European Union governments are seeking greater flexibility over plans to remove equipment supplied by companies considered a security risk from Europe’s telecommunications networks, potentially extending the timetable for replacing Chinese technology already embedded in 5G infrastructure.
A Council draft dated 22 September removes the fixed 36-month phase-out period proposed by the European Commission, according to a document reported on 29 September. Instead, member states want the timetable to take account of the level of identified risk, product and infrastructure lifecycles, normal equipment replacement cycles, interoperability requirements and the availability of suitable alternatives.
The change would not abandon the EU’s attempt to reduce reliance on suppliers considered high risk. It would, however, remove a uniform deadline and give considerably more weight to the practical and financial consequences of replacing equipment already installed across European networks.
The Commission proposed a revision of the EU Cybersecurity Act on 20 January, seeking to establish a common European framework for addressing security risks in information and communications technology supply chains rather than relying principally on separate national measures.
For mobile telecommunications, the practical effect would fall particularly heavily on Chinese suppliers Huawei and ZTE. Under the Commission’s proposal, mobile operators would have three years to remove equipment from suppliers formally classified as high risk.
As EU Today reported when the proposal was unveiled, the measure represented a significant shift from the EU’s existing 5G security framework. Restrictions on Huawei and ZTE have previously depended heavily on decisions taken by individual member states, producing markedly different timetables across the Union.
Operators put replacement cost at €40bn
The pressure to change the timetable follows warnings from Europe’s largest telecommunications groups over the cost of removing existing equipment.
Seventeen industry executives, including senior figures from Deutsche Telekom, Orange and Telefónica, warned earlier this month that replacing equipment affected by the proposed restrictions could cost the sector as much as €40 billion.
The operators argued that such expenditure would draw investment away from fibre networks, further 5G deployment and preparations for 6G. The issue is particularly significant in Germany, Italy and Spain, where Huawei equipment remains extensively used in parts of existing telecommunications infrastructure.
Replacing one supplier’s equipment is not simply a matter of purchasing alternative hardware. Mobile networks contain generations of interconnected equipment installed over many years, while operators must continue providing services during any transition.
The Council’s proposed approach would allow these factors to influence how quickly individual components are removed. Equipment judged to present an immediate or particularly serious risk could face a shorter deadline, while other infrastructure could potentially remain in operation until a scheduled replacement becomes technically and economically practical.
From Huawei to wider supply-chain security
The dispute is broader than Huawei or mobile networks.
The revised Cybersecurity Act is intended to establish an EU-wide framework for dealing with dependence on third-country suppliers across critical ICT infrastructure. The Commission says the legislation would introduce a harmonised and risk-based approach to supply-chain security, including risks associated with foreign interference.
In February, the EU also introduced an ICT Supply Chain Security Toolbox, setting out measures for identifying and mitigating risks associated with critical suppliers. These include multi-vendor strategies and measures intended to reduce dependence on suppliers considered high risk.
The Commission’s January proposal goes considerably further. It covers a range of critical sectors beyond telecommunications, including connected vehicles, electricity infrastructure, water systems, drones, cloud services, medical devices, surveillance technology, space services and semiconductors.
Under the proposed system, restrictions would follow a formal risk assessment initiated by the Commission or at least three member states, accompanied by market and impact assessments.
Huawei has consistently rejected claims that its equipment represents a security threat and has opposed measures that it argues discriminate against suppliers on the basis of their country of origin.
The Commission has taken a different position. Its approach to the security of Europe’s ICT supply chains is increasingly focused not only on technical vulnerabilities but also on strategic dependence on suppliers from third countries.
Deadline now part of negotiations
The Council changes are not final. Member states must agree their negotiating position, while the revised Cybersecurity Act will ultimately require agreement with the European Parliament before becoming law.
The emerging position nevertheless points towards a significant change from the Commission’s original model.
Rather than requiring mobile operators across the EU to remove high-risk equipment within the same 36-month period, governments want deadlines to reflect the risk associated with particular equipment, its remaining operational lifetime and whether suitable replacements are available.
That could leave the EU with the same strategic objective — reducing dependence on suppliers considered a security risk — but a considerably longer and more differentiated timetable for achieving it.
Login
