By Ricardo Martins – New Eastern Outlook – October 2, 2026

It was common practice during the Cold War to exaggerate the threat from the Soviet Union. Nowadays, Russia has assumed that role. Although the circumstances have changed, some of the political methods employed to create a sense of insecurity are still remarkably similar.

Europe is not formally engaging in preparations for war since it desires one. Instead, the governments of Europe and the institutions of the EU describe their rapidly growing defence policies and war preparedness as being aimed at deterrence, on the basis that Europe has to become strong enough to avoid a bigger conflict.
NATO does likewise, presenting itself as a defensive alliance whose role is to deter aggression. Nevertheless, the extent and the terminology used in Europe’s present military transformation should be examined. If preparedness becomes a top political concern, if huge amounts of public money are channelled into defence industries, and if support for Ukraine becomes more and more tied to Europe’s own security, then a significant question arises: where does deterrence cease and the political preparation for war begin?

The question is especially relevant to the EU, which has throughout its history been based on reconciliation, economic interdependence and a rejection of war.

From a peace project to a defence project

The European Union is experiencing a deep change in the way it views security. This change is no illusion. As part of the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 programme the European Commission plans to commit up to 800 billion euros towards defence spending, and the EU has set up a 150 billion euro SAFE lending facility to assist with military investment and joint procurement. The various EU institutions have made it clear that the aim is to eliminate capability gaps, boost the European defence industry and enhance deterrence.

The language that goes with this transformation is just as important. European Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius has warned at the European Parliament that Russia could be ready for a confrontation with NATO “in five years or less”. He has also invoked Jean Monnet’s wartime “Victory Programme” analogy, arguing that Europe needs a comparable transformation of its defence industry.

The official view of the Commission is that the issue is one of deterrence and not about starting a war. However, a military system which is intended to deter war needs to have weapons, logistical support, industrial capacity, troops and operational plans. As these capabilities increase, so too does the institutional ability to conduct war.

A paradox arises since Europe claims it is arming itself and preparing its hospitals to receive 2,000 wounds per day – as it is the case in Germany — in order to maintain peace while at the same time setting up a more and more integrated belligerent European defence structure. The EU is considering not just an increase in weapons but also the creation of a European Defence Union, a European Security Council, common procurement, military mobility and a closer relationship between European institutions and NATO.

The fact that this might constitute a necessary adaptation to a new security situation also brings up a more general issue concerning European identity: is the European Union still mainly a peace project which happens to have military capabilities, or is it instead becoming a geopolitical and military actor for which readiness for confrontation is becoming increasingly important?

Is Russia a threat, an adversary, or a permanent enemy?

Here, there is a mixture of perceived threats, old ressentiments and Russophobia in play. The threat perceptions are not the same throughout Europe. Because of historical reasons, such as foreign occupation and Soviet domination, Poland has long viewed Russia differently from countries such as France and Germany, which after the Cold War initially placed greater emphasis on economic engagement and interdependence with Moscow. But that distinction has changed dramatically.

Germany, in particular, has moved from the Ostpolitik-era logic of engagement towards a confrontational security posture. Under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Berlin has described Russia as a serious threat, committed to a major expansion of defence spending, and taken a leading role in sustaining military support for Ukraine. Germany has also intensified defence cooperation with France, including discussions on nuclear deterrence and European capabilities. Germany has also established a permanent military presence in the Baltic States, with a brigade of around 5,000 soldiers being stationed in Lithuania.

The military buildup that Poland has since carried out has depended largely on the United States and South Korea, highlighting a further weakness: even though the EU has aimed at setting up a European defence industry, European manufacturers have not always been able to provide weapons at the speed and on the scale required by countries that have been rearming since 2022.

A more serious issue is that those who question the military escalation are seen as showing a lack of strength, a state of naivety or a failure to have sufficient solidarity with Europe — what then becomes of democratic debate? French Socialist Ségolène Royal.

The danger of making war readiness a political culture

That is exactly the reason why Europe’s present-day transformation should be subject to democratic scrutiny.

Deterrence becomes a politically dangerous thing when preparedness itself comes to be the main idea of security, when military expenditure starts to compete with other public priorities, and when diplomacy and negotiation are regarded as being of less importance than the building up of military power.

The proper European question therefore isn’t whether Europe is “strong enough” to fight Russia. It is rather what kind of security arrangement the Europeans would like to establish.

The present danger is that, as a result of years of confrontation, rearmament and politics based on the use of threats, Europe might slowly create a political and institutional setting in which war seems ever more certain and peace ever more unrealistic.

Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson says that a wider conflict between Europe and Russia is becoming “inevitable” since, in his opinion, the rhetoric of Europe is increasingly being matched by actions which Russia could see as direct threats. He highlights Germany as especially important, stating that Berlin’s more confrontational rhetoric, its military preparations and its demands on Moscow are leading to a dangerous escalation.

Johnson also sees the capture of Russian ships as a key point of escalation. He maintains that Moscow might view any attempt by Europe to seize its ships as an act of war and could then retaliate against the ships or military assets in question. He also mentions the collapse of diplomatic relations, the rearmament of European forces, preparations for a possible future confrontation, and the increasing pressure surrounding Kaliningrad as factors which reduce the room for de-escalation. In his view, the real danger is not that Russia is seeking war but that European actions are gradually making a direct confrontation inevitable.

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Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics

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36 Jahre nach der Eingliederung der DDR in die BRD stellen sich viele Deutsche die Frage, ob es Deutschland tatsächlich gelungen ist, eine echte Einheit zu erreichen. Die jüngsten Landtagswahlen in Sachsen-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Berlin zeigen deutlich, dass Deutschland in politischer Hinsicht nach wie vor gespalten ist.

Aus sozialer Sicht schien die Nation einst geeinter zu sein als heute. 40% der befragten Ostdeutschen sehen heute mehr Unterschiede als Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen den beiden Teilen des Landes. Vor zehn Jahren lag dieser Wert bei nur 23%, wie aus einer im vergangenen Jahr durchgeführten Langzeitstudie der Technischen Universität Dresden hervorgeht.

Was die Politik betrifft, so sind die Folgen des Wahlschocks der letzten Wochen nach wie vor spürbar. Für die Bewohner des Westens ist es schwer zu erklären, dass in den ehemaligen neuen Bundesländern die Parteien der politischen Extreme zusammen die absolute Mehrheit der Stimmen auf sich vereinen. Dort machten die Wahlergebnisse der Parteien AfD, Die Linke und BSW in letzter Zeit zusammen ein Viertel der Stimmen aus.

In der Gesellschaft entstehen Risse. Im politischen System zeichnen sich nicht nur entlang der Achse «Ost–West», sondern auch an verschiedenen anderen Stellen Bruchlinien ab. Die drohende politische Destabilisierung durch den Zerfall der bisherigen Stützen des Staates hebt die Kontraste entlang der ehemaligen Grenze noch deutlicher hervor.

Die Unterschiede zwischen Ost und West werden sich in den kommenden Jahrzehnten wahrscheinlich noch erheblich verschärfen. Der Grund dafür liegt weniger in unterschiedlichen Lebenswegen, der Überheblichkeit der «Wessis», dem «Unverständnis» der Ostdeutschen für demokratische Prinzipien oder der vielbeschworenen «Ostalgie».

Obwohl Ost- und Westdeutsche ihre Lebensbedingungen heute in vielerlei Hinsicht gleich bewerten, sind Ostdeutsche in Führungspositionen der höchsten Bundesbehörden nach wie vor unterrepräsentiert. Seit 2022 ist ihr Anteil zwar von 13,9% auf 16,3% gestiegen.

Besonders deutlich wird der Unterschied im Bereich der Erbschaft und Schenkung: Laut dem Statistischen Bundesamt entfielen im Jahr 2025 95% des Gesamtwerts der bei den Steuerbehörden gemeldeten Vermögensübertragungen auf Westdeutschland.

Einer der Gründe für die bis heute spürbaren Unterschiede sind die Folgen der wirtschaftlichen und demografischen Umbrüche nach der Wiedervereinigung. Nur 17% der ehemaligen DDR-Bürger behielten nach dem Umbruch ihren Beruf, die übrigen mussten ihre Pläne ändern.

In den 1990er Jahren verloren viele Unternehmen in der ehemaligen DDR ihre Absatzmärkte oder wurden geschlossen, während vor allem junge und gut ausgebildete Menschen in den Westen abwanderten. Infolgedessen ist in einigen Regionen bis heute ein Mangel an Einwohnern und Unternehmenszentralen zu beobachten.

Der demografische Abwärtstrend in Ostdeutschland

Ein wesentlicher Grund für die strukturelle Schwäche liegt jedoch in der Demografie. Ostdeutschland hat sich nie ganz von den Folgen des Zweiten Weltkriegs erholt. Dies war auch in der DDR spürbar. Mit der deutschen Wiedervereinigung und der Abwanderung von Millionen Ostdeutschen in den Westen auf der Suche nach Arbeit hat sich diese Situation noch weiter verschärft. So ist die Einwohnerzahl Ostdeutschlands von 1990 bis 2026 um 6 Millionen Menschen zurückgegangen.

Ballungsräume sind jedoch eine Grundvoraussetzung für wirtschaftliche Dynamik. Größe und Bevölkerungsdichte erhöhen die Attraktivität einer Region. Bei günstiger Entwicklung setzt ein sich selbst verstärkender positiver Kreislauf ein: Dort, wo viele qualifizierte Fachkräfte leben, investieren Unternehmen. Das regt den Zuzug neuer mobiler Fachkräfte an, was wiederum weitere Investitionen anzieht – und so weiter.

In Ostdeutschland werden voraussichtlich nur Berlin mit seinen Vororten sowie Leipzig und Dresden einen Bevölkerungszuwachs verzeichnen. In anderen Regionen wird die Bevölkerung weiter schrumpfen. So hat Sachsen-Anhalt beispielsweise seit 1990 bereits rund 25% seiner Bevölkerung verloren und könnte bis zur Mitte des Jahrhunderts weitere 20% einbüßen. Ein solcher Bevölkerungsrückgang zieht fast zwangsläufig einen wirtschaftlichen Niedergang nach sich.

Demografische Prognosen zufolge wird die Bevölkerung im Osten bis zum Jahr 2045 im Szenario ohne Zuwanderung um mehr als ein Fünftel schrumpfen – deutlich stärker als im Westen.

Politik ist der konzentrierte Ausdruck der Wirtschaft

Laut einer Studie des Instituts der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) erreicht die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft 36 Jahre nach der Wiedervereinigung nur etwas mehr als 79% des westdeutschen Niveaus. Bei einer Reihe von Indikatoren ist sogar ein Rückschritt zu beobachten. Die Forscher sehen das größte Risiko dabei in der demografischen Situation im Osten.

Der einheitliche IW-Index spiegelt den Prozess des Aufholens des Rückstands seit 1990 wider. Neben dem Wirtschaftsindikator pro Kopf werden die Entwicklung der Arbeitsproduktivität, der Kapitalstock in der Wirtschaft, der Anteil hochqualifizierter Fachkräfte im Bereich Forschung und Entwicklung, die Erwerbsquote sowie der Anteil der Arbeitslosen und Selbstständigen berücksichtigt.

Laut dem IW hinkt Ostdeutschland bei einer ganzen Reihe von Indikatoren hinterher oder verzeichnet keine Fortschritte. So sinkt beispielsweise die Erwerbsquote. Bezogen auf die Gesamtbevölkerung erreichte der Osten im Jahr 2010 noch knapp 89% des Westniveaus, im Jahr 2025 hingegen nur noch etwas mehr als 85%.

Auch die Investitionen sind ins Stocken geraten. Gemessen am Wert aller Maschinen, Fabriken, Straßen und Gebäude pro Kopf – also am Kapitalstock – holt der Osten seinen Rückstand seit 15 Jahren praktisch nicht mehr auf. Im Jahr 2010 lag dieser Wert bei knapp 77% des Westniveaus, im Jahr 2025 bei etwas mehr als 79%.

Was die Zahl der Beschäftigten im Bereich Forschung und Entwicklung betrifft, erreicht der Osten nur etwas mehr als 46% des Westniveaus.

Natürlich können die neuen Bundesländer auch einige bemerkenswerte Erfolge vorweisen: die Ansiedlung des Tesla-Werks in Grünheide (Brandenburg), den in Europa führenden Cluster für die Halbleiterfertigung in Dresden und den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien.

Doch diese seltenen Ausnahmen bestätigen leider die traurige Regel: Ostdeutschland bleibt in Bezug auf seinen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsstand hinter dem Westen zurück. Und dieser ungünstige Trend wird offenbar noch lange anhalten.

Germany is moving ahead with plans to give its unusually large F125 frigates a medium-range air-defense capability, helping address one of the most conspicuous weaknesses of a four-ship class that has long attracted attention for having relatively little combat power for its size.

Diehl Defense and Germany’s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) have signed a contract to adapt and develop the IRIS-T SLM surface-to-air missile system for operational use aboard the German Navy’s F125 frigates. Under the agreement, Diehl will build prototypes and conduct comprehensive test firings intended to validate the system’s integration and performance within the existing F125 architecture. Each frigate will be fitted with two new launchers, each capable of holding 16 missiles, for a total of 32.

“The aim is to make the system mission-capable on the German Navy’s F125 frigates,” Diehl said in today’s announcement. The company described the prototype construction and test-firing phase as necessary to ensure “the seamless integration and maximum performance” of IRIS-T SLM within the frigate’s existing architecture.

The program has moved notably quickly, reflecting the urgency of the requirement.

Germany began examining the feasibility of integrating IRIS-T SLM with the F125 in 2024, with BAAINBw and Diehl studying the technical risks and requirements of adapting the normally land-based system for shipboard use. That effort led to the development of a navalized demonstrator in 2025. In October of that year, the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg took part in a German Navy Maritime Firing Exercise off Andøya, Norway, carrying an experimental anti-air warfare module based on IRIS-T SLM. Diehl says the module went from concept to firing in less than 10 months and met all established test and evaluation objectives.

The Bundeswehr subsequently reported that Baden-Württemberg fired three live IRIS-T SLM missiles during the exercise. The ship’s radar supplied target data to the missile system, demonstrating the basic integration between the F125’s sensors and the navalized air defense architecture.

The exercise established that the concept could work at sea; the contract signed now is intended to turn that demonstration into a qualified fleet capability.

The German parliament’s Budget Committee approved the adaptation effort on September 23, with the German Defense Ministry describing it as a means of expanding the F125’s self-defense capabilities in response to the current air threat. The ministry also pointed to IRIS-T SLM’s combat experience in Ukraine.

The effort needs to be seen in the context of why the F125 has been such a controversial warship in the first place.

As TWZ examined in 2017, the F125 is a roughly 7,200-ton, 490-foot warship with an unusually small core crew and a concept of operations centered on long-duration deployments, stabilization missions, crisis management, conflict prevention, and international intervention rather than high-end fleet combat. The class was designed to spend long periods away from Germany and operate with relatively modest manpower requirements.

But its armament does not remotely match the size and sophistication of the hull. As completed, the ships were equipped with eight RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a 127mm gun, remotely operated guns and, for close-quarters air defense, two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers. The F125 has no medium- or long-range surface-to-air missile capability and no organic sonar or dedicated anti-submarine warfare weapon system.

At the same time, the TRS-4D/NR radar and other sensors can see far beyond the engagement envelope of the close-in air-defense weapons, but there is little the ship itself can do with that information against an aircraft or incoming missile at medium range.

Nearly a decade later, IRIS-T SLM is emerging as an answer to at least part of that problem.

Even with IRIS-T SLM, the F125 is well short of being an air warfare destroyer. It also still lacks an organic anti-submarine warfare capability or the kind of large vertical-launch missile battery found on Germany’s F124 frigates.

However, it does fill a gap between the F125’s original short-range defenses and the capabilities of other ships or aircraft operating around it.

IRIS-T SLM is designed as a medium-range surface-to-air system, with an engagement range of around 25 miles and an altitude envelope of approximately 65,000 feet. As shown in the 2025 demonstration, the F125’s radar can feed information directly into the missile system, exploiting the ship’s existing sensor capabilities.

Rather than rely heavily on escorts for protection against airborne threats outside the short range of RAM, an IRIS-T-equipped F125 could at least contribute to its own medium-range air defense. Recent operations in the Middle East have underscored the importance of this in contested maritime environments.

It also gives the ships a more useful role in a task group. The threat environment has changed substantially since the F125’s original concept was drafted. Cruise missiles, drones, loitering munitions, and increasingly sophisticated aircraft mean that even ships operating away from a major naval war can face threats well beyond the range of their existing close-in defenses.

In November 2024, Germany confirmed that the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg, returning from an Indo-Pacific deployment, would avoid the Red Sea and sail around Africa because of the Houthi missile and drone threat. The German Defense Ministry explicitly cited the ship’s limited air defense capability and its inability to provide an effective air-defense umbrella for itself or its accompanying replenishment ship.

Ironically, the F125’s large hull, extensive electrical power, sophisticated radar, substantial aviation facilities, long endurance and relatively spacious mission areas were always supposed to provide room for a flexible approach to future missions. Yet the class’s original weight and integration constraints made adding major weapons difficult, a concern TWZ also highlighted in 2017.

IRIS-T SLM offers Germany a way to add a meaningful capability without undertaking the much more invasive redesign associated with installing a conventional vertical-launch system. The 2025 demonstration used an AAW module mounted on the ship’s deck rather than a conventional VLS installation, and today’s program is focused on adapting the system to the F125 architecture.

Once IRIS-T SLM is installed, the F125 will still be an unusual frigate. It is enormous by the standards of its mission, optimized for endurance, and lacks some of the weapons traditionally associated with a high-end surface combatant. But it will bring more to a contested fight.

The program should give the class a credible medium-range air-defense role, and provide Germany with a way to get considerably more utility out of four ships whose original design philosophy was always somewhat controversial.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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