By Jeffrey Silverman – New Eastern Outlook – September 26, 2026

Ukraine is already providing an early glimpse of what may become a much larger post-war phenomenon: highly trained combat personnel, particularly special-forces and other specialists, carrying their battlefield skills beyond the borders of the countries, in which they acquired them, with many of them NATO trained.

History offers plenty of warnings. Africa has spent decades wrestling with the problem of demobilized combatants, soldiers and guerrillas, whose military skills suddenly have little obvious place in civilian economies.

South Africa and Georgia both provide instructive case studies. After apartheid, using the South African example, the labor force had to absorb, integrate or demobilize personnel from competing military and paramilitary structures. Thousands of former combatants faced unemployment and uncertain futures, while the new South African National Defence Force itself eventually had to undergo substantial downsizing, and not only among white troops.

So what happens when the largest European land war in generations finally winds down? What will the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian servicemen do when the battlefield no longer needs them, and the economy cannot reintegrate them?

Many will also have significant trauma, both mental and physical, the former being far harder to identify, it is an unfortunate fact that many former combatants will have developed a taste for killing.

And that is where the story becomes considerably more uncomfortable.

In 2024, UNODC and international organized-crime specialists were already examining the possibility that Ukraine’s enormous post-war veteran population could become a source of organized-crime risk—not because veterans were inherently criminal, but because demobilization, weapons proliferation, inadequate reintegration and the availability of trained manpower could create conditions attractive to criminal networks.

Have Gun, Will Travel is an old American expression, but it may acquire a new geopolitical meaning in the aftermath of the Ukraine war. The world already has a market for soldiers, military trainers, private security personnel and combat veterans. Africa, the Middle East and other conflict zones have repeatedly demonstrated the demand for experienced men with battlefield skills.

Will wealthy states, such as the Gulf monarchies, Western governments, private military companies and international security organizations see this enormous reservoir of experience as a manpower pool to be exploited? Almost certainly in fact, it is already happening in Africa, where Ukrainian “specialists” are aiding terrorist groups, particularly in the Sahel, aiming to overthrow governments that have been causing the French problems.

It is doubtful that so many of these veterans be recruited for legitimate security and peacekeeping missions but rather for the less visible wars conducted through proxies, contractors and allied forces as US Flag Draped in Dover Delaware is not politically expedient.

The next major Ukrainian export may not be agricultural products, weapons, or drones. But battlefield tested military experience.

There is a particularly interesting precedent in Africa. War on the Rocks warned several years ago that the eventual end of the Ukraine war could produce an influx of experienced personnel into African conflicts. And we can now see the reverse phenomenon too: Russia has recruited tens of thousands of foreign nationals into its war, including substantial numbers from Africa.

The fact that Ukrainian personnel or Ukrainian-trained capabilities are already appearing in African theaters would suggest that the post-war question isn’t simply what happens to Ukrainian veterans inside Ukraine? It is also who will recruit their expertise internationally?

The broader literature is already warning about exactly this transition: the Global Initiative has specifically examined organized-crime risks surrounding Ukraine’s eventual veteran population.

Demand for armed warm bodies

That does not require those governments to deliberately create a “mercenary army.” Governments already have incentives to use contractors, partner forces, local auxiliaries and allied personnel when they don’t want to commit their own regular forces.

The postwar Ukrainian veteran question is potentially a major international-security story in its own right.

“The postwar disposition of Ukraine’s enormous veteran population could become one of the most important security questions of the post-war period. History shows that when large numbers of highly trained combatants are simultaneously demobilized, economically marginalized and connected to international illicit markets, some will inevitably find employment in private warfare, political militias, transnational security networks and organized crime.”

Africa provides some very strong precedents

This has happened repeatedly in Africa. Research on Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe found that poorly designed demobilization and reintegration programs could themselves create later security problems.

And the phenomenon isn’t limited to Africa. Research on Colombia found that demobilization of armed groups could increase some forms of crime—particularly robbery—where former combatants were not successfully reintegrated.

Ukraine could produce a much larger version of the problem

This is where the argument becomes interesting.

Ukraine is potentially different in scale, technological sophistication and international connectivity. A future Ukrainian demobilization could involve enormous numbers of veterans. One recent analysis by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime estimates that Ukraine could eventually have up to nine million veterans, alongside millions of displaced people and refugees.

Obviously, nine million does not mean nine million armed or unemployed men. Most veterans will simply return to civilian life. But even a tiny percentage becoming involved in illicit activity could constitute a significant population.

The Financial Times reported that Colombian criminals have sought to send people into Ukraine to acquire advanced drone expertise and bring that knowledge back to criminal organizations in Colombia, and it is now becoming apparent the Mexican cartels are following suit.

The post-Soviet precedent is important too

There is another historical analogy that may be even more relevant than Africa: the breakup of the Soviet Union.

When the USSR collapsed, large numbers of trained military personnel suddenly found themselves outside a functioning Soviet military system. Some went into private security and legitimate military contracting; others became involved in mercenary activity. Former Soviet military personnel subsequently appeared in conflicts in Africa and elsewhere.

Ukraine is producing veterans with skills that did not exist at anything like today’s scale in previous wars—particularly FPV/drone warfare, electronic warfare and battlefield intelligence.

But there is another elephant in the room. The combat in Ukraine has been brutal, well beyond anything else seen in recent decades. Combined with the violently racist nationalist indoctrination by the Ukrainian government, this has created a large number of emotionally traumatised young men and women, for whom killing comes natural.

If enough of these individuals are recruited into the worlds conflict zones, either by state actors or the underworld and terrorists, the results will be absolutely horrific in terms of war crimes and brutality, as evidenced by the massacre of civilians during the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk, and now in Africa.

Those hoping to profit from the monster they have created may well find its teeth searching for them.

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Jeffrey K. Silverman is a freelance journalist and international development specialist, BSc, MSc, based for 30 years in Georgia and the former Soviet Union

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By Samyar Rostami – New Eastern Outlook – September 26, 2026

The persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.

For the past ten years, the Southern Red Sea has been a pivotal factor in the UAE’s foreign policy. Over the past decade, the UAE has built a layered maritime, air, and commercial infrastructure network, including military bases, in the Red Sea or near Yemen, Somaliland, Somalia and Sudan, starting from 2015.

According to some estimates, the value of UAE investments along Africa’s coastal regions and the Arabian Peninsula amounts to $60 billion.

In September 2015, the UAE established its first military base in Africa, in Eritrea. These bases possessed strategic advantages: the ‘protection of interests’ and control over the security and economic architecture of international maritime routes.

With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, cooperation between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi in the Red Sea intensified.

The UAE’s approach—channeled through companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports—is centered on controlling ports, strategic waterways, military bases, and key trade and energy routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in coordination with the United States and its allies. Abu Dhabi’s approach also included engagement with non-state armed actors and separatist movements in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.

Factors Behind the UAE’s Diminishing Role

Over the past decade, the UAE emerged as a party to the conflicts in the southern Red Sea. However, geopolitical developments over the past year signal a gradual decline in the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.

Several factors are also significant, stemming from US and Israeli military strikes against Iran, the war between Sanaa and Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Emirati rivalry in the region, and disputes among African states.

Sudan’s value lies in its geopolitics. With 853 kilometres of coastline and several key ports, Sudan constitutes a vital link in the Red Sea.

The Sudan war since April 2023 has created conditions for the expansion of the UAE’s role. The UAE faces accusations of providing training and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Human rights and political demands against the UAE has increased.

The UAE also maintains bases inside Sudanese territory. However, the ongoing war in Sudan and the support of allies for the Sudanese government have led to increased pressure on the UAE.

Riyadh regards the Red Sea as part of its strategic interests and its exclusive backyard. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh each view the other as a direct threat to their position and interests in parts of the southern Red Sea. Thus, the reduction of the UAE’s footprint in the southern Red Sea constitutes a strategic gain for Riyadh. Riyadh has effectively sought to weaken Abu Dhabi’s role.

In late 2025, Saudi Arabia’s support for Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) resulted in pressure being brought to bear on UAE-backed forces.

In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks among 14 countries—including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia—which established a multinational maritime defence alliance. The UAE and Ethiopia were excluded from the list.

The formation of a Riyadh-led Red Sea maritime task force—with the participation of Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea—without coordination with the UAE amounts to a further constriction of the UAE’s role in the region.

Despite ongoing Egyptian–Emirati consultations on guaranteeing maritime navigation security in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, Egypt’s foreign policy is not aligned with the UAE’s interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. Additionally, the alignment and coordination among Israel, India, the UAE, and Ethiopia are not particularly consonant with Egypt’s interests in Ethiopia and the Red Sea.

Until last September, the UAE played a significant role in the southern Yemeni islands of the Red Sea and in southwestern Yemen. However, Sanaa’s advance in the eastern Red Sea—the port of Mokha, Mayun Island, and other archipelagos north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait—in September 2026 inflicted negative and fundamental consequences on the UAE’s regional role.

Sanaa’s advance amounts to the nullification of the presence of Emirati actors in Yemen’s future political sphere. Sanaa is seeking to consolidate itself as a strategic “node” within the Iran-led Axis of Resistance.

Despite Cairo’s opposition to Sanaa’s proposal for maritime navigation coordination in the Red Sea, Sanaa—having secured control over the most important islands and cities overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait on the Yemeni side—is calling for the formulation of new rules to ensure security and navigation in the region. Ansar Allah’s control over Bab al-Mandab could put the UAE under pressure. Any expansion of Sanaa’s role in Sudan could likewise prove detrimental to the UAE.

Amid tensions between the United States and Iran, Abu Dhabi finds itself facing a more constrained strategic space.

The UAE’s alignment with the United States is, in a sense, also an intensification of Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Iran in areas such as the Red Sea. Unlike the UAE, Iran is seeking better relations with the Sudanese government. Many in Iran believe that Israel and the UAE are devising an economic and geopolitical plan to control the vital routes of the Red Sea and Yemen’s ports.

With Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, many in the countries of the southern Red Sea have linked it to the UAE.

After years, Eritrea revoked the UAE’s access to its military infrastructure. Eritrean officials have recently made sharp statements about the UAE and Israel—particularly regarding Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland.

Eritrea is providing frontline support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Any deeper alliance between Eritrea and Sudan, Iran, Russia, China, and Sanaa could diminish the UAE’s regional role in the Red Sea. Additionally, some countries and actors near the Red Sea also hold a negative view of the UAE’s regional role.

The Somali government’s decision in January 2026 to sever relations with the UAE is, in a sense, a counter to the UAE’s role in the Somaliland and Puntland regions. Somalia has revoked all agreements with the UAE, including cooperation as well as security and defence arrangements. This move has negative implications for the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.

Moreover, the southern Red Sea plays a pivotal role in the regional strategy of Russia and Beijing. For example, apart from China’s role in Djibouti, Beijing is Eritrea’s principal creditor and has expanded its influence in Sudan.

The developments of the past year have also contributed to a decline in the standing of the UAE’s allies in the region.

Outlook

The US presence in the Red Sea’s African states is rooted in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.

The European Union’s presence in the region, via Operation ASPIDES, is limited to commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Despite the UAE’s formal withdrawal from some bases, its economic and security influence, as well as its soft-power instruments, remain strong.

A decrease in UAE military deployments in the region could negatively impact its support for allies in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.

The UAE continues to have significant economic potential, secure partnerships, and influence in the southern Red Sea. In a way, this is considered a threat and a risk to certain African nations in the Red Sea region.

Certainly, a more extensive Sanaa presence over Bab al-Mandab, strategic coasts, and islands could confront Abu Dhabi’s maneuver and role in the southern Red Sea with a structural challenge.

The UAE’s approach in ports, logistics, energy, and other strategic infrastructure—along with deeper defense and security coordination with the West in the southern Red Sea—is likely to continue. However, the expansion of the UAE’s role also requires an extensive US presence in the Red Sea.

Moreover, the persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.

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Samyar Rostami is а political observer and senior researcher in international relations.

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