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By Emran FEROZ
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The war inaugurated a terrible new global order in which armed drones kill civilians who are neither named nor counted.
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There were nights full of terror. Our village was bombed constantly,” says Zalmay Khan. Afterward, he goes to pray. Because of his wounds, he cannot kneel, so he prays sitting down.
Khan is in his early twenties and now works as a Taliban intelligence officer. As a boy, he says, he learned to read the sky before he learned to read words. His village in Wardak province, near Kabul, was bombed, then bombed again. First came American planes, then NATO’s, then those of the Afghan army the West had built. By night it got worse, when jets and armed foreign contractors hit villages and killed civilians seemingly at random.
“I became a Mujahed [a Taliban fighter] naturally,” Khan tells me.
He is not an outlier. In village after village on my most recent trip to Afghanistan a few weeks ago, I met men who grew up as the so-called war on terror’s raw material. Some wear the Taliban’s turbans, and some do not. Almost all of them say the same thing, with remarkable calm: The American narrative of this war belongs to the past. After two decades of war and destruction, it is their turn to control narratives and to rule the country.
October 7, 2026, marks exactly 25 years since the United States began bombing Afghanistan. The anniversary will pass in Washington with little reflection. In Afghanistan, the reality of it is lived daily.
Drones and Ghosts
The war on terror made history in a way few people remember. In its opening weeks, the United States used an armed drone against a target in Afghanistan, one of the first such attacks ever, in an attempt to kill the Taliban’s founder, Mullah Mohammad Omar, in Kandahar. Omar was not hit on October 7, 2001. He survived and reportedly died of natural causes a decade later, which the Taliban kept secret for years.
Who died instead? The record offers almost nothing: no definitive or officially confirmed names, ages, villages. One news report cites unnamed Kandahar residents suggesting the raid killed Omar’s 10-year-old son and the child’s stepfather, but the Taliban’s ambassador to Pakistan declined to confirm or deny this report.
In other words, the first known attempt to kill a man with an armed drone killed people no one has ever definitively identified, and it set the template for the type of warfare that would dominate over the next decades. No one can say who the victims were. But if the pattern of the following years is any guide, many were likely civilians, like the thousands of victims who came after them. During the Obama years, Afghanistan officially became the world’s most drone-bombed country.
That template repeated itself so often that Afghans developed names for the many men who were declared dead after supposed “surgical strikes,” but who then reappeared alive: mord-e zinda (the living dead) in Farsi and khyali marr (the not truly dead) in Pashto. I call them “Taliban ghosts.”
It continued across successive U.S. administrations, even across the bureaucratic, supposedly methodical “kill lists” infamously used by the Obama administration used to mark people for death from the skies.
The obvious question was almost never asked: If Omar was not the victim, who was killed instead? In the logic of the drone war, a body is a statistic, and a body in a targeted area becomes a militant by default. The dead were not counted, and the stories of their families, who were left to count for themselves, largely continued to go unknown.
Strikes did not only create ghosts. They also created recruits. Researchers, journalists, and Afghan elders have long described the same pattern: A village is hit, a family is destroyed, and the Taliban offer the survivors the only form of justice made available to them. By the end of the war, entire districts had made that choice, not out of ideological conviction but out of grief.
Democratic Torture
One of the people I talked to on my recent trip was a Taliban official who had been held at Bagram, the American prison north of Kabul, for several years. He told me what the Americans wanted from him. “Accept our democracy or get tortured and rot here. That’s what they told me,” he recalled.
The aim, as he described it, was reeducation by coercion: Accept our system, our ideology, and the pain stops. He refused. By his account, he left more committed than when he arrived. He was freed in 2020 under the prisoner exchange the United States negotiated with the Taliban, part of the same Doha process that handed the country back to the movement the war was purportedly meant to destroy.
Consider the sequence. A man is imprisoned and tortured to make him embrace a political order. He then walks out of the prison and eventually helps govern. The war’s own methods created much of its failure.
I make no argument here that the Taliban’s rule is benign. Women and girls have been shut out of education and public life, and dissent is severely punished. These facts belong in any honest account. But an honest account also includes what the war did, who did it, and whom they harmed; the powers that waged it have shown little interest in reckoning with that part.
A War Passed On
Here is the part that does not fit the story that the war on terror ended in August 2021: someone else is still fighting it.
Pakistan is currently bombing Afghanistan. Just a few days ago, Pakistani airstrikes killed at least 10 civilians, most of them children, in the provinces of Helmand and Kunar.
Pakistani authorities say they are targeting militants of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, often known as the Pakistani Taliban. Afghans on the ground, and independent reports, repeatedly describe civilians as being among the dead. Islamabad has also forced hundreds of thousands of Afghans, many of them born there, out of Pakistan.
The phrasing used to justify these attacks is familiar: “Terrorists were eliminated.” Anyone who covered the American war has heard that sentence before, and the same pattern follows. The claims are hard to verify, the dead are hard to identify, and the people left behind are not asked.
Pakistan has run this game before, and it has historically done well for itself out of it. In the first days of the war on terror, Islamabad aligned itself with Washington while, according to critics and many former officials, hedging its bets with the Taliban. The United States poured billions into Pakistan in military aid and reimbursements. A double game paid for itself.
For a military establishment that benefits from a war to fight, an enemy is an asset. That helps explain why the army has so little tolerance for those who challenge its role. This pattern goes beyond the foreign policy of one country alone. It is a system — one created by the U.S. but now adopted globally — that requires a threat to warrant its continued expansion and removes the people who question its logic.
If Pakistan again needs an Afghan threat to justify its budgets, its alliances, and its hold on power at home, the logic is the same as in 2001. The war on terror, seen from Islamabad, is a renewable resource.
The Violence That Made the TTP
The TTP itself is not a mystery. It did not appear from nowhere, and it cannot be blamed on Kabul alone. It grew out of Pakistan’s own tribal areas, where decades of military operations, drone strikes with Islamabad’s tacit consent, and brutality under former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf shattered communities. Many of these massacres have been forgotten outside the region. In the tribal belt they are not.
The result was a generation radicalized by state violence, in much the same process I heard described in Afghan villages. The TTP is, in significant part, a product of the very policies now used to justify the continued bombing of Afghanistan. Without Pakistan’s violence in the tribal areas, the group would not look as it does. Accountability for that history will not come from the same army that carried it out.
The war on terror in Afghanistan was sold as a campaign against a specific enemy. What it produced was a country scarred by airstrikes, night raids, and detention, and an enemy that outlasted the world’s strongest military. It also produced a new precedent: That a state can kill from the sky, in secret, and rarely be asked who died, much less held accountable for its deathmaking.
That precedent traveled. Drones have gone from being an innovation in killing, one shrouded in secrecy, to a mainstay of battlefields on multiple continents.. The language of “surgical” strikes and “militants eliminated” has become standard, notably throughout the genocide in Gaza. And in Afghanistan, the war continues in new hands, with the same justifications and the same result.
On October 7, if this anniversary is marked in the U.S. at all, there will be speeches about sacrifice and lessons supposedly learned. The real lessons are available to anyone who asks the people who lived under the sky, and the most critical question is still the one nobody answered in 2001: Who was killed instead?
Original article: truthout.org
Já se conhece a proposta do Orçamento do Estado para 2027 (OE2027), que foi apresentada pelo ministro das Finanças, Joaquim Miranda Sarmento, na quinta-feira e sobre o que vai mudar.
O Economia ao Minuto publica uma análise na qual destaca seis medidas que podem ter impacto na carteira do cidadão contribuinte e que se considera importante veicular.
A atualização dos limites dos nove escalões de IRS em 3,88%, bem como uma revisão do mínimo de existência é a proposta do Governo.
O Governo mantém as taxas dos escalões iguais às que inscreveu na proposta de lei que prevê uma descida adicional do IRS para 2026, ainda não votada em sede de Parlamento.
Segundo o Economia ao Minuto, além de atualizar os valores dos nove escalões, o OE2027 sobe o patamar de rendimentos a partir do qual incide a taxa de solidariedade de IRS que desde a ‘troika’ tributa os rendimentos mais altos, alinhando-a com o 9.º escalão.
De acordo com o previsto no acordo assinado em Concertação Social, segundo o relatório que acompanha a proposta do OE2027, o Governo assume que o salário mínimo nacional passará para 970 euros em 2027.
“Em 2027, o Governo da AD elevará o salário mínimo (RMMG) para os 970 euros, concretizando o terceiro aumento consecutivo desde que tomou posse o XXIV Governo Constitucional, em 2024, ano em que a RMMG se cifrava nos 820 euros”, refere o documento.
O salário mínimo nacional, que se encontra atualmente em 920 euros, será definido por portaria do Governo, após auscultação dos parceiros sociais e será então homologado.
O Governo prevê mais de 730 milhões de euros no Orçamento do Estado para 2027 para a Prestação Social Única (PSU), que reúne 13 apoios sociais [Rendimento Social de Inserção (RSI), pensões sociais (velhice, invalidez especial, viuvez e orfandade), o Complemento Extraordinário de Solidariedade (CES), o subsídio social de desemprego e vários subsídios sociais no âmbito da parentalidade e riscos clínicos], sofre um aumento de 10,1% face à previsão de execução de 2026.
De acordo com o documento entregue na Assembleia da República, refere a Economia ao Minuto que a PSU “foi orçamentada em 734,3 milhões de euros, em 2027, mais 10,1% face à previsão de execução em 2026, com as 13 prestações sociais do regime não contributivo que vão ser substituídas pela PSU”.
“Este aumento é justificado essencialmente pela fixação do valor de referência em 50% do indexante dos apoios sociais e pela componente de incentivo ao trabalho”, lê-se no documento.
O Governo estima que o Complemento Solidário para Idosos custará mais 100 milhões de euros em 2027, ultrapassando os 700 milhões de euros, com o valor mensal a subir para 720 euros, segundo a proposta do Executivo.
Assim, a despesa com o CSI deverá atingir o montante de 709,7 milhões de euros, uma variação anual de 15,6% face a 2026″.
A explicação está no “aumento do valor de referência em 50 euros/mês em 2027, para 720 euros, no âmbito da sua trajetória de convergência para 870 euros em 2029″.
O ministro das Finanças assegurou que existe neutralidade fiscal para quem tenha aumentos salariais de até 4,5%, em virtude da atualização dos escalões de IRS, do mínimo de existência, da dedução específica e da baixa das taxas.
O ministro Joaquim Miranda Sarmento, questionado em conferência de imprensa sobre o desfasamento entre a atualização dos escalões de IRS e o referencial para o aumento global dos salários de 4,5% previsto no acordo assinado entre UGT, confederações empresariais e Governo em 2024, reiterou que existe um nível de neutralidade fiscal.
A garantia pública e as isenções de IMT e de Imposto de Selo concedidas aos jovens de até 35 anos na aquisição da primeira habitação própria e permanente devem manter-se no próximo ano, de acordo com a proposta orçamental do Governo.
No relatório da proposta de OE2027 é mencionado que estas medidas “já beneficiaram quase 120 mil jovens, para um valor médio de aquisição de imóvel de 200 mil euros”. O OE2027 reforçará também o programa Porta 65, dirigido ao arrendamento para habitação permanente dos jovens.
Importa salientar ainda que o Parlamento vai debater na generalidade a proposta do Governo de OE2027 nos dias 27 e 28 de outubro, ocorrendo a votação final global (prevista) em 24 de novembro.
Depois do debate na generalidade, a proposta de OE2027 será ainda discutida na especialidade entre 29 de outubro e 24 de novembro. O prazo para a entrada de propostas de alteração por parte dos diferentes partidos termina em 6 de novembro, data em que ocorrerá uma nova audição com o ministro de Estado e das Finanças.
Na publicação a que tivemos acesso da Associação Empresarial de Portugal (AEP) a exigência é de que o Orçamento do Estado para 2027 (OE2027) coloque o crescimento económico e a competitividade empresarial no centro da política económica.
Com base nesses objetivos, a AEP enviou ao Governo 16 propostas, que incluem “redução da carga fiscal sobre empresas e trabalho, mais investimento, maior escala empresarial, reforço da internacionalização e um Estado mais eficiente“.
“Portugal está a crescer, mas não cresce o suficiente para convergir com a União Europeia. O próximo Orçamento deve, por isso, criar condições para que a economia cresça a ritmos superiores, assente em mais investimento, produtividade, exportações e valor acrescentado”, diz a associação liderada por Luís Miguel Ribeiro, conforme publicação no DN a que tivemos acesso.
A AEP no que se refere ao trabalho, diz que o país apresenta um quadro de “escassez de trabalhadores” e “dificuldade em atrair e reter talento”, por isso a AEP “propõe uma redução da progressividade do IRS, através da redução do número de escalões e da sua atualização anual”.
Defende também a majoração de 50% em IRC dos custos suportados pelas empresas com o alojamento dos trabalhadores; majoração de 50% dos gastos com pessoal jovem altamente qualificado; e a contabilização da formação modular financiada por fundos europeus, quando integrada nos planos de formação das associações empresariais, para efeitos das 40 horas de formação contínua obrigatória, lê-se no DN.
Não há qualquer dúvida que as famílias sentem o aumento do custo de vida, as empresas, principalmnete as PME’s, enfrentam encargos elevadissimos, a habitação para muitos jovens está fora de hipótese e o Estado continua a arrecadar muito sem que os portugueses sintam benefícios, ou sequer esperança que eles possam surgir a curto prazo.
A votação final global da proposta do Governo de OE2027 vai ocorrer na véspera da sessão solene evocativa do 25 de Novembro de 1975.
Russia has demanded the extradition of International Criminal Court (ICC) President Tomoko Akane from the Netherlands, seeking to enforce criminal sentences against judges and prosecutors involved in issuing arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military officials.
The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office announced on Thursday, 8 October, that it had submitted requests to several governments for the extradition of nine current and former ICC officials, including Karim Khan, who served as the court’s chief prosecutor when the arrest warrant against Putin was issued in March 2023.
The requests follow a ruling by Moscow City Court on 12 December 2025, when nine ICC officials were convicted in absentia and sentenced to prison terms ranging from three and a half to 15 years. Their alleged offences arose from their participation in investigations and judicial decisions concerning Russian officials suspected of international crimes.
Moscow’s latest move is unlikely to secure Akane’s extradition from the Netherlands, which hosts the ICC and is among its principal supporters. Russian authorities are nevertheless seeking cooperation from several countries, potentially exposing court officials to arrest when travelling to jurisdictions maintaining close relations with Moscow.
Japan has condemned the proceedings against Akane, a Japanese national who became ICC president in March 2024.
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masanao Ozaki said Tokyo had repeatedly protested to Moscow over its treatment of ICC personnel and regarded the latest measures as unjustified and unacceptable.
He indicated that Japan would consider further diplomatic action in consultation with the court and other states parties to the Rome Statute.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reaffirmed Japan’s support for the ICC during a parliamentary session on Friday, 9 October, saying Tokyo would continue to defend the institution as part of its commitment to international law.
Akane, who was elected president for a three-year term in March 2024, served on the judicial panel responsible for the arrest warrants against Putin and Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova.
Russian investigators opened criminal proceedings against the judges shortly after those warrants were announced, subsequently adding other ICC officials to their wanted lists as investigations concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine progressed.
The confrontation began on 17 March 2023, when the ICC issued arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas to Russia.
The judges found reasonable grounds to believe that both officials bore individual criminal responsibility for the alleged offences. The warrants remain in force, although neither suspect has been brought before the court.
The investigation concerns the removal of children from Ukrainian territory following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ukrainian authorities have documented cases involving children transferred to Russia, placed with Russian families or subjected to measures intended to integrate them into Russian society.
Russia maintains that the transfers were humanitarian evacuations. The ICC’s investigation concerns whether children were unlawfully deported or transferred from occupied territory, conduct prohibited under international humanitarian law.
The court subsequently issued further warrants against senior Russian commanders. In June 2024, former defence minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov were accused of responsibility for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected to attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
Russian prosecutors responded by expanding their criminal cases against ICC personnel. The charges included knowingly prosecuting innocent individuals and attacking representatives of a foreign state.
The December 2025 convictions provided Moscow with the domestic judgments it is now attempting to enforce through extradition requests.
The Netherlands has not indicated any intention to surrender Akane. Dutch authorities have consistently supported the ICC’s independence, and the Russian convictions concern actions undertaken by officials in the exercise of their judicial responsibilities.
The position may be less predictable in countries maintaining extradition arrangements with Moscow. Although Russian convictions would not automatically require another state to surrender an ICC official, the existence of arrest warrants could complicate international travel and expose those named to detention pending legal proceedings.
The situation recalls the difficulties surrounding Putin’s own international movements since March 2023. His arrest warrant has restricted travel to ICC member states, which are generally required to cooperate with the court’s requests for arrest and surrender.
Russia’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016 did not prevent the ICC from investigating alleged crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine had already accepted the court’s jurisdiction and became a full member on 1 January 2025.
The ICC investigation into Ukraine continues, covering alleged offences committed since 21 November 2013 within the scope of Ukraine’s acceptance of jurisdiction.
The Russian extradition demands coincide with a separate dispute between the ICC and the United States, whose government has sanctioned several members of the court.
On 18 August 2026, President Donald Trump’s administration imposed sanctions on Akane and senior ICC trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye. Washington has objected to investigations involving American personnel and Israeli officials, arguing that the court has exceeded its jurisdiction.
The ICC condemned the additional American sanctions, warning that restrictions targeting judges and prosecutors interfere with its judicial work.
The American measures primarily involve financial restrictions, while Russia has pursued criminal convictions and extradition requests. Both have placed ICC personnel under pressure for their involvement in proceedings opposed by governments outside the Rome Statute system.
The European Union has repeatedly defended the ICC against attempts to interfere with its investigations. The Netherlands, as host country, has particular responsibilities concerning the court’s operations and the security of its personnel.
Moscow’s latest requests are therefore expected to meet resistance from European governments. Their possible consequences elsewhere will depend on the countries approached and whether local authorities are prepared to act on Russian arrest warrants.
The Kremlin has so far failed to halt the ICC’s proceedings against Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Its response has been to pursue the judges and prosecutors responsible, seeking prison sentences against international judicial officials while the allegations against Russia’s own leadership remain before the court.
The truth is told very well with images. A picture says a thousand words, and memes a few more. These pages have lots of images and memes that focus on the truth. Click image to enlarge + use arrows to navigate.
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