The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is moving to bar every Chinese lab from testing electronics for the US market, a sector China dominates. And Chinese media and commentators say that Beijing, having already retaliated with three countermeasures, is ready to strike back again. The FCC said on October 7 that it will vote on […]

The post FCC product testing ban deepens US-China tech decoupling appeared first on Asia Times.

After President Donald Trump banned CNN, MS NOW, and Politico from the White House last month, ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox News protested by suspending their participation in the press pool that provides widely used video of presidential events. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which last Friday demanded network communications regarding the TV pool, that show of solidarity may have violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.

The antitrust investigation adds another layer of bullying to Trump's vendetta against "Fake News Media Outlets." The president reflexively threatens to yank broadcast licenses in response to news coverage he views as biased against him. He has repeatedly tried to punish disfavored journalists by excluding them from the White House, culminating in last month's sanctions against CNN, MS NOW, and Politico, which irked him by running "purposely negative stories." Now he is deploying the Justice Department against the TV networks that objected to his assault on freedom of the press.

Under a longstanding arrangement, ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, and Fox News take turns covering the president in venues where press access is limited, sharing the footage with other news outlets. But after Trump excluded CNN from that role, the other networks stopped participating. They resumed their coverage on September 25, the day after a federal judge ordered the White House to restore press passes for employees of CNN, MS NOW, and Politico.

The TV pool suspension was brief, lasting just four days. But it irritated Trump, who on September 24 complained that the networks "refused to cover one of the Biggest and Most Beautiful Events to take place in many years"—i.e., "the arrival at the White House of the Highly Respected President of China, Xi Jinping, and his beautiful wife, Madam Peng." That event was "magnificent" and "made for Television," he said, but the networks "refused to be there" because "they knew how good it would be" and "didn't want credit to be given to 'TRUMP.'"

As the DOJ tells it, the lack of network coverage was not only annoying; it was also potentially illegal. "Members of the television press pool have boycotted covering White House events," Emily Covington, who directs the department's Office of Public Affairs, said on Saturday. "Group boycotts among commercial competitors can violate the Sherman Act," she added, and "the Antitrust Division is simply investigating to determine whether these news organizations have violated the antitrust laws."

Section 1 of the Sherman Act broadly prohibits any "contract," "combination," or "conspiracy" in "restraint of trade." But it applies to group boycotts only insofar as they aim to thwart competing businesses.

William E. Kovacic, who chaired the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) during the George W. Bush administration, is skeptical that the concept applies in this case. "The critical ingredient in successful antitrust cases is to demonstrate that there is unmistakably a commercial motive and that the commercial motive predominates," Kovacic told The New York Times. "And I don't think they would ever be able to do that here."

The Supreme Court's 1990 decision in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association illustrates the importance of a "commercial motive." The case involved attorneys in private practice who were paid to serve as court-appointed counsel for criminal defendants in the District of Columbia. The FTC concluded that they violated the Sherman Act when they agreed to stop accepting cases until their fees were increased.

Since that agreement was aimed at protecting the right to counsel by ensuring adequate funding for court-appointed attorneys, the lawyers association argued, it was protected under NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, a 1982 decision in which the Supreme Court recognized a First Amendment right to engage in politically motivated consumer boycotts. But the Court saw an important distinction between the two cases.

"Our reasoning in Claiborne Hardware is not applicable to a boycott conducted by business competitors who 'stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market,'" Justice John Paul Stevens wrote. "No matter how altruistic the motives of respondents may have been, it is undisputed that their immediate objective was to increase the price that they would be paid for their services."

In Claiborne Hardware, by contrast, the boycotters were not trying to reap a financial benefit by reducing competition. Nor were ABC et al. when they "boycotted" the White House TV pool. They were not trying to increase their profits by putting competitors at a disadvantage; they were standing up for freedom of the press.

"The investigation is nonsense," Seth Stern, chief of advocacy at the Freedom of the Press Foundation, says in an emailed press release. "Trump may view the presidency as a business venture, but news outlets' standing up for their constitutional rights has nothing to do with antitrust law….Depriving Trump of the attention he craves is not a competitive harm."

The post TV Networks Protested Press Bans by Declining To Cover Trump. That Might Have Been Illegal, the DOJ Says. appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The American humorist Will Rogers observed that there are three kinds of people in this world: those who learn by reading; those who learn by observation; and the rest, who have to learn by peeing on the electric fence for themselves.

In Europe, we have been learning things the hard way.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting turmoil came as a shock to our energy system. More recently, the conflict in the Gulf has sparked fresh shock waves. 

Having built on our experience of the energy crisis in 2022, Europe was better prepared. But the fact of the matter is that we were still left exposed to external shocks.

Since the start of the conflict, the EU spent more than €100bn more on imported oil and gas, compared to the same period last year. We are not only learning the hard way – we are learning the expensive way.

And the lesson could not be clearer: we need to free ourselves from fossil fuel imports, as much as possible and as soon as possible.

The more clean energy that we produce – from homegrown sources like renewables, nuclear, and geothermal – the lower our bills become. At the same time, we also strengthen our energy security, cut our emissions, and reinforce our energy independence.

That’s the direction we are taking

Last year, we added 89 gigawatts of renewable energy to our energy system. One gigawatt is enough to provide electricity for up to 1m households.

And for the first time ever, the EU produced more electricity from solar and wind than from fossil fuels.

In other words, more of our energy is being “made in Europe”, which makes us less reliant on fossil imports. Since 2022, we have decreased our gas consumption significantly, to the order of 17 percent.

But it’s not just about how Europe generates electricity – it’s about how we share it. Over the past decades, EU countries have linked up their electricity markets to a degree not seen elsewhere in the world.

This makes it much easier to support each other with supplies in times of need, as well as to buy and sell electricity across borders at the best price.

This progress has firmed up the foundations of our energy system. But can these foundations withstand our uncertain times? I believe that they can and they will – as long we stick to a solid strategy.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

European Union leaders will meet in Brussels on 15–16 October under pressure to address surging energy costs, Russian hybrid attacks, continued support for Ukraine and the bloc’s next long-term budget. The summit comes as economic pressures expose growing differences between national governments.

European Union leaders are preparing for a two-day summit in Brussels dominated by the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and mounting pressure on governments to reconcile defence commitments with deteriorating public finances.

The European Council meeting on 15–16 October will bring together the leaders of the 27 member states to consider immediate measures addressing high energy prices alongside longer-term decisions on competitiveness, enlargement, migration and the EU’s budget for 2028–2034.

European Council President António Costa has placed economic competitiveness and energy costs at the centre of the discussions, reflecting concerns that the disruption of global oil and gas markets is threatening the bloc’s industrial recovery.

The meeting also takes place against the background of renewed disputes over national spending limits, with Italy and Greece seeking greater freedom to finance energy relief and France facing increasing pressure over the credibility of its budget.

Energy crisis puts fiscal rules under pressure

The Middle East conflict has created a renewed energy shock for European economies, raising transport and industrial costs while pushing inflation higher.

The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has also affected global oil supplies, exposing Europe’s continuing dependence on internationally traded fossil fuels despite efforts to diversify imports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

European leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary support measures for households and businesses, as well as longer-term policies intended to reduce energy dependence.

The political disagreement concerns how those measures should be financed.

The European Commission has resisted requests from Italy and Greece for further exemptions from the EU’s fiscal framework. Both governments argue that extraordinary energy costs require additional budgetary flexibility.

Brussels maintains that existing provisions already permit exceptional expenditure within defined limits.

The disagreement is particularly difficult for indebted governments that must simultaneously finance military expansion, maintain public services and protect their economies from energy inflation.

France’s position has added urgency to the debate. Its borrowing costs have increased sharply as investors question whether the government can adopt a credible budget ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

A summit agreement on emergency energy assistance would therefore have to accommodate substantially different national fiscal circumstances.

Ukraine and the changing transatlantic relationship

Support for Ukraine remains a central item on the summit agenda as Russia continues attacks against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure and industrial facilities.

EU leaders are expected to review military and financial assistance, the implementation of sanctions against Moscow and the resilience of Ukraine’s economy.

The discussions take place amid renewed uncertainty surrounding American weapons deliveries.

Washington’s reported threats to suspend supplies under the NATO-backed PURL procurement arrangement have raised further questions about Europe’s dependence on the United States for advanced military equipment.

European governments have increased defence expenditure and committed additional support to Ukraine, but replacing American capabilities remains difficult, particularly in air defence, precision-guided weapons and certain intelligence systems.

The summit is unlikely to resolve those industrial limitations, but the broader question of Europe’s ability to sustain Ukrainian defence over several years will influence discussions.

Member states must also consider how increased defence expenditure will be financed alongside other demands on national budgets.

Russian hybrid operations move higher on the agenda

The EU’s published summit agenda includes Russian-linked hybrid attacks within Europe.

The issue has gained prominence as European governments investigate sabotage, cyber operations, information interference and threats against infrastructure and defence-related industries.

Recent warnings concerning possible Russian assassination operations targeting European defence executives and employees of companies supplying Ukraine illustrate the changing nature of the security threat.

Such activities place additional demands on national intelligence services, police forces and European institutions responsible for cross-border cooperation.

The EU has strengthened its sanctions instruments against hybrid activities, but enforcement remains dependent on coordination between national authorities.

Any further measures would need to address intelligence sharing, protection of critical infrastructure and the relationship between internal security and the Union’s wider Russia policy.

A larger EU with a contested budget

Enlargement will form another important part of the discussions following the Commission’s proposals for preparing a wider Union.

Brussels has outlined possible institutional safeguards intended to prevent future members from undermining democratic standards or blocking common decisions.

Montenegro and Albania are advancing through their accession negotiations, while Ukraine and Moldova remain central to the EU’s geopolitical enlargement strategy.

The financial implications will become increasingly important as governments negotiate the next multiannual financial framework covering 2028–2034.

Existing members are already divided over how much the EU should spend, which programmes should receive priority and whether additional common resources should be raised.

Agricultural expenditure, cohesion funding, defence investment and support for Ukraine will compete for resources within the same budget negotiations.

The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated through targeted reforms, but securing agreement among member states will require decisions on future expenditure and the distribution of financial benefits.

Competitiveness and the single market

Leaders will also examine progress on the One Europe, One Market agenda, which aims to reduce barriers to economic activity within the EU and improve conditions for European businesses.

The initiative is intended to address structural weaknesses affecting investment, industrial development and the ability of European companies to compete internationally.

High energy prices have made those concerns more immediate, particularly for industries competing against producers in economies where electricity and fuel are cheaper.

The European Council will be asked to provide direction on measures planned for 2026 and 2027, but implementation will depend on subsequent legislation and decisions by member states.

The October meeting brings several unresolved European policy questions into the same negotiation: how to protect economic competitiveness, maintain fiscal credibility, finance defence, sustain Ukraine and prepare for enlargement.

The immediate test will be whether leaders can agree on a credible response to energy prices without reopening broader disputes over national budgets.

More difficult decisions concerning defence financing, institutional reform and the EU’s long-term expenditure commitments will extend well beyond the two-day summit.

Montenegro and Albania will hold separate accession conferences on 12 and 13 October as the European Commission introduces proposals for stronger safeguards against democratic backsliding, linking the next phase of EU enlargement to reforms within the Union itself.

Montenegro and Albania are preparing for another round of European Union accession negotiations this week, with meetings in Luxembourg scheduled to advance their membership bids as Brussels considers substantial changes to the conditions under which future countries will join the bloc.

Montenegro’s 29th accession conference will take place on Monday, 12 October, followed by Albania’s tenth conference on Tuesday. The meetings come less than a week after the European Commission presented a package of proposals intended to prepare the EU for enlargement while strengthening its ability to respond to breaches of democratic standards by newly admitted members.

For Montenegro, the immediate objective is to continue closing negotiating chapters after years of institutional and legal reforms. Albania’s meeting has a more precisely defined agenda: the provisional closure of Chapter 20, covering enterprise and industrial policy.

Both countries have made progress towards membership, but the Commission’s latest proposals indicate that the terms of accession could become more demanding as the EU considers admitting several new members.

Montenegro moves towards the final negotiating stage

Montenegro is widely regarded as the most advanced candidate among the Western Balkan countries.

Accession negotiations began in 2012, and all 33 negotiating chapters have been opened. Progress towards closure has accelerated as the government seeks to complete the process and secure an accession treaty.

At the end of 2025, Montenegro provisionally closed five chapters covering services, capital movements, company law, agriculture and fisheries.

As EU Today reported following that conference, the agreements brought the number of provisionally closed chapters to twelve at that stage, while the EU continued to emphasise the importance of judicial reform and sustained implementation.

Subsequent accession conferences have continued the negotiating process, with the 29th conference scheduled for 12 October.

The Commission has identified Montenegro as a country capable of concluding accession negotiations by the end of 2026, provided sufficient progress is maintained.

That objective does not mean membership would follow automatically. A completed negotiation must still lead to an accession treaty, which requires approval by all existing member states and ratification under their constitutional procedures.

Outstanding questions include the independence of the judiciary, enforcement of anti-corruption legislation and the capacity of state institutions to apply EU law consistently.

Albania advances in industrial policy negotiations

Albania’s accession process has also gained momentum, supported by renewed EU interest in incorporating the Western Balkans into European political and economic structures.

The conference scheduled for 13 October is expected to provisionally close Chapter 20, which covers enterprise and industrial policy.

The chapter concerns the legal and institutional environment in which businesses operate, including industrial competitiveness, entrepreneurship and policies supporting small and medium-sized enterprises.

Provisional closure would represent further progress in Albania’s alignment with EU legislation and policy, although it would not constitute a final agreement on accession.

As with Montenegro, the negotiating framework requires sustained progress on the fundamentals of membership, notably judicial independence, fundamental rights, corruption and organised crime.

Brussels prepares stronger safeguards

The latest accession conferences follow the European Commission’s proposals of 6 October, which address the institutional consequences of admitting new countries.

The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated within the existing treaties, but that the EU will need additional safeguards and improvements to decision-making.

Among the most consequential proposals is the possibility of suspending a new member state’s voting rights in the Council if it commits serious breaches of the Union’s fundamental values or the principle of sincere cooperation.

Such provisions would be incorporated into future accession arrangements, making some membership conditions enforceable after a country has joined.

The proposal reflects concerns that the EU’s existing mechanisms for responding to democratic backsliding can be slow and politically difficult to apply.

In June, EU Today reported on proposals advanced by five member states seeking stronger protections against governments that might undermine common decisions after accession.

The Commission’s October package develops that argument into a broader programme of institutional preparation.

Enlargement beyond the Western Balkans

The debate extends to Ukraine and Moldova, whose membership applications have acquired greater strategic importance following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Commission is examining how candidate countries can progressively participate in EU policies and programmes before obtaining full membership.

These arrangements could include greater integration in energy, transport, defence and selected areas of the single market, subject to the implementation of relevant reforms.

Brussels is also considering transitional arrangements affecting agricultural support, financial transfers and sensitive sectors of the economy.

The political challenge is to provide candidate countries with credible membership prospects while reassuring existing members that enlargement will not weaken common decision-making or create unsustainable budget commitments.

For Montenegro and Albania, the October conferences therefore take place at a pivotal point in the accession process.

Both governments are moving through the technical stages of membership negotiations while the EU is still determining how its next enlargement will operate.

The outcome will depend not only on their progress towards meeting accession conditions, but also on whether the existing 27 member states can agree on the institutional changes required for a larger Union.

The European Commission has rejected demands from Italy and Greece for additional exemptions from EU spending rules as the Middle East energy crisis drives inflation higher, exposing renewed divisions over how much financial assistance European governments can provide.

The European Commission has rejected requests from Italy and Greece for greater freedom to increase public spending in response to the energy crisis, resisting pressure from two member states that argue existing budget restrictions are limiting their ability to protect households and businesses.

The decision, confirmed on 8 October, follows renewed appeals from Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis for measures recognising the exceptional financial burden imposed by higher energy prices.

Meloni wants Brussels to take greater account of unexpected inflation when assessing national budgets and to permit additional tax revenue generated by rising prices to be used for energy relief. Mitsotakis has sought the exclusion of temporary support measures for consumers and businesses from the expenditure limits agreed under the EU’s fiscal framework.

Economic Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis rejected the argument for further concessions, maintaining that the existing arrangements already take inflation into account and provide mechanisms for responding to exceptional circumstances.

The disagreement comes as Europe’s governments confront the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, including higher fuel costs, inflationary pressures and increased demands for state intervention.

Italy’s increasingly difficult budget choices

For Italy, the dispute adds to a fiscal problem that has been developing throughout the year.

The government expects its budget deficit to rise to 3.4 per cent of GDP in 2027, reversing an earlier objective of reducing borrowing below the EU’s three per cent reference value.

As EU Today reported earlier this month, Rome plans to use additional fiscal room for defence and energy-related expenditure, while public debt is projected to remain close to 138 per cent of GDP.

The new request concerns the treatment of inflation and the financial support required to offset its effects.

Energy inflation creates an unusual budgetary problem. Governments can receive additional nominal tax revenue as prices rise, particularly through consumption taxes, while simultaneously facing public pressure to compensate consumers for higher living costs.

Meloni argues that such unexpected revenue should be available for targeted assistance without forcing equivalent reductions elsewhere in national expenditure.

Brussels is reluctant to accept arrangements that could turn temporary increases in tax receipts into an opportunity for permanent spending expansion.

Italy’s position also reflects the political competition between defence spending and domestic economic support. Rome has accepted the need for higher military expenditure but faces immediate pressure from households and energy-intensive industries.

That competition was already apparent when the government chose to prioritise energy relief over the full use of defence-spending flexibility.

Greece seeks different treatment for emergency support

Greece’s request is more narrowly focused on the treatment of temporary assistance under the EU’s expenditure rules.

Athens argues that measures intended to help businesses and households manage exceptional energy costs should not be counted against the normal spending limits.

The Greek government faces an economic environment in which higher imported energy prices threaten household purchasing power and business profitability, particularly in sectors dependent on transport and fuel.

Excluding temporary relief from expenditure calculations would give Athens additional room to intervene without breaching its agreed fiscal trajectory.

The Commission, however, has resisted establishing further exemptions beyond those already provided in the fiscal framework.

Its objection is institutional as well as financial. If additional categories of emergency expenditure are repeatedly excluded from fiscal calculations, the system becomes increasingly difficult to enforce consistently across the Union.

The limits of Europe’s reformed fiscal rules

The EU revised its fiscal governance framework in 2024, introducing nationally agreed expenditure paths intended to provide greater flexibility while maintaining sustainable public finances.

The Commission’s rules on exceptional circumstances permit member states to depart temporarily from normal requirements under specified conditions.

Those provisions have already been used to accommodate higher defence expenditure, while the Commission has also issued guidance on their application to energy-security investments.

Temporary financial assistance intended to reduce household energy bills, however, is not necessarily treated in the same way as investment in infrastructure that reduces Europe’s long-term dependence on imported fuel.

That distinction has become a source of friction between Brussels and national capitals.

Governments argue that the immediate economic effects of an international crisis require exceptional measures. The Commission is concerned that repeated concessions could weaken the credibility of the spending framework.

A wider dispute over Europe’s economic response

The Commission’s decision also comes as France faces increasing pressure over its debt and budget deficit.

The deterioration in French borrowing conditions has reinforced concerns about the risks associated with heavily indebted governments continuing to expand expenditure.

France, Italy and Greece have different fiscal positions, but the problems confronting them originate partly in the same combination of expensive energy, weak economic growth and competing spending commitments.

The dispute will now feed into preparations for the European Council meeting on 15–16 October, where energy prices and economic competitiveness are prominent agenda items.

EU leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary measures to reduce the burden on businesses and consumers, alongside longer-term initiatives intended to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

The Commission’s refusal to provide Italy and Greece with further fiscal exemptions establishes the limits within which those discussions will take place.

National governments remain free to introduce assistance, but Brussels is insisting that they account for its cost within the fiscal rules already agreed.

For Rome and Athens, the question is whether those rules provide sufficient room to respond to an energy crisis whose duration remains uncertain.