Iran “targeted two US vessels and eight oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, inflicting heavy damages to them,” the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said in a statement issued on Wednesday, September 9.
The IRGC claimed the attacks were carried out in retaliation to US attacks on five of its oil tankers in the Persian Gulf hours before.
On Tuesday, the US Central Command had claimed that it destroyed five Iranian oil tankers after Iran “targeted a US Navy warship with ballistic missiles twice over the past two days.” It also claimed that the Iranian attacks had failed to cause any harm to the warship or US personnel.
The IRGC claimed that 10 ships trying to cross the Strait of Hormuz through the “unauthorized” US-sponsored route near Oman were also attacked for violating its restrictions on navigation through the region.
“The Strait of Hormuz remains firmly under the surveillance and management of the capable and valiant IRGC navy,” the statement underlined, refuting the claims made by President Donald Trump earlier about the US Navy having full control over the crucial waterway that has been at the core of the latest rounds of the war.
Iran also carried out “large-scale” missile attacks on the US military base at Al-Azraq in Jordan on Tuesday night, targeting maintenance and deployment centers of F-35s, F-16s, and other fighter jets.
The Iranian Navy announced on Tuesday that it captured an advanced unmanned US Navy submersible or submarine at the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz.
The latest round of escalation in the six-month-long war on Iran is attributed to the failure of the US to force Iran to lift its blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. In violation of the terms of the peace deal signed in June, the US first bombed Iran various times and then shifted to economic warfare late last month. This is the second round of military escalation, which began earlier this month.
On Tuesday, both sides warned against further attacks, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio threatening that Iran will lose more oil tankers if it continues its attacks on US naval ships in the region.
Chief of Staff of Iran’s armed forces Ali Abdollahi replied with his own set of threats, claiming if the US strikes Iranian oil tankers it will face retaliation against most of its military bases in the region.
US imposes fresh unilateral sanctions
On Tuesday, the US Department of the Treasury imposed fresh sanctions on Iran’s aviation sector as part of the so-called “operation economic outcast,” which is an attempt to economically isolate the country.
It targeted over two dozen airlines, both private and commercial, including Mahan Air Cargo Services, for their alleged role in the “regime’s destabilizing activities, in procurement and transfer of weapons and ferrying the personnel.”
The sanctions aim to stop the supply of new aircrafts and spare parts for the existing ones, as well as halting the support of general sales agents to the identified entities by “any foreign firm and individual,” threatening them “with serious consequences” for any violations.
Last month, the US announced that it was launching an operation to economically isolate Iran, asking all the countries in the world to sever any kind of existing economic or trade relation with it, threatening them with US sanctions otherwise.
Most of the countries have not actively responded to Washington’s demand, except the UAE, which decided to suspend all its economic ties with Iran after US Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent announced the policy.
The economic isolation was announced as a superior strategy for dealing with Iran after months of military actions failed to force Iran to lift its blockade on the Strait of Hormuz.
UK joins the US economic war against Iran
The UK, a close US ally, announced its own fresh economic measures against Iran on Tuesday. The “sanctions” targeted UK supplies to crucial economic sectors in Iran, such as energy, mining, software, shipping, insurance, and banking, among others.
Iran sharply reacted to the UK’s unilateral move, calling it illegal and contrary to the shared interests of the two nations. It warned that “London’s alignment with the US policy of economic terrorism would further heighten the wall of mistrust between the two nations,” IRNA reported.
Reacting to the new set of sanctions against his country, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi questioned its “novelty,” claiming it was a sign of the Trump administration’s failures to achieve any of its goals in Iran.
“After 47 years of sanctions, the US went to war with Iran on behalf of Israel. The fallout has been disastrous for America, including its standing worldwide. After failing to achieve its aims through sanctions or war, Washington’s “novel” solution is…more sanctions. Seriously?” Araghchi wrote in his post on X on Tuesday.
BEIJING, CHINA - AUGUST 19, 2026 - A humanoid robot plays table tennis with an audience at the 2026 World Robot Conference in Beijing, China on August 19, 2026. | picture alliance / CFOTO | CFOTO
For much of the 20th century, the US represented not just a place on the map. It was also a point in time. When Western Europeans looked at images of America after the second world war—depictions of Hollywood’s glamour, American cars and newfangled labour-saving devices—they thought they were looking into the future.
The American Dream had an especially irresistible draw for Eastern Europeans behind the Iron Curtain, and for tens of millions of Chinese during the opening and reform era that began after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976. China’s great economic reinvention was inspired, in part, by Deng Xiaoping’s awe at American modernity, which he witnessed firsthand during an official visit in 1979.
But fast-forward to 2026, and the positions have been reversed. For most people in most countries, the future can now be seen in China. Just as Hollywood once showed the world what modern life looked like, China is showing African, Latin American and even American young people what an economy built on green energy, mobile payments and other services, and advanced robotics looks like. For Cobus van Staden of the China-Global South Project, the West is “increasingly being framed as backward-looking [and] associated with the past”, a phenomenon presumably accelerated by Trumpism, with its rejection of renewable energy, diversity and its social conservatism.
In the global south, young people aren’t just imitating Chinese practices like drinking hot water or trying out tai chi. They are watching as China reshapes their daily experiences
In many parts of the West, disillusionment has given rise to Chinamaxxing on social media, with American and European influencers performatively embracing Chinese mannerisms and aesthetics. And in the global south, young people aren’t just imitating Chinese practices like drinking hot water or trying out tai chi. They are watching as China reshapes their daily experiences.
This signals a genuine historical rupture. For generations, most countries defined themselves in relation to the West. Some sought (or were convinced) to emulate Western development models like the Washington Consensus, and many were keen to acquire Western technology and aid, or simply to get the West’s approval. Other countries did push back against the West’s influence and attack Western hypocrisy, but their counter-models were themselves defined by opposition to the West.
Either way, West-centrism was the prism through which geopolitics was conducted and interpreted. When countries in the Sahel invited Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries to help them deal with insurgencies, it was seen as a reaction against France and its traditional role in the region. When Angola invited Sinopec to exploit its oil fields, it was seen as a snub to Portugal and Britain. And then there are the many challenges to US hegemony in the Middle East, Latin America and South-East Asia. Around the world, memories of bloody Western interventions or financial crises still linger.
Yet younger generations around the world are not even pro- or anti-Western so much as they are post-Western. For them, China, not the US, is at the centre of their conceptual universe and envisaged future.
What happened? One of the big differences between countries in the global south and the global north is their demographic profile. In the US and Europe, the median age is 40–50, compared to 19 in Nigeria, and 29 in South Africa, India and Lebanon. That means some 70% of Nigerians aren’t even old enough to have registered the 2003 US invasion of Iraq or the 2008 global financial crisis. As Cobus points out, young West Africans “never knew anything more than the US as we know it now”. The era of Donald Trump encompasses their entire political memory, and they presumably are not very impressed.
This shift in perceptions is not just an African story, of course. In Vietnam, which has long had a fraught relationship with China, young people are becoming less reflexively Sinophobic than their elders. Chelsea Nguyen, a researcher at the London School of Economics, credits the covid-19 pandemic for catalysing this change. The West’s perceived mishandling of the pandemic undermined its status as a model worthy of emulation. Many Vietnamese turned to exploring their own history and that of their Asian neighbours, including China. As in much of Africa, growing exposure to China’s rapid technological progress and Chinese consumer goods transformed the country’s global brand.
Meanwhile, Loubna El Amine, a China scholar at King’s College London, notes that in regions riven by instability—such as the Middle East, where the US itself is a big part of the problem— “a lot of the attraction of China is its absence rather than presence”. The latest Arab Opinion Index bears this out, showing that 77% of respondents view US policies as a threat to the region’s security and stability, compared with just 25% for China—and that was well before Trump launched his catastrophic war against Iran. And, of course, China carries none of the colonial baggage that complicates European interventions (or even peacebuilding efforts) in the region.
Still, China has been known to be aggressive in pursuing its economic agenda in the developing world, whether through predatory loans, acquiring critical national infrastructure or deliberately exporting its domestic overcapacity. Such behaviour ruffles feathers as much in Thailand, Mexico and Nigeria as it does in the US and Europe. Moreover, young people’s widespread distrust of their governments can easily bleed into unhappiness with China when political leaders are seen to be giving it undue privileges.
Since the pivot to China as an exemplar of modernity is in many ways pragmatic and non-ideological, its hold on the popular imagination is still tenuous. Lots of leaders in the West want to compete with China for “soft power”. But the key is not to counter Chinese “propaganda” or improve Western PR. The winners in the battle for hearts and minds will be those who offer real solutions to people’s problems and create more opportunities for prosperity than are currently available.
This article was first published by Project Syndicate on August 18th 2026
The natural disaster that struck Nepal last month is the outcome of the West’s high-handed climate exploitation policies. On August 26, the collapse of a massive glacier and the bedrock of the surrounding area near Mount Langtang Lirung along the Nepal-Tibet border triggered a violent surge of water, ice, and debris, which rushed down the […]
The multipolar world has closely watched the importance of SCO’s 26th meeting of the Council of Heads of State, as it marked the “25 Years of the SCO: Together for Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity.” Introduction From 31 August to 1 September, 2026, the 26th meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the […]
On September 1, the leaders of some of Eurasia’s most consequential states gathered in Bishkek for the 26th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Council of Heads of State. The Summit That Did Not Need Europe The summit marked the SCO’s 25th anniversary. Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Narendra Modi, Masoud Pezeshkian, Shehbaz Sharif, Aleksandr Lukashenko, […]
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and participated in the SCO summit in Bishkek. Relations between India and the countries of Central Asia have longstanding and deep historical roots, having gone through various periods of development. However, in recent decades, they have been on a clear upward trajectory, despite a number of […]
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan is set to sign long-delayed agreements with five oil refineries, unlocking more than $6 billion in planned upgrades to modernize aging plants and cut reliance on fuel imports, officials said. But industry warnings that changes to the financial framework could derail the projects overshadowed the announcement. The agreements with Pak-Arab Refinery Ltd., Pakistan ... Read more
THE HAGUE: The Permanent Court of Arbitration has ordered India to uphold the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan and suspend work on its hydroelectric projects, a major legal victory for Islamabad in the dispute over the agreement. The Hague-based tribunal issued the award on the status of the treaty and interim measures concerning India’s Ratle ... Read more
C’è un passaggio dell‘intervista concessa dal vescovo di Kharkiv-Zaporizhzhia Pavlo Honcharuk a Tempi a margine di una conferenza al Meeting, che, a mio giudizio, merita molta più attenzione di quella ...
L’architettura geopolitica globale sta subendo una trasformazione in cui le alleanze tradizionali lasciano il posto a intese transazionali e strategie di sopravvivenza. Analizzando le dinamiche tra Washington, Mosca, Pyongyang, Seul ...
The increasing intensity of heatwaves is generally attributed to climate change as a result of the global reliance on fossil fuels. While cutting carbon emissions remains the focus of EU climate policy, European governments also need to ensure that their societies can better adapt to extreme weather. Many households have already taken matters into their own hands by turning to portable air conditioners—often Chinese-made—for relief.
And China’s air-conditioner export boom points to a broader challenge: whether confronting extreme weather or fragile economic dependencies, Europeans need to adapt to the consequences while also addressing underlying sources of vulnerability. They should not just accept the status quo; here, some answers may lie in the lessons of China’s own industrial transformation.
China leads on AC
Once again, when Europe looks for a climate solution, China has one ready to ship. China is a powerhouse in technologies used to mitigate climate change, from solar panels to wind turbines; it is also a vital player in helping Europe adapt to warmer temperatures. China produces over 80% of the world’s air conditioners: exports of Chinese AC units to the EU rose by 43% year on year in the first half of 2026. Chinese brands now account for 41% of the European market, up from 27% in 2023.
This success is not only about price and scale. Chinese manufacturers have adapted their products for the European market: for example, Midea’s PortaSplit model is tailored to overcome cumbersome building regulations and high installation costs. Chinese manufacturers were also early adopters of refrigerants less harmful to the climate, ensuring their products meet Europe’s strict environmental rules.
But this is not all. Chinese commentators say that Europe should not only adapt to the hotter climate—it should adapt to the patterns of EU-China trade. They portray the EU’s de-risking and trade-defence measures to tackle economic imbalance with China as economically self-defeating, arguing that Europe lacks confidence in its own industries. European policymakers, they say, are approaching trade as a game of “cold statistics” that will ultimately hurt ordinary consumers.
This is a fatalistic prescription for industrial policy from a country that refuses to accept that its position in global supply chains or its existing competitive advantage is fixed. For decades, Beijing has made industrial upgrading a central policy objective that has reoriented global trade patterns. Europeans are experiencing this firsthand in the AC boom, where China’s position reflects decades of deliberate industrial upgrading. And now Beijing is advising Europe to be content with trade patterns as they stand: strange advice, given that this would not pass the political sniff test in Zhongnanhai.
Since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders have not simply passively adapted to their inherited competitive advantages. Neither do they treat the existing global division of labour as an efficient market outcome to be preserved. This is especially the case when such patterns risk constraining China from developing the sectors it considers strategically important—robotics, clean technology or aviation, for example.
These policies helped Chinese firms “import, digest and absorb” foreign know-how, build scale, and create globally competitive and innovative companies across supply chains. But while the European debate on competitiveness centres on many of the same concepts, European politicians, industries and member states are divided over future industrial policy. One prevailing idea is that Europe should pull a “reverse Deng” by ushering in a new era of industrial policy capable of matching the scale of support and protection that China extended to its domestic industries during the 1990s and 2000s.
Europeans should preserve their ability to source and scale critical technologies through viable alternatives, ensuring they have options should conditions change
But Europe should be cautious in trying to beat China at its own game. It has no centralised state to direct capital and help companies navigate commercial losses in pursuit of their goals. The main lessons from China’s industrial policy lie in the assumptions behind it: Europeans should minimise dependencies that could be strategically constraining; industrial competitiveness is not only about efficient production; Europeans should preserve their ability to source and scale critical technologies through viable alternatives, ensuring they have options should conditions change.
This logic is becoming more relevant as climate shocks intensify and geopolitics grows more volatile.
What Europeans should do
Europeans need to consider what such options would look like in practice. To borrow the question posed by Chinese commentators: what could Europe do right now without Chinese air conditioners?
Cooling is becoming essential infrastructure. Much like heating and water, Europe will need a broader portfolio of solutions to meet demand. AC is part of the answer, alongside low-energy and passive-cooling technologies such as evaporative cooling, reflective roofs and building retrofits, and stronger building standards. But Europe does not need to develop every solution itself; it could build a network of alternative suppliers and production capabilities.
For example, Singapore and the Gulf states are confronting many similar challenges and could be potential partners in deploying more efficient solutions such as district cooling. Europe can build similar partnerships in clean-tech supply chains. South Korea, the second-largest battery manufacturer globally, holds 78% of installed battery capacity in Europe. It can learn from countries such as Japan, which has diversified its rare-earth supply through partnerships with Australia and Malaysia, as well as Vietnam. India doubled solar-cell manufacturing capacity in the first half of 2026 alone, backed by localisation incentives extending to upstream components like ingots and polysilicon.
China will remain part of Europe’s clean-tech supply chains. For Europe, preserving its options does not mean that it needs to produce every critical technology in the clean-tech supply chain. But it should work with external partners to maintain commercially viable alternatives at scale. This can be done through reciprocal access to public procurement markets, targeted incentives and shared product standards.
Where climate and competitiveness collide
Fundamentally, having options means being able to adapt to a problem while tackling its cause. Climate policy offers a useful framework: Europeans have concluded that the impact of heatwaves or floods are not inevitable; they are not relying on AC, seawalls and floodgates as their only response. Instead, they are tackling the cause of climate change by pursuing adaptation while mitigating the underlying problem through cuts in fossil-fuel emissions.
Europe should dare to do the same with its competitiveness and economic dependencies. Rather than simply adapting to change, its governments should invest in Europe’s capacity to innovate, work with partners and build alternatives, with the aim of reducing vulnerabilities and helping preserve its choices.
The summer heat of 2026 is a reminder of the cost of delayed climate action. The same lesson applies to economic security: adapting to today’s dependencies in the name of efficiency will leave Europe with fewer options—and come with a larger bill—tomorrow.
di Patrizio Ricci | vietatoparlare.it Il rifiuto della Corea del Sud di partecipare al fronte d’attacco ed economico orchestrato da Washington contro l’Iran ha provocato la reazione immediata di Donald ...
Un equipo internacional de investigadores ha identificado dos huesos de pierna hallados en el Canal de Penghu, Taiwán, como pertenecientes a denisovanos, un grupo extinto de homínidos primos de los neandertales. Los fósiles, que datan de hace aproximadamente 45.000 años, revelan que estos antiguos humanos alcanzaron tamaños corporales extraordinariamente grandes, comparables a los de los […]
Por Marcelo Ramírez Hay decisiones militares destinadas a resolver una batalla y otras que dicen mucho más: revelan cómo un Estado imagina la guerra que tendrá que librar en los…
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey recently signed the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement”. Many analysts believe this trilateral pact is aimed at checking Iranian and Israeli “hegemony” in the tumultuous Middle East region.
Meanwhile, the biggest question running through India’s nearly 1.5 billion people is how this trilateral defense pact will impact India, which has fought multiple wars with Pakistan and maintains a tense relationship with Islamabad.
Despite hogging global media limelight for playing the role of mediator in the ongoing Iran war, Pakistan’s position back home looks scary with relentless terror attacks and a deteriorating security situation.
Pakistan continues to face tremendous domestic pressures. Protests in Pak-controlled Kashmir have intensified since mid-2026, with scores of innocent protesters killed by the security forces.
Islamabad imposed a communication blockade, ordered foreign journalists to leave the region, and limited access to international media outlets, including Al Jazeera’s digital platform.
This is no ordinary region. India claims the Pak-controlled Kashmir as its own and has vowed to integrate it with Jammu and Kashmir. Reportedly, pro-India slogans and flags were seen in the demonstration.
Then, regions like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) are Pakistan’s Achilles’ heel. Separatism in these two regions appears to have gone beyond the control of the Pakistan Army, and looks as volatile as East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) during 1971. The question is how long Pakistan can hold these two regions, and at what cost.
Dismal economic conditions, disgruntled population, and heightened tensions with neighboring India and Afghanistan have intensified Pakistan’s problems. The question is: does Pakistan have the financial muscle or resources to fight a five-front conflict — Balochistan, KPK, Kashmir, India and Afghanistan, simultaneously?
On top of it, Pakistan has signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which means they should be prepared to fight outside the country as well, probably against Houthis in Yemen. That would open a sixth front.
Indian military exposed Pakistan’s defense architecture during Operation Sindoor last year in May. India not only managed to breach Pakistani defenses to hit multiple terror targets in the first wave of attacks, but India also launched precision strikes that impaired critical Pakistani military infrastructure across the country.
Indian military targeted multiple airbases including Nur Khan (Chaklala) near Rawalpindi, Mushaf (Sargodha), Murid, Rafiqui, Rahim Yar Khan, Sukkur, Jacobabad, Bholari, and others—using supersonic BrahMos and other precision munitions.
Satellite imagery confirmed the heavy damage, including destroyed runways, hangars, command-and-control centers, and loss of up to 14 aircraft (as per IAF) and scores of personnel on the ground. Pakistan also claimed downing multiple Indian jets, but it could hardly penetrate the Indian air defense network, led by the S-400.
Operation Sindoor demonstrated that Pakistan’s defenses could be easily penetrated and its Air Force could be crippled even with limited, restrained strikes.
Meanwhile, Turkey is already a member of NATO, arguably the most powerful Islamic country in terms of military. It does not really need Pakistan or Saudi Arabia to defend itself. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has been battered by Iran and Houthi rebels. But when the US could not completely defend it, what can Pakistan and Turkey do?
In the case of Pakistan, it is the most vulnerable of the three.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, assumes utmost importance for Islamabad. The pact’s core clause treats an armed attack on any one party as an attack on all three.
It directly follows the September 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
For Riyadh, it’s another insurance policy, but for Pakistan—still repairing airbases more than a year later—the pact is aimed at sending a strong deterrence message to India, which has pledged a devastating response to any terror attack on the country.
File Image
Collective defense commitments from Riyadh and Ankara are sure to boost Pakistan’s morale, but Turkey (and Saudi Arabia) have been supporting Pakistan since 1947 and have never managed to turn the tide against India.
For instance, during the 1971 war, Turkey provided critical military and diplomatic support to defend Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Operating under the CENTO defense pact, Ankara provided substantial material support to Pakistan by providing aircraft assistance and military hardware, but to little avail.
Even politically, Turkey refused to recognize the newly independent state of Bangladesh for over two years. It only recognized Bangladesh in February 1974 after Pakistan did.
Meanwhile, India has already established strong military ties with Ankara’s adversaries, Greece, Cyprus, and Armenia. India also shares robust military ties with Israel. There might not be a formal agreement on paper, but India-Israel ties go beyond any melodramatic pact.
No doubt, the Mecca pact embeds Pakistan in a broader Islamic-world security architecture at a moment when its conventional defenses have been publicly tested while the country’s biggest province, Balochistan, continues to fight for its liberation, just like East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
For a country simultaneously battling insurgencies in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Pakistan-administered Kashmir while managing tense borders with both Afghanistan and India, the Mecca defense pact is far more valuable to Pakistan than it is to either Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
Nitin J Ticku holds a double master’s degree in Journalism and Business Management from the University of Glasgow. He has over 20 years of global experience in MARCOM, Journalism, and Digital Marketing, and has worked & traveled widely across Europe, the Americas, and Asia. Nitin is the Editor of the EurAsian Times.
This is an Opinion Article
He can be reached at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
India appears poised to overlook Russia’s Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter and opt for a sixth-gen aircraft instead.
Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh recently clarified that New Delhi has “not thought about” new Sukhoi variants, prioritizing the upgrade of the Su-30MKI fleet under the ‘Super Sukhoi’ program and the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) instead.
Moscow’s aggressive pitch—including local production, full source codes, and a two-seat variant—has failed to sway planners wary of diverting resources from self-reliance goals.
With AMCA still a far away and China fielding growing J-20 numbers, India is actively exploring partnerships in sixth-generation programs.
India’s Ministry of Defense has reportedly initiated efforts to join the French-led sixth-generation fighter program. This was stated in a report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense, presented in Parliament, according to news agency PTI.
The ministry has sought a roadmap from the French side for acquiring such aircraft. The panel noted that two major consortia are developing sixth-generation fighters: one involving the UK, Italy, and Japan; another involving (now-defunct) France and Germany.
The Indian Air Force plans to partner with one of these groups so that India does not fall behind in advanced combat aircraft technology.
End of Su-57?
In 1962, the USSR agreed to transfer technology to produce nearly 800 MiG-21 jet fighters for India, which it had earlier denied to China. They helped India set up factories for the aircraft, aero-engines, and avionics.
India’s relationship with the Soviet Union grew strategically, culminating in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
Through the 1971 India-Pakistan War for the liberation of Bangladesh, the Soviet Union stood by India against US and Chinese intimidations.
During the Cold War, India and the USSR maintained a “special and privileged strategic partnership” that was built on five major components: politics, defense, civil nuclear energy, anti-terrorism cooperation, and space.
Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India maintained warm relations with Russia’s successor state. The first major political initiative after the dissolution was the Strategic Partnership signed by the two countries in 2000.
The IRIGC (India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission) is the main body responsible for conducting official affairs between the two countries at the governmental level. Both countries are members of international bodies, including the UN, BRICS, G20, SCO, and Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping. Russia supports India’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
India is one of the largest markets for the Russian defense industry. Approximately 60 percent of the Indian military’s hardware today is of Russian origin. Military hardware supplies and, more recently, joint-venture production have been key pillars.
The Soviet Union was the first to support Make in India defense production.
The MiG-21 factories set up in the early 1960s later produced the MiG-27 (170) and the Su-30 MKI (230). Su-30 MKI was a joint D&D project. Russia also learned a lot from the Su-30 MKI project and imbibed some of these ideas for its Su-30SM aircraft.
222 Su-30 MKI were produced under license at HAL’s Nashik plant since 2004. An estimated 920 AL-31FP turbofans were manufactured at HAL’s Koraput Division. The Su-30MKI is the backbone of the IAF’s fighter fleet.
In 1965, Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) was set up at Avadi, Chennai, with Soviet assistance. HVF products included Russian-designed T-72 Ajeya and T-90 Bhishma tanks.
In September 1965, the Soviet Union and India signed the first contract for the delivery of naval equipment, including four Project I641 diesel-electric submarines, five Project 159E corvettes, and five Project 368P motor boats. The Agreement also envisaged rendering Soviet technical assistance for the construction of a submarine naval base in Vishakhapatnam.
Recently, two frigates, the INS Tushil and INS Tamala, were built by Russia at the Yantar Shipyard, while the remaining two are under construction at Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) in India through technology transfer.
Russia is reportedly expanding its shipbuilding cooperation with India, with two Indian shipyards being considered for the construction of four non-nuclear icebreakers. Russian shipbuilding officials have reportedly offered New Delhi their nuclear-powered design for an Indian Navy aircraft carrier.
GSL is also constructing 24 river-sea class cargo ships for Russian clients in the Caspian Sea by 2027. Cooperation with India in shipbuilding has its benefits for Russia, as the unit cost per vessel is projected to be half of what it would cost Russian shipbuilders.
Between 2012 and 2016, Russia accounted for 68% of India’s defense imports. Russia and India’s cooperation is not limited to a buyer-seller relationship but includes joint research and development, training, service-to-service contacts, and joint exercises.
India and Russia have a strong success story with Joint Ventures (JVs). The BrahMos is a medium-range ramjet supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarines, ships, and fighter aircraft. BrahMos Aerospace is a joint venture between the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The missiles are already being exported.
Under an over ₹5000 crore contract signed in July 2021, over 610,000 AK-203 assault rifles are to be manufactured in India with technology transfer from Russia, by the JV Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited (IRRPL).
Indian companies hold a controlling 50.5 percent share, and Russian companies hold 49.5 percent. The level of indigenous content has already reached 50% and is rising rapidly, with a target of 100% in the near future.
India and Russia have also agreed to expedite the delivery of spare parts of Russian-origin military platforms by setting up a JV in India.
Notwithstanding the above, some JVs did not take off. India had withdrawn from the joint Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) program due to technical issues. Finally, Russia continued the project and today has a successful Sukhoi Su-57 ‘Felon’ 5th generation fighter.
Following the selection of the Ka-226T to meet an Indian requirement for 197 helicopters, an agreement was signed in December 2015 to create a JV between Rostec, Russian Helicopters, and HAL to build the helicopters at a new factory in Tumakuru, India.
Later, India decided to make its own Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) based on the indigenous ‘Dhruv.’ India’s LUH is delayed, and Russia has been pushing the case for Ka-226T again.
Similarly, India canceled the Indo-Russian program to develop a new Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA) for both countries through a JV between Russia’s UAC and India’s HAL.
In February 2023, on the sidelines of the Aero India 2023 air show, the Russians offered to jointly develop the Il-276. However, India would prefer the aircraft to be powered by a European engine rather than a Russian one.
India has operated a wide range of Soviet and Russian combat jets that formed the backbone of the Indian Air Force for decades. Key types include the prolific MiG-21 (in multiple variants including Bison), MiG-23 (BN and MF), high-altitude MiG-25, ground-attack MiG-27, and air-superiority MiG-29 (including upgraded versions).
From the Sukhoi stable came the Su-7 fighter-bomber and the highly successful Su-30MKI, which remains the IAF’s primary multi-role platform that India is looking to upgrade.
India’s decision to effectively rule out the Su-57 marks a noticeable shift. After decades of reliance on Russian fighters—from the MiG-21 to the Su-30MKI—New Delhi is prioritizing the AMCA program and partnerships in sixth-generation projects.
While the historic Indo-Russian defense ties remain strong in other domains, the rejection of Moscow’s most advanced stealth jet signals a clear preference for next-generation technology.
With China rapidly expanding its stealth fleet and AMCA still years away, India appears to be choosing long-term capability over Russian platforms.
With Inputs from EurAsian Times story by Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retired)
This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Adriana Abdenur, a Brazilian policy expert and co-president of the Global Fund for a New Economy, and Jorge Castañeda, former foreign minister of Mexico and professor at Sciences Po, to explore debates about development and ideas of strategic autonomy across Latin America.
Jorge explains why China’s role is varied across the region, arguing that Mexico and much of Central America remain deeply constrained by their economic ties to the US. Adriana discusses Brazil’s long tradition of strategic autonomy, describing how policymakers engage with China as both an economic partner and a source of ideas on development, technology and global governance.
Together, Mark, Adriana and Jorge explore how intensifying US-China competition is reshaping the region’s choices. Can Latin American countries balance relations with both powers? Is China a model, a market or simply another partner in a multipolar world? And what does strategic autonomy look like in an increasingly coercive geopolitical environment?
This podcast episode was recorded on July 31st 2026.
If anything, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh’s call on August 3 for greater “military-civil integration” to create “a robust defense ecosystem to tackle emerging challenges” implies that there is still a structural mismatch between generalist bureaucrats (critically called Babus) and uniformed personnel within the Ministry of Defense (MoD).
In other words, in India’s higher defense reforms, integration between the military and civil components of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is being seen as important as greater jointness among the three armed services (army, air force, and navy).
For decades, the relationship between civilian staff and military personnel within the MoD has been described by experts as both a strength and a fault line, particularly at the level of defense management.
Therefore, as India moves toward theatre commands, self-reliance under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-reliant India) scheme, and faster procurement of defense components, the question is: how has this synergy worked in retrospect, and what should it look like in the future?
Addressing the 85th Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) Civilian Services Day celebrations in New Delhi on Monday, Singh emphasised that both the uniformed and civil services cannot proceed along separate paths, adding that, as joint and integrated structures develop, there will be a need for continuity and expertise across all areas – policy, administration, human resource management, financial processes, logistics, and institutional knowledge.
He highlighted the importance of further enhancing structured cross-exposure between civilian and military officers, suggesting joint training programs and developmental assignments for both sides to learn from each other’s experiences.
“Military officers bring operational experience, a command perspective, and an understanding of warfare, while civilian officers contribute through administrative continuity, policy experience, an understanding of government processes, and institutional memory. When these strengths combine, decision-making becomes more informed, balanced, and effective,” stated the Defense Minister.
As things stand today, there are nine major participating groups dealing with India’s defence – three military services, and the non-military six – Department of Defence(DoD), the Department of Military Affairs(DMA), the Department of Defence Production ( DDP), the Department of Defence Research and Development (DDR&D), the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW), and Defence Finance.
While these nine groups are — three military services, and the non-military six – inside the MoD, there are three others outside the domain having considerable influence on defense matters – the Ministry of Finance (controlling the defense spending), the Cabinet Secretariat (policy matters that have implications for other ministries) and the Prime Minister’s Office (which can always intervene or arbitrate selectively).
However, we will focus here only on the MoD, particularly on the integration of the military services with the non-military ones.
To begin with, one is reminded of what late Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara had said: each of the major participating groups in Indian defense is known for “jealously guarding its turf and mistrustful of the others”.
Incidentally, the Admiral was talking of eight groups, because the DMA was a later creation. But the spirit behind his comment remains intact.
It may be noted that the total workforce under the MoD stands at approximately 2.92 million (29.2 lakh) personnel, making it the largest employer in the world. Expenditure on salaries and pensions for both civilian and non-civilian personnel is fully integrated into the official MoD budget.
The total strength encompasses active military personnel, reservists, and defense civilians. Approximately 1.43 million active-duty personnel serving across the Army, Navy, and Air Force are complemented by roughly 1 million reserve personnel.
Approximately 400,000 defense civilians are distributed across administrative services. They come mainly from the Indian Defense Accounts Service, Indian Ordnance Factories Service, Defense Research & Development Organization scientists, and the Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Service, the Defense Accounts Department (DAD), Border Roads Organization (BRO), DRDO, and top bureaucracy.
The apex bureaucratic positions like the Defense Secretary, Secretary (Defense Production), and Secretary (Ex-Servicemen Welfare) are often held by IAS officers.
The last 5 years have seen some important defense reforms in India. For the first time, a serving 4-star General became Secretary in MoD as Chief of Defense Staff. DMA handles procurement, tri-service matters, and jointness. This is said to have broken the wall between the civilian secretariat and the military.
Service HQs have been integrated with the HQ of MoD. Joint Secretaries from the military now sit in the MoD and sign files. This means operational officers are now part of the procurement and policy process.
Before this reform, the MoD was entirely dominated by generalist civilian bureaucrats under the Department of Defense (DoD), led by the Defense Secretary. The Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters operated merely as “attached offices,” meaning military files had to be routed through junior civilian desk officers for approval.
However, there are still well-documented latent and reported mutual resentment between military and civilian personnel in the MoD, which analysts and scholars refer to as “civil-military dissonance”.
The friction does not stem from opposition to the constitutional principle of political/democratic civilian control, which the military fully accepts. Instead, the resentment focuses on “bureaucratic control,” where career civil servants are perceived to act as a barrier between the uniformed leadership and the political executive.
File Image: Indian Army/Twitter
A primary driver of public friction involves rank parity and protocol equivalence between military officers and civilian cadres. As Admiral Arun Prakash points out, the three Chiefs have been accorded “no locus standi in the structure of the GoI, so much so that the Secretary of the Department of Defense is deemed to represent the three Services in most forums”.
According to the “Government of India Allocation of Business Rules” (AoB Rules) and the “Government of India Transaction of Business Rules” (ToB Rules), the Secretary of DoD (a IAS officer) is allocated the responsibilities of “(a) Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective Demobilisation; (b) The Armed Forces of the Union, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force; (c) Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence comprising of Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters and Defence Staff Headquarters”.
This looks particularly strange as, in terms of protocol, the Defense Secretary ranks at 23 in the order of preference, along with “Army Commanders/ Vice-Chief of the Army Staff or equivalent in other services”. In contrast, a Service Chief of Staff holding the rank of full General or equivalent rank is at number 12.
Even at 16, Officiating Chiefs of Staff holding the rank of Lieutenant General or equivalent rank are higher in protocol than the Defense Secretary.
Similarly, the Military officers are said to have resented the equation of lower-tier civilian administrative posts of Joint Secretary with senior military ranks like Major Generals. It is argued that a Major General has significantly more operational responsibility and seniority (often over 32 years of service) compared to an IAS officer reaching Joint Secretary level in roughly 18 years.
Military officials often point out that allowances, non-functional financial upgrades, and pension structures have favored civilian bureaucracies over the unique hazards of military service. Successive Central Pay Commission awards have frequently triggered military dissatisfaction.
In other words, there is an underlying perception of hierarchical degradation that persists within the armed forces.
Secondly, there are gaps between the military and civilian officials over what is called “Policies vs Operations”. While civilians are accused of lacking operational understanding, the military is accused of not understanding procurement rules. This really leads to delays in equipment purchase.
Perhaps, realizing these deep-seated systemic silos, Defense Minister Singh said on Monday that the military and civilian wings can no longer afford to operate in isolated silos to build an effective national defense ecosystem.
As he underscored, the civilian officials should read Indian military history, examining it from a civilian perspective, thereby fostering fresh ideas and new perspectives. He called upon the Civilian Services to evolve into the “strategic brain” of India’s defence management architecture by developing a comprehensive understanding of the defence sector, functioning effectively in a joint environment, and continuously enhancing its expertise to face the emerging challenges.
Notably, when one talks of dissonance between the military and civilian officers, it is perhaps more to do with purely civilians like IAS and other central services within the MoD rather than the non-military technical and scientific personnel.
There has been relatively smoother synergy in areas like defense production and infrastructure building. For instance, Defence Public Sector Undertakings like the HAL, BEL, BDL and OFB, which are run with a mix of civilian managers, engineers, scientists and military users, have produced platforms and ammunition like Tejas, Arjun, BrahMos. succeeded because civilian scientists in DRDO worked with military feedback loops.
Similarly, the BRO, a civilian-led organization with military engineers, has built highly acclaimed critical roads in the country’s northern and north-eastern border (Line of Actual Control) with China.
However, it is with the civilian officials working within the MoD that military officials have some issues, such as policy decisions, pay, and ranks.
But then, it is also to be noted that while services may all agree on their fight against the civilians, when it comes to “promoting jointness” in military matters, they do not have the same ideas. There is an intense rivalry amongst them. Although the situation has improved of late, there are differences over whether the country should have theater commands, and if it will have them, then how those will be operated.
In other words, there are, overall, challenges in building better “Civil-Military Synergy”. There seem to be merits when some experts argue that National Defense College (NDC) and the College of Defense Management (CDM) could bridge strategic and administrative silos, fostering deeper synergy, mutual understanding, and coordinated policy-making between senior civilian bureaucrats and military leadership.
There are also ideas like extending the DMA model to have military officers in all key procurement and policy wings, and civilian officers in Integrated Theatre Commands. Defense civilians should have tenures in field formations and military officers in MoD finance and policy.
Another interesting suggestion is to extend the synergy beyond the MoD and involve the private sector, startups, academia and state governments. Of course, in a way this is happening with projects like defence corridors, and through collaboration in the space, cyber and AI sectors.
Viewed thus, the core challenge to the synergy that the Defense Minister has talked about is removing what is said to be the “Trust Deficit” between the civilian and military wings within the MoD, due to decades of suspicion.
The synergy does not mean the dilution of civilian supremacy at the policy-making level, be it the MoD, or the Union cabinet, or the Parliament. But it means the military’s voice is heard in policy-making. The military does not grudge civilian control; it opposes “the bureaucratic control”.
Synergy does not imply that civilians are made into soldiers, or soldiers into ‘babus’. Its goal is to make both into “defense managers”
Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
Her voice is that of a frail, elderly woman, but ousted Bangladesh leader Sheikh Hasina still has the power to incite from exile, vowing to return home despite facing the gallows.
Analysts say her defiance is not a death wish, but a desperate bid to remain politically relevant, claw on to her supporters, and revive an outlawed party which once dominated Bangladesh.
To her enemies, Hasina is evil incarnate — a convicted fugitive sentenced to hang for crimes against humanity over her failed bid to crush the 2024 revolution that toppled her.
The 78-year-old told AFP in July from India that she wanted to return to Bangladesh by the year’s end.
“I may be killed. I may be arrested. I may be sent to prison,” Hasina wrote in an email sent from hiding.
“I am fully aware of my fate. Still, I want to go back because my people are calling me.”
On Wednesday, marking two years since she fled by helicopter to old ally India, she is due to address by telephone a New Delhi event entitled “Sheikh Hasina’s homecoming”.
“Sheikh Hasina’s return is important for the survival of the party — she is still a symbol,” said Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder, a political science professor at North South University (NSU) in Dhaka.
One senior member of her Awami League (AL) party said he believed she was genuine in wanting to return.
“She feels obligated because party members are being arrested left and right, despite having no involvement in any crimes,” he said, too fearful himself to speak on record.
“Her return is a way of repaying the party’s loyalty.”
Dhaka’s Prothom Alo newspaper suggested her vow was “part of a strategy to energize party members, build pressure for the lifting of the ban on the party, and reclaim political space”.
But former senior Awami League member Mahmudur Rahman Manna, now a fierce critic of Hasina, dismissed the vow as self-serving.
“There are people in the AL who have some degree of public acceptance. Sheikh Hasina could have given them a little space to help bring the party back after the ban. She didn’t,” he said.
“The idea that she would come back for the sake of the party is absurd.”
Hasina also knows that simply threatening to return will needle Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, who swept February’s elections in which the Awami League was barred, Sikder said.
Political imprisonment has a long history in Bangladesh.
Under Hasina’s rule, Rahman’s mother, former leader Khaleda Zia, spent years in jail in Dhaka on graft charges that her party said were politically motivated.
“The Bangladesh government isn’t ready to accept her, even if she lands in jail directly from India,” Sikder told AFP.
“Her return will create political instability… I doubt the government can handle that.”
Prime Minister, Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina at the inauguration of various projects in Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangladesh. (Source: PIB)
‘Ensure Justice’
Not so, says Zahed Ur Rahman, an adviser to Bangladesh’s prime minister.
“We want her back — please return,” he told reporters. “We have written to India. The individual we want to bring back intends to return. We are ready — let her come, and we will ensure justice.”
Hasina refused to attend her trial in Dhaka, where she was found guilty of incitement, ordering killings and failing to prevent atrocities.
Her vow to return comes as Bangladesh and India seek to repair strained ties, with Hasina remaining a persistent point of friction.
Dhaka has repeatedly requested her extradition, while New Delhi has said only that the request is being examined through the legal process.
But relations have improved since Rahman, leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, became leader, and India has invited him to a BRICS summit in September.
India’s foreign ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal, speaking to reporters on Tuesday, sought to distance New Delhi from Hasina’s “homecoming” speech.
“The government has no involvement whatsoever in it, nor does it endorse any views that may be expressed at the forum,” he said.
But some in Bangladesh see India’s hand in using Hasina’s return threat as leverage.
Mahmudur Rahman, editor of Dhaka’s Amar Desh newspaper, told AFP he saw her threat as part of a power struggle between New Delhi and Dhaka. “Delhi wants to gain the upper hand,” he said.
“India is just playing the ‘Hasina card’ to put pressure on the government.”
The Indian Air Force (IAF) held a week-long counter-drone exercise to strengthen its capabilities against low-cost unmanned aerial systems.
The primary goal of the exercise, dubbed “Rotor Clap-III”, was reportedly to assess and refine operational principles to address emerging aerial threats from unmanned systems. The exercise concluded on August 2.
The Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) drill was held at the Pokhran Field Firing Range in the Thar Desert.
The site is best known as the location of India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998, but its vast, sparsely populated expanse near the India-Pakistan border supports secure live-fire practice, helicopter operations, and high-intensity training while closely matching the terrain, climate, and conditions of the western theatre.
The drills were also aimed at improving the IAF’s helicopter fleet’s operational capabilities against threats posed by drones.
#IAF Helicopters undertook, Exercise ROTOR CLAP III themed "Counter-UAS" in Rajasthan.
Several IAF helicopter units participated in the exercise, conducting tactical missions such as coordinated actions against both aerial and ground-based threats, soldier insertion, reconnaissance, precision attacks, battlefield support, and casualty evacuation.
The drills evaluated integrated helicopter tactics, procedures, and coordination in simulated combat conditions.
Moreover, the aircrew and operational units had the opportunity to test and validate mission planning, inter-unit coordination, quick response, and cooperative operations in near-war scenarios throughout the exercise. According to reports, special emphasis was placed on ensuring smooth coordination among multiple helicopters in the desert terrain.
Notably, helicopters are increasingly being employed worldwide in counter-UAS roles, especially against slower, low-cost loitering munitions and reconnaissance drones. Russia and Ukraine, for example, routinely use military helicopters for this purpose, whereas Gulf countries have recently started deploying their own choppers to down Iranian drones.
File: IAF helicopters participated in ROTOR CLAP III themed “Counter-UAS” in Rajasthan
In general, helicopters make good counter-UAS platforms because many of them cruise at speeds similar to those of propeller-driven drones such as the Shahed class, enabling them to close the distance, match altitude, and make repeated engagement passes—advantages not available to fast jets, which are limited to a single high-speed pass.
Typically, helicopters can also operate from dispersed or improvised sites, fly low and slow, and loiter over threat areas. Equipped with thermal or electro-optical sensors and night-vision systems, they are effective at detecting and engaging low-flying drones after dark.
Once the helicopter matches the drone’s path, gunners or automated systems use proximity-fuzed rockets or brief bursts of cannon or machine-gun fire to neutralize a drone.
Therefore, these armed helicopters form one mobile layer alongside ground-based guns, electronic warfare, interceptor drones, and high-end surface-to-air missiles (SAM).
Using helicopters as counter-drone platforms is also cost-effective, given that machine guns, cannons, and rockets are far cheaper per engagement than surface-to-air missiles or fighter sorties. In fact, the US has now integrated its Apache helicopters with APWKS laser rockets to further reduce the cost of hunting drones.
The IAF operates a range of different military choppers—AH-64 Apache, the aging Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters, the LCH Prachand, Chinook Heavy-lift transport helicopter, the Mi-17 Medium utility helicopter, and the ALH Dhruv
Sources said the exercise reaffirmed the IAF’s commitment to high operational readiness and adaptation to new security challenges. It forms part of India’s broader push to strengthen counter-UAS capabilities at a time when inexpensive small drones, loitering munitions, and sophisticated unmanned systems have upended the cost calculus of conflict and changed the face of conventional warfare that India has participated in.
India’s Counter-Drone Effort Inspired By Op Sindoor
India’s heightened focus on counter-drone measures is driven by global trends, persistent cross-border drone activity, and, most significantly, experience gained during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, which it launched against Pakistan-based terror infrastructure.
Pakistan retaliated almost instantly and employed large numbers of drones as a core element of its response codenamed Operation Bunyan al-Marsus.
Indian official briefings stated that Pakistan launched swarms of drones in major coordinated waves. According to the Government of India’s official press briefing, Pakistan launched 400–500 drones in a coordinated reconnaissance and SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) operation. These were intended to clutter Indian radars, force air-defense systems to expend ammunition and attention, probe for gaps, and mask the presence of a smaller number of more capable surveillance or attack drones.
Pakistan has invested heavily in drone manufacture using indigenous capabilities acquired from allies like Turkey and China, as previously explained in detail by the EurAsian Times. During the conflict,it used Turkish Asisguard Songar, Turkish Yiha-III, Bayraktar TB2 drone, and Chinese drones like the CH-4 and Wing Loong II, to name a few.
India stated that the large majority of incoming drones were neutralized by a combination of kinetic systems (anti-aircraft guns, including the L-70, ZU-23, and Schilka, as well as surface-to-air missiles such as Akash), and non-kinetic measures (spoofing and jamming).
File Image: Akash Missiles
While India has significantly expanded its own inventory of drones, many of which were used successfully and decisively against Pakistani targets during the war, the intensity of drone use by the Pakistani military during the four-day intense conflict has accelerated Indian investment in counter-drone programs and tactics.
For example, counter-drone grids are being incorporated into Mission Sudarshan Chakra, a long-term, AI-enabled, multi-layered national air-defense shield announced last year.
In early July 2026, the Defense Acquisition Council granted Acceptance of Necessity for procurement proposals worth approximately ₹52,000 crore. These include the indigenous Akash Tarang anti-UAV electronic-warfare system for the Army, Very Short-Range Air Defense Systems (V-SHORADS) to bolster low-altitude defense against drones, and jet-powered kamikaze drones, underscoring the priority now attached to both unmanned systems and counter-UAS capabilities
A range of new counter-drone systems developed jointly by public- and private-sector entities are at various stages of testing.
Last year, for instance, India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) unveiled the D4 (Drone Detect, Deter, Destroy) anti-drone system, which is now being deployed along key border areas. This integrated counter-drone solution is designed to detect and neutralize rogue unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with precision.
Earlier this year, the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of development trials of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile-V3 (ULPGM-V3) in air-to-ground and air-to-air modes. The ULPGM is designed for UAV integration to destroy soft and hard targets, on the ground and in the air.
Similarly, India-based Zen Technologies launched an enhanced variant of its counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) that is already in service with the Indian Armed Forces in May 2026. The new variant of the system reportedly has increased detection and jamming ranges and is integrated with AI for improved threat detection.
These are just a few examples of India’s counter-drone effort.
The armed forces are also conducting dedicated counter-drone exercises based on lessons from Operation Sindoor. In October 2025, for instance, India’s largest drone and counter-drone warfare drill, Exercise Cold Start, was conducted in Madhya Pradesh to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing air defense
Therefore, the recently concluded Rotor Clap-III, focused on the IAF’s helicopter fleet, is another step in preparing for operations on a battlefield increasingly dominated by drones.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
Login
