiscriminate bombardment. Satellite imagery and post-strike assessments revealed a pattern of targeting that prioritized specific high-value nodes: radar installations, fuel and ammunition storage facilities, maintenance hangars, and communications infrastructure.
Radar systems were a particular priority. The ability to detect, track, and target Iranian missiles and UAVs depends on a layered network of radar systems. By striking radar installations at air bases, Iran degraded the situational awareness that underpins both offensive operations and defensive intercepts. A radar that is destroyed or forced offline creates a coverage gap that cascades through the entire air defense architecture.
Before-and-after imagery of an AN/FPS-117 early warning radar installation at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait, showing structural damage
Logistics infrastructure was targeted with equal deliberateness. Fuel depots, ammunition storage sites, and maintenance facilities at American bases around the Persian Gulf were struck with sufficient accuracy to cause meaningful operational disruption.
An air force that cannot fuel its aircraft, rearm them, or repair battle damage cannot sustain sortie rates. The targeting of logistics was a direct attack on the tempo of American air operations to derail the American aggression against Iranian sites and reduce the pressure on Iranian forces.
The accuracy of these strikes, achieved at ranges of several hundred kilometers, validated the operational utility of Iran’s solid-fuel ballistic missile force and demonstrated that the IRGC aerospace force had developed the targeting data, launch procedures, and quality control necessary to achieve consistent results against fixed infrastructure.
The anti-access/area denial campaign
The most strategically significant dimension of the Iranian retaliatory campaign was its systematic execution of an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy that progressively pushed American air operations out of the Persian Gulf and into increasingly distant and operationally constrained locations.
The logic of A2/AD in this context was straightforward. The closer American aircraft operate to Iran, the shorter their flight times, the larger their payloads, the less refueling they require, and the more sorties they can generate per day.
Conversely, every additional hundred kilometers of distance imposes compounding costs: greater tanker support, longer mission times, reduced payload, increased crew fatigue, and more complex coordination. By rendering the Persian Gulf operationally untenable for American air assets, Iran systematically degraded the offensive capacity of the aggressors.
The first displacement was from the Persian Gulf itself. Sustained missile and drone attacks against air bases made sustained operations from those locations unfeasible. The American response was to shift primary air operations to bases in Jordan – Al-Azraq and Muwaffaq Salti –which offered greater distance from Iranian missile systems.
Iran’s response was to extend its reach to Jordan. Multiple strikes against American bases, documented by US casualties and satellite imagery showing damaged hangars and destroyed aircraft, demonstrated that Iran had the capability to contest operations from that distance.
The retaliatory strikes destroyed American aircraft, damaged infrastructure, and forced the US war machine to reconsider the viability of Jordan as a primary operating location.
The second displacement was to the occupied territories. American air assets, including tanker aircraft critical to sustaining long-range strike operations, were pushed further west to Israeli military bases.
This displacement carried its own operational costs. The distance from Iranian targets increased further, and the concentration of American assets in the occupied territories created its own targeting opportunities for Iran, which has demonstrated both the willingness and capability to strike at extended ranges.
A particularly telling indicator of this displacement dynamic was the repositioning of the RQ-4 Global Hawk strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which had been operating from Al Dhafra in the UAE and from Jordanian facilities, to Sigonella Naval Air Station in Sicily.
The Global Hawk, with its long endurance and high-altitude sensors, is a critical ISR asset for tracking Iranian missile launches and providing targeting data. Its displacement to Sicily represented a dramatic reduction in persistent surveillance coverage over Iran and the Persian Gulf, with direct consequences for the effectiveness of American strike operations.
A qualitative leap in extended-range precision
One of the most significant revelations of the recent round of US aggression and Iran’s retaliation was the demonstrated accuracy of Iranian ballistic missiles at ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. Previous assessments of Iranian ballistic missile accuracy had generally been skeptical about the ability to achieve consistent precision at such distances. The strikes on Jordanian targets, located well over 1,000 kilometers from Iranian launch sites, completely shattered that skepticism.
The circular error probable (CEP) – the radius within which 50 percent of strikes fall – observed in the Jordanian strikes was dramatically smaller than what Iranian missiles had previously demonstrated at comparable ranges. Strikes that hit specific buildings, specific aircraft shelters, and specific sections of structures, rather than simply landing somewhere on a base, indicated a qualitative improvement in guidance accuracy that demands explanation.
Several hypotheses present themselves, and the evidence suggests that the answer likely involves a combination of all of them. First are technical improvements. Iran may have upgraded the terminal guidance systems on its Kheibarshekan, Haj Qasem, and Fattah variants, potentially incorporating improved inertial navigation, satnav receivers, or optical terminal seekers that allow the missile to better correct its trajectory in the final phase of flight.
Second are tactical improvements. Iranian launch crews may have refined their pre-launch survey procedures, improving the accuracy of the initial position fix that the missile’s inertial navigation system uses as its reference point. Third are software improvements, which mean updates to the missile’s flight control algorithms could improve trajectory optimization and reduce the accumulated errors that degrade accuracy over long distances.
The most likely explanation is a combination of all three – a systematic program of improvement across the technical, procedural, and software dimensions of missile accuracy that had been underway for years and was now being demonstrated operationally for the first time at this range, following the experiences of the 40-day war.
The MQ-9 hunt
The MQ-9 Reaper drone occupied a central and uniquely vulnerable position in American military offensives against Iran. The Reaper is not merely a strike platform but the primary persistent ISR asset used to locate and track mobile Iranian missile launchers, particularly after the heavy attrition of similar Israeli military systems.
Without the MQ-9’s ability to loiter for extended periods, the capacity to find and destroy TELs before they fire, or to conduct battle damage assessment after strikes, is dramatically reduced.
Iran understood this dependency and targeted it systematically during this campaign. The campaign against MQ-9 assets operated on multiple levels. Ground-based air defense systems, which had previously demonstrated the ability to engage high-altitude targets, were used to engage Reapers operating over Iranian territory and adjacent areas.
But Iran also struck the ground infrastructure that supports MQ-9 operations: the maintenance facilities, fuel systems, satellite communication ground stations, and launch-and-recovery equipment that allow the aircraft to operate.
Western media reporting confirmed the destruction of a number of MQ-9 aircraft on the ground at Jordanian bases and, in a particularly striking detail, the destruction of some aircraft while still in their transport canisters before assembly.
This achievement indicates that Iran has developed targeting intelligence on the logistics chain supporting drone operations, not merely the operational bases themselves. Destroying aircraft before they are assembled and made operational is a force multiplication achievement. It eliminates capability before it can be employed, at a point when the aircraft is most vulnerable and least defended.
The cumulative effect of the MQ-9 campaign was a significant degradation of American persistent ISR coverage over Iran. This directly reduced the effectiveness of the hunt for mobile missile launchers, allowing Iranian TELs greater freedom of movement and survivability.
Suppressing proxy terrorist forces in Iraq
From the first day of the exchange, Iran conducted daily retaliatory strikes against armed terrorist groups in Iraq that had the capability and potential motivation to conduct land attacks against Iranian territory or to serve as a forward platform for American-directed operations.
This campaign was methodical and comprehensive, targeting personnel concentrations, weapons storage facilities, and command infrastructure.
Iran’s western flank, which includes the border with Iraq, represents a potential vulnerability. Armed terrorist groups in Iraq, some with historical ties to American intelligence, could in theory conduct cross-border raids, provide intelligence for American strikes, or serve as a distraction that forced Iran to divert defensive resources.
By striking these groups preemptively and continuously, Iran sought to exhaust their operational capacity before it could be brought to bear.
The daily rhythm of these retaliatory strikes was itself a message. It demonstrated that Iran had persistent targeting intelligence on these groups’ locations, that it was willing to expend munitions on this secondary campaign even while conducting the primary campaign against American forces, and that it intended to maintain pressure regardless of any ceasefire negotiations that might be underway.
The logic of reciprocity
Iran’s retaliatory strikes on electrical and water infrastructure in Kuwait represented a deliberate response that operated on two distinct logics simultaneously.
The first was reciprocity: Iran’s own civilian infrastructure had been targeted, and the strikes on Kuwaiti infrastructure were a direct signal that such targeting would not be absorbed without response to the aggressor and its facilitators.
The second was military utility. American forces in the Persian Gulf region depend on host nations’ electrical grids and water supplies for base operations. Infrastructure that serves both civilian and military purposes is, under the laws of armed conflict, a legitimate military target when the military use is substantial and the strike is proportionate.
The targeting of Kuwait’s infrastructure was also a message to Persian Gulf states more broadly. Kuwait, like Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, hosts American military facilities and had provided varying degrees of support to American operations.
By demonstrating the ability and willingness to strike Kuwaiti infrastructure, Iran was communicating that the costs of hosting American forces were not abstract. They were concrete, immediate, and would be borne by the host nation as well as the American military.
The pillars of operational success
Iran’s two-week retaliatory campaign against American aggression and attempts to force open an illegal southern corridor through the Strait of Hormuz largely succeeded on every dimension that its operational planners had identified.
The exchange demonstrated that Iran had developed, over decades of institutional study and investment, a military capability genuinely capable of contesting American power projection in the Persian Gulf region, even after two high-intensity wars.
It demonstrated something relevant to the strategic environment of the region – that the costs of American military aggression in the Persian Gulf had increased substantially; that the infrastructure of American power projection was more vulnerable than pre-war assessments had suggested; and that Iran possessed both the capability and the operational sophistication to exploit those vulnerabilities in a systematic and disciplined manner.
American media this week began circulating a carefully placed story, claiming that the US military has drafted strike options against Iran that include deployment of the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb, the weapon branded as the “Mother of All Bombs.”
CNN was the first to report it on October 15, followed immediately by a wave of amplification across the mainstream American and European media.
US President Donald Trump, appearing later on Newsmax in an interview, did not deny the story. He offered instead a characteristically garbled endorsement, describing the MOAB as “like a tiny nuclear bomb, but it’s not nuclear,” and adding that the US may have to “take a shot” at Pickaxe Mountain in Iran’s Karkas mountain range.
The narrative was set, and it deserves to be taken apart with facts.
The GBU-43/B is an enormous munition by conventional standards. It carries approximately 8,500 kilograms of high explosive in a casing that brings its total weight to around 9,800 kilograms, just under 10 tons. Stretched end to end, it measures just over nine meters.
It is GPS-guided and essentially designed to detonate above the ground.
The MOAB is a thermobaric, or fuel-air, weapon. This description explains precisely why the weapon is irrelevant to the current discussion. A thermobaric weapon does not carry all of its oxidizer within its casing the way a conventional explosive does.
Instead, on detonation, it disperses a fine aerosol of fuel particles or reactive material into the surrounding atmosphere. A secondary ignition then detonates this cloud together with the ambient oxygen in the air itself, producing a pressure wave of exceptional duration and reach.
The fireball essentially consumes the atmosphere around it. The result is a weapon optimized for destroying things on or just above the surface, such as personnel in the open, light structures, and cave mouths, across a wide area. What the MOAB does not and cannot do is drive energy downward through hundreds of meters of solid rock.
Trump’s description, “like a tiny nuclear bomb,” is not merely imprecise. It is exactly the kind of rhetorical inflation that makes the current hostile military campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran intelligible as communication strategy rather than military planning.
The MOAB has been used in combat once. On April 13, 2017, during Trump’s first term, a single GBU-43/B was dropped on a tunnel complex in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, claiming to target the ISIS (Daesh) Khorasan infrastructure.
The US administration at the time announced that the strike had killed approximately 90 ISIS-K militants. The actual battle damage assessment remained classified. What was confirmed is that a very large explosion occurred in a mountainous area of eastern Afghanistan.
The strategic effect on ISIS-K’s operational capacity in the region was, at best, ambiguous. The organization has continued to carry out attacks in the months and years that followed. That one strike, against an unprotected tunnel network in soft ground, in an area with no air defense, delivered by a slow cargo aircraft operating in uncontested airspace, is the entire operational history of this weapon.
The target reportedly under consideration is Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La, internationally known as the Pickaxe Mountain, in the Karkas range of central Iran. The facility buried beneath it reportedly sits under more than 100 meters of hard granite.
To suggest that an air-burst weapon, however large, could threaten such a target is to misunderstand the physics of the problem at the most elementary level.
The United States possesses a weapon actually designed for this task, namely the GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator; a 13,600-kilogram bomb built specifically to drive through reinforced concrete and hardened rock before detonating.
The MOP was used against Iranian nuclear sites on June 22, 2025, during the 12-day imposed war. Its effectiveness against the deepest and most hardened of those facilities, particularly the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, remains a matter of genuine debate.
If the weapon engineered for penetration cannot be confirmed to have neutralized Fordow, a target much less protected than Pickaxe Mountain, then the notion that an air-burst weapon detonating above the mountain surface would accomplish anything beyond scorching rock is not a serious military proposition.
Even setting aside hardened underground targets, the MOAB offers no material advantage against any conventional surface target that cannot be achieved more efficiently and with far less operational risk by using multiple precision-guided JDAMs delivered from fighter aircraft operating at standoff ranges.
The MOAB does not expand the target set. It does not add capability. It adds spectacle.
There is a further operational reality that receives almost no attention in the current American media narrative. The GBU-43/B is confirmed to be deliverable only by the C-130 family of cargo aircraft. Flying such a platform into contested Iranian airspace is not a minor planning consideration and introduces significant operational difficulties.
The United States lost two MC-130J Commando IIs during its wars of aggression against Iran. The idea of routing another slow cargo aircraft into that same environment in order to drop a weapon that cannot reach the target it is supposedly meant to destroy compounds the absurdity.
What the current MOAB narrative resembles most closely is not a serious military planning process. It resembles the late-war German doctrine of the Wunderwaffe, the wonder weapon.
Under mounting pressure, facing an unwinnable strategic position, Nazi Germany’s leadership turned to announcements of extraordinary new weapons that would change the course of the war. The V-1 and V-2 generated genuine fear and caused real casualties.
They did not alter the strategic outcome by a single day. The function of the wonder weapon is not primarily military. It is political. It tells a domestic audience and a wavering alliance that there are still options, that new instruments of power remain available, that the situation is not as bad as it looks.When strategy fails, spectacle fills the gap.
The Trump administration is conducting a war that did not emerge from American strategic interests. It entered the war of aggression to further Israeli goals and expansionist ambitions, has absorbed significant losses and embarrassments, and now approaches midterm elections with a public that has not been offered a clear account of what victory looks like.
In that very context, the MOAB story makes complete sense as an information management campaign, to paint a picture of a strong American military, when the truth is something else.
There is one more thing worth stating plainly. Even if the MOAB is used, even if a C-130 penetrates Iranian airspace, releases the weapon over Pickaxe Mountain, and produces the largest conventional explosion seen in the region, Iran will be compelled to respond.
Not because the strike will have damaged anything of military significance. A major attack that fails to achieve its stated objective does not end a war. It resets the escalation clock. Tehran’s hand will be forced, and it will answer with something commensurate in visibility, and Iran has demonstrated repeatedly that it possesses the means and the will to do exactly that.
The MOAB is a very large bomb, but it is particularly good at the thing it is now being asked to symbolize. What it is, in the current context, is a prop, useful for an interview, useful for a news campaign, and essentially useless for anything happening 100 meters below the surface of a granite mountain in central Iran.
Arman Shariati is a Tehran-based military analyst and researcher.
Iran has obtained the technology behind a US-made 14-ton GBU bomb and now possesses samples of the weapon, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, senior advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), stated.
Speaking during the “Fedayeen for Iran” military exercise in Sari, Naqdi said Iranian forces acquired some of the bombs after they failed to detonate during the 12-day war, allowing local forces to seize them and study their technology.
“We should recall that during the 12-day war, 14-ton bombs were dropped,” Naqdi said, adding that “the failure of some of the 14-ton bombs to explode enabled the local forces to seize them.”
“Today, Iran possesses samples of these bombs alongside the manufacturing country,” he asserted, adding that Iranian forces have analyzed all the technologies associated with the US 14-ton bomb and now possess its technology in full.
What is the GBU?
The weapon Naqdi referred to is a GBU, or Guided Bomb Unit, a designation used by the US military for a broad family of air-dropped precision-guided bombs.
GBUs use guidance systems to direct their warheads toward designated targets, with different variants ranging from conventional precision bombs to much heavier bunker-busting weapons.
The term “14-ton bomb” is generally associated with the US GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a deep-penetration weapon designed to strike heavily fortified underground facilities, such as Iran’s nuclear facilities bombed during the 12-day war.
The GBU-57 is one of the largest conventional bombs in the US arsenal and is designed to penetrate deeply buried and hardened targets before detonating. Its deployment requires specialized heavy aircraft.
Iran has heavy fighter jet at hand
Earlier, Iranian Defense Minister Mehrdad Akhlaghi announced Sunday that a heavy Iranian fighter jet will take its first flight next year.
Naqdi also warned that Iran’s response to any renewed US aggression would extend to infrastructure and energy investments belonging to those involved in attacks against Iran in the region.
“In the event of any mistake, the investments related to the infrastructure and energy of the aggressors in the region will be within the operational targeting circle,” he said.
Responding to US threats involving the use of weapons such as the “Mother of All Bombs,” Naqdi said Iran’s Armed Forces have demonstrated advanced missile and deterrence capabilities capable of delivering a decisive response to any aggression.
Iran advances domestic defense production
The emphasis on domestic defense production forms part of Iran’s broader strategy of military self-reliance.
Iranian officials have repeatedly linked the development of indigenous defense capabilities to the need to maintain national security and deterrence without relying on foreign suppliers.
The focus on precision, missile range, and warhead development also reflects the importance Iranian military planners place on technological advancement as a component of deterrence.
J.D. Vance is approaching the halfway point of his term as vice president in an administration that has committed the United States to wars in locations from Ukraine to Venezuela to Somalia to Iran and beyond. All the while, the administration has threatened sending the military into other places across the world including Mexico, Greenland, and Cuba. In short, this presidential administration is fully committed to a warmongering agenda.
Over his 14 years as a United States House of Representatives member, Mike Rogers similarly established his reputation as a committed advocate for US warmongering across the world. This Michigan Republican and the presidential administration are two peas in a pod when it comes to supporting an aggressive empire.
President Donald Trump in the 2024 presidential campaign portrayed himself as the peace candidate in the race, a tactic that may have brought him the votes needed to obtain a close electoral victory. But, once elected, Trump turned on a dime, becoming the war president who delivers turmoil, destruction, and death. Through this, Vance has stood by Trump in support.
Given this context, it seems almost unimaginable that Vance would stump in Michigan for electing Rogers to the US Senate by asserting that Vance and Rogers are supporters of peace. Yet, that is what Vance did in a Monroe, Michigan speech on Thursday. With the “peace candidate” ploy having worked for Trump in the 2024 presidential election, Vance audaciously gave it a try in the Michigan speech despite it being divorced from reality.
Vance, in his speech, framed the race between Rogers and Democratic nominee Abdul El-Sayed as a battle “between politicians obsessed with foreign causes and leaders who remember that their first duty is to fight for the people right here at home.” Vance’s claim is that he and Rogers are among the good “leaders” instead of the bad “politicians” in this comparison. But, it is Rogers, who relentlessly supported US intervention abroad as a House member and in his chairmanship of the House Intelligence Committee is the quintessential politician obsessed with foreign causes. And it is crystal clear that over the last two years the Trump administration has, in its obsessive pursuit of foreign causes, sacrificed the interests of the American people, including by substantially increasing the national debt and driving the cost of fuel sky-high.
Vance proceeded in his speech to declare that the Democratic opponent Rogers faces in the race is “absolutely obsessed with conflicts occurring thousands of miles away in the Middle East.” “He is obsessed,” continued Vance, “with the state of Israel and with Gaza.” This, of course, is an obsession of the Trump administration that started the Iran War jointly with Israel and has been giving Israel enormous financial, military equipment, and intelligence aid to support Israel’s attacks on not just Gaza but also other places including Iran and Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Rogers, a staunch supporter of the US aiding Israel, has asked the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) — the most prominent organization in the “Israel Lobby” in America — to not directly fund advertisements for his campaign while he travels the country to attend AIPAC organized fundraisers. Rogers is trying to keep under wraps that he is what Vance says his opponent is. Will voters understand the reality or be tricked by the subterfuge?
Why did Vance go through with making claims regarding US foreign policy in his speech that fly in the face of reality? The answer may be found in a comment by Rogers’s Democratic opponent in a Senate election debate held the week before. In that debate, El-Sayed stated in regard to Rogers: “So, it’s just inconsistent to me to be running for Senate from Michigan when you’re more focused on what’s happening to a foreign government than you are focused on what’s happening to folks right here in Michigan.” The foreign government referenced in El-Sayed’s comment is Israel. Instead of trying to give a nuanced counterargument to this charge from the debate, Vance went in his speech with the old standby of “I’m rubber and you’re glue; whatever you say bounces off of me and sticks to you.” In the process, Vance ended up looking ridiculous to anyone with basic knowledge of the foreign policy records of Rogers and the Trump administration.
Iran’s ambassador and chargé d’affaires to the UN has stressed that any arrangements for the Gaza Strip’s future must fully respect Palestinian rights and self-determination, denouncing the United States and the Israeli regime for the current situation affecting the Strait of Hormuz.
Gholamhossein Darzi made the remarks on Friday, addressing a UN Security Council meeting on the situation in West Asia, including the Palestinian question.
He noted that Gaza remained devastated and continued to be subject to military aggression, despite the announcement of a ceasefire last year.
The ceasefire was announced last October as part of a United States-proposed plan to bring an end to two years of Israeli genocide, supposedly.
The Israeli regime has, however, killed more than 1,400 Palestinians during attacks across the territory ever since, in addition to the tens of thousands it had already killed throughout the genocide that began on October 7, 2023.
Darzi called for a permanent end to the Israeli aggression, lifting of the Israeli blockade on the coastal sliver, and realization of a lasting ceasefire in the territory.
He called for unconditional and complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territory as well as immediate and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and deployment of relief personnel.
The diplomat called accountability for serious violations of international law a legal obligation, condemning the regime for committing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
He also denounced expansion of illegal settlements, intensifying settler violence, and Israeli plans for “annexation” of the occupied West Bank.
Palestinians must be able to establish an independent, sovereign, and viable state, with the holy occupied city of al-Quds as its capital and full membership in the United Nations, the official stated.
He also demanded Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and occupied Syrian areas and respect for both countries’ sovereignty.
Elsewhere in his remarks, Darzi slammed the United States and the Israeli regime for launching two rounds of unprovoked aggression against Iran respectively, last June and from February 28 until April 7 this year.
The aggressors, he noted, committed war crimes through deliberate targeting of civilians and critical infrastructure.
He also attributed the situation affecting the Strait of Hormuz to the American-Israeli atrocities, including an American naval blockade.
“Our position is crystal clear: The only practical way to restore normal and safe maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is immediate and permanent cessation of US aggression, provision of credible guarantees against its recurrence, respect for Iran’s sovereign rights, and complete lifting of the naval blockade and other unlawful coercive measures.”
Following the US-Israeli aggression against Iran on February 28, Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz to its adversaries. The key waterway has remained largely closed ever since, driving up fuel prices worldwide and increasing the cost of living for millions of people.
Tehran has made it clear that it will not reopen the strait until Washington meets its demands, including a permanent end to the war.
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is trying to maneuver between pressure from the United States, which demands participation in the conflict with Iran, and risks to national security and reputation, opting for a strategy of stalling and minimizing a direct military presence.
The previous article explained why South Korea refused to join the United States in the “denuclearization of Iran” and how, in response, Donald Trump struck at Lee Jae-myung’s ambitions, nudging him toward the desired choice. And although President Lee’s rhetoric ultimately seems anti-war, in reality there are many loopholes remaining: for example, not a new contingent, but a decisive increase and expansion of the existing contingent’s mandate.
“No!” or “Maybe”
On September 16, Donald Trump said on social media that countries that “provided no assistance” would, after the war with Iran ended, have to “compensate” the United States for damages. Trump did not say whom he meant.
On September 17, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Park Yun-ju stated that the ROK’s participation in an international operation in the Strait of Hormuz region depends on a number of factors and is tied not only to relations with the United States but also to the safety of navigation, energy supplies, and the protection of the country’s citizens.
On September 18, Lee Jae-myung stated that South Korea would not deploy troops or military equipment in a way that would draw the country into the war between the United States and Iran. However, he allowed for minimal measures to protect South Korean vessels, oil delivery routes, and citizens, pointing to disruptions in crude oil supplies as one of the risks.
Apparently, eyebrows were raised in Washington, after which on September 19 the Blue House indicated that President Lee Jae-myung’s remarks did not amount to a rejection of Trump’s call for military cooperation. An administration official said that the government is considering practical ways to assist in close contact with the international community, including the United States.
The Specifics of the Future Conflict
Because the war with Iran follows a sine curve, and Donald Trump’s promises to “flatten Iran” alternate with talk of peace, it is possible that, once Trump enters a peace phase, Seoul’s need to rush to help the United States will temporarily disappear. Therefore, let us consider the scenario in which Seoul is actively pressed to help Washington—at least as proof of the Republic of Korea’s allied status.
Compared with previous deployments of South Korean troops as U.S. allies—whether in Vietnam or Iraq—they find themselves in a far more difficult situation. In both cases, this was a ground war in which South Koreans performed auxiliary tasks and mainly carried out clearing operations and fought poorly armed guerrillas, or guarded South Korean specialists while stationed in territory controlled by the Kurds.
However, although Iran does not have nuclear weapons, it has ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones in abundance. This means that wherever South Korean troops are located, they could become targets, especially since South Koreans have no experience countering such a threat, and any serious losses would both damage the country’s domestic political standing and hurt the president’s reputation. As the saying goes, victory has many fathers, but defeat always has one—and he is often the scapegoat.
If anything goes wrong, President Lee will be symbolically held responsible as the person who initiated South Korean participation in the war. At the same time, he may also be criticized for the fact that, in seeking to neutralize the threat of a military coup, he carried out a whole set of measures that could be seen as a certain decline in military readiness—which, alas, performed poorly when confronted with Iranian drones.
Lee Jae-myung’s Two Strategies
Lee Jae-myung understands this situation perfectly and will therefore adhere to two strategies.
The first is to stall for as much time as possible, especially since, under the country’s constitution, sending troops abroad must go through parliament. Because the conflict is escalating and there is domestic opposition, the timing of any troop deployment remains in question.
The situation is interesting: parliament is generally under President Lee’s control, and if he says “yes,” the National Assembly will vote according to his will. But if Lee throws up his hands and says, “I’m in favor, but the Korean people are against it, and we have a democracy, which I cannot go against,” then, on the one hand, outside observers may perceive this as a mutiny on board; on the other, the United States may find another painful way to push Seoul in the right direction. The hope here is rather that the geopolitical situation or Trump’s mood will change and assistance will not be needed.
The second strategy is to send assistance but minimize Korean participation in direct combat: patrol operations, intelligence and surveillance, demining assistance, medical or other humanitarian aid. As a government source told Yonhap, “we are discussing how to contribute safely, without direct participation in combat,” and according to the Dong-A Ilbo, South Korea is considering sending a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft designed for long-range maritime surveillance, a supply ship, and explosive ordnance disposal specialists.
Another option is the Cheonghae Unit (the newest destroyer with a special forces team aboard), which has long been in the Middle East and is engaged in protecting shipping and responding to threats, including piracy. Increasing its size is not the same as deploying a new contingent, and when, on July 24, 2019, during one of the previous rounds of escalation, the United States demanded not only an increase in South Korea’s share of the costs of maintaining American troops but also the deployment of South Korean naval forces to the Strait of Hormuz, the Cheonghae contingent, which was supposed to fight Somali pirates, “expanded its area of operations” from the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. In 2021, Cheonghae was also in the strait, but it was withdrawn to leave a window of opportunity for negotiations after Iran seized a South Korean tanker.
Iran’s Response: What Matters to Tehran Is the Fact Per Se, Not the Scale
It seems that the Iranian side responds in this respect much as North Korea does: what matters is the very fact of Seoul’s participation on the side of the United States, not the scale of such measures. Diplomats and officials have already issued a series of warnings, voicing fairly specific and inconvenient response options for Seoul.
On September 7, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei published a warning in Korean, stating that Tehran would regard the military presence or participation of any third country in operations in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as direct support for the aggressor, which could entail “serious consequences.” At the same time, the diplomat stressed the importance of friendly relations with Seoul.
Earlier, Iranian expert Mohammad Marandi said that South Korea’s participation in the war could make it an enemy of Iran, and retaliatory strikes could affect not only military but also economic assets of South Korean companies in the Persian Gulf countries. South Korea gets most of its energy resources from the Near and Middle East, and a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on vessels delivering petroleum products to South Korea would force it to urgently rethink its supply chains.
At the same time, the most convenient and safe backup supply-chain option is also uncertain, because it involves obtaining petroleum products from Russia. Talks on this issue have already begun, and South Korea is trying to prepare its European partners for the possibility of obtaining Russian petroleum products. But, first, the EU still has to be persuaded; second, it is not at all clear that Moscow would welcome this with open arms, knowing that this is not a conceptual turn toward Russia but a desire to solve a problem now that is de facto completely irrelevant to Moscow.
In Lieu of a Conclusion
Lee Jae-myung remains trapped. Refusing to send troops could lead to a further deterioration in relations with Trump, who could take actions against South Korea, such as imposing new tariffs. Sending troops carries certain reputational and domestic political risks. This is harder than a “test of strategic thinking” and a choice between two great evils.
Therefore, we will follow with great interest whether a parliamentary discussion finally takes place and what its verdict will be. It is interesting to see how ready South Korean military personnel and South Korean weapons are to take part in a modern war.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
The Saudi kingdom is facing the danger of collapse from soaring war costs as Yemeni air strikes ramp up, hitting its northern neighbor’s capital and industrial centers with impunity.
Yemeni journalist Hussein al-Bukhaiti says the corruption and arrogance of the “House of Evil” is culminating in historic defeat. Its U.S. patron seems unable to avert the coming collapse.
Despite decades of the U.S. selling weapons worth hundreds of billions of dollars to the Saudi rulers, the regime seems shockingly exposed, with no viable defenses. Yemen’s missiles are striking Saudi Arabia at will. The panicky rulers are pleading with the United States and Europe for help.
Yemen’s armed forces are taking the war to Saudi Arabia, striking its airports, imposing a no-fly zone over the entire state and shutting down its vital oil industry.
“The Saudis cannot stop our drones and hypersonic missiles… we are taking the war to them,” says Sanaa-based Hussain al-Bukhaiti.
With no oil exports, Al-Bukhaiti reckons the Saudi rulers are facing an existential nemesis. Many observers have long predicted that the autocratic Saudi kingdom, created by the British Empire, is awaiting downfall from its ossified and family-run power structure.
Speaking from the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, Hussain al-Bukhaiti described the Saudi monarchy as “a house of glass” that is now being shattered by air strikes that cannot be defended against.
“Yemen did not want this war, but we are bringing the fire back to Saudi Arabia.”
Western politicians and media are portraying the conflict between the two Arab Peninsula countries as being caused by recent aggression from the Ansar Allah-led Yemeni government.
Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid international airport was attacked on October 10 with ballistic missiles that killed several people. Other Saudi airports have also been hit. This has led international airlines to suspend flights.
The state-owned Aramco oil industry has also been blasted with missiles. Fires are raging at major facilities, including at the main base of operations in Dammam on the Persian Gulf coast.
Following the missile strike on Riyadh airport at the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump and all European leaders condemned an “act of terrorism” by Yemen.
Hussain al-Bukhaiti pointed out the gross hypocrisy of European governments not condemning the thousands of Saudi air strikes on Yemen that have occurred since 2015. These governments still remain silent about the ongoing Saudi atrocities against Yemeni civilians. The European Union even declares “solidarity” with Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi monarchy, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, started the war with unprovoked attacks in March 2015. The aggression was enabled by the United States, Britain, and France supplying warplanes, bombs, and intelligence.
These Western powers continue to arm and direct the Saudi regime in its war against Yemen.
Since 2015, there have been thousands of Western-backed air strikes on Yemen, resulting in more than 20,000 mainly civilian deaths.
“They hit everything, schools, hospitals, water-treatment plants, farms, homes, wedding and funeral halls,” says Al-Bukhaiti.
In addition, over 400,000 Yemenis have died from starvation and diseases caused by a blockade on the country imposed by Saudi Arabia and its Western backers for over 10 years.
He says the war reignited in July 2026 after the Saudis broke a four-year truce signed in 2022 by bombing Sanaa international airport. There was no condemnation by Europe of the Saudi violation then.
What Yemen is doing to Saudi Arabia now is but a taste of what the House of Saud inflicted on Yemenis since 2015 with Western support.
The Yemenis this week rejected a reported Saudi proposal for a short-term truce because they see it as just a ploy by the Saudis for rearming and regrouping in a losing situation.
For the war to end, Saudi Arabia must respect Yemen’s sovereignty and stop interfering in its internal affairs.
However, Hussain al-Bukhaiti thinks that the United States will double down and escalate its military involvement in Yemen with a full-blown war. This is not primarily to support the Saudi monarchy, he believes, but rather to prop up the Israeli regime.
Yemen has inflicted huge damage on the Israeli state since it intensified the genocide against Palestinians in October 2023. Yemeni air strikes have repeatedly struck Tel Aviv despite American air defenses.
An expanded U.S. war in Yemen might seem surprising given that Trump has made such a mess of his reckless aggression against Iran and may not have the military forces at his disposal.
But Al-Bukhaiti believes the issue is beyond Trump’s choice. Washington is locked in with the Zionist regime and will do whatever it takes to salvage Israel from defeat. Yemen represents the biggest threat to Israel from the cutting off of its shipping in the Red Sea.
“We are ready for the war that is coming,” he warns.
Espionage novels portray the spy as a person in a trench coat carrying stolen documents and disappearing into a dark alley. Israeli spy, Jonathan Pollard, certainly fit that picture. A Navy analyst who stole American secrets including the complete ten-volume manual of the National Security Agency exposing how the US gathers its signal intelligence and the names of thousands of foreign individuals who worked for US spy agencies. Intelligence officials believe Israel shared stolen documents with the Soviet Union. According to several intelligence assessments, Pollard was one of the most damaging spies in US history.
Pollard received a life sentence in 1987 and was released in 2015. At first, Israel claimed he was a rogue, apologised and did not admit he had been its agent until 1998. In 2007, Israel named a square in Jerusalem after him, honouring him for his services.
Pollard was neither the first nor the last Israeli asset. Lawrence Franklin, a Pentagon analyst, pleaded guilty in 2005 to passing classified information to an Israeli embassy official and two AIPAC staffers. Ben-Ami Kadish, a former Army engineer, pleaded guilty in 2008 to passing secret documents to an Israeli consulate official, and served no prison time. Stewart Nozette from NASA was charged with attempted espionage following an FBI sting operation. In 1970, Richard Perle was caught in an FBI wiretap discussing classified information with an Israeli embassy official.
In 2001, the same Perle chaired the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, while two other Israel-firsters, Douglas Feith and Paul Wolfowitz held senior posts in the same building. Franklin had worked in Feith’s policy office when he was indicted for espionage. In 1996, a study group led by Perle, and Feith, prepared a policy paper for incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu titled “A Clean Break.” It urged Israel to abandon the Oslo Accords and the peace process with the Palestinians, and it proposed removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq as part of a broader Israeli strategy to reshape the region. Five years later, as leaders in the Pentagon, they delivered America’s first made-for-Israel war in Iraq.
The above is in no way intended to insinuate or allege that anyone, least of all these Zionist Americans, has dual loyalties. No. It is so profound, there is only one way to describe it: Israel-first loyalty.
Fast forward to 2026. David Milstein, stepson of Israeli propagandist Mark Levin and a senior aide to Ambassador Mike Huckabee, effectively the ambassador’s chief of staff. An unabashed Israel-first American Zionist, Milstein oversees the embassy’s West Bank and Gaza portfolio, placing the fox in charge of the henhouse. According to The New York Times, citing a dozen people who have worked with him, Milstein has repeatedly quashed or rewritten embassy reports to the U.S. State Department to favour Netanyahu’s government.
When the Israeli government accelerated the approval of building more Jewish-only colonies in occupied West Bank, embassy staff drafted an urgent memo warning that the move might cross President Trump’s own red line against annexation. According to The Times, the memo never left Jerusalem.
In response to the surge in attacks by Israeli Jewish mobs on Palestinian homes and farms, embassy staff prepared a report documenting Israel’s failure to rein in violence by Zionist youth. Milstein rewrote it and sent an embassy cable to Washington titled “Government Cracks Down on Escalating West Bank Violence.” When US diplomats pointed out that the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation’s distribution sites were chaotic and deadly, Milstein concluded the operation was a success.
Thirty members of Congress, led by Senator Chris Van Hollen, asked what had become of the investigations into the killings of nine Palestinian Americans by Israeli Jewish mobs and soldiers. Embassy staff compiled a report showing little progress and no charges. According to The Times, the report was set aside in favor of a letter saying Israel was handling the cases properly.
Cable traffic from the section covering Palestinian affairs fell from several a week to a few a month, because American embassy staff feared their work would be blocked, rewritten or impact their diplomatic career. Milstein would question embassy staff if they were “pro-Israel” or “pro-Hamas,” not if they were loyal Americans. A diplomatic mission that polices loyalty with questions like that ceases to function as an American embassy.
I once shared a lunch table with an American ambassador serving abroad. He recounted how, during George Shultz’s tenure as Secretary of State, Shultz would meet newly appointed ambassadors, point to a world map in his office, and ask the appointee to identify their country. Most would point to the country where they had been assigned. Shultz would correct them: “No, your country is the United States. Your duty is to serve your own country’s interests, not those of the country to which you are assigned.”
Ambassador Huckabee and Milstein either never heard that lesson, or serving Israel was their priority.
Rather than representing American interests in Jerusalem, the embassy operates as Israel’s envoy within the US government. Turning the US embassy into a Zionist mission run by the evangelical church, and an indoctrinated Zionist whose stepfather is referred to as “Tel Aviv Levin.”
Here again, no one is accusing Huckabee or Milstein of being foreign agents. Frankly, Israel does not need them to be. It need not recruit them or pay them like Pollard. Officials ideologically devoted to Israel can do the same work from within the U.S. government, under legitimate titles and without risking arrest.
No country receives more American financial and military aid than Israel. Yet US counterintelligence assessments have identified Israel as one of the most aggressive intelligence-gathering threats to the American homeland. Jonathan Pollard and others may have been the quintessential trench-coat spies. But the more dangerous risk is not someone stealing classified files; it is Americans whose loyalty to Israel overrides their duty to the U.S., operating in the halls of the White House and the Pentagon with one focus: serve Israel.
Consider David Frum, who coined President George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” phrase, helping lay the rhetorical roadmap for America’s longest foreign war.
Frum also wrote speeches for Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, making Israel’s case before the international body. The same writer, serving an Israel-first agenda from two different platforms: first helping sell America a war in the Middle East, then making Israel’s case before the world.
In the 21st century, with Zionist control of mainstream corporate media, and these implants inside America’s halls of power, Israel does not require trench coats, or stolen documents. It operates through officials who occupy positions of power deciding what American policymakers read by shaping diplomatic reporting, suppressing information and steering American decisions in ways that advances Israel’s strategic interests over America’s own. And whenever Israel’s interests and Washington’s information needs diverge, the information bends, delivered in plain sight, through official channels, under official titles, and on the American taxpayer’s payroll.
I’ve had this article sitting in storage waiting for the right moment to publish it. Tonight, Mario Nawfal hosted a debate on Iran that featured Robert Barnes and Matt Tardio. Matt put out so much disinformation and falsities that I believe now is the time to set the record straight about what happened to the JCPOA. I was tempted to attach the prefix, “RE” to Matt’s last name but decided not to go down the ad hominem path. Instead, let’s just deal with the facts.
On May 8, 2018, Donald Trump announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear agreement that Iran had signed with the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China three years earlier. He reimposed every sanction the deal had lifted and then piled on more under a policy he called “maximum pressure.” Iran had not violated the agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which had inspectors at every Iranian nuclear site, had certified again and again that Iran was keeping its side of the bargain.
Most people in Washington expected Tehran to respond in kind: throw out the inspectors, restart the centrifuges and race for the bomb. Some in the administration hoped it would, because that would have justified the next step. Iran did the opposite. For a full year it continued to abide by every limit in the agreement, keeping its enrichment at 3.67%, its stockpile under 300 kilograms and its doors open to the IAEA. Understanding why tells you a great deal about how Iran’s leaders actually think, and it undercuts the caricature of a reckless regime that dominates American commentary.
It put the United States in the wrong
The first reason was legitimacy. By staying in the deal, Iran turned the dispute from “Iran versus the world” into “the United States versus everyone else.” Washington, not Tehran, was the party that had broken an agreement endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2231. Europe, Russia and China all said so. For the first time in decades Iran held the diplomatic high ground, and its leaders understood that giving it up would reunite the coalition that had sanctioned them before 2015.
That calculation paid off in a way few predicted. In August 2020 the Trump administration tried to invoke the deal’s “snapback” clause to restore all UN sanctions on Iran. Thirteen of the fifteen members of the Security Council rejected the move, on the grounds that the United States had left the agreement and could not use its provisions. Had Iran walked out in 2018, the snapback would have been automatic and unanimous. Patience bought Iran protection at the United Nations.
It gave Europe a chance to deliver
The second reason was economic hope. The deal’s value to Iran was sanctions relief, and the Europeans promised to preserve some of it. They created a special trade channel, INSTEX, designed to let European companies do business with Iran without exposure to American sanctions. Tehran gave Europe time to make it work. It never did. INSTEX completed its first transaction, a shipment of medical supplies, only in March 2020, and European companies fled Iran rather than risk being cut off from the American market and the dollar. Iran’s oil exports collapsed from about 2.5 million barrels a day to a few hundred thousand. But Iran’s leaders had to test the European promise before they could declare it worthless, and they did.
It denied Washington and Israel a pretext
The third reason was security. Iran’s leaders knew that any visible move toward a bomb would be used to justify military strikes. Hawks in Washington and Jerusalem had argued for years that the deal only delayed the inevitable; an Iranian walkout would have proved their case. By staying inside the agreement, with inspectors on the ground, Iran made it far harder to sell a war. The IAEA’s reports were Iran’s best defense.
This was consistent with the position Iran’s leadership has held publicly for two decades. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a religious ruling forbidding nuclear weapons, and Iran remained a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty throughout. Whatever one thinks of the sincerity of that position, Iran’s conduct after May 2018 matched it.
It bet on outlasting Trump
The fourth reason was time. Iran’s leaders had watched American politics closely, and they knew presidents come and go. The deal had been negotiated by one administration and abandoned by the next; it could be restored by a third. Staying in the agreement kept that door open. President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif had staked their political careers on the deal, and they argued that Iran should wait out Trump rather than burn the bridge. Khamenei, who had always been skeptical of American promises, allowed them to make that case. It was a wager that the United States would return to its word.
Why the patience ran out
Iran’s patience was not unlimited, and it was never unconditional. On May 8, 2019, exactly one year after Trump’s announcement, Rouhani said Iran would begin to scale back its commitments in stages. Iran invoked paragraph 36 of the deal itself, which allows a party to stop performing its obligations if another party is in significant non-compliance. Each step was announced in advance, carried out under IAEA observation and described as reversible the moment the United States returned and lifted sanctions. In July 2019 Iran exceeded the stockpile limit and enriched to 4.5%. In November it resumed enrichment at Fordow.
Then came the events that hardened Tehran. The United States killed General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was assassinated in November 2020. The Natanz enrichment plant was sabotaged in April 2021. Each attack was answered with another step: 20% enrichment, the end of expanded inspections, and finally 60%. The Biden administration had a chance to restore the deal in Vienna in 2021 and 2022, and those talks collapsed too.
Sixty percent as leverage
The most alarming of Iran’s steps, the decision in April 2021 to enrich uranium to 60%, is usually cited as proof that Tehran was racing for a bomb. Look at the timing and the terms and it reads very differently. Talks to restore the deal opened in Vienna on April 6, 2021. Five days later the enrichment hall at Natanz was sabotaged in an attack widely attributed to Israel. Iran announced 60% enrichment two days after that.
The move was a message aimed at the negotiating table. Iran was telling the remaining parties, and the United States, that every month they failed to honor their commitments would cost them, and that the cost would rise. Iran’s government spokesman, Ali Rabiei, said publicly on April 20 that the step “can quickly be reversed” if the other parties returned to their obligations, and that enrichment would then go back to the level set in the 2015 accord. The parliament’s law of December 2020, which ordered higher enrichment and fewer inspections, was written the same way: it tied every escalation to the absence of sanctions relief.
That is leverage, not a breakout. Iran had watched Europe fail to deliver for three years and the United States refuse to return without new concessions. Staying at 3.67% had won it praise and nothing else. Raising the stakes was the only tool it had left to make the other signatories take their own commitments seriously. Iran enriched to 60% so that it would have something to give back.
What the critics will say
Critics make three arguments that challenge my thesis. The first is that Iran was provoking the United States all along through its missile program and its support for allies across the region. But neither was covered by the JCPOA. The deal was deliberately limited to the nuclear program because that was the only issue on which agreement was possible. Holding Iran responsible for breaking terms that were never in the agreement is not a fair test.
The second is that 60% enrichment has no civilian purpose. That is largely true, and it is the point. A bargaining chip has to be valuable to the other side, and 60% was valuable precisely because it worried Washington, Europe and Israel. Iran never enriched to 90%, never left the Non-Proliferation Treaty and never expelled inspectors during this period.
The third is that in early 2023 the IAEA found uranium particles enriched to 83.7% at Fordow. Iran said they were the result of unintended fluctuations in the enrichment process, and the agency did not report any stockpile at that level. Particles are not a stockpile, and a stockpile is not a weapon. Iran’s accumulated 60% material did grow, to about 87.5 kilograms by that report and far more later, and that growth was dangerous. But it was the predictable price of a policy of pressure that gave Iran no reason to stop.
The lesson
The record shows a government that responded to the breach of an international agreement with restraint, then with measured and reversible pressure, and only escalated after its economy had been strangled and its officers and scientists killed. That is not the behavior of a regime determined to build a bomb at the first opportunity. It is the behavior of a government that wanted the deal to survive and concluded, slowly, that the United States would not let it.
There is a lesson here for Washington. When the United States walked away from an agreement that was working, it did not get a better deal. It got an Iran with near-weapons-grade uranium, fewer inspectors and every reason to doubt American promises. Iran kept the JCPOA alive for a year after Trump abandoned it. The question we should be asking is not why Iran eventually stepped back, but why the United States walked away from a deal that was keeping Iran a year away from a bomb.
In August, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) publicly took credit for shaping “multiple provisions” now in this year’s defense policy bill, stating that many were “impacted by prior JINSA policy recommendations,” including “proposals to strengthen U.S.-Israel defense industrial base integration” and “renew pre-existing joint U.S.-Israel programs.”
Among the provisions JINSA takes credit for is the controversial Section 219. In the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), this section mandates the creation of a single executive agent tasked with “synchronizing cooperative efforts” between the U.S. and Israel across nine basket categories, including AI, quantum technology, biotechnology, and virtually every category of weapons.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has argued that such provisions would transition the U.S.-Israel security relationship from aid to partnership. But pro-Israel advocates have emphasized the leverage it would provide over Washington’s military policy.
Mark Dubowitz, the CEO of the pro-Israel Foundation for Defense of Democracies, appeared to reference this provision in an article arguing that the U.S. and Israel must “deepen their military, technological, intelligence and economic integration to such an extent that inflicting financial harm on Israel would also carry a significant cost for Washington.”
Other initiatives JINSA has advocated for likewise read like an Israeli government wishlist. They include a pending provision to “extend the existing War Reserve Stockpile Authority for Israel,” which provides a secretive and high-speed pathway for funneling weapons to Israel, as well as Abraham Accords provisions including “Improvements to Air and Missile Defense Acquisition” and a “United States-Abraham Accords Defense Cooperation Initiative.”
The policy wins JINSA is trumpeting are a result of its strong foothold within the military-industrial complex, and are perhaps one of the most overlooked aspects of the pro-Israel lobby. The group says it achieves these goals “by conducting both educational programs that build ties among American, Israeli and other Middle Eastern partner military leaders, along with in-depth research and actionable recommendations to influence U.S. policy.” JINSA’s “Our People” webpage includes a long roster of retired U.S. military officials.
One of JINSA’s most important programs, which has existed for more than four decades, is its “Generals and Admirals Program.” The initiative involves flying recently retired U.S. military officials to Israel. Many of the trip’s participants were already sitting on defense-industry boards when they went, while others joined soon afterward. At least 55 of the 83 alumni from the 2019–2026 G&A program cohorts (about 66%) have held or currently hold positions in the defense industry spanning board seats, executive jobs or advisory roles at defense contractors and defense-tech firms, or posts at defense-focused investment funds, consultancies and lobbying shops.
JINSA hopes that, when these former military officials return from Israel, they will use their credentials and defense industry power to become Israel’s advocates.
JINSA describes the program, founded in 1981, as “designed to ensure that the delegation is well briefed on the security concerns of Israel, as well as the key role Israel plays as a friend and ally of the United States.” The Helmsley Charitable Trust, which provided a 13 month grant for the program in 2017 worth $237,846, similarly says the purpose of the program is in part for participants to “return home to share publicly what they learned.”
The itinerary for the Generals and Admirals program includes meetings with Israel’s prime minister, defense minister, IDF chief of staff and the Director of Mossad. According to JINSA, after completing the program, “participants often engage on important policy initiatives through JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy that strengthen…the U.S.-Israel security relationship.” JINSA CEO Michael Makovsky highlighted the program’s influence in 2014, calling U.S. generals and admirals “America’s most admired leaders, who remain very influential even after retirement.”
The JINSA program trains retired military leaders, many of whom go on to work in the defense industry, to be advocates for Israeli interests, both in their public writing and in their work behind the scenes.
A 2023 Quincy Institute report found that 80% of four-star officers who retired between June 2018 and July 2023 went on to work for the defense industry. Of the 32 officers tracked in the report, nine appear on JINSA’s participant lists, and seven of those nine retired officers hold industry lobbying or defense-tech roles. Gen. Joseph Dunford, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined Lockheed Martin’s board five months after leaving the military and went on JINSA’s Israel junket the following year, 2021. Adm. Michael S. Rogers, the former NSA director and head of U.S. Cyber Command, retired in 2018, became a senior adviser at the lobbying and public relations firm Brunswick Group in 2019 and went on the JINSA trip in 2021.
Gen. Hawk Carlisle participated in the 2019 delegation while serving as president and CEO of the National Defense Industrial Association, the war lobby’s leading trade group, and has served on the board of the U.S. subsidiary of Israel’s largest defense contractor, Elbit Systems of America, which was renamed Twenty-Six Defense in September. Some participants, such as retired Gen. Robert Magnus and Gen. Duncan McNabb, joined the board of Elbit America after their JINSA trips.
Embedded within the highest levels of the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill, JINSA’s roster of retired generals and admirals often use their credentials to advocate for pro-Israel policy in Washington.
In 2010, when then-head of U.S. Central Command Gen. David Petraeus testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Israel-Palestine conflict “foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel,” which is used to “mobilize support” for various militant groups in the region, JINSA’s G&A participants rushed to Israel’s defense. Responding to Petraeus, 30 ex-military leaders associated with the program put out an ad claiming that “a strong, secure Israel is an asset,” labeling the country, which has been deemed an apartheid state by numerous human rights groups, as “a democracy” that “shares our commitment to freedom, personal liberty and rule of law.”
In May 2018, a JINSA task force of retired senior officers chaired by Adm. James Stavridis released “Atlas Supported,” urging Washington to elevate Israel to “a top-tier ally” and invest jointly in next-generation military technology — the latter now a central purpose of Section 219. JINSA says the report was also the first to recommend moving Israel from the U.S. European Command to U.S. Central Command, which Trump then ordered on January 15, 2021. JINSA celebrated the fifth anniversary of Israel’s shift into CENTCOM this January by noting that the “Wall Street Journal recognized” it as “the only organization promoting this move,” and by featuring glowing tributes from JINSA G&A participants.
JINSA’s roster of retired military officials was once again mobilized in October 2026 to deny the findings of a trifecta of human rights groups and the U.N. that Israel committed a genocide in Gaza, praising what it called a “pattern of law-abiding IDF conduct in Gaza.”
JINSA’s delegates routinely appear on cable news, often without disclosures of their affiliation with the pro-Israel lobby group: Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, who commanded CENTCOM from 2019 to 2022 and traveled with JINSA’s 2023 delegation, and became a “distinguished fellow” at JINSA in 2024, is now a CBS News contributor. In July, McKenzie appeared on Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan, who introduced McKenzie as a retired CENTCOM commander but omitted his fellowship with JINSA. In that appearance, McKenzie recommended Washington consider seizing Kharg Island. Ret. Vice Admiral Robert Harward, a member of JINSA’s “Iran Policy Project,” frequently appears on Fox News too, though his affiliation is generally disclosed.
One of the group’s most consequential efforts was to push the Trump administration to start a war with Iran, with a group of JINSA-aligned military leaders writing a March 2025 letter arguing that “U.S. support for Israeli action to prevent a nuclear Iran should be a top priority,” adding that “time is running out to stop its march to the bomb.” Sixty-six of the 79 signers of that letter appear on JINSA’s Generals and Admirals participant lists. Members of JINSA’s roster of retired military officials subsequently wrote open letters of support for the 12-Day War and the current months-long Iran War.
Harrison Berger is an independent journalist who has contributed to Drop Site News, The American Conservative, and The Nation. Previously, he was a researcher and producer for System Update with Glenn Greenwald. His work focuses on civil liberties and U.S. foreign policy. He holds a BA in Political Science and Russian Studies from Union College (NY).
Speculation is growing over the sustainability of the United States’ model of global dominance which emerged as Washington ended the Second World War as plausibly the sole superpower. That role was first tested in the Korean War, which produced something of a stalemate in a confrontation that included China, and led to a Ceasefire Agreement which is still in place to this day. More recently the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, even given the disastrous and pointless war in Vietnam, confirmed the US’s superior military, political and financial status, leading to an affirmation of American dominance as an essential element in global political stability in several initiated and mandated policy documents including in the statement of principles spelled out in 1990’s which was later published in September 2000 as the Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century: a Project for the New American Century (PNAC). The final elaboration of the policy was derived from the so-called “Wolfowitz Doctrine” which was the common referral to national defense guidance developed when Paul Wolfowitz, working for Vice President Dick Cheney, was Associate Secretary of Defense. The term is an informal version of the US Department of Defense’s Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for the years 1994-9 dated February 18, 1992.
As the first DPG after the Cold War and first Gulf Wars ended and the draft described the United States as the world’s only superpower it made preventing the emergence (or re-emergence) of a global or regional competitor a top priority. This objective included preventing any hostile power’s dominance of strategically or resource rich important regions that could produce alternative sources of global power. It argued that that the US Military must remain sufficiently strong enough to deter possible competitors, retaining the ability to act unilaterally if necessary. The PNAC declaration called for a continuing global leadership role for the United States which implied the resort to preemptive war against adversaries when needed.
In promoting the new policy, the Project’s Statement of Principles document of June 1997 elaborated how “… America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests… We need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”
The statement was signed by Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby, Zalmay Khalilzad, Donald Rumsfeld, Peter Rodman, Elliot Abrams, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Aaron Friedberg, Donald Kagan, I Lewis Libby, and Norman Podhoretz among others. It was considered to be very “Israel friendly” subsequently and it, combined with the awesome and growing political and institutional power of the US Israeli Lobby, was used to justify US interventions in the Middle East during the following decades. Indeed, one might argue that Israel’s form of interaction with its neighbors and even with much of the world today was shaped by the numerous Jews and Israel firsters who participated in the drafting of the critical documents asserting Washington’s need to behave aggressively, to include its participation in conflicts that it would otherwise have been able to avoid such as those occurring in the Middle East which were instigated by Israel’s promotion of its own interests just like is currently taking place with Iran.
What is important to note today is how the documents that were intended to guarantee American military supremacy including interventionism to maintain that edge appear to have taken hold of the President Donald J Trump administration, most particularly in the minds of the president himself and his Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. So, what went wrong as the United States now appears to be losing on all fronts where it has opted for confrontation instead of negotiation? It is perhaps important to note that the geopolitical missteps are likely the result of a doctrine coming from a different world than 1991 with different means of assessing strength or weakness. Trump and Hegseth might well be perceived as dinosaurs heading for extinction during their own version of the Triassic Period and the country that they have so much abused might be heading for decline and fall. The question becomes “After the US falls, who will be there to pick up the pieces?”
And one might presume that America’s most protected client Israel, which would certainly be joined to the US as the world’s most hated nation, might also be heading in the same direction. The only difference being that Israel has declared that it will use its nuclear arsenal to take much of the world with it if it goes down, the so-called Samson Option. Israel has at least several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions from its submarine delivery capabilities. Most European capitals would certainly be targets for Israeli missiles and warplanes. Former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan served notice of what might come: “Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother.” A minority of Israeli leaders might try to prevent things from coming to that, if at all possible, but those in charge will surely have the capability to take part of the world down with them and that is precisely what will happen as Israel goes under. But before that happens a wave of millions of Jewish “refugees” will roll over the US and Europe primarily. They will insist on creating new nations just like they did to the Palestinians and likely will have their nuclear weapons with them as “insurance.”
Interestingly, Israel is also reported to be developing a biological weapon arsenal which is “ethnically targeting” selective meaning that it will kill only holders of certain DNA or ethnic characteristics, presumably killing those with majority Arab biology while sparing anyone with Jewish traits or characteristics. Interesting. It might be the easy way to “mow the lawn” of objectionable foreigners as Israel’s leaders have frequently carried out in places like Gaza and Lebanon.
But it occurs to me that Israel will follow a slightly different pattern, namely disorienting the playing field by the use of false flag incidents that will encourage Americans and Europeans to support pro-Israel policies that are clearly not in their interest, and applying “Palestinian option” alternatives to reduce and then completely eliminate resistance to its own form of “global dominance.” That means stealing other people’s land while also systematically exterminating them, possibly with the biological bombs. The process of emigrating is already underway among many mostly better educated Israelis who are already rapidly leaving an Israel under threat to recreate their exclusively Jewish ghettos and settlements in places like Crete, Greece and in South America. The local residents frequently complain about the abuse they receive from the newcomers but their governments suffer from the typical Zionist disease, i.e. local governments that are bought or pressured to give way.
America already has discovered the phenomenon in the communities in New York and New Jersey and elsewhere in the country where often Orthodox Jewish religious ritual restrictions control behavior of all citizens and even visitors who dare to defile the enclaves. If Israel in what was once Palestine goes under will that mean that millions of new immigrants, certainly given free entry with no conditions on their behavior by a US Congress which displays Israeli flags in its office spaces on Capitol Hill? The clowns in Congress and the White House may not be bothered by the Israeli Jewish tendency to despise the other 90% of any country’s inhabitants as subhuman, as they do with the Palestinians currently. Florida (of course!) Congressman Brian Mast, who wears his Israeli army uniform when working in his Congressional office, said : “there is no such thing as innocent Palestinians”! And he is not the only congressman or staffer who embraces that view, which is reiterated by 90% of Israeli Jews who support extermination of all Muslims and Christians!
So what comes next? John Gehan has written about the next moves by Israel emigrants and how they will impact on the rest of the world after their regional genocidal campaign to create Greater (Eretz) Israel is either concluded in failure or otherwise goes down in flames: “Essentially what we’ll have are at least hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of psychotically racist terrorists entering the USA. These are ethnically obsessed monsters who don’t consider anyone outside of their pernicious tribe to be human. They’ll have weapons at their disposal and a cemented nationwide network to commit mass murder. Maybe some of these crazies will seek shelter in Europe or Canada or Argentina, etc. But many will choose the USA as a redoubt. At best, murders and acts of terror will spike dramatically in this country. Israeli Zionists are genocidal psychopaths. As we have all seen.”
For those who need further elucidation of what is going on and what drives it, the head of one of Israel’s most prominent think tanks, Major General Tamir Hayman has described in an article further examined by Trita Parsi the Quincy Institute, the harsh reality of Israel’s current and ongoing new national security doctrine: Hayman describes how “The United States is a ‘declining power’ and, given its ongoing social and political shifts, will soon abandon Israel in any event. This is compelling Israel to move toward greater self-reliance in order to avoid ‘excessive dependence’ on the US since it ‘exposes Israel to the influence of a progressive American value system that is incompatible with Israel’s Jewish character.’ He concludes: ‘Severing ties with the United States is therefore not only inevitable, but essential to Israel’s independence and the resilience of its Jewish national identity.’” Why is that? “Because of the Primacy of Jewish Identity over Democracy: The state’s Jewish identity takes precedence over its democratic system of government.” And it takes precedence over the constitutional rights of any nation that Jews should wind up settling in!
So, we Americans and presumably lots of other people have something to look forward to from an Israel whose leaders including Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon have often bragged about how they control “America,” and now it it boasting how it has taken its pound of flesh and then will discard the US donor after it is bled white! It presumes the end of nations as we know them that try to function decently to be replaced by an ethno-religious state armed with nukes and bio weapons that will begin its process of extermination just as it is already carrying out in the Middle East! Mazel Tov to y’all!
Philip M. Giraldi, Ph.D., is Executive Director of the Council for the National Interest, a 501(c)3 tax deductible educational foundation (Federal ID Number #52-1739023) that seeks a more interests-based U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Website is https://councilforthenationalinterest.orgaddress is P.O. Box 2157, Purcellville VA 20134 and its email is inform@cnionline.org.
It’s hard to know whether to break the TV set or throw up when listening to the European governments rushing to condemn the air strike by Yemeni forces on Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid international airport.
The blast from a ballistic missile that slammed into the airport at the weekend, October 12, killed at least 13 civilians and injured scores of other travellers. Horrific video footage shows the moment the missile explosion ripped through a terminal lounge.
European leaders immediately in a coordinated fashion trotted out condemnations of Yemeni “terrorism” and vowed solidarity and support for Saudi Arabia. U.S. President Donald Trump called it “a terrible thing.” (As if bombing schoolchildren is not quite a terrible thing.)
Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, and Spain all issued strident denunciations of the Yemeni attack.
The strike on the Saudi capital came after the Ansar Allah-led Yemen Armed Forces had given ample warning to the Saudis that their airports would be targeted and for civilians to avoid the areas. The airports were kept open for business as usual. The Yemenis have said that the attack on Riyadh and other Saudi airports are retaliation for weeks of multiple air strikes by the Saudis on Yemeni civilian centers.
Hundreds of Yemeni civilians have been killed since Saudi Arabia broke a four-year truce with an air strike on the international airport in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, on July 13. Saudi warplanes, U.S.-supplied F-15s and European Typhoon jets, have been continously bombing homes across Yemen. This week, two days after the Riyadh strike, at least nine people including five children were killed in air raids on houses in Taiz city and in northern al Jawf province. Al Masirah TV footage showed a distraught father holding up a child’s shredded body amid rubble. There was no condemnation of that atrocity from any European leader.
As Mick Wallace and Clare Daly, former Irish Members of the European Parliament, point out in their podcast this week, the official European reaction is utter hypocrisy and a cynical distortion of the conflict on the Arabian Peninsula.
Britain and France in particular, along with the United States, have backed the Saudi aggression against Yemen beginning in 2015. Over seven years, that aggression killed up to 400,000 Yemenis through air strikes and a blockade on humanitarian needs.
The European Union remained largely silent for seven years. No protests were made to Washington, Paris or London. Ambassadors were not summoned, sanctions were not imposed.
The return to hostilities that began with Saudi air strikes on Sanaa in July have been enabled by U.S. and Britain supplying warplanes, military advisors and intelligence.
None of the European governments have bothered to condemn this recent U.S. and UK-backed slaughter.
So, it is nauseating when one hears British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband saying he is “appalled” by the strike on Riyadh airport. And other European leaders vowing “full solidarity with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”
Germany’s Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul condemned Yemen’s “terrorist act.”
His French counterpart said France stood with Saudi Arabia “in defending its territory and infrastructue.” (No mention of what the Saudis have been doing for years to Yemen’s territory.)
Referring to the strike on Riyadh without any context, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni said: “Attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure are unacceptable and must cease.” (Yes, indeed, so why not tell that to the Saudis who are doing it deliberately on a massive scale with support from Washington and London?)
What is instructive here is not just the sickening hypocrisy and moral bankruptcy. It is the manifestation of a systematic corruption and criminal responsibility. This is not just one more example of a flawed European political class whose judgement is suspect. What is increasingly apparent is the totality of the corruption.
The same European supporters of Saudi monarchs waging a genocidal war on Yemen are also contemporaneously supporting the Israeli Zionist regime in its extermination of Palestinians. They are complicit in enabling the U.S. aggression against Iran, Cuba and Venezuela. They are sponsors of the NeoNazi regime in Kiev to keep fighting a proxy war against Russia despite more than one million Ukrainian military casualties and the risk of nuclear conflagration.
The death cult of Western capitalism is on full display in multiple theaters, exposing the organic evil at work. There is sense that all of Western imperialist history is now on display in one final orgy of barbarity.
In previous times, the death cult operated discreetly in seemingly disparate conflict scenarios. Wars on different continents seemed somehow unconnected. The Western media would in the past reliably cover up the crimes by distorting the motives and objectives with false narratives and (laughable) claims of noble purpose. The West was “defending democracy,” “fighting communism,” “protecting human rights,” or “waging war on terrorism,” or some other pretext that in isolation and with loads of media propaganda managed to fool a lot of people as somehow plausible.
What’s happening now, it seems, is a concatenation of wars that ultimately exposes the essential system that drives the violence, and its insatiable lust for human suffering.
It is impossible to work for such a vile system, the death cult of capitalism, without also being oblivious to its evil ways. To remain oblivious necessitates denial or lies. That deception might be tenable for occasional and seemingly disparate scenarios. But not when the system is exposed in its infernal entirety.
American and European wars in the past might have succeeded in being sold to the Western public as one-off wars and misadventures. We think of the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Latin American, Africa, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently Libya.
In more recent years, as consciousness evolved, the public began discerning and decrying “endless wars”.
But now the world is witnessing a totalizing of the war machine that goes by the name of “Western democracy”.
What’s happening in Ukraine, Gaza, Iran and Yemen is not coincidence. It is the death cult on display and unable to hide itself. It manifests too in attacking and locking up Western citizens who condemn genocide or who simply call for peace.
Capitalism, fascism, wars, the Epstein class, endemic poverty and suffering – it’s a death cult in a theater near you.
The politicians, governments, media and pundits who promote it or serve it are seen for what they are.
In September 2026, Ansar Allah, derisively labeled as the Houthis in Western foreign policy circles, redrew the map of western Yemen in a matter of days. Its fighters swept down the Red Sea coast, seized Mocha on September 10, then pushed through Dhubab and took Mayyun Island at the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb strait the following day, consolidating control over Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline and roughly 5,400 square kilometers of newly gained territory. Yemen’s Saudi-backed government answered on October 4 when Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alimi announced Operation Dawn of Yemen, vowing to keep fighting until the country was “liberated from the grip of the terrorist militia,” with 100 Saudi coalition fighter jets providing air cover and Ansar Allah firing missiles at targets inside the kingdom in response.
Washington reached for a familiar script. Secretary of State Marco Rubio branded Ansarh an Iranian proxy, and Tehran fired back on September 9. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei wrote on X, “Marco Rubio’s lies cannot replace facts. Ansarallah is an independent Yemeni actor that makes its own decisions; it takes orders from no one and acts as nobody’s proxy.”
On the question of Ansar Allah’s relationship to Iran, the record sides with those who emphasize the movement’s homegrown roots. In the 1980s, Zaydi religious networks in the northern province of Saada organized study groups and summer camps to resist the Wahhabi and Salafi outreach that Saudi money spread across the region. Around 1992, those networks crystallized as the Believing Youth, an educational and social revival movement dedicated to Zaydi theology and the preservation of a tradition stretching back a millennium. Saada’s poverty and its chronic neglect by Sanaa fueled the grievances that eventually became a military force.
Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi sharpened that network into a political cause after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. He accused President Ali Abdullah Saleh of running a corrupt government that neglected Saada, sidelined Zaydis, and surrendered Yemeni sovereignty to Saudi and American interests. His followers adopted a chant that read in full: “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam.” The chant named foreign powers, but its domestic meaning was clear: Yemeni authorities understood that a movement chanting “death to America” today could be chanting “death to the president” tomorrow. Palestine and the Second Intifada also featured prominently in Hussein’s sermons, which cast Israel as an occupying power and the United States as its enabler. The antisemitism in the Yemeni resistance’s messaging reflected a long-held hostility to Jewry’s machinations among the Yemeni population.
Saleh went to war against the movement in 2004, and his forces killed Hussein on September 10. Leadership passed to his younger brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. During the 2011 uprising the movement took the name Ansar Allah and pitched itself as a national force against corruption and inequality.
The episode that best exposes the proxy myth unfolded in September 2014. Iranian representatives reportedly urged Ansar Allah not to seize the capital, and Ansar Allah marched in anyway. HuffPost broke the story in April 2015, citing American officials familiar with the intelligence. One official told the outlet “It is wrong to think of the Houthis as a proxy force for Iran.” National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan added: “It remains our assessment that Iran does not exert command and control over the Houthis in Yemen.” The Wilson Center also called attention to the aforementioned restraint Iran advocated for: “In 2014, Iran reportedly advised the Houthis against taking over Sanaa, but they pressed on.”
Thomas Juneau of the University of Ottawa built the academic foundation for this view. His 2016 study in International Affairs argued that “the Houthis are not Iranian proxies; Tehran’s influence in Yemen is marginal.” In a Washington Post op-ed that same year, he wrote: “It is simply inaccurate to claim that the Houthis are Iranian proxies.” Juneau has since acknowledged deeper cooperation, yet he told The Iran Primer : “The Houthis are fiercely nationalist, and do not take orders from Iran. Instead, they work together, closely, on the basis of their common interests.”
Helen Lackner, among the most respected Western scholars of Yemen, put it plainly on Democracy Now: “The Houthis are not Iranian proxies. They are not Iranian servants. They don’t do what the Iranians tell them to do. They make their own decisions.” She described how the alliance functions: “If their decisions and their policies coincide with those of Iran, then there’s no issue. But if they don’t, they don’t do it.”
Allison Minor challenged the proxy narrative directly in a Brookings essay: “Rigorous definitions of the term ‘proxy’ require that the sponsor has some means of controlling the proxy, as this is what differentiates a proxy from a partner/ally. In truth, the Houthis are not an Iranian proxy, even though they benefit from Iranian support.” Minor pointed to the unilateral ceasefire Ansar Allah declared with Saudi Arabia in 2019, even as Iran sought escalation, and stressed their possession of independent revenue, local arms production, and diverse supply lines as other indicators of autonomous production and decision-making.
Others well-versed in Yemeni affairs reached the same conclusion years earlier. Saudi journalist and filmmaker Safa al-Ahmad, who reported from inside Ansar Allah territory, told PBS Frontline that Iran’s ties to the group were “vastly overblown” and that “the Iranians can’t just pick up the phone and tell the Houthis what to do.”
Even the hawkish Institute for the Study of War agrees. Its September 18 update stated, “The Houthis are not an Iranian proxy, although their objectives often overlap with Iran’s strategic interests.” It added, “The Houthis are an independent partner of Iran and may resist potential Iranian pressure to halt their campaigns, however.”
None of this means Iran sits on the sidelines. The Associated Pressreported in late September that officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps helped Ansar Allah with planning during the coastal offensive. Yet researcher Nicholas Brumfield told Al Jazeera that the campaign reportedly involved 76,000 Yemeni fighters, raised “using their own governance apparatuses,” and that mounting evidence points to Ansar Allah boasting a burgeoning domestic arms industry.
Ansar Allah ultimately behaves as a national liberation movement that shares many of Iran’s enemies and welcomes Iranian assistance, yet it charts its own course whenever its interests diverge. It does not need Tehran to steer it any more than any serious and credible resistance movement needs a foreign master. It grew from Yemeni grievances, and it will naturally seek allies such as Iran that oppose the same aggressive powers—Israel and the United States—that work tirelessly to destabilize West Asia. Movements like it already shake the foundations of the regional order. If the current momentum holds, Ansar Allah could reshape not only Yemen but also the Saudi provinces of Asir, Jizan and Najran, lands that many Yemenis still regard as their own and that Saudi Arabia locked down after the 1934 war between the two countries.
What started as a revolt against a corrupt president in a neglected mountain province has become a war that stretches from Taiz to Riyadh. With Ansar Allah astride the Bab el-Mandeb and Iran pressing on the Strait of Hormuz, two of the world’s most vital chokepoints now sit within reach of forces Washington cannot push back. If Asir, Jizan and Najran ever slip from Riyadh’s grip, historians will trace the new map back to Saada, not to Tehran.
Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Major General Mohsen Rezaei, has dismissed the United States’ partial concessions regarding Tehran’s seven conditions for resolving the ongoing war as “inadequate.”
In a post on X, Rezaei acknowledged that Washington has agreed to some of the conditions outlined by the Islamic Republic, but stressed that the response falls far short of Tehran’s demands.
“Iranian diplomacy has changed, and there will be no return to the status quo ante,” he declared, signaling a fundamental and permanent shift in how Tehran engages with Washington, demanding full compliance rather than incremental or half-hearted concessions.
In a second post, Rezaei eviscerated the US administration’s strategic competence and the origins of the war.
He stated that US President Donald Trump, “deluded by the fantasy of conquering Iran, launched one of the most idiotic wars in human history after being duped by Netanyahu.”
Rezaei then highlighted the humiliating reality of the US military’s inability to achieve its objectives on the battlefield, referencing Washington’s recent attempts to bypass Iranian maritime controls.
“Now, after the US fleet failed to reopen the Hormuz, he has resorted to smuggling,” Rezaei wrote, adding that “the US military has never sunk to such a disgraceful low!”
This rebuke comes against the backdrop of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, which established the framework for halting the US-Israeli war of aggression.
Under the MoU, Washington committed to lifting its illegal naval blockade, releasing frozen Iranian assets, and ceasing all military operations in exchange for a phased normalization of maritime traffic.
Crucially, the agreement stipulated that any resumption of commercial transit through the strait must be coordinated with and approved by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
However, instead of adhering to the agreed-upon framework, US officials have reportedly attempted to force or sneak commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz without coordination with Iranian authorities.
The Iranian Armed Forces have responded decisively to these violations, intercepting unauthorized vessels and enforcing the defensive arrangements established during the war.
Tehran maintains that the Strait of Hormuz will remain under its firm control until the United States fully implements all seven of Iran’s conditions, proving that the era of US hegemonic dictates in the region is permanently over.
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