Twice in four months, Egyptian warplanes have bombed Sudanese miners inside their own territory, and dozens of bodies have failed to draw from Abdel Fattah al-Burhan a stance worthy of his citizens’ blood. Cairo, for its part, justifies its military operations, while Port Sudan hides behind a fact-finding committee, a cable of condolences and talk of contact between the two leaderships, without daring to name the party accused of killing its citizens.

This is the scene before us: a state acting on the Sudanese border by force of arms, and an army commander who avoids naming the party accused of killing Sudanese, for fear of losing an ally whose approval seems to matter more to him than their lives. On the morning of 10 October 2026, the mining site at Jabal al-Uqaydat in the Shamal al-Wadi area inside Sudan turned into a killing field after it was struck by five consecutive airstrikes, according to the testimony of a survivor relayed by Agence France-Presse. Thousands of miners had been searching for gold in a land exhausted by war; some ended up under the rubble, while others fled to the mountains without water or supplies.

In a significant pinpointing of the site of the bombing, The New York Times, in its report published on 12 October 2026, stated that the targeted mine is located in Sudan’s Red Sea State, about 25 miles from the Egyptian border, or roughly 40 kilometres inside Sudanese territory. Al-Hurra, in its coverage of the June attack, had cited an estimate placing Jabal al-Uqaydat about 20 kilometres inside Sudan; the forty-kilometre distance is cited here as attributed to the American newspaper’s determination of the location of the October strike, which keeps the question of sovereignty and the protection of civilians at the heart of the matter.

Agence France-Presse relayed from survivors that thousands of miners were working at the site, and “Emergency Lawyers” counted 72 dead according to preliminary information, while witnesses told the BBC of more than 60 dead and about 150 wounded. Survivors told Sudan Tribune that the dead numbered at least 200, with more than 15,000 workers fleeing, while the Sudan Doctors Network recorded a preliminary toll of 13 dead and 28 wounded, warning that it could rise.

Cairo Justifies the Bombing While Burhan Avoids Naming the Perpetrator

The “Emergency Lawyers” organization accused the Egyptian air force of targeting civilian miners, considering the attack a violation of international law. When Reuters asked Egyptian security officials about the raid, they did not deny the operation but justified it as ending what they described as border chaos and preventing Egyptian and Sudanese groups from taking control of mining areas.

Two days later, the Egyptian military spokesman announced the continuation of the “third phase” of the campaign, noting that warning leaflets had been dropped on those he described as criminal elements. However, the statement placed the operations inside Egyptian territory and did not include an explicit acknowledgment of carrying out a raid inside Sudan or of the killing of the miners.

Thus Cairo has a military justification for bombing a Sudanese site, while Burhan’s authority is incapable of issuing an explicit condemnation of the party that human rights organizations accuse of killing its citizens. The irony is that the state that is supposed to demand the victims’ rights appeared more concerned about its relationship with Cairo than about naming the party responsible for their blood.

From June to October: The Victims Change, the Silence Remains

The October raid was preceded by a strike that targeted the area on 16 June 2026. Agence France-Presse reported 23 dead, while Sudanese platforms estimated the toll at around one hundred. According to the testimonies received, the operations extended to Jabal al-Uqaydat, the Red Mountain and the area around Souk al-Ansari, and included raids by warplanes and drones followed by a ground incursion. The organization “Darfur Victims Advocacy” relayed from witnesses that an Egyptian force of about sixty armed vehicles had surrounded the miners and detained civilians, some of whom were beaten.

In the days following the June attacks, Radio Dabanga reported the arrival of about two thousand deported miners via the Argeen crossing, according to a local activist, while the crossing’s director spoke of more than three thousand over the preceding days, and the Egyptian army announced the arrest of 223 people, including 136 foreigners. On 22 June, Burhan appeared in Al-Ratj to say, according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: “Our northern neighbor — people must respect it and not cross the borders so as not to cause problems for themselves and for the state.”

Sudanese had been waiting for their army’s commander to defend their blood, but they heard him urging them to respect the borders of the neighbor accused of bombing them. When the raid was repeated in October, the Sovereignty Council repeated the scene: condolences over the “painful incident,” a fact-finding committee, and an assurance that the two countries’ leaderships are in contact.

Burhan’s adviser, Amjad Farid, described the bombing as an unjustified and unacceptable crime, noting that border violations could be addressed without warplanes, but his position did not translate into an announced official protest or a clear path to accountability.

Sudan’s Gold: A Wealth Guarded by Force

Al-Uqaydat lies within the gold-rich Nubian Shield belt, and the Chatham House institute estimated that about 60% of gold production in the Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states is smuggled to Egypt, in quantities exceeding one hundred kilograms per day, and more than sixty tonnes since the outbreak of the war through the end of 2024.

By contrast, official gold exports to Egypt in 2024 did not exceed about 16 million dollars, roughly 1% of Sudan’s total gold exports, according to Central Bank of Sudan data cited in the Chatham House report.

Miners told Sudan Tribune that they had observed drilling machinery and trucks carrying rocks across the border into Egypt, and that an Egyptian patrol had previously warned them against approaching a site it said lies inside Egyptian territory. Al-Hurra relayed testimony about friction between workers and personnel of an Egyptian mining company operating near them.

Egyptian Law No. 193 of 2020 authorizes contracting with the Egyptian Company for Mining and the Management and Exploitation of Quarries and Salt Works, affiliated with the National Service Projects Organization, to exploit the quarries and salt works specified by the law for a period of thirty years, while the state-owned Shalateen Mineral Resources Company is active in the south of the Eastern Desert. The businessman Naguib Sawiris also praised the June operation and linked it to investors’ confidence in the Egyptian mining sector.

In the same month, Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum denied statements attributed to its minister about agreements to establish 108 gold mines in northern Sudan, but the researcher Mohamed al-Hadi considered it likely that the attacks are linked to undisclosed understandings with the Sudanese government, a hypothesis that calls for an independent investigation.

Burhan: When the Ally Becomes More Precious Than the Citizen

The website Al-Hurra relayed from a miner that a group of pro-government joint forces withdrew from the mountain a day before the June raid, and that the Sudanese army did not arrive to evacuate the wounded and collect the bodies until the third day. The testimony raised workers’ suspicions about possible coordination between the two governments, without establishing that it took place.

But Burhan’s silence does not need those suspicions to be proven in order to become a matter of political accountability. Cairo supports the commander of the Sudanese army and considers the war on its borders a threat to its security. Agence France-Presse has verified satellite images showing the repeated presence of Turkish Bayraktar drones at an Egyptian base near Sudan, while reports spoke of facilitating the delivery of drones to the Sudanese army and training its crews inside Egypt, alongside broader military and intelligence cooperation.

An analysis published by the Horn Review in June held that the army’s silence over the raids is linked to Egyptian support for it.

Yet this relationship does not absolve Burhan of responsibility; it multiplies it. Whoever relies on another state’s support in his war cannot make the protection of his citizens a negotiable item, and his need for weapons and political backing must not become an immunity he grants to Cairo at the expense of Sudanese blood.

Sovereignty Tested With the Blood of the Poor

The raids reopen the wound of Halayeb and Shalateen, the disputed triangle under Egyptian control. Sudanese administrative maps confirm that the targeted mining sites lie inside Sudan, while Cairo treats them as part of the border area adjoining the triangle.

Human rights, political and trade union forces have called for an independent international investigation, and the “Sumud” alliance led by Abdalla Hamdok held the Egyptian side directly responsible.

Today, Egypt is required to answer for the bombing and the fall of civilians, not merely to classify them as criminal elements and offer security justifications, and Burhan is required to announce the results of the investigation, determine responsibility, demand compensation and accountability, and take the necessary diplomatic and legal measures.

As for settling for condolences, it is not a defense of sovereignty; it is a declaration that the alliance with Cairo is more precious to the authorities than the Sudanese people’s right to life and justice. At Jabal al-Uqaydat the bill is clear and admits no doubt: the gold crosses the border, the dead remain under the rubble, and Burhan guards his silence.

Netflix is preparing to release a new Kuwaiti psychological horror series, Al-Nafs Al-Mutma'inna, as part of its Halloween line-up.

The series, known in English as Obsess, will premiere on 30 October and is set in Kuwait during the 1980s.

It follows a man who returns home following his father's death, only to find himself drawn back into what Netflix describes as a cursed and obsessive relationship.

The supernatural thriller blends psychological horror with demonic themes, exploring the boundaries between desire, guilt and forces that may be beyond its protagonist's control.

Lebanese director Said El Marouk directs the series, which stars Haya Abdel Salam, Yagoub Alfarhan and Layla Abdallah.

The cast also includes Hussein Al-Mansour, Asmahan Tawfiq, Ibrahim Al-Harbi, Ghada AlMulla, Hussain Al-Haddad, Abdullah AlBloushi and Sara Salah.

Netflix has classified the show as Kuwaiti and Middle Eastern horror, describing it as ominous, psychological and suspenseful.

The series arrives as part of the streaming platform's Halloween 2026 slate, alongside titles including Below, Haunted Hotel and Balaraw: Blood Island.

Its release also marks a relatively unusual addition to Arab television, where horror has traditionally been produced less frequently than drama, comedy and romance.

Netflix has increasingly invested in Gulf productions, including the Kuwaiti romantic comedy Honeymoonish, released in 2024.

Arab filmmakers have nevertheless returned to supernatural stories periodically over the decades.

Egyptian films such as Al-Ins wal-Jinn and Al-Ta'weeza became prominent early examples of the genre, while Tunisia's Dachra, released in 2018, brought North African folk horror to a wider audience.

Netflix itself has previously experimented with Arabic-language supernatural drama.

Its 2019 Jordanian series Jinn followed teenagers confronting supernatural forces in Petra and became controversial in Jordan over its portrayal of sex, drinking and drug use.

The series was Netflix's first Arabic-language original from the Middle East, with the platform saying at the time that it planned to continue investing in Arabic-language productions.

Netflix has since expanded its regional catalogue considerably, with global titles such as Stranger Things also attracting large audiences across the Middle East.

The company's Gulf output has meanwhile included a growing number of Kuwaiti series and films, with Kuwaiti drama already forming part of Netflix's Arabic catalogue before its more recent push into locally produced originals.

Obsess now brings that approach to horror, combining a recognisably Gulf setting with psychological and supernatural themes.

Sorpresa: abolire il reddito di cittadinanza non ha ridotto il lavoro nero. Anzi, nell’anno in cui il governo Meloni ha abrogato il sussidio anti povertà sostituendolo con misure meno generose e selettive le unità di lavoro irregolari sono aumentate, e non di poco. Nel 2024, calcola l’Istat nel report sull’economia non osservata, quell’aggregato statistico che traduce le ore lavorate in lavoratori a tempo pieno è salito del 4,6% toccando quota 3,27 milioni, oltre 145mila in più rispetto al 2023. Mentre la crescita del lavoro regolare si è fermata a +1,6% (sono cresciuti i dipendenti regolari ma diminuiti gli autonomi). Rispetto al 2022, quando la leader di Fratelli d’Italia è arrivata a Palazzo Chigi, si contano 298mila irregolari in più e il tasso di nero è passato dal 12,5% al 13,1%: più di uno su otto è fuori dalle regole. La narrazione della maggioranza di destra sulle cause della ripresa dell’occupazione con il superamento – da luglio 2024 – dei 24 milioni di persone al lavoro ne esce decisamente ammaccata.

Il Reddito “ha fatto proliferare il nero”, sosteneva nel marzo 2023 Meloni, rivendicando la decisione di cancellare la misura universale di contrasto alla povertà che era stata introdotta nel 2019 e evocando tra le righe una futura emersione del sommerso. Ma la presidente del Consiglio era evidentemente ben consapevole del fatto che, propaganda a parte, fare tabula rasa di quell’aiuto non sarebbe servito per ridurre il fenomeno: non a caso alla fine dello stesso anno, rinegoziando il Pnrr con Bruxelles, il governo ha chiesto e ottenuto la cancellazione dell’impegno a diminuire di 2 punti percentuali la quota di lavoro nero rispetto al dato 2020, sostituendolo con impegni su ispezioni, potenziamento dei centri per l’impiego e attivazione di un portale nazionale ad hoc. L’obiettivo sarebbe stato in effetti ampiamente mancato.

Tornando ai dati, i dipendenti irregolari – per responsabilità dei datori di lavoro – sono arrivati nel 2024 a 2,39 milioni, +121.800 in un anno (+5,4%), e gli autonomi a 881mila, 23.400 in più sull’anno prima (+2,7%). Il confronto con gli anni precedenti è impietoso e imbarazzante per il governo. Nel 2021 le unità di lavoro irregolari erano 2,98 milioni e nel 2022 erano rimaste stabili. Poi, nel primo anno pieno di Giorgia Meloni a palazzo Chigi, è arrivata l’inversione: 3,13 milioni nel 2023 e oltre 3,27 milioni del 2024. I numeri ovviamente non dimostrano un rapporto causale con l’abolizione del Rdc, ma di sicuro bastano per smentire la causalità inversa che la maggioranza dava per sicura.

L’aumento riguarda quasi tutti i settori, ma è particolarmente evidente in agricoltura, dove il tasso di irregolarità sale dal 17,6% al 18,4%, e nelle costruzioni, dove passa al 13,6%, +0,8 punti. Nei servizi alla persona, che comprendono il lavoro domestico, raggiunge il 41,4%, in crescita di 0,9 punti. Nel commercio, nei trasporti, negli alberghi e nella ristorazione arriva al 15,5%, mezzo punto in più rispetto al 2023.

In parallelo il valore aggiunto legato al lavoro irregolare è salito a 80,3 miliardi di euro: 3,1 miliardi in più. Mentre la componente legata alla sotto-dichiarazione, cioè i ricavi non dichiarati o costi sovrastimati dalle imprese per ridurre il reddito dichiarato al fisco, è scesa da 108,2 a 107,6 miliardi.

L'articolo Smontata la propaganda di Meloni: nell’anno di abolizione del reddito di cittadinanza +145mila lavoratori in nero. Da quando c’è lei a Chigi +300mila proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

L’Istat ha rilasciato l’analisi delle performance del commercio estero dell’Italia. Nel mese di agosto le esportazioni hanno tenuto dal punto di vista del valore, registrando una crescita tendenziale del 9%. Tuttavia, il volume delle vendite aumenta solo dell’1,9% rispetto all’anno precedente.

Se rispetto all’anno precedente i valori sono migliori, rispetto a luglio 2026 si registra una lieve flessione congiunturale: -1,5% l’export, -1,6% l’import. Un dato, quest’ultimo, in parte condizionato dalle importanti consegne di navi e imbarcazioni registrate il mese prima. Al netto di questo fattore, la flessione congiunturale dell’export si ridimensiona a un più contenuto -0,4%.

Quali sono i Paesi e i settori che spingono la crescita

A trainare le vendite sono i mercati extra-Ue che, nonostante i dazi e le tensioni geopolitiche, sono aumentati del 16,7% su base annua. Rallenta invece l’esportazione verso l’area comunitaria, che si arresta a un modesto +1,6%.

Tra le destinazioni che registrano i maggiori incrementi delle nostre vendite all’estero troviamo:

• Svizzera (+57,1%)
• Cina (+32,7%)
• Stati Uniti (+31,2%)
• Paesi OPEC (+17,8%)

L’apporto negativo del nostro export si spiega con la diminuzione dei traffici con la Francia (-8,3%), storico partner continentale.

I settori chiave che guidano la volata dell’export in valore ad agosto sono:

• autoveicoli (+55,8%)
• prodotti petroliferi raffinati (+55,4%)
• metalli di base e prodotti in metallo (+26,5%)
• altri mezzi di trasporto (+17,2%)
• alimentari, bevande e tabacco (+5,4%)

Tra i comparti in contrazione si segnala unicamente la vendita di macchinari e apparecchiature (-1,4%). Un freno per quello che è storicamente uno dei pilastro dell’export italiano si spiega dal rallentamento degli investimenti industriali in Europa e dal rinvio dell’acquisto di beni strumentali da parte delle imprese estere.

Effetto inflazione: perché i fatturati salgono ma le merci no

Il divario tra la crescita dell’export in valore (+9,0%) e quella in volume (+1,9%) si spiega facilmente con l’inflazione. L’aumento del fatturato della nostra manifattura è per larga parte drogato dall’incremento dei costi di vendita.

Il fenomeno risulta ancora più evidente sul fronte delle importazioni, che ad agosto aumentano del 9,7% in valore ma registrano una contrazione del 2,4% in volume. In sostanza, l’Italia sta importando meno beni fisici, ma li sta pagando molto di più.

Bilancio finale

Il saldo commerciale globale dell’Italia ad agosto si conferma positivo per 1.773 milioni di euro, a fronte di un avanzo nei prodotti non energetici pari a 6.925 milioni. A pesare sui conti nazionali è però il peggioramento del deficit energetico, che sale a 5,15 miliardi di euro rispetto ai 3,43 miliardi registrati un anno fa.

Nei primi otto mesi del 2026, l’avanzo commerciale, ottenuto dalla differenza tra import ed export, sale comunque a 34,7 miliardi di euro, contro i 32,5 miliardi dello stesso periodo del 2025.

Cos’è il deficit energetico

Per deficit energetico si intende la differenza tra il valore di petrolio greggio, gas ed elettricità che l’Italia acquista e quello delle materie energetiche (come carburanti raffinati e lubrificanti) che vende fuori dai confini.

Poiché l’Italia è un Paese strutturalmente trasformatore e dipendente dalle materie prime estere, la bolletta energetica è perennemente in rosso. L’aumento del 7,3% su base annua dei prezzi all’importazione ad agosto si è tradotto in un costo maggiore per le nostre filiere industriali, drenando risorse al surplus generato dalle esportazioni non energetiche.

L’inflazione accelera in Italia e passa dal 3,3% di agosto al 4,2% di settembre 2026. Lo conferma l’Istat, con la rilevazione relativa ai dati definitivi sui prezzi al consumo.

La variazione congiunturale è pari al +0,7%. A pesare soprattutto l’aumento dei costi dell’energia e degli alimentari freschi. Il rialzo riguarda anche il carrello della spesa in generale, la cui crescita annua passa dallo 0,9% all’1,5%.

Aumenta l’inflazione in Italia

Entrando nello specifico, i beni energetici regolamentati passano dal +18,6% al +25,8%, mentre quelli non regolamentati vanno dal +17% al +22,5%.

L’inflazione di fondo si porta a +1,6% (da +1,5%) e la variazione media annua, acquisita a settembre, a +3,1%. Per inflazione di fondo si intende una misura dei prezzi al consumo che esclude le componenti più volatili, ovvero l’energia e i beni alimentari non lavorati. Questo lo stato dell’inflazione al netto dei soli beni energetici: da +1,7% a +2%.

L’inflazione acquisita per il 2026 è pari a +3,1% per l’indice generale e a +1,9% per la componente di fondo.

Per quanto riguarda l’inflazione nel suo complesso, viene così confermata la stima preliminare.

L’energia

I prezzi, in generale, sono spinti dalla nuova accelerazione dei prezzi dei beni energetici. Quando aumenta l’energia, infatti, costa di più produrre le merci ed anche distribuirle. E le aziende hanno meno soldi da investire in innovazione e personale. E, a cascata, interi settori vedono aumentare i prezzi.

Servizi, beni e trasporti

Aumentano anche i prezzi dei servizi ricreativi, culturali e per la cura della persona (da +2,6% a + 2,9%), mentre anche i trasporti registrano una crescita più sostenuta su base annua (da +0,8% a + 1,6%).

La crescita dei prezzi dei beni passa dal +4,1% al +5,4%. Supera, dunque, la crescita dei prezzi relativa ai servizi (da +2,4% a +2,6%). Il differenziale tra il comparto passa così da -1,7 a -2,8 punti percentuali.

Questo l’andamento dei prezzi dei beni alimentari, per la cura della casa e della persona: da +0,9% a +1,5%. E qui si mostra l’andamento dei prodotti ad alta frequenza d’acquisto: da +4,3% a +5,2%.

Come viene evidenziato, aumenta tutto con un’unica eccezione: quella che riguarda i servizi relativi all’informazione e alla comunicazione (-0,2%). È possibile ipotizzare che, di fronte all’aumento del costo della vita, famiglie e imprese prestino maggiore attenzione a queste spese anche se il dato sui prezzi, da solo, non consente di stabilire se sia effettivamente diminuita la domanda.

Il peso per le famiglie

E per quanto riguarda le famiglie? Nel terzo trimestre del 2026, l’aumento dei prezzi misurato dall’indice armonizzato IPCA è stato più elevato per i nuclei con livelli di spesa più bassi (+4,4%) rispetto a quelli con livelli di spesa più alti (+2,9%). Traduzione: chi stava male, ora sta anche peggio.

Si ricorda, per concludere, che negli ultimi 25 anni i prezzi sono aumentati fino al +120%.

• Bruno Bianchini quit his job at Google to focus on sustainability in Cambodia and green finance.
• While still at Google, he pursued a degree at Harvard in sustainable studies.
• He says leaving Google was a hard decision, but his career shift aligns with his values.

This as-told-to essay is based on an interview with Bruno Bianchini, the 40-year-old former Head of Global Partnerships for the Middle East, Africa, and Turkey for Google, who is based in the Netherlands. It has been edited for length and clarity.

Growing up in the Italian countryside, sustainability was simply part of everyday life. At 18, I left my small village near Milan to study at Bocconi University in Milan.

In 2005, I started my degree in accounting, corporate finance, and law. Then I did a master's in business administration. When I was about to graduate, a friend at the university said a group of professors had opened a boutique consulting firm. I interviewed for the role and landed it.

That path led me first to consulting and then to Google, where I spent more than 13 years before leaving to pursue work in sustainability.

I started work as a business analyst at the consulting firm in January 2011

At 25, I was working on three projects — a hotel, a food company, and a company that made pressure gauges. My experience was very much about seeing problems through an analytical lens.

In 2012, I was invited to a friend's birthday dinner, where I was seated opposite a guy working at Google. Although Google was already a huge company, I had little sense of its scale. I thought of it mainly as a search engine.

We stayed in touch, and they eventually asked if I'd be interested in an interview

I remember wearing a jacket and tie, and I thought, I can't show up at Google like this; they're never going to hire me. I roughed up my hair, removed my jacket and my tie, and went to the interview.

I had three interviews at Google on the same day. One interviewer asked me about role-related knowledge, the next about more general knowledge, and the third was Googleyness — whether I was a culture fit. I remember thinking in the interview that I wanted to work with these people.

About a week later, I had a fourth interview. The process moved quickly because it was for a temp job. In July 2012, I joined Google.

The Google office in Milan was colorful and playful

I remember there was a game area. In consulting, I'd start work at 8:30 a.m. and leave at 10:30 p.m. every day. At Google, people were coming and going whenever they wanted. The culture was a huge change for me. It was fantastic.

A year later, I applied for a full-time role working with DoubleClick for Publishers, now part of Google Ad Manager. I did lots of prep for the interview, and I got the job.

In 2016, my boss asked me to give a presentation at the Google office in Dubai

After the presentation, a guy who became my new boss asked if I'd consider moving to Dubai because they were expanding the team. Two months later, they opened the role; I applied, got the job, and moved to Dubai.

That same year, I got to see the San Francisco campus for the first time. When I saw the scale of the buildings, the number of meeting rooms, micro kitchens, and the bicycles employees rode around campus, I was mesmerized. Working for one of the most innovative companies on the planet, I felt like I was always at the forefront of tech innovation. I definitely got a kick out of that.

By 2024, I had become the Head of Global Partnerships for the Middle East, Africa, and Turkey at Google

As I was managing a large region, there was a lot of travel.

On office days, I generally worked 9-to-5, depending on projects and deadlines. I might have calls with people in the US, but travel was more hectic. From the moment I arrived, I was having breakfast with colleagues, attending an event, or meeting with clients.

Throughout my time at Google, my value system changed

I'd been thinking about sustainability for some time. When I was in Milan, I met someone from LA who told me they were vegan. They told me about the damage the dairy and meat industries are causing to the planet. I started reading more, and I went down the rabbit hole. I remember feeling that I wanted to be part of the movement for the solution.

While still at Google, I looked into which universities offered degrees in sustainability and came across a program at Harvard.

In December 2025, I resigned from Google

I pursued my master's degree in sustainable studies at Harvard online while working at Google. The last part of my studies involved a thesis. I took a sabbatical from Google and traveled to Cambodia to work on an ambitious project that plans to reforest 100,000 hectares of flooded forest. I worked on the feasibility study.

Google was kind enough to say, "Go pursue your dreams, and if something doesn't work, you're welcome to come back." Eventually, I decided it was time. After four months in Cambodia, I felt the umbilical cord was stretched enough. When I returned from my sabbatical, I handed in my notice.

I feel now that I have a big purpose in my heart, confidence in the abilities Harvard gave me, and, at the same time, I feel financially secure. I could leave a high-paying role where I was making more than $300,000 in annual total compensation for the unknown.

I'm now working as an independent consultant for this project in Cambodia.

Leaving Google was not an easy choice

Google nurtured me in so many ways, but as I was learning more about sustainability, my value system was changing. I was encouraging people to sell more stuff, and on my dark days, I remember thinking that staying at home on the couch was better for the environment.

I want to capitalize on my background in business and finance. I'm currently working on publishing a research paper about the project in Cambodia. I'm doing this long-distance while we're securing funds for the pilot. This month, I moved to the Netherlands, as it is one of the best places for green finance.

Oltre 218 miliardi di euro, quasi un decimo del Pil italiano. È il valore (aggiornato al 2024) dell’economia non osservata, che comprende il sommerso e le attività illegali. Il fenomeno, secondo le stime diffuse dall’Istat, si allarga in valori assoluti dai 217,6 miliardi del 2023 ma rallenta lievemente in rapporto al pil: l’incidenza sul prodotto interno lordo è scesa al 9,9% dal 10,2% del 2023. Continua però ad allargarsi il fronte del lavoro irregolare. Nel 2024 le unità di lavoro non regolari sono state 3 milioni e 277mila, oltre 145mila in più rispetto all’anno precedente, con un aumento del 4,6%. Il tasso di irregolarità, calcolato sul totale delle unità di lavoro, è salito così dal 12,7% al 13,1%: più di un’unità di lavoro su otto è irregolare.

L’economia sommersa, al netto delle attività illegali, si attesta a 198,4 miliardi di euro, 800 milioni in più rispetto al 2023. La sua incidenza sul Pil torna al 9%, dal 9,2% dell’anno precedente, interrompendo la crescita registrata nel biennio precedente. Ma all’interno del sommerso le componenti si muovono in direzioni opposte. La sotto-dichiarazione dei redditi d’impresa, ottenuta attraverso comunicazioni intenzionalmente errate di fatturato e costi, resta la voce più consistente: vale 107,6 miliardi, contro i 108,2 miliardi del 2023, con una flessione dello 0,6%.

Al contrario, il valore aggiunto generato dall’impiego di lavoro irregolare sale a 80,3 miliardi, dai 77,2 miliardi dell’anno precedente: 3,1 miliardi in più, pari a una crescita del 3,9%. Il lavoro irregolare pesa così per il 36,8% sul valore dell’intera economia non osservata, contro il 35,5% del 2023. La quota riconducibile alla sotto-dichiarazione scende invece dal 49,7% al 49,3%. Si riducono anche le componenti residuali del sommerso, che comprendono tra l’altro fitti e mance non dichiarati: da 12,2 a 10,6 miliardi, con una contrazione del 13,1%.

Anche le attività illegali, che comprendono il traffico di stupefacenti, i servizi di prostituzione e il contrabbando di tabacco, arretrano leggermente, passando da circa 20 miliardi a 19,8 miliardi, lo 0,9% in meno, pari allo 0,9% del Pil. Il valore aggiunto del traffico di droga scende da 15,3 a 14,9 miliardi, mentre quello dei servizi di prostituzione sale da 4,1 a 4,2 miliardi.

L'articolo L’economia sommersa e illegale vale oltre 218 miliardi nel 2024. I lavoratori irregolari salgono a 3,27 milioni, +4,6% proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

È di 218 miliardi il valore dell’economia non osservata nel solo 2024. Si tratta di un dato in aumento rispetto al 2023 (+0,3%) a fronte di una crescita del Pil del 3,2%. L’incidenza di questo valore rimane inferiore rispetto allo scorso anno (dal 10,2% al 9,9%). Mentre l’economia sommersa si attesta intorno ai 198,4 miliardi, con le attività illegali che scendono a 19,8 miliardi, il lavoro irregolare è di 3.277.000 unità, in aumento rispetto al 2023.

Sono questi i dati dell’ultimo report sull’Economia non osservata nei conti nazionali per gli anni 2021-2024, pubblicati dall’Istat il 16 ottobre 2026.

Economia non osservata: oltre 218 miliardi nel 2024

L’Istat ha pubblicato il report su “Economia non osservata nei conti nazionali”, ovvero tutte quelle attività produttive di mercato che sfuggono all’osservazione diretta. Si parla di economia sommersa ed economia illegale, che insieme raggiungono un valore di 218,2 miliardi di euro, in aumento dello 0,3% rispetto all’anno precedente (217,6 miliardi).

Un valore a fronte di una crescita del Pil a prezzi correnti del 3,2%, sul quale l’economia non osservata incide per il 9,9%, in diminuzione rispetto al 10,2% del 2023.

La dinamica dell’economia non osservata viene sostenuta dalla crescita del valore aggiunto generato dall’impiego di lavoro irregolare, che aumenta del 3,9%. Nel 2024 cambia la composizione delle componenti dell’economia non osservata:

• sale al 36,8% la quota del valore aggiunto generato dall’impiego di lavoro irregolare;
• scende il valore delle sotto-dichiarazioni al 49,3%.

Per gli anni 2021-2024, la tabella:

Istat

Aumenta il sommerso

Il valore dell’economia sommersa si attesta intorno ai 198,4 miliardi di euro, in aumento rispetto all’anno precedente (+0,4%). Incide sul Pil per il 9%, tornando ai livelli del 2021 e interrompendo la tendenza mostrata nel biennio precedente. La componente delle sotto-dichiarazioni è pari a 107,6 miliardi di euro, mentre quella connessa all’impiego di lavoro irregolare raggiunge gli 80,3 miliardi di euro.

La diffusione del sommerso, spiega l’Istat, è legata al tipo di mercato di riferimento e non alla tipologia di bene o servizio prodotto. Nel complesso il peso del sommerso sul valore aggiunto è più elevato:

• negli altri servizi alle persone (30,7%);
  
• nel commercio, trasporti, alloggio e ristorazione (18,5%);
  
• nelle costruzioni (17,7%);
  
• negli altri servizi all’impresa (5%);
  
• nella produzione di beni di investimento (4%);
  
• nella produzione di beni intermedi (1,4%).
  

Cresce il lavoro irregolare: i settori

Aumenta anche il lavoro irregolare, ovvero le posizioni lavorative per le quali non viene rispettata la normativa in materia fiscale e contributiva, relative ad attività illegali e quindi non osservabili direttamente attraverso le fonti amministrative. Di queste unità di lavoro, nel 2024 se ne contano oltre 3 milioni (nello specifico 3.277.000) e di queste 2.396.000 sono occupate come dipendenti, ma con contratti irregolari.

L’incremento del tasso di irregolarità è dovuto alla crescita del lavoro non regolare (+4,6%) e si conferma più elevato tra i dipendenti rispetto agli indipendenti.

Il lavoro irregolare è aumentato in numerosi settori; gli unici comparti in controtendenza sono l’istruzione, la sanità e l’assistenza sociale. Mentre i comparti dove si osserva l’aumento più consistente sono:

• altri servizi alle persone (+0,9%);
  
• agricoltura, silvicoltura, pesca e costruzioni (+0,8%);
  
• commercio, trasporti, alloggio e ristorazione (+0,5%);
  
• produzione di beni di investimento (+0,5%);
  
• produzione di beni intermedi, energia e rifiuti (+0,3%);
  
• produzione di beni alimentari e di consumo (+0,2%);
  
• servizi professionali (+0,1%).
  

In generale, l’incidenza del lavoro irregolare pesa di più nel terziario e raggiunge livelli particolarmente elevati nel comparto degli “altri servizi alle persone”. Ma risulta significativa anche la presenza di lavoratori irregolari nell’agricoltura, nel commercio, nei trasporti, negli alloggi e nella ristorazione.

Economia illegale in lieve calo

Un dato positivo è quello riferito all’economia illegale, che nel 2024 è stimata a 19,8 miliardi di euro. Si tratta di un dato in diminuzione di 0,2 miliardi di euro. Tra questi risalta il traffico di stupefacenti, che registra una lieve diminuzione, mentre si confermano marginali l’attività di contrabbando di sigarette e le irregolarità nel settore dei trasporti e del magazzinaggio.

The Australian government has introduced its digital duty of care legislation to parliament today. The bill includes an “off switch” to allow social media users to opt out of recommender algorithms. If passed, Australians could choose to switch off their algorithmic recommendation and consume a news feed populated by the accounts they subscribe to. It’s […]

The post China previews a world where the algorithm is switched off appeared first on Asia Times.

Eurozone industrial production contracted for a second consecutive month in August, with Belgium recording one of the steepest declines. The latest figures expose continuing weaknesses in Europe’s manufacturing sector as governments confront high energy costs and growing international competition.

Industrial production in the eurozone fell by 0.5 per cent in August compared with July, according to figures released by Eurostat on Thursday, adding to evidence that European manufacturers are struggling to sustain a recovery amid rising energy costs and uncertain demand.

The decline followed a revised contraction of 0.3 per cent in July, while output across the wider European Union fell by 0.3 per cent in August. Compared with the same month last year, eurozone production was down 1.1 per cent, against a decline of 0.2 per cent across the EU as a whole.

Belgium recorded the largest monthly contraction among the member states covered by the release, at 5.1 per cent, followed by Ireland at 3.1 per cent and Portugal at 2 per cent.

The latest industrial production figures underline the uneven performance of Europe’s factories, with losses concentrated in some economies and sectors while others continue to expand.

Manufacturing weakness spreads unevenly

The sectoral breakdown presents a particularly revealing picture of the pressures facing European industry.

Production of intermediate goods, which include materials and components supplied to other manufacturers, declined by 0.8 per cent across the eurozone in August. Energy production fell by 0.6 per cent, while output of non-durable consumer goods contracted by 2.7 per cent.

By contrast, capital goods production increased by 0.4 per cent, indicating that activity in equipment and machinery manufacturing remained comparatively resilient.

The divergence was also pronounced between member states. Industrial production increased by 6.5 per cent in Sweden, 4.3 per cent in Estonia and 2.6 per cent in the Netherlands.

On an annual basis, Ireland recorded a 15 per cent decline, followed by Belgium at 7.1 per cent and Bulgaria at 5.4 per cent. The Netherlands, meanwhile, registered growth of 9.8 per cent compared with August 2025.

These variations make it difficult to describe Europe’s industrial position as a single, uniform downturn. National production figures reflect different industrial structures, production cycles and exposure to particular markets.

Ireland’s figures, for example, can be influenced by changes in output among large multinational enterprises, while Belgium’s manufacturing economy is particularly exposed to developments in chemicals, pharmaceuticals and energy-intensive production.

Nevertheless, the simultaneous contraction of industrial output across the eurozone reinforces concerns about the strength of the European economic recovery.

Energy prices and industrial competitiveness

The continuing disruption of global energy supplies has complicated the position of European manufacturers, particularly businesses that depend on predictable electricity and gas prices.

The Middle East conflict has increased uncertainty over energy costs and transportation, making production planning more difficult for companies operating with substantial fuel, heating or electricity requirements.

As EU Today reported earlier this week, Brussels has already moved to delay certain methane requirements for energy imports as governments seek to limit additional pressure on gas supplies.

The decision reflects a wider debate over whether the EU’s existing regulatory framework adequately accounts for the international cost disadvantages facing European industrial producers.

Chemicals, metals, fertilisers and other energy-intensive industries must compete with manufacturers operating in markets where energy costs and regulatory requirements can differ considerably.

The problem extends beyond immediate profitability. Persistently unfavourable operating costs can affect decisions about new factories, maintenance, modernisation and the location of future investment.

Those decisions may have longer-lasting economic consequences than monthly fluctuations in production.

Industrial policy under political pressure

The figures arrive as EU governments debate the future of European industrial policy, including the treatment of imported products and the conditions under which companies should qualify for public support.

Recent disagreements over proposed European-content requirements have illustrated divisions between governments seeking greater protection for EU manufacturers and those concerned that restrictive rules could increase costs or disrupt supply chains.

In a recent warning over the proposed Made in Europe framework, Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius argued against excluding Britain from industrial arrangements intended to strengthen European production.

The debate is particularly consequential for automotive manufacturers whose supply chains extend across EU borders and into neighbouring countries.

Meanwhile, the proposed EU budget for 2028–2034 has become another focus of disagreement, with member states questioning how much funding should be devoted to industrial competitiveness, strategic technologies and energy infrastructure.

The immediate economic issue is whether European factories can recover production as energy costs remain elevated and external demand fluctuates.

Eurostat’s August figures do not establish how individual government policies have affected output, nor do they determine whether the contraction will continue. They do, however, show that industrial activity entered the autumn with limited momentum.

The next industrial production release, covering September, is scheduled for 16 November and will provide an indication of whether the late-summer weakness persisted into the final quarter of the year.

¿Cómo sabe alguien que ha alcanzado la inmortalidad? En el pasado era obvio: uno daba su nombre a un queso, un instituto o un tramo de circunvalación. Es signo de los tiempos que, en nuestro presente, la pervivencia pase necesariamente por las pantallas. Algunas veces sucede al modo de Julio Iglesias: multiplicándote como un meme. Y otras veces Netflix posa sus ojos sobre ti, decide que tu vida forma parte del canon y te dedica una serie. Les ocurrió a Isabel II y a Michael Jordan. Les ocurrió a Luis Miguel y a Ana Bolena. Y le acaba de ocurrir a Ferran Adrià (L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, 64 años), que este otoño estrena Gènesi y pasa así a formar parte de una cierta cremita de lo humano. La gesta quizá solo pueda compararse a conseguir una mesa en El Bulli en esos años —2004, 2005— en que había demanda de “dos millones de personas” y hueco para siete mil.

Seguir leyendo