Non c’è modo di combattere l’Impero senza aggirare il suo controllo sul sistema finanziario internazionale.

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Si sta già scatenando il finimondo quando si tratta di indagare su ciò che sta realmente accadendo in relazione agli ultimi, decisamente oscuri, movimenti legati agli Stati Uniti sul territorio e nelle acque pakistane. Dopo una prima analisi su Transition Protocol – che, come ammesso, non ha fornito tutte le risposte necessarie – abbiamo approfondito l’argomento con un’analisi molto più completa, supportata da diverse fonti.

Ciò che stiamo osservando in diversi punti nevralgici della connettività terrestre estremamente delicata tra Iran e Pakistan non è una chiusura totale delle frontiere, bensì un delicato equilibrio su due fronti da parte di Islamabad tra l’enorme morsa finanziaria di Washington e l’ancora di salvezza strategica di Teheran.

Ecco quindi a che punto siamo, integrando i dati verificati con le nostre ultime consultazioni.

Il punto chiave: il fattore scatenante dal punto di vista normativo è stata una misura di sanzioni bancarie, non solo la sicurezza delle frontiere.

Sebbene i funzionari provinciali del Balochistan abbiano pubblicamente attribuito la sospensione di sabato in due nodi chiave, Taftan e Gabd–Rimdan, a motivi di sicurezza, antiterrorismo e lotta al contrabbando, ciò che conta di più è l’esatto meccanismo relativo a un memorandum emanato venerdì scorso dal Ministero del Commercio pakistano.

Tale memorandum ha immediatamente revocato la proroga del 3 ottobre relativa all’esenzione dal Modulo Elettronico di Importazione (EIF) per le merci importate dall’Iran, e ha coinciso con l’ordine impartito da Islamabad di chiudere il valico di frontiera dell’Agenzia Federale di Investigazione (FIA) a Taftan.

L’aspetto fondamentale è che, senza l’esenzione dall’EIF, gli importatori pakistani devono gestire gli acquisti iraniani attraverso i canali bancari ufficiali pakistani – cosa che le sanzioni statunitensi, ovviamente, rendono assolutamente impossibile.

Peyman Sanandaji, presidente della Commissione Trasporti della Camera di Commercio di Teheran, ha confermato ufficialmente che è proprio il rispetto delle sanzioni bancarie (l’abbandono dell’EIF) ad aver bloccato le esportazioni iraniane verso il Pakistan.

Lo shock immediato ai valichi ufficiali è stato notevole: sono a rischio oltre 4.000 tonnellate di importazioni giornaliere di GPL iraniano attraverso Gabd–Rimdan. L’ex presidente della Camera di Commercio di Quetta, Ayoub Miryani, ha riferito che oltre 2.000 container sono bloccati nella sola Gabd–Rimdan, con altre centinaia di autocarri merci in coda a Taftan.

Ma perché sta accadendo proprio ora? A causa della spiacevole coincidenza tra la rata del FMI del 7 ottobre che il Pakistan doveva pagare e l’«Operazione Economic Outcast» del Tesoro imperiale statunitense.

Nell’ambito dell’«Operazione Economic Outcast», Washington ha concesso ai paesi terzi una «scadenza ben definita per interrompere» i collegamenti commerciali con l’Iran, pena l’espulsione dal sistema finanziario statunitense. A ciò hanno fatto seguito le designazioni dell’OFAC del 1° ottobre contro le reti ferroviarie terrestri e industriali iraniane e le azioni dell’8 ottobre contro 17 petroliere della «flotta ombra».

Ma poi, il 7 ottobre – appena nove giorni prima che il Ministero del Commercio revocasse la deroga EIF – Islamabad ha raggiunto un accordo con il FMI sulla quarta revisione della sua Extended Fund Facility per sbloccare 1,21 miliardi di dollari. Ciò richiede ancora l’approvazione del Consiglio esecutivo del FMI.

Naturalmente non esiste alcun documento pubblico che dimostri un ordine diretto da parte degli Stati Uniti o del FMI di chiudere i confini tra Iran e Pakistan. Tuttavia, fonti di Islamabad hanno sottolineato che lasciare in vigore una deroga a tempo indeterminato sugli strumenti bancari in vista del voto del Consiglio del FMI era diventato per il Pakistan un punto di vulnerabilità insostenibile in materia di sanzioni.

Le fonti di Islamabad sostengono con fermezza che la mossa fosse accompagnata da autentiche preoccupazioni in materia di controsabotaggio e silenziosamente coordinata tra Islamabad e Teheran (corsivo mio), affinché la sospensione non compromettesse i rapporti bilaterali.

Il portavoce del Ministero degli Esteri iraniano, Esmaeil Baghaei, ha pubblicamente definito l’interruzione una pausa temporanea dovuta a «problemi tecnici» e a «misure precauzionali».

Da parte loro, fonti ufficiali pakistane hanno insistito sul fatto che i controlli più rigorosi costituiscono una misura congiunta di antiterrorismo che riflette la «reciproca comprensione» con Teheran a seguito di un’impennata degli attacchi nel Sistan-Baluchistan, delle imboscate autostradali e di un attacco marittimo avvenuto l’11 ottobre contro imbarcazioni della Guardia Costiera pakistana al largo di Jiwani – che i funzionari pakistani hanno attribuito ad «attori stranieri» intenti a sabotare la mediazione del Pakistan nell’accordo di pace con l’Iran.

Si torna allo stesso vecchio schema dei salafiti-jihadisti strumentalizzati e manipolati dai soliti sospetti.

L’unica telefonata pubblicamente confermata tra il vice primo ministro Ishaq Dar e il ministro degli Esteri Abbas Araghchi ha avuto luogo domenica 18 ottobre – due giorni dopo il memorandum del 16 ottobre – e i resoconti ufficiali menzionano solo la diplomazia regionale e la riunione dell’OIC a Baghdad.

Pertanto, il coordinamento preventivo a livello di vice primo ministro Dar e ministro degli Esteri Araghchi, così come gli arresti specifici per sabotaggio, fanno parte della nostra stessa cronaca.

Esportazioni asimmetriche di generi alimentari e rotte informali

In sintesi, le merci continuano a attraversare i confini. Islamabad ha deliberatamente lasciato in essere le esportazioni pakistane di prodotti deperibili e alimentari verso l’Iran. Prodotti deperibili essenziali – tra cui pomodori, patate e cipolle – continuano a circolare, insieme ai tradizionali flussi di petrolio e carburante, attraverso il poroso confine lungo 909 km.

La documentazione normativa ne spiega il motivo: otto mesi fa, il Pakistan ha emanato una deroga separata relativa agli strumenti bancari, specificamente per dieci prodotti alimentari esportati via terra verso l’Iran (elencando esplicitamente riso, patate, cipolle, pomodori, carne e frutta), oltre ai prodotti farmaceutici.

La Camera di Commercio di Teheran ha confermato sabato scorso che, mentre le esportazioni iraniane verso il Pakistan sono bloccate dalla norma EIF, le importazioni dal Pakistan verso l’Iran proseguono, e il commercio informale di carburante e il commercio transfrontaliero attraverso il Baluchistan operano già per un valore stimato compreso tra 800 milioni e oltre 1 miliardo di dollari all’anno al di fuori dei canali doganali ufficiali.

Si dovrebbe prestare particolare attenzione ai porti di Gwadar e Karachi, nonché all’architettura complessiva del transito Cina-Iran. Secondo le nostre fonti, il transito di merci provenienti da paesi terzi e quello tra Cina e Iran attraverso il Pakistan rimane protetto.

A livello giuridico, un documento che descrive in dettaglio il transito delle merci attraverso il Pakistan ha stabilito sei corridoi di transito terrestri designati che collegano Gwadar, Karachi e Port Qasim a Gabd e Taftan per le merci provenienti da paesi terzi dirette in Iran, sotto la garanzia di una banca.

Inoltre, una notifica del Federal Board of Revenue dello scorso giugno ha formalmente designato la stazione ferroviaria di Taftan come stazione doganale terrestre, mentre i ministri iraniani e pakistani promuovono il corridoio ferroviario per collegare la Cina all’Iran e all’Europa.

Tuttavia, permangono due vincoli operativi molto complessi.

La modernizzazione della linea ferroviaria Quetta-Taftan è ancora ufficialmente classificata come un progetto di potenziamento; inoltre, la designazione da parte dell’OFAC, avvenuta il 1° ottobre, della Compagnia Ferroviaria della Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran (RAI) era esplicitamente volta a ostacolare il passaggio di Teheran dalle rotte marittime bloccate al trasporto ferroviario.

Per riassumere: ci vuole una maestria eccezionale per affrontare l’Impero della Pirateria. Islamabad ha messo in atto una manovra classica e ben calibrata: revocare visibilmente la deroga formale alle importazioni EIF a Taftan e Gabd–Rimdan per proteggere la sua tranche in sospeso da 1,21 miliardi di dollari del FMI e le banche pakistane dalle sanzioni secondarie del Tesoro statunitense.

E nel contempo ha mantenuto attive con Teheran le esportazioni alimentari pakistane, i canali informali di confine e gli accordi di transito con paesi terzi.

Se ciò rimarrà un breve riassetto amministrativo o si consoliderà in un punto di strozzatura più duraturo sarà deciso da tre indicatori nel corso delle prossime due settimane:

1. Una notifica modificata relativa all’EIF o al baratto da parte del Ministero del Commercio.
2. Sdoganamento separato per le merci in transito verso Gwadar/Karachi.
3. Movimenti documentati di merci lungo il collegamento ferroviario Taftan–Zahedan.

Possa questa lezione rimanere impressa nelle terre rare affinché l’intero Sud del mondo rifletta: non c’è modo di combattere l’Impero senza aggirare il suo controllo sul sistema finanziario internazionale.

There’s no way to fight the Empire without bypassing its control of the international financial system.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

All hell is already breaking loose when it comes to probing what is exactly taking place related to the latest, definitely murky U.S.-linked movements in Pakistani land and sea. After an initial assessment at Transition Protocol – which avowedly did not provide all the necessary answers – we dug deeper into a way more comprehensive examination supported by several sources.

What we are watching across several nodes of extremely sensitive Iran-Pakistan overland connectivity is not a blanket border shutdown; but a surgical, two-track balancing act by Islamabad between Washington’s tremendous financial vise and Tehran’s strategic lifeline.

So here’s where it all stands – compounding the verified record with our latest consultations.

The key point: the regulatory trigger was a banking sanctions move, not just border security.

While provincial officials in Balochistan publicly framed Saturday’s halt at two key nodes, Taftan and Gabd–Rimdan, around security, counterterrorism, and anti-smuggling, what matters most is the exact mechanism around a memorandum issued last Friday by the Pakistani Ministry of Commerce.

That immediately revoked an October 3 extension of the Electronic Import Form (EIF) waiver for goods imported from Iran, and coincided with Islamabad’s instruction to close the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) immigration gate at Taftan.

What is key is that without the EIF waiver, Pakistani importers must process Iranian purchases through formal Pakistani banking channels – which U.S. sanctions, of course, make absolutely impossible.

Peyman Sanandaji, head of the Transportation Commission at the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, confirmed on the record that it is banking sanctions compliance (ditching the EIF) that halted Iranian exports into Pakistan.

The immediate shock at the formal gates was quite something: more than 4,000 tons of daily Iranian LPG imports through Gabd–Rimdan are at risk. Former Quetta Chamber of Commerce president Ayoub Miryani reported that over 2,000 containers are stranded at Gabd–Rimdan alone, with hundreds more freight trucks backed up at Taftan.

So why is this happening now? Because of the nasty convergence between the October 7 IMF tranche Pakistan had to pay, and the imperial U.S. Treasury “Operation Economic Outcast”.

Under Operation Economic Outcast, Washington gave third countries a “defined timeline to shut down” Iran-related commercial lifelines or face expulsion from the U.S. financial system. That was followed by OFAC’s October 1 designations against Iran’s overland rail and industrial networks and October 8 actions against 17 shadow-fleet tankers.

But then, on October 7 – only nine days before the Ministry of Commerce revoked the EIF waiver – Islamabad reached an agreement with the IMF on the Fourth Review of its Extended Fund Facility to unlock $1.21 billion. That still requires IMF Executive Board approval.

Of course there is no public document showing a direct U.S. or IMF order to close Iran-Pakistan borders. But sources in Islamabad stressed that leaving an open-ended banking-instrument waiver on the books ahead of the IMF Board vote had become an untenable sanctions vulnerability for Pakistan.

Islamabad sources are adamant that the move was paired with genuine counter-sabotage concerns and quietly coordinated between Islamabad and Tehran (italics mine) so the pause would not rupture bilateral ties.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei publicly called the disruption a temporary pause due to “technical issues” and “precautionary measures”.

Pakistani official sources, for their part, insisted that the tightened controls are a joint counterterrorism measure reflecting “mutual understanding” with Tehran after a spike in Sistan-Balochistan attacks; highway ambushes; and an October 11 maritime attack on Pakistan Coast Guard boats off Jiwani – which Pakistani officials attributed to “foreign actors” seeking to sabotage Pakistan’s mediation of the Iran peace deal.

Back to the same old pattern of Salafi-jihadis weaponized and manipulated by the usual suspects.

The only publicly confirmed telephone call between Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi took place on Sunday, October 18 – two days after the October 16 memorandum – and its official readouts mention only regional diplomacy and the Baghdad OIC meeting.

So prior coordination at the Dar–Araghchi Foreign Minister level and specific sabotage arrests therefore are part of our own reporting.

Asymmetric food exports and informal routes

In a nutshell, stuff is still moving across borders. Islamabad deliberately left alive Pakistani perishables and food exports to Iran. Essential perishables – including tomatoes, potatoes, and onions – continue to move, alongside traditional oil and fuel flows across the porous 909-km border.

The regulatory record explains why: 8 months ago, Pakistan enacted a separate banking-instrument waiver specifically for 10 food exports to Iran by land (explicitly listing rice, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, meat, and fruit) plus pharmaceuticals.

Tehran’s Chamber of Commerce confirmed this past Saturday that while Iranian exports to Pakistan are stalled by the EIF rule, imports from Pakistan into Iran are continuing, and informal fuel and border trade across Balochistan already operates at an estimated $800 million to over $1 billion annually outside formal customs.

Special attention should be placed on the ports of Gwadar and Karachi, and the overall China–Iran Transit Architecture. Third-country and China-Iran transit through Pakistan, according to our sources, remains protected.

On a legal level, a document detailing Pakistan’s transit of goods established six designated overland transit corridors linking Gwadar, Karachi, and Port Qasim to Gabd and Taftan for third-country cargo bound for Iran under a bank guarantee.

And a Federal Board of Revenue’s notification this past June formally designated Taftan railway station as a Land Customs Station, with Iranian and Pakistani ministers pitching the rail corridor to link China to Iran and Europe.

However, two very complicated operational constraints remain in place.

The Quetta-Taftan rail modernization is still listed officially as a planned upgrade; and OFAC’s October 1 designation of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railway Company (RAI) was explicitly designed to choke Tehran’s shift from blockaded sea lanes to rail.

To sum it all up: it takes supreme skill to face The Empire of Piracy. Islamabad has executed a classic, calibrated maneuver: visibly revoking the formal EIF import waiver at Taftan and Gabd–Rimdan to insulate its pending $1.21 billion IMF tranche and Pakistani banks from U.S. Treasury secondary sanctions.

And all the while keeping Pakistani food exports, informal border valves, and third-country transit frameworks alive with Tehran.

Whether this remains a brief administrative reset or hardens into a longer choke point will be decided by three indicators over the next fortnight:

1. A modified EIF or barter notification from the Commerce Ministry.
2. Separate customs clearance for Gwadar/Karachi transit cargo.
3. Documented freight movements across the Taftan–Zahedan rail link.

May the lesson be imprinted on rare earths for the whole Global South to ponder: there’s no way to fight the Empire without bypassing its control of the international financial system.

Ninguna forma de gobernanza inclusiva puede sostenerse sin el respeto por las identidades culturales de los pueblos: ahí es donde se puede reconstruir la confianza, el bien que más le falta al mundo hoy en día.

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Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

¿Dónde persiste el crecimiento y a qué costo?

Quienes estudian las crisis económicas suelen imaginarlas como choques repentinos: un colapso que desata el pánico, un mercado bursátil que se desploma en una sola sesión, una frontera que se cierra.

Estos son los sucesos de 2008 y 2020, las tormentas que marcan un antes y un después.

Pero existe una segunda forma de sufrimiento, menos fotogénica y más insidiosa, que no llega a los titulares: la parálisis lenta, la ausencia de crecimiento, una economía que da vueltas en vacío sin hundirse ni recuperar impulso.

Esta situación les resultaba familiar a los marineros. Los veleros que cruzaban el Atlántico temían a los huracanes, pero también temían al Mar de los Sargazos, esa extensión sin corrientes donde el viento se calmaba y el casco quedaba atrapado entre las algas durante semanas. En 2026, la economía mundial se enfrenta sobre todo a esta segunda amenaza, y es como el Titanic, tal como Leonid Grigoryev escribió brillantemente.

El transatlántico, para seguir con la metáfora, no se ha hundido: sigue a flote y aún crece, pero avanza lentamente y su casco tiene varios agujeros. Los vigías escudriñan una niebla que no da señales de disiparse, y los capitanes confían en que el iceberg se mantenga a distancia.

En sus proyecciones de julio, el Fondo Monetario Internacional ha revisado a la baja su pronóstico de crecimiento mundial para 2026, situándolo en un 3 por ciento, en comparación con el 3,5 por ciento del año anterior. Traducido a términos absolutos, frente a un PIB mundial que supera los cien billones de dólares en paridad de poder adquisitivo, esa pérdida de medio punto equivale a cientos de mil millones que no se convertirán en salarios, ingresos fiscales ni inversión.

La guerra arancelaria entre Washington y Bruselas está siendo absorbida por los principales actores, pero deja a su paso reajustes y fricciones colaterales, desde Irlanda hasta Canadá; y, por razones puramente contables más que políticas, resurge la perspectiva de la fragmentación económica del Reino Unido.

La fase expansionista pospandémica nunca ha seguido un rumbo claro y sigue topándose con los obstáculos de la geopolítica. Un factor en particular ha impulsado el crecimiento del PIB en los últimos trimestres: la carrera por construir centros de datos.

Esto representa una demanda de inversión masiva y geográficamente concentrada, que ha impulsado las exportaciones de los proveedores asiáticos de semiconductores y equipos —Corea del Sur, Taiwán, Malasia y Tailandia—, pero que depende de unas pocas empresas y de rendimientos esperados que aún no se han materializado.

Este ciclo impulsa el PIB mientras las obras de construcción están en marcha; el quid de la cuestión surge más adelante, cuando la capacidad instalada debe generar ingresos proporcionales al capital invertido.

Fuera de este marco, las economías que crecen lo hacen por razones internas: China gracias a su propia demanda y sector manufacturero, la India gracias a su mercado interno y Estados Unidos gracias a una combinación de inmigración, entradas de capital y gasto público.

El caso estadounidense, en particular, merece una aclaración que desmienta un error común. Cada año, Estados Unidos importa bienes por un valor de alrededor de un billón de dólares más de lo que exporta y, al mismo tiempo, sus líderes lamentan la pérdida de su base industrial.

Ambas circunstancias no son contradictorias: son la misma ecuación vista desde dos ángulos. Un déficit en cuenta corriente de tales proporciones no es, por definición contable, más que la contrapartida del ahorro extranjero que fluye hacia Estados Unidos: el mundo suministra bienes y, a cambio, acumula activos en dólares, bonos del Tesoro y acciones.

Mientras el dólar siga siendo la moneda de reserva y el mercado de valores estadounidense el mercado más líquido disponible, este privilegio financia el déficit en condiciones inalcanzables para cualquier otro país.

Sin embargo, ese mismo flujo sostiene el tipo de cambio real, penaliza a la industria orientada a la exportación y es precisamente lo que provoca la desindustrialización que tan a menudo se lamenta. Los aranceles atacan el aspecto comercial, pero dejan intacta la raíz financiera: reajustan el equilibrio, no lo eliminan.

El yugo de los rendimientos y el peso de la deuda

Hacia mediados de año, la inflación mundial volvió a repuntar, impulsada en gran medida por el aumento de los precios de la energía. Un aumento de los precios derivado de los costos, más que de un exceso de demanda, plantea a los bancos centrales su decisión más difícil: frenar una economía ya debilitada por la crisis, para no permitir que las expectativas se desanclen.

Los altos precios de la energía actúan como un impuesto regresivo, erosionando el ingreso disponible y repercutiendo en los niveles de precios al ritmo lento que dictan los contratos indexados y los precios regulados.

En el frente de la deuda, la tensión es aún más evidente. Los rendimientos de los bonos del Estado a largo plazo están aumentando a un ritmo alarmante: en Estados Unidos, el rendimiento a 10 años ha alcanzado el 5 por ciento, y otras economías avanzadas siguen el mismo camino.

No solo importa el nivel, sino también su estructura. El extremo largo de la curva refleja una prima de plazo al alza —es decir, la compensación que exigen los inversionistas por inmovilizar su dinero a largo plazo cuando la inflación y el volumen de dinero nuevo que ingresa al sistema siguen siendo inciertos.

El stock de deuda ya es colosal, y los bonos baratos emitidos durante la era de las tasas de interés cero están siendo reemplazados, a medida que vencen, por emisiones mucho más caras: el costo promedio aumenta con un retraso, pero sí aumenta.

Aquí prevalece una aritmética elemental e inflexible: la comparación entre la tasa de interés real y la tasa de crecimiento real. Cuando la economía crece más rápido que el costo de su deuda, la carga se aligera por sí sola; cuando la relación se invierte —y esto es lo que está sucediendo hoy en varios países ricos—, mantener estable la relación deuda-PIB requiere superávits presupuestarios que el electorado rara vez permite.

Una maniobra técnica con implicaciones políticas está contribuyendo a apretar el lazo. Los ministerios de Hacienda de las principales economías buscan devolver al mercado abierto una parte de los bonos a largo plazo que hasta ahora figuraban en los balances de los bancos centrales, justo cuando estos últimos están dejando que venzan los bonos acumulados durante la flexibilización cuantitativa y reduciendo sus activos.

El resultado es que la oferta neta de bonos a largo plazo disponibles para los inversionistas privados aumenta en el momento en que el prestamista de última instancia se retira; para absorber esta oferta, el mercado exige rendimientos más altos.

Al mismo tiempo, los bancos centrales están elevando gradualmente las tasas de interés para combatir la inflación, y la combinación de estos factores está empujando al sistema hacia el estancamiento. Es la calma del Mar de los Sargazos, no la tormenta.

En este contexto, cada unidad adicional de gasto militar, en presupuestos ya al límite, se convierte en una unidad menos para la salud, la educación y las obras públicas: la vieja disyuntiva entre «armas y mantequilla», que se repite a escala continental.

Las rentas energéticas están cambiando de manos

Toda una región, el Medio Oriente, ha caído en territorio negativo debido a la caída en la producción y las exportaciones de hidrocarburos. El aumento de los precios y los márgenes —y, en consecuencia, de los dividendos y los precios de las acciones— ha beneficiado a las empresas energéticas estadounidenses, que controlan la capacidad de producción marginal y pueden abrir el grifo cuando los precios suben.

Se trata de una redistribución de la renta: del proveedor tradicional al productor que ha ganado flexibilidad en los últimos años. Oriente Medio paga por partida doble —por sus ingresos actuales de exportación y por su infraestructura física desgastada o dañada—, mientras que las ganancias emigran al extranjero.

Los precios más altos del petróleo crudo y la escasez de diésel no solo afectan a las fábricas, al transporte y al sector de la construcción.

El diésel impulsa la logística y la agricultura mecanizada, y un aumento en su precio se propaga por toda la cadena de suministro con una omnipresencia de la que carece la gasolina. Las repercusiones más graves, sin embargo, van más allá de las estadísticas: la incertidumbre sobre los precios de la energía aumenta la tasa a la que las empresas descuentan los proyectos a largo plazo y desalienta la acumulación de capital de la que depende el crecimiento del futuro. Ninguna prosperidad puede sostenerse solo con centros de datos.

Europa en un letargo

En este contexto, el segundo bloque económico más grande del mundo —la Unión Europea, incluido el Reino Unido, con más de 500 millones de consumidores— no ofrece ningún contrapeso.

Su PIB, en la práctica, crece al mismo ritmo que su población: medido per cápita —la única forma que refleja verdaderamente los niveles de vida—, el estancamiento es casi total. Se ve lastrada por la deuda pública y los déficits, por estructuras industriales e infraestructura obsoletas, y por una demografía que ni siquiera los flujos migratorios han logrado rejuvenecer con la rapidez suficiente.

El problema subyacente tiene un nombre específico: una brecha de productividad que se ha venido ampliando desde hace más de una década. Europa gasta menos en investigación y capital digital, fragmenta el mercado de capitales en veintisiete sistemas jurídicos y no ha logrado producir líderes tecnológicos comparables a los de Estados Unidos o China.

El capital se está yendo a Estados Unidos, atraído por rendimientos más altos y mercados más profundos; la industria manufacturera está perdiendo terreno frente a la producción china, que ahora es competitiva no solo en costos sino también en tecnología; y la política, casi en todas partes, está fragmentada en mayorías frágiles que hacen que cualquier reforma de gran alcance sea una lucha.

Los costos de la energía son estructuralmente mucho más altos que en Estados Unidos —un legado de la dependencia del gas importado y de una transición iniciada sin un puente de suministro estable— y esta brecha está erosionando a las industrias que consumen mucha energía.

La productividad sigue estando muy por debajo de la de China en sectores competitivos, y el estado de ánimo del electorado, como muestran las encuestas, es más sombrío de lo que cabría esperar en un rincón tan afortunado del mundo.

Mientras tanto, el clima también se ha calentado demasiado, sin esperar a que se materialicen los beneficios de los programas ecológicos.

Las sanciones y el cambio de rumbo

Casi todos son conscientes de los peligros asociados con la espiral creciente de sanciones, pero los descartan como una molestia en la gestión cotidiana.

El punto es que no hay una salida ordenada de la maraña de restricciones legales, intereses comerciales y cálculos políticos —determinados por órganos legislativos y administrativos que no logran coordinarse entre sí—.

Queda la medida extrema que la historia asocia con Solón: hacer tabla rasa de un solo golpe, como lo hizo Atenas a principios del siglo VI a. C. con la seisachtheia, el alivio de la deuda que borró las deudas y restableció el pacto cívico.

Mientras tanto, las sanciones, la destrucción de la capacidad de extracción y transporte, y la pérdida de mercados de exportación —factores que se acumulan— se comportan como olas gigantes: surcan los océanos y regresan, a menudo con mayor fuerza, hacia quienes las generaron, en forma de inflación importada, interrupciones en el suministro y reajustes del tipo de cambio.

Hay una máxima de Clausewitz que aquí conviene invertir: si, para él, la guerra era la continuación de la política por otros medios, las sanciones son la continuación de la guerra por medios distintos a las armas.

Y los golpes más duros —así como los más injustos— recaen sobre países y clases sociales que no están involucrados en esos conflictos y preferirían seguir sin estarlo.

Tras tales experiencias, es difícil no anhelar menos globalización y menos interdependencia: la teoría de sistemas nos enseña que, cuando los elementos de una gran red se vuelven inestables, el retorno al equilibrio es más lento, porque las perturbaciones se propagan a lo largo de las conexiones en lugar de extinguirse.

Es la amarga otra cara de una economía global que había hecho de la integración su fortaleza y ahora descubre su vulnerabilidad.

Un inventario de desequilibrios

La probabilidad de una recesión depende, como siempre, de dos factores: la acumulación de desequilibrios y un detonante que, por definición, no se puede predecir.

Los desequilibrios son la pólvora —apalancamiento excesivo, valoraciones bursátiles infladas, riesgo concentrado en unos pocos actores, vencimientos de deuda agrupados en los mismos meses—; el detonante es el evento que enciende la mecha: una nueva pandemia, una caída de la bolsa, un colapso mayor similar al de 2008.

Si la pólvora se está acumulando es ahora objeto de debate entre los especialistas. A esto se suma un número creciente de entidades que ya han sido sacrificadas por los conflictos geopolíticos, por la desaceleración y por el desvío de recursos, que se han desviado del desarrollo para contener las pérdidas.

En la cima de la lista de costos olvidados se encuentran los problemas globales: la pobreza, las brechas de desarrollo y el cambio climático. Es probable que los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible establecidos por la ONU para 2030 se alcancen en torno al 17 por ciento, con secciones enteras apenas esbozadas.

Se necesita un proyecto global de nueva generación, pero esto presupone paz, compromiso, coordinación, estabilidad y confianza: todos recursos escasos, y la confianza más que ningún otro.

Las clases dirigentes parecen haber desplazado su enfoque de los horizontes a largo plazo hacia los enfrentamientos a corto plazo. Las organizaciones internacionales tienen poco impacto; las principales naciones desarrolladas están ocupadas con sus propios problemas y sanciones; y nadie responde a la pregunta de quién asumirá las tareas compartidas: el desarrollo para acortar brechas, la reducción de la pobreza y la gestión de los bienes públicos globales.

En casi todos los países, amplios sectores de la población se enfrentan a algún tipo de dificultad, ya sea en materia de salud, educación o desigualdad en los niveles de vida.

¿Quién pagará la cuenta?

Esa carga recaerá, por defecto, sobre los hombros de las principales economías emergentes, cuyos intereses coinciden en gran medida con los objetivos globales y ciertamente no van en contra de ellos: el grupo BRICS y varios países con ideas afines.

Cuentan con menos recursos que Occidente, pero la necesidad los obliga a coordinar sus esfuerzos. La Declaración de la última cumbre, que marca el vigésimo aniversario del grupo, resuena como una voz de la razón en una época que evoca con inquietud la llamada «trampa de Tucídides»: ese mecanismo por el cual el miedo mutuo entre una potencia dominante y una emergente las empuja hacia el conflicto, incluso cuando ninguna de las dos lo busca realmente.

No faltan las fricciones entre los miembros, con sistemas políticos divergentes y niveles desiguales de prosperidad; sin embargo, el documento señala el camino hacia el compromiso —concretamente, el fortalecimiento de la ONU y la reforma del FMI—, reconociendo que no existen atajos radicales.

En el párrafo 49, se reconoce que los desafíos globales están entrelazados y son complejos, lo que obstaculiza el crecimiento y exacerba las disparidades persistentes entre países y regiones.

A nivel operativo, la Declaración esboza una política industrial y energética adaptada a la tarea de ir más allá de la Cuarta Revolución Industrial: completar la infraestructura, impulsar la manufactura, los ferrocarriles y la innovación, garantizar el acceso a la tecnología y realizar la transición hacia tecnologías de desarrollo propio, al tiempo que se invierte en capital humano y en cuestiones sociales.

También defiende el libre comercio, los mercados abiertos, la libertad de circulación y la seguridad del ahorro y las finanzas globales, y presenta una postura independiente sobre la gobernanza de la inteligencia artificial —mirando ya más allá del presente—.

La exigencia fundamental es institucional: estos países han operado durante décadas dentro de marcos diseñados por Occidente y ahora reclaman organismos que trabajen en pro de su propio desarrollo. Una revisión de las cuotas del FMI para reflejar el peso económico real, un papel más amplio para instituciones como el Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo y canales de pago menos expuestos al uso geopolítico de las monedas de reserva.

En qué medida todo esto se traducirá en capacidad real sigue siendo la verdadera incógnita, que debe medirse en términos de probabilidad más que de certeza.

Es plausible, con un grado moderado de confianza, que en los próximos años el grupo consolide los sistemas de liquidación en monedas nacionales y el financiamiento para el desarrollo; por el momento, es poco probable que suplanten a las instituciones existentes o socaven la moneda de reserva —un objetivo que requeriría mercados de bonos profundos y líquidos fuera de la zona del dólar, los cuales no se observan actualmente—.

Los indicadores a seguir son tangibles: el resultado de la revisión de las cuotas del FMI, los montos desembolsados por el Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo y la proporción del comercio intrarregional liquidado fuera del dólar.

Sin embargo, quienes reclaman instituciones que sirvan a su propio desarrollo y al bien común tienen un argumento sólido, ya que la reforma de la arquitectura global es el único ámbito en el que los compromisos parciales aún pueden generar confianza.

Las declaraciones de principios, repetidas durante años, solo pasan a formar parte de la agenda cuando alguien las financia.

Y ninguna gobernanza inclusiva puede sostenerse sin respeto por las identidades culturales de los pueblos: ahí es donde se puede reconstruir la confianza, el bien que más le falta al mundo hoy en día.

Traducción:  Observatorio de trabajador@s en lucha

"This referendum comes at the worst possible time," Carney told a large pro-Canada rally in Calgary. "The world has become more dangerous and divided. Some outside our borders are working to break us so they can own us."

Ursula von der Leyen has the answer. Borrow even more money. Borrow like there’s no tomorrow.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The most remarkable thing about the rapid demise of the U.S. is that when it hits the bottom of the ocean floor economically, it will be in a better state than the EU. The panic among EU leaders, in particular Ursula von der Leyen, is breathtaking. Barely a week passes before she makes another crackpot policy announcement, gives herself a salary increase, or makes a statement about needing to give even more money to Ukraine. But in recent months these announcements have become more radical and existential, and we are seeing a new dawn now in the EU where the only solution to cover up the feral spending and borrowing is to fabricate a war with Russia and then blame Putin for the whole fiasco.

Every now and again we get a sober reminder about the economic situation of the U.S., EU and Russia. The recent news that Putin is going to sell around 2 million tonnes of diesel oil to “global markets” (as U.S. media phrases it), the lion’s share going to the U.S. before, during and just after the midterm elections in a bid to stabilise the price to help Trump. We will have to assume that countries who buy some of their diesel from the U.S. will continue doing so, but it might, in fact, be Russian oil.

There’s a lot of fake news buzzing around originating from Trump, who likes to distract journalists away from the top issues. It’s hard to see how the American public will respond to Trump’s latest decision to buy Russian diesel, but it’s hard to see this being a solution to the global oil crisis, let alone Trump’s record-low ratings. Will Trump really go ahead with a new wave of strikes on Iran after the midterms, as he has said? Or is it that his own intelligence agencies have picked up information that Iran is poised for a massive strike, and so therefore he is obliged to send even more troops, plus a carrier, to the region?

Regardless of how France and Germany get their diesel in the coming weeks, after Trump forced these governments to dip into their own reserves by threatening a U.S. export ban, it’s hard to see how the Achilles heel of most EU economies – crude oil products – can still be controlled by Moscow. While intellectually challenged figures like Mark Rutte make such stupid comments about how Russia could never win a war with NATO based on comparative GDP data, this latest move might be a huge wake-up call for Macron and Merz, the latter facing dismally low poll ratings. How do you continue to fund a war in Ukraine with the ‘frenemy’ relationship pushed to breaking point, such as is the case now with the U.S. having to buy diesel from Russia? EU countries loathe Putin, as the one hope they had to magically breathe new life into EU economies by taking Ukraine under its wing was shattered when Russian forces invaded. Putin is everything they are not. Nobody can deny Putin is a leader – the very thing that is so desperately lacking in EU countries. Leadership.

But the situation now has reached farce. With a global diesel crisis brought about by Trump’s war with Iran, EU countries are expected to buy diesel on the international market, topped up by Russia. In fact, buying oil from your enemy is nothing new. Countries have been doing this for decades. Even in Syria, we saw terror groups in the north-east of the country take over the oil infrastructure and then sell oil back to the Assad regime.

It’s hard to see how EU countries will draw a line in the sand between their geostrategic military objectives and their very realistic need for a stable oil supply. But in the midst of this chaos, Ursula von der Leyen has the answer. Borrow even more money. Borrow like there’s no tomorrow. Her latest proposal is to expand the current seven-year EU budget to 2 trillion euros, and there is only one way this can be achieved, as member states are never going to cough up more for the EU experiment. She will be forced to borrow from international banks to replace a previous loan of 750 billion euros for COVID. This is the solution for failing economies. Where once for so many years EU apparatchiks would defend the EU’s failure to implement its own rule book, in preference for constantly adopting new legislation, now this seems to have been replaced by ‘create a panic about Russia and make the EU a sort of executive of NATO without a single trace of democratic virtue’. Von der Leyen doesn’t stipulate what this massive increase is for, but we can assume some of it will be siphoned off for Ukraine. Madness on steroids. But hidden in the text is a new series of taxes which the EU itself could impose on individuals, and so in the smoke-and-mirrors confusion we see there is a back-door way to start taxing EU citizens, something Brussels never touched before. How long has the whole project got?

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Where growth persists, and at what cost

Those who study economic crises tend to imagine them as sudden shocks: a collapse that triggers panic, a stock market that plummets in a single session, a border that closes. These are the events of 2008 and 2020, the storms that mark a before and after. But there is a second form of suffering, less photogenic and more insidious, which does not make the headlines: slow paralysis, the absence of growth, an economy spinning its wheels without ever sinking or regaining momentum. This condition was familiar to seafarers. The sailing ships crossing the Atlantic feared hurricanes, but they also feared the Sargasso Sea, that currentless expanse where the wind died down and the hull remained trapped in seaweed for weeks. In 2026, the global economy is facing this second threat above all, and it is like the Titanic, as Leonid Grigoryev brilliantly wrote.

The ocean liner, to stick with the metaphor, has not sunk: it is afloat, and still growing, but it is making slow progress and its hull is holed in several places. Lookouts scan a fog that shows no sign of lifting, and captains are banking on the iceberg staying at bay. In its July forecasts, the International Monetary Fund has revised its global growth forecast for 2026 downwards, bringing it to 3 per cent compared with 3.5 per cent the previous year. Translated into absolute terms, against a global GDP exceeding one hundred trillion dollars at purchasing power parity, that half-point loss amounts to hundreds of billions that will not be converted into wages, tax revenue or investment. The tariff war between Washington and Brussels is being absorbed by the main players, but it leaves in its wake realignments and collateral friction, from Ireland to Canada; and, for purely accounting rather than political reasons, the prospect of the United Kingdom’s economic fragmentation is resurfacing.

The post-pandemic expansionary phase has never followed a clear course, and continues to come up against the obstacles of geopolitics. One driver in particular has fuelled GDP growth in recent quarters: the rush to build data centres. This represents a massive and geographically concentrated demand for investment, which has driven exports from Asian suppliers of semiconductors and equipment — South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand — but which relies on just a few companies and on expected returns that have yet to be realised. Such a cycle fuels GDP as long as construction work is under way; the crux of the matter arises later, when the installed capacity must generate revenues commensurate with the capital expended. Outside this framework, economies that grow do so for internal reasons: China on the strength of its own demand and manufacturing, India on its domestic market, and the United States on a combination of immigration, capital inflows and public spending.

The American case in particular warrants a clarification that debunks a common misconception. Every year, the United States imports goods worth around one trillion dollars more than it exports, and at the same time its leaders lament the loss of its industrial base. The two circumstances are not contradictory: they are the same equation viewed from two sides. A current account deficit of such proportions is, by accounting definition, nothing other than the counterpart to foreign savings flowing into the United States: the world supplies goods and, in return, accumulates assets in dollars, Treasury bonds and shares. As long as the greenback remains the reserve currency and the US securities market the most liquid pool available, this privilege finances the deficit on terms unattainable for anyone else. The same flow, however, props up the real exchange rate, penalises the export-oriented industry and is precisely what causes the deindustrialisation that is so often lamented. Tariffs strike at the trade side whilst leaving the financial root intact: they reshape the balance, they do not eliminate it.

The stranglehold of yields and the burden of debt

Towards the middle of the year, global inflation picked up again, driven largely by rising energy prices. A rise in prices stemming from costs, rather than excess demand, presents central banks with their most unpleasant choice: to rein in an economy already weakened by the shock, so as not to allow expectations to become unanchored. High energy prices act as a regressive tax, eroding disposable income and feeding through to price levels at the slow pace dictated by index-linked contracts and regulated prices.

On the debt front, the strain is even more evident. Yields on long-term government bonds are rising at an alarming rate: in the United States, the 10-year yield has hit 5 per cent, with other advanced economies following suit. It is not just the level that matters, but its structure. The long end of the curve is reflecting a rising term premium – that is, the compensation investors demand for tying up money over long horizons when inflation and the volume of new money entering the system remain uncertain. The stock of debt is already colossal, and the cheap bonds issued during the era of zero interest rates are being replaced, as they mature, with far more expensive issues: the average cost rises with a lag, but it does rise. Here, elementary and inflexible arithmetic prevails: the comparison between the real interest rate and the rate of real growth. When the economy grows faster than the cost of its debt, the burden eases of its own accord; when the relationship is reversed — and this is what is happening today in several wealthy countries — keeping the debt-to-GDP ratio stable requires budget surpluses that the electorate rarely allows.

A technical manoeuvre with political implications is helping to tighten the noose. The treasury departments of the major economies are seeking to return to the open market a portion of the long-term bonds hitherto held on central banks’ balance sheets, just as the latter are allowing the bonds accumulated during quantitative easing to mature and reducing their assets. The result is that the net supply of long-term bonds available to private investors increases the moment the lender of last resort steps aside; to absorb this supply, the market demands higher yields. At the same time, central banks are gradually raising interest rates to combat inflation, and the combination of these factors is pushing the system towards stagnation. It is the calm of the Sargasso Sea, not the storm. Against this backdrop, every additional unit of military spending, in budgets already stretched to the limit, becomes one unit less for healthcare, education and public works: the old choice between ‘guns and butter’, replayed on a continental scale.

Energy rents are changing hands

An entire region, the Middle East, has slipped into negative territory due to the fall in hydrocarbon production and exports. The rise in prices and margins — and, consequently, in dividends and share prices — has rewarded US energy companies, which control marginal production capacity and can turn on the taps when prices rise. This is a redistribution of rent: from the traditional supplier to the producer that has gained flexibility in recent years. The Middle East pays twice over – on its current export income and on its worn-out or damaged physical infrastructure – whilst profits migrate overseas.

Higher crude oil prices and diesel shortages do not merely weigh on factories, transport and the construction sector. Diesel powers logistics and mechanised agriculture, and a rise in its price ripples through the entire supply chain with a pervasiveness that petrol lacks. The most serious repercussions, however, lie beyond the statistics: uncertainty over energy prices raises the rate at which businesses discount long-term projects and discourages the accumulation of capital on which tomorrow’s growth depends. No prosperity can be sustained by data centres alone.

Europe in a lull

Against this backdrop, the world’s second-largest economic bloc — the European Union, including the United Kingdom, with over half a billion consumers — offers no counterbalance. Its GDP is, in practice, growing at the same rate as its population: measured per capita — the only way that truly reflects living standards — stagnation is almost total. It is weighed down by public debt and deficits, outdated industrial structures and infrastructure, and a demographic that even migration flows have failed to rejuvenate quickly enough. The underlying problem has a specific name: a productivity gap that has been widening for over a decade. Europe spends less on research and digital capital, fragments the capital market across twenty-seven legal systems, and has failed to produce technological leaders comparable to those in the US or China.

Capital is flowing out to the United States, drawn by higher returns and deeper markets; manufacturing is losing ground to Chinese production, which is now competitive not only on cost but also on technology; and politics, almost everywhere, is fragmented into fragile majorities that make any far-reaching reform a struggle. Energy costs are structurally much higher than in the United States — a legacy of dependence on imported gas and a transition launched without a stable supply bridge — and this gap is eroding energy-intensive industries. Productivity remains well below that of China in competitive sectors, and the mood of the electorate, as the polls show, is gloomier than one might expect in such a fortunate corner of the world. Meanwhile, the climate has also warmed too much, without waiting for the benefits of green programmes to materialise.

Sanctions and the tide turning

Almost everyone is aware of the dangers associated with the escalating sanctions spiral, but they dismiss them as a nuisance in day-to-day management. The point is that there is no orderly way out of the tangle of legal constraints, commercial interests and political calculations — determined by legislative and administrative bodies that fail to coordinate with one another. There remains the extreme measure that history associates with Solon: to wipe the slate clean in one go, as Athens did at the dawn of the 6th century BC with the seisachtheia, the debt relief that wiped out debts and re-established the civic pact. In the meantime, sanctions, the destruction of extraction and transport capacity, and the loss of export markets – factors that accumulate – behave like rogue waves: they plough through the oceans and return, often swelled in size, to those who generated them, in the form of imported inflation, disrupted supplies and exchange rate realignments.

There is a maxim of Clausewitz’s that can usefully be turned on its head here: if, for him, war was the continuation of politics by other means, sanctions are the continuation of war by means other than weapons. And the heaviest blows—as well as the most unjust ones—fall upon countries and social classes that are uninvolved in those conflicts and would prefer to remain so. After such experiences, it is hard not to yearn for less globalisation and less interdependence: systems theory teaches us that when the elements of a large network become unstable, the return to equilibrium is slower, because disturbances travel along the connections rather than dying out. It is the bitter flip-side of a global economy that had made integration its strength and is now discovering its vulnerability.

An inventory of imbalances

The likelihood of a recession depends, as always, on two factors: the accumulation of imbalances and a trigger which, by definition, cannot be predicted. The imbalances are the gunpowder — excessive leverage, inflated share valuations, risk concentrated among a few players, debt maturities clustered in the same months; the trigger is the event that ignites the fuse: a new pandemic, a stock market crash, a major collapse along the lines of 2008. Whether the gunpowder is accumulating is now a matter of debate amongst specialists. Added to this is a growing number of entities already sacrificed by geopolitical conflicts, by the slowdown and by the diversion of resources, diverted from development to stem the losses.

At the top of the list of forgotten costs lie global problems: poverty, development gaps and climate change. The Sustainable Development Goals set by the UN for 2030 will likely be achieved to around 17 per cent, with entire sections barely sketched out. A new-generation global project is needed, but this presupposes peace, compromise, coordination, stability and trust: all scarce resources, and trust more than any other. The ruling classes seem to have shifted their focus from long-term horizons to short-term clashes. International organisations have little impact; the major developed nations are preoccupied with their own troubles and sanctions; and no one is answering the question of who will take on the shared tasks — catch-up development, poverty reduction, and the management of global public goods. In almost every country, large sections of the population are grappling with one form of hardship or another, whether in healthcare, education or inequality of living standards.

Who will foot the bill

That burden will, by default, fall on the shoulders of the major emerging economies, whose interests largely coincide with global objectives and certainly do not run counter to them: the BRICS grouping and a number of like-minded countries. They have fewer resources than the West, but necessity compels them to coordinate their efforts. The Declaration from the latest summit, marking the group’s twentieth anniversary, rings out as a voice of reason in an era that uneasily evokes the so-called Thucydides’ Trap — that mechanism whereby mutual fear between a dominant power and an emerging one drives them towards conflict even when neither truly seeks it. There is no shortage of friction amongst the members, with divergent political systems and unequal levels of prosperity; yet the document points the way towards compromise – namely, the strengthening of the UN and the reform of the IMF – recognising that there are no radical shortcuts. In paragraph 49, it acknowledges that global challenges are intertwined and complex, hindering growth and exacerbating persistent disparities between countries and regions.

At an operational level, the Declaration outlines an industrial and energy policy tailored to the task of moving beyond the Fourth Industrial Revolution: completing infrastructure, boosting manufacturing, railways and innovation, ensuring access to technology and transitioning to home-grown technologies, whilst investing in human capital and social issues. It also defends free trade, open markets, freedom of movement and the security of global savings and finance, and puts forward an independent stance on the governance of artificial intelligence — already looking beyond the present. The fundamental demand is institutional: these countries have operated for decades within frameworks designed by the West, and are now calling for bodies that work for their own development. A review of IMF quotas to reflect actual economic weight, a broader role for institutions such as the New Development Bank, and payment channels less exposed to the geopolitical use of reserve currencies.

How much of this will translate into actual capacity remains the real unknown, to be measured in terms of probability rather than certainty. It is plausible, with moderate confidence, that over the coming years the group will consolidate settlement systems in national currencies and development financing; it is unlikely, for the time being, that it will supplant existing institutions or undermine the reserve currency – a goal that would require deep and liquid bond markets outside the dollar zone, which are not currently in evidence. The indicators to watch are tangible: the outcome of the IMF quota review, the volumes disbursed by the New Development Bank, and the share of intra-regional trade settled outside the dollar. However, those calling for institutions that serve their own development and the common good have a solid argument, because reform of the global architecture is the only arena in which partial compromises can still generate trust. Declarations of principle, repeated for years, only become part of the agenda when someone funds them.

And no inclusive governance can hold without respect for the cultural identities of peoples: that is where trust can be rebuilt – the commodity the world lacks most of all today.

Die EU verlängert ihre Russland-Sanktionen um drei Jahre. Damit wird der Wirtschaftskrieg zum Geschäftsmodell: zugunsten US-amerikanischer Energiekonzerne und Fonds – und zulasten der Europäer. Wer sich in diesen Tagen die Entscheidung der EU anschaut, die Strafmaßnahmen gegen Russland für volle drei Jahre zu verlängern, muss sich unwillkürlich an Julian Assanges Diktum erinnert fühlen:

„Das eigentliche Ziel ist ein endloser Krieg, kein erfolgreicher Krieg.“

Denn der völkerrechtswidrige Wirtschaftskrieg gegen Russland mittels einseitiger Sanktionen, der in kolonialer Absicht formal auf eine Verhaltensänderung Moskaus gerichtet ist, wird zum Selbstzweck.

Ungeachtet der Zerstörungen, die die Sanktionen in der Wirtschaft der EU-Mitgliedstaaten selbst anrichten, schält sich immer deutlicher heraus: Die Verewigung der EU-Sanktionen, die bisher halbjährlich oder jährlich verlängert wurden, dient vor allem der Interessendurchsetzung von US-Energiekonzernen sowie der Profitmaximierung von US-Investmentfonds wie BlackRock. Durch die Sanktionen erlangen sie unter anderem eine Monopolstellung bei der Energieversorgung Europas und können zu viel höheren Preisen verkaufen als eine mögliche russische Konkurrenz.

Die Investmentfonds profitieren wiederum von der begleitenden Hochrüstungspolitik – nicht nur in den USA, sondern auch durch ihre Beteiligungen an deutschen Rüstungsschmieden wie Rheinmetall.

Es gibt also ein Profitinteresse sowohl daran, den Wirtschaftskrieg zu verlängern, als auch daran, die Situation gegenüber Russland zu eskalieren. Dieses Interesse schlägt über die Europäer voll durch.

Es mag paradox klingen, aber ein erfolgreicher Wirtschaftskrieg würde dieses Bereicherungsmodell rasch beenden. Dass man jetzt für die kommenden drei Jahre Sanktionen verhängt, zeigt denn auch, dass man kein Interesse an einer schnellen Beendigung des Stellvertreterkrieges des Westens in der Ukraine hat. Mit einer Verhaltensänderung wird nicht gerechnet. Die Sanktionen sind zum Modell geworden, die Europäer auszurauben. Sie sind nichts anderes als ein Unterwerfungsakt unter die Vorgaben aus den USA. Der Vasallenstatus der Europäer wird so weiter vertieft – bis hin zur Gefahr, dass man die Bereitschaft zeigt, sich selbst für Washington aufzuopfern.

Es ist denn auch kein Widerspruch dazu, dass man, während man die Sanktionen gegen 3.000 Personen und Organisationen verlängert, zwei russische Oligarchen jetzt davon ausnehmen will. Die Aufhebung der EU-Strafmaßnahmen gegen Alischer Usmanow und Michail Fridman dient den Interessen einzelner Mitgliedstaaten und ist offenbar der verzweifelte Versuch, Russland zum eigenen Vorteil destabilisieren zu wollen.

Grönland als Vertragsmodell

Immer deutlicher wird hingegen, dass sich die Europäer dem aktualisierten US-Kolonialmodell unterordnen. Während der deutsche Kanzler Merz das Abkommen über Grönland zwischen Dänemark und den USA als Erhalt der Souveränität feiert, spricht der Text der Vereinbarung eine ganz andere Sprache.

Das Abkommen von 1951 war an die NATO gebunden und an dänische Mitwirkung gekoppelt. Der neue Deal gilt ohne Enddatum und überdauert sogar eine mögliche Unabhängigkeit Grönlands. Die USA sichern sich dauerhafte Stützpunkte, können weitere Basen mit dem Schutz des amerikanischen Kontinents begründen und müssen über das Prinzip neuer Standorte nicht mehr verhandeln, sondern nur noch über deren Ausführung. US-Truppen bewegen sich frei zu Land, zu Wasser und in der Luft – nun auch unter Wasser –, ohne dass dänische Behörden in Grönland dafür noch die Regeln setzen.

Hinzu kommt ein Vetorecht: gegen militärische Präsenz von Nicht-NATO-Staaten und gegen Investitionen von außerhalb der westlichen Blöcke in sensible Sektoren und Ressourcen. Formal bleibt die Souveränität Dänemarks und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht Grönlands bestätigt. Tatsächlich entstehen quasi extraterritoriale Entitäten, in denen Kopenhagen und Nuuk nichts zu sagen haben. Die USA bestimmen die zentralen Bereiche der Politik auf der Insel und sichern sich ein privilegiertes Ausbeutungsrecht.

Ein Modell für die ganze Hemisphäre

Zugleich wurde ein Vertragsmodell geschaffen, das auch für andere Gegenden der westlichen und der nördlichen Hemisphäre gelten soll: von Venezuela über die Kanalzone in Panama bis hin zu den Küsten Kanadas.

Es ist zugleich das Modell für eine Zerschlagung Russlands, die als Folge des Abnutzungskriegs in der Ukraine angestrebt wird, um gegenüber China wieder in die Vorhand zu kommen und den eigenen Niedergang aufzuhalten.

Moral des Völkermords

Die Moral dieser Ordnung hat US-Präsident Donald Trump vor der UN mit seiner Auslöschungsdrohung gegenüber dem Iran zusammengefasst. Sollte der Iran nicht den Vorgaben aus Washington zustimmen, dann „treibe ich sie in die Hölle“. Es ist die Moral des Völkermords.

Es liegt auf der Hand, dass der immer höhere Einsatz des Westens im Versuch, die Welt zu kolonisieren, die entsprechenden Gegenkräfte auf den Plan rufen wird. Allein in Europa wird man diese bei einer Kompradorenbourgeoisie vergeblich suchen.

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The U.S.-Canada relationship is entering a period of strategic change as economic tensions, U.S. pressure and Canada’s push for diversification challenge the foundations of their traditional partnership. From Closest Partners to Strategic Friction The Trump administration imposed 50% tariffs on Canadian goods, in response to which Ottawa has imposed retaliatory 15%- 50% tariffs on the […]

On Wednesday (16 September) Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney had a good day at the EU Parliament in Strasbourg. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated that she would like to work with Mr Carney “on opening the door for Canada to be the first associate member of the European Union", writes Dick Roche.

Prime Minister Carney was given a standing ovation by the Parliament’s Members. While it is not clear  what ‘associate EU Membership’ means, the offer from the Commission President and the welcome by MEPs was a plus, of sorts, for Mr Carney in his battle with President Trump.

A bumpy relationship

The relationship between Prime Minister Carney and President Trump was always destined to be a bumpy one. Days before President Trump was sworn in for his second term Justin Trudeau stepped down as Prime Minister of Canada. As Trudeau was leaving office the president-elect repeated comments that he had made during the 2024 US elections about Canada becoming the 51^st US State.

On 1 February 2025, as the contest to replace Mr Trudeau as the Liberal Party leader was getting underway President Trump, announced a 25% tariff on imports from Canada, Mexico and Canada: Canadian energy exports were subject to a 10% tariff. Trump explained the tariffs were intended to address the emergency related to fentanyl trafficking and illegal immigration.

Nine days later Trump announced a blanket 25% tariff on all imported steel and aluminium to “protect US industry and national security.” This hit Canada the biggest foreign supplier of steel and aluminium into the US market badly.

The pain for Canada did not stop there, on 26^th March Trump announced his 25% tariff on all automobile imports into the US. Again, another bad hit on - most Canadian vehicle production is destined for the US market. The impact on Canadian auto producers was somewhat ameliorated by the fact that the tariff applied only to non-US content vehicle imports from Canada.

The stream of tariff announcements from the US while hurting Canada played to Mark Carney’s advantage in the race for leadership of Canada’s Liberal Party. While a "political ingénue" never having held political office or been a Member of a Member of Canada’s Parliament Mr Carney brought deep economic experience to the contest. He won almost 87% of the votes cast in the leadership election.

Mr Carney was sworn in as Prime Minister of Canada on 14^th March 2025 - seven weeks into President Trump’s second term. Six weeks after his swearing in Mark Carney was elected to the Canadian House of Commons in the General Election of 28^th April 2025.  

Placating a cranky neighbour

From the outset  Prime Minister Mark Carney invested considerable effort in improving relations with President Trump. The two leaders met in the White House on 6^th May. The meeting, reportedly, went well.

Asked at the press briefing after the meeting about Trump’s suggestions that Canada should become the 51^st US state, Carney responded humorously. He recalled that during the recent elections he had met the owners of Canada. They were not he said interested in ‘selling the property’, something that Mr Trump as a property man would understand. Smiling President Trump responded ‘never say never.’

At the G7 meeting held in Kananaskis, Alberta, in June President Trump and Mr Carney had another cordial meeting.  

The cordiality  did not last long. At the end of June the first payments on Canada’s Digital Services Tax (DST) were due to be made.  The DST legislation enacted during the Trudeau Government, hit US tech companies causing fury in the White House. Trump called the tax a "direct and blatant attack on our country" and announced all trade talks with Canada would cease immediately.

Within days Carney announced that his administration would rescind the DST and halt the collection of the tax to advance negotiations with the US.

There was another flashpoint in January when President Trump reacted to reports that Canada and China were pursuing a comprehensive free trade deal. Prime Minister Carney defused the situation by explaining the talks with China were focused on adjusting existing arrangements.

While Carney faced criticism for ‘climbing down’ on the DST issue and for being too eager to placate the White House on China, his approach got US-Canada trade talks back underway.

By August 2025 there was some optimism that a breakthrough trade talks was close.  On August 18^th President Trump announced that a tentative understanding had been reached and as a result he was prepared to push back on the late August deadline for US tariff increases. 

The talks came to an abrupt halt three days later when Carney instructed Canada’s negotiating team to return to Ottawa.

That decision came as a surprise. Walking away risked incurring the wrath of President Trump. That was a risk that the Canadian PM had clearly calibrated.

When the US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer sought to blame Canada for the breakdown Carney responded that it was the US United States that made last-minute demands which Canada considered unacceptable, including efforts to introduce provisions that would impact Canada's trade autonomy and sovereignty.

President Trump  reacted immediately to Canada’s decision.  Using  a section of the Tariff Act 1930 that had never been used previously Trump imposed 50% tariffs across US$20 billion worth of Canadian products exported to the US.  

Carney announced that Canada would hit US exports to Canada with “dollar for dollar” retaliatory measures. These would come into  effect immediately after Labour Day 7^th September –the day when the starting gun for US mid-term elections is ‘fired’ to get into full swing.

Asked at the press conference whether Canada was starting a trade war with the United States, Mr. Carney responded: “you’re at war when you get attacked—we got attacked.”

In a televised address, Carney acknowledged that the steps he was taking  would come at a cost but argued that U.S. actions had left him with little alternative. He characterized the measures being taken by the United States as an attempt to hurt and divide Canadians. That, he suggested, was a miscalculation. Rather than weakening Canada, U.S. pressure would, he said, bring Canadians closer together.  

Backing Carney

All of indications suggest that Prime Minister Carney was correct in his assessment.

The leader of the Conservative Party Canada, Pierre Poilievre who previously accused Carney of being too willing to concede to Trump, strongly supported the decision to walk away from those trade talks.

Mr Poilievre  was not alone, with one exception the Premiers of Canadian Provinces publicly supported Prime Minister Carney’s stance.

The Premier of Ontario Canada’s most populous province, Doug Ford, an open critic of the US President, encouraged PM Carney to respond to Trump “tariff for tariff, dollar for dollar.”

The Quebec Premier, Christine Fréchette, was particularly supportive  of Carney’s refusal to make concessions to Trump on Quebec’s cultural protections.

Other Premiers have encouraged Carney to “fight back,” praised “team Canada,” criticised US tariff threats as unjustified, promised “full support,” and urged that Canada not accept a ‘subordinate economic relationship’ to the US.  

The Premier of Alberta where a referendum on a range of questions including Alberta’s future within Canada is to be held on 19^th October was the lone outrider,  cautioning against celebrating retaliatory tariffs and expressed the hope that negotiations be resumed.

Public support in Canada for the position taken by Carney has been positive. Reuters referred to  the tariff dispute encouraging a ‘rally around Canada’ effect that will likely dampen support for Alberta separation from Canada.

Ten days after the Canadian negotiating team abandoned the trade talks in Washington Carney’s Liberal Party received a very tangible indication of voter support when it won three by-elections for seats in the Canadian House of Commons including a seat in Quebec that had previously been held by a Conservative Party Member.

Opinion polls since the Canadian team walked away from the negotiations also show strong support for the position taken the Carney government.  

An Ipsos poll taken on August 26-27 indicates support across party lines for Canada standing up to the US - even if it resulted in higher costs and job losses: 63% of those surveyed felt Canada was right to stand firm in the negotiations.  Just 18 per cent said Canada should have made additional sacrifices to get a deal.

An Angus Reid Institute poll taken on 22 and 23 August immediately after the talks were ended found that 76% supported the line taken by the Canadian government.

A third poll by Abacus Data one of Canada’s most cited polling firms found that 60% approved of how the Carney government had handled the dispute while  18% disapproved.

Negatives for Trump

In the US, unsurprisingly, positions on the trade war with Canada splits along party lines. Democrats overwhelmingly oppose the Trump’s position arguing that tariffs cost consumers and businesses.

On 9^th September a group of nine Democrat Senators from states with close business ties with Canada issued a joint statement attacking President Trump’s “senseless trade war” with a key trading partner, primary export market and most enduring defence partner, pointing out that the President’s actions would force Canada to “diversify away from the US and deepen trade ties with other countries including China.”

Republicans generally, but not universally, support Trump’s position, arguing that Trump’s tariff stance is ‘putting America first.’ Concerns have been flagged in the Republican ranks that the tariffs will be an issue in the November mid-terms, particularly in competitive Senate and House races.  

Senator Susan Collins of Maine, the US state most exposed to the tariff dispute with Canada, who is facing a tough re-election contest in November has labelled the tariffs on Canada ‘a mistake’ pointing out that Canadian retaliation could cost Maine up to $170 million in export losses.  The Republican governor of Vermont has also been openly critical.    

The position for President Trump is considerably less positive than that of Prime Minister Carney. The Canadian Prime Minister enjoys the public and political support that President Trump conspicuously lacks. As this week's appearance in the European Parliament demonstrated Mr Carney’s support is not confined to Canada; he has international support which, President Trump again conspicuously lacks.

At the moment there is no obvious ‘off ramp’ to facilitate  a return to the negotiating table. Politically and temperamentally it will be harder for President Trump to pull back from the position he has taken in the tariff war than it will be for Mark Carney. Mr Carney has more political support for his position, at home and internationally than President Trump. He has also  played an infinitely better game than Mr Trump. For the moment the ball is very much in Mark Carney’s court. 

Dick Roche is a former Irish Minister for European Affairs and former Minister for the Environment. 

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