France, Germany, Austria and Poland are expanding or reviewing the authority of critical infrastructure operators to defend facilities against drones, raising legal and operational questions over the growing role of civilian companies in national security.

European governments are reconsidering who should be authorised to intercept hostile drones as energy companies and critical infrastructure operators confront an increasingly serious threat to electricity networks, transport systems and other essential facilities.

France has already introduced legislation permitting approved operators to deploy counter-drone systems, while Germany is reviewing similar arrangements and Austria has announced plans to extend certain protective powers to infrastructure companies.

Poland has moved further by authorising designated security units to disable or destroy drones entering restricted areas around important energy installations.

The changes reflect concerns that national police and armed forces cannot provide permanent protection for every substation, power station, railway facility or pipeline against relatively inexpensive unmanned aircraft.

France establishes a new approach

In August 2026, the French parliament approved legislation allowing authorised operators of critical infrastructure and their contractors to detect, jam and intercept drones near designated facilities.

The legislation followed a series of reported drone incursions over sensitive locations, including military installations.

Under the French approach, operators of strategically important infrastructure may eventually use approved counter-drone systems without relying exclusively on the immediate intervention of military personnel.

Potential beneficiaries include electricity operators and organisations responsible for transport infrastructure.

French authorities are testing detection equipment, electronic countermeasures and interceptor drones at Brétigny-sur-Orge, south of Paris.

The programme examines systems capable of identifying approaching aircraft, determining whether they present a threat and initiating an appropriate response.

France intends to expand the protection of sites classified as strategically important, with further deployment planned during 2027.

The initiative would introduce responsibilities traditionally associated with military or police operations into the management of civilian infrastructure.

Germany and Austria reconsider existing restrictions

Germany is examining the legal conditions under which private companies and infrastructure operators could participate in active counter-drone operations.

At present, responsibility for neutralising threatening aircraft remains primarily with the competent public authorities.

The debate has intensified following security incidents involving unmanned aircraft, including the discovery of an explosives-laden drone near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle airport in August.

German authorities attributed the incident to Russia, an allegation Moscow denied.

The German government’s review concerns not only the equipment that companies may possess but also whether trained security personnel should be permitted to deploy countermeasures without waiting for a separate police authorisation.

Austria announced plans in September to extend comparable powers to selected critical infrastructure operators, including major energy companies.

The government has acknowledged the practical limitations of protecting a large number of widely dispersed installations using state security personnel alone.

Poland has already established restricted drone zones around sensitive energy facilities, with designated security units authorised to intercept aircraft entering those areas under applicable national rules.

Electricity networks face particular risks

Electricity infrastructure presents a difficult security problem because essential installations are distributed across extensive geographical areas.

Transmission operators manage thousands of kilometres of high-voltage lines, while substations, transformers and switching stations connect generation facilities to consumers.

A successful attack against critical equipment can produce consequences extending well beyond the immediate site.

Large power transformers are particularly difficult to replace. Manufacturing, transporting and installing specialised equipment can require lengthy preparation, making rapid recovery uncertain after serious damage.

European utilities have traditionally concentrated on physical security, maintenance and restoring services after technical failures or accidents.

The spread of drones creates additional demands for surveillance, early warning and the ability to respond before an attack reaches its target.

Russia’s repeated strikes against Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure have demonstrated the extensive disruption that attacks on power systems can cause.

European governments are now evaluating how comparable vulnerabilities could be exploited against their own networks.

Who bears responsibility for an interception?

Giving civilian operators access to counter-drone equipment raises unresolved legal questions.

Electronic jamming can interfere with communications and navigation systems beyond the targeted aircraft. A drone brought down over an industrial or residential area could injure members of the public or damage surrounding property.

Security personnel must also determine whether an unidentified drone is hostile, operating unlawfully or simply present because of an error by its operator.

A mistaken interception could expose infrastructure companies to compensation claims and other legal consequences.

European governments must therefore establish who can authorise an intervention, which countermeasures are permitted and how responsibility is allocated when damage occurs.

There is no uniform European approach.

Some operators support expanding their protective powers, while others argue that the use of force should remain the responsibility of the state.

Finland’s national electricity transmission operator, Fingrid, has expressed reservations about transferring such authority to energy companies.

The position reflects a wider concern that infrastructure operators should concentrate on maintaining essential services rather than assuming responsibilities for armed or coercive security operations.

A growing European security market

The regulatory debate is developing alongside a rapidly expanding market for counter-drone technology.

Manufacturers are offering equipment that integrates radar, optical sensors, electronic detection and software capable of classifying possible threats.

Interceptor drones and electronic countermeasures are increasingly being designed for use around civilian infrastructure rather than exclusively on military installations.

German defence company Rheinmetall has reported growing interest from private infrastructure operators in counter-drone protection.

However, the technology is advancing faster than the legal frameworks governing its use.

The immediate challenge for European governments is to establish protective arrangements that allow rapid intervention while preserving clear accountability.

A counter-drone system can identify an approaching aircraft within seconds. Determining who is authorised to stop it remains a matter for national law.

Soccer fans have labeled reporters 'worms' and 'traitors' for covering antisemitic march ahead of game; banner posted on social media depicts journalists hanging from a tree

Latvia has called for a European Union-wide ban on tourist visas for Russian citizens, reopening a dispute between member states over border security, freedom of movement and the treatment of Russian nationals during Moscow’s continuing war against Ukraine.

Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs is pressing Brussels and other European capitals to adopt a common approach, arguing that continued visa issuance by some Schengen countries weakens restrictions imposed by states bordering Russia.

His intervention comes amid growing concerns over suspected Russian sabotage, espionage and other hostile activities across Europe. The Latvian government regards restrictions on non-essential travel as an additional measure to reduce potential security risks.

According to details of the Latvian proposal, Kulbergs has criticised the continued issuance of tourist visas by countries including France, Italy and Spain, maintaining that the consequences extend beyond the states granting entry.

The proposal would go considerably further than the restrictions already introduced by the EU since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

A divided European visa policy

The European Union suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia in September 2022, ending the preferential conditions previously available to Russian applicants.

The Council’s original decision introduced more demanding documentation requirements, higher application fees and stricter scrutiny, but it did not prohibit Russian citizens from obtaining short-stay visas.

National authorities therefore retained considerable discretion when assessing applications, subject to common Schengen rules.

In November 2025, the Commission introduced additional restrictions on multiple-entry visas, requiring Russian travellers covered by the new rules to apply again for subsequent visits.

The EU has also agreed a legal basis for restrictions targeting Russian military personnel and former combatants involved in the invasion of Ukraine, although implementation requires further measures.

Latvia argues that these steps remain insufficient because ordinary tourist visas continue to be available through some European consulates.

Once admitted to the Schengen area, a visitor can generally travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. This creates difficulties for governments seeking to enforce stricter national entry policies.

Security concerns on the eastern border

Latvia shares borders with Russia and Belarus and has repeatedly warned that Moscow’s activities present risks extending beyond conventional military threats.

European governments have investigated incidents involving suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence gathering and interference with transport infrastructure.

Such concerns have intensified following drone incursions and security alerts affecting NATO’s eastern members.

These concerns were also evident in EU Today’s reporting on suspected security breaches in Europe, although the circumstances of individual incidents must be investigated rather than assumed to involve foreign intelligence services.

The distinction is relevant to the Latvian proposal. European intelligence agencies have identified Russian-linked activities, but this does not establish that ordinary Russian tourists are collectively involved in intelligence operations.

Supporters of tighter visa restrictions argue that limiting discretionary entry could reduce opportunities for hostile activity and simplify security screening.

Opponents question whether a nationality-based prohibition would be proportionate or effective, particularly when intelligence operations may involve individuals travelling under other nationalities or using established residency arrangements.

Political and legal complications

A comprehensive tourist visa ban would require agreement on its precise scope, legal basis and implementation.

European governments would need to determine how the restrictions apply to Russian citizens with family members in the EU, people travelling for humanitarian purposes and individuals seeking protection from the Russian authorities.

The EU Visa Code already permits refusals where applicants present security risks, but a general prohibition based on nationality would involve a different policy decision.

Humanitarian exceptions would be particularly important for Russian dissidents, independent journalists and other individuals facing political persecution.

France has supported restrictions on entry by Russian combatants, while other member states are considering further measures. That does not necessarily mean they support Latvia’s broader proposal covering ordinary tourists.

Kulbergs is also seeking greater European financial assistance for countries facing the economic and security consequences of their proximity to Russia and Belarus.

Sanctions and Schengen controls

The renewed visa debate coincides with disagreements between Washington and Brussels over economic restrictions on Moscow.

EU leaders have maintained that sanctions should remain in place until Russia ends its aggression against Ukraine. Visa policy, however, requires separate legal and political consideration from economic sanctions.

Latvia’s proposal has not been adopted as an EU-wide rule. The immediate question is whether enough member states are prepared to move from tighter individual screening towards a general restriction on Russian leisure travel.

Until that agreement is reached, European countries will continue to apply different policies within a shared Schengen system, leaving the security concerns raised by Riga unresolved.

An apparent vehicle breach at Leipzig/Halle Airport has renewed questions about infrastructure protection. After an earlier drone incident blamed on Russia, Germany faces the challenge of responding firmly while allowing evidence to determine responsibility.

A damaged airport fence would ordinarily be a local policing story. At Leipzig/Halle, it carries a heavier significance. Following an attempted drone attack earlier this year, another security incident inevitably raises questions about whether Germany can adequately protect infrastructure operating in an increasingly hostile environment.

Yet the central distinction remains essential: an apparent perimeter breach is under investigation. Its cause, purpose and perpetrators have not been established. The implications deserve scrutiny; suggestions of another foreign operation remain speculation.

Police said damage was discovered shortly before 11pm on Saturday, October 17th. The northern runway was closed while federal and state officers searched the grounds. In a Sunday morning update, investigators said a vehicle had most probably broken through the fence. Initial searches found neither unauthorised people nor suspicious objects, with further searches planned.

Those findings provide reassurance without resolving the incident. Investigators still need to establish how the damage occurred, whether anyone entered restricted areas and whether the apparent breach was deliberate. Until those questions are answered, describing it as sabotage would run ahead of the evidence.

The operational picture also requires proportion. Although the northern runway remained closed, airport spokesman Uwe Schuhart said on Sunday morning that passenger and freight flights were continuing without restrictions because the second runway remained available. This was a significant security response, but not an airport-wide shutdown.

That distinction matters politically. Public confidence depends on authorities explaining both the seriousness of a suspected intrusion and the effectiveness of arrangements that keep essential services functioning.

Leipzig’s recent history nevertheless makes heightened vigilance understandable. Reuters recalled that investigators discovered an explosive-laden drone near a runway in August. German officials subsequently attributed responsibility to Russia, which denied the allegations. No connection between that episode and the latest fence damage has been established.

The earlier incident changes the context in which airport authorities must make decisions. Once a location has faced a potentially lethal threat, uncertainty becomes more expensive. An unexplained opening in a perimeter cannot be treated casually simply because the first search produces nothing suspicious.

This creates an uncomfortable imbalance. Damage that takes little time to inflict can require extensive searches, specialist personnel and precautionary closures. Whether caused by criminality, recklessness or hostile intent, a breach can impose costs far beyond the price of repairing a fence.

The wider German security debate gives those concerns additional weight. On October 12, Reuters reported warnings from Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt about a “shadow war”. Domestic intelligence chief Sinan Selen described Russian activities encompassing disinformation, sabotage and assassination preparations, and said he expected further incidents resembling the earlier Leipzig drone episode.

Those warnings justify preparedness. They do not establish who damaged this fence. Conflating the two would weaken public understanding and risk turning every unexplained incident into an assumed act of geopolitical aggression.

For policymakers, the practical questions are more useful than premature attribution. How quickly was the damage detected? Could security personnel reconstruct movements around the affected area? Were protective measures proportionate to the risks? And what improvements, if any, would reduce the interval between a breach and a reliable assessment?

The airport’s continued operation offers one encouraging lesson: resilience includes maintaining service while investigating danger. A second runway provided operational flexibility. Similar thinking should guide investment across critical infrastructure, where preventing every disruption may be impossible but limiting its consequences remains achievable.

There is also a clear accountability test. Once investigators establish what happened, authorities should explain the findings and any resulting changes without revealing details that would assist future intruders. An accident, an ordinary crime and a hostile operation would demand different responses.

For now, Leipzig presents a warning about vulnerability rather than proof of another attack. Germany needs the capacity to investigate rapidly, protect exposed facilities and sustain normal life under pressure. Its credibility will depend on demonstrating those capabilities—and maintaining the discipline to distinguish justified suspicion from established fact.

Main Image: WikiABG

Explosive Drone Discovery at German Airport Exposes Europe’s Growing Hybrid Security Challenge

Poland has launched a nationwide security operation after three knife attacks at educational institutions left one woman dead and more than a dozen people injured. Police have detained 117 people amid a wave of online threats, while intelligence officials are examining whether Russian disinformation networks exploited the violence to spread panic.

Poland is confronting an unprecedented school security crisis after a succession of violent attacks by young people triggered widespread fear, school closures and a nationwide police mobilisation. By Sunday, 11 October, officers had detained 117 people and conducted nearly 64,000 security checks at educational establishments, as the authorities attempted to contain both genuine threats and an escalating campaign of intimidation on social media.

The crisis reached its height on Friday, 9 October, when warnings circulated about a supposed nationwide killing campaign known as “Bloody Friday”. Videos, threatening messages and lists of potential targets spread through TikTok, messaging platforms and school discussion groups, prompting parents to keep children at home and several local authorities to suspend classroom teaching.

Although police have found no evidence of an organised nationwide conspiracy, the violence that preceded the rumours was real. Three separate attacks took place between 7 and 10 October, while investigators are examining hundreds of other incidents involving threats or suspected criminal activity.

Two attacks that triggered nationwide panic

The first major incident occurred on Wednesday, 7 October, at a vocational school in Ostrołęka, north-east of Warsaw. A 19-year-old student armed with a machete attacked pupils, teachers and other people in and around the building, injuring nine victims before harming himself.

Investigators subsequently discovered a homemade explosive device inside his backpack. The suspect was arrested, and prosecutors brought nine charges against him, including attempted murder. The discovery of explosives raised further questions about the extent of his preparations and the possibility of a substantially higher death toll.

The following day, a 15-year-old former pupil entered a primary school in Leszczydół-Nowiny, near Wyszków, and attacked three members of staff with a knife. A 37-year-old caretaker died from her injuries, while two teachers, including the headteacher, were wounded.

According to investigators, the teenager wore a helmet-mounted camera, raising suspicions that he intended to record the assault. The official prosecution statement confirmed the victim’s death and the detention of the suspect.

The attacks were followed by threatening messages from other teenagers, including a video attributed to a 17-year-old in the Przasnysz district who claimed to be participating in a competition involving killings. Police subsequently detained him. In Sierpc, another 17-year-old was arrested after allegedly discussing plans for violence at school; officers discovered two knives.

Thousands of schools under police surveillance

The rumours produced an immediate reaction. Schools in Wyszków, Ciechanów, Pułtusk and other municipalities cancelled classroom teaching or introduced remote lessons. Elsewhere, parents independently withdrew their children, leaving some classrooms largely empty.

Police launched an extensive preventive operation, deploying additional officers around schools and investigating online threats.

According to the figures released on 11 October, the authorities had recorded 275 incidents requiring investigation, detained 117 people and carried out nearly 64,000 checks at schools, nurseries and other educational facilities.

The situation deteriorated further on Saturday, 10 October, when a 21-year-old student attacked three people at a post-secondary educational institution in Warsaw. Two 17-year-old girls and a 24-year-old woman were injured. One victim required hospital treatment, although none of the injuries was considered life-threatening.

Interior Minister Marcin Kierwiński subsequently stated that investigators had established no links between the recent attacks. The authorities nevertheless remain concerned about imitation offences, particularly where threatening material circulates among teenagers through closed online communities.

Russia’s possible role in spreading panic

The events have also raised questions about whether hostile foreign actors deliberately amplified the crisis. Tomasz Siemoniak, Poland’s minister responsible for coordinating the intelligence services, warned that Russian organisations routinely exploit domestic emergencies to spread disinformation and undermine confidence in public institutions.

In his statement on 9 October, Siemoniak acknowledged the possibility of foreign involvement but stressed the need for evidence before assigning responsibility.

There is, at present, no publicly established evidence that Moscow organised the school attacks or directed the subsequent threats. Nevertheless, the rapid circulation of alarming videos, fabricated warnings and unverified target lists illustrates how genuine violent incidents can be exploited to disrupt everyday life without further physical attacks.

The episode also presents a challenge for European regulators. Poland is examining measures against dangerous online content, while its existing obligations under the EU Digital Services Act provide a framework for addressing systemic risks associated with major platforms.

For Donald Tusk’s government, the immediate priority is preventing further attacks as schools reopen under heightened security. The longer-term challenge concerns the interaction between online radicalisation, copycat violence and disinformation capable of transforming isolated crimes into a national emergency.

The European Commission is preparing proposals to impose tighter visa restrictions on Russian citizens entering the Schengen area, with new measures expected to be presented in January 2027 following pressure from several member states concerned about Russia’s expanding hybrid operations across Europe.

Poland, Sweden and Estonia are among the countries demanding a tougher approach to Russian visitors, particularly former military personnel who fought in Ukraine. The proposals could affect hundreds of thousands of Russian nationals who continue to receive visas for travel to the European Union despite restrictions introduced following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

According to a report published on Sunday, EU officials are finalising plans to address vulnerabilities in the Schengen visa system, which governments increasingly regard as a potential entry point for individuals involved in intelligence operations, organised crime and acts of sabotage.

Swedish Justice Minister Gunnar Strömmer said the Commission was working towards a January announcement, although Stockholm would prefer an earlier decision. He told Politico that vulnerabilities in the existing arrangements could be exploited by hostile actors.

The initiative is expected to feature in discussions surrounding the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 12 October, when ministers will examine Russia’s intensifying hybrid campaign against EU member states.

Schengen visas remain a security concern

Despite the deterioration in relations between Brussels and Moscow, Russian citizens continue to receive substantial numbers of Schengen visas. Approximately 478,000 tourist visas were reportedly issued to Russian nationals in 2025, including a significant proportion allowing multiple entries.

The figures have renewed questions about whether existing screening arrangements adequately reflect the security environment created by Russia’s war against Ukraine.

In September 2022, the EU suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia, ending preferential treatment and introducing stricter application procedures, additional documentation requirements and more restrictive conditions for multiple-entry visas.

However, the decision did not amount to a general prohibition on Russian tourism. National authorities retained considerable discretion over applications, producing differences in how individual Schengen countries handle Russian visitors.

The Commission’s existing visa guidelines also preserve access for certain categories of travellers, including journalists, political dissidents, civil society representatives and people travelling for essential family reasons.

The new initiative would therefore concern not only the number of visas issued but also the extent to which national screening decisions can affect the security of other Schengen countries. Under the Schengen system, a visa issued by one participating state generally permits its holder to travel throughout the area.

Estonia calls for restrictions on former Russian soldiers

Estonia has taken a particularly forceful position, proposing an EU-wide entry ban targeting former members of the Russian armed forces who participated in the invasion of Ukraine. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna estimates that approximately 650,000 former Russian combatants could fall within the category of individuals requiring closer scrutiny.

Tallinn has advocated individual entry restrictions rather than relying exclusively on broader measures covering Russian nationals generally. Tsahkna warned that former soldiers, particularly those with combat experience and connections to Russian intelligence services, could present a serious security challenge if they entered European countries.

He suggested that Moscow could exploit former combatants to penetrate organised criminal networks or facilitate violent operations against European targets. These assessments remain security warnings rather than evidence that Russian veterans as a group are involved in such activities.

A coordinated European policy would also seek to prevent individuals refused entry by one member state from exploiting differences in national visa procedures elsewhere.

Restrictions on Russian diplomats also under consideration

The visa proposals form part of a wider effort to restrict the activities of Russian nationals whose presence in Europe may present security risks. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has previously indicated that member states are considering tighter controls on the movement of Russian diplomats within Schengen, alongside restrictions on visas for former combatants and a reduction in Russian tourism.

One proposal would prevent Russian diplomatic personnel from travelling beyond the member state in which they are accredited. Such restrictions would complicate cross-border activities by diplomatic officials suspected of conducting intelligence operations under official cover.

The issue has acquired greater urgency as European governments report an expanding pattern of Russian-linked sabotage, including suspected arson attacks, cyber operations and attempts to disrupt critical infrastructure.

Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner acknowledged that the initial decline in visa issuance to Russian nationals had levelled off. He urged member states to reduce the number of visas granted and to strengthen scrutiny of applicants.

January proposals will test EU consensus

The immediate question is whether member states can agree on common restrictions that go beyond the existing visa framework. An outright prohibition on Russian tourism would represent a significant departure from the current approach, under which national governments retain responsibility for individual visa decisions.

More narrowly targeted measures against former combatants could prove easier to justify on security grounds, although identifying eligible individuals would require reliable information and cooperation between national authorities. The Commission has yet to publish its proposals, and the precise legal instruments under consideration remain unclear.

Foreign ministers meeting on Monday will discuss Russia’s hybrid campaign and possible European responses. The Council’s published agenda places the issue in the context of Moscow’s continuing aggression against Ukraine.

Whether the Commission ultimately proposes new binding restrictions or stronger common guidelines, the central difficulty remains the same: a Schengen system built around common freedom of movement must accommodate increasingly different national assessments of the security risks associated with travel from Russia.

Three armed men accompanying at least 20 migrants from Belarus threatened Latvian soldiers and attempted to force the group across the frontier, according to Latvia’s National Armed Forces.

Hours later, masked intruders crossed into Latvia, damaged an electrical distribution unit and stole surveillance cameras before retreating into Belarus.

Latvia has reported an unusually aggressive incident on its border with Belarus in which armed, masked men threatened Latvian troops during an attempted migrant crossing, followed several hours later by an incursion targeting surveillance infrastructure.

The confrontation began on Monday evening when at least 20 people approached the Latvian border from Belarus accompanied by three masked men. Latvia’s National Armed Forces said the escorts were armed, issued threats to Latvian soldiers and actively drove the migrants towards the frontier. Latvian troops prevented the group from entering the country.

Several hours later, masked individuals crossed from Belarus into Latvian territory and targeted equipment used to monitor the border. Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava said they damaged an electrical distribution cabinet and removed surveillance cameras before returning across the frontier ahead of the arrival of a Latvian border-guard unit. Latvian authorities have not publicly identified the intruders or established whether all of those involved in the second incident were the same men who had earlier accompanied the migrants.

Dombrava described the events as markedly more aggressive than previous episodes on the frontier. He warned that Belarus should understand that incidents of this kind could have “more serious consequences” for the country.

The episode comes amid sustained pressure on Latvia’s 172km border with Belarus. According to the Latvian State Border Guard’s latest figures, 21 people were prevented from crossing illegally from Belarus on Tuesday, taking the total number stopped at that frontier since the beginning of 2026 to 11,946.

Latvia has for several years treated irregular migration from Belarus not simply as an immigration issue but as a security operation. Riga accuses the Belarusian authorities of deliberately facilitating migrant movements towards the EU border as a means of exerting political pressure.

In January, the Latvian National Armed Forces published what it described as evidence of Belarusian state involvement in organising illegal crossings. The military said documented cases included migrants being transported in Belarusian military vehicles and Belarusian officials participating in operations to direct people towards Latvia. That earlier material does not, however, establish the identities or affiliation of those involved in this week’s armed confrontation.

Pressure on the frontier intensified during the summer. In July, Latvian soldiers used tear gas and fired a warning shot when a group attempting to enter from Belarus refused orders to withdraw and, according to Latvian authorities, threw logs towards security personnel.

The methods used to circumvent the fortified border have also become more elaborate. In August, border guards found Latvia’s first known tunnel used for an illegal crossing from Belarus after intercepting 15 people near Skrudaliena. A second tunnel was discovered nine days later near Krāslava after another 28 people crossed the frontier. The State Border Guard said both incidents formed part of the continuing pressure on Latvia’s eastern border.

Riga responded in August by launching Operation VILKATIS, bringing together border guards, police and the armed forces under a co-ordinated security operation. Surveillance drones and other military capabilities have been deployed to reinforce monitoring of the frontier.

On Tuesday, the same day Latvian authorities disclosed the latest confrontation, the government extended Operation VILKATIS until 31 December. The Cabinet described the instrumentalisation of migration by Belarus as a hybrid threat and said additional resources would continue to be used along the eastern border.

The involvement of armed escorts changes the immediate security calculation for Latvian personnel. Previous incidents have largely centred on migrants, smugglers and attempts to bypass physical barriers. This week’s episode included direct threats against serving soldiers, followed by an unauthorised crossing and deliberate interference with border-monitoring equipment.

Latvia has not publicly attributed the operation to a particular Belarusian military, security or border agency. The account released by Riga therefore establishes an armed incident originating from Belarusian territory, but not yet who ordered or organised it. For Latvia, however, it adds another element to a border that is already being managed as part of the country’s wider response to hybrid threats on NATO and the EU’s eastern flank.

Main Image: By Saeima – https://www.flickr.com/photos/saeima/53117747287/, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=136391897

Two Iranian nationals have been charged with terrorism offences over an alleged plot targeting the Jewish community in Manchester, with investigators accusing them of researching potential targets and obtaining instructions and materials for an improvised explosive device.

Rahman Salehi, of Salford, and Salam Ahmadyan, 36, of Liverpool, were charged on Friday, 2 October, with engaging in conduct in preparation for terrorist acts, contrary to Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006.

According to the Metropolitan Police announcement detailing the charges, both men are Iranian nationals and were arrested in Manchester on Sunday, 20 September.

They have been remanded in custody and are due to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Saturday, 3 October.

The arrests followed what police described as a long-running counter-terrorism investigation into a suspected plot directed against the Jewish community in the Manchester area.

Police allege that the two men were communicating with a third person overseas who may have been in Iran. No allegation has been made in the charges released so far that the Iranian government directed the suspected plot.

The particulars published by Counter Terrorism Policing allege that Salehi and Ahmadyan used encrypted communications and obtained material containing instructions for manufacturing an explosive device.

Investigators say the men acquired instructions relating to a device using powdered chlorine and vehicle brake fluid, along with video material concerning the manufacture or assembly of an improvised explosive device.

They are further accused of acquiring liquids, components and equipment, researching potential targets, obtaining images, maps and plans, and carrying out reconnaissance at locations considered as possible targets.

The Crown Prosecution Service confirmed that prosecutors had authorised charges after reviewing evidence gathered during the investigation.

Frank Ferguson, Chief Crown Prosecutor for the CPS Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division, said prosecutors had concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the case to be put before a court.

The CPS stressed that the proceedings are now active and that both men have the right to a fair trial. The charges are allegations and no finding of guilt has been made.

Arrests during Jewish High Holy Days

The arrests took place shortly before Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, and came amid heightened security surrounding Jewish institutions in Britain.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Vicki Evans, Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, said the investigation had disrupted what police believed to be a plot targeting Manchester’s Jewish community.

The timing is particularly sensitive because it comes one year after the terrorist attack at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025.

Two worshippers were killed in that attack, which took place on Yom Kippur. EU Today reported at the time on the Manchester synagogue attack and the security concerns facing Britain’s Jewish population.

The latest case also comes against the background of a series of alleged Iranian-linked threats and attacks involving Jewish and Israeli targets in Britain.

British security agencies have repeatedly warned about Iranian activity on UK territory. The government said earlier this year that more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots had been tracked by British security agencies over the preceding year.

Concerns intensified following attacks on Jewish-linked premises during 2026. In July, the government imposed sanctions on an Iran-linked organisation that had claimed responsibility for attacks on Jewish and Israeli-linked locations.

The group, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, was subsequently designated under Britain’s new state-threat legislation alongside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

EU Today has previously examined Iran-linked security threats in Britain following counter-terrorism arrests involving Iranian nationals, as well as alleged Iranian-linked plots targeting Jewish institutions elsewhere in Europe and North America.

Britain expands protection for Jewish communities

The Manchester case comes as the British government increases security around synagogues, Jewish schools and community centres.

In July, ministers announced more than £250 million in additional funding over three years to strengthen protection for Jewish communities.

The package includes funding for more than 500 additional police officers across England and Wales, including around 80 officers in Greater Manchester, as well as additional resources for Counter Terrorism Policing.

The UK’s national terrorism threat level was raised to severe in April, meaning that an attack is considered highly likely. The government said the decision reflected both an increased threat from Islamist and extreme-right terrorism and a wider background of state-linked physical threats against the Jewish community.

EU Today has also reported on the government’s £250 million programme to strengthen Jewish community security and the broader increase in antisemitic incidents and violence affecting Jewish communities across Britain.

The allegations against Salehi and Ahmadyan will now be considered by the courts. Prosecutors have warned against publishing material that could prejudice the proceedings.

Several bomb threats by anonymous callers targeting diplomatic missions and commerce buildings in central Athens triggered a major police response Friday morning. Authorities have been carrying out security checks at four locations, including the French Consulate, the Egyptian Embassy and two business organizations. According to Greek Police, unknown callers contacted the French Consulate and the […]

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