The U.S. Army wants to infuse new autonomous capabilities into its current and future fleets of amphibious landing ships and other watercraft. The service is also aiming to acquire up to 100 new purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV). The maritime assets the service has now, often referred to as ‘the Army’s Navy,’ are obscure and generally underappreciated. However, the small force offers an important additional set of naval logistics capabilities, especially for any future fight in the Pacific, which could be further bolstered with optionally-crewed or entirely uncrewed platforms.

Army Maj. Gen. Frederick Crist, head of 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), issued plans for future autonomous watercraft capabilities during a talk last week during a talk at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium. 8th TSC, which has its main headquarters at Fort Shafter in Hawaii, is one of the top formations tasked with managing U.S. military logistics across the Pacific.

“In order to be able to increase theater distribution, we have the two composite watercraft companies, at end state there, west of the IDL [International Date Line],” Crist explained, referring to the Army’s future planned maritime force posture in the Pacific. “We continue partnering with industry to be able to move into autonomous watercraft systems to be able to conduct other means of maritime distribution.”

To take a step back quickly, as part of its broader regional role, 8th TSC also has forward-deployed elements in Japan. This includes the 5th Transportation Company, which is currently organized as what the Army calls a composite watercraft company. As of 2024, the unit had a pair of General Frank S. Besson class Logistics Support Vessels (LSV), as well as 10 smaller Landing Craft Utility (LCU) type vessels and four small tugs, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

The Army has eight LSVs, in total, and these are by far its largest and most capable ships. The two youngest LSVs, which were acquired in the mid-2000s, also form a distinct subclass, and their design is optimized for long-distance open-ocean operations, as you can read more about here. It’s not immediately clear which LSVs are currently assigned to the 5th Transportation Company. The unit is also set to receive new Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) landing craft.

Until very recently, the 10th Support Group (Regional), headquartered in Okinawa, was more directly responsible for overseeing forward-deployed Army logistics units in Japan. Earlier this month, the Army performed a so-called ‘reflagging’ of that formation, a largely administrative process that transformed it into the 45th Sustainment Brigade.

As part of the reflagging of the 10th Support Group into the 45th Sustainment Brigade, the Army has also been pushing ahead with plans for “the standup of a second composite watercraft company in Yokohama North Dock,” in the port city of the same name on the Japanese home island of Honshu, Maj. Gen. Crist explained last week. “That end state will have two composite water[craft] companies west of the IDL [International Date Line] under the command and control of the 45th Sustainment Brigade.”

When it comes to the watercraft assigned to these units, “we’re also moving into the autonomous lane,” Crist added. “Just in August, USARPAC [U.S. Army Pacific] had an opportunity to conduct an experiment by retrofitting an existing commercial vessel, the HOS Resolute [sic; HOS Resolution], with a kit to provide autonomous navigation.”

Maritime autonomy firm Sea Machines was able to integrate its SM300 software package on the HOS Resolution in just nine days for this demonstration. The ship is a 257-foot-long offshore support vessel more typically used to support oil and gas rigs. However, it features a stern ramp and four jack-up legs that also make it well suited to loading and unloading cargo at remote beaches.

For years now, the U.S. Marine Corps has also been experimenting with the HOS Resolution and other similar ships more generally. That service has been using the vessels to help refine its new expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations, which are themselves heavily centered on future conflict scenarios in the Pacific. The Marines have brought those capabilities to Army demonstration exercises in the past, as well.

The Army sees the August experiment as a potential stepping stone to integrating increasing degrees into its existing watercraft fleets.

“You could increase the fleet of autonomous vessels by tapping into the existing manned fleet,” Maj. Gen. Crist said. “Put on retrofitting kits to be able to conduct navigation, and then eventually propulsion and engine room activities, and eventually get to a fully autonomous system.”

Even just adding in autonomous navigation capabilities could help reduce the workload for the human crews on Army vessels and provide added margins of safety. Blending autonomy with “propulsion and engine room activities” could improve reliability and reduce maintenance demands. Being able to operate those ships in a fully uncrewed mode, if desired, would open up additional operational possibilities, including just for repositioning ships across the broad expanses of the Pacific.

Reduced manning requirements could be especially attractive for the Army’s ‘Navy,’ which is already a very small part of the service’s overall force structure. Last week, Maj. Gen. Crist also talked about further leveraging traditional crewed vessels owned and/or operated by contractors.

“It’s going to be a broad portfolio of systems of systems,” he said of the overall watercraft vision for the Pacific. “Army watercraft with Army Mariners will be, of course, one aspect of it. We also look for the opportunity to be able to leverage USTRANSCOM’s (U.S. Transportation Command) contracting capability to leverage operational support vessels that are commercially owned and commercially operated. We’re considering ways of being able to have commercial vessels that become manned by Army mariners.”

It is also interesting to note here how extremely similar this all sounds to the modifications the U.S. Navy made to the Spearhead class Expeditionary Fast Transport USNS Apalachicola ahead of its commissioning in 2023. However, despite tens of millions of dollars spent and successful demonstration of autonomous capabilities, the Navy curiously decided to put the Apalachicola into service without any plan to make use of these features operationally. There does not appear to have been any effort to integrate these capabilities more broadly within the Spearhead class since then, either.

Last year, the Navy struck the four oldest Spearhead class ships from its rolls entirely and has put several others on reduced operating status, ostensibly as a cost-saving measure. The service is still acquiring new Expeditionary Fast Transports, including members of the Expeditionary Medical Ship subclass that feature expanded medical facilities. The Spearhead class was born out of a program specifically to meet Army and Marine Corps requirements, and the ships are regularly used to support those services in the Pacific and elsewhere globally.

The Army also wants to expand its fleets of purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV) for use in the Pacific, as well as elsewhere globally. Just earlier this year, Army Maj. Gen. Gavin Gardner, who preceded Maj. Gen. Crist as head of the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, said he wanted to rapidly acquire as many as 100 drone boats. His vision included larger USVs capable of carrying eight to 10 standardized shipping containers.

“I could see those operating in the U.S. PACOM area of responsibility,” Gardner told reporters at a roundtable in June, according to Military Times. “I think that gives you a ton of operations, inventory in motion, easy to respond. And then because they’re autonomous, and we can work with our partner nations forward, you have those berthed up everywhere from Korea to Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, etc.”

“Clearly, [the autonomous vessels] would be forward in the theater, kind of moving supplies, because we have a constant demand for Army watercraft time now, to deliver equipment and supplies forward in the theater,” Gardner added at that time.

One of the inherent benefits of the Army watercraft fleets, and its LSVs in particular, is their ability to help alleviate the need for the U.S. Navy to meet more localized littoral logistics needs, if they are even available to help in the first place. Navy amphibious and military sealift ships would already be heavily strained by high demand during any major conflict in the Pacific or elsewhere globally. This could easily be further exacerbated by threats to those supply lines. All of this has already been underscored this year by pressure on maritime logistics chains in the context of the war with Iran. The Army’s ‘Navy’ also offers valuable additional capabilities and capacity in non-combat contingencies, such as responding to natural disasters.

More generally, the Army has been working to expand its use of smaller USVs, including speedboat-like designs, in various roles. The service has clearly been paying close attention to Ukraine’s very successful use of drone boats in one-way kamikaze attacks, as well as ones armed with guns and rockets and examples configured as launch platforms for surface-to-air missiles and weaponized uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).

The 7th Infantry Division, one of the Army’s main maneuver combat formations in the Pacific, just recently experimented with a Ukrainian-developed Magura-series USV during an exercise in Michigan. That particular USV was configured to launch a quadcopter-type drone. Another member of the Magura family was observed being used in a one-way-attack configuration by U.S. Army Green Berets from the 1st Special Forces Group during the annual Balikatan exercise in the Philippines earlier this year.

The Army has also been experimenting with American-designed USVs. The aforementioned recent exercise in Michigan also featured a Saronic Corsair, the same type of USV that the Navy used to rescue the crew of an Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter that went down in the Gulf of Oman in June. Explosive-laden Corsairs were also used to carry out the first known U.S. kamikaze USV attack, which was launched against a coastal target in Iran in July.

During another separate exercise in the Philippines this year, Salaknib 2026, Army forces used unarmed Rampage USVs from U.S. firm Havoc, as seen below. As part of that exercise, the USVs escorted a crewed General Frank S. Besson class LSV to its destination, heading out in front to help spot potential hazards.

“There’s all the work that the Department’s already doing with autonomy and autonomous systems that we look to take advantage of in the [Pacific] theater, as well,” Maj. Gen. Crist said at AUSA.

The Navy and the Marine Corps have both been working to grow their operational fleets of smaller USVs, as well as larger ones, in recent years. At the same time, the Navy has suffered years of setbacks and shakeups in its efforts to operationalize bigger and more capable designs. The service awarded contracts for a total of 30 new medium-sized USVs last month in its latest attempt to reverse that trend.

In September, Secretary Pete Hegseth also announced several new initiatives aimed at further expanding use of uncrewed platforms and advanced autonomous capabilities across the U.S. military and all domains. The Pentagon is presently laying the groundwork for the establishment of an all-new top-level Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM), which it hopes to see come to fruition next year.

What is clear now is that the Army’s vision for future watercraft operations, especially in the Pacific, is increasingly autonomous.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post How The U.S. Army’s ‘Navy’ Aims To Go More Autonomous With Its Vessels In The Pacific appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Air Force says any decision on whether or not to acquire new production F-16 Viper fighters is likely a year or more away. The service’s top officer in charge of force structure planning has also now raised the prospect of using a “spectrum of capability” to eventually supplant aging older-model F-16s. All of this comes as the Air Force has laid out a new vision to have 1,509 combat-coded fighters in inventory, hundreds more than it has now, by 2035, amid questions about whether industry and budgets can keep up.

Inside Defense and Air & Space Forces Magazine were among the first to report on the Air Force’s latest long-term fighter force structure plan late yesterday. This followed a roundtable with Lt. Gen. David Tabor, the service’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs. At the time of writing, an unclassified copy of the report, which was submitted to Congress last week, has not been released publicly. TWZ has reached out for more information.

Tabor said yesterday that the target fleet of 1,509 combat-coded fighters by 2035 would be approximately 40 percent F-35s, 40 percent F-15s (inclusive of F-15E Strike Eagles and F-15EX Eagle IIs) and F-16s, and 20 percent F-22 Raptors and F-47s, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine. As an aside, the final expected F-47 fleet size remains unclear, though the Air Force continues to say it plans to acquire at least enough of those jets to replace its 185 F-22s on a one-for-one basis.

The current breakdown of the service’s fighter force structure is 45 percent F-16s, 30 percent F-35s, 15 percent F-15s, and 10 percent F-22s. Last year’s long-term fighter force structure report said the service was aiming for an eventual inventory of 1,558 combat-coded fighters and hoped to hit a milestone of 1,369 aircraft by Fiscal Year 2030. As of the start of Fiscal Year 2026, the Air Force had 1,168 combat-coded fighters, not including 103 A-10 Warthog ground attack jets, which have been part of this force structure planning in the past. The plan now is for the last of the A-10s to be retired by 2030. The new 2035 figure also does not include the hundreds of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones the service wants to have acquired by that time, something we will come back to later on.

Currently, the Air Force expects fighter fleet expansion to be driven by the acquisition of new F-35As, F-15EXs, and F-47s. This was also the case when last year’s fighter force structure report was released. The possibility of the Air Force also acquiring new-production F-16s has come up several times in recent years. Most recently, there were several reports last month that prime contractor Lockheed Martin had made a new pitch to the service for a version of the latest Block 70 version of the fighter, tentatively dubbed the F-16G. New Block 70 and Block 72 F-16s, which differ in what engine they use, are being actively produced at Lockheed Martin’s plant in Greenville, South Carolina. At that time, TWZ did a deep dive into the benefits that this could offer the Air Force.

“There is a spectrum of capability that we might want to replace the F-16s with,” Lt. Gen. Tabor said amid a discussion about the prospect of acquiring new Vipers at the roundtable yesterday, per Air & Space Forces Magazine. “It’s not urgent, frankly. What we don’t want to get to is a point where it is urgent, and we haven’t done the homework and decided ‘hey, this is really the right place to be.’ We do have time to churn through that and make sure that we have a good option going forward.”

“We’re not in a position where that decision has to be made immediately,” Tabor added, while acknowledging that “we are very conscious” that older-model F-16s are set to begin reaching the end of their lifespans in the 2030s. He also said any such planning was unlikely to be part of the process of developing the service’s Fiscal Year 2028 budget proposal, which will be released sometime early next year.

The Air Force is “in the initial phases of analyzing options for the next Future Years Defense Program,” a spokesperson for the service had told us last month without specifically mentioning any particular type of aircraft. “At this stage, we have neither defined the precise mission requirements nor the spectrum of options that could fill it.”

When it comes to the current F-16 fleet, the Air Force had 774 Vipers in inventory at the start of Fiscal Year 2026 and expected that number to drop to 768, according to past budget documents. This includes a mixture of subvariants, and not all of them are assigned combat-coded units. The Air Force has been substantially upgrading at least a portion of its existing F-16s, including with the addition of new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars and electronic warfare suites, to ensure their operational relevance for years to come.

The Air Force has also already been taking newer F-16s from squadrons transitioning to the F-35 and using them to replace older Vipers in other units. Last year’s fighter force structure report explicitly highlighted plans to supplant Block 30 F-16s in five Air National Guard formations – three combat-coded squadrons and two training units – with Block 40 and 50 types in this way.

As we’ve previously written:

“A new F-16 offers a fresh and highly mature airframe — one with a full service-life ahead of it, on the order of 12,000 flight hours without the need for structural upgrades — double that of the original F-16. This is compared to existing F-16s in the inventory with the decades of wear and fatigue already accumulated on them, with structural upgrades keeping them in the air. That difference in remaining structural life is arguably the single biggest advantage a new-build aircraft has compared with extending an existing one.”

“Dumping more money into existing F-16s is becoming questionable. Service life extensions and technical upgrades can only go so far and supporting these jets is becoming harder as parts dry up and suppliers who made them are long gone. A new airframe would give the Guard many decades of highly efficient service and the piece of mind for future force planning that goes with it.”

…

“The new [F-16G] proposal would let some Guard and Reserve units swap their F-16s for vastly improved F-16s — the same logic that drove the F-15EX buy — while also keeping the Greenville line hot, which is a significant benefit in its own right. And it accomplishes both in the most efficient way possible: not just in acquisition cost, but in sustainment cost, which is really the more problematic burden of the two. In the end, this points to another glaring reality check for the all-stealth-force concept, a vision the Air Force has effectively already abandoned.”

“The Air Force has spent years describing the F-35 as the replacement for its F-16 fleet, yet it now has to contend with aging F-16s, delayed or constrained fighter production, a larger stated requirement for total fighter capacity, and the lengthy transition toward the F-47 and uncrewed combat aircraft. In that environment, a new-build F-16 provides an option that sits between extending legacy aircraft and buying the most sophisticated — and expensive — fighters available.”

You can read our full prior deep analysis on this topic here.

Lt. Gen. Tabor acknowledged many of these exact same points at the roundtable yesterday. He notably described acquiring new F-16s as “maybe the lazy” option, but also one that would benefit from “practically a ready-made aircraft” that is in production now, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“The question is, can industry produce at those levels?” he also said, speaking more generally. “They’ve assured us that they can, and we believe them, but we also actually need to see it manifest.”

In the context of acquiring new F-16s, especially, it is important to note here that Lockheed Martin order books are very full already as a result of demand for these fighters from U.S. allies and partners. The company’s capacity, at least at present, to add a substantial new Air Force acquisition program on top of that is a real question. This, in some ways, mirrors questions that surround Boeing efforts to meet surging Air Force demand for F-15EXs.

On top of all this, the Air Force’s still-evolving CCA plans remain something of a wildcard in these discussions. The Air Force has ordered General Atomics FQ-42 Vengeance and Anduril’s FQ-44 Fury CCAs into production, and is now aiming to have a combined fleet of at least 500 of these drones in inventory by 2032. The service is also still expecting to acquire additional CCAs, which could be of entirely different types, through a second iterative development cycle, or Increment 2, under this program. This is influencing the service’s crewed fighter force structure plans, but the full scale and scope of those impacts remain to be seen.

“CCA is very much a reality,” Tabor said yesterday, per Air & Space Forces Magazine. “It is going to be a part of our future, and there is absolutely a world in which the incorporation of CCAs into the force will mitigate the requirement for the number of fighters. That’s not the CCA that we have right now, but it is advancing very, very rapidly. We’re confident that it will play a major role in future versions of the fighter force structure report.”

The Air Force’s F-22s are currently set to be its first ‘aerial quarterbacks’ for CCAs, with F-35s and F-47s expected to follow. At the same time, TWZ has highlighted previously how CCA could offer particular value when paired with fourth-generation fighters like the F-16. This, in turn, could actually bolster the case for new Viper acquisitions as a more affordable force multiplier.

The Air Force’s ability to secure necessary funding and other factors will play in all this, too. 2035 is a long way off from a budgetary perspective. It also stretches across multiple election cycles, including the one that will decide the next presidential administration, all of which could lead to major changes in defense spending priorities. Congress can and routinely does demand that the U.S. military alter major procurement plans. Just in the past two years or so, legislators have intervened to force the Air Force to move ahead with the acquisition of new E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control planes and to save the U.S. Navy F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter program.

In the meantime, the Air Force clearly faces many continued questions about how to balance the need to modernize its fighter fleets while ensuring it retains enough tactical airpower to meet current and future operational demands. Even so, the service says it sees no need to rush to make a decision about whether to choose the “lazy” route of just buying new F-16s.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Any Decision To Buy New-Build F-16s Not An “Urgent” Priority: USAF appeared first on TWZ.

One of the KC-10A Extender aerial refueling tankers the U.S. Air Force retired some two years ago has left the boneyard at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona. This aircraft is one of a set of KC-10As sold to private aerial refueling contractor Omega Air. At least one other potential operator, a still mysterious end user somewhere in North Africa, could also be in line to pick up several ex-Air Force Extenders.

Maxim Loshak, who goes by the handle @az_aviator on X and Instagram, caught the KC-10A leaving Davis-Monthan earlier today. The aircraft currently carries U.S. civil registration number N82247, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records confirm that Omega Air is the new owner. Online flight tracking data also shows the aircraft subsequently flew to San Antonio International Airport, which is Omega’s main base of operations.

Omega's first KC-10A, N82247 (formerly 86-0034), has departed Davis-Monthan en route to San Antonio International Airport. pic.twitter.com/kALlgeuLGy

— KIWA Spotter (@KiwaSpotter) October 20, 2026

The KC-10A in question previously carried the Air Force registration number 86-0034 and had been in the boneyard since May 12, 2023, per the service’s records. The Air Force acquired a total of 60 Extender tankers between 1979 and 1987, and lost one in an accident in 1987. The very last of the remaining 59 KC-10As was retired in September 2024. The Extender was derived from the three-engine DC-10 airliner and was designed to refuel aircraft using either the boom or the probe-and-drogue method.

As seen in the picture at the top of this story, N82247 notably lacks the KC-10A’s trademark boom under the rear fuselage. This is actually not entirely unexpected. The Air Force had put 10 Extenders up for auction last year in a non-flyable state. Each of the planes was missing a single engine, taken from under one of their wings, for reasons that are still not entirely clear. These particular aircraft were also among the first KC-10As to be retired, and their booms had been stripped to be used as spares for other examples that had remained in service until the type’s final retirement in 2024.

In addition to sourcing the requisite engines, “in order to make them flyable, the winning bidder will need to work with Boeing to obtain a fly-away kit to seal up the area where the boom systems was,” an Air Force spokesperson told us last year while the 10 KC-10As were still up for auction.

Omega Air could fit new booms to this KC-10A, as well as other ex-USAF Extenders it is in the process of acquiring. The company could also leave some of them configured as probe-and-drogue-only tankers. Omega already flies two ex-Dutch KDC-10 tankers, which are broadly similar to the KC-10, as well as another DC-10 converted into a probe-and-drogue-only tanker. The company has several Boeing 707-based tankers, as well.

There is a possibility that some of the KC-10As that Omega is acquiring could be operated in non-tanker roles. Carrying cargo was also a major role for Extender while in Air Force service. Still, this seems unlikely given that aerial refueling is Omega’s primary business. Some of the ex-Air Force Extenders might also be used as sources of spare parts. TWZ has reached out for more information about Omega’s overall plans for its new acquisitions.

Regardless, even in a boomless configuration, ex-USAF KC-10As will be a significant addition to Omega Air’s fleet. Demand for private aerial refueling services, in general, has been ramping up in the United States and elsewhere globally in recent years.

For the U.S. military, private contractors offer a valuable way to reduce demand for and strain on organic tanker fleets to meet non-combat-related aerial refueling needs. This, in turn, helps free up government-owned tankers for combat missions and other higher-priority taskings. Those tankers may also simply not need to fly as much with private companies helping to shift the burden. The ability of the Air Force’s existing tanker fleets, in particular, to meet even peacetime demands has been a growing point of concern for years now. This has been further exacerbated by persistent technical and other issues with replacement KC-46 tankers.

With all this in mind, the Air Force’s decision to retire the KC-10A fleet entirely was and still is controversial. Though the Extenders were certainly aging, they were also highly flexible tankers able to carry greater loads of fuel than the KC-46s that supplanted them.

Omega Air clearly still sees value in the KC-10A. As mentioned, at least one other operator in North Africa is at least interested in potentially acquiring Extenders. Others may yet emerge.

If nothing else, after just over two years, an ex-USAF KC-10A has returned to the skies for a second career in the private sector.

Special thanks again to Maxim Loshak for sharing his picture of N82247 with us.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Retired KC-10 Extender Tanker Has Risen From Boneyard To Fly Again appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine continues to struggle with throttling of the speeds at which weapons using the vital satellite communications services provided by the SpaceX Starlink system can operate, and one weapons manufacturer tells us it is rethinking whether to rely on it in the future. As we have previously reported, heavy use of Starlink on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine, including as a means of guiding one-way attackers in the air and at sea, has underscored potential risks of exclusive reliance on Elon Musk’s orbital communications networks in critical tactical tasks.

At issue are complaints by Ukrainian officials that “in various sectors of the front, the equipment ceases to function at speeds of 130–161 kilometers per hour.”

A limit on how fast Starlink terminals on vehicles can travel before the feed is cut off in certain areas impacts a slew of weapons and campaigns, especially strikes on Russian logistics behind enemy lines and in the sea of Asov, as well as the control of defensive interceptor drones critical for taking down Russian long-range one-way attack drones, like the notorious Shahed-136.

The following video shows one such Shahed interception.

Spectacular footage of a Ukrainian interceptor striking a Russian Shahed kamikaze drone, followed by its fall to the ground. pic.twitter.com/8DrJyS22Fn

— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) October 20, 2026

The limiting of Starlink/Starshield occurred amid deteriorating relations between the Trump administration and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The latest chill between Washington and Kyiv was sparked by the American leader’s claims that Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure have reduced the supply of diesel fuel to the U.S. and other nations more than the conflict in the Middle East. Trump was upset Ukraine kept hitting these targets despite his demanding they stop.

Q: Do you think Ukraine should stop attacks on Russian oil refineries? Have you told Zelenskyy that?
TRUMP: We've talked about it, we have, and I think they're slowing it down, but they are causing a lot of problems. The lack of refineries is the problem. pic.twitter.com/ffpFnRqFlk

— Furkan Gözükara (@FurkanGozukara) October 5, 2026

Exacerbating this issue, Trump on Oct. 9 announced via his Truth Social platform that he had made a deal to purchase diesel from Russia, pivoting away from a years-old Western policy that placed massive economic pressure on Moscow.

Trump: "I have just concluded a highly successful discussion with President Vladimir Putin, of Russia, wherein it was agreed that Russia will immediately supply over 300,000 Tons of Diesel Fuel to the American and Global Marketplace, another 500,000 Tons during the month of… pic.twitter.com/zH0I6HA941

— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) October 9, 2026

Who gave the order to limit the speeds at which Ukrainian weapons using the Starlink/Starshield system operate is unclear.

“The order to limit a satellite system used by Ukraine ​for battlefield communications and drone operations came from inside the White House,” Reuters reported last week, citing two U.S. officials and a Western official briefed on the matter. “The officials said ‌leaders at the Defense Department received a message that the SpaceX Starshield service for the Ukrainian military needed to be slowed.”

“No such request was ever made by the president,” a U.S. official told us on Monday.

“There has been no change to Department of War policy regarding intelligence sharing or any capabilities we are enabling Europeans to provide to Ukraine,” a senior Pentagon official responded to our questions about whether the Pentagon imposed the limits and, if so, why.

When we pushed for a more specific response to the Starlink/Starshield concerns, the Pentagon declined comment. However, Tuesday afternoon, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the Pentagon did not order any changes and that Ukraine violated Starlink’s terms of services.

Hegseth suggests Ukrainians haven't abided by Starlink's "terms of service" pic.twitter.com/Z8MJyQ4Nvq

— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) October 20, 2026

We reached out to SpaceX as well, but the company did not immediately respond. Last week, SpaceX’s founder and CEO, Elon Musk, said that “any limits on speed or usage are decided by the US military and ultimately” Trump. Musk had previously refused Ukrainian requests to use Starlink against targets inside Russia.

The prohibition against using Starlink inside Russia has drastically limited Ukraine’s ability to strike dynamic targets like mobile ballistic missile launchers and hunt for drone launch sites. However, Ukraine has not had to rely on Starlink in its campaign against oil infrastructure or other fixed targets deep inside Russia which upset Trump in the first place.

Tuesday morning, Zelensky spoke with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and again brought up Starlink/Starshield in addition to other major concerns.

“…the situation with Starlink/Starshield… needs to be restored,” Zelensky urged.

I spoke with Marco Rubio @SecRubio, and it was a substantive conversation – focused on the issues that matter. I am grateful for his readiness to help and his clear position. First, ballistic missile interceptors, which are needed to protect lives. Second, early warning of…

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) October 20, 2026

Rubio denied that any assistance was being withheld from Ukraine. Noting that Starlink “is a private company,” the secretary told reporters that Trump is “frustrated…because he doesn’t like to be blamed for things that aren’t true, including accusations that somehow he had ordered intelligence sharing to be cut off. And that’s not true; he’s said that repeatedly.”

SECRETARY RUBIO: There's nothing being deliberately denied to Ukraine. It's simply a balance between our obligations to other partners, and frankly, our own standards and requirements for our own facilities as well. pic.twitter.com/x9NWbIufBa

— Department of State (@StateDept) October 20, 2026

This most recent flap isn’t the first time SpaceX and Musk have faced particularly significant criticism over limiting some Ukrainian use of the network. Actions SpaceX took earlier this year to block unregistered Starlink terminals also had major consequences for Russian forces, which were sent scrambling to find alternatives to fill the massive resulting communications gap.

Given the tenuous nature of Ukraine’s ability to use Starlink/Starshield, the Wild Hornets company is reevaluating whether to use the SpaceX system in future endeavors even though, so far, it has experienced few problems with it. Wild Hornets is a major Ukrainian combat drone maker. Among other weapons, it makes the Sting interceptors, designed to defend against Russian Shahed kamikaze drones.

The Starlink/Starshield issue isn’t affecting current operations, a Wild Hornets spokesman told us Tuesday morning. “Our own communications system provides the basic connection to our interceptors,” he said. “Plus, our technology for remote control of the interceptors can use various sources of internet connectivity. True, the military often uses Starlink for this, but in our case, the terminal doesn’t need to be moved at high speeds (it simply provides a connection between the command center and the ground station to which the interceptor is connected—it’s somewhat similar to cell towers).”

Concerns about the reduction in speeds at which Starlink terminals can operate has Wild Hornets thinking about ditching a future project, the spokesman told us.

“But we understand that there are other types of interceptors,” added the spokesman. “For example, some drones carry a terminal on board and need to fly at high speed with it. In such cases, Starlink’s limitations make their operation impossible. From this point of view, it also makes us rethink some of the projects we’re currently working on. For example, launching interceptors from aerial platforms.”

“We’re keeping an eye on the situation,” the spokesman continued. “For our current operations (connections with ground stations), we can use any source of stable internet connectivity. Therefore, various solutions are possible in different locations. However, for these needs, everything is operating normally with Starlink at the moment. As for our plans with new projects, we don’t have a clear decision yet, but we will be testing alternatives.”

The spokesman declined to provide further details about what “alternatives” could look like.

There are a number of ways the lack of Starlink for extended-range drone operations could be mitigated to a degree, but the persistent, reliable, high-bandwidth and compact capability SpaceX provides has no direct alternative at this time. The use of drones that work as line-of-sight relays, which can be daisy chained together electronically with other airborne relays, with a connection spanning dozens or even hundreds of miles to a ground entry point is possible. You can read about this concept here. The use of swarms of balloons to create an active network over a battlespace and using Starlink on those slower moving platforms to relay line-of-sight connections to multiple drones below is another possibility. You can read more about this concept here. But we must stress again, nothing can fully replace Starlink/Starshield and its seamless beyond line-of-sight communications architecture at this time.

“I believe, in any case, depending on a single solution is very risky,” the Wild Hornets spokesman proffered. “Especially if you don’t have full control over it. Especially when it comes to something as critical on the battlefield as communications. That’s exactly why our ecosystem is built around our own communications technology and basically is open to various solutions when it comes to internet connectivity.”

The No. 1 interceptor: STING by Wild Hornets has destroyed over 15,000 Shaheds and Gerberas in one year

Confirmed data shows that STING has topped the interceptor rankings for 12 consecutive months. In September this year, Ukraine’s Defense Forces downed around 1,600 Shaheds,… pic.twitter.com/4v1aeOxPiy

— Wild Hornets (@wilendhornets) October 13, 2026

As far as military units are concerned, the commander of the Georgian Legion told us that his forces have been affected by issues with Starlink/Starshield even though the main concerns have been about the speeds at which weapons can travel and still have connectivity. The Georgian Legion is fighting in the heavily contested Kramatorsk region of eastern Ukraine.

“We use Starlink a lot because, in this war, reliable communication is essential,” Mamuka Mamulashvili told us. “It helps us stay connected when everything around us is changing. Of course, we’ve learned not to rely on just one system. There are alternatives, like mobile internet, fiber-optic connections, radio and other satellite systems such as OneWeb. But honestly, none of them can fully replace Starlink in Ukraine right now.”

“The problems were not limited to the speed restriction of approximately 160 km/h,” the Georgian Legion commander pointed out. “Starlink connectivity itself was also intermittent, repeatedly switching on and off. This caused communication disruptions across various drone systems, not just those operating at speeds exceeding 160 km/h. As a result, the impact was broader than the restriction on high-speed interceptor drones. Intermittent connectivity created problems for drone control and communications across multiple systems, affecting their reliability and the ability to carry out missions as intended.”

“We had serious communication problems,” Mamulashvili explained. “At one point, our drone operators were struggling to maintain a reliable connection with the drone systems, which disrupted coordination and made it difficult to carry out missions as planned. When you lose the connection between the operator and the drone, you can lose control of the situation in seconds. We managed to adapt, but it definitely affected our work.”

“We have to adapt and find solutions, as we always do,” the commander said. “This war teaches you one thing every day. You can’t depend on a single technology or expect someone else to solve all your problems. You have to be ready for anything and keep moving forward.”

Russian sources, meanwhile, are gloating over the speed limits placed on weapons using Starlink/Starshield, particularly how it is affecting Ukraine’s mid-range drone attacks that have crippled Russian logistics. As we explained in a previous report, Ukrainian units have relied on the SpaceX system to help extend the range of their drones to reach as far as 150 miles into Russian-occupied territory. The SpaceX system is not used to hit targets inside Russia proper.

The following video shows some of these mid-range attacks.

Russian rail logistics are now also the target of Midstrike drones, with lines to Crimea being particularly affected. pic.twitter.com/K1BFd0QVov

— Sergio (@SergioCentaurus) June 5, 2026

“Disabling or slowing down Starlink has significantly reduced the enemy’s ability to launch medium-range drone strikes along the ‘Novorossiya’ highway,” influential Russian milblogger Vladimir Romanov reported. The highway, also known as the R-280, is a key link between cities in occupied southern Ukraine and the occupied Crimean peninsula. The road has been a frequent target of Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign.

“The success of these strikes depends on the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ access to American satellite communication,” Romanov noted. “For the past six months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been attacking civilian transport – trucks, cars, and buses – exclusively through the use of ‘Starshield.’ This means that, for the past six months, American military satellite infrastructure has been used to carry out terrorist acts against Russian civilians, and so on. In other words, the United States is still directly involved in the war with Russia!”

America's gifts to Russia never end, with Russian military bloggers now confirming that Washington's operation to cut Ukraine's Starlink has halted Ukraine's ability to strike Russian logistics routes in Ukraine.

An operation likely written in the Kremlin, executed by… pic.twitter.com/iXcIAu5Rr3

— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) October 20, 2026

As for how widespread worries among Ukrainian weapons manufacturers are, the Wild Hornets spokesman suggested that his company is not alone. He said he has spoken with other companies relying much more heavily on Starlink/Starshield who have expressed concerns. He pointed to growing interest in the European Eutelsat satellite constellation as an example of companies seeking options, but noted that “of course, creating something like Starlink won’t be easy.”

We’ve reached out to the Ukrainian Brave1 defense technology incubator and the National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries (NAUDI) for additional insights into how this issue is affecting Ukraine’s defense manufacturing base.

It will be interesting to see if other Ukrainian weapons companies also consider scrapping plans to rely on Starlink in the future and what architectures will emerge at least as a backstop to it.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Major Ukrainian Arms Maker Rethinking Future Reliance On Starlink appeared first on TWZ.

NATO member Finland is preparing to reintroduce anti-personnel landmines into its military arsenal, with a contract for around one million examples due to be signed soon, following the country’s withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention that aims to eliminate these weapons. The move comes as Helsinki looks to strengthen its territorial defenses against a longstanding Russian threat and the prospect of a larger Russian military presence along its eastern border in the years ahead.

Finland’s withdrawal from the treaty, which prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel mines, took effect on January 10 of this year. Reflecting growing concern among NATO’s eastern-flank members about Russia’s military posture and the lessons of the war in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have also moved to leave the convention.

Mines have, for many centuries, been used to complicate an attacker’s movement, slow operations, and force troops to devote time and resources to clearing obstacles. Anti-personnel mines, in particular, have long been employed in defensive campaigns, but they come with significant humanitarian risks. They can kill or maim civilians long after hostilities end, which has seen them fall foul of international humanitarian law in many countries — at least when those nations don’t see a realistic risk of invasion.

It is a measure of how badly the European security environment has deteriorated that anti-personnel mines are back on the agenda.

The Finnish Defense Forces previously said that discussions with the domestic defense industry and preparations to train military personnel would begin early this year. It has now announced that the project seeks two different types of anti-personnel mines, of Finnish manufacture.

The two weapons will comprise a modern tube mine activated by a tripwire trigger, and a pressure-activated step mine. In the future, more technically advanced mines may also be procured, including cluster-type mines of the kind deployed by Russia in Ukraine. In general, anti-personnel mines have been very widely used by both sides in that conflict, with Kyiv notably receiving them as part of U.S. air packages, as you can read about here. Neither the United States nor Russia are signatories of the Ottawa Convention.

“The aim is for production of the new anti-personnel mines to begin in Finland in 2028,” said Col. Riku Mikkonen, inspector of engineers for the Finnish Army Command.

“We have a materials procurement project underway, which is currently in the preparatory and market review phase. At the same time, we are drawing up the technical specifications for the mines,” Mikkonen added. “We will soon move on to the stage where we issue requests for tenders, so that we can eventually proceed to a competitive tendering process and conclude contracts.”

At this point, no contracts have been signed. However, once the procurement effort is underway, the Finnish Defense Forces are set to return their anti-personnel mine stockpile to what it was before acceding to the Ottawa Convention in 2012.

The first new mines and associated training equipment are expected to become available during 2027. Ultimately, all conscripts will be trained to employ anti-personnel mines. The total cost of the project is around $110 million, with the last of the mines scheduled to be delivered in the 2030s.

Helsinki has stressed that it does not intend to lay anti-personnel mines during peacetime. Mikkonen said the weapons would be used only under emergency conditions.

Finland’s decision reflects a national defense philosophy that has long been shaped by direct experience with Soviet aggression. The Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939, beginning the Winter War, and fought another conflict with the country from 1941 to 1944. Finland lost territory but preserved its independence, subsequently maintaining conscription, a large trained reserve, and a defense strategy built around making any invasion costly.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced Finnish concerns that major conventional warfare in Europe remained a realistic possibility. Finland joined NATO in April 2023, and the country shares a little over 800 miles of border with Russia.

Finland’s defensive approach traditionally emphasizes rapid mobilization to defend national territory and delay a much larger attacking force until reinforcements can arrive. The role of anti-personnel mines in that scenario is clear, being sown to slow down infantry movements and hamper advances through vulnerable areas. Their disproportionate effect, at least in theory, is especially relevant for a country with a relatively tiny population compared to the length of its border.

At the same time, anti-personnel mines would form only one part of a much broader defensive system incorporating artillery, airstrikes, engineering obstacles, fortifications, and reserve forces. It should be noted that Finland also has a considerable armory of anti-tank and anti-vehicle mines, most of which are of local manufacture.

In general, Moscow has been restructuring its military command arrangements and starting to establish the foundations for a larger conventional presence across northern Europe.

In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District, an apparent response to Finland’s and Sweden’s subsequent entry into NATO.

The Leningrad Military District is responsible for a strategically important region that covers the approaches to St. Petersburg, areas bordering Finland, and territory extending toward the Arctic. Its reestablishment gives Russia a dedicated command structure for managing forces facing NATO across this northern sector.

While significant, the creation of a military district does not necessarily generate additional combat power.

Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to drain resources in terms of personnel, equipment, logistics, and more.

Nevertheless, Moscow’s longer-term plans point toward a substantial expansion of its ground forces and military infrastructure in areas facing Finland and the wider NATO alliance.

A central element of Russia’s reorganization is the formation of the 44th Army Corps in the Republic of Karelia, near Finland’s eastern border. The corps was established in 2024 as part of the wider effort to strengthen Russia’s military presence in the northwest.

Russia’s wider military development also encompasses the Kola Peninsula and approaches to the Arctic, where facilities support the Northern Fleet and its strategic nuclear submarine force.

Satellite imagery last year showed construction at the Lupche-Savino garrison near Kandalaksha, including facilities intended to accommodate an artillery brigade and at least part of an engineering brigade. The location is approximately 70 miles east of Finland’s border.

Earlier this year, a separate report by the Finnish Yle media outlet found that the Russian military was expanding a base in the town of Novaya Vilga to hold as many as 6,000 Russian troops. It is located about 100 miles from the Finnish border.

Breaking News: Where exactly is Russia building its massive new military garrison?

For the first time, a completely new base is going up behind Finland's eastern border, set to hold up to 6,000 soldiers. Take a look at the first satellite data: https://t.co/IuZerZRyeQ #russia pic.twitter.com/2UvQXheaAP

— Mika Mäkeläinen (@Mikareport) June 10, 2026

For Finland, the situation could change dramatically if the war in Ukraine winds down, and the Russian military assembles in greater strength closer to its borders.

Finland’s Military Intelligence Review 2026 assesses that Russia’s military reforms have not yet significantly increased its capabilities in its immediate vicinity. But it still anticipates a substantial increase in Russian military capabilities as circumstances permit and identifies Finland as a major direction for future force development after the war.

A ceasefire or settlement in Ukraine would not automatically enable Russia to launch a major offensive against Finland. A ceasefire could ease the immediate military pressure on Russia while still creating a serious economic and political challenge for the Kremlin. Russia’s wartime spending has sustained defense-sector production and employment, but winding that spending down risks exposing structural weaknesses.

With a ceasefire or settlement, Moscow would still need to rebuild units, replace equipment, replenish personnel, and establish the logistical capacity to sustain large-scale operations. However, there are indications that this is already happening, at least to a degree.

Recent imagery analysis indicates, for example, a significant buildup of newly delivered Russian armor, including new T-90M tanks, at the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Base, located around 450 miles from the Finnish border.

Mind you, the 22nd with T-90Ms, BTR-82As and BMP-3ms (and maybe BREMs) is just the latest storage depot beign refilled. There's also the 80th mainly with 2S19s and the 374th near the Finnish border with 2S43s and 2S44s since 2025…

— Jompy (@Jonpy99) October 15, 2026

Finland’s planned acquisition of anti-personnel mines fits into a broader effort to prepare for a potential future conflict. Prominent in the minds of Finnish — and other Nordic — defense planners is the fact that Russia is rebuilding the command structures and infrastructure needed to support a larger military presence near NATO’s northern frontier, even as the war in Ukraine limits its immediate ability to do so.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Finland To Build A Million Landmines As Russian Threat Looms appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. military has successfully demonstrated a new lower-cost receiver that could form part of a future over-the-horizon (OTH) radar. The testing also raises the question of whether the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) research site in Alaska, which the U.S. Air Force transferred away more than a decade ago, could be repurposed for operational use in this role. A new radar of this kind would help the United States plug critical gaps in surveillance coverage over the ever-more strategic Arctic region. Canada is notably already pursuing a multi-billion-dollar OTH radar project in cooperation with Australia for this exact purpose.

The U.S. military put out a press release yesterday regarding the testing of the newly developed receiver array, which occurred between September 7 and September 11. This was the culmination of a series of “Arctic air domain awareness” experiments conducted cooperatively by U.S. and Canadian authorities over the past three years.

The final round of experimentation last month “examined whether an existing high-frequency transmitter [HAARP], paired with a newly developed, low-cost [16-element high-frequency] receiver array, could detect aircraft beyond the coverage of current long-range radar sites,” according to the release. “The effort focused on improving awareness across a region where vast distances, harsh weather and limited infrastructure present challenges for air surveillance.”

“Researchers used the University of Alaska Fairbanks’ High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program [HAARP] facility and a receiver array in Cold Bay developed by MITRE to collect data on participating aircraft over the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea,” the release added. “MITRE also supported the effort throughout the three-year experiment series and designed and executed the field experiment in partnership with government, scientific, and operational participants.”

The remote HAARP site was built in the 1990s as part of a joint U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy effort. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was also involved. The central component of the 33-acre facility is an array of 180 crossed-dipole antennas, which can transmit up to 3.6 megawatts of radio frequency energy, according to the Air Force.

The primary purpose of HAARP was to provide U.S. government and independent researchers with a state-of-the-art facility to explore ionospheric phenomena. On the U.S. military side, work was focused on improving long-range surveillance and communications capabilities, including ways to communicate with submerged submarines. Over the years, HAARP has also been the subject of several entirely unsubstantiated conspiracy theories.

In 2014, the U.S. Air Force announced that it would shutter the HAARP site and dismantle it. However, the following year, the decision was instead made to transfer it to the University of Alaska Fairbanks, which has continued to operate it as a civilian research facility.

“During an experimental air domain awareness initiative, HAARP served as a high-power illuminator, transmitting signals toward the ionosphere to support the detection of airborne targets over Alaska’s maritime approaches,” according to the captions of several pictures that accompanied the release yesterday. “The experiment evaluated bistatic over-the-horizon detection methods to explore potential improvements in long-range surveillance and air domain awareness across Alaska’s maritime approaches.”

The most common types of OTH radars are so-called ‘skywave’ or ‘backscatter’ designs. They usually consist of two large and geographically separated arrays of antennas. The ‘illuminator’ array pumps out signals that are bounced off the ionosphere, the ionized layer of Earth’s upper atmosphere, at a specific angle so that they return to the ‘receiver’ array. Objects of interest (in the air and/or on the surface depending on the specific configuration) are detected in the process. As TWZ has previously written:

“Commonly, radars are limited by line of sight due to the curvature of the Earth in relation to the altitude they are operating at. OTHRs overcome this critical limitation, but with some major drawbacks.”

…

“While they offer much lower fidelity than many of their line-of-sight counterparts in most cases, they make up for it in huge range, hundreds of miles to thousands of miles (1,500 miles is common, for instance, for powerful military sky wave/backscatter OTHR systems) and a large coverage area. The sky wave type of OTHRs achieve this by bouncing their radio waves off the ionosphere to a coverage area where they hit targets and return the same way to the receiving station. The angle at which the radio waves hit the ionosphere dictates the range, and that angle is limited to a specific envelope or the waves won’t properly bounce back toward Earth. As such, placing the radar in the right place in relation to the targeted surveillance area or areas, to begin with, is key.”

In the testing last month, Air Force E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes, HC-130J Combat King II rescue aircraft, and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers “served as cooperative targets, providing known positions against which researchers could compare the experimental data,” according to the official release. “The team successfully completed testing, meeting or exceeding its test execution objectives. Initial results show the system was successfully able to achieve full skywave (beyond line of sight) detections of aircraft and correlation to truth flights. Thorough data analysis is ongoing.”

The release also says that the tests “explored how existing infrastructure and emerging technology could complement current surveillance capabilities.” This raises the possibility that the HAARP site, specifically, might be utilized as part of a new OTH radar. Whether or not this is actually under consideration is still unclear, and TWZ has reached out for more information.

Regardless, OTH radars have been experiencing something of a renaissance in recent years in the United States and elsewhere globally. Separate reports just in the past day or so have highlighted what appears to be significant progress on at least one part of a long-planned OTH radar in Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave.

Outside of Alaska, the U.S. military has been working to establish a Tactical Mobile Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR) site in the South Pacific archipelago nation of Palau. The originally stated goal had been to finish work on this facility in 2026, but the project has faced legal challenges.

As already mentioned, OTH radars have also been part of U.S. plans to improve surveillance coverage in the Arctic. Like the recent testing in Alaska, there has been significant cooperation with Canada in this regard over the years, including through the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

Today, NORAD relies heavily on a network of ground-based radars called the North Warning System (NWS) to provide aerial surveillance coverage in the High North. The radars that make up the NWS are also all pointed northward, and none of them provide the kind of wide-area long-range coverage that an OTH design would offer.

The NWS reflects a long-standing focus on monitoring for aerial threats heading across the North Pole toward North America, especially possible nuclear strikes from Russia (and the Soviet Union before it). However, new avenues for geostrategic competition in the Arctic with Russia, as well as China, over natural resources, from oil and natural gas to fish and other sealife, as well as trade routes have emerged in recent years amid receding ice and other impacts of global climate change. This, in turn, has only prompted growing demand for surveillance coverage.

“We need a layered sensing grid, from [the] seafloor to the space layer. And we have no choice. It has to be layered and deep, a defense in depth, from a sensing point of view,” Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Maj. Gen. Chris McKenna, head of 1 Canadian Air Division and the Canadian NORAD Region, also said during a panel discussion at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in 2025, at which TWZ was in attendance. “And I will say I suffer from an insufficiency of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in the Arctic on a daily basis. And I am fighting for information.”

McKenna was responding at the time to a direct question about gaps in so-called “domain awareness” in and around the Arctic and how to address them.

“I think there’s an importance here of not just air domain, but also space domain, and having a sufficiency of ISR in the Arctic to actually build you the [domain awareness] picture,” he added. “I haven’t really touched on over-the-horizon radar, but I certainly can get into it. I think that’s a really important capability given the austerity of the Arctic and the need for it to cue other things.”

For its part, Canada is now building its own new Arctic Over The Horizon Radar (A-OTHR), at an estimated cost of more than $4 billion. In an announcement last year that caught many off guard, the Canadian government announced that it would be leveraging technology originally developed for Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) to support this development. It is also important to note here that relations between Canadian authorities and the Trump administration have been and continue to be heavily strained over a variety of issues, which has prompted broad concerns about future defense and security cooperation.

Back in the United States, OTH radar plans are also now tied in with the broader Golden Dome air and missile defense initiative. Golden Dome is seeking to establish new layers of defense around the U.S. homeland against a wide array of threat types, and puts major emphasis on new space-based sensor and interceptor capabilities. Expanded defensive architectures within the Earth’s atmosphere are also part of this plan.

“Adversaries are developing and building advanced nuclear and conventional delivery capabilities,” U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Jarrard, Vice Commander of the U.S. element of NORAD and Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), warned at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in August. This includes “cruise, hypersonic, and ballistic missiles, as well as fractional orbital bombardment systems, or FOBS, to threaten not only Alaska and Hawaii, but the entire continent of the United States.”

Chinese hypersonic and other developments, in particular, enable new modes of attack that “can approach North America from the south, rather than the traditional northerly vector for which our legacy early warning radars were designed,” Jarrard continued. “The Chinese have also been building a conventionally-armed ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles that can range [sic] targets throughout Alaska, providing Chinese leaders strike options against our homeland below the nuclear threshold.”

“Russia’s advanced missiles, like the nuclear-armed Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, are designed to circumvent the ground-based radars used by NORAD and NORTHCOM to detect and characterize an inbound threat, and challenge the ability to provide threat warning and attack assessment,” he added.

New OTH radars positioned in Alaska and elsewhere in the Pacific will not be able to address all of these threat developments alone. At the same time, the recent testing leveraging the HAARP site is another step toward meeting demands for sorely needed expanded long-range radar coverage in the Arctic.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Alaska’s HAARP Site Now Being Used To Test New Air Force Over-The-Horizon Radar Tech appeared first on TWZ.

A Russian satellite, Kosmos 2612, may have passed within approximately 85 feet (26 meters) of a U.S.-registered satellite belonging to commercial imagery provider ICEYE. This would be an extraordinarily close and potentially dangerous pass-by for two objects in space traveling at thousands of miles per hour. For weeks beforehand, ICEYE-X36, which would be of special interest to Russia, had already found itself in increasingly close orbital alignment with its pursuer. The two satellites now look to be drifting further and further apart, but the episode has been a clear sign of what is to come as the potential for conflict in space only continues to grow.

Publicly available space tracking data from the satellitemap.space and orbitalradar.com websites show that Kosmos 2612 (also written sometimes Cosmos 2612 and abbreviated K2612) and ICEYE X36 had their especially close encounter at approximately 16:07 UTC today. Private space services company LeoLabs also told TWZ today that it could not “confirm or contradict what other data sources have stated publicly,” but that it has “high-confidence that the objects came within approximately [emphasis in the original] 500 meters [1,640 feet] of each other.” Kosmos 2612 had been making progressively closer passes by ICEYE X36 in recent days.

Short time-lapse of part of this morning’s first pass of ICEYE-X36 (59103) and COSMOS 2612 (68762) over South America under partly cloudy skies. pic.twitter.com/t8RhwmKcV4

— s2a systems (@s2a_systems) October 18, 2026

6/x
Note that while ICEYE-X36 was Finnish built, it is (like other ICEYE sats who's ownership transferred) no longer Finnish. It is registered in the US but might be Ukranian owned/leased now.

— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) October 17, 2026

“COSMOS 2612 closed from hundreds of kilometers away to extreme proximity to ICEYE-X36. It then maneuvered around ICEYE-X36,  remained nearby for an extended period, and then began moving away,” LeoLabs also stated in a report assessing the situation, which was updated today and provided to TWZ. “The latest observations show the spacecraft strongly diverging and confirm that the close-proximity activity had ended.” 

LeoLabs’ broader assessment here is supported by data from other publicly available sources, as seen below.

UPDATE: Cosmos 2612 appears to have maneuvered following a close approach with the ICEYE satellite.

The latest TLEs show 2612 in a larger orbit that will drift away with no further maneuvers.

In this animation, I fit an impulsive burn to bridge 2612’s previous TLE to its most… https://t.co/owzTZiijka pic.twitter.com/RBqGDvVH9H

— Adam Cohen (@AdamCohen8) October 18, 2026

Additional context

None of the distances stated earlier may seem especially close, let alone worrisome, by terrestrial standards. However, this is absolutely abnormal for operations in space that are not being directly coordinated by the parties involved. As a point of reference, in 2020, another Russian satellite, Kosmos 2542, came within 150 to 300 kilometers (93 to 186 miles) of USA 245, a KH-11 spy satellite, and became a major international news story.

“We are aware of the situation and tracking it closely,” a spokesperson for ICEYE’s U.S.-based division told TWZ this morning. “Our constellation architecture is designed for continuity and resilience.”

ICEYE was founded in Finland, but now has offices globally. The company specializes in providing imagery via synthetic aperture radar (SAR) from satellites like ICEYE X36, which was launched in 2024.

SAR has the benefit of being able to capture images day or night, and regardless of bad weather or other obscurants like heavy smoke. There are trade-offs in terms of the kinds of details typically visible via SAR compared to what is seen in visual spectrum imagery. Ukrainian authorities have been utilizing ICEYE imagery for years now, including for targeting purposes, as part of the ongoing conflict with Russia. There have been reports in the past that ICEYE X36 has been operating more directly under the control of the Ukrainian government, but this has not been confirmed.

Kosmos 2612 is one of six satellites (Cosmos 2609 through Cosmos 2614) the Russian military launched via a single Soyuz-2.1b rocket on April 17. The exact purpose and configuration of these satellites are unconfirmed. However, they appear to be so-called inspector types capable of rendezvousing and maneuvering close to other objects in space. We will come back to this later on.

What is clear is that Kosmos 2612 has spent the past three weeks deliberately maneuvering to extremely closely shadow ICEYE X36.

“Over two weeks beginning on September 30, 2026, Cosmos 2612 executed a series of new maneuvers that brought it back into coplanar alignment and placed it at nearly the same altitude as the commercial satellite,” Clayton Swope, Deputy Director of the Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank in Washington, D.C., along with Research Assistant Chantal Li, wrote in an analysis of the situation just last Thursday.

“According to current orbital elements, the Russian #KOSMOS 2612 satellite is now within 1-2 km [0.6 miles to 1.2 miles] of #ICEYE-X36,” Dr. Marco Langbroek, currently a lecturer on Space Situational Awareness at the Faculty of Aerospace Engineering of Delft Technical University in the Netherlands, wrote in a thread on X on Saturday. “Based on current elements, it might come within meters of the latter within a few hours from now. This is an #RPO [rendezvous and proximity operation] without consent.”

2/x
Initially I was skeptic whether #ICEYEX36 really was an intentional target: but a series of manoeuvers by #Kosmos2612 starting on Sept 30, were clearly designed to bring the two objects very close and synchronise their orbital periods, orbital altitude and eccentricity: pic.twitter.com/BhIoi8Rtbe

— Dr Marco Langbroek (@Marco_Langbroek) October 17, 2026

“New TLEs [two-line elements] show that K2612 made a manuever [sic] on Oct 16 and is now stationkeeping within 5 km [3.1 miles] or less of ICEYE X36,” Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist and astronomer, who previously worked for the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and has long been tracking objects of interest in orbit, also wrote in a series of posts on X on Saturday. “To my knowledge this is the first LEO [low Earth orbit] rendezvous of two active satellites where the owner of one of the sats did not give approval.”

McDowell later clarified that “close passes” of objects in orbit had certainly occurred previously, “but not I think rendezvous [sic] (matching velocity vector).”

“This is the most advanced and potentially dangerous uncooperative RPO we’ve observed,” Adam Marsh, LeoLabs vice president for technical solutions, separately told Breaking Defense.

Unprecedented orbital maneuvering

As underscored by the previous interaction of Kosmos 2542 and USA 245, close shadowing of satellites in orbit is certainly nothing new. The U.S. government, as well as Russia and others, have been observed engaging in this kind of activity in the past. At the same time, just how close Kosmos 2612 got to ICEYE X36, and how long they spent in close alignment, are, at the very least, highly unusual.

“It’s important to note that ‘red’ on ‘blue’ engagements,  such as this, are relatively uncommon in Low Earth Orbit (LEO),” LeoLabs’ report points out. At the same time, “this was not a routine conjunction or ‘fly by.’ The sequence included a controlled approach, changes in relative position, close-proximity loitering, additional small maneuvers, and a controlled departure. The behavior is consistent with sophisticated rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO).”

On top of this, there are other signs that what just happened between Kosmos 2612 and ICEYE X36 may follow a Russian playbook of sorts that could also be used in a prelude to an on-orbit anti-satellite attack.

Within weeks of their launch in April, Kosmos 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, and 2614 had all moved orbital planes shared by multiple ICEYE satellites. Three of them subsequently made close passes by ICEYE X36, specifically, but none of them initially kept station with it. ICEYE CEO Rafal Modrzewski did say “the company later moved its ​satellite, prompting further Russian manoeuvres [sic],” according to a story Reuters published last week.

Russian satellites approaching ICEYE: a closer look at the timeline.

Tracking data via @LeoLabs_Space . Analysis via COMSPOC SSA.

On April 16, Russia launched six maneuverable satellites (Cosmos 2609-2614) from Plesetsk. Five of them — Cosmos 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, and 2614… pic.twitter.com/ISoToOptnp

— COMSPOC_OPS (@COMSPOC_OPS) July 15, 2026

To take a step even further back, before Kosmos 2542 was caught shadowing USA 245 in 2020, there were reports that the U.S. spy satellite had shifted its orbit. This was possibly prompted by the movements of another Russian ‘inspector,’ Kosmos 2543. This does not appear to have ever been confirmed.

While in space, Kosmos 2542 had deployed Kosmos 2543 in November 2019. Then, on July 23, 2020, the U.S. military said that it had detected Kosmos 2543 itself launching a smaller object in what it described as a test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon. In a subsequent interview with Time, then-Chief of Space Operations Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, U.S. Space Force’s top uniformed officer, disclosed that American forces had first observed Russian “nesting doll” satellites – a reference to traditional Russian matryoshka dolls – similarly demonstrating the “characteristics of a weapon system” in 2017.

U.S. officials have been warning for years that Russia’s growing array of inspector-type satellites, ostensibly designed to examine other assets the country has in orbit if they break down or otherwise malfunction, are inherently dual-purpose in nature. Beyond launching projectiles, a host of other modes of attack, kinetic and non-kinetic, are enabled by the underlying ability of a spacecraft to maneuver very close to other objects in orbit and hold that position. This includes the use of grappling arms to cause damage or just tow a satellite out of orbit, spraying aerosols to harm or impair optics and solar panels, and electronic warfare jamming. A satellite could turn out to be the weapon itself, becoming a kinetic interceptor that smashes into its target on command.

One satellite shadowing another closely in orbit allows various kinds of intelligence gathering, as well. Collection of imagery and signal emissions can offer valuable details about a target’s capabilities and vulnerabilities, as well as how it is being used in a particular context.

“As observed by LeoLabs Global Radar Network and analyzed by our team, COSMOS 2612 demonstrated a sequence of capabilities that could be used to inspect, characterize, shadow, or potentially interfere with another spacecraft,” according to LeoLabs’ report. “These actions require planning, maneuverability, precise navigation, and significant fuel. They may also indicate the use of onboard sensors capable of measuring the relative position of another spacecraft.”

What has just transpired between Kosmos 2612 and ICEYE X36 highlights how just a viable threat of attack can be disruptive in its own right. Simply forcing an imagery-gathering satellite out of position could prevent it from collecting over an intended area, or at least doing so in the most effective manner.

Furthermore, satellites only have a limited amount of fuel with which to maneuver in any way after reaching orbit. Harassment in space that forces them to burn off that finite resource at a higher-than-expected rate could reduce their total operational life expectancy, as well as further limit their effectiveness and make them more vulnerable to attacks or accidents. Debris in space is a steadily growing hazard that satellites increasingly need to dodge.

The United States, among others, has been actively pursuing on-orbit refueling capabilities to help address these issues. Last month, American officials also made the bombshell admission that there are unspecified U.S. weapon systems in orbit now, ostensibly for defensive purposes amid growing threats from Russia, as well as China. Both of those countries, among others, have been actively developing and fielding various anti-satellite capabilities inside and out of the Earth’s atmosphere.

“We can only speculate about the operation’s goal, but it could have been anything from simply intimidation to outright destruction or sabotage of a U.S.-registered satellite,” CSIS’ Clayton Swope told TWZ directly today in light of the new developments regarding Kosmos 2612 and ICEYE X36. “Perhaps the operation is on hold. There are, however, several other satellites that shadowed ICEYE X36 back in May that could be brought in[to] action too.”

Attribution and broader ramifications

It is important to point out that space, as a domain, inherently creates complications when it comes to attributing any form of attack, should one occur. Satellites do suffer mishaps, sometimes with catastrophic results, the causes of which are not always clear.

Just in January, a Russian inspector satellite launched in 2014 appeared to break up unexpectedly. Sometime around the end of July, the Chinese reconnaissance satellite Yaogan 50-02, which had only been launched some four months earlier, also broke up in orbit. On Sept. 13, a similar fate befell the U.S. Cold War-era Farrah III spy satellite, also known as USA 32. At the time of writing, no firm evidence has emerged to indicate any of these incidents were the result of hostile action rather than accidents of some kind.

Update: Debris from active PRC satellite Yaogan 50-02.@S4S_SDA has now cataloged 62 pieces of debris originating from the PRC's active Yaogan 50-02 satellite (68196 / 2026-051A) on around 20 July 2026 (ref my initial analysis on Substack, link in thread).

In spite of the… pic.twitter.com/1ecF68W8VQ

— Space Domain Awareness (@shell_jim) October 12, 2026

Some recordings of USA 32 (#19460), whose fragmentation in LEO on 13 Sep 2026 at approximately 2113 UTC was confirmed by U.S. Space Forces–Space (S4S). By the time of the recordings, a large number of fragments had already dispersed over a wide section of the track. pic.twitter.com/gjRxCTPz2o

— s2a systems (@s2a_systems) September 16, 2026

“While the intention behind COSMOS 2612’s behavior remains uncertain, the deliberate nature of the activity, the fuel required to conduct this activity, and the proximity to a Western commercial imaging satellite make the event strategically important,” LeoLab’s report notes. “This event, and the capabilities demonstrated, do not establish hostile intent. It does, however, demonstrate capabilities that could support intelligence collection, on-orbit inspection, coercive signaling, interference, or preparation for future counterspace operations.”

It is very possible, if not highly probable, that Kosmos 2612’s recent activities will be indicative of a trend going forward. Aggressive and potentially dangerous maneuvering by armed forces in close proximity to each other is not uncommon within the atmosphere, especially in the air and at sea. Extending a variation of those tactics into the space domain would make sense, especially given the central role that capabilities in orbit increasingly play in modern military operations globally. Those roles extend to early warning, general intelligence gathering, weapons guidance, near-real-time communications, and beyond.

American officials have already said in the past that American assets in space are routinely the target of “reversible attacks,” meaning ones that do not cause permanent damage. That also speaks to the difficulty of attribution if there is no lasting effect or impact to draw attention to.

The U.S. government’s long-time monopoly on the space domain has also been steadily eroding in recent years, especially in light of China’s massive expansion of its intelligence-gathering and other satellite constellations. The scale and scope of what commercial satellite imagery and other space services providers, like ICEYE, offer today have led to a further democratization of space-based capabilities to countries like Ukraine that do not possess significant, if any, constellations of their own.

All of this, in turn, has increasingly driven the U.S. military, specifically, to plan for more proactive operations and potential direct conflict in orbit to ensure it retains its edge going forward. The aforementioned disclosure of U.S. on-orbit weapons is indicative of those developments and an accompanying shift in U.S. policy to be more open about counter-space capabilities.

More details may yet emerge about Kosmos 2612 and its recent rendezvous in orbit with ICEYE X36, but it already points to how space has become an increasingly likely potential zone for direct conflict going forward.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Russian Satellite’s Unprecedented Shadowing Of A Very Particular Radar Imaging Satellite Is A Big Deal appeared first on TWZ.

Germany appears to have dropped plans to directly procure the larger, Block 3 version of Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), leaving doubts over Berlin’s ambitions to field uncrewed combat aircraft alongside its crewed fighters before the end of the decade.

Boeing confirmed to Breaking Defense that Germany’s Ministry of Defense had informed the company it would not proceed with a direct acquisition of the drone, which had previously been lined up. The decision, first reported by Politico, represents a setback for Boeing’s effort to position the Ghost Bat as a candidate for Berlin’s planned CCA capability, something that had seen it announce a partnership with Rheinmetall, the largest arms manufacturer in Germany, earlier this year.

NEW: Germany has formally scrapped plans to buy the Ghost Bat combat drones directly from Australia, documents show.

Its air force wanted them by 2029. Now it faces a longer wait.

Behind the decision is a much bigger political dilemma facing Germany as it races to rearm. pic.twitter.com/2fWHPoQOl0

— Chris Lunday (@lundayfunday) October 15, 2026

“With Boeing Defense Australia as a partner, we are laying the groundwork to optimally tailor the MQ-28 to the Bundeswehr’s requirements,” said Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall AG, in March of this year. “As a system integrator, we ensure that integration, operation, and further development come from a single source while simultaneously strengthening industrial value creation in the form of an industrial hub in Germany and Europe. We see revenue potential for Rheinmetall in the range of three-digit millions of euros.”

#Rheinmetall and #Boeing partner on German MQ-28 #Ghost #Bat
https://t.co/zGEhjQNqqi pic.twitter.com/VLBDQ8EAaV

— Rheinmetall (@RheinmetallAG) March 31, 2026

The move does not necessarily mean the MQ-28 is out of contention for Germany’s wider program. Instead, Berlin appears set to move toward a different acquisition approach, with competing designs potentially having an opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities before a selection is made.

A Boeing spokesperson told Breaking Defense the company “stands ready to support” its German customer on the next steps, while referring questions about the decision to the German Ministry of Defense.

The ministry declined to discuss the specific procurement with the same outlet, citing regulations governing public contracting and the need for such matters to be addressed by parliament.

“[As a] matter of principle — and regardless of the specific case in question — we cannot provide information regarding potential procurement projects,” a ministry spokesperson told Breaking Defense.

Germany has set an ambitious goal of fielding CCAs by 2029. These uncrewed aircraft are intended to operate alongside crewed fighters such as the Eurofighter, extending their reach, adding sensors and weapons, and giving air forces additional options for conducting high-risk missions.

However, the reported change in Berlin’s acquisition plans raises questions about whether that deadline remains achievable.

According to Politico, Germany is now looking toward the early 2030s for the capability to arrive, with flight testing expected to begin in 2027. That would suggest the original target was based around the introduction of the MQ-28, which has already undergone extensive testing, rather than a newer design. The reshuffle could now give prospective suppliers additional time to demonstrate their designs.

The reported new timeline suggests that Germany’s CCA effort could be entering a more competitive and potentially longer development phase.

There is also a question about the degree of operational capability that will initially be fielded by the given date. Getting a CCA into meaningful frontline service is a very significant task, calling for integration with crewed fighters, communications systems, mission-planning networks, weapons, and sensors. Then there is also testing, certification, training, and the establishment of supporting infrastructure. For Germany in particular, getting a military drone, let alone an armed one, cleared to operate routinely in commercial airspace has long been an issue.

If Germany acquired the Ghost Bat directly, it would have offered a route to a CCA capability without having to begin an entirely new aircraft development effort.

However, the MQ-28 was always one of a larger field of candidate aircraft.

A week ago, Airbus and Kratos Defense & Security Solutions announced the first flight of their U740 Valkyrie uncrewed combat aircraft, a Europeanized version of the XQ-58A Valkyrie. Airbus is simultaneously working on its larger U760 Ravenstorm, intended for service in the early 2030s, and the company has previously pitched a stealthy CCA-like concept known as Wingman.

The ride of the Valkyrie
With the successful first flight of the Airbus U740 Valkyrie in Europe, we are one step closer to introducing an operational uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to the German and other European Armed Forces.
The flight achieved all… pic.twitter.com/S2sFrtdmGA

— Airbus Defence (@AirbusDefence) October 12, 2026

Other entrants include Anduril, General Atomics partnered with Germany’s INTEC, as well as Lockheed Martin. Meanwhile, Helsing and Hensoldt are pursuing the homegrown CA-1 Europa, very much an MQ-28 lookalike.

Germany may not be looking for a single drone to do everything, a point we have discussed in the past:

“One option might be a split high-low approach that could pair more capable, longer-range systems for deep-strike missions with cheaper, attritable collaborative combat aircraft that can fly alongside crewed fighters. At this point, it should also be noted that CCAs could also give older fourth-generation fighters a new lease on life, boosting their lethality and survivability by extending their sensor reach, adding weapons capacity, and allowing uncrewed aircraft to take on more dangerous tasks.”

At the same time, Germany continues to define its requirements for a capability described in media reports as a Jagdbomberdrohne, or fighter-bomber drone. Berlin has yet to publicly clarify its intended concept of CCA operations, including whether the Luftwaffe envisions an uncrewed wingman operating alongside crewed fighters, a platform capable of carrying out long-range strike missions independently, or a system designed to perform both roles.

There are signs that the strike mission is being prioritized, at least initially, with a reduced emphasis on air-to-air missions. This is essentially the reverse of the U.S. Air Force’s CCA effort.

Since Germany is set to receive the F-35 stealth fighter, there is also an argument that Berlin could place more orders for the crewed jet. This could have the dual role of filling the gap left by the collapse of the pan-European Future Combat Air System (FCAS), specifically its sixth-generation crewed fighter, and the delayed introduction of the first operational CCAs. Germany is also looking forward to receiving more Eurofighters.

Germany’s evolving CCA plans form part of a broader effort by Western air forces to develop uncrewed aircraft capable of working alongside advanced fighters. These systems are intended to expand the number of available platforms, distribute sensors and weapons across a larger force, and potentially take on missions that would otherwise expose pilots and expensive crewed aircraft to greater risk.

Boeing’s Ghost Bat could still have an opportunity to compete, depending on the structure of the eventual acquisition process and the requirements Berlin establishes.

However, with testing reportedly planned from 2027 and operational fielding potentially slipping into the early 2030s, the original 2029 ambition for an operational German CCA appears increasingly uncertain.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Germany Drops Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat Rapid Procurement Plan appeared first on TWZ.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces say they have carried out the world’s first frontline evacuation of a wounded soldier by aerial drone. The soldier, from the 30th Mechanized Brigade, is said to have been recovered successfully and is undergoing treatment and rehabilitation.

“This is a historic event, at least for our unit for sure,” said “Napalm,” a squad commander and programmer with the 92nd Assault Brigade’s uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) company. The precise date and location of the operation have not been disclosed, and the claim of a global first has not been independently verified. However, a video of the event has been published by the 92nd, which you can watch below:

At this point, it should be noted that the footage has not been independently verified and could depict a staged demonstration rather than an actual combat evacuation. It should, at least, be treated with a degree of caution.

According to accompanying reports, the infantryman was wounded while holding his position. Mines and intense Russian drone activity prevented a conventional ground evacuation, prompting the 92nd’s specialists to attempt an aerial extraction. The video shows the soldier clipping himself to the underside of the drone via a harness before being flown to safety. The extemporized nature of the platform is underscored by the fact that, while in the air, the soldier dangles below its rigid landing legs.

The aircraft was a heavy hexacopter manufactured by Ukrainian company Gurzuf Defense, which provided it free of charge. A UAV operator from the 30th Mechanized Brigade piloted the drone. Throughout the recovery, the soldier remained in contact with the drone operator.

The operation involved the 92nd, 30th and 14th Mechanized Brigades, the 10th Army Corps and Gurzuf Defense.

Ukraine increasingly uses uncrewed ground vehicles to deliver supplies and evacuate casualties from exposed positions. According to Euromaidan Press, Ukrainian UGVs conducted approximately 112,000 logistics and evacuation missions between January and August 2026.

However, ground robots can struggle with mines, mud, and cratered terrain, while remaining vulnerable to drones and artillery. These obstacles make it especially difficult to conduct UGV operations in the battlefield’s “kill zone,” which can extend six to nine miles or more from the front line. You can read an in-depth account of Ukrainian UGV efforts in this previous story.

A video showing a Ukrainian UGV in action in the Donetsk region:

Aerial platforms are able to reach casualties in places where ground vehicles cannot safely travel, and can get there far quicker, without having to stick to specific routes.

The 92nd has not disclosed the evacuation distance or flight duration of the mission. If, as reported, the drone used was an Audag-6 model, this is stated to be capable of carrying a 200-pound payload over a distance of up to 15 miles.

Meanwhile, the recovery points to a growing trend in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Only days before the story of the evacuation broke, it emerged that Ukraine is also now testing the StarGate, a purpose-built aerial medical evacuation drone — also of the heavy hexacopter type — developed by the SkyFall company. This is a rather more tailored solution to the problem, with a covered, medical-grade stretcher slung below the drone. It has a reported payload capacity of around 330 pounds, uses AI-assisted navigation, and can also deploy nets against hostile drones attempting to intercept it.

The 92nd’s operation used a heavy-lift hexacopter adapted for an ad hoc casualty transport, rather than a more bespoke design. This means the soldier had to be adequately trained on how to strap in, and also had to be in a condition that they could actually perform this procedure. This would also be the case even if other soldiers were able to assist them in strapping in.

While these kinds of solutions may be new to the battlefield in Ukraine, using uncrewed aerial systems for personnel recovery and medical evacuation is far from new.

Back in 2016, the Army completed a demonstration of the Lockheed Martin K-Max helicopter in a casualty evacuation role. The K-Max can operate with and without a pilot and was used as a drone by the Marine Corps to deliver cargo in Afghanistan.

“Unmanned and autonomous platforms have the potential to completely rewrite the medical doctrine,” Army Col. Daniel Kral, head of the Army’s Advanced Technology Research Center (TATRC), explained during a conference at Fort Detrick in Maryland in 2017.

In 2019, TWZ reported on U.S. Army efforts to explore how uncrewed craft might speed up the casualty evacuation process. This work included evaluation of the Dragonfly Pictures, Inc. (DPI) DP-14 Hawk, a small, tandem-rotor drone with a 400-pound cargo capacity.

The emergence of autonomous air vehicles, or uncrewed ‘flying taxis,’ with short or vertical take-off and landing capabilities in the urban air mobility sector has also generated military interest. The U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, for example, has conducted studies into how craft such as these could be adapted for combat search and rescue, with the idea that they would be airdropped to recover a fighter pilot shot down while operating over hostile territory.

Closer to the Ukrainian hexacopter concept is the Flowcopter FC-100, a heavy-lift quadcopter drone that the U.S. Army tested in a medical evacuation capacity in Poland during the large-scale Saber Strike exercise earlier this year. Carrying a 220-pound payload, the drone has a range of more than 60 miles.

All of these concepts aim to address the inherent vulnerability of larger personnel recovery platforms in more contested environments.

In their favor, they offer the potential to rescue troops from more precarious situations, with the smaller drones touching down in relatively tight areas in mountainous, forested, or jungle environments. Autonomous navigation systems can guide the drones through smoke, dust, or bad weather, too.

On the other hand, these small craft have no space for a medic, pararescuemen, or other additional personnel. Bearing in mind their limited range and lower speeds, they also need to be in the right location to respond to emergencies as and when they occur.

For the Ukrainian Armed Forces, aerial medical evacuation drones are being rapidly developed and now fielded to help address another problem: the vulnerability of UGVs in areas of the battlefield that have long become far too hazardous for crewed medevac platforms to operate.

By now, both sides in the Ukraine war are relying heavily upon small, autonomous uncrewed aircraft to perform a wide variety of resupply, surveillance, communications, and strike roles on and around the front lines. With that in mind, the adaptation of these kinds of vehicles for casualty evacuation and personnel recovery missions is the next logical step.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Aerial Drones Appear To Be Picking Up Wounded Off The Battlefield In Ukraine appeared first on TWZ.

Nearly a month ago, we reported on a uniquely configured vessel that was far along in its construction at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard on Changxing Island in Shanghai. The intentions behind this design appeared to be as an uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) mothership, capable of deploying a handful of very large vehicles or many more smaller ones via its stern garage door and well deck. Its large pylons would be used to lift the vessels up and down out of the water and to different levels in the ship. Now it appears China has not just one, but two of these vessels nearly complete.

Make sure to read our initial report on this vessel configuration for full context by clicking here.

The new image was taken in Guangzhou and the vessel has a near identical shape, but with smaller proportions and minor changes to its overall moldline, compared to the larger one in Shanghai. This new vessel appears to be about a third smaller overall than its counterpart. The lift towers number six in total instead of six larger ones and six smaller ones on the Shanghai vessel. Regardless, the major design features are all there, including the flight deck and hangar behind the forward superstructure, the location of the smokestacks, and so on.

While two of these assets could still be considered largely intended for experimental use, a growing fleet would have increasing tactical and even strategic importance. Being able to easily launch and recover large numbers of UUVs, or a few very large ones, far from Chinese shores would provide an asymmetric capability. A fleet of ships that is dedicated to deploying, recovering, and tending to these systems, some of which can remain on patrol for very long periods, would be a major indication of how important China sees UUV operations as part of its future strategy.

There have been rumors that these vessels are part of a larger overall program that will see more ships with similar capabilities constructed. Once again, this would be a strong indication that these vessels’ utility will go beyond testing and limited operational use cases. The launch and recovery of large UUVs remains a conceptual work in progress for the U.S., with nothing similar in the U.S. Navy’s inventory, as we discussed in our original post.

Large long-range UUVs can be used for many tasks, from mapping the sea floor to hunting submarines and ships to searching for mines to launching cruise missiles and drones to being turned into immensely destructive weapons in their own right that can circumvent traditional strategic defenses. For China, providing a credible threat to America’s outposts deep in the Pacific and even the U.S. seaboard would be on the table.

There is speculation online as to where exactly this vessel was built. The first place that came to mind is Guangzhou Shipyard International’s (GSI) facilities on Longxue Island, just southeast of the city of Guangzhou. GSI is a subsidiary of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC). It is here that many of China’s most unique vessels are born. These include drone test ships of various kinds, massive beach landing barges, and giant supply ships. Upon closer review of archival satellite imagery, we can say for certain that GSI did build this ship. An image from October 2nd shows it peeking out of a covered graving yard area at the facility prior to launch.

The emergence of two of these large UUV tenders in such a short period of time underscores China’s major bet on the technologies they will support. If more ships are added to the currently known fleet of two, a clearer picture of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s large UUV plans, and its expeditionary potential, will come into focus.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com

The post Second Chinese Submarine Drone Mothership Emerges appeared first on TWZ.

A pilot flying an F-22 Raptor fighter has issued commands to a YFQ-44A Fury Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drone in a first-of-its-kind test. This is an important development for the U.S. Air Force’s CCA program, as its F-22s are set to be the first aerial ‘quarterbacks’ for these uncrewed aircraft once they enter operational service.

The Air Force and Anduril, Fury’s prime contractor, announced the “airborne tactical-control demonstration” today, but it occurred sometime earlier this month. An Anduril spokesperson confirmed directly to TWZ that this was a first for an F-22 and a pre-production YFQ-44A. Last month, the company disclosed tests involving Fury flying in formation with F-35 fighters, but stressed that the latter were not yet issuing commands to the former in mid-air. A Fury drone also launched an AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) for the first time earlier this year.

The Air Force has orders in now for production of FQ-44As, as well as General Atomics’ FQ-42A Vengeance drones, under the first phase, or Increment 1, of its CCA program. The service is still planning to acquire additional CCAs, which could be of entirely different types, through a follow-on Increment 2. The goal now is to have a fleet of at least 500 Increment 1 CCAs by 2032. The recent test is part of efforts to lay the groundwork for an initial tranche of CCAs to start entering operational service around the end of the decade.

“During the demonstration, an F-22 pilot served as an airborne ‘quarterback,’ issuing high-level tactical directives to a single YFQ-44A,” according to a press release from the Air Force. “The aircraft’s onboard autonomy software interpreted and executed those directives in real time, conducting dynamic flight maneuvers and simulated combat tasks.”

“The event brought together personnel from the 412th Test Wing, 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron, 309th Software Engineering Group, Experimental Operations Unit, F-22 System Program Office and the CCA Software Autonomy and Teaming Branch,” according to the Air Force release.

The Experimental Operations Unit (EOU) mentioned here is based at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada and has been leading efforts to pave the way for future Air Force CCA operations.

The “Fury and an F-22 both took off [from] Edwards AFB [Air Force Base in California] and joined up midair,” according to a separate release from Anduril. “While in flight, the Raptor pilot sent an updated mission plan to Fury using a tactical data link, commanding Fury through operationally-relevant maneuvers from the cockpit of the crewed quarterback.”

Neither the Air Force nor Anduril provided further details on how the F-22 was configured for this test. Past Air Force budget documents have mentioned the need to integrate “tablets, cables, and associated materials” onto the Raptor for this purpose. A single Raptor is also expected to be able to manage multiple CCA drones simultaneously.

The Raptor’s prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, has certainly been working with the Air Force to develop the relevant control architectures and user interfaces for that fighter, as well as the F-35. In terms of in-cockpit user interfaces for controlling drones, known work to date has centered largely on the use of touchscreen tablet-like devices, but this is understood to just be a starting point. Though tablet-based interfaces are a workable option, questions and criticisms about increased workload, especially for pilots in single-seat fighters, have been raised in the past.

It is also worth noting here that General Atomics announced a similar demonstration involving a Raptor and an MQ-20 Avenger back in November 2025. General Atomics has been using the MQ-20 as a CCA surrogate in various types of testing. What the plan might be now to demonstrate the F-22’s ability to control an FQ-42A in flight is unclear. General Atomics has previously released a picture of a Vengeance drone flying in formation with, though not being directly controlled by, Air Force fighters.

In addition, Fury and Vengeance are set to make their debut in a large-scale exercise before the end of the year. Bringing the CCAs to the next iteration of Exercise Emerald Flag will give the Air Force further opportunity to test them in a more operationally relevant context alongside crewed fighters.

“We have not yet done a LFE [large-force employment exercise] with these [CCAs], for real. The first one is going to be Emerald Flag. That’s in December,” Lt. Col. Lyndon “OTTO” Bartlett, the EOU’s Director of Operations, said during a panel at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference in September, at which TWZ was in attendance. “That’ll be our first tip [sic] dip of the toe in an actual force integration.”

The EOU, working together with other Air Force elements and industry partners, still has to answer a host of other outstanding questions unrelated to tactical operations. CCAs will be deployed, launched, recovered, supported, and otherwise operated in ways that are distinct from their crewed counterparts, and for which new policies and procedures will need to be developed. Just making sure human pilots have trust in their uncrewed wingmen operating as expected will be critical, underscoring the specific importance of the demonstration disclosed today. All of this applies equally to the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy CCA programs, which are being run in very close coordination with the Air Force’s efforts.

When it comes to the recent test involving the F-22 and the YFQ-44A, “this achievement demonstrates what is possible when we are aligned with industry on a shared imperative: delivering capability to the warfighter at unprecedented speed,” Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink said in a statement today. “We are driving urgency into every part of acquisition from rapid integration and flight learning to disciplined assessment, so we can turn promising technology into combat capability at the pace the threat demands.”

“This flight shows the power of crewed-uncrewed teaming and the advantage it provides our warfighters,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach also said. “We must test often, learn fast, and give commanders what they need, when they need it.”

“The U.S. Air Force’s CCA program is the fastest moving, most mature CCA program anywhere in the world, and will be the first to field operational aircraft,” Mark Shushnar, Anduril’s Vice President of Autonomous Airpower, said as well. “Getting there demands that Anduril and the U.S. Air Force work together to prove out the capability, define the operational procedures, and build trust between operators and their semi-autonomous wingmen.”

With all this in mind, an F-22 issuing orders to a YFQ-44A in mid-air is an important new sign of what is on the horizon for the U.S. Air Force, though there is still work to be done.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post F-22 Pilot Controls FQ-44 Fighter Drone From The Cockpit For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

Hey guys, just wanted to talk about a cool thing that happened last Sunday. We won Best Military Aviation Submission at the 2026 Defense Media Awards in Washington, D.C., for “What The F-47’s Canards Say About The Rest Of Its Design.” This is the biggest deal in our little corner of journalism. Not just that, but we were nominated in many categories:

• Tyler: Best Defense Electronics and Best Missile Defense
• Tyler and Joe Trevithick: Best Rotorcraft
• Howard Altman: Integrated Maritime, AI Integration, and the John Morrocco Award for In Depth Reporting
• Thomas Newdick: Training, Simulation and Readiness, and Missile Defense
• Jamie Hunter: Best Multimedia
• Hope Seck: National Security Space
• Joe Trevithick: Space and Mobile Combat Systems

A big thanks to the committee and the Defense Media Awards!

Welcome to Bunker Talk. This is a weekend open discussion post for the best commenting crew on the net, in which we can chat about all the stuff that went on this week that we didn’t cover. We can also talk about the stuff we did or whatever else grabs your interest. In other words, it’s an off-topic thread.

This week’s caption reads:

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Sep. 18, 2023) – Navy Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians assigned to EOD Mobile Unit (EODMU) 6 conduct radiological search procedures at a training bunker onboard Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story as part of a training evolution, Sep. 18. EODMU 6 provides operational EOD capabilities for the location, identification, rendering safe, recovery, field evaluation and disposal of explosive ordnance, including chemical and nuclear weapons.

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The post Bunker Talk: Let’s Talk About All The Things We Did And Didn’t Cover This Week appeared first on TWZ.

Army leaders preparing for a potential fight in the Pacific told us that some of the biggest lessons they’ve learned from the war in Ukraine and America’s now-paused fight against Iran are to move around assets that you can and find a better way to camouflage those that you can’t. While seemingly common sense, these lessons come from watching how war is now waged. The ubiquity of drones in Ukraine providing constant overwatch and strike capabilities, and U.S. troops killed and equipment destroyed or damaged by massive Iranian barrages on static installations are informing changes to how the Army trains, equips and operates.

These conversations took place during the recently wrapped Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) annual convention in Washington, D.C., which TWZ attended.

“A lot of the things that are happening right now in terms of long-range fires, integrated air and missile defense, and the lessons that we’re learning from them, we’re able to bring a lot of that to our potential challenges in the Pacific,” Gen. Ron Clark, commander of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), told us at a media roundtable. “Specifically, I am thinking through mobility and camouflage. So it’s one of those age-old Army forgotten sciences of how to hide in plain sight and how to camouflage ourselves from observation, because the ability to be able to see surface entities is almost ubiquitous.”

“Our ability to be able to use electronic warfare, to be able to use just good old-fashioned camouflage, and the ability to deceive our adversary is a must,” Clark added. You can read more about the U.S. military’s camouflage and deception efforts in our story here.

As we have frequently reported about the Ukraine war, both sides have been using a variety of “old-fashioned” tactics to duck, dodge and hide. They range from practices like smokescreens to hide from drones to updates on measures from the past like paint schemes designed to obfuscate vehicles and other equipment from AI-enabled targeting systems.

 As tough as things have been for Ukraine and for U.S. forces in the Middle East, the challenges will be even greater in the Pacific, Clark warned.

In Europe and the Middle East, “it’s not a near-peer adversary that we will be working against,” said Clark, referring respectively to Russia and Iran.

“Whereas in our theater, it absolutely is,” the USARPAC commander noted in a reference to China without naming the country. “So our ability to scale that and to think through the problem sets of how do we fight Type One, Type Two UAS? How do we think through ballistic missile defense holistically in the region? We spend a lot of time working with the joint force for solutions associated with that. How do we maneuver inside an archipelagic environment?”

For the Army, any fight in the Pacific will require soldiers to be able to hop islands and move through vast swaths of ocean, constantly hunted and frequently inside the Chinese weapons engagement zone. Clark said that the Army’s organic fleet of ships like landing craft, small tugs, and modular causeway systems operated by the service’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command will be vital for maneuver.

The Army, however, is struggling to keep its aging fleet of 70 of these vessels in the water and it got rid of a number of others over the years. Concerns about this underappreciated force have been something TWZ has raised for years.

“But we also have to be able to conduct tactical maneuver with forces on the ground that can provide long-range precision fires, as an example, and then move so that fires, radars, sensors are not easily targeted,” Clark added. “Because if they can see you, they can hit you. And if you know they have an opportunity to return fire, they will. So our lessons that we’re learning are, in some cases, are very, very relevant. In some cases, we can learn from some of the changing characteristics of war.”

Still, the wide-open plains and dense cities of Ukraine are quite different from the beaches and jungles of the Pacific, Clark reminded us.

“The way we generally fight does not equate specifically in the Ukraine piece to the maneuver that you would see out of U.S. forces if deployed in a conflict like that,” the USARPAC commander explained. “To be able to use operational maneuver and tactical maneuver in a way that it’s not just simply drone on drone or firing long range fires at one another at scale for an extended period of time. We find our way to work through that problem set and maneuver to positions of advantage and to prevail.”

Ukraine’s 115th Mechanized Brigade has released new footage showing a VB-140 Flamingo interceptor drone attacking a Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter in flight.

The drone approaches from above and flies directly into the helicopter’s spinning main rotor. It’s unclear whether… pic.twitter.com/GCb9FodXG3

— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) October 16, 2026

Regardless of the terrain, the ubiquity of drones in the Ukraine war has made maneuver and resupply deadly endeavors, with much of the front lines bogged down with limited territorial advances by either combatant.

When we pushed further on that point, Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea, weighed in.

“To be able to move with sensors everywhere at all times causes us to achieve positions of advantage from distributed locations,” Brunson pointed out. “So the fight is: you look at maneuver. You might maneuver to a position of advantage, knowing that you’re going to change that again. The ability to utilize not only joint sensors but joint effectors, if you will, joint fires, to be able to use those things from different positions changes the shape of the operating environment.”

The bottom line, he added, is that “maneuver is always going to be maneuver. You’re going from A to B, but you might go from A to A1 to A2 to A3 to get to B, and that’s what I think we realize in this distributed fight that’s going on in Ukraine, and so we continue to watch to see what lessons might be coming back into” effect.

In part reacting to lessons learned from Ukraine and the Middle East, the Army is also changing how it trains, Clark stated. In South Korea, he said the service has to get out of the habit of concentrating so heavily on just two annual major training exercises.

“We recognize… that largely the two big exercises every year in Korea focus on large command posts,” Clark proffered. “We’ve got to move away from that. So what we intend to do is take advantage of the knowledge that we have of the threats that exist or that prevail in the Ukraine fight.”

Clark said these discussions are underway with his deputy commander, Republic of Korea Army Gen. Sungmin Kim.

“We talk about how we would operate in a distributed fashion. You know as well as I do, there’s a location that we go to to train every year in Korea, and we stay in that place,” Clark said in response to a question from another reporter. “What would it look like if we train from Jeju all the way up to Gyeonggi Province in the north? What would that look like, just with our headquarters alone?”

“So just imagine,” Clark postulated, “if we train across the entirety of the peninsula, and got ourselves in the shape where we would say [to North Korea], ‘You can’t utilize the things that you’ve learned in the fight and the battlefield in Ukraine on us, because we learned the same lessons and we’ve distributed ourselves in such a way that we don’t make ourselves the target. We won’t be moored in place,’ and that’s what I’m talking about when I talk about positional advantage. It might not be the same place to the continuum. It might not be the same place when you’re in crisis or conflict or competition. We might have to change that, and that’s what we’re learning.”

Another lesson from Ukraine that Army leaders should be paying attention to, said another panelist, is how both sides are using aerial and ground drones to supply frontline forces and evacuate the wounded because human efforts have now become too deadly, thanks to drones.

“I think you also can’t talk about Ukraine without talking about autonomy,” said Tara Murphy Dougherty, CEO of a company called Air, which provides AI-based sustainment solutions to the Army.

“One of the advantages that you get from using simulation and automation, and really using models and compute in order to create convoy plans, as opposed to humans with Excel spreadsheets, is you are able to do many fewer actual convoys because you’re using all of your capabilities so much more effectively and efficiently,” Dougherty posited. “And while it’s an indirect example, I think it does tie to soldier protection because you’re putting fewer soldiers out there in vulnerable settings. I see that not as an end-goal outcome; we need convoys.”

Ultimately, however, the Army will have to advance what Ukraine and Russia are doing with the deployment of aerial drones and uncrewed ground vehicles for logistics by creating “convoys” of autonomous vehicles.

“I see the end goal outcome as having as many autonomous convoys as possible, and we’ve heard today already at this event some of those ideas,” the CEO added. “In the interim, until we get to more autonomy in medevac and more autonomy in convoys when it’s non-soldier material that’s going out to the battlefield, let’s try and put fewer out there while actually getting more material and capability into the force where it needs to be.”

The Iranian missile and drone barrages on fixed U.S. bases across the Middle East have created some very costly lessons for American forces. As we noted earlier in this story, several troops were killed and critical air defense radars, aircraft and other important equipment were destroyed or damaged. U.S. installations across the region have also suffered damage.

In another media session, we pressed Army officials operating in South Korea about what they learned from watching the destruction caused by Iran and what they are doing to address it.

You can see a satellite image of damage to a U.S. radar site in Jordan below:

NEW: The radar for a THAAD system was struck and apparently destroyed in Jordan while two other THAAD radar systems may have been hit in the UAE, satellite images show – w/ @ThomasBordeaux7 https://t.co/qiuWVQgyda

— Gianluca Mezzofiore (@GianlucaMezzo) March 5, 2026

“We certainly are watching what’s happening, and we are learning from what is happening in Operation Epic Fury,” Lt. Gen. Joseph “Joe” Hilbert, commanding general of Eighth Army, stationed in South Korea, told us. “We’re learning what’s happening in Ukraine, and we are working through changes in our own tactics and techniques and procedures to be able to react to those threats and to be able to defend against them.”

For more details, he turned the microphone over to Col. Rosanna “Ro” M. Clemente, commander of the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade in South Korea.

“Drawing from those lessons learned, a lot of it is trying to understand how our systems are being hunted by the adversary,” she told us. “So, strictly into all of our training plans, and as we conduct our own internal exercises, all of our air defenders are practicing something as simple as mobility and survivability jumps, which is being able to reposition and displace your systems to different alternative locations based on any type of threat warnings that we receive. They’re very, very well trained. I think all of our soldiers know how to move their systems extremely, extremely well. They move them quickly, and they are able to move them and reposition them into different locations across the peninsula that still maintains that ballistic missile defense coverage.”

In addition, “we also have to rely on the other pillars of integrated air and missile defense, most specifically the passive defensive measures that we also have in place,” she added.

Those measures involve “a little bit more than just hardening – but a couple of other techniques that we’ve learned from the Russia-Ukraine war in terms of deception, how to move things around, create distractions, and make sure that we create different types of dilemmas for the adversary in terms of where our capabilities are and where are they positioned to protect its defended assets.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post What The Army’s Pacific Commanders Are Learning From Ukraine And Iran Conflicts appeared first on TWZ.

America’s adoption of long-range one-way attack munitions like the Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) is evolving quickly. Training on how to fold these relatively low-cost, but potentially highly destructive systems into a joint force playbook for targeting adversaries on land and at sea, from the Pacific to Europe, and anywhere in between, continues.

How exactly LUCAS drones, and other types to come, will be used in future fights globally was highlighted during a panel at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium earlier this week, at which TWZ was in attendance. The discussion was centered on how Army training is changing to meet the extreme combat demands of the future.

The U.S. military first announced it had begun fielding LUCAS, which was reverse-engineered from the Iranian-designed Shahed-136, in December 2025. This came just months after TWZ laid out a detailed case for why the U.S. military should start acquiring Shahed-136 clones in large volumes. LUCAS made its official combat debut in the opening phases of major combat operations against Iran earlier this year. The pusher-propeller, combustion-engine-powered kamikaze drones, which are employed from static launchers that can be positioned on the ground or installed on ships, and with the help of a small rocket booster, were subsequently praised as “indispensable” by America’s top commander in the Middle East.

With all that in mind, “long-range strike drones like LUCAS, how is that fitting into your planning and training?” our Howard Altman asked the panelists at AUSA.

“We’ve taken our Bayonet Academy, as we call it, a training area at JBLM [Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington State], and have started incorporating the employment of long-range one-way attack. Like, how do I maintain it? How do I employ it? How does that then get orchestrated in order to achieve that effect?” Maj. Gen. Bernard Harrington, head of the 7th Infantry Division, responded. “So we see that playing a key role in order to be able to achieve that effect at mass, … [and] in an affordable manner, while also being able potentially to preserve something that’s more exquisite for something that requires an exquisite munition.”

Earlier this year, the Army brought the 7th Infantry and the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force together under the umbrella of what it now calls the Multi-Domain Command-Pacific (MDC-PAC). Maj. Gen. Harrington is also now the commander of MDC-PAC, and has talked previously about how he sees uncrewed capabilities as critical to overwhelming adversaries in future conflicts. The service’s MDTFs, of which there are now four, have been at the leading edge of fielding new long-range strike and other advanced capabilities.

In his response to Altman’s question, Harrington elaborated more on how he sees long-range one-way attack munitions like LUCAS factoring specifically into future fights in the Pacific, such as one against China. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has already established extensive anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) bubbles in the Western Pacific and is continuing to expand on that strategy.

“So as we start modeling out what it looks like to be able to penetrate a portion of the anti-access/area denial network in support of the joint task force in the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] area of operations, we started looking at, well, how do I bend – how do I achieve mass at a cost curve?” the 7th Infantry and MDC-PAC commander explained. “What effect am I really trying to achieve on a system in order to provide that window of opportunity for that joint force commander?”

“So maybe I don’t necessarily need to sink a ship, but if I take out certain systems on that vessel, well then it creates this temporal window opportunity,” he continued. “Then that joint force commander can surge in that carrier strike group or bomber task force.”

What the general is describing here is typically referred to as a mission kill. For years now, TWZ has repeatedly highlighted how long-range one-way attack drones and loitering munitions could be used in exactly this way against even larger warships. Damaging or destroying radars, communications antennas, and other subsystems could severely degrade a ship’s combat effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to follow-on attacks. The time and effort required for repairs could keep it sidelined for a protracted period of time.

“So when we started looking at that, we saw great value. That maybe I don’t have to use specifically or unmask an exquisite system to achieve that effect,” Harrington added. “If I can achieve [the] effect of mass utilizing lower cost systems, hey, maybe that will get me there. So we modeled that, and what we saw was, particularly with our unmanned surface vessels [USV], long-range one-way attack, long-range launch effects, the ability to synchronize and mass that could potentially get us to achieve that effect.”

As with long-range one-way attack drones, the adoption of kamikaze USVs by the U.S. military is evolving rapidly. America’s first use of this capability in real combat also came against Iran in July.

Yesterday, using multiple one-way attack surface drones, CENTCOM forces successfully struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran. Three Corsair unmanned surface vessels hit the port at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, marking the first time American forces have employed sea… pic.twitter.com/bOM2kmgRxz

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 13, 2026

The term “launch effects” that Harrington used here is a catch-all term the U.S. military now routinely applies to a diverse array of uncrewed aerial systems designed to be launched from other platforms in the air, on the ground, and/or at sea. This includes loitering munitions, but also designs configured for surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, signal relay, and other tasks. The lines separating long-range one-way attack drones, launched effects, and traditional cruise missiles and decoys are in many cases now very blurry.

None of this is limited to the Pacific region or the Middle East, either.

“So, in terms of launch effects, I think you mentioned LUCAS. Covenant’s out there. There’s other systems that are out there,” Brig. Gen. Steven Carpenter, head of Multi-Domain Command-Europe (MDC-E), another one of the panelists, also said in direct response to Howard Altman’s question. “In Europe, we like that, more than accepting risk in an area, maybe we’re disintegrating an anti-access/area denial bubble in the center, and then way up north, we’re going to go ahead and accept some risk there. We like to use those systems to create counter-fire parity, long-range fires parity with an adversary.”

Similar to the establishment of MDC-PAC, MDC-E was formed last year by blending together the 56th Artillery Command and the 2nd MDTF, both of which are forward-deployed in Germany.

The “Covenant” mentioned by Carpenter is a U.S.-Israeli company that has been developing a long-range strike weapon system called Anthem. It was just confirmed in September that the U.S. Army has been actively engaged in testing of Anthem. This includes a live-fire demonstration in Morocco earlier this year. You can read more about Anthem and the current plans for it here.

“The reason we like those types of systems is because they’re EMI [electromagnetic interference] resilient, they’re longer range, and they’re higher yield, so they can go ahead and destroy like SS-26 systems, SS-21 systems,” the MDC-E commander added.

SS-26 Stone and SS-21 Scarab are the NATO reporting names for Russia’s Iskander-M and the older Soviet-designed OTR-21 Tochka short-range ballistic missiles, respectively. They are both fired from road-mobile launchers. Russia and Ukraine have employed Tochka in the course of their ongoing conflict, though their role on both sides has steadily diminished amid shrinking inventories. Tochka is also increasingly limited in service elsewhere globally. Iskander-M is a much more capable design that has factored heavily into U.S. military planning in Europe for years now. The U.S. military has previously acknowledged that war in Ukraine has led to improvements to that missile that make it even more dangerous and difficult to intercept.

Long-range one-way attack munitions like LUCAS are well suited to striking surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile launchers, along with other high-value and time-sensitive targets, as TWZ highlights regularly. It’s also worth noting that Iran’s Shahed-136, specifically, traces its roots back to pioneering Israeli developments in munitions of this kind, where the focus initially was explicitly on finding new avenues to neutralize hostile air defenses. Iran has shown Shahed-136s and other related designs being employed in exactly this way in large-scale exercises in the past, as seen in the video below.

More recently, Iranian forces demonstrated just how effective these capabilities could be in a real-world context in retaliatory attacks on prized air defense radars on the opposite side of the Persian Gulf after the United States and Israel launched their open waves of strikes back in February. TWZ previously explored the far-reaching ramifications of this in a detailed feature that you can find here.

Overall, as we’ve previously written:

“When it comes to this class of drone, speed and advanced guidance concepts do not define its utility. Range and cost do. Survivability comes in numbers, and due to their smaller size, use of composite materials, and small internal combustion engine, as well as their slow speed. These attributes, along with their low-altitude flight profile, mean they possess a reduced signature and general level of detectability that can be a challenge for traditionally configured ground-based radars. Despite their smaller signature, the fact that they are still somewhat vulnerable to interception is actually a positive, but we will get to that in a moment.”

“Above all else, the Shahed-136 and other long-range one-way attack drones exist to put a relevantly-sized warhead on a target far from their launch position at the lowest possible cost. It was previously estimated that the Russian Shahed-136 variant costs around $50,000 per copy, with some estimates being far lower. This cost has also likely declined significantly since Russia has mastered the design and drastically ramped up serial production. By comparison, traditional cruise missiles with similar range have costs in the millions of dollars per round, so the price differential is very dramatic. The Shaheds are also just far easier to build and can be produced in much less time than a typical cruise missile.”

The ‘mass’ afforded by LUCAS and other long-range kamikaze drones also imposes problematic cost calculations for opponents when it comes to the air defense equation, and offers a way to rapidly drain an opponent’s stocks of vital interceptors. These are realities the U.S. military is currently grappling with after expending thousands of anti-air interceptors in conflict with Iran and in other crises in the Middle East in recent years, as well as supporting allies and partners, such as Ukraine.

LUCAS, specifically, is already in line to become even more capable through the introduction of a swarming capability, made possible by the Hivemind autonomy software package from Shield AI. As we’ve explained before:

“Using the software, multiple LUCAS drones will be able to share tasks and maneuver cooperatively, making saturation attacks even more effective. As well as the drones dynamically rerouting, avoiding air defenses, and otherwise adapting to changing battlefield conditions, an AI pilot makes it easier for missions to continue despite hostile jamming or loss of datalink connectivity. Indeed, using AI, drone swarms can maintain near-perfect combat efficiency even if it loses members. Drones can be configured with all different payloads, with the swarm’s makeup tailored to each mission, and the AI system can maximize their collective effectiveness at all times.”

The U.S. Army still has many questions to answer about how it will field LUCAS and other long-range one-way-attack drones on a more widespread basis, as well as train personnel to employ them. As evidenced by the establishment of the MDTFs, and now the MDC-PAC and MDC-E formations, the underlying force structure that will go along with all of this is still evolving, as well.

The remarks from Maj. Gen. Bernard Harrington and Brig. Gen. Steven Carpenter at AUSA this week show senior Army leaders are working hard now to lay the groundwork to answer these questions. A clear vision for how LUCAS and similar weapons will be employed in future fights against land-based and maritime threats is taking shape already.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post The Army’s Plan For Employing LUCAS Kamikaze Drones Against Its Adversaries appeared first on TWZ.

Airbus recently put the demonstrator for its MQ-72C drone helicopter through the paces for the U.S. Army. The MQ-72C has been in development for several years now for a U.S. Marine Corps competition seeking a new uncrewed cargo-carrying Aerial Logistics Connector (ALC). The Marines see uncrewed logistics ‘connectors’ as key to future expeditionary and distributed operations, and a similar Army requirement could be on the horizon, especially to support long-range air assaults.

Jaysen Yochim, Senior Director for the ALC program at Airbus, talked about the demonstration for the Army with our Howard Altman at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention on Monday. Airbus is currently teamed with L3Harris Technologies, Shield AI, and Parry Labs on development of this drone helicopter for the Marines, as you can learn more about here.

The current iteration of the MQ-72C is based on the crewed UH-72B Lakota, which is in turn a variant of Airbus’ H145 twin-engine light helicopter. The Army operates crewed UH-72s today, but only in non-combat roles, including counter-drug and border patrol missions, and almost exclusively within the borders of the United States.

The MQ-72C demonstration for the Army, which Airbus self-funded, took place last week at Huntsville Executive Airport just outside of Huntsville, Alabama. The service has a major presence in the Huntsville area, which is focused heavily on supporting aviation and missile developments. As of April of this year, Airbus and its partners had already conducted four rounds of autonomous flight testing of the initial demonstrator version of this design, which is not in a fully uncrewed configuration.

“We did a demonstration for the Army down in Huntsville, really to show all the capabilities that we’ve been able to develop so far on the Marine Corps-funded program,” Yochim said. “We had a total of five demonstration flights that we did down there, showing everything from the autonomous capability of the aircraft in a hover.”

This included “complex hovering patterns, both step turns and fly-through turns, similar to what you’d see on an airfield, to just show how it can be integrated onto an airfield inside of the existing routing structure and everything that exists on an airfield,” he continued. “We did multiple traffic patterns to demonstrate just a normal traffic pattern, like a normal day would be, but also traffic patterns or a flight with a no-fly zone popping up in the middle of the flight.”

The video below shows previous flight testing of the MQ-72C demonstrator.

In that latter instance, the MQ-72C had to “autonomously make decisions” about how it was “going to route itself around the no-fly zones” once they popped up, he added. The human operator did provide the initial flight plan. There was also a pilot on board during the autonomous flight demonstrations, but only as an added safety margin, and they “never had to take control of the aircraft once,” according to Yochim.

Though the demonstrator now has provisions for a pilot, the intention is for the MQ-72C to eventually operate in a completely uncrewed mode. The current version of the design has two LIDAR sensors, facing front and back, as well as an electro-optical camera at the nose end, to help with navigation and otherwise provide situational awareness while operating in the uncrewed mode.

Those sensors feed “imagery into the flight computer with HiveMind that’s interpreting that through its perception systems to make decisions on the go,” Yochim explained. HiveMind is an autonomy software package from Shield AI, which is in use on a growing number of other uncrewed platforms, as you can read more about here.

Yochim also talked about work that has already been done to start laying the groundwork for controlling the MQ-72C in the fully uncrewed mode. Parry Labs has been leading ground control station work.

“Over the summer is really where now the aircraft, rather than having a pilot inside the aircraft, or sorry, an autonomous operator inside the aircraft, using a gaming computer to tell the aircraft what to do, now the aircraft is receiving commands from a ground control station,” he told us. “That is that human in the loop, sending commands to the aircraft over Starlink, so that it has beyond line-of-sight. We’ve had flights that have been autonomously commanded from up to 70 miles away. All of that is stuff that’s happened in the last year. We also have where the aircraft can be commanded from both a ground control station like this and also with the Samsung tablet.”

SpaceX’s Starlink space-based network and its more secure, government-focused cousin, Starshield, are in increasingly widespread use across the U.S. military for communications and other purposes. At present, Starlink also dominates the commercial market for these services globally. Starlink and Starshield offer highly persistent and robust connectivity that is ideal for uncrewed aircraft command and control operations.

The current MQ-72C demonstrator also lacks certain features that are expected to be found on the final configuration. Plans for a set of clamshell doors at the nose notably still have yet to be realized. The UH-72 design already features clamshell doors at the rear of the fuselage, as seen below. The end goal is for the uncrewed version to have an open pass-through main cabin, offering major advantages for loading and unloading cargo, and doing so rapidly.

The nose door arrangement has been “designed. It’s been 3D rendered. It’s gone through some testing on that end, but not flight testing,” Airbus’ Yochim told us. “The flight testing, wind tunnel testing, things like that, take time, and it’s just not been the priority to get there with getting the aircraft ready.”

Yochim said that Airbus is now looking toward the 2029-2030 timeframe for integrating the nose doors. This is tied, in part, to the Marine Corps’ ALC program, where delayed funding has shifted the schedule to the right. On that front, the Marine Corps is aiming for demonstration of this capability in an operationally relevant context next year. The Airbus-led team is also not the only one under contract for that program, with Near Earth Autonomy and Honeywell also working on a design based on the Leonardo AW139 helicopter. The expectation is that the Marines will eventually pick a single ALC design to actually acquire.

In the meantime, Airbus is clearly eyeing other opportunities, including with the U.S. Army. The company’s main arm in Europe is also now pitching a functionally identical U145 drone helicopter based on the current generation H145 design.

At @ILA_Berlin, we introduce the Airbus U145: an uncrewed, fully autonomous variant of the H145. Optimised for cargo with no cockpit, an integrated nose door, and full autonomy, its first flight is set for late 2026. https://t.co/MbodUxYxyI pic.twitter.com/2EnMXzog6c

— Airbus Helicopters (@AirbusHeli) June 8, 2026

Airbus did the “demonstration to just show the Army the capabilities that we’ve been developing with the Marine Corps,” Yochim told us. “So the Marine Corps has been funding the program up to now, and so the message we are giving the Army is this is how far your sister unit [sic; service] has been able to get us with the funding that we’ve had. It’s already product that’s out there. It’s already product that’s working.”

As mentioned, the Marines see ALC as part of a larger family of uncrewed logistics ‘connectors,’ in the air and on the surface, which will be critical to supporting expeditionary and distributed operations involving units spread across far-flung forward locations. The service sees this as particularly central to an island-hopping campaign scenario in the context of a larger potential high-end fight with China in the Pacific, where traditional logistics chains will be top targets. The conflict with Iran has only underscored how disruptive those threats can be.

The Army is facing many of the same kinds of future operational scenarios, especially when it comes to supporting future airmobile operations. The service is already expecting air assaults to take place over far greater distances in the future thanks to the introduction of the MV-75A tiltrotor. Those units will need to be supported once they arrive at their objectives, which could be heavily contested.

“We did several [air assaults] over the last few years directly from Fort Campbell to the Joint Readiness Training Center, which is 500 miles, give or take. The [Marine Corps’ MV-22] Osprey can do that very fast and in one leap,” Army Maj. Gen. David Gardner, head of the 101st Airborne Division, told our sister site Task & Purpose at AUSA. “Our current helicopters, you’ve got to make some fuel and re-arming stops along the way, and the distance isn’t there. But now that helped us think through as a division how we were going to command and control something that moved, expanded our battlefield, so to speak, twice as far, three times, four times as far, and twice as fast.”

The 101st is the Army’s premier air assault formation and is set to be the first to fly MV-75As operationally.

“We can put some things inside the helicopter, and we can put some things under a helicopter with a sling load. We’re not going to sling load something moving 250-ish knots for 500 miles. We’re not going to hang Humvees under that,” Gardner also told Task & Purpose. “We learned some things about how we need to get our equipment to the battlefield, how we need to get our sustainment to the battlefield at those distances, how we might need to rely on autonomous logistics delivery systems.”

It should be stressed that the market for semi-autonomous aerial logistics support is heating up, and that the MQ-72C is not the only option to meet such a requirement. As noted, there is another competitor in the running just for the Marines’ ALC effort, the AW139-based offering from Near Earth Autonomy and Honeywell.

Last year, Sikorsky, now a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin, revealed that it was working on a fully uncrewed version of the Black Hawk helicopter that also features a clamshell nose. Sikorsky has also been working with Robinson Unmanned on a pilotless version of the smaller R66 helicopter that again features clamshell doors at the front of the fuselage. Bell, together with Near Earth Autonomy, is developing an uncrewed cargo-carrying version of its Model 505 Jet Ranger X, as well. The drone versions of the R66 and Jet Ranger X are aimed primarily at another Marine Corps ‘connector’ program called the Medium Aerial Resupply Vehicle-Expeditionary Logistics (MARV-EL).

As mentioned, the Army does already operate crewed UH-72s, but it also flies Black Hawks. The service is also expanding its use of contractor-operated R66s for pilot training.

The Army does not appear to have formalized any requirement for a cargo-carrying drone helicopter yet. At the same time, the comments from Maj. Gen. Gardner certainly suggest one may be emerging now.

There was at least enough interest within the Army already to accept Airbus’ offer of a demonstration of its MQ-72C last week.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post MQ-72C Cargo Helicopter Drone Capabilities Demonstrated For U.S. Army appeared first on TWZ.

A plan for a new military weapons “super range” test center in Montana announced by President Donald Trump Wednesday night seeks to address a growing concern about the need for more such facilities. As the U.S. races to develop autonomous capabilities, hypersonic munitions, laser and directed energy weapons and improved electronic warfare systems, a limiting factor has been the lack of suitable locations for testing.

While the U.S. military has a wide array of installations where it can test these systems, it’s still not enough. In addition to the massive increase in weapons development and the need for more realistic training, the changing nature of war is outstripping the capacity of existing facilities as future kill webs will extend thousands of miles, not hundreds. There are only so many places with enough space to try out these systems even to a limited degree without butting up against statutes and regulations while also avoiding interference with civilian air traffic and communications, all in an environment remote enough to avoid prying eyes. The need for more and bigger testing grounds is an issue TWZ has long raised.

In addition to the backdrop of the increase in a wide range of weapons testing, much of it aimed at China, Trump’s super range announcement was delivered as the Pentagon and services are specifically creating commands dedicated to autonomous weapons. On Tuesday, during the annual Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, D.C., attended by TWZ, the acting Army Secretary unveiled one such new command, which we will discuss in greater detail later in this story.

“I’m pleased to inform ​you and announce that right here in Montana, the Department of War is ⁠going ⁠to establish a new ⁠”super range” ​for testing advanced weapons and technologies, technologies including potential autonomous weapons, space, and electronic ​warfare technology, supersonics and ⁠hypersonics,” Trump said during a campaign rally in Kalispell. “Montana will help ensure the American military always reigns supreme.”

.@POTUS: "I'm pleased to inform you and announce that right here in Montana, the @DeptofWar is going to establish a new Super Range for testing advanced weapons and technologies, including potential autonomous weapons, space and electronic warfare technology, supersonics, and… pic.twitter.com/W4YqKfq8X4

— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) October 15, 2026

Trump provided no additional details about where this new “super range” will be located, when it will come online, exactly which systems will be tested or how much it will cost.

Thursday morning, the office of U.S. Sen. Tim Sheehy noted that he has been “a strong advocate for building an advanced training range in Montana, securing $10 million for a feasibility study in the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act that passed the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year.”

“The 21st-century battlefield is being redefined by new weapons and evolving technical frontiers that require a novel approach to how America will resource its warfighting capabilities,” the senator said in a statement. “Contested spectrum, electronic warfare, hypersonics, space capabilities and enhanced targeting require a new class of testing and evaluation facilities for our military. The U.S. faces a clear choice: adapt and expand our development infrastructure to the realities of modern warfare, or risk falling behind adversaries who iterate faster.”

The Montana Republican highlighted the value of his state’s huge swaths of undeveloped land for this effort.

“By combining our state’s vast landscapes, innovative spirit, and proud tradition of military service, we are the Last Best Place to ensure America’s fighting men and women have the technological edge they need to dominate the battlefield and win the wars of tomorrow,” he explained.

Like Trump, Sheehy offered no specifics about exactly where in Montana the “super range” will be located, when it will come online or how much it will cost. We have reached out to the White House, Sheehy and the Pentagon for more details. The Pentagon deferred us to the White House, which referred us back to the Pentagon. We also contacted the office of U.S. Sen. Steve Daines and Gov. Greg Gianforte.

There are already a number of facilities in Montana conducting the kind of military weapons testing described by Trump. One that closely matches what would be needed from such a location is the Montana Spaceport & Test Range and the affiliated Limestone Hills Innovation & Test Campus. A public-private aerospace and defense initiative, it already conducts testing for next-generation space vehicles, hypersonic, supersonic and ballistic weapons, drones and counter-drone systems and electronic warfare equipment.

Another potential site could be an expansion of the Big Sky Autonomous Systems Range (BSASR). Located near Bozeman, it is “the Lobo Institute’s primary training and testing facility for U.S. and allied military, federal, and partner organizations.” Operated under the Lobo Tactical division, BSASR is “a 6,000-acre, fully fenced complex purpose-built for advanced unmanned aerial systems operations, full-spectrum live fire, mounted and dismounted mobility, and full mission profile exercises grounded in the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures from active conflict zones,” according to the Lobo Institute. “The range pairs realistic terrain with the regulatory, infrastructure, and instructor depth required to train against the operational realities of today’s and tomorrow’s battlefields — and it does so in a remote, controlled environment where units can push hard while keeping risk to acceptable levels.”

We have reached out to both facilities for more details.

The new super range could also leverage existing range space on the ground and in the air. There is also the large Hays Military Operations Area (MOA) which could be expanded for this new test range effort. MOAs are blocks of airspace designated for military training. Malmstrom Air Force Base and its ICBM fields could also potentially be utilized. Overall, it’s possible a number of existing range areas could be interconnected, both digitally and via airspace corridors, to create a larger complex, as well.

The Pentagon has long realized the need to increase the areas where it can test out these systems, especially to evaluate them under combat-like conditions.

“The current open-air range space should be increased and better integrated to support system-of-systems assessments of air, land, and sea combat systems with capability for emerging long-range fires, hypersonic missiles, EMS warfare, unmanned systems, nuclear effects, and directed energy (DE) weapons,” the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) stated in a report last year. “The DoW needs to invest in and coordinate expanding and connecting the airspace available to the open-air ranges enabling testing and training of advanced capabilities.”

The current facilities are inadequate, DOT&E further explained.

“Threat systems and our own capabilities far exceed the current available air space on the open-air ranges,” according to the report. “The ranges need support and assistance to coordinate additional airspace and corridors with the FAA and industry. Expanding and connecting range air space is necessary to facilitate testing and training critical long-range capabilities that our warfighters need and to replicate the threats they will face.”

In addition, the report states that “to test missiles with longer ranges and gather data to support simulation validation, including for hypersonic missiles, the DoW should invest in long-range, overland missile flight test corridors with land-based impact areas and mobile hypersonic-specific range instrumentation to produce the required lethality data against threat-representative targets for terminal area assessments.”

The Defense Department had largely been conducting the testing of hypersonic weapons — those that can reach speeds of Mach 5 and above — at sea given the need for the long ranges for evaluation. Still, even that was limited. The Pentagon restricted the number and location of hypersonic tests it carried out each year because of the aging fleet of ships it used as its primary data collection assets to track the capabilities while in flight.

Retired Block 20 and Block 30 RQ-4 Global Hawks belonging to the U.S. Air Force, reconfigured as RangeHawks under the SkyRange hypersonic weapon testing infrastructure program, would help address some of those restrictions. You can read more about that in our story here.

However, if testing moves to an overland phase, the need for expanded air corridors could grow increasingly critical. Last year, the Pentagon’s Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) identified three candidate locations to perform those tests, one over Alaska, another at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and a third in Australia, Defense News reported at the time.

Hypersonic testing in Australia is already underway. Earlier this month, we broke the news that the U.S. Air Force’s scramjet-powered Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) had finally reached the flight test phase, with at least one “release” having been carried out so far over a range in Australia.

The military is also looking to expand where it can test electronic warfare systems to help ease the bottleneck at White Sands and a few other locations. Such testing is limited due to U.S. restrictions on jamming, which can interfere with civilian systems.

Before he resigned after tensions with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, former Army Secretary Dan Driscoll in June said the service had plans to set up at least two domestic ranges that mimic realistic conditions on Ukraine’s battlefields, where the electromagnetic spectrum is a highly contested domain. This spectrum would be even more heavily disputed in a fight with China.

“You can have a kind of electronic warfare and all of the contested environment created, and you can have drone manufacturers and counter-drone tool-builders engaging together,” Driscoll told reporters. “Then, we also want soldiers to be able to go there, so that they can strengthen their skills and work hand-in-hand with developers.”

Driscoll said there are already places in the U.S. where the Army can test safely, and separately, the service is looking at a global range outside the U.S. to do “much more aggressive testing,” including with hypersonics. When asked, Driscoll declined to say where these ranges would be until planning is farther along. 

“At least some of the current counter-drone training for soldiers, like one CBS News saw in April, does not include electronic jamming — in part because the U.S. restricts jamming domestically,” CBS reported.

In August, the Army opened premier test ranges for the use of private industry to conduct internal research and development. Additionally, the service co-hosted a Denied, Disrupted, Intermittent and Limited testing environment, at Camp Grayling in September, and there are three more scheduled for Fiscal Year 2027, an Army spokesperson told us.

Trump’s news about the “super range” was delivered as the Pentagon and the services are working to ramp up the development and production of a range of autonomous systems.

Last month, as we noted earlier in this story, the Pentagon announced plans for a new functional combatant command, very broadly akin to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), but for operational activities involving autonomous and robotic capabilities. In addition, Hegseth also announced new initiatives to help further accelerate the fielding of uncrewed systems in the air, at sea, and on land, as well as to explore future warfighting challenges. All of this builds on previous and long-overdue efforts to prioritize the fielding of various tiers of drones, as well as artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies, across domains, but there are questions about how these new efforts will translate into tangible developments.

.@SECWAR “Today, at my direction—we are announcing the creation of Autonomous Warfare Command, or AutoWarCom:

A new 4-star combatant command—with service-like authorities—built to scale autonomous and robotic capabilities across the Joint Force in the fastest peacetime shift in… pic.twitter.com/kYWBxy6Dij

— DOW Rapid Response (@DOWResponse) September 30, 2026

On Tuesday, acting Army Secretary Adam Telle announced the creation of the service’s Futures and Autonomous Systems Command (FASCOM).

“This is our way to make sure that we take all of the great work that’s been happening with the resources that we have today, and we centralize it,” Telle said. “We’re pushing autonomy down into our units, but when it comes to having and making sure that the left hand in the Army knows what the right hand of the Army is doing, this happens at FASCOM; then FASCOM feeds up into AutoWarCom.”

Telle added that FASCOM “will work with the other services to create scale for purchasing power and share best practices on autonomy.”

“It is too soon to speculate about anything related to FASCOM,” the Army told us. “Specifics on structure, command, mission, etc. will be announced at a future dates [and] will require the kind of additional testing facilities that a new Montana super range could provide.”

The use of highly cooperative autonomous weapons platforms that can swarm and operate collectively over large areas will also tax existing ranges beyond their capacity.

Details about the new range proposed by Trump are scant, and it remains to be seen whether it will live up to the hype or even be built. As we noted earlier in this piece, a feasibility study, which hasn’t even been funded yet, is still needed before major work can begin. However, if and when it does come online, a new Montana test range will be welcomed by a military in need of additional places to test out its latest capabilities.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post New Montana “Super Range” Complex Could Add Critical Weapons Testing Capacity appeared first on TWZ.

North Korea says it has test-fired two types of submarine-launched strategic cruise missiles off its east coast, in what appears to be the first time its bizarre Hero Kim Kun Ok submarine has been seen at sea in a publicized manner. If the vessel truly was the launch platform, the tests would mark its first confirmed weapons trials and a potential step toward operational service. Unveiled with considerable fanfare in 2023, the Hero Kim Kun Ok has been billed by Pyongyang as a centerpiece of its future nuclear-armed navy, but its operational status and actual capabilities have remained unclear.

The launches took place Wednesday, October 14, with state media Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reporting the activity earlier today. North Korea said the tests were intended to assess the readiness of its underwater combat systems, improve the Navy’s ability to execute strategic missions, and demonstrate the reliability of its deterrent. Along with imagery of the cruise missiles, KCNA released one photo of the Hero Kim Kun Ok underway, which you can see at the top of this story.

KCNA did not otherwise identify the submarine involved or disclose the missiles’ ranges, flight paths, or performance. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it had detected and tracked the launches from before firing through the cruise and terminal phases. A JCS spokesperson said one missile type was launched from a vertical launch system and another from a torpedo tube. This would match the imagery we are seeing, it would also match the Hero Kim Kun Ok’s unique capabilities. The South Korean military assessed that the launches came from a submarine but did not initially identify the vessel publicly.

There remains a possibility that the 3,000-ton-class Hero Kim Kun Ok was not actually involved in launching the missiles. North Korea has long used underwater platforms for test missile launches and has paired these with images of an actual submarine for propaganda purposes. However, the JCS confirming they came from a submarine would lend additional credence to the possibility Hero Kim Kun Ok did indeed launch the missiles. If this is the case, it would indicate that North Korea has begun validating weapons systems aboard the submarine ahead of deployment. At the very least, we can confirm that the Hero Kim Kun Ok is now sailing, although South Korean and U.S. intelligence would be acutely aware of its movements and it could have been in at-sea testing for years now, we just don’t know.

North Korea unveiled the submarine in September 2023, describing it as its first “tactical nuclear attack submarine” and one of the Navy’s core offensive platforms. At the launching ceremony, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was quoted as saying that arming the Navy with nuclear weapons “brooks no further delay.”

Nevertheless, many questions remain about the submarine’s design and operational prospects. Overall, it remains a heavily modified derivative of a Cold War-era Romeo class diesel-electric submarine — nearly an antique by today’s standards — rather than a purpose-built guided missile submarine. Previous imagery shows 10 missile launch tubes concealed in the prominent ‘turtle back’ aft of the sail, in addition to torpedo tubes, although the precise configuration, usable capacity, and operational status of those systems remain uncertain.

The absence of publicly reported weapons tests from the vessel over the following years raised questions about its development. Analyst Shin Jong-woo of South Korea’s Defense and Security Forum told Reuters that the latest launches suggested combat-system testing for operational deployment was underway. He also suggested that North Korea may have resolved technical problems and could also test a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) before the vessel enters service. North Korea has previously presented SLBMs of increasing size, but has lacked a suitable submarine to launch them from.

Missile launches while the submarine is submerged represent a more demanding and operationally relevant capability than firing from the surface.

At the same time, a missile launch of any kind demonstrates only part of the capability required for a submarine like this to be effective at all. An operational submarine must also be able to deploy reliably, remain sufficiently difficult to detect, maintain its weapons, and execute missions under realistic conditions.

A vertical launch system (VLS) can provide dedicated capacity for certain missile types — potentially much larger ones — and may enable faster launches or larger salvos than a configuration relying exclusively on torpedo tubes. Torpedo tubes offer an alternative launch method, but with different constraints on weapon dimensions, handling, and firing procedures.

The forward four tubes are larger than the rear six on the submarine’s ‘turtle back.’ This would allow the boat to carry multiple types of missiles, possibly including a mix of short-range and longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

Testing both systems would be consistent with an effort to validate multiple elements of the submarine’s weapons architecture.

North Korea has pursued submarine-launched missiles for years. In March 2023, it reported a submarine-launched cruise missile test from the older 8.24 Yongung submarine. In January 2024, Pyongyang said it had fired Pulhwasal-3-31 strategic cruise missiles from that same vessel. The earlier sub is in the 2,000-ton-class and is understood to have only one or two vertical launch tubes.

North Korea’s description of the weapons as “strategic” cruise missiles should also be treated cautiously. North Korea’s long-range cruise missile program is well established and a nuclear payload is a major part of its ambitions, but how mature or reliable a nuclear warhead is for this application at this time isn’t clear. Regardless, ground, surface, and now subsurface-launched cruise missiles are a key part of North Korea’s broader deterrent architecture.

According to reports, Wednesday’s activity was the first publicly reported underwater North Korean missile-testing event since the January 2024 launch.

Compared to the 8.24 Yongung submarine, the Hero Kim Kun Ok has a larger hull and additional vertical launch tubes, but it still uses very dated diesel-electric propulsion, which presents hugely different endurance, acoustic, and operating constraints compared with nuclear propulsion or even modern diesel-electric submarine capabilities.

As to the expectation that Pyongyang may test an SLBM from the submarine before deployment, this would be a likely milestone toward North Korea fielding a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.

North Korea is also pursuing a separate nuclear-powered submarine project, unveiled as under construction in March 2025. Its completion and operational timeline remain uncertain. Nuclear propulsion is a much bigger challenge, but if perfected, such a boat would be of considerably greater value, especially as a second-strike capability.

The latest submarine tests come amid a broader series of North Korean weapons demonstrations, including reported hypersonic missile tests on September 20 and October 3, as well as tactical ballistic missile launches earlier in October.

The sequence is consistent with Pyongyang’s effort to diversify its delivery systems and complicate military planning for South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

The activity also carries a diplomatic message. North Korea has repeatedly insisted that it will not abandon its nuclear weapons while the United States maintains what Pyongyang calls a hostile policy. It has also rejected the suggestion that adjustments to U.S.-South Korean military exercises would be sufficient to change the underlying relationship.

The tests also follow North Korea’s rejection of an apparent diplomatic opening from U.S. President Donald Trump after Washington sought to reduce tensions surrounding a U.S.-South Korean military exercise.

A submarine able to launch missiles from less predictable locations complicates defensive planning for South Korea and the United States. The challenge extends beyond intercepting missiles after launch to detecting and tracking the submarine before it reaches a potential firing position. Even a partially capable vessel places additional demands on potential adversaries.

Were things to ‘go hot’ on the Korean Peninsula, any submarine capable of carrying strategic weapons would be at the top of the targeting list for Pyongyang’s adversaries. A submarine based on the archaic Romeo class design would be fairly easy to track from the time it leaves its berth. This is especially the case bearing in mind the sophisticated nature of South Korea’s anti-submarine capabilities.

Future submarines will become increasingly more challenging, however. That problem could intensify if future North Korean boats make more use of Russian assistance in developing their capabilities. Submarine technology is supposedly part of the payment to Pyongyang for its help in the war in Ukraine. This could become a much larger problem, even if Moscow were to provide North Korea with advanced Kilo class boats, for example.

For now, provided that the Hero Kim Kun Ok launched the missiles, which seems most likely, this would indicate that North Korea is advancing weapons integration aboard a submarine intended to expand its offensive naval capabilities. The fact that the Hero Kim Kun Ok is now at sea also signals progress toward deployment.

Whatever the ultimate operational effectiveness of the Hero Kim Kun Ok and its emerging missile armament, Pyongyang continues to demonstrate incremental improvements to its submarine forces.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post North Korea’s ‘Hunchback’ Submarine Makes First At-Sea Appearance For Missile Tests appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Army is pursuing a family of modular and scalable laser directed energy weapons that can be fitted to any vehicle in its inventory. The service sees this as key to expanding the operational use of lasers, particularly to provide an extra layer of defense against drone threats, and outside of dedicated units. The Army is already fielding high-energy lasers operationally on a limited basis, including along the border wth Mexico, but the technology has faced continued hurdles to more widespread use in recent years.

Army officials and industry representatives discussed what is currently called the Enduring-High Energy Laser (E-HEL) program during a panel discussion this week at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ was in attendance. In September, AeroVironment received the first production contract under E-HEL to supply examples of its 30-kilowatt-class LOCUST X3 laser directed energy weapon system. The Army has already acquired earlier LOCUST variants, including vehicle-mounted and palletized types, through more experimental programs, and these are the systems now deployed along the southern border. The U.S. Navy has also at least tested a containerized version of LOCUST for shipboard use as part of its own larger laser ambitions.

“We’re focused on any vehicle in the motorpool. I want to try to integrate future capability of high-energy lasers into it,” Army Brig. Gen. Guy Yelverton, the Capability Program Executive for Defensive Fires with the Portfolio Acquisition Executive Office for Fires, said during the panel on Monday. “And, so, our E-HEL is on a sled. With that, I can look at integrating it onto multiple different vehicles.”

“And then, as I think about vehicle agnosticness, if I open up my aperture to MOS [military occupation speciality] agnostic, and ensure that it’s easy to train, easy to operate, I can not just focus on air and missile defense organizations,” he continued. “I can now look at any formation type to be able to put a high-energy laser capability into it for the counter-UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] fight.”

“That gives me even more opportunities to share this capability across all Army formations, and give our senior leaders [the] maximum amount of thought process and input into where the system goes, who the soldier is that’s operating it, and I’ve given them quite a solution,” he added. “It’s a great dilemma to have of where do I put all this capability.”

In 2022, the Army reactivated the 4th Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (4-60th ADA) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as part of plans to field new laser-armed Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD) systems based on the 8×8 Stryker light armored vehicle. Reliability and other issues with DE M-SHORAD vehicles led the Army to shift focus, and 4-60th ADA has since assumed a more traditional air defense role. The problems with the DE M-SHORAD system are indicative of struggles that have dogged laser-directed energy weapon developments across the U.S. military, and that have led to several other programs being severely truncated or outright cancelled in recent years.

The Army does now have the aforementioned LOCUST systems, including versions mounted on 4×4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) and Infantry Squad Vehicles (ISV), as well as the palletized types. Those systems appear to be currently fielded on a more ad hoc level to units at forward locations.

LOCUST is well suited to the Army’s current vision for fielding E-HEL without being tied to specific vehicles or unit types. At the core of the system is a turret with the laser beam projector, as well as built-in electro-optical and infrared video cameras for target acquisition and tracking. Other sensors, such as small-form-factor high-frequency radars and passive radio frequency signal detection systems on host vehicles, as well as off-board radars and other capabilities positioned elsewhere, can be used to cue the turret.

With the 30-kilowatt power rating, the new X3 versions of LOCUST the Army is acquiring now are still at the lower end of the power spectrum for laser directed energy weapons. All versions of LOCUST to date are geared explicitly toward countering small drones.

It is possible that the Army could field other types of laser directed energy weapon systems through E-HEL in the future. The service, in cooperation with other branches of the U.S. military, is also pursuing designs with far higher power ratings through separate programs.

Just being able to field LOCUST X3 more broadly would still offer valuable additional layers of defense against drones across different types of Army units. More broadly speaking, the central benefit that laser directed energy weapons offer is the promise of functionally unlimited magazine depth, though this is dependent on there being sufficient power and cooling capacity. This, in turn, translates to a substantial reduction in the cost-per-intercept equation compared to traditional anti-air interceptors. All of this is especially advantageous for tackling drone threats, which do not have to be large or expensive to present real dangers.

By miniaturizing and ruggedizing lower-power systems like LOCUST, the Army could distribute these capabilities across a broad area, or deploy them in a more concentrated fashion, depending on the fight. Even a convoy with a number of the vehicles sprinkled in with them could help defend it from pop-up attacks

In this context, mobility and flexibility are also important boons. LOCUST systems mounted on light vehicles can be readily positioned and repositioned to respond to changes on the battlefield, as well as be brought to forward locations slung under helicopters. Palletized and containerized versions offer additional kinds of flexibility for providing point defense at sites on land, as well as installation on ships.

At the panel on Monday, Brig. Gen. Yelverton stressed that when it comes to laser weapons systems, in general, the technology is no longer a matter of “science fiction” but has become “science reality.” The U.S. military says laser systems positioned along the border with Mexico have downed real targets, though many questions remain about those deployments. Regardless, challenges do clearly remain.

“Lasers are real. We can do it. We can go out. We can shoot things,” Kirk Williams, Chief Engineer at the Army’s Directed Energy Project Office, another one of the panelists, said. “But what we got to do now is make these systems reliable enough so that the soldiers have the faith in them when they need them, and that’s really the main point that we’re trying to go after right now.”

“We’re getting to the point where the systems are reliable enough, but we still have to make them maintainable and repairable because this is an Army system,” he continued. “It’s going to be on a battlefield. Things are going to break. We can break things in very creative ways, right? So if it’s not reliable, or if it’s not maintainable, if it’s not repairable, that’s a problem.”

“We’re also looking to reduce size, weight, and power,” he added. “JLTV has a lot better payload capacity than ISV. So we really need to be able to get something smaller if we want to have the same effectiveness on an ISV. So that same modular architecture will allow us to go in, take some of those components, make trade-offs.”

The focus on modular and open systems architectures will also help when it comes to integrating new and improved functionality down the line. It will also feed into the larger goal of having E-HEL options not tied to a particular vehicle or other platform.

“By going after the modular architecture, that gives us the flexibility to not only go after increases in reliability, but also increases in performance,” Williams further explained. “It gives us the way to inject new technology into existing systems, and then hopefully it also gives us a way of getting better prices out of some of our vendors.”

In addition, “one of the things we learned is you can have a really cool integrated system, and then when that truck needs an oil change, well, then your laser weapon system is down for the count,” he added. “So, trying to make it so that you can just pull it off of any vehicle, put it on any other vehicle is really one of the things that we’re trying to go after.”

The Army is also very cognizant of the basic fact that a single laser can only engage one target at once. The beam from any laser weapon system also drops in power as it gets further from the source, just because of the need to propagate through the atmosphere. Weather and other environmental conditions like smoke and dust then also become a factor. This has driven demand for more power (and cooling capacity) to improve effectiveness, especially at range. Developments in adaptive optics can also help overcome these issues to a degree, but lasers currently remain very short-range weapons overall.

“That’s why it’s important to us to get enough energy on the target to kill it as quickly as possible and move on to the next threat. Speaking about the magazine, you know I have battery power on there, so depending upon which system, around 80 seconds, 120 seconds, whatever that is, you know that’s the magazine depth I have,” Brig. Gen. Yelverton said on Monday. “The quicker I get on the target, kill it, and off the target, I start rebuilding, regenerating that magazine depth.”

“It’s the targeting system. It’s the optics system that lets you focus on the target,” Williams also chimed in at this point on the panel discussion. “I mentioned trying to make the trackers better and take some of the onus off of the operator. If we can do better aim point control and keep the laser in the same spot, it gives you a better and a quicker kill.”

Earlier on, Williams had highlighted how artificial intelligence-assisted targeting capabilities could be a particularly important addition to laser directed energy weapons. Networking multiple systems together could help with sorting and assigning targets as efficiently as possible.

When it comes to the actual operational employment of laser directed energy weapons, “as these systems get smaller, as they get more powerful, the quicker we could get them into our soldiers’ hands,” Army Col. Charles Kean, Deputy Commanding Officer for Support at the 7th Infantry Division at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state, another one of the panelists, said.

This, in turn, will open up important new opportunities to “operate with them forward, test them in the mud, the dirt, the humidity of the Pacific, test them down in the southern border where they’re different conditions, whether it’s in the Middle East and Europe, it’s applicable across the board,” Kean continued. “We have to understand it, get it in our hands as quickly as possible, so we could iterate it, iterate on it, and make it better and continue to iterate, because the adversaries continue to iterate in reverse against us.”

This last point is worth highlighting. The U.S. military’s chief global competitor, China, has been particularly active in the development and fielding of ground-based laser and other directed energy weapons, as well as designs for shipboard use. Chinese firms are selling laser weapon systems to foreign armed forces, as well. Other countries, including American allies and partners, are also very actively pursuing these capabilities.

Touted as the "world’s most powerful," China’s LY-1 ship-based laser air defense system was displayed on an eight-wheeled truck, with no specs released. pic.twitter.com/WalkQffaA9

— Polymarket Intel (@PolymarketIntel) September 3, 2025

Col. Kean also stressed that laser directed energy weapons would still only be one part of a larger layered air and missile defense ecosystem for the Army.

As it stands now, the Army hopes to have the first LOCUST X3 systems acquired through E-HEL in operational service by early 2028. A similar timeframe has been put forward for the separate Joint Laser Weapon System (JLWS) program, which the Army is also involved in. JLWS is aiming to produce a viable containerized 150-kilowatt-class laser directed energy weapon, with plans to work toward 300- and 500-kilowatt-class designs. At the panel on Monday, Scott Keeney, CEO of laser systems developer nLIGHT, which has been working together with AeroVironment on LOCUST, among other projects, said he saw further scaling up of capabilities to the one-megawatt-class as being on the horizon. This is a power rating the U.S. Navy has also talked about as a future goal.

The Army clearly sees E-HEL already as a path to truly operationalizing laser directed energy capabilities across the system, but the service itself acknowledges that there is still significant work to be done to make this goal a reality.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Army Wants High-Energy Laser Weapons It Can Put On “Any Vehicle In The Motorpool” appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Army now has at least five named programs seeking new anti-air interceptors of various tiers to collectively address everything from advanced hypersonic missiles to small weaponized drones. In the process, an important central theme is emerging: the service’s days of fielding air defense systems that can only use one type of interceptor look to be increasingly over. For the U.S. military, the impacts from the war with Iran have made clear that diversifying munitions stockpiles and supplier bases is no longer just valuable, it is critical.

Army Lt. Gen. Frank Lozano, the service’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Fires, highlighted this growing trend yesterday during a panel discussion at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ has been in attendance.

To provide some immediate context, with the exception of Patriot, the main ground-based air defense systems in Army inventory today are fielded with just one type of interceptor. In the case of Patriot, the service’s procurement of new interceptors had also been increasingly limited to just one type, the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE). Production of the preceding PAC-3 Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI) missile ended in 2023. Just earlier this year, the Army placed its first order in decades for new PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) missiles, an older interceptor design for Patriot that has remained in production primarily for U.S. allies and partners.

Separately, the Army is in the process of fielding Enduring Shield, a new middle-tier air defense system designed to handle multiple interceptor types. However, the service is currently only acquiring AIM-9X Sidewinders to load into them. We will come back to this later on.

“We have the capabilities we need to have to fight and win, but it’s our job to ensure that victory is achievable in the future inside of any dynamic environment scenario fight we might find ourselves in,” Lt. Gen. Lozano said yesterday. “So, it’s incumbent upon Mr. Ingraham [Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Brent Ingraham] and I to continue to be creative and looking at, well, should we buy GEM-Ts because they’re being produced?”

“GEM-Ts are a really good missile in the battlespace within they operate. I mean, they’re being employed today by air defense brigades around the world,” he continued. “So if we have the opportunity, it’s probably something we should take advantage of, and we’re looking at doing that.

“We’ve had a lot of discussions about even more interceptors. From a PAC-3 MSE perspective, our goal has always been to get to 2,000 [per year],” he added. “Why we’re running programs like LCI [Low Cost Interceptor], and NGSRI [Next-Generation Short-Range Interceptor], and NGCM [Next-Generation C-UAS Missile], and Second Interceptor, is because I think the easy button answer is just buy more of a great missile. We’re going to buy more [PAC-3 MSEs], but when we start talking about overall missile output, we start looking at numbers like is it 4,000, is it 6,000, is it 8,000, we’re looking at a diverse set of capabilities.”

The LCI program is seeking a lower-cost and lower-tier interceptor for Patriot with a unit price of no more than $1 million. PAC-3 MSE’s average unit cost has been around $4 million in recent years.

NGSRI is the Army’s program to find a replacement for the venerable Stinger. The new missiles have to be compatible with existing vehicle-based and man-portable launchers.

The Army is working to field a new counter-drone interceptor through NGCM. Those missiles will be integrated into launchers the service has now for the Coyote interceptor.

The Second Interceptor effort is for Enduring Shield, which is also known as the Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2 (IFPC Inc 2). The main goal there is to provide increased capability against incoming cruise missiles compared to the AIM-9X.

There is also the Army’s Future Interceptor effort, which also came up separately at the panel yesterday, and is also for Patriot. Unlike LCI, the aim here is to acquire a new interceptor with improved capabilities against hypersonic missiles and other upper-tier threats.

Historically, Army programs like these would eventually result in the selection of a single winning missile design. Lozano’s remarks yesterday point to the service increasingly taking a very different approach.

On “second interceptor, obviously, we just moved into phase two of that program. We’ve got Lockheed Martin competing with Boeing, who was teamed with Anduril,” Lozano said. “But we wanted to turn up the heat on that program. I constantly get frustrated when a funding profile emerges over the FYDP [the Future Years Defense Program], and then magically we lay in a five-year program.”

“I’m like, no, I actually need that capability now,” he continued. “So, have we thought maybe what if we ran a 24-month program or a 36-month program, right? And so, in that vein, what we have decided to do is, while those two companies continue to compete, we’re going to create a shoot-off opportunity in [the] fourth quarter [of Fiscal Year 20]27, and I want to run an in-parallel, what I call an in-stride competition.”

“We just held an industry day, and we basically just said, hey, if there’s any other company who didn’t make the first cut in the phase one, but, oh, by the way, who continued to invest in the IFPC Second Interceptor capability, we’d love for you to come out to the range,” he added. “We’ll give you range time, we’ll present targets, and we’ll allow you to recompete with an opportunity to get back into the program folder.”

The Army is doing the exact same thing with NGSRI, where Lockheed Martin and Raytheon have been competing face-to-face. That program is also now planning to hold a new shoot-off that will be open to other vendors in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2027.

There are signs the Army is moving in a similar direction with NGCM, where it previously selected AeroVironment to supply its Freedom Eagle-1 (FE-1) interceptor. The service put out a request for information seeking new NGCM options in August, with a goal of holding an initial evaluation again in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2027. A deeper operational assessment could then follow in Fiscal Year 2028.

To reiterate, on top of all this, the Army is also now pursuing at least two new interceptor options for Patriot.

“We have to address the threat, and we need to address the threat in a complementary way, meaning we need to fight on a cost curve that’s affordable for the U.S. Army to maintain and sustain that warfighting capability abroad,” Lozano stressed yesterday.

This gets to the crux of the matter. It is not at all a new observation that just having a stockpile of any particular munition on day one of a conflict is not enough, especially if the fight becomes drawn out. There needs to be sufficient depth to those stocks at the start and the ability to readily replenish them in line with expenditures. The war with Iran, compounded by other crises in the Middle East and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, has made clear that these core truths apply to all armed forces, even the U.S. military.

Lower-cost munitions are part of the solution, but they also need to be producible at scale on reasonable timelines. The lead time for higher-end munitions today is often measured in months, if not years. Furthermore, being locked into a single vendor has been shown to not just be undesirable, but a potential national security risk in an actual conflict. Lozano’s remarks yesterday, and how the Army is now pursuing new anti-air interceptors, reflect larger trends, not just in the acquisition of larger volumes of munitions overall, but also from a broader array of total suppliers.

There has also been a push across the U.S. military to bring in new and non-traditional firms, including in partnership with established prime contractors. An example of this is the Boeing/Anduril team-up for Second Interceptor. This was also underscored by new framework agreements the Pentagon announced back in May regarding the planned purchase of thousands of lower-cost cruise missiles.

The @DeptofWar has reached new framework agreements with a slate of disruptive new entrants to aggressively expand the United States military’s lethal cruise missile and hypersonic missile strike capabilities.
 
Low-Cost Containerized Missiles (LCCM) Program:
• Anduril
•… pic.twitter.com/Fr2xAnBM7y

— Department of War CTO (@DoWCTO) May 13, 2026

With regard to the LCI program, specifically, Lozano highlighted an additional aspect of all of this yesterday.

LCI has “a unique twist to it because we’re looking for companies who have all-up rounds, but I’m also asking for companies to come in at the component level,” he explained. “We typically don’t do that, right? There’s a lot of risk in managing components and generating all-up round systems. But we’re also looking for weapon system integrators, because I want to be able to create two or three teams who can compete with the all-up round guys to see if we can generate some momentum behind the fact that we need to thicken our inventory with low-cost, affordable munitions.”

The U.S. Navy is now pursuing a roughly similar approach with its Naval Modular Missile (NMM) program. NMM envisions an entirely new family of sea-launched surface-to-air missiles that offer very different capabilities, but that all feature certain common components, as you can read more about here.

The Army is also eyeing a new family of launcher vehicles, as well as containerized options, all capable of firing various types of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface munitions. Autonomy is also an important aspect of what is aptly dubbed the Common Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher (CAML) program.

It is also important to note here that the underlying aim is not to eliminate more exquisite munitions, or the capabilities that they offer, but to create a more affordable, complementary mix of options.

“What I would say is we’re solely focused on delivering on the programs we are executing now,” Lozano said in closing at the end of the panel yesterday. “We have to deliver, and if we deliver on that wide variety of capability, then we can increase and ramp that capacity. And that would be my wish list, that we have enough resources and we achieve programmatic success in the way that we’re planning to, so we can deliver in mass.”

All signs point to the diversity in munitions that Lozano is talking about here being particularly pronounced in future Army air defense capabilities full of systems firing multiple types of interceptors.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post The Days Of Army Air Defense Systems Firing Just One Type Of Interceptor Are Ending appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Army turned the Merops interceptor drone into a formal program in just 142 days, an acquisition milestone that highlights efforts to speed the service’s response to emerging threats and get combat-proven capabilities into the hands of troops and allies. The Merops won accolades for its role in defending against Iranian barrages of Shahed-136 one-way attack munitions in the Middle East.

Speaking at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention in Washington, D.C., where TWZ is in attendance, Col. Christopher Hill, director of the Army’s Global Tactical Edge Acquisition Directorate (G-TEAD), described the Merops effort as “an example of how we can move fast when we need to.”

The Merops is a small, relatively low-cost counter-UAS system designed to rapidly intercept long-range, one-way attack drones in flight. It was originally developed by Perennial Autonomy. The system uses Surveyor drones as airborne interceptors, with onboard sensors to track targets and the ability to operate autonomously or under remote control. The interceptors can destroy enemy unmanned aircraft through direct impact or a proximity-detonated explosive warhead.

The interceptor was initially brought to the Army’s attention after drone incursions involving two NATO partners prompted a senior commander to demand an urgent response. The system was not part of the commander’s original acquisition plan, Hill explained, but its demonstrated performance in Ukraine made it a compelling candidate.

“He said, ‘I want this capability in the hands of our partners within 14 days,’” Hill recalled. “Everyone looked around the room, and he looked over at me, and I nodded my head like, ‘We’ll figure it out.’”

The Army did not quite meet that deadline. Hill said acquisition personnel and soldiers went into the theater to evaluate the capability, ultimately getting it into the hands of NATO partners within approximately 21 or 22 days.

That initial effort has since expanded. Hill said the Army procured additional Merops systems in partnership with the Joint Interagency Task Force, which procured 13,000 of the interceptors. The effort also progressed from providing the capability to NATO partners to supplying mobile Merops firing teams to a second theater — presumably U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

In CENTCOM, the U.S. military has been confronting the threat posed by Iran’s Shahed-136 and other one-way attack drones, which have been used in barrages against American and allied forces and installations in the Middle East. Former Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll had previously highlighted Merops as a particularly attractive option for countering such threats because of its relatively low cost and the speed with which it can be acquired.

You can watch Driscoll’s testimony on Merops at the 36-minute mark of the video below:

During congressional testimony, Driscoll said the Army was able to purchase 13,000 Merops interceptors within approximately eight days after the conflict with Iran began. He put the cost at about $15,000 per interceptor, with the potential for that figure to fall below $10,000 as production scales. In a separate interview with Bloomberg, he suggested larger orders could eventually push the price down to between $3,000 and $5,000.

Shahed drones have been estimated to cost tens of thousands of dollars apiece, while traditional air defense interceptors are far more expensive. Using comparatively inexpensive drones to defeat them can improve the economics of air defense while preserving more sophisticated interceptors for threats that require them.

Ukraine has employed Merops alongside domestically produced interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed/Geran one-way attack drones. The system’s battlefield use has helped demonstrate the potential of a new class of air defense weapons designed to defeat these kinds of drones without relying exclusively on costly surface-to-air missiles.

However, Hill cautioned that success in Ukraine does not automatically mean a system will perform equally well in every operational environment.

“On the Merops, it absolutely was influenced by [Ukraine]. I mean, that’s where it came from. That’s where we saw the capability,” he said. “But that’s one of the things where the employment of the system really matters.”

Hill noted that the system’s effectiveness will vary depending on where it is used, including differences between desert environments and the urban areas where it has operated in Ukraine. The objective, he said, is to get the capability into the Army’s inventory so commanders can make informed decisions about how and where to use it.

“Once we get it into our hands, now we can make a decision in Europe. Where does it go? Do I even need it?” Hill said. “It’s getting it in our hands. So that was the key for the Merops. The speed of getting it, then we can make the decision of how we employ it.”

That approach reflects a broader change in how the Army wants to manage emerging technology. Rapid fielding is important, but the service also wants to avoid acquiring a capability for an urgent operational need only to leave it without a clear path toward long-term funding, production, and support.

Hill said G-TEAD’s process is designed to involve the organizations that will eventually take responsibility for a capability from the outset. Program acquisition executives, or PAEs, are involved early, while the Army’s test and evaluation community and soldiers provide feedback as the system is assessed. The goal is to identify a transition partner upfront rather than wait until after an initial fielding effort to determine who will take ownership.

“We want to make sure that we’re giving commanders capability that we know works,” Hill said.

He described the directorate’s standard process as a 180-day effort, with the objective of reaching a decision on whether a capability should become an Army program within that period. The Merops effort, at 142 days, moved faster than that target.

The process is also intended to address what acquisition officials often call the ‘valley of death’: the gap between getting an emerging capability into the hands of operational units and the point at which a program office takes over and provides the funding and contracting structure needed to scale it.

“We will work to fill that valley of death gap between the time that we put capability into the hands of units and the time that the PM picks it up and actually [provides funding],” Hill said. “There’s a gap there. So we can do that intermediate scaling portion before it fully transitions.”

The effort builds on the Army’s wider push to streamline acquisition, an issue Driscoll has also emphasized. The Army secretary previously described an old process involving 16 decision-making steps, each with the ability to veto a proposal and send it back through the system. That structure could leave the service waiting two to seven years to purchase a capability.

The Merops experience suggests that some of those delays can be reduced when acquisition professionals work directly with operational units and the organizations responsible for evaluating and sustaining new equipment.

But rapidly acquiring an interceptor is only part of the challenge. The Army must still determine where it offers the greatest value, how it fits into existing air defense architectures, and how to produce and sustain enough systems to meet operational demand.

Low-cost interceptors are also not a replacement for every layer of air defense. They are, however, an increasingly important option against large numbers of relatively inexpensive attack drones, particularly when the alternative is expending missiles worth hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars to defeat each target.

For the Army, Merops is therefore serving two purposes: providing an additional tool against the growing one-way attack drone threat and demonstrating a faster route from an emerging battlefield capability to a formally supported military program.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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