Germany appears to have dropped plans to directly procure the larger, Block 3 version of Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), leaving doubts over Berlin’s ambitions to field uncrewed combat aircraft alongside its crewed fighters before the end of the decade.

Boeing confirmed to Breaking Defense that Germany’s Ministry of Defense had informed the company it would not proceed with a direct acquisition of the drone, which had previously been lined up. The decision, first reported by Politico, represents a setback for Boeing’s effort to position the Ghost Bat as a candidate for Berlin’s planned CCA capability, something that had seen it announce a partnership with Rheinmetall, the largest arms manufacturer in Germany, earlier this year.

NEW: Germany has formally scrapped plans to buy the Ghost Bat combat drones directly from Australia, documents show.

Its air force wanted them by 2029. Now it faces a longer wait.

Behind the decision is a much bigger political dilemma facing Germany as it races to rearm. pic.twitter.com/2fWHPoQOl0

— Chris Lunday (@lundayfunday) October 15, 2026

“With Boeing Defense Australia as a partner, we are laying the groundwork to optimally tailor the MQ-28 to the Bundeswehr’s requirements,” said Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall AG, in March of this year. “As a system integrator, we ensure that integration, operation, and further development come from a single source while simultaneously strengthening industrial value creation in the form of an industrial hub in Germany and Europe. We see revenue potential for Rheinmetall in the range of three-digit millions of euros.”

#Rheinmetall and #Boeing partner on German MQ-28 #Ghost #Bat
https://t.co/zGEhjQNqqi pic.twitter.com/VLBDQ8EAaV

— Rheinmetall (@RheinmetallAG) March 31, 2026

The move does not necessarily mean the MQ-28 is out of contention for Germany’s wider program. Instead, Berlin appears set to move toward a different acquisition approach, with competing designs potentially having an opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities before a selection is made.

A Boeing spokesperson told Breaking Defense the company “stands ready to support” its German customer on the next steps, while referring questions about the decision to the German Ministry of Defense.

The ministry declined to discuss the specific procurement with the same outlet, citing regulations governing public contracting and the need for such matters to be addressed by parliament.

“[As a] matter of principle — and regardless of the specific case in question — we cannot provide information regarding potential procurement projects,” a ministry spokesperson told Breaking Defense.

Germany has set an ambitious goal of fielding CCAs by 2029. These uncrewed aircraft are intended to operate alongside crewed fighters such as the Eurofighter, extending their reach, adding sensors and weapons, and giving air forces additional options for conducting high-risk missions.

However, the reported change in Berlin’s acquisition plans raises questions about whether that deadline remains achievable.

According to Politico, Germany is now looking toward the early 2030s for the capability to arrive, with flight testing expected to begin in 2027. That would suggest the original target was based around the introduction of the MQ-28, which has already undergone extensive testing, rather than a newer design. The reshuffle could now give prospective suppliers additional time to demonstrate their designs.

The reported new timeline suggests that Germany’s CCA effort could be entering a more competitive and potentially longer development phase.

There is also a question about the degree of operational capability that will initially be fielded by the given date. Getting a CCA into meaningful frontline service is a very significant task, calling for integration with crewed fighters, communications systems, mission-planning networks, weapons, and sensors. Then there is also testing, certification, training, and the establishment of supporting infrastructure. For Germany in particular, getting a military drone, let alone an armed one, cleared to operate routinely in commercial airspace has long been an issue.

If Germany acquired the Ghost Bat directly, it would have offered a route to a CCA capability without having to begin an entirely new aircraft development effort.

However, the MQ-28 was always one of a larger field of candidate aircraft.

A week ago, Airbus and Kratos Defense & Security Solutions announced the first flight of their U740 Valkyrie uncrewed combat aircraft, a Europeanized version of the XQ-58A Valkyrie. Airbus is simultaneously working on its larger U760 Ravenstorm, intended for service in the early 2030s, and the company has previously pitched a stealthy CCA-like concept known as Wingman.

The ride of the Valkyrie
With the successful first flight of the Airbus U740 Valkyrie in Europe, we are one step closer to introducing an operational uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to the German and other European Armed Forces.
The flight achieved all… pic.twitter.com/S2sFrtdmGA

— Airbus Defence (@AirbusDefence) October 12, 2026

Other entrants include Anduril, General Atomics partnered with Germany’s INTEC, as well as Lockheed Martin. Meanwhile, Helsing and Hensoldt are pursuing the homegrown CA-1 Europa, very much an MQ-28 lookalike.

Germany may not be looking for a single drone to do everything, a point we have discussed in the past:

“One option might be a split high-low approach that could pair more capable, longer-range systems for deep-strike missions with cheaper, attritable collaborative combat aircraft that can fly alongside crewed fighters. At this point, it should also be noted that CCAs could also give older fourth-generation fighters a new lease on life, boosting their lethality and survivability by extending their sensor reach, adding weapons capacity, and allowing uncrewed aircraft to take on more dangerous tasks.”

At the same time, Germany continues to define its requirements for a capability described in media reports as a Jagdbomberdrohne, or fighter-bomber drone. Berlin has yet to publicly clarify its intended concept of CCA operations, including whether the Luftwaffe envisions an uncrewed wingman operating alongside crewed fighters, a platform capable of carrying out long-range strike missions independently, or a system designed to perform both roles.

There are signs that the strike mission is being prioritized, at least initially, with a reduced emphasis on air-to-air missions. This is essentially the reverse of the U.S. Air Force’s CCA effort.

Since Germany is set to receive the F-35 stealth fighter, there is also an argument that Berlin could place more orders for the crewed jet. This could have the dual role of filling the gap left by the collapse of the pan-European Future Combat Air System (FCAS), specifically its sixth-generation crewed fighter, and the delayed introduction of the first operational CCAs. Germany is also looking forward to receiving more Eurofighters.

Germany’s evolving CCA plans form part of a broader effort by Western air forces to develop uncrewed aircraft capable of working alongside advanced fighters. These systems are intended to expand the number of available platforms, distribute sensors and weapons across a larger force, and potentially take on missions that would otherwise expose pilots and expensive crewed aircraft to greater risk.

Boeing’s Ghost Bat could still have an opportunity to compete, depending on the structure of the eventual acquisition process and the requirements Berlin establishes.

However, with testing reportedly planned from 2027 and operational fielding potentially slipping into the early 2030s, the original 2029 ambition for an operational German CCA appears increasingly uncertain.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Germany Drops Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat Rapid Procurement Plan appeared first on TWZ.

The European Union claims that "the fundamental right to freedom of expression" only applies to journalists "acting in good faith," and that authorities do not have to give due process before freezing people's bank accounts, as these sanctions are "temporary and are not criminal in nature," according to a legal letter shared by a sanctioned journalist.

Last year, the European Union blacklisted 21 people for allegedly spreading Russian propaganda, banning them from doing business in Europe. One of them, Hüseyin Doğru, was falsely listed as a Turkish citizen living in Istanbul. In fact, Doğru is a German journalist in Berlin, making him the first European citizen on European soil to be sanctioned this way.

It was like being sentenced to "civil death," Doğru told American journalist Chris Hedges. He was banned from holding a job in Europe or having a European bank account, and authorities have restricted Doğru to a €506 ($567) per month allowance from his own money. "The sanctions are designed for people outside of Europe, so they don't really know how that should function with me, because I'm a European citizen and I'm living in Europe," Doğru told Hedges.

Last month, the civil libertarian Wau Holland Foundation hired lawyers to contest the sanctions against Doğru. And earlier this month, the Council of the European Union sent a response letter, which Doğru shared on social media, promising to escalate the case to the E.U. General Court. Although the council conceded to Doğru that he is not a Turkish citizen living in Turkey, it still insisted on the authority to punish him for his speech.

The council quoted a 2022 court case between the Russian news outlet RT and several European countries: "The protection of the right of the media and, more particularly, of journalists to impart information on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide 'reliable and precise' information in accordance with the ethics of journalism."

Doğru's lawyers insisted that he should be treated as innocent until proven guilty. But the council responded that sanctions fall short of a criminal punishment, so any complaint about a "violation of the presumption of innocence is therefore unfounded." In other words, because he is not accused of a crime, Doğru has fewer rights than a criminal suspect.

"People need to understand sanctions are an extrajudicial measure. They're extrajudicial. There's no court. There is no hearing, no evidence, there is no sentence by the court, nothing," Doğru told Hedges. "When you're sanctioned, you are not informed….The day when I was sanctioned, me and my wife, my wife was pregnant back then, we went to the pharmacy to buy medicine for her, and her cards did not work."

The original blacklisting decision accuses Doğru of supporting "actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union" by spreading "false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience."

Doğru and his wife, British journalist Lizzie Phelan, previously worked at the Russian-funded publication Redfish. A few months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he split off to create a new website called red.media, insisting to The Left Berlin that "we are not Russian. We are not Kremlin. red.media is not funded by Russia or any other state." In the same interview, Doğru called Russia an "imperialist" regime.

But in September 2024, a Biden administration "fact sheet" on Russian propaganda offhandedly mentioned red.media, citing a hit piece on Doğru by the German newspaper Tagesspiegel. Doğru told Hedges that the U.S. fact sheet created a circular logic in German media: "They said red.media is Russian because [U.S. Secretary of State Antony] Blinken said so. But what they never said is that Blinken is referring to your articles where you never say it like that. You say there is a suspicion, it might be so."

Doğru shut down red.media in May 2025 due to the bad press. The European Union sanctioned him a few weeks later. Doğru's lawyer, Alexander Górski, told the Frankfurter Allgemeine earlier this year that the European Union didn't "even attempt to make an evidentiary case" about any ongoing connection to Russia.

The blacklisting decision also claimed that, during a pro-Palestinian student protest at Humboldt University in Berlin, red.media "coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism—which included the use of Hamas symbols." Doğru told Hedges that these accusations are an attack on journalists' freedom to do their jobs.

The European Union does not have the same protections for the freedom of the press as the U.S. Constitution. Earlier this year, the Curia of the European Union ruled that simply reposting clips from Russian media could be a violation of European sanctions, even if no money changes hands, something that is explicitly exempted from U.S. sanctions under the Berman Amendment.

Still, U.S. authorities have tried to push the limits of international sanctions to censor speech. The Biden administration told an American nonprofit that "the provision of a platform for [the sanctioned individuals] to speak" was illegal, backing down after the nonprofit sued.

And the Trump administration sanctioned Italian academic Francesca Albanese for her "lawfare" calling for the prosecution of Israeli leaders and a boycott of Israeli industries. In addition to freezing her bank accounts, the sanctions forced Columbia University researchers to cut off their relationship with Albanese, and Georgetown University to close her email account. 

In the same statement accusing red.stream of being a Russian front, the Biden administration announced sanctions on two Russian news agencies. "We encourage dissent, open debate, and free discourse. But we will not stand for attempts by state actors to carry out covert activities with the goal of hijacking that discourse," the statement insisted. "The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior."

The post The European Union Wants To Punish People for Their Speech—Without Even a Trial appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The turmoil shows the profound challenges facing governments stuck between unhappy citizens and wary bond investors.

© Abdul Saboor/Reuters

In a video uploaded by German content creator Johanna Pauline Steiner, who is a solo travel influencer and model, she repeatedly asked a foreign man to stop following her in an indoor public space in Munich. Steiner quickly lost her temper as the man relentlessly followed her.

During the clip, Steiner, who also describes herself as an actress and yoga teacher, declined an invitation to talk with the foreign man and said she is busy and has to work. When he persists and keeps following her, she tells him multiple times, “Please stop following me.”

Near the end of the footage she says, “F*ck… Oh God, now I have no idea which direction I need to go.”

"F*ck, oh God… Can you please stop following me? Thank you." Johanna Pauline Steiner, a German solo traveler, influencer and model, was sexually harassed by a migrant man in Munich. Remarkably, she wrote on her video that she gets asked: "Are you afraid to travel alone as a woman?" She responded with this video: "Why does it matter where you are? Unfortunately, you get harassed everywhere." She celebrates feminism on her channel, which she says allows her to travel and live alone. Follow: @RMXnews

— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) October 20, 2026

Steiner posted two versions of the video, including one where she wrote on text overlaid on the video: “Are you afraid to travel alone as a woman? Why does it matter where you are? Unfortunately, you get harassed everywhere.”

In the video description, she further wrote: “It just occurred to me that I’m trying to play off this very serious topic with a joke. But somehow, whenever this question is asked, or whenever I’m told that it’s so dangerous when you go to this country, that exact sentence comes to mind. It’s not about different countries or cultures. Unfortunately, people with bad intentions exist everywhere.”

Germany has 68,000 female genital mutilation victims and migration is to blame: German family minister

Steiner does not appear to connect the fact that, even in Germany, she is being confronted by a man who is in the country as a guest, presumably through mass migration.

The threats facing women in countries outside Europe have been well-documented, yet many of these same women support mass immigration from countries where women are at risk of sexual violence and harassment at a far higher level than in Europe.

While many women continue to promote solo travel, there have been troubling incidents and footage over the years.

“Do you like to have sex?” A man from Kyrgyzstan sexually harassed a German travel influencer, Valerie Kraus, who was traveling solo in the country. When he demanded they go to his yurt, she responded, “You said sex, I said no.” He asked her if she had a husband and if her tent “sleeps 1 person or 2.” “I’m so glad I filmed this. It just shows the reality sometimes,” she said afterwards. In Muslim countries, Western women traveling solo can face harassment, and in some cases, it has also led to sexual assault. The Instagram user “journeyious” noted that Instagram removed her video when she first posted it for reasons that were never explained. She subsequently reposted the encounter. Follow: @RMXnews

— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) October 11, 2026

"What do you want, you dirty whore?!" Famed Korean streamer "Jinnytty" was brutally attacked by a man reportedly of North African origin on the streets of Toulouse. The Korean streamer has 1.1 million Twitch followers, and is one of the biggest streamers in South Korea. She had a rude welcome to multicultural France, where you can be attacked randomly on the streets at nearly all times. She likes to travel the world, sharing her adventures with her very large community, but in this case, she got punched in the face. This was broadcast live to thousands of Koreans.

— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) May 9, 2025

A Portuguese tourist, Ines Faria, was harassed in Mumbai, India. The video shows her being followed by 2 men for over 15 minutes, who insist on selfies. The video went viral and the two men were reportedly arrested via facial recognition. https://t.co/9Qj8N7nCyb

— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) March 10, 2026

Steiner has also expressed support for feminism in other videos for enabling her to travel and live alone. However, even within Germany, the importation of foreign cultures has led to incredibly anti-feminist policies, including forced marriage and female genital mutilation. These concepts are entirely foreign to German culture and exclusively practiced by migrants who have moved to Germany.

Germany: 358 recorded child marriages since 2012, including an 11-year-old Iraqi girl

The post German solo travel influencer sexually harassed in Munich, claims the incident proves women can be harassed anywhere and ‘it’s not about different countries or cultures’ appeared first on Remix News.

A 21-year-old German Erasmus student reported being raped by two men in the early hours of Oct. 15 while walking home from a night out in the NoLo neighborhood, police said. She told police she believed the men were likely North African.

The woman told investigators that she was attacked from behind near Parco Trotter, around the intersection of Via Crespi and Via Giacosa, shortly before 5:00 a.m. She said the men restrained her, prevented her from screaming or escaping, and assaulted her in a secluded spot before fleeing.

“He attacked me from behind and knocked me to the ground. Then he took off my pants,” said the victim.

Italy: German woman found beheaded near Florence, North African suspect arrested

An Italian couple visiting the city on vacation encountered her distressed and in shock. She told them in English that two men had attacked her from behind and raped her. The pair called emergency services. Carabinieri and medical responders arrived, noted bruising, and took her first to a hospital and then to the Mangiagalli clinic, which specializes in sexual-violence cases. She received medical examinations and psychological support.

The student, in Milan through the European Erasmus exchange program, had spent the evening in a local club before heading toward her student housing. According to Italian news outlet Il Giornale, she may have crossed paths with one of the men earlier that night.

After the rape, her parents arrived from Germany.

‘Maybe I was raped’ – Italian police open investigation after 17-year-old German tourist woke up in Turkish man’s bed with no memory

Investigators are reviewing public and private surveillance footage from the area, which captured two male figures near the scene around the time of the reported assault, along with cell-phone data and other technical evidence.

No suspects have been publicly identified or arrested. One Italian newspaper, Il Giorno MIlano, described an attacker pulling down her pants after throwing her to the ground and then briefly pretending to comfort her when passersby appeared nearby.

‘This is the first femicide our city has seen’ – Tunisian migrant arrested for stabbing his Polish wife 4 times in the throat near Rome

Descriptions varied slightly across reports, including references to olive skin and an age range of roughly 30 to 40 for one man.

Remix News has covered a number of stories involving German tourists being victimized in Italy by Middle-Eastern males over the last year, including a 17-year-old German student who said she was raped by a Turkish man just last month. In addition, a German woman was beheaded near Florence earlier this year, with Italian police arresting a North African suspect.

The post ‘He attacked me from behind’ – 21-year-old German student allegedly raped by 2 North African men in Italy appeared first on Remix News.

Deutschland steht vor einer sicherheitspolitischen Frage, die weit über den Krieg in der Ukraine hinausreicht: Wie viel militärische Stärke braucht das Land – und welches politische Ziel soll mit dieser Stärke eigentlich verfolgt werden?

Der frühere Brigadegeneral und langjährige militärpolitische Berater Angela Merkels, Erich Vad, stellt dabei eine Position zur Diskussion, die in Berlin inzwischen beinahe ungewöhnlich klingt. Er bestreitet nicht die Notwendigkeit von Verteidigungsfähigkeit. Im Gegenteil. Aber er warnt davor, Aufrüstung mit einer Politik dauerhafter Konfrontation gegenüber Russland gleichzusetzen. Deutschlands Interesse, so seine Argumentation, müsse vor allem darin bestehen, einen großen Krieg in Europa zu verhindern und deshalb die politischen Gesprächskanäle nach Moskau wieder ernsthaft zu öffnen.

Gerade dieser Unterschied ist entscheidend. Ein Staat kann militärisch stark sein und dennoch Diplomatie betreiben. Er kann seine Verteidigungsfähigkeit erhöhen, ohne daraus die politische Doktrin abzuleiten, dass Sicherheit nur noch gegen einen bestimmten Gegner organisiert werden könne. Genau darin liegt der Kern der von Vad geforderten Neuorientierung: Deutschland müsse seine eigenen Interessen definieren, statt sich immer tiefer in eine Eskalationslogik hineinziehen zu lassen, deren Endpunkt niemand seriös benennen kann.

Vad verweist dabei ausdrücklich auf deutsche historische Erfahrungen. Das ist keineswegs nostalgische Rückschau. Konrad Adenauer war alles andere als ein russlandfreundlicher Romantiker. Er band die junge Bundesrepublik fest an den Westen, setzte auf NATO-Mitgliedschaft und transatlantische Partnerschaft. Und dennoch reiste derselbe Adenauer 1955 nach Moskau. Die Verhandlungen waren hart, die politischen Gegensätze fundamental, und doch nahmen die Bundesrepublik und die Sowjetunion diplomatische Beziehungen auf. Zugleich erreichte die deutsche Delegation die Zusage zur Heimkehr Tausender noch in sowjetischem Gewahrsam befindlicher Deutscher.

Gerade dieser Vorgang zeigt, wie verkürzt die heutige Vorstellung ist, Dialog sei automatisch ein Zeichen von Schwäche.

Adenauer hatte wenige Monate zuvor die Westbindung der Bundesrepublik institutionell gefestigt. Trotzdem behandelte er den Gesprächskanal nach Moskau nicht als Verrat am eigenen Bündnis, sondern als Teil verantwortlicher deutscher Außenpolitik. Stärke und Verständigung waren für ihn keine Gegensätze.

Noch deutlicher wurde diese Logik später unter Willy Brandt. Die neue Ostpolitik entstand nicht aus der Illusion, alle Konflikte mit der Sowjetunion seien verschwunden. Sie entstand gerade deshalb, weil sie existierten. Brandt und Egon Bahr gingen davon aus, dass dauerhafte Blockkonfrontation Europa nicht sicherer machte und dass Veränderung nur durch Kontakte, Verhandlungen und schrittweise Entspannung möglich war. Die Bundesregierung setzte auf Gewaltverzicht, geregelte Beziehungen und politische Kommunikation über die Blockgrenzen hinweg. Der Bundestag erinnert bis heute daran, dass die Ostpolitik ausdrücklich darauf zielte, die starre Konfrontation zwischen Ost und West aufzubrechen.

Man muss diese Politik nicht idealisieren, um ihre strategische Bedeutung zu erkennen. Weder Adenauer noch Brandt bauten ihre Außenpolitik auf Vertrauen im naiven Sinn. Sie handelten aus Interessen. Sie wussten, dass Deutschland geografisch in der Mitte Europas lag und dass eine stabile Friedensordnung auf diesem Kontinent nicht allein durch militärische Abschreckung geschaffen werden konnte.

Genau hier setzt Vads Kritik am heutigen Kurs an. Dass Außenminister Johann Wadephul erklärt, Deutschland sei grundsätzlich weiterhin offen für Gespräche mit Russland, reicht aus seiner Sicht nicht. Das jüngste Treffen Wadephuls mit Sergej Lawrow bezeichnete er als eine Art widerwillige Pflichtübung. Formale Gesprächsbereitschaft ersetzt eben keine Diplomatie, wenn beide Seiten im Grunde nur noch ihre bekannten Positionen vortragen und anschließend auseinandergehen.

Das Problem ist größer. In Deutschland hat sich seit Beginn des Ukraine-Krieges ein politisches Verständnis etabliert, in dem militärische Stärke und politische Härte immer stärker miteinander verschmelzen. Wer mehr Verteidigungsfähigkeit fordert, landet fast automatisch bei der Forderung nach noch härterer Konfrontation mit Moskau. Wer für Verhandlungen plädiert, gerät umgekehrt schnell unter Rechtfertigungsdruck, als müsse Diplomatie zwangsläufig Kapitulation bedeuten.

Historisch war deutsche Außenpolitik gerade dann erfolgreich, wenn sie solche falschen Gegensätze vermied. Adenauer konnte NATO-Kanzler sein und nach Moskau fahren. Brandt konnte fest im westlichen Bündnis verankert bleiben und gleichzeitig eine Politik der Entspannung beginnen. Das eine schloss das andere nicht aus.

Auch heute müsste eine eigenständigere deutsche Politik nicht bedeuten, auf Verteidigungsfähigkeit zu verzichten. Vad fordert das ausdrücklich nicht. Sein Argument ist vielmehr, dass Aufrüstung ohne politische Strategie am Ende selbst zum Risiko werden kann. Wenn jede Seite nur noch militärisch denkt, jede Bewegung des Gegners als Vorbereitung auf den nächsten Angriff interpretiert und Gesprächskanäle verkümmern lässt, entsteht Sicherheit irgendwann nur noch auf dem Papier.

Deutschland hat dabei besondere Interessen. Ein großer europäischer Krieg würde nicht in Washington geführt. Wie Vad zugespitzt formuliert, würde in den Vereinigten Staaten dabei keine Fensterscheibe zu Bruch gehen. Deutschland dagegen läge mitten im Zentrum einer solchen Eskalation. Es wäre logistischer Knotenpunkt, wirtschaftlicher Hauptbetroffener und im Ernstfall selbst Kriegsschauplatz. Genau deshalb müsste Berlin ein größeres Interesse an Deeskalation haben als weit entfernte Mächte, die ihre eigenen geopolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Ziele verfolgen.

Das bedeutet auch, die amerikanische Politik nüchtern zu betrachten. Vad beschreibt Trumps Außenpolitik als „doppelzüngig“ und weist darauf hin, dass Washington keineswegs ausschließlich das Ende des Krieges im Blick habe. Die USA verfolgen gegenüber Russland, China und der Ukraine eigene strategische und wirtschaftliche Interessen. Für eine deutsche Politik wäre es daher fahrlässig, die eigenen Sicherheitsinteressen einfach mit denen Washingtons gleichzusetzen.

Die eigentliche Frage lautet deshalb nicht, ob Deutschland stark oder schwach sein soll. Natürlich braucht ein souveräner Staat Streitkräfte, die zur Verteidigung fähig sind. Die Frage lautet vielmehr, wofür diese Stärke eingesetzt wird.

Dient sie dazu, politische Handlungsspielräume zu schaffen und aus einer Position der Sicherheit heraus wieder verhandeln zu können? Oder wird sie selbst zum Ersatz für Politik?

Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik liefert zumindest genügend Beispiele dafür, dass militärische Einbindung in den Westen und Verständigung mit Moskau gleichzeitig möglich waren.

Gerade verantwortliche deutsche Politiker des Kalten Krieges wussten, dass man sich seine Gesprächspartner nicht aussuchen kann. Diplomatie beginnt nicht dort, wo ohnehin Einigkeit herrscht. Sie wird dort notwendig, wo Interessen aufeinanderprallen.

Eine künftige europäische Sicherheitsordnung wird deshalb auf Dauer kaum stabil sein, wenn sie ausschließlich auf Abschreckung und gegenseitiger Isolation beruht. Sie muss die Sicherheitsinteressen aller beteiligten Staaten berücksichtigen, ohne deren politische Systeme oder Entscheidungen deshalb gutzuheißen.

Das wäre keine Rückkehr zu irgendeiner romantisierten Vergangenheit und auch kein Verzicht auf deutsche Stärke. Es wäre vielmehr die Rückkehr zu einem Prinzip, das Adenauer, Brandt und andere deutsche Staatsmänner in sehr unterschiedlichen historischen Situationen verstanden haben: Sicherheit in Europa entsteht langfristig nicht dadurch, dass man Russland aus Europa hinausdefiniert.

Sie entsteht durch eine Ordnung, in der Verteidigungsfähigkeit und Diplomatie einander ergänzen – und in der Sicherheit gemeinsam organisiert wird, nicht dauerhaft gegeneinander.

Europe is supposed to be financing its defence together. It barely is.

Of the €800bn announced under ReArm Europe in March 2025, €650bn is not common money. It is an estimate of the extra room governments get under the national escape clause to spend up to 1.5 percent of GDP more on defence for four years.

Each country still pays for that spending itself.

The room is also temporary: EU Commission simulations suggest that maintaining higher defence spending after 2028 could require additional annual fiscal adjustment of 0.25 to 0.4 percentage points of GDP from 2029.

The other €150bn is SAFE, and it is loans, not grants.

The EU borrows and lends the money on, and each country repays its share. Grants are small: €1.5bn from the European Defence Industry Programme for 2025-2027, plus the European Defence Fund for joint research.

Not every country has used these tools, as Table 1 shows. The Netherlands and Sweden have used neither. Like Germany, which has taken only the clause, they can borrow at least as cheaply as the EU, so SAFE gets them nothing.

France has taken SAFE but not the clause, to protect the credibility of its budget plans.

Table 1. Who uses SAFE and the national escape clause

Source: Council of the EU, European Commission. Data as of 17 October 2026. * Hungary: allocated €16.2bn, now requesting €5.4bn; still pending. ** Italy: the Commission backed its request on 8 October 2026; the Council has yet to decide.

Where SAFE does matter is on the eastern flank. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia can borrow the equivalent of five to eight percent of their GDP, and Poland almost five percent.

Graph 1. SAFE loans as a share of GDP, by country (%)

Source: Council of the EU, European Commission, Eurostat. SAFE loans only, as a share of 2025 GDP. Amounts approved by the Council, except Italy and Hungary (* revised requests of €8bn and €5.4bn, September 2026). Data as of 17 October 2026.

That leaves private money.

The European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund are trying to bring in private investors, partly by removing the reputational stigma of financing defence.

But defence is almost a monopsony: the state is nearly the only buyer. Without a clear flow of public orders, private investment will be hard to come by.

So Europe barely borrows together. And it buys alone.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

The tractors rolling into the town of Gela on the southern tip of Europe are flying the Sicilian flag, emblazoned with Medusa, three bent legs and ears of wheat, a reminder of the island’s role as a breadbasket since Roman times.

But the farmers are not bringing in a harvest. They are protesting.

As soaring fuel prices squeeze household budgets and businesses across Europe, cost-of-living pressures are driving unrest and giving fresh momentum to far-right parties ahead of elections next year in countries including France, Italy and Poland.

Parties once considered fringe had already been gaining ground, with voters from motorists in rural France to young men in Germany’s former Communist east looking for alternatives.

The US-Iran war, which erupted in February and sent energy prices sharply higher, has compounded the challenge for governments already struggling to contain inflation, support growth and rein in spending.

The discontent has spilled onto the streets.

In France, demonstrations that began over deteriorating school facilities in Paris’ northern suburbs have morphed into some of the country’s worst unrest in decades, with shops looted, buildings torched and a 19th-century town hall in Limoges set on fire.

“Why am I here? Well, quite simply, I find the current cost of living truly terrifying,” said Quentin Leviloux, a 21-year-old protester in Nantes.

“Just think of people who earn barely the minimum wage, when you look at the cost of food, fuel, and everything else. It’s terrifying how incredibly expensive things have become.”

The European Commission estimates the Iran conflict has cost Europe roughly €100 billion ($112 billion) through disrupted trade and energy markets. Gas prices have jumped about 140% and diesel prices have doubled.

In a weekend address, French President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged the “legitimate demands” of protesters angered by rising living and fuel costs, while condemning those responsible for violence and looting. “We must never confuse them with those who destroyed, vandalised and looted,” he said.

Cost-of-living protests spread across Europe

Violence has also erupted elsewhere. In the wealthy northern Italian city of Milan, police clashed on Sunday with protesters hurling stones and looting stores during demonstrations over poor public services and rising living costs.

In Gela, on Sicily’s southern coast, farmers say fuel costs have made operating machinery prohibitively expensive. “We cultivate the land, we harvest debts,” said one banner.

“We are completely at a standstill,” said Arcangelo Gambino, a farmers’ representative in Caltanissetta province. “The (fuel) cost has more than doubled.”

Roadblocks by truckers, farmers and steelworkers have disrupted transport across parts of southern Italy, contributing to local fuel shortages and concerns over supermarket supplies.

Tens of thousands marched through Lisbon on Saturday over low wages, housing costs and the rising cost of living, increasing pressure on Portugal’s centre-right government.

In Spain, the eviction of an 87-year-old woman from her home sparked nationwide demonstrations over housing shortages and soaring rents, helping trigger a snap election next month.

Belgium has also seen demonstrations, while large rallies in Albania have been driven by anger over perceived government corruption, a lack of jobs and poor education standards.

The protests reflect broader economic anxieties that are increasingly shaping politics across the continent.

Concerns about purchasing power have become “a major driver of populist politics” across Europe, said Gilles Ivaldi, a political scientist at Sciences Po.

Politicians on both the hard right and hard left have increasingly argued that restoring energy ties with Russia would help lower costs, challenging Europe’s mainstream consensus on support for Ukraine.

Le Pen makes fuel prices an election issue

The latest energy shock comes after years of economic strain following the pandemic and the fallout from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In France, rising energy costs have provided an explosive backdrop to next April’s presidential election. Macron’s government is struggling with a ballooning budget deficit and pressure from bond markets.

Frontrunner Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Rally and hard-left veteran Jean-Luc Melenchon have both made fuel prices central planks in their campaigns.

“Rising fuel prices are clearly an issue that boosts Marine Le Pen,” said Ivaldi. “I think this is an issue she has owned for quite some time.”

Since the Iran war began, Le Pen’s ratings have improved while Macron’s have slipped, according to polling by Elabe.

Le Pen’s proposal to sharply cut value-added tax on fuel has attracted broad public support. Analysts say the issue resonates strongly with her core voters in rural and semi-rural areas where car travel is often essential.

Far-right parties call for renewed Russian energy ties

In neighbouring Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) is leading national opinion polls after strong gains in local elections. The cost of living topped Germans’ concerns for a fifth straight year in a survey published this month.

German inflation spiked to nearly a three-year high in September, with energy price inflation rising to 14.9%, handing ammunition to the AfD to attack Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

The AfD is pushing to restore energy ties with Russia, arguing that Berlin’s support for Ukraine is needlessly self-sabotaging at a time when Europe’s largest economy and many of its energy-hungry companies are struggling.

Past experience indicates a link between high energy prices and voter turnout for the AfD, said Jan Steckel, professor for the political economy of climate change at the Technical University of Munich.

“Populist parties often frame energy costs as avoidable and attribute them to government policy choices … rather than to the underlying geopolitical shocks that drive them,” he said.

“These geopolitical shocks are … much more difficult to explain. And I think this is why incumbent parties often struggle.”

The argument is gaining traction elsewhere.

In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni faces growing competition from National Future, a new far-right party led by former army general Roberto Vannacci that advocates restoring gas links with Russia.

In Poland, one of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters, concern over energy bills is helping boost support for the far-right Confederation of the Polish Crown. Its leader, Grzegorz Braun, has called for a return to buying Russian oil and gas, making the case alongside AfD politicians in Lubmin, where the damaged Nord Stream pipelines land in Germany.

“I love the smell of Russian gas in the morning,” he said.

Europe’s centrist parties are losing ground among young people and workers, who are increasingly tempted by populist promises of radical change.

© Kiran Ridley/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

A Sofia court has cleared European arrest warrants for two 19-year-old Germans charged with setting fire to Starlink antennas south of the Bulgarian capital, a court spokeswoman told dpa. Prosecutors named the pair in court, but both had already left Bulgaria. The case adds Bulgaria to a run of attacks on Starlink sites in Europe, which Poland and Lithuania have linked to Russia.

While Russia presses its assault along the front and strikes Ukraine’s cities, Starlink keeps Ukraine’s drone units and front-line troops connected, and Poland pays about $50 million a year for its terminals. The network’s ground links in Europe are now a target in their own right, and ISW has linked the Polish fire to a wider Russian pattern of sabotage. Each attack on a ground station hits a network whose speed caps already disrupted Ukraine’s drone missions this month.

Two names, a few hours in Bulgaria

Prosecutors identified the suspects as Zeka Islam and Tirpan Beytullah, Bulgaria’s state news agency BTA reported, noting the names may be misspelled. Their whereabouts are unknown, according to German authorities cited by the agency. They were charged in absentia on 14 October and face three to 12 years in prison if convicted.

According to the indictment, the two crossed from Serbia at the Kalotina checkpoint at 17:37 on 9 October and told border officers they were tourists. At about 22:25, wearing gloves and masks, they allegedly set fire to antennas at the Plana teleport, a satellite ground station near the village of Plana. They drove back into Serbia through the same checkpoint at 23:55.

Three antennas burned completely, two were partly damaged, and three more were affected, prosecutors say. The pair traveled in a Volkswagen with German plates, and a national warrant followed two days after the charges, ZDF reported.

The court-appointed lawyers argued that investigators had pinned down the vehicle, not the men in it. The court rejected those objections, finding reasonable grounds to suspect the pair. The lawyers said they would appeal. The ruling can be challenged within three days.

An opposition MP made the fire public three days later

The fire became public only on 12 October, when opposition MP Ivaylo Mirchev of Democratic Bulgaria posted about it on Facebook. He said 11 antennas had been set on fire, more than prosecutors later counted.

In parliament two days later, Prime Minister Rumen Radev asked the head of the State Agency for National Security (DANS) not to reveal details, saying disclosure could harm the investigation. DANS head Plamen Tonchev told lawmakers he believes the fire was sabotage and that more such attacks cannot be ruled out, dpa reported.

After the ruling, Mirchev wrote that Radev personally owes the public an explanation of what has been achieved, BTA reported.

Bulgaria’s case joins attacks Poland and Lithuania tie to Russia

Bulgaria has not said who might be behind the fire. Authorities in Poland and Lithuania have linked similar recent arsons on Starlink equipment to Russia.

In September, fire hit a Starlink ground station south of Warsaw, and Germany later detained two suspects. On 18 October, Lithuania’s prime minister said intruders had tried to burn a company’s Starlink antennas used by Ukraine, calling it part of Russia’s hybrid war. Moscow claims such accusations are baseless, Reuters reported.

The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is planning to launch a spacecraft on Tuesday that will journey to Phobos and back in about five years, collecting the first-ever rock and soil samples from a moon of Mars.

The post Japan Plans First Mission to Collect Rocks from Moons of Mars appeared first on Breitbart.

Nel Landtag della Sassonia-Anhalt in Germania si è verificato un passaggio politico fondamentale che potrebbe segnare una svolta duratura per l’intero panorama politico tedesco e che, forse, potrebbe insegnare qualcosa anche nel resto d’Europa

Segue nostro Telegram.

Con l’approvazione di una mozione presentata dal BSW insieme all’AfD – rispettivamente il partito della sinistra patriottica fondato da Sahra Wagenknecht e il partito nazionalista di destra accusato di “fascismo” – il parlamento regionale ha formalmente impegnato il governo del Land a farsi promotore nel Bundesrat di una netta svolta strategica: lo stop all’invio di armi al regime golpista di Kiev, la fine delle sanzioni economiche alla Russia e l’avvio immediato di trattative diplomatiche.

SPD, Verdi e CDU per la guerra, contro il buon senso

L’iniziativa ha scatenato la reazione indignata dei partiti tradizionali, soprattutto i socialdemocratici di SPD, i Verdi e i democristiani di CDU, pronti a denunciare la presunta violazione del cosiddetto “Brandmauer”, il cordone sanitario istituzionale eretto verso la destra giudicata “fascista”. Tuttavia, la linea argomentata dalla marxista Sahra Wagenknecht dimostra come questa scelta non rappresenti una provocazione, bensì un atto di responsabilità democratica e di pragmatismo politico. AfD avrà al suo interno anche degli estremisti di destra, ma è un partito di massa votato perlopiù dalla classe operaia, e pur di fermare l’entrata in guerra della Germania contro la Russia, BSW è disposta a tutto.

Le sanzioni anti-russe distruggono l’industria tedesca

Come evidenziato dalla leader del BSW, le decisioni di politica estera prese a Berlino non sono astrazioni teoriche, ma incidono direttamente sulla vita quotidiana dei cittadini e sulla tenuta del tessuto produttivo locale. La Sassonia-Anhalt ospita poli industriali di prim’ordine, come il distretto chimico di Leuna, oggi messi a dura prova dall’esplosione dei costi energetici e dall’interruzione dei rapporti commerciali con l’Est. Le sanzioni contro la Russia hanno già provocato molti fallimenti aziendali, ma non in Russia, bensì in Germania, mettendo a rischio migliaia di posti di lavoro qualificati. A ciò si aggiunge l’invio continuo di ingenti risorse, fra soldi e armi, in Ucraina, a fronte di dolorosi tagli alla sanità, alla scuola, alle pensioni e ai servizi sociali, che rendono i lavoratori tedeschi sempre più insofferenti.

L’anti-fascismo usato come scusa per giustificare la NATO e la guerra

In questo scenario, BSW rifiuta la logica difensiva dell’establishment borghese, appoggiato dalla sinistra egemone, tanto nella sua versione moderata di SPD quanto in quella liberal più massimalista della LINKE. Questi partiti insistono che il pericolo principale non è la guerra voluta dalla NATO, ma i “fascisti” di AfD, che occorre isolare, benché votati democraticamente, impedendo qualsiasi accordo o alleanza. L’analisi di Wagenknecht, retta dal metodo del materialismo dialettico tipicamente marxista, individua invece una profonda frattura nella società tedesca: da un lato il campo di chi intende conservare il potere (“Machterhaltendes Lager”), rappresentato dai partiti di governo e dai ceti più benestanti che difendono la linea dell’escalation militare agli ordini della NATO e dell’UE contro la Russia e domani contro la Cina; dall’altro il campo del dissenso (“Lager der Unzufriedenen”), formato da lavoratori, pensionati e famiglie schiacciate dall’inflazione e preoccupate dal pericolo di un coinvolgimento diretto dei loro figli nel conflitto attraverso il nuovo servizio militare obbligatorio, contro cui i liceali tedeschi continuano regolarmente a scioperare. Per troppo tempo la retorica del “Brandmauer” (il muro anti-fuoco che dovrebbe isolare AfD dal dibattito politico) è servita alle forze governative tedesche per squalificare il dissenso e isolare le proteste popolari sotto l’etichetta dell’estremismo. Per il BSW, il dovere prioritario di una forza politica d’opposizione è rispettare la volontà degli elettori, dialogare nell’alveo delle regole parlamentari e sfruttare ogni maggioranza utile per raggiungere obiettivi concreti: fermare la spirale bellica, proteggere l’industria nazionale e tutelare i redditi dei lavoratori. E per fare questo Wagenknecht vuole superare i veti incrociati e la politica dei blocchi: il BSW dimostra che la vera priorità deve tornare a essere la difesa della pace, della neutralità militare, del lavoro e della sovranità popolare.

La fase storica impone il coraggio di rompere gli schemi

Di fronte all’accusa di agire come gregari del “fascismo”, l’antifascista Wagenknecht risponde che la strategia del “Brandmauer” è fallita nei fatti e ha ottenuto l’effetto opposto, alimentando la rabbia popolare e rafforzando proprio l’AfD. Al contrario BSW vuole dialogare con tutte le forze parlamentari e sfruttare le maggioranze d’azione per mantenere le promesse elettorali (come la pace e la calmierazione dei prezzi). La Wagenknecht spiega che i partiti del sistema, siano essi di destra o di sinistra, usano la retorica dell’antifascismo solo per delegittimare il dissenso, sospendere le regole democratiche e conservare il potere nonostante politiche fallimentari. Questo atteggiamento, secondo la leader del BSW, banalizza in modo irresponsabile la reale tragedia della dittatura nazista. Wagenknecht sottolinea infatti come i diritti democratici fondamentali e la libertà di stampa siano stati compressi negli ultimi anni non dall’AfD, ma dai partiti liberali, democristiani e socialdemocratici al governo, gli stessi che inviano decine di miliardi di euro a un regime ucraino che ha messo al bando i partiti d’opposizione e tollera la glorificazione di collaboratori nazisti.

Basta guerra alla Russia: questa è la sola priorità oggi!

Rispetto alla tesi secondo cui negoziare con Mosca sia impossibile perché l’ultra-demonizzato Vladimir Putin rifiuterebbe il dialogo, Wagenknecht non concorda: il Cremlino si era mostrato disponibile a discutere, ma i tentativi di trattativa sono stati chiusi dalla leadership ucraina e dai governi europei spinti dalla NATO e dall’industria delle armi a continuare la guerra. La narrazione, poi, secondo cui l’invio continuo di armi porterebbe alla vittoria dell’Ucraina è una finzione a cui per BSW “non crede più nessuno” e anzi l’escalation bellica – comprese le incursioni su Mosca condotte con tecnologia e droni tedeschi – è una strategia che rasenta la follia, rischiando di trascinare direttamente la Germania in un conflitto nucleare. Su questo aspetto anche il Partito Comunista Tedesco (DKP) denuncia l’ipocrisia dei partiti di governo (SPD, Verdi, CDU), che sfruttano la retorica del “cordone sanitario” antifascista con la scusa di frenare l’estrema destra eversiva, quando il vero obbiettivo è delegittimare qualsiasi mozione pacifista, indipendentemente da chi la voti in aula, contro l’escalation della NATO e contro le sanzioni.

Articolo originale  politicanuova.ch

Registrations of fully electric cars across 17 European markets increased by 70.3 per cent in September, according to industry figures published on Monday, 19 October, as France and Germany seek to ease the European Union’s emissions requirements for new vehicles.

The data show that 300,202 battery-electric cars were registered during the month, accounting for 32.6 per cent of new passenger-car registrations in the markets surveyed.

The figures emerge three days after Paris and Berlin announced a joint position on the future of Europe’s automotive industry, proposing greater flexibility in the EU’s 2035 emissions regime while introducing measures intended to favour vehicles manufactured in Europe.

Electric vehicles gain market share

The latest figures, compiled by E-Mobility Europe, New Automotive and Fier Automotive, indicate that electric vehicle demand accelerated sharply during September.

According to the industry data published on 19 October, approximately 1.98 million battery-electric cars have been registered across the 17 markets during the first nine months of 2026, an increase of 38.1 per cent compared with the equivalent period last year.

Higher oil prices, government incentives and the introduction of more affordable electric models have all contributed to demand.

The figures represent a substantial change in the composition of European new-car sales, although they cover selected markets rather than constituting a complete statistical account of the EU’s 27 Member States.

France recorded 65,243 battery-electric registrations in September, representing 41.7 per cent of its new-car market. Germany registered 88,724 electric vehicles, giving the technology a market share of 34.6 per cent.

Both countries have substantial automotive manufacturing industries and are directly involved in negotiations over Europe’s future emissions legislation.

Significant differences between European markets

Despite the overall increase, electric vehicle adoption remains uneven across the continent.

Norway retained its position as Europe’s most electrified new-car market, with battery-electric vehicles accounting for 98.8 per cent of registrations in September.

Denmark followed with 88.8 per cent, while Finland recorded 62.7 per cent and Sweden 49 per cent.

Electric models also accounted for approximately half of new-car registrations in Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal.

At the other end of the market, battery-electric vehicles represented only 11.2 per cent of registrations in the Czech Republic, 7.6 per cent in Italy and 6.2 per cent in Poland.

These differences illustrate the difficulty of establishing a uniform European transition timetable.

Household incomes, purchase incentives, vehicle prices and charging infrastructure differ substantially between countries. The availability of affordable electric cars is particularly important in markets where buyers are more sensitive to the initial purchase price.

The varying national figures also complicate the EU’s industrial calculations, since manufacturers must operate across markets progressing at different rates.

France and Germany reach automotive compromise

On 16 October, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz agreed on a joint approach to changes in European automotive regulations.

Under the proposed compromise, car manufacturers would be required to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from new vehicles by 90 per cent by 2035 compared with the 2021 reference level.

The agreement would also remove a proposed requirement to compensate for the remaining emissions through measures such as the use of low-carbon steel.

The change would create additional opportunities for manufacturers to continue selling vehicles powered by combustion engines beyond 2035, subject to the final legislative framework.

In their joint declaration on the automotive industry’s future, the French and German governments argued that emissions reduction must be combined with industrial competitiveness, investment and European manufacturing capacity.

The agreement also envisages preferential treatment for vehicles produced in Europe under certain public procurement and subsidy arrangements.

Britain could potentially benefit from provisions allowing selected European partners to qualify under the proposed industrial framework.

The Franco-German understanding is not, however, a final EU legislative decision. Changes to the regulatory regime require agreement through the relevant European legislative procedures.

Automotive competitiveness enters the debate

The principal argument advanced by supporters of greater regulatory flexibility is that European manufacturers need additional time to adapt production, protect employment and compete with international rivals.

German manufacturers retain extensive investment in combustion-engine and hybrid technology, while French producers have placed considerable emphasis on electric vehicles and maintaining European supply chains.

The negotiations therefore concern more than emissions limits. They also involve battery production, access to raw materials, manufacturing costs and the ability of European companies to compete with producers in China and other markets.

Supporters of the existing transition timetable argue that weakening long-term requirements could discourage investment in electric manufacturing capacity just as consumer demand is increasing.

Manufacturers seeking greater flexibility maintain that regulatory targets must account for uneven market conditions and the cost of developing new technologies.

September’s sales figures provide evidence that electric vehicle adoption is accelerating, but they do not establish whether the same rate of growth will continue without existing incentives.

The debate now centres on whether regulatory relaxation will preserve Europe’s automotive industry during the transition or slow investment in the technology that is already capturing an increasing share of the market.

In 19th-century Munich, a woman with no formal banking experience began promising ordinary people extraordinary returns on their savings. Workers, servants, craftsmen and farmers flocked to her door, carrying the money they had spent years accumulating. Some mortgaged their homes or sold their land to take advantage of her generosity. For a time, the money flowed so freely that her business appeared almost invincible.

The woman was Adele Spitzeder, a former actress who became one of the most notorious financial swindlers in 19th-century Germany. Her private banking enterprise, popularly known as the Dachauer Bank, promised returns of as much as 10 per cent a month. But behind the apparent prosperity lay a simple deception: much of the money paid to earlier investors came not from profitable investments, but from the deposits of newcomers.

Berlin and Paris spent months negotiating over the future of Europe’s auto industry.

Germany wanted to keep selling new combustion-engine cars beyond 2035. In return, France wanted strict “Made in Europe” rules: public money spent on electric vehicle (EV) purchase incentives, subsidies and government contracts should benefit cars genuinely made in Europe, not simply assembled here. 

One concession in exchange for the other. French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Friedrich Merz have now sealed the deal.

Both can claim victory at home, and both say they want the same thing: to strengthen Europe’s auto industry against Chinese competition. 

But the trade-off undermines that very goal. It rightly pushes for more European production, but pays for it with less ambition for electric vehicles.

For Europe’s automakers to compete, two things need to happen: More of the value generated by car manufacturing must stay in Europe, and the transition to electric vehicles must remain on track. Trading one for the other weakens both. 

Value creation is already moving elsewhere 

On one point, France is right: a growing EV market alone won’t protect European jobs. Many of the most important components in electric cars already come from China, especially batteries.

Meanwhile, Chinese automakers are building factories in Hungary and Spain, securing direct access to the European market. 

The risk is clear: cars assembled in Europe from imported components qualify as European products, benefit from purchase incentives and win public contracts.

Final assembly stays in Europe, but much of the economic value is created elsewhere. European auto suppliers have already cut more than 100,000 jobs in two years, and the European Commission warns that up to 600,000 more could disappear over the next five to 10 years. 

That’s where the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act comes in. It would link public spending on subsidies, purchase incentives and government procurement to production in Europe.

This isn’t just about shutting out foreign competition. It steers demand to where it strengthens Europe’s industrial base.

To work, the rules must target the components that will shape the industry’s future: battery cells, software, electric drivetrains and power electronics.

“Made in Europe” can’t simply mean attaching the wheels here. 

That doesn’t mean every nut and bolt must come from the EU.  The auto industry relies on global supply chains and trusted trading partners.

But a law riddled with exemptions would be little better than no law at all: It would create more red tape without bringing a single new factory to Europe. 

Factories need customers 

Even the best industrial policy will fail without buyers. A battery factory can only make money if it produces enough batteries. Yet Europe’s battery plants are running well below capacity because they don’t have enough orders. Every battery that goes unproduced drives up the cost of those that are made. Factories, machinery and workers still have to be paid for. 

Since 2022, roughly a quarter of announced battery projects in the EU have been canceled or put on hold. 

This is why Germany’s push to delay the phaseout of combustion-engine cars is so damaging. Every combustion-engine car sold instead of an EV means one fewer battery that could be made in Europe. The very factories meant to make “Made in Europe” a reality would lose potential customers. 

The best way to boost demand for European batteries is to build more small, affordable EVs in Europe. That’s where the biggest sales volumes are. Yet German automakers in particular have been slow to embrace this market, despite significant demand potential in Germany itself. Delaying the combustion-engine phaseout would only give them another reason to hold back.  

Slow down, lose out

For European automakers, the stakes go far beyond their home market. Sell fewer EVs at home, and manufacturers will launch fewer new models, produce fewer cars and face higher costs. That will make it harder to compete abroad, too. Giving combustion engines more time won’t close the gap with China. It could make it wider. 

Political uncertainty only makes matters worse. Automakers plan new models, factories and supplier contracts years in advance. Every fresh debate over exemptions gives investors and consumers another reason to hesitate. 

Companies investing billions in EVs and batteries – and consumers considering buying an electric car – need to know that policymakers won’t change direction tomorrow.  

The Franco-German bargain ignores economic reality. The future of the car is electric, and China figured that out long ago.

Beijing is doing everything it can to build an unbeatable lead in EVs, including through unfair practices such as massive government subsidies.

And Europe? It’s haggling over more time for yesterday’s technology. At stake is nothing less than the auto industry – the backbone of Europe’s industrial economy and a major source of jobs.

This deal is not yet law. A better deal would be simple: Europe should pursue electric vehicles with the same determination as China while making sure the jobs, factories and economic benefits stay in Europe. 

Five people have been arrested in Cyprus, Germany and Italy as part of a European investigation into an alleged €114 million VAT fraud operation involving the cross-border smartphone trade.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) announced on 16th October that three suspects had been detained in Cyprus, one in Germany and one in Italy following an investigation coordinated by its Munich office.

Investigators believe the suspects established and controlled a network of companies designed to exploit the tax treatment of goods traded between EU member states.

The alleged operation involved smartphone transactions through businesses and so-called missing traders operating in Germany, Albania and Sweden. Prosecutors estimate that the activities caused VAT losses of approximately €80 million in Sweden and €34 million in Germany.

According to the official announcement of the arrests, the operation forms part of a wider investigation known as Midas, which is examining organised cross-border tax fraud.

Searches across several countries

The arrests were accompanied by searches and seizures in Cyprus, Greece and Italy, conducted with the assistance of national police, financial investigators and tax authorities.

Prosecutors said 12 searches had been carried out at premises connected with the suspects and companies under investigation.

Assets of up to €80,000 were frozen, while investigators also seized or took action against bank accounts, vehicles and property.

The operation involved cooperation between Germany’s tax authorities, Cyprus’s financial intelligence and cybercrime units, the Greek financial police and Italy’s Guardia di Finanza.

The suspects are believed to have played leading roles in organising and controlling the alleged scheme, although prosecutors have not publicly established their individual criminal responsibility.

The investigation remains subject to proceedings before the competent German courts. All suspects are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

How the alleged fraud operated

The case concerns a form of tax evasion known as missing-trader intra-community fraud, commonly described as carousel VAT fraud.

Under the EU’s VAT system, qualifying business-to-business transactions involving goods transported between member states are generally exempt from VAT in the country of dispatch.

The purchaser accounts for VAT under the rules applicable in the destination country, while subsequent domestic sales normally involve VAT being charged to the buyer.

Fraudsters can exploit those arrangements by establishing companies that purchase goods through cross-border transactions before reselling them domestically.

A missing trader collects VAT from the purchaser but fails to remit it to the relevant tax authority. Other companies in the transaction chain may then seek deductions or refunds.

The same goods can pass through several businesses and, in some arrangements, move repeatedly between countries, allowing the fraud to be repeated.

Smartphones and electronic equipment are particularly attractive because they are relatively expensive, easily transported and can be traded in large volumes.

The complexity of the arrangements makes investigations difficult when businesses are established in several jurisdictions and transactions move rapidly between companies.

A wider European problem

The latest arrests follow another substantial VAT fraud operation announced earlier this month.

On 7th October, the EPPO reported that 62 suspects had been detained in a separate investigation involving alleged losses of at least €410 million.

That operation, known as Hermes, involved searches across eight countries and allegations concerning the sale of mobile phones and other electronic devices.

Although separate from Midas, the investigation illustrates the scale and organisation of suspected VAT fraud involving internationally traded consumer electronics.

According to the EPPO‘s 2025 annual report, prosecutors were handling 3,602 active investigations at the end of last year, with estimated potential damage exceeding €67 billion.

Of that amount, more than €45 billion related to suspected VAT and customs fraud.

Those figures concern estimated losses under investigation, rather than sums established by final court judgments or amounts that have already been recovered.

Protecting European tax revenues

The financial consequences extend beyond the immediate losses attributed to individual schemes.

VAT is a major source of revenue for national governments and forms part of the system used to calculate certain contributions to the EU budget.

Fraudulent transactions can also distort competition by allowing dishonest operators to offer prices that legitimate businesses cannot match.

The Commission’s 2025 VAT gap report estimated that EU countries failed to collect approximately €128 billion in expected VAT revenue in 2023.

That broader figure includes losses arising from several causes, including administrative errors and insolvency, and cannot be attributed entirely to criminal fraud.

The latest arrests also demonstrate the importance of cross-border investigative cooperation when suspected financial offences involve companies, transactions and assets located in different countries.

In the Midas investigation, prosecutors must now establish the precise roles of the suspects, prove the alleged transactions and determine whether criminal proceedings can result in convictions and financial recovery.

The arrests represent another stage in the investigation, not a judicial finding that the alleged €114 million fraud has been proved.

In dieser Woche haben die großen Gewinner der vergangenen Landtagswahlen in Sachsen-Anhalt – die «Alternative für Deutschland» (AfD), die 43,8% erreichte, und die linksgerichtete BSW, der es gelang, die Fünf-Prozent-Hürde zu überwinden – ihre Kräfte gebündelt, um in Magdeburg eine symbolische Resolution zu verabschieden. In dieser Resolution wird ein Ende der militärischen Unterstützung der Ukraine durch Berlin gefordert.

Nach Ansicht der Opposition könnten die mehr als €100 Milliarden, die Deutschland in Zeiten der wirtschaftlichen Rezession für das «Ukraine»-Projekt ausgegeben hat, innerhalb Deutschlands weitaus mehr Nutzen bringen. Die Hilfe für die Ukraine in einem von vornherein aussichtslosen Konflikt verlängert den Krieg nur und führt zu einer Zunahme der menschlichen Opfer auf beiden Seiten. Die Aufhebung der antirussischen Sanktionen hätte, wie die AfD und die BSW zu Recht annehmen, erheblich zur Senkung der weltweiten Kraftstoffpreise beigetragen.

Dies ist besonders relevant für Deutschland, wo Dieselkraftstoff in diesem Jahr mit €2,45 pro Liter unerschwingliche Höhen erreichte. Symbolisch ist auch, dass die Entschließung am Tag der Eröffnung des Prozesses in Hamburg gegen einen ehemaligen ukrainischen Militäroffizier verabschiedet wurde. Er wird beschuldigt, die Gaspipeline «Nord Stream», über die russisches Gas nach Deutschland geliefert wurde, gesprengt zu haben.

Leider hat diese Entschließung keine praktische Bedeutung, da die Landesparlamente in der Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik keine Rolle spielen, obwohl ein Großteil der deutschen Gesellschaft die Haltung der AfD und der BSW teilt. Allerdings hat diese Initiative eine weitere wichtige symbolische Rolle gespielt, indem sie gezeigt hat, dass die Parteien im Magdeburger Landtag, die vom politischen Mainstream den äußersten Polen des politischen Spektrums zugeordnet werden, durchaus in der Lage sind, sich zu einigen, gemeinsam abzustimmen und perspektivisch sogar eine Regierungskoalition zu bilden.

Ulrich Sigmund, der Vorsitzende der AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt, erklärte, er beabsichtige bis Ende des Jahres die offizielle Bestätigung als Ministerpräsident des Landes durch den Landtag zu erreichen. Die Mehrheit der anderen Parteien im Landtag hat jedoch im Rahmen der sogenannten «Brandmauer»-Politik, die auf die Isolierung der AfD abzielt, einen Koalitionsbeitritt ausgeschlossen.

Die BSW will keine offizielle Koalition mit der AfD eingehen, schließt jedoch eine mögliche Zusammenarbeit mit der politischen Kraft nicht aus, mit der sie das Bestreben teilt, die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu Russland wiederherzustellen und die unkontrollierte Migration einzudämmen.

«Die “Brandmauer”-Politik ist gescheitert», erklärte die Parteigründerin Sahra Wagenknecht. «Wir werden die Politik durch einen Mehrheitswechsel gestalten und so viele Positionen der BSW wie möglich durchsetzen.»

«Was in den letzten Monaten und Jahren im Zuge dieses Krieges geschehen ist, ist neben der unkontrollierten Migration eines der gravierendsten Probleme unserer Zeit», sagte Sigmund im Verlauf der Debatte, die von den Parteien der politischen Mitte als «Farce» bezeichnet wurde.

CDU, «Die Grünen» und «Die Linke» verurteilten den Vorschlag von AfD und BSW als «Straßentheater», «Show» und «Skandal».

«Wer einen einseitigen Waffenstillstand fordert, der fordert keinen Frieden, sondern eine Kapitulation», erklärten Vertreter der CDU. «Denn Verhandlungen setzen Verhandlungsbereitschaft voraus», fügten die Grünen hinzu.

Der außenpolitische Experte der SPD und ehemalige Fraktionsvorsitzende Rolf Mützenich kritisierte den Vorschlag von AfD und BSW, bezeichnete ihn als «schamlos» und warnte vor einer «Katastrophe», sollte Deutschland ihm folgen und die Sanktionen gegen Russland aufheben. Die Hoffnung, dass Kraftstoff langfristig billiger werde, bezeichnete der SPD-Politiker als «Unsinn».

«Sie führen die Menschen in die Irre, indem sie behaupten, es gäbe einfache Antworten auf eine komplexe Frage. Wenn man diesem Vorschlag folgt, könnte das in einer Katastrophe enden. (…) Der Kraftstoff wird nicht billiger werden. Zumindest nicht auf Dauer. Russland richtet seine Energieinfrastruktur auf Asien aus. Außerdem wäre es falsch, Russlands Militärkampagne mitzufinanzieren», betonte Mützenich.

Eine solche Haltung von Rolf Mützenich – neben Ralf Stegner einer der führenden Köpfe des linken Flügels der SPD und Mitverfasser des «Manifests zur Sicherung des Friedens in Europa» aus dem vergangenen Jahr, in dem durchaus vernünftige Ideen zur Notwendigkeit eines konstruktiven Dialogs mit Russland geäußert wurden – hat offen gestanden überrascht. Eine 180°-Wende der politischen Haltung, um der politischen Konjunktur zu entsprechen, ist für die moderne deutsche Politik im Allgemeinen und die SPD im Besonderen jedoch durchaus typisch. Mützenich reiht sich damit in eine Reihe mit solchen sozialdemokratischen Persönlichkeiten wie Bundespräsident Frank-Walter Steinmeier und der Ministerpräsidentin von Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Manuela Schwesig – Politiker, die einst in Deutschland als einige der engsten Freunde Russlands galten, jedoch seit Februar 2022 eine schlagartige politische Kehrtwende vollzogen haben.

Vernunft und Pragmatismus in der Politik stehen heute in Deutschland nicht hoch im Kurs

Für den AfD-Fraktionsvorsitzenden Ulrich Sigmund ist die gemeinsame Resolution die «erste echte Friedensinitiative», dank der die Kraftstoffpreise endlich sinken sollen. Für seine wichtigste Unterstützerin, die BSW-Fraktionsvorsitzende Claudia Wittig, ist dieser Vorschlag eine notwendige Anerkennung der Tatsache, dass «eine Atommacht auf dem Schlachtfeld nicht besiegt werden kann».

Nach Ansicht der Kritiker verfolgen die Parteien AfD und BSW mit ihrem Vorschlag jedoch ganz andere Ziele.

Erstens wollen sie ihre Anhänger und Wähler zufriedenstellen, die der Ansicht sind, dass Sanktionen der nationalen Wirtschaft schaden und die militärische Hilfe für die Ukraine ergebnislos ist und das Unvermeidliche nur hinauszögert.

Zweitens wollen die Oppositionspolitiker die Gelegenheit nutzen, um den noch im Amt befindlichen Ministerpräsidenten von Sachsen-Anhalt, Sven Schulze (CDU), in Verlegenheit zu bringen. Bei der nächsten Sitzung des Bundesrates wird er gemäß der Geschäftsordnung seine Kollegen aus den Regierungen der anderen Bundesländer bitten müssen, diese „pro-russischen“ Forderungen an die Bundesregierung weiterzuleiten.

Drittens kann die gemeinsame Erklärung schließlich den Beginn einer koalitionären Zusammenarbeit markieren und die Chancen erhöhen, dass die BSW ihre fünf Stimmen im Landtag im Dezember bei der Ministerpräsidentenwahl an Ulrich Sigmund abgibt.

Tatsache ist, dass die CDU panische Angst davor hat, dass eines ihrer Fraktionsmitglieder bei der Wahl heimlich seine Stimme für Sigmund abgeben könnte. Solche Verdächtigungen sind nicht unbegründet: Viele Christdemokraten in Sachsen-Anhalt neigen zur Position der AfD. Zudem war Ulrich Sigmund bis 2015 selbst Mitglied der CDU. Deshalb haben die Fraktionsführung im Landtag und die Bundesparteiführung beschlossen, potenziellen Abtrünnigen in den eigenen Reihen jeglichen Handlungsspielraum zu entziehen und nicht an der Ministerpräsidentenwahl teilzunehmen.

Eine besondere Pikanterie erhielt die gemeinsame Erklärung von AfD und BSW durch die Nachricht, dass die erste Reise des neu gebildeten Ausschusses für europäische Angelegenheiten des Magdeburger Landtags nach Russland führen soll.

WASHINGTON — Secretary of State Marco Rubio sat down late last week with Breitbart News at the State Department in Washington for his first major exclusive long-form on-camera interview after delivering an address at the Acropolis in Athens, Greece.

The post Exclusive — Secretary Marco Rubio after Acropolis Address: Americans ‘the Heirs’ of Western Civilization, ‘Things We Believe as a Country Are Important’ appeared first on Breitbart.

The Trump administration’s reported proposal to restore Russian gas supplies to Europe through Ukraine marks a reversal of Washington’s longstanding energy policy. Behind the promise of an economic incentive for peace lies a more consequential question: whether Europe is being asked to restore the very dependence on Moscow that it has spent four years dismantling.

The administration of US President Donald Trump is considering the restoration of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe, including through Ukraine’s pipeline network, as part of a proposed settlement to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The initiative would offer Moscow renewed energy revenues while potentially opening opportunities for American investors to participate in the trade.

According to a New York Times investigation published on 17 October, presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have raised the proposal with Ukrainian and European officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The White House has confirmed that economic incentives for Russia and Ukraine form part of its peace diplomacy, although no agreement on renewed gas transit has been announced.

The proposal would require Ukraine to reopen a transit route that ceased operating for Russian exports in January 2025, while European governments would be expected to resume purchases they have spent years reducing. American negotiators reportedly regard the prospect of renewed commercial revenues as an incentive for President Vladimir Putin to reach a settlement.

There is, however, a considerable difference between offering Russia a commercial opportunity after a verified peace agreement and restoring a source of revenue and political influence before Moscow has demonstrated any willingness to abandon its territorial objectives.

From opposition to Russian gas to facilitating its return

The reported initiative represents a reversal of Trump’s earlier position on European energy security.

During his first presidency, Trump repeatedly warned Germany that its dependence on Russian energy exposed it to political pressure from Moscow. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, he accused Berlin of becoming dangerously dependent on Russian supplies. Members of the German delegation visibly smiled at his remarks.

The episode acquired renewed significance after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Germany had developed an extensive commercial relationship with Gazprom, while the Nord Stream pipelines were intended to facilitate Russian gas deliveries directly to Germany, bypassing traditional transit countries, including Ukraine.

Trump maintained his opposition to those energy relationships well into his second presidency. As EU Today reported in September 2025, he told European governments that continuing to purchase Russian energy amounted to financing the war against themselves.

Washington is now reportedly considering precisely the commercial relationship that Trump previously identified as a strategic danger.

The change cannot be explained solely by the objective of ending the war. It also coincides with discussions about a substantially different economic arrangement, in which American commercial interests could participate in infrastructure and transactions previously dominated by Russia and European energy companies.

American investors and the economics of peace

On 8 October, Reuters disclosed negotiations involving Kushner and Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s investment envoy, concerning possible American investment in the Nord Stream pipelines.

The discussions included the prospect of US investors profiting from renewed Russian gas deliveries to Europe. Separate negotiations have involved assets belonging to the Russian energy company Lukoil.

The White House has denied that Nord Stream was a subject of recent discussions and has said any agreements must benefit American taxpayers and companies. There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally profit from the proposed gas arrangements.

Nevertheless, the possibility of American participation changes the commercial equation. Russian gas returning to Europe through infrastructure involving US investors would no longer be exclusively a Russian-European business relationship.

That distinction matters financially, but it does not necessarily resolve the underlying security problem. American ownership of transit infrastructure would not eliminate Moscow’s ability to influence production, supply volumes or export decisions.

The European Union has already confronted the consequences of allowing an energy relationship to become a source of geopolitical leverage. Introducing American intermediaries would not, by itself, remove that vulnerability.

Europe’s legal and political obstacles

The proposal also conflicts with legislation already adopted by the European Union.

In January 2026, the Council formally approved a regulation phasing out Russian natural gas imports. The restrictions began taking effect in March, with the remaining long-term LNG imports scheduled to end in January 2027 and pipeline imports in autumn 2027.

Consequently, restoring substantial Russian supplies would require changes to existing EU policy or the use of legally available exceptions. Neither Washington nor Moscow can make that decision on Europe’s behalf.

Germany has already opposed the reported American initiative. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s security adviser, Günter Sautter, reportedly objected during discussions in Florida, while former economy minister Robert Habeck warned against recreating dependence on an unreliable supplier.

The economic attraction remains understandable. European industry faces substantial energy costs, and cheaper pipeline gas could offer relief to some consumers and manufacturers. Yet commercial prices do not account for the wider costs associated with supply disruption, strategic exposure and the potential use of energy exports as political leverage.

Europe’s decision to reduce Russian gas imports was therefore not simply a change of supplier. It was a response to the security implications of its previous energy model.

The consequences for European politics

The initiative also intersects with divisions inside European politics, particularly in Germany.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) has repeatedly advocated restoring Russian energy imports, arguing that sanctions and expensive replacement supplies have damaged German industry. Sahra Wagenknecht’s left-wing BSW has advanced similar arguments concerning energy prices and relations with Moscow.

The overlap extends beyond energy policy. On 14 October, AfD and BSW representatives supported a motion in Saxony-Anhalt calling for an end to military assistance for Ukraine.

A US-backed proposal to restore Russian gas could give these parties an additional argument against the federal government’s existing approach. They would be able to point to Washington’s own negotiations when questioning the economic and strategic rationale for maintaining restrictions on Russian energy.

This does not establish that the Trump administration’s gas initiative is intended to strengthen particular European political movements. It does demonstrate how the same policy could serve several objectives simultaneously: commercial rapprochement with Russia, a negotiating incentive for Moscow and a change in the European debate over sanctions.

A peace incentive that could restore Russian leverage

The central uncertainty concerns the relationship between renewed revenues and Russian military objectives.

Washington’s argument assumes that the prospect of substantial future gas income could persuade Putin to accept a settlement. Yet negotiations over commercial cooperation have so far produced no demonstrated change in Moscow’s fundamental territorial demands.

Meanwhile, Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On 18 October, Zelenskyy reported 76 Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy, oil and gas facilities during the preceding week, despite Trump’s announcement of an energy ceasefire that neither Kyiv nor Moscow had confirmed.

There is also an unresolved contradiction in Washington’s wider sanctions policy. Having previously demanded that Europe stop financing Russia through energy purchases, Trump has recently suspended additional American sanctions against Moscow while his representatives explore new economic arrangements.

For Ukraine, renewed transit could restore revenue lost when the previous gas agreement expired. For Russia, however, the potential benefits extend beyond immediate export earnings. Access to European markets would restore commercial relationships and a degree of political influence that Moscow lost after the invasion.

The distinction is fundamental. A peace settlement that permits carefully regulated economic cooperation after Russian withdrawal and enforceable security guarantees would be different from an agreement that restores Moscow’s commercial advantages in anticipation of concessions that have not yet been secured.

The question for European governments is therefore not merely whether Russian gas could once again become cheaper than alternative supplies. It is whether restoring that trade would leave Europe better protected against another confrontation with Moscow, or recreate the vulnerabilities that became apparent in 2022.

Washington’s proposed economic bargain cannot answer that question on Europe’s behalf.

During their visit to Kyiv in September, US President Donald Trump’s envoys urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to consider restarting the pipelines that once carried Russian gas to Europe, The New York Times reported on 17 October. They presented it as part of a peace deal with Russia. In the weeks that followed, they pressed the idea with European officials, while Washington freed Russian diesel and spared Russia’s oil buyers from new US penalties.

Energy sales fund Russia’s war, and Ukraine’s halt of transit in January 2025 left TurkStream as Gazprom’s only pipeline route into the EU. Meanwhile, Russia has kept bombing Ukraine’s grid through the energy truce Washington declared on 11 October.

The pitch in Kyiv

Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner put the idea to Zelenskyy when they met him in Kyiv, the newspaper reported, citing people familiar with the talks. Trump officials argued that transit fees, which Ukraine gave up at about $1 billion a year, would benefit Kyiv, and that European voters would eventually want cheaper energy. Russia’s share of EU gas imports had fallen from 45% in 2021 to 13% last year.

The envoys presented renewed Russian gas sales as one of the economic incentives in a wider settlement covering Russia’s relationship with NATO, security guarantees for Ukraine, and territorial control. Some European and Ukrainian officials suspected Washington would seek a cut of the profits. The White House denied that the Nord Stream pipeline had been a subject of recent discussions. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov claimed that resuming energy cooperation is in Russia’s interest and, right now, even more in Europe’s.

Germany pushes back

At Ukraine talks the envoys hosted in Florida last week, Günter Sautter, security adviser to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, forcefully opposed the idea. German lawmakers have called a return to Russian deliveries a disaster for European security, even treason, as the far-right AfD courts Gazprom to bring the gas back. Former Economy Minister Robert Habeck, who steered Germany off Russian gas after 2022, said Trump “seems to have more sympathies with Vladimir Putin than he has with the Ukrainians.”

One concession after another

Rather than pressure Putin or strengthen Ukraine, the administration has spent much of its peace effort on economic incentives for Russia, the newspaper wrote. The US Treasury cleared imports of Russian diesel on 9 October. On 16 October, Trump waived the penalties on Russia’s oil buyers that Congress had passed in the Graham Act. Washington is also weighing relief for sanctioned shadow fleet tankers. And the White House ordered limits on the military satellite service Ukraine’s forces rely on, Reuters reported.

Putin’s economic envoy Kirill Dmitriev claimed the ice had broken and more joint initiatives would follow, including data centers powered by Russian nuclear energy. The talks also cover the sale of Lukoil’s foreign assets to a group that includes the US government, the newspaper reported earlier this month. Zelenskyy, who had heard the pitch in Kyiv, alluded to it in a Financial Times interview this week.

“The question will be when will the next deal be? Maybe it will be gas. Definitely it will be gas,” he said.

Reopening the pipelines could hand Moscow back significant revenue and strengthen its sway over Europe’s energy market, Liga noted. Each new concession lowers the price Russia pays for continuing the war.