European Council President Antonio Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Tuesday offered “solidarity” to both Greece and Cyprus after the Libyan parliament had earlier in the day ratified a maritime boundary agreement with Turkey which both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus consider to be illegal.

“We deeply regret the ratification today by the Libyan parliament of the so-called Libyan-Turkey memorandum of understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea. We recall that the EU’s position on this matter was clearly stated by the European Council in 2019 and remains unchanged,” they said.

They added that the agreement “infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states”, “does not comply with the law of the sea”, and “is null and void”.

“We reaffirm our solidarity with Greece and Cyprus. We reiterate the EU’s well-known position against any outside interference in Libya,” they said.

The European Council’s conclusions on December 12, 2019, had stated similarly that the agreement “infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the law of the sea, and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states”.

Libya’s parliament voted unanimously to adopt agreement

Earlier on Tuesday, the Libyan parliament voted unanimously to adopt the agreement, which states that Libya and Turkey agree that their respective exclusive economic zones share a border in the Mediterranean sea, and that that border is located southeast of the Greek island of Crete.

The ratification came on a day on which a day on which Turkey’s national intelligence organisation (Mit)’s chief Ibrahim Kalin was in the country to meet Libya’s government of national unity’s Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dibeybe.

Turkey had signed an agreement with the Libyan government of national accord in 2019, but it had not until Tuesday been ratified by Libya’s legislature. The government of national unity superseded the government of national accord in 2021 and is now the sole internationally recognised government of Libya.

After the agreement was signed, Cypriot Foreign Minister Constantinos Kombos and his Greek counterpart Giorgos Gerapetritis held a telephone call, after which both ministries released condemnatory statements.

“The Republic of Cyprus’ foreign ministry condemns the Libyan parliament’s decision to approve the illegal Turkish-Libyan ‘memorandum of understanding’ of 2019. This ‘memorandum’ violates the sovereign rights of third states and is contrary to the recognised principles of the United Nations convention on the law of the sea,” the Cypriot ministry said.

It added that the agreement also violates “customary international law regarding the rights of islands in maritime zones, including the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf”.

“Therefore, the foreign ministry continues to consider the said ‘memorandum’ illegal, null and void, and that it does not produce, in any way, legal effects against third states,” it said.

Turkey is not an Unclos signatory, Libya signed but did not ratify

Greece’s foreign ministry said that that it “rejects” it and that the decision “does not change the illegal, null and void nature of the memorandum, which is contrary to the international law of the sea and violates the sovereign rights of the states of the region”.

“Geography and the international law of the sea do not change with unilateral, legally unfounded parliamentary decisions. Turkey and Libya do not have opposing or adjacent coasts which would provide a legal basis for the attempted delimitation of maritime zones,” it added.

While Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are signatories to the United Nations convention on the law of the sea (Unclos), Turkey is not, and while Libya under its then leader Muammar Gadaffi signed the convention in 1984, no Libyan legislature ever ratified the signature.

Turkey’s belief is that the convention gives too much weight to islands, which it says should instead only be allowed 12 nautical miles of territorial waters as their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ), whereas Greece believes that its islands are entitled to full EEZs of their own.

As such, Turkey’s view is that its own EEZ stretches south to meet Libya’s EEZ, and as of Wednesday, Libya agrees, whereas Greece’s position is that Turkey and Libya do not share a maritime border because the sea in question belongs to Crete.

Given this to be the case, Turkey’s presidential press office director Burhanettin Duran described Tuesday’s vote as “an important advancement towards protecting the shared rights and interests of both nations in the eastern Mediterranean, establishing maritime jurisdiction areas on the basis of equity, and strengthening regional cooperation”.

“Under the leadership of our President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey will continue to safeguard its rights and interests within the Blue Homeland, while further developing its relations with friendly and brotherly Libya and promoting equitable resource sharing, peace, and stability in the eastern Mediterranean”.

Cyprus’ foreign ministry on Friday declared the maritime boundary agreement signed by the governments of Turkey and Libya to be both “illegal” and “null and void” after it was ratified by the Libyan parliament earlier in the day.

“The Republic of Cyprus’ foreign ministry condemns the Libyan parliament’s decision to approve the illegal Turkish-Libyan ‘memorandum of understanding’ of 2019. This ‘memorandum’ violates the sovereign rights of third states and is contrary to the recognised principles of the United Nations convention on the law of the sea,” it said.

It added that the agreement also violates “customary international law regarding the rights of islands in maritime zones, including the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf”.

“Therefore, the foreign ministry continues to consider the said ‘memorandum’ illegal, null and void, and that it does not produce, in any way, legal effects against third states,” it said.

The Libyan parliament’s spokesman Abdullah Bliheg had said earlier in the day that the legislature had “voted unanimously” to adopt the agreement, on a day on which Turkey’s national intelligence organisation (Mit)’s chief Ibrahim Kalin was in the country to meet Libya’s government of national unity’s Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dibeybe.

Turkey had signed an agreement with the Libyan government of national accord in 2019, but it had not until Tuesday been ratified by Libya’s legislature. The government of national unity superseded the government of national accord in 2021 and is now the sole internationally recognised government of Libya.

Turkey and Libya officially agree that their EEZs share a border

As a result of the agreement, Libya and Turkey agree that their respective exclusive economic zones share a border in the Mediterranean sea, and that that border is located southeast of the Greek island of Crete.

Greece, too, reacted furiously to the Libyan parliament’s approval of the deal, with the country’s foreign ministry that it “rejects” it and that the decision “does not change the illegal, null and void nature of the memorandum, which is contrary to the international law of the sea and violates the sovereign rights of the states of the region”.

“Geography and the international law of the sea do not change with unilateral, legally unfounded parliamentary decisions. Turkey and Libya do not have opposing or adjacent coasts which would provide a legal basis for the attempted delimitation of maritime zones,” it added.

It then said that the agreement “also disregards the Greek islands and their rights to maritime zones based on [the United Nations convention on the law of the sea] Unclos and customary international law”.

“Having already concluded maritime delimitation agreements with Egypt and Italy, in accordance with the international law of the sea, Greece has demonstrated its respect for international law and the sovereign rights of neighbouring states. We call on the Libyan side to refrain from any action which is contrary to international law and undermines stability in the eastern Mediterranean,” it said.

It added that it has “already informed its partners and allies” and that it will “take all appropriate action to safeguard its sovereign rights”.

Turkey is not an Unclos signatory, Libya signed but did not ratify

In this, the country’s Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis had earlier held a telephone call with his Cypriot counterpart Constantinos Kombos shortly after the Libyan parliament voted on the matter.

While Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are signatories to Unclos, Turkey is not, and while Libya under its then leader Muammar Gadaffi signed the convention in 1984, no Libyan legislature ever ratified the signature.

Turkey’s belief is that the convention gives too much weight to islands, which it says should instead only be allowed 12 nautical miles of territorial waters as their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ), whereas Greece believes that its islands are entitled to full EEZs of their own.

As such, Turkey’s view is that its own EEZ stretches south to meet Libya’s EEZ, and as of Wednesday, Libya agrees, whereas Greece’s position is that Turkey and Libya do not share a maritime border because the sea in question belongs to Crete.

Given this to be the case, Turkey’s presidential press office director Burhanettin Duran described Tuesday’s vote as “an important advancement towards protecting the shared rights and interests of both nations in the eastern Mediterranean, establishing maritime jurisdiction areas on the basis of equity, and strengthening regional cooperation”.

“Under the leadership of our President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey will continue to safeguard its rights and interests within the Blue Homeland, while further developing its relations with friendly and brotherly Libya and promoting equitable resource sharing, peace, and stability in the eastern Mediterranean”.

Just hours after it became known that the parliament in Libya approved the Maritime Memorandum with turkey, the Greek Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting the approval decision for being “illegal”. Greece has rejected the Maritime Memorandum right from the beginning in 2019 and had also briefed its EU partners accordingly. Foreign Ministry Statement Greece […]

The post Greece rejects as “Illegal” Libya’s decision to approve Memorandum with Turkey appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

The post Haftar’s LNA Moves Closer to Turkey, Raising Stakes for Tripoli appeared first on South Front.

The European Union claims that "the fundamental right to freedom of expression" only applies to journalists "acting in good faith," and that authorities do not have to give due process before freezing people's bank accounts, as these sanctions are "temporary and are not criminal in nature," according to a legal letter shared by a sanctioned journalist.

Last year, the European Union blacklisted 21 people for allegedly spreading Russian propaganda, banning them from doing business in Europe. One of them, Hüseyin Doğru, was falsely listed as a Turkish citizen living in Istanbul. In fact, Doğru is a German journalist in Berlin, making him the first European citizen on European soil to be sanctioned this way.

It was like being sentenced to "civil death," Doğru told American journalist Chris Hedges. He was banned from holding a job in Europe or having a European bank account, and authorities have restricted Doğru to a €506 ($567) per month allowance from his own money. "The sanctions are designed for people outside of Europe, so they don't really know how that should function with me, because I'm a European citizen and I'm living in Europe," Doğru told Hedges.

Last month, the civil libertarian Wau Holland Foundation hired lawyers to contest the sanctions against Doğru. And earlier this month, the Council of the European Union sent a response letter, which Doğru shared on social media, promising to escalate the case to the E.U. General Court. Although the council conceded to Doğru that he is not a Turkish citizen living in Turkey, it still insisted on the authority to punish him for his speech.

The council quoted a 2022 court case between the Russian news outlet RT and several European countries: "The protection of the right of the media and, more particularly, of journalists to impart information on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide 'reliable and precise' information in accordance with the ethics of journalism."

Doğru's lawyers insisted that he should be treated as innocent until proven guilty. But the council responded that sanctions fall short of a criminal punishment, so any complaint about a "violation of the presumption of innocence is therefore unfounded." In other words, because he is not accused of a crime, Doğru has fewer rights than a criminal suspect.

"People need to understand sanctions are an extrajudicial measure. They're extrajudicial. There's no court. There is no hearing, no evidence, there is no sentence by the court, nothing," Doğru told Hedges. "When you're sanctioned, you are not informed….The day when I was sanctioned, me and my wife, my wife was pregnant back then, we went to the pharmacy to buy medicine for her, and her cards did not work."

The original blacklisting decision accuses Doğru of supporting "actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union" by spreading "false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience."

Doğru and his wife, British journalist Lizzie Phelan, previously worked at the Russian-funded publication Redfish. A few months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he split off to create a new website called red.media, insisting to The Left Berlin that "we are not Russian. We are not Kremlin. red.media is not funded by Russia or any other state." In the same interview, Doğru called Russia an "imperialist" regime.

But in September 2024, a Biden administration "fact sheet" on Russian propaganda offhandedly mentioned red.media, citing a hit piece on Doğru by the German newspaper Tagesspiegel. Doğru told Hedges that the U.S. fact sheet created a circular logic in German media: "They said red.media is Russian because [U.S. Secretary of State Antony] Blinken said so. But what they never said is that Blinken is referring to your articles where you never say it like that. You say there is a suspicion, it might be so."

Doğru shut down red.media in May 2025 due to the bad press. The European Union sanctioned him a few weeks later. Doğru's lawyer, Alexander Górski, told the Frankfurter Allgemeine earlier this year that the European Union didn't "even attempt to make an evidentiary case" about any ongoing connection to Russia.

The blacklisting decision also claimed that, during a pro-Palestinian student protest at Humboldt University in Berlin, red.media "coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism—which included the use of Hamas symbols." Doğru told Hedges that these accusations are an attack on journalists' freedom to do their jobs.

The European Union does not have the same protections for the freedom of the press as the U.S. Constitution. Earlier this year, the Curia of the European Union ruled that simply reposting clips from Russian media could be a violation of European sanctions, even if no money changes hands, something that is explicitly exempted from U.S. sanctions under the Berman Amendment.

Still, U.S. authorities have tried to push the limits of international sanctions to censor speech. The Biden administration told an American nonprofit that "the provision of a platform for [the sanctioned individuals] to speak" was illegal, backing down after the nonprofit sued.

And the Trump administration sanctioned Italian academic Francesca Albanese for her "lawfare" calling for the prosecution of Israeli leaders and a boycott of Israeli industries. In addition to freezing her bank accounts, the sanctions forced Columbia University researchers to cut off their relationship with Albanese, and Georgetown University to close her email account. 

In the same statement accusing red.stream of being a Russian front, the Biden administration announced sanctions on two Russian news agencies. "We encourage dissent, open debate, and free discourse. But we will not stand for attempts by state actors to carry out covert activities with the goal of hijacking that discourse," the statement insisted. "The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior."

The post The European Union Wants To Punish People for Their Speech—Without Even a Trial appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Libya’s parliament ⁠approved a maritime agreement ⁠with ​Turkey ⁠and ⁠revoked ‌a ⁠2020 ​boycott decision ‌on Tuesday, two ​members of ‌parliament told ​Reuters. The maritime delimitation accord was signed with non-neighboring Libya in 2019, Reuters reported on Tuesday. The Turkey-Libya maritime memorandum has been opposed by Greece and even the EU top diplomat has said that […]

The post Libya approves Maritime Memorandum with Turkey appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

VERSIONE IN ITALIANO

Over the past ten days, a great many extreme weather events have been recorded—from the USA to Europe, and from Asia to South America.

Is it truly all the fault of El Niño only?

Or does geoengineering—a subject to which Gospa News has devoted numerous investigations—play a role?

---

UPDATE on OCTOBER, 22, 2026

New Massive and Flash Flooding in the US even inside an Hospital

In the latest hours and days new massive floods are devastating some US states and North America. Four footages in one video below on ocober, 2026 events.

• 1st footage – Water Surges Through Endoscopy Recovery Bays in Austin Hospital in Texas
• 2nd footage – Flash flooding buried cars in debris on Tuesday in Clifton, Arizona.
• 3rd footage – Heavy rain inundated parts of West Texas on Thursday, part of a multi-day flood threat fueled by tropical moisture colliding with a massive cold front moving across the country.
• 4th – footage Millions in Electronics Drenched as a Massive Ceiling Flood Destroys a Toronto Showroom

Wild Weather across Europe. Devastation in Spain, UK, Italy, France and Portugal

The western Mediterranean is currently experiencing a period of extreme weather, characterized by torrential rain, flooding, and overflowing rivers across Europpe ande above all eastern Spain, southern France, and Italy. The situation is most critical along the Spanish coast, where Storm Adam has triggered exceptional rainfall, resulting in a heavy toll of casualties and displaced people.

The Valencian Community has been among the hardest-hit areas. In Pego, in the province of Alicante, 693 mm of rain was recorded over a 36-hour period.

As of October 20, the provisional toll stands at four fatalities, with over 2,100 people evacuated and hundreds of rescue operations carried out. Blocked roads, flooded homes, and vehicles swept away by the currents bear witness to the intensity of the event.

The severe weather is now also affecting southern France and Corsica. This Mediterranean weather system has primarily impacted the Languedoc region, with the departments of Hérault and Gard being of particular concern.

In the latest hours and days new massive floods are devastating some European countries. Below the footages from Spain, France, UK, Italy and Portugal in October, 2026

1st footage – Helicopters continue to rescue people trapped in Oliva (Valencia, Spain). The La Safor and La Marina Alta districts are the most severely affected.
2nd footage – An intense downpour hit El Palo, Málaga (Spain). The storm dumped nearly 60 liters per square meter in just 30 minutes, causing significant water accumulation on the streets.
3rd footage – Massive Flash Flood Turns a London Airport Baggage Hall Into a Raging River
4th footage – The famous giant waves of Nazaré are found at Praia do Norte, in the town of Nazaré, in the Western region of Portugal.

France

Italy

---

FIRST POSTED on OCTOBER, 20, 2026

Harsh Floods in Las Vegas, Newport and Long Beach

El Niño Alert: WMO and Peterson Institute Warn of Up to $986 Billion in Damages by 2027

The current El Niño event could have far-reaching economic and humanitarian consequences. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) predicts that the phenomenon will almost certainly persist until February 2027, while the Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that global losses in 2027 could reach nearly $986 billion if the event’s intensity matches that of 1997–98.

The WMO has issued warnings regarding potential impacts on temperatures and precipitation, noting an increased risk of heatwaves, droughts, and floods.

In its Global Seasonal Climate Update for the September–November 2026 quarter, the organization forecasts a likely rise in temperatures across Europe—particularly in central and southern regions—along with a higher probability of above-average rainfall in Southern Europe.

The repercussions will extend beyond the climate. An analysis by the World Food Programme, cited in the study, indicates that among 45 countries already facing food insecurity, an additional 49 million people could fall into a state of severe food insecurity by the end of 2027. The most significant effects are expected in parts of Central America and Southern Africa, with substantial impacts also anticipated in East Africa, as well as South and Southeast Asia.

HAARP DOSSIER – 10. Military “GEOMAGNETIC STORMS” from Alaska at 3,6 MegaWatts (as Energy from 12,000 Homes). Over the “foF2 Frequency” that can “Modeling SPACE WEATHER” with Dangerous Impacts on Earth, Clouds (US-EU Studies – Videos)

From an economic perspective, the outlook is concerning: the Peterson Institute warns that, in addition to the nearly $1 trillion in losses projected for 2027 alone, cumulative losses over the following five years could exceed $7.2 trillion in the absence of coordinated intervention.

These figures have reignited the debate regarding the international community’s preparedness and response capabilities.

Extreme weather events in Italy have risen from 60 in 2015 to 376 in 2025.

On the mornign of October 9, 2026, in Marsala (Sicily, Italy) , a double waterspout struck the Alcide De Gasperi school, where approximately 270 children were present.

The building has been rendered unusable; reports vary, but five or six children sustained minor injuries. In Petrosino, two people are in critical condition (classified as “red code”) after their car was forced off the road. This is not an isolated incident.

Around the same time, severe weather rendered a nursery school in Viareggio unusable, left a school bus stranded in floodwaters in Giugliano, and caused a lightning strike on a 17th-century church in Forio d’Ischia.

Extreme weather events recorded in Italy have increased from 60 in 2015 to 376 in 2025—a sixfold increase in ten years.

The estimated cost of damages for 2025 alone is 11.9 billion euros. A national adaptation plan was approved at the end of 2023; the observatory tasked with its implementation began its work in February 2026, yet, according to Legambiente, the necessary funding is still missing.

MAIN SOURCES

GOSPA NEWS – ITALIAN VERSION

GOSPA NEWS – CLIMATE GEOENGINEERING DOSSIER

---

RELATED POSTS AND VIDEOS

HAARP DOSSIER – 9. CYCLONES, LANDSLIDES and POLAR VORTEX after New SECRET U.S. MILITARY TESTS. Electromagnetic Bombing from Alaska Station Before Climate Disasters

The FURY of RING of FIRE STRUCK AGAIN! 7.7 Earthquakes in Panama after 7,2 in Peru (VIDEO). Wild Weather or Geoengineering Nightmares inside HAARP & HARP, US Pentagon partner?

WEATHER WARFARE & GEOENGINEERING HISTORY. From Operation Popeye to recente Devastating storm ‘Ditwah’ in Asia

---

 

Twelve migrants, including an infant, have died in two separate incidents involving boats travelling from Turkey towards the Greek islands of Lesbos and Samos, prompting investigations into the circumstances of the deaths and the activities of suspected people smugglers.

The incidents occurred on Monday, 19 October, in the northeastern Aegean Sea. Six people died when a speedboat collided with a Greek coastguard vessel near Lesbos, while another six were killed after a separate boat overturned north of Samos.

The deaths coincided with the publication of new figures from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, showing that irregular crossings into the EU fell by almost one-third during the first nine months of 2026.

According to the latest border monitoring figures, approximately 91,000 irregular crossings were detected between January and September, although the eastern Mediterranean remained the busiest migration route into the Union.

Two incidents under investigation

According to information released by the Greek authorities, the first fatal incident occurred near Agrilia on Lesbos when a speedboat carrying migrants struck a coastguard patrol vessel before overturning.

Six people died, while eight survivors were taken to hospital. The authorities subsequently arrested a 37-year-old Turkish national, identifying him as the suspected operator of the migrant boat.

Greece’s Maritime Affairs Minister Vassilis Kikilias said the available evidence indicated that the speedboat had struck the left side of the coastguard vessel. The precise circumstances remain under investigation.

In the second incident, approximately four nautical miles north of Samos, a boat reportedly overturned after making a sudden manoeuvre while being pursued by the coastguard.

Five men and one woman died, while 14 people were rescued. An Iranian national was arrested on suspicion of involvement in migrant smuggling.

The arrests do not establish criminal responsibility, and the circumstances surrounding both incidents remain subject to investigation.

Greek authorities have attributed the dangers of the crossings to trafficking networks operating between Turkey and the Aegean islands. The government has reiterated its policy of pursuing smugglers and restricting unauthorised maritime arrivals.

Fewer crossings, continued fatalities

Frontex recorded approximately 31,800 detections along the eastern Mediterranean route during the first nine months of this year, representing a decline of around 15 per cent compared with the equivalent period in 2025.

Across the European Union’s external borders, the agency reported an even larger reduction, with overall detections down by almost one-third.

The Central Mediterranean route experienced a particularly substantial fall, while the Western Mediterranean recorded an increase, reflecting changes in departure points and migration patterns.

These figures count detected border crossings rather than individual migrants and do not necessarily capture every unauthorised arrival.

The latest data also have to be considered alongside exceptional developments elsewhere on Europe’s borders. In July, large-scale movements through Spain’s Ceuta enclave created additional pressures on Spanish authorities and raised questions about the application of the EU’s new asylum arrangements.

The eastern Mediterranean figures encompass several routes, including crossings from Libya towards Crete, movements through the Aegean islands and arrivals across the land border with Turkey.

Consequently, the total recorded for the wider region should not be interpreted solely as the number of people arriving on the Greek islands.

Greece remains central to European border policy

Greece has occupied a central position in EU migration policy since the 2015–2016 crisis, when hundreds of thousands of people arrived from Turkey, many travelling onwards through the Balkans.

The subsequent EU–Turkey migration arrangements were intended to reduce unauthorised crossings and establish procedures for returning certain migrants who did not qualify for protection.

Athens has also faced persistent criticism from human rights organisations concerning allegations of unlawful returns at sea and land borders. Greek authorities deny operating an unlawful pushback policy and maintain that their border operations respect domestic and international law.

The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, which entered into application in 2026, has introduced common procedures for screening arrivals, processing asylum claims and managing people who do not have permission to remain.

Its implementation has placed greater emphasis on border identification, biometric registration and cooperation between national authorities and Frontex.

However, the two disasters demonstrate the continued risks associated with maritime crossings, even during a period of declining arrivals.

Investigators must now establish precisely how both boats overturned, whether criminal offences were committed and what occurred during the encounters with coastguard vessels.

The findings will be relevant not only to the prosecutions of those arrested, but also to continuing scrutiny of maritime enforcement along one of the European Union’s principal external borders.

Foreign Ministry condemns confrontation with the dual national as ‘disgraceful and unacceptable’; activists accuse the woman of bringing Israeli soldiers to Turkey on vacation

Trudy weakens to tropical storm after warnings of strong winds and heavy rain, while one person killed in Greece

In contrast to the quiet Atlantic hurricane season, there has been ongoing activity in the Pacific, with Trudy being the 22nd and latest named system. The category 2 hurricane remained roughly 100 miles (160km) south-west of the coast of Mexico, meaning the worst of the conditions stayed offshore. However, the US National Hurricane Center put coastal parts of the states of Jalisco, Michoacán and Colima under hurricane warnings, with sustained winds of up to 60-90mph forecast on Sunday.

Rainfall totals of 100-150mm were likely for these areas, prompting warnings of flooding and landslides. Warnings also covered the risk of a dangerous storm surge accompanied by damaging waves in areas of onshore winds across the coast of south-western Mexico. By Monday morning, Trudy had weakened and been downgraded to a tropical storm, with coastal warnings being lifted.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Javier Verdin/Reuters

© Photograph: Javier Verdin/Reuters

© Photograph: Javier Verdin/Reuters

The E-ZPT, an electric armored personnel carrier (APC) developed at military facilities under Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense, has entered service with the country’s army, the Ministry announced. The manufacturer—the Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKE)—has delivered three E-ZPT units to the Land Forces. The project envisions a total of 50 such vehicles entering service, […]

The European Union and Turkey are preparing high-level talks before the end of October in an attempt to revive negotiations over Cyprus, following an initiative by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.

Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides announced the planned meeting on 16 October during the European Council summit in Brussels, saying discussions would address both the resumption of negotiations over the island’s division and the possibility of improving relations between Ankara and the EU.

The initiative follows diplomatic contacts in New York involving Guterres, European institutional leaders and the Cypriot government. However, renewed differences over the conditions for negotiations have already cast doubt on whether the process can produce substantial progress.

On Sunday, 18 October, Christodoulides accused Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman of imposing preconditions before formal negotiations could resume, particularly concerning arrangements for a rotating presidency in a reunited Cyprus.

The disagreement underlines the difficulties facing an initiative intended to reconnect the UN peace process with the EU’s broader relationship with Turkey.

Brussels seeks a negotiating role

Christodoulides said the planned meeting between the EU and Turkey would examine how to establish the necessary conditions for negotiations to restart within the previously agreed UN framework.

He indicated that any improvement in EU–Turkey relations would be linked to progress over Cyprus.

The president’s announcement in Brussels follows months of diplomatic consultations involving the Commission, European Council and UN.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa have urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to support the renewed peace initiative.

Turkey’s relationship with the EU encompasses trade, customs cooperation, migration and regional security. Ankara remains an EU candidate country, although accession negotiations have been effectively stalled for years.

Cyprus remains one of the principal obstacles to any substantial improvement in that relationship.

The island has been divided since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974. The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, but EU law remains suspended in areas where its government does not exercise effective control.

The self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey.

Disagreement over political equality

The UN has traditionally sought a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Negotiations collapsed at Crans-Montana in Switzerland in 2017 amid unresolved disputes over security guarantees, political representation, territory and the presence of Turkish troops.

Erhürman, who became Turkish Cypriot leader in 2025, has expressed support for renewed negotiations within a federal framework. However, he wants assurances about political equality and the structure of future talks.

The latest dispute concerns whether the principle of a rotating presidency between the two communities should be accepted before negotiations resume.

Christodoulides rejected that demand on 18 October, arguing that substantive questions should be negotiated together rather than settled in advance.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership regards rotating executive power as an essential element of political equality, while the Greek Cypriot side objects to making agreement on that arrangement a prerequisite for restarting discussions.

The disagreement has emerged despite recent efforts by the United Nations to improve relations between the communities.

In a statement issued on 13 October, the UN confirmed that Christodoulides and Erhürman had met in Nicosia and agreed to continue discussions, including participation in bicommunal initiatives.

The two leaders subsequently attended a joint event in Pyla, although their public differences persisted.

Turkey’s position remains decisive

A Cyprus settlement would require agreement not only between the island’s communities but also on Turkey’s military presence and the system of security guarantees established at independence.

Ankara has long maintained that Turkish Cypriots require effective political equality and credible security arrangements.

Greek Cypriot leaders argue that the continuation of foreign intervention rights and Turkish military deployments would be incompatible with a fully sovereign and reunited state.

The EU cannot resolve those differences independently of the UN process, but it can influence the economic and institutional framework within which a settlement might operate.

A comprehensive agreement would affect property ownership, trade, customs arrangements, border administration and the application of European law throughout the island.

The European Commission has sought a greater role in supporting the UN-led peace process, reflecting Brussels’ interest in progress towards a settlement.

Negotiations face immediate test

The UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, has warned that the opportunity for renewed negotiations may be narrowing.

Disagreements over diplomatic representation, contacts with foreign missions and the status of Turkish Cypriot institutions have complicated relations between the two communities.

Christodoulides has also referred to a series of proposals intended to advance discussions, including the future of the fenced-off area of Varosha. Their full contents have not been publicly disclosed.

The proposed EU–Turkey meeting offers a separate diplomatic channel through which Brussels can assess Ankara’s willingness to support renewed negotiations.

No final date, detailed agenda or list of participants had been publicly confirmed by 18 October.

The immediate test will be whether the parties can agree on the basis for formal talks without attempting to settle disputed constitutional questions before negotiations begin.

ANKARA, Oct 18 (Reuters) – Turkey will take some of the diesel Russia is supplying to global markets under its agreement with US President Donald Trump, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said on...

In 2026, Turkey’s policy in Yemen shifted from exclusive neutrality and mediation efforts to “the brink” of military intervention against the government in Sanaa and the Ansar Allah movement, yet a range of geopolitical, legal and domestic political factors makes this scenario being fully put into practice unlikely. A Brief Retrospective of Turkish-Yemeni Relations Relations […]

Archaeologists said that they had found jars from a shipwreck as much as 4,700 years old, with black residue inside. Outside experts were skeptical but intrigued.

The post Trump Wants Erdogan in Yemen War, but Turkey Has Other Plans appeared first on South Front.

Belgium’s foreign minister has called on the EU to deepen its economic, trade, and defence ties with Turkey, amid concerns from Ankara that it risks being shut out of the bloc’s new rules on industrial supply chains and multi-billion euro defence procurement scheme. 

Speaking at a Turkey-EU business forum in Brussels on Tuesday (13 October), Belgian foreign minister Maxime Pévot said that European manufacturers were increasingly looking for reliable partners closer to home as they seek to reduce their reliance on Chinese inputs. 

“We should make values of its proximity, particularly in sectors where Europe needs to reduce strategic dependencies,” he added. 

“Our economic relationship should no longer be limited to buying and selling goods. We should also be developing, producing, and investing together,” he said. 

For his part, following talks with Ankara’s trade minister, Ömer Bolat, EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič told reporters that the two sides had agreed on reforms to Turkey’s import control system to make the system easier for EU exporters to use and a mutual recognition pact on trusted traders. 

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

The post Hijab Dispute Tests ‘One Nation, Two States’ Alliance Between Turkey and Azerbaijan appeared first on South Front.

Saudi Arabia is desperately trying to reverse its losses on the ground in the Yemeni conflict, while Houthi attacks reach its airports and threaten its oil trade. Yet the coalition Riyadh has assembled does not match the war it wants to fight. Washington is engaged in the conflict with Iran, Turkey excludes offensive deployments, and Pakistan draws the line at crossing into Yemen. The kingdom has foreign support, but the burden of recovering and holding territory still falls on its weakened Yemeni partners.

Retreat Before the Counteroffensive

By early October 2026, Riyadh was responding to a deteriorating military position. The Houthis’ September advance along Yemen’s western coast brought the loss of Mokha and strategic positions around Bab el-Mandeb. These setbacks exposed the weakness of Saudi-backed forces and strengthened the Houthis’ leverage over a shipping route increasingly important to Saudi oil exports.

The renewed Saudi–Houthi escalation began with the July 13, 2026, strike on Sanaa airport’s runway. Saudi aircraft sought to prevent an Iranian Mahan Air flight carrying a senior Houthi delegation from landing without coalition permission. The plane later landed in Hodeida after Omani mediation, but the Houthis retaliated against Abha airport and subsequently announced a blockade on Saudi shipping. The strike broke the relative calm established by the 2022 truce; September’s coastal offensive then turned the confrontation into a major territorial setback for Riyadh’s partners.

The retreat exposed divisions within the anti-Houthi camp. Saudi–Emirati cooperation had broken down, and the withdrawal of the UAE left command arrangements that Riyadh failed to replace effectively. The factions expected to carry the offensive remained divided and poorly prepared for a sustained campaign. Saudi airpower could not compensate for the absence of a coherent local force.

The cost is also being felt inside Saudi Arabia. The October 10, 2026, attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport killed 12 people and wounded 309, according to Saudi authorities, and temporarily suspended operations. Riyadh blamed the Houthis, who renewed their warning against using Saudi airports and airspace on October 11. Airport disruption, cancelled flights and attacks on oil facilities bring the economic consequences of the war directly into the kingdom. The Saudi air campaign has not secured its civilian infrastructure.

Operation Dawn of Yemen began on October 5, 2026, after Saudi-backed Yemeni leader Rashad al-Alimi announced military action the previous day. The immediate objective was to recover the coastal positions lost in September, alongside the Saudi-backed Yemeni government’s broader ambition to restore its authority over Houthi-held territory. On October 11, the coalition announced the destruction of 136 military targets in a large-scale operation. That tally says little about whether Saudi-backed units can hold territory, secure supply routes or reopen shipping lanes.

Houthi footage released October 10, 2026: Shawaz drone strikes on Saudi-backed forces in Kahbub and Al-Waziya, as presented by the movement’s military media

---

Why Taiz Matters

The counteroffensive has produced conflicting accounts of control on the coast. On October 9, 2026, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Yemen announced that Bab el-Mandeb and Mayun Island had been cleared of Houthi forces. The Houthis maintained that they still held those positions. Control of the waterway remains contested, despite Riyadh’s announcements of success.

Taiz adds another strain after the coastal setbacks. Pressure on its approaches threatens supply routes and forces Saudi-backed units to divide their effort between the inland front and the Red Sea coast. The Houthis can disrupt their opponents’ counteroffensive without winning every coastal engagement: sustained pressure inland prevents those opponents from concentrating their forces. Saudi airpower does not resolve the fragmentation of the Saudi-backed Yemeni forces expected to hold the ground.

Houthi military footage released October 10, 2026: the movement presents advances and the surrender of opposing fighters in Sami, As-Silw and Al-Mawasit, Taiz province. The fighting places further pressure on the ground forces on which Riyadh’s campaign depends

---

The Iran War Narrows Saudi Options

The US–Israeli war with Iran, which began in February 2026, has expanded the military demands on Washington. Regional deployments, shipping protection and operations against Iran compete with Saudi requests for a larger American role in Yemen. Riyadh cannot assume that American support will expand on its terms. Its dependence on outside assistance has grown at the same time as the regional war has made that assistance more conditional.

The Iran war compounds Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability. Disruption at Hormuz has increased Riyadh’s dependence on its westbound pipeline and Red Sea ports. Southbound cargoes from Yanbu must pass Bab el-Mandeb; northbound exports follow a different route. Moving crude across the peninsula bypasses Hormuz, but it does not remove the threat to shipping off Yemen.

Pressure at Bab el-Mandeb gives Iran an additional advantage while the Houthis gain territory and bargaining power of their own. Their overlapping interests put Riyadh under pressure on two fronts. A Washington–Tehran agreement would not automatically end the war in Yemen: the Houthis have their own territorial, political and economic demands.

Washington is already involved through military advisers, intelligence and targeting support. The issue is the extent of that involvement, not American neutrality. Earlier in October 2026, Trump rejected Saudi requests for direct strikes; after the Riyadh airport attack, he said the United States might join them. Riyadh still lacks a firm American commitment to the wider offensive. Its requests compete with Washington’s military operations and priorities in the Iran war.

Allies Draw Their Own Lines

Riyadh’s response is to widen its support network through the Mecca pact, signed with Turkey and Pakistan on August 7, 2026, and activated on October 5. But an agreement to defend Saudi Arabia is not an agreement to win its war in Yemen. Pakistan’s military presence and Turkey’s technical, intelligence and air-defense assistance address the kingdom’s security without supplying a joint ground campaign across the border.

The alliance has a secretary-general, retired Pakistani general Nauman Mahmood, but its detailed force-generation timetable, operational command arrangements, cost-sharing formula and mission duration remain unpublished. On October 8, 2026, Ankara excluded offensive operations while parliamentary ratification was pending. On October 9, Islamabad confirmed a substantial military presence in the kingdom but ruled out crossing into Yemen to attack the Houthis. Riyadh is obtaining defensive commitments, not a combined expeditionary army.

Pakistan’s decision-making has also shifted. In 2015, parliament unanimously rejected participation in the Yemen war while promising to defend Saudi territory and holy sites. In October 2026, reinforcement commitments are proceeding without a parliamentary vote. The government says it followed the necessary procedures. The political result is a narrower domestic debate over a commitment that could draw Pakistan further into the conflict.

Fewer political checks make deployments easier to authorize and harder to reconsider once costs and casualties accumulate. Pakistan’s own security pressures add another burden: the October 11, 2026, emergency in opposition-run Khyber Pakhtunkhwa coincides with its commitments to Saudi Arabia. Islamabad is extending support abroad while managing a deepening confrontation at home.

Saudi-led coalition footage, October 9, 2026: the coalition announces strikes on three Houthi missile launchers. The continuing attacks inside Saudi Arabia expose the limits of destroying individual launch sites

---

Defensive support can still sustain the offensive by freeing Saudi assets for use in Yemen. France’s support for the defense of Yanbu and Britain’s refueling assistance contribute to that effort. But none of this repairs the weakness of Riyadh’s Yemeni ground forces. Pakistan also has its border with Iran and its mediation role to consider, while Turkey keeps its commitment separate from offensive operations. Each partner sets limits according to its own interests.

Different Interests, No Shared Victory

Pakistan’s proposed $1.21 billion IMF disbursement awaits board approval. Turkey’s September 2026 inflation was 29.73%, with its policy rate at 37%. Both face financial pressures that favor limited missions over an open-ended expedition. Who pays for the current assistance remains undisclosed.

Saudi Arabia’s updated deficit forecast is 4.9% of GDP. September 2026’s non-oil purchasing managers’ index stood at 55.3, indicating expansion before the latest escalation. The airport attacks and disruption to transport now place that activity under additional pressure. Riyadh must finance the campaign while protecting the infrastructure and trade on which its wider economic plans depend.

The Houthis are using that pressure to advance their negotiating demands. On October 10, 2026, the Houthi authorities proposed reciprocal exclusion of airports, ports and other humanitarian infrastructure from blockade and attack. The proposal seeks to exchange limits on disruption for concessions over access and blockade. It puts the economic consequences of continued fighting at the center of the bargaining.

The conflict of interests runs through the entire coalition. Riyadh wants to reverse Houthi gains and protect Saudi infrastructure. The Saudi-backed Yemeni government wants to restore its authority. Turkey and Pakistan seek bounded commitments, and Washington calculates its involvement against the Iran war. The Houthis seek concessions while preserving their military leverage. A common adversary has not produced an agreed objective or a shared willingness to bear the cost.

Saudi Arabia therefore has partners willing to help defend the kingdom, but those partners have made no common commitment to reverse Riyadh’s setbacks in Yemen or sustain the ground campaign of the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. That is the gap behind the coalition’s announcements and strike tallies. Without stronger local forces and a political settlement addressing shipping, attacks and access, additional foreign support can prolong the campaign without resolving it. Riyadh risks remaining surrounded by allies while carrying a war none of them has agreed to finish.

---

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Houthis Claim Key Taiz District as Pressure Tightens on Provincial Capital (Videos)
• Military Situation In Yemen On October 11, 2026 (Map Update)
• Houthis Strike Riyadh Airport Again, Claim Hits on Saudi Oil and Gas Facilities (Videos)

The post Saudi Arabia Has Allies. But Who Will Fight Its War in Yemen? appeared first on South Front.