France, Germany, Austria and Poland are expanding or reviewing the authority of critical infrastructure operators to defend facilities against drones, raising legal and operational questions over the growing role of civilian companies in national security.

European governments are reconsidering who should be authorised to intercept hostile drones as energy companies and critical infrastructure operators confront an increasingly serious threat to electricity networks, transport systems and other essential facilities.

France has already introduced legislation permitting approved operators to deploy counter-drone systems, while Germany is reviewing similar arrangements and Austria has announced plans to extend certain protective powers to infrastructure companies.

Poland has moved further by authorising designated security units to disable or destroy drones entering restricted areas around important energy installations.

The changes reflect concerns that national police and armed forces cannot provide permanent protection for every substation, power station, railway facility or pipeline against relatively inexpensive unmanned aircraft.

France establishes a new approach

In August 2026, the French parliament approved legislation allowing authorised operators of critical infrastructure and their contractors to detect, jam and intercept drones near designated facilities.

The legislation followed a series of reported drone incursions over sensitive locations, including military installations.

Under the French approach, operators of strategically important infrastructure may eventually use approved counter-drone systems without relying exclusively on the immediate intervention of military personnel.

Potential beneficiaries include electricity operators and organisations responsible for transport infrastructure.

French authorities are testing detection equipment, electronic countermeasures and interceptor drones at Brétigny-sur-Orge, south of Paris.

The programme examines systems capable of identifying approaching aircraft, determining whether they present a threat and initiating an appropriate response.

France intends to expand the protection of sites classified as strategically important, with further deployment planned during 2027.

The initiative would introduce responsibilities traditionally associated with military or police operations into the management of civilian infrastructure.

Germany and Austria reconsider existing restrictions

Germany is examining the legal conditions under which private companies and infrastructure operators could participate in active counter-drone operations.

At present, responsibility for neutralising threatening aircraft remains primarily with the competent public authorities.

The debate has intensified following security incidents involving unmanned aircraft, including the discovery of an explosives-laden drone near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle airport in August.

German authorities attributed the incident to Russia, an allegation Moscow denied.

The German government’s review concerns not only the equipment that companies may possess but also whether trained security personnel should be permitted to deploy countermeasures without waiting for a separate police authorisation.

Austria announced plans in September to extend comparable powers to selected critical infrastructure operators, including major energy companies.

The government has acknowledged the practical limitations of protecting a large number of widely dispersed installations using state security personnel alone.

Poland has already established restricted drone zones around sensitive energy facilities, with designated security units authorised to intercept aircraft entering those areas under applicable national rules.

Electricity networks face particular risks

Electricity infrastructure presents a difficult security problem because essential installations are distributed across extensive geographical areas.

Transmission operators manage thousands of kilometres of high-voltage lines, while substations, transformers and switching stations connect generation facilities to consumers.

A successful attack against critical equipment can produce consequences extending well beyond the immediate site.

Large power transformers are particularly difficult to replace. Manufacturing, transporting and installing specialised equipment can require lengthy preparation, making rapid recovery uncertain after serious damage.

European utilities have traditionally concentrated on physical security, maintenance and restoring services after technical failures or accidents.

The spread of drones creates additional demands for surveillance, early warning and the ability to respond before an attack reaches its target.

Russia’s repeated strikes against Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure have demonstrated the extensive disruption that attacks on power systems can cause.

European governments are now evaluating how comparable vulnerabilities could be exploited against their own networks.

Who bears responsibility for an interception?

Giving civilian operators access to counter-drone equipment raises unresolved legal questions.

Electronic jamming can interfere with communications and navigation systems beyond the targeted aircraft. A drone brought down over an industrial or residential area could injure members of the public or damage surrounding property.

Security personnel must also determine whether an unidentified drone is hostile, operating unlawfully or simply present because of an error by its operator.

A mistaken interception could expose infrastructure companies to compensation claims and other legal consequences.

European governments must therefore establish who can authorise an intervention, which countermeasures are permitted and how responsibility is allocated when damage occurs.

There is no uniform European approach.

Some operators support expanding their protective powers, while others argue that the use of force should remain the responsibility of the state.

Finland’s national electricity transmission operator, Fingrid, has expressed reservations about transferring such authority to energy companies.

The position reflects a wider concern that infrastructure operators should concentrate on maintaining essential services rather than assuming responsibilities for armed or coercive security operations.

A growing European security market

The regulatory debate is developing alongside a rapidly expanding market for counter-drone technology.

Manufacturers are offering equipment that integrates radar, optical sensors, electronic detection and software capable of classifying possible threats.

Interceptor drones and electronic countermeasures are increasingly being designed for use around civilian infrastructure rather than exclusively on military installations.

German defence company Rheinmetall has reported growing interest from private infrastructure operators in counter-drone protection.

However, the technology is advancing faster than the legal frameworks governing its use.

The immediate challenge for European governments is to establish protective arrangements that allow rapid intervention while preserving clear accountability.

A counter-drone system can identify an approaching aircraft within seconds. Determining who is authorised to stop it remains a matter for national law.

Reviewing internal documents from Germany's armed forces, German media reports that this is the military's second-highest threat classification.

Patrol density along Lithuania’s border with Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave has practically doubled since soldiers joined the border guards there in early October. Lithuanian Armed Forces Commander Raimundas Vaikšnoras told LRT this in an interview. He linked the deployment to provocations and to what he described as Russian preparations for a large-scale mobilization.

Kaliningrad is a piece of Russia wedged between Lithuania and Poland on the Baltic Sea. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said people would naturally flee a Russian mobilization. Earlier, on 11 August, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Russia planned to mobilize several hundred thousand people by the end of 2026, after its parliamentary vote.

Commander: Russia lacks troops for a breakthrough

Vaikšnoras said Russia is struggling in Ukraine and needs to fill gaps in its capabilities. Moscow would probably like a breakthrough but lacks people, he added. In July, Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service estimated that Russia had signed about as many new military contracts this year as it had lost troops.

He also cited provocations. In Latvia, armed men recently tried to push migrants across the border, he noted, leaving open whether they were bandits or criminals. Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka denies everything, he added. On 6 October, Latvian Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava wrote that the escorts stood on the Belarusian side, were armed, and threatened Latvian soldiers.

Mission extended to mid-November

Lithuania decided to send troops after that Latvian incident. On 7 October, Interior Minister Martynas Katelynas asked Defense Minister Kaunas for troops to help the State Border Guard Service. Kaunas then approved up to 100 soldiers until 16 October, LRT reported.

On 16 October, Kaunas extended the mission to mid-November at Katelynas’s request. The Defense Ministry cited possible flows of people fleeing Kaliningrad and related illegal border crossings. It also said military intelligence sees no significant changes in military activity in Kaliningrad. Katelynas had earlier called the step preventive, BNS noted. He cited public, non-intelligence reports of a call-up planned after Russia’s parliamentary elections and said the threat level at the border had not risen.

Commander doubts Moscow’s intentions

Vaikšnoras said Russia and Belarus may not want open incidents that leave their traces right now. He added that he does not believe in their good intentions. He noted it has been said publicly that Russia’s capability in Kaliningrad is sharply reduced, because most of its forces are committed to Ukraine. Back in June 2025, Poland’s foreign minister said that, from what he knew, Russia had withdrawn a large part of its troops from the exclave.

Instead, hybrid attacks and sabotage that cannot be traced at once will probably continue, Vaikšnoras said. LRT noted the interview took place before a Ukrainian drone crashed in Pasvalys district on Sunday and before an attempted arson at premises used by SpaceX in Vilnius.

The attackers attempted to set fire to satellite antennas and a control unit, Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevicius said.

German industry expects Russian sabotage against the country’s companies to persist and take more forms, the deputy head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) told Handelsblatt. His warning follows alarms from Germany’s intelligence services, which describe the country as a main target of Russia’s covert campaign in Europe.

Russia keeps striking Ukrainian cities and power plants every day while trying to weaken the European support that keeps Ukraine fighting. Germany is home to arms makers producing with and for Ukraine, so pressure on its companies targets the supply behind Ukraine’s defense.

Industry expects attacks to last and change form

The warning came from Holger Lösch, the BDI’s deputy managing director.

“German industry is preparing for the threat to persist and for attack methods to become more varied,” he told Handelsblatt. “Companies don’t end up in the crosshairs by chance,” he added.

Russian influence and sabotage operations are no longer an abstract scenario, and companies, critical infrastructure, and defense supply chains are already among their targets, Lösch said. Companies now receive more threat warnings, and their cooperation with the authorities has improved significantly, he noted. “What is still missing are joint procedures to quickly derive concrete measures from warnings,” Lösch said, calling the protection of the economy a cornerstone of national security.

German intelligence describes a Russian shadow war

The warning comes a week after a public hearing of the intelligence oversight panel of the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, on 5 October. There, Martin Jäger, head of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), said Russia was waging a shadow war against Germany. “Germany has become a main obstacle to Russian hegemonic power projection in Europe and thus a target of Russian action,” Jäger said. “The danger of attacks against targets in Germany remains real and present,” he warned.

Sinan Selen, head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, told the same hearing that Russia was showing a readiness for sabotage and killings.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on 1 October that Germany was preparing for further hybrid attacks, “including serious ones,” and would respond “quickly and very clearly,” as it did after the drone attack at Leipzig airport.

Drone bombs, arson, and paid saboteurs on German soil

In August, a drone carrying Semtex explosives hit the wing of a Ukrainian An-124 cargo plane at Leipzig/Halle Airport but did not explode. Germany blamed Russia on 1 September, and German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said Germany was not at war with Russia but was a “target of war.”

German authorities suspect Russian intelligence of commissioning an arson attack near two Munich defense firms, and a confidential Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) assessment counted more than 165 suspected sabotage cases in Germany between January and August. The same assessment recorded 747 suspicious drone incidents involving 1,068 drones over critical infrastructure, military sites, and defense companies.

Germany’s Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) warns that the threat from low-level agents, locals paid small sums for one-off jobs such as arson or photographing military sites, has increased significantly. European intelligence agencies also report that Russia is increasingly targeting defense company executives, including at smaller drone makers, and the BfV has advised some German firms to hire close protection.

As long as Germany keeps backing Ukraine, Russian pressure on its companies is unlikely to ease, and the gap between warnings and action that industry flagged leaves smaller firms, with fewer resources for security, the most exposed.

European Union leaders will meet in Brussels on 15–16 October under pressure to address surging energy costs, Russian hybrid attacks, continued support for Ukraine and the bloc’s next long-term budget. The summit comes as economic pressures expose growing differences between national governments.

European Union leaders are preparing for a two-day summit in Brussels dominated by the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and mounting pressure on governments to reconcile defence commitments with deteriorating public finances.

The European Council meeting on 15–16 October will bring together the leaders of the 27 member states to consider immediate measures addressing high energy prices alongside longer-term decisions on competitiveness, enlargement, migration and the EU’s budget for 2028–2034.

European Council President António Costa has placed economic competitiveness and energy costs at the centre of the discussions, reflecting concerns that the disruption of global oil and gas markets is threatening the bloc’s industrial recovery.

The meeting also takes place against the background of renewed disputes over national spending limits, with Italy and Greece seeking greater freedom to finance energy relief and France facing increasing pressure over the credibility of its budget.

Energy crisis puts fiscal rules under pressure

The Middle East conflict has created a renewed energy shock for European economies, raising transport and industrial costs while pushing inflation higher.

The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has also affected global oil supplies, exposing Europe’s continuing dependence on internationally traded fossil fuels despite efforts to diversify imports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

European leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary support measures for households and businesses, as well as longer-term policies intended to reduce energy dependence.

The political disagreement concerns how those measures should be financed.

The European Commission has resisted requests from Italy and Greece for further exemptions from the EU’s fiscal framework. Both governments argue that extraordinary energy costs require additional budgetary flexibility.

Brussels maintains that existing provisions already permit exceptional expenditure within defined limits.

The disagreement is particularly difficult for indebted governments that must simultaneously finance military expansion, maintain public services and protect their economies from energy inflation.

France’s position has added urgency to the debate. Its borrowing costs have increased sharply as investors question whether the government can adopt a credible budget ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

A summit agreement on emergency energy assistance would therefore have to accommodate substantially different national fiscal circumstances.

Ukraine and the changing transatlantic relationship

Support for Ukraine remains a central item on the summit agenda as Russia continues attacks against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure and industrial facilities.

EU leaders are expected to review military and financial assistance, the implementation of sanctions against Moscow and the resilience of Ukraine’s economy.

The discussions take place amid renewed uncertainty surrounding American weapons deliveries.

Washington’s reported threats to suspend supplies under the NATO-backed PURL procurement arrangement have raised further questions about Europe’s dependence on the United States for advanced military equipment.

European governments have increased defence expenditure and committed additional support to Ukraine, but replacing American capabilities remains difficult, particularly in air defence, precision-guided weapons and certain intelligence systems.

The summit is unlikely to resolve those industrial limitations, but the broader question of Europe’s ability to sustain Ukrainian defence over several years will influence discussions.

Member states must also consider how increased defence expenditure will be financed alongside other demands on national budgets.

Russian hybrid operations move higher on the agenda

The EU’s published summit agenda includes Russian-linked hybrid attacks within Europe.

The issue has gained prominence as European governments investigate sabotage, cyber operations, information interference and threats against infrastructure and defence-related industries.

Recent warnings concerning possible Russian assassination operations targeting European defence executives and employees of companies supplying Ukraine illustrate the changing nature of the security threat.

Such activities place additional demands on national intelligence services, police forces and European institutions responsible for cross-border cooperation.

The EU has strengthened its sanctions instruments against hybrid activities, but enforcement remains dependent on coordination between national authorities.

Any further measures would need to address intelligence sharing, protection of critical infrastructure and the relationship between internal security and the Union’s wider Russia policy.

A larger EU with a contested budget

Enlargement will form another important part of the discussions following the Commission’s proposals for preparing a wider Union.

Brussels has outlined possible institutional safeguards intended to prevent future members from undermining democratic standards or blocking common decisions.

Montenegro and Albania are advancing through their accession negotiations, while Ukraine and Moldova remain central to the EU’s geopolitical enlargement strategy.

The financial implications will become increasingly important as governments negotiate the next multiannual financial framework covering 2028–2034.

Existing members are already divided over how much the EU should spend, which programmes should receive priority and whether additional common resources should be raised.

Agricultural expenditure, cohesion funding, defence investment and support for Ukraine will compete for resources within the same budget negotiations.

The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated through targeted reforms, but securing agreement among member states will require decisions on future expenditure and the distribution of financial benefits.

Competitiveness and the single market

Leaders will also examine progress on the One Europe, One Market agenda, which aims to reduce barriers to economic activity within the EU and improve conditions for European businesses.

The initiative is intended to address structural weaknesses affecting investment, industrial development and the ability of European companies to compete internationally.

High energy prices have made those concerns more immediate, particularly for industries competing against producers in economies where electricity and fuel are cheaper.

The European Council will be asked to provide direction on measures planned for 2026 and 2027, but implementation will depend on subsequent legislation and decisions by member states.

The October meeting brings several unresolved European policy questions into the same negotiation: how to protect economic competitiveness, maintain fiscal credibility, finance defence, sustain Ukraine and prepare for enlargement.

The immediate test will be whether leaders can agree on a credible response to energy prices without reopening broader disputes over national budgets.

More difficult decisions concerning defence financing, institutional reform and the EU’s long-term expenditure commitments will extend well beyond the two-day summit.

Prime Minister Andy Burnham has acknowledged that Russia interfered in Britain’s 2016 referendum on European Union membership, ending a decade in which successive governments avoided making a definitive public assessment of Moscow’s involvement.

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has confirmed that Russia interfered in the 2016 Brexit referendum, marking a significant change in the government’s position on foreign involvement in one of the country’s most consequential political decisions. The acknowledgement comes more than ten years after Britain voted to leave the European Union and six years after a parliamentary intelligence investigation criticised the failure to examine Russian activities surrounding the vote.

Speaking on The Rest Is Politics podcast, Burnham said he had requested an assessment of Russian interference after becoming prime minister in July. He subsequently received confirmation that Moscow had attempted to influence the referendum, although he declined to disclose the intelligence underpinning that conclusion or explain the methods employed.

The statement establishes an important distinction between Russian interference and the referendum’s outcome. The former is now publicly acknowledged by the British government; the latter remains a separate question. No evidence has been presented demonstrating that Russian activities determined the result, which saw 51.9 per cent vote to leave the EU.

The investigation that never took place

The controversy dates back to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 report on Russia, which identified serious weaknesses in Britain’s response to hostile foreign influence.

The committee examined Russian activities targeting British political institutions, including attempts to exploit social divisions through state-controlled information channels and online networks. It found that the British government had failed to conduct a comprehensive assessment of potential Russian interference in the Brexit referendum.

That failure was particularly striking when compared with the United States, where intelligence agencies investigated Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and published conclusions identifying a coordinated campaign.

In Britain, by contrast, responsibility for examining foreign interference had been divided between departments and intelligence agencies. The parliamentary committee found that no organisation had assumed responsibility for assessing the threat to the referendum comprehensively.

The distinction was politically convenient for successive governments. Without a formal investigation, ministers could maintain that there was insufficient evidence to establish interference while avoiding the question of whether the evidence had ever been properly examined.

Burnham’s acknowledgement changes that position, although it does not resolve every question raised by the original inquiry.

What Russia sought to achieve

Russian information operations have repeatedly targeted political divisions within European societies, particularly disagreements over immigration, national sovereignty, NATO and relations with Brussels.

Research into online activity surrounding the Brexit campaign identified networks of accounts associated with Russian influence operations that circulated divisive political messages. Establishing their precise reach, coordination and effect on individual voters remains considerably more difficult.

Moscow had an identifiable strategic interest in weakening European political cohesion. Britain’s departure from the EU removed one of the bloc’s largest economies, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and an important supporter of sanctions against Russia.

That geopolitical consequence does not establish that Brexit was engineered by Moscow. Britain’s referendum reflected longstanding domestic political divisions, disagreements over European integration and dissatisfaction with successive governments.

Russian interference, however, need not create political divisions to exploit them. Amplifying existing disputes, discrediting institutions and encouraging distrust between political opponents can serve strategic objectives without requiring direct control over a campaign.

Consequences for relations with Europe

The timing of Burnham’s intervention is significant. His government has begun reconsidering Britain’s relationship with the EU, while European governments are confronting increasingly aggressive Russian hybrid operations.

Burnham has also suggested that Britain should be prepared to reconsider EU membership in the future, although such a decision would require a separate political mandate and negotiations with the bloc’s 27 members.

The prime minister’s comments place Russian interference within a broader European security debate. France and Germany are among the countries confronting allegations of foreign information operations, covert political influence and attempts to undermine electoral confidence.

The European Council’s forthcoming October summit will include discussions of Russian-linked hybrid attacks, demonstrating that the problem extends beyond conventional espionage and cyber-security.

For Britain, the outstanding question concerns the intelligence assessment itself. Burnham has not indicated whether further evidence will be published, whether Parliament will receive a classified briefing or whether the government intends to examine failures by previous administrations.

A public acknowledgement without supporting details may establish the government’s position, but it cannot by itself provide a complete historical account.

Ten years after the referendum, Britain is therefore confronting two separate matters: the extent of Russia’s activities during the campaign and the reasons its own institutions took so long to acknowledge them.

The first concerns foreign interference. The second concerns the accountability of the British state.

Intelligence services from five European countries warn that Russia is expanding assassination and sabotage operations against defence manufacturers supplying Ukraine. The threats coincide with an alleged plot against Poland’s prime minister and defence minister, raising concerns about Moscow’s efforts to undermine European military assistance through intimidation and political destabilisation.

European intelligence agencies have warned that Russia is intensifying efforts to assassinate executives of defence companies supplying Ukraine, extending its campaign of sabotage and intimidation into the European military-industrial sector.

According to intelligence assessments obtained from five European security services, Moscow has ordered an expansion of covert operations targeting senior figures at major arms manufacturers and smaller companies producing drones and military components. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the BfV, has reportedly advised executives to strengthen personal security, while some manufacturers have already increased protection for senior personnel.

The warnings emerged alongside reports of an alleged assassination plot against Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Polish authorities convened an emergency security meeting and subsequently detained a suspect. No connection between the Polish case and Russian intelligence has been established.

Europe becomes Moscow’s principal target

The apparent expansion of Russian covert operations reflects a shift in Moscow’s calculations concerning Western military assistance.

President Vladimir Putin had reason to anticipate that Donald Trump’s return to the White House would weaken American support for Kyiv. Trump repeatedly questioned US military expenditure on Ukraine and advocated a negotiated settlement with Russia. A substantial reduction in American weapons deliveries could have increased pressure on Ukraine to accept Moscow’s territorial demands.

Instead, European governments assumed greater responsibility for sustaining Ukrainian defence capabilities, including financing weapons purchases and expanding domestic production.

The European Union’s €90 billion support programme for 2026–2027 allocates €60 billion to defence procurement and industrial capacity. The EU has also established mechanisms allowing Ukraine to participate in European joint procurement programmes.

Disrupting European manufacturers therefore offers Moscow a means of restricting Ukraine’s military capabilities without directly confronting NATO.

Assassination threats can interfere with procurement even when attacks are never carried out. Large manufacturers can afford extensive security arrangements, but smaller companies producing electronics, drone components and specialised equipment often lack comparable resources.

Intimidation could delay contracts, discourage investment and persuade individual suppliers to withdraw from Ukrainian defence programmes.

Sabotage as an instrument of political pressure

Russia’s alleged interest in targeting defence executives is not unprecedented. In 2024, American intelligence reportedly uncovered a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, chief executive of Rheinmetall, one of Germany’s principal suppliers of ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine.

As EU Today previously reported, Moscow has also publicly identified European factories involved in Ukrainian drone production, increasing concerns that civilian industrial facilities could become targets of Russian operations.

European authorities have investigated suspected Russian involvement in arson, infrastructure attacks and clandestine networks. An earlier cross-border investigation into alleged assassination and sabotage preparations demonstrated how intermediaries could be recruited to conduct operations while obscuring their sponsors.

Such activity also carries political consequences. Attacks against infrastructure and industrial facilities can reinforce public fears about confrontation with Russia, particularly during elections when parties advocating accommodation with Moscow seek to exploit security concerns.

Poland has already experienced mounting Russian hybrid pressure, including threats to critical infrastructure and information operations intended to aggravate domestic political divisions.

Putin’s strategy against European rearmament

Ukraine’s continuing strikes against Russian refineries and military-industrial facilities have added economic and operational pressures to Moscow’s prolonged war effort. Russia retains substantial military production capacity, but the costs of sustaining the conflict remain considerable.

Interfering with European weapons manufacturing could serve two objectives: restricting Ukraine’s access to equipment and obstructing Europe’s longer-term rearmament.

The Kremlin does not necessarily need European governments to abandon Ukraine formally. Production delays, disrupted contracts and reluctant suppliers could reduce the practical effect of military assistance even while political commitments remain unchanged.

European governments have acknowledged the industrial challenge. In its June conclusions on European defence, the European Council called for accelerated manufacturing capacity, stronger supply chains and closer cooperation with Ukraine’s defence industry.

Russia’s apparent strategy seeks to exploit the dependence of these programmes on private companies and skilled civilian personnel.

The warnings from European intelligence agencies suggest that protecting defence executives, engineers and contractors is becoming part of the continent’s wider security responsibilities.

For Moscow, intimidation offers the possibility of weakening Ukrainian military resistance without an open confrontation with NATO. For European governments, preventing covert operations from disrupting weapons production is increasingly inseparable from their commitment to sustain Ukraine’s defence.

Russia is expanding efforts to target European defense industry leaders as part of a broader campaign of sabotage and hybrid operations aimed at weakening support for Ukraine, the Financial Times reported on 11 October, citing officials from five European intelligence agencies.

The warnings come amid a wider increase in Russia-linked sabotage and other covert operations targeting European defense companies and critical infrastructure. Moscow is expanding its so-called hybrid warfare campaign against European countries as they continue to support Ukraine, using covert networks, intimidation, and suspected sabotage to undermine security and deter further assistance to Kyiv.

The FT reported that assassinations of civilian targets in Europe, once considered "taboo" even within Russian intelligence services, are becoming an increasingly prominent part of the Kremlin’s plans.

Russian operatives target defense industry leaders

European intelligence officials told the FT that Russian operatives are targeting chief executives and senior employees at defense companies, including smaller firms manufacturing drones and drone components. 

The campaign comes as Russia seeks to undermine European backing for Ukraine amid a battlefield stalemate and mounting pressure on the Russian economy.

The warnings have prompted defense companies to strengthen security around senior executives. Some have increased personal protection, while others have relocated production sites in response to suspected Russian threats, according to the FT.

Germany's domestic intelligence service, the BfV, has stepped up contact with employees and management at German defense companies and recommended that some use privately contracted close-protection teams, an agency official told the newspaper.

BfV chief Sinan Selen warned German lawmakers that Russia was deliberately planning acts of violence against individuals through state or state-controlled actors. He said the operations were evolving in their targets, methods, and use of organized crime networks.

Russia adapts its methods to carry out attacks

According to the intelligence officials cited by the FT, Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU, has adapted its methods by working more closely with criminal groups and dividing surveillance, logistics, planning, and execution among different operatives.

Officials said some plots had been disrupted, while other cases involved surveillance of targets at home and at work.

The campaign's intended effect extends beyond any individual attack. One European intelligence official told the FT that the threat is psychological, designed to make people reconsider doing business with Ukraine.

Although some Russian operations remain amateurish and have been detected early, the resulting uncertainty forces companies to devote more resources to security. Smaller firms, which may have fewer resources to protect their personnel and facilities, could be particularly vulnerable.

Plot against Rheinmetall CEO raised alarm in 2024

European defense executives have been on heightened alert since 2024, when US and German intelligence agencies uncovered a Russian plot against Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger, a prominent advocate of supplying weapons to Ukraine.

Papperger has said he now receives round-the-clock protection from private security personnel and police.

The FT reported that European intelligence agencies now view threats against defense industry leaders as part of a broader effort to disrupt the production and supply of weapons to Ukraine, rather than isolated plots against individual executives.

Montenegro has ordered the expulsion of Mikhail Zvynchuk, head of the pro-Kremlin military information network Rybar, and four other Russian citizens over national security concerns following a security operation targeting suspected Russian hybrid influence activities, Vijesti reported on 9 October.

Zvynchuk is the founder and head of Rybar, a prominent Russian military-focused information network known for its Telegram channels covering Russia's war against Ukraine. The network promotes pro-Kremlin narratives and has been associated with Russian propaganda and influence operations.

Montenegrin police announced on 9 October that the five Russians had their residence rights revoked and were ordered to leave the country on national and internal security grounds. 

Montenegro investigates suspected Russian hybrid activity

The operation involved Montenegro's police and National Security Agency (ANB), which seized drones, high-resolution recording equipment, cameras, and several mobile phones for further examination, according to Vijesti.

According to Montenegrin authorities, the five had arrived in the country less than two days before the operation. The investigation is being conducted with support from international partners.

Montenegrin police identified the five Russian citizens as Zvynchuk, his wife Valeria Zvynchuk, Sergei Belous, Pavel Lekatorchuk, and Kira Doroshenko. Authorities said the case had been referred to prosecutors in Podgorica and Kotor.

The European Union has sanctioned Zvynchuk over activities that undermine or threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. He has also been sanctioned by the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Ukraine, according to Vijesti.

Suspected influence operation targeting EU integration

Vijesti reported, citing security sources, that Montenegrin authorities suspected the group of planning a documentary intended to undermine public support for the country's European integration.

According to the outlet, the planned material would portray Montenegro's expected alignment of its visa policy with EU standards as a politically imposed measure that threatens tourism, economic stability, and national interests.

Security services had monitored the group's arrival before carrying out the operation in Risan, in the Bay of Kotor area, Vijesti reported. The equipment seized from the group will undergo expert analysis to establish its intended purpose and use in Montenegro.

Medvedev threatens imprisoning “European and American idiots” for prisoner exchanges

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev responded to the operation by suggesting Moscow might need to expand its pool of prisoners to exchange for Europeans and Americans to secure Zvynchuk's return.

“We will probably have to replenish our pool of prisoners for exchange with European and American idiots,” Medvedev said, according to Vijesti.

Montenegro, a NATO member and EU candidate, has aligned itself with EU sanctions against Russia following Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The expulsion comes amid broader European concerns over Russian intelligence activity, propaganda, and other forms of hybrid interference. 

Lithuania plans to deploy up to 100 soldiers to support border guards along its frontier with Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast, Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said on 7 October.

Lithuanian Interior Minister Martynas Katelynas has described the deployment as a preventive measure linked to possible Russian mobilization and a recent incident on the Latvia-Belarus border, where masked, armed escorts tried to push a group of migrants into Latvia. Katelynas said Lithuania could face people trying to avoid mobilization and seeking asylum.

Kaunas said he had granted permission to use Lithuanian soldiers to strengthen border protection for the next several weeks.

 “The order starts being implemented immediately,” he wrote on Facebook.

Russia denies a new mobilization

The Kremlin denies a new mobilization is coming. In early September, Russian President Vladimir Putin called reports of one "complete nonsense" and "an information attack on Russia." Ukraine's military and foreign intelligence services say Russia's General Staff has prepared a scenario to mobilize 600,000 people over 2026 and 2027. On 28 September, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that "in effect, the Russians have already begun additional mobilization."

Frontier-station patrols for a couple of weeks, possibly longer

On 8 October, the Lithuanian army said soldiers were being brought in to help the State Border Guard Service from that day. A company-sized unit was planned for the assignment, initially for two weeks, with the option to extend. Soldiers will patrol with border guards in frontier-station areas, while mobile patrols, mobile observation posts, and military police crews may be added as needed. The army described the deployment as preventive and a normal form of interagency cooperation.

Kaunas had told LRT TV the soldiers would stay until 16 October. On the morning of 8 October, he said the deployment "was supposed to start" overnight and that he would check with the army. On 8 October, the Lithuanian army said soldiers were being brought in to help the State Border Guard Service from that day. Kaunas also said that “on the Kaliningrad side” there were no physical barriers, unlike the border with Belarus.

Lithuania says its border guards are stretched

On 8 October, Katelynas said the border guard service’s capacity was insufficient, with shifts growing while officer numbers were not increasing. He said the threat level had not changed. In a Facebook post the previous day, he said the situation at Lithuania’s border was calm and there was no reason to panic. He said Russia was planning mobilization after the elections and that Lithuania may face people trying to avoid it and seeking asylum.

Lithuania's State Border Guard Service had turned back 1,693 people trying to cross illegally from Belarus this year and about 26,300 since the migration crisis began, as reported by ELTA on 8 October. Katelynas said 43 migrants tried to enter southern Lithuania last week and were turned back.

Armed escorts in masks pushed a group of migrants from Belarus toward Latvia and threatened Latvian soldiers, and hours later masked people crossed into Latvia and stole border surveillance cameras, Latvian Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava said on 6 October. Latvia's military described the incident as part of a continuing hybrid campaign on the border, and Ukraine's foreign minister blamed Moscow.

Russia keeps probing the EU's eastern defenses with migrants pushed from its own soil and through its ally Belarus, alongside drone incursions and sabotage that ISW has linked into one Russian pattern across Europe.

Armed escorts threatened Latvian soldiers

Latvian soldiers stopped at least 20 migrants trying to cross the border illegally from Belarus, the Latvian National Armed Forces said. Masked escorts led the group, and this time they were armed, threatened the soldiers, and urged and drove the migrants toward Latvia, the military said.

"Unlike many previous incidents, this time the provocation was particularly demonstrative and aggressive," Dombrava said.

The incident confirms that deliberate provocations and hybrid threats on the border will continue, the armed forces said. Illegal migration is being used as a tool to pressure Latvia's border and, with it, the external border of the EU and NATO, they added.

Belarus began funneling migrants toward the EU in 2021, a campaign Poland's government called a hybrid attack in which the migrants end up as weapons. In 2023, Finland closed its border crossings with Russia, accusing Moscow of the same tactic, and by mid-July Latvia had logged 111 straight days of migrants pushed across from Belarus.

Masked people stole the cameras

Several hours after the standoff, people in masks entered Latvian territory, damaged a distribution cabinet, and stole surveillance cameras, Dombrava said. They returned to Belarus before the border guard patrol could arrive.

"Belarus should understand that such incidents could lead to more serious consequences for Belarus itself," he said.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said Ukraine stands in full solidarity with Latvia. "Make no mistake: Moscow is behind it," he wrote, adding that Russian President Vladimir Putin "deliberately weaponizes migration, with the help of Lukashenka, to destabilise Europe."

Tunnels, tear gas, and damaged cameras on the border

Latvia's border guards stopped 11,384 attempts to cross illegally from Belarus between the start of 2026 and 24 September. In January, Latvia's armed forces and border guard published evidence that Belarusian security agencies were organizing illegal migration across the border. Latvia has also recorded deliberate damage to cables, distribution cabinets, and camera poles on its eastern border, aimed at slowing the rollout of an automated border control system.

On 22 July, Latvian soldiers fired warning shots and used tear gas against migrants trying to cross. The next day, Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs said Russia and Belarus were stepping up their hybrid war against the Baltic States to distract from Russia's failures in Ukraine. Latvia temporarily halted crossings on the Belarus border on 31 July. In August, Latvian guards found the first tunnel dug from Belarus and turned back 15 migrants who used it.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned that Russia is intensifying hybrid operations across Europe, citing sabotage attempts, airspace violations and Russian drones and missiles crossing into Moldovan territory.

Her intervention adds pressure for a more coordinated European response to hostile activity below the threshold of conventional warfare.

Russia is putting lives at risk across Europe through an expanding campaign of hybrid activity, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday, after another series of Russian drones and missiles entered Moldovan airspace.

Speaking in Brussels alongside Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, Kallas said Europe had experienced an increase in sabotage attempts and airspace violations during recent weeks.

“Russian missiles and drones violated Moldovan airspace again over the weekend,” she said, describing the incidents as unacceptable.

According to the official EU record of the press conference, Kallas said the Kremlin was seeking to create fear and interfere with European decision-making, and argued that the response should include greater resilience and continued support for Ukraine.

Her remarks follow Russia’s renewed large-scale attacks against Ukraine’s energy system and continued reports of drones crossing borders beyond Ukrainian territory.

Moldova’s defence authorities reported that three drones entered Moldovan airspace during Russia’s 30 September attack on Ukraine. Moldova, which shares a long border with Ukraine and is seeking EU membership, has repeatedly accused Moscow of attempting to destabilise the country.

The latest incidents broaden a European debate that has been developing for months: how governments should respond to hostile operations that are deliberate and potentially dangerous but fall short of an overt military attack.

EU Today reported on 28 September that European governments were discussing an emergency security protocol intended to improve coordination when member states face sabotage and other hybrid threats.

That followed earlier warnings concerning suspected attacks on infrastructure, cyber operations, interference campaigns and airspace violations across several European countries.

The problem is partly one of attribution and partly one of thresholds.

A conventional armed attack on a NATO member may trigger consultation under Article 4 or, in sufficiently serious circumstances, collective defence provisions under Article 5. The European Union also has its own mutual assistance provision under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union.

Hybrid activity is frequently designed to remain below those thresholds.

Cyberattacks, covert sabotage, GPS interference, disinformation, drones and operations conducted through intermediaries can impose costs without giving governments an obvious basis for a military response.

Kallas’s warning comes as Germany has also reported an increase in activity it attributes to Russia.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz has warned that Germany faces growing hybrid pressure involving drones and cyber operations. European security services have separately investigated suspected Russian involvement in sabotage and attacks on infrastructure in several countries.

Moscow has denied Western accusations that it is directing such operations.

The EU has already used sanctions against individuals and entities accused of Russian hybrid activity, while governments are considering faster systems for sharing intelligence and attributing incidents.

EU Today examined the debate in September as the European Parliament considered proposals for quicker attribution, stronger intelligence-sharing and improved protection of critical infrastructure.

Moldova occupies a particularly exposed position.

The EU has provided €317 million through the European Peace Facility for Moldovan defence modernisation, according to Kallas, including €120 million allocated in 2026 for air defence. Brussels is also supporting Moldova through its EU Partnership Mission, which provides assistance against hybrid and cyber threats.

Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is not a NATO member and has constitutional neutrality. Its ability to counter Russian missiles or drones entering its airspace is therefore closely connected to the development of its own detection and air-defence capabilities.

For the EU, repeated incidents involving Moldova, NATO airspace and European infrastructure are increasingly being considered as parts of the same security problem rather than isolated events.