Cruelty, Deprivation, Indignity: A Journalist’s 22 Months in Israeli Prison




RT | October 5, 2026
Swiss police are investigating a sprawling fraud operation with suspected links to Ukrainian scam call centers, an industry said to be worth billions to corrupt officials in Kiev, Neue Zurcher Zeitung (NZZ) has reported, citing law enforcement officials.
According to a report on Sunday, NEDIK, the police network coordinating Switzerland’s fight against digital crime, recently recorded an increase in fraud offenses suspected of having links to Ukraine. The network declined to provide nationwide figures “for tactical reasons,” but noted that at least four fraudulent call centers in Ukraine have been identified in international investigations involving Swiss authorities, with Swiss and German citizens among their main victims.
One investigation by Bern authorities, reportedly underway for years, concerns a man suspected of operating several call centers in Kiev. On just one platform allegedly linked to the operation, reported losses in Switzerland amounted to nearly 4 million Swiss francs ($4.8 million).
Several Ukrainian nationals have also recently been arrested in Swiss cantons for allegedly acting as cash collectors in telephone scams. In St. Gallen in early September, a person posing as a bank employee called a 93-year-old man and instructed him to withdraw and hand over a large sum of money. Police later arrested a 38-year-old Ukrainian who allegedly collected the cash.
Police in Aargau have similarly reported a growing number of suspected cash collectors holding Ukrainian citizenship. Authorities, however, have not established whether they are being directed by call centers in Ukraine or acting independently. NZZ noted that it remains unclear to what extent Ukraine-based operations are connected to fraud networks and cash collectors operating in Switzerland.
While Russians have long been portrayed as the main targets of Ukrainian scammers, sources cited by NZZ challenged that narrative. Brian Lee, head of the Eurasia Observatory at the Geneva-based Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), said Russians accounted for just 10%-15% of targets even at the height of the so-called “patriotic fraud” narrative, under which young Ukrainians were recruited into scam networks on the pretext of taking revenge for Moscow’s military operation against the Kiev regime. Victims have been identified in at least 29 countries, with scam centers increasingly targeting Europe and the US, according to a GI-TOC report published earlier this year.
Lee also reported that bribing Ukrainian officials for protection is central to the business model, saying GI-TOC investigations found that criminal elements “operate seamlessly and efficiently alongside law enforcement agencies, public officials and the private sector.” Such protection reportedly costs scam operators $10,000-$15,000 per month.
Scam networks and state structures
Corruption has long plagued Ukraine, with high-level scandals including last year’s $100 million Energoatom kickback scheme, reportedly led by Timur Mindich, a former business partner of Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky. Western-backed investigators have since uncovered further graft involving Ukrainian officials.
The scam call center network reentered the spotlight last month after Ukrainian Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko – a key pillar of Zelensky’s increasingly fragile governing structure – resigned amid the exposure of an industrial-scale network across the country with alleged links to senior figures in Kiev. Ukraine’s Western-backed National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) accused Sergey Kropiva, head of the cybercrime unit at the Prosecutor General’s Office, of leading a ring that collected protection payments from notorious Ukrainian scam call centers. NABU said it identified assets worth almost $1 million allegedly purchased with proceeds from the scheme.
The sums involved in Ukraine’s wider scam industry are reportedly far larger. Ukrainian media earlier estimated that roughly 2,000 scam offices were operating nationwide as of early August, about half paying protection money to corrupt officials. Such payments were estimated at $240 million annually, while the industry itself has been valued at up to $1 billion a month.
The scam industry has also been linked to powerful security structures under Zelensky’s government. In September, personnel from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and military intelligence (HUR) exchanged fire in Kiev in a confrontation that left three servicemen injured. The clash centered on Stepan Kaplunov, a member of an HUR-linked armed unit detained by the SBU. A law enforcement source cited by Ukrainian outlet Strana said Kaplunov may have been involved in operating scam call centers, pointing to a broader struggle between rival security agencies over the lucrative industry. Ukrainian journalists have also reported that proceeds from criminal operations help finance parts of the HUR’s activities.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has described phone scams as a key tactic employed by Kiev to extract money from Russian citizens, suggesting the practice has effectively become state policy. Moscow considers the industry a national security threat and claims Ukrainian scam networks operate in coordination with the country’s intelligence services.
Russian forces have recently intensified strikes on Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure, mobile operators, and data centers in response to Kiev’s botched “pressure campaign” of drone attacks on civilian infrastructure deep inside Russia. The strikes have disrupted internet access, digital television, and other services, including by hitting data centers in Kiev that Moscow says were used by Ukrainian military and intelligence services. Media reports late last month also claimed a Russian strike hit one of the scam call centers in Dnepropetrovsk.
BND chief Martin Jaeger’s claim comes as his agency pushes for more funding and expanded powers
RT | October 5, 2026
Martin Jaeger arrives to speak in the annual open hearing of Germany’s three intelligence services at the Bundestag in Berlin, Germany, October 5, 2026 © Getty Images ; Sean Gallup
Germany could become “embroiled in a violent conflict with Russia,” the country’s foreign intelligence chief has warned, claiming that a mysterious drone incident at Leipzig airport is an example of the “real and imminent” threat posed by Moscow.
Speaking to lawmakers at a parliamentary hearing on Monday, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) head Martin Jaeger declared that “the confrontation we are facing with Russia has taken on a new, more dangerous dimension.”
“Germany is in danger of becoming embroiled in a violent conflict with Russia – the attempted attack in Leipzig is just one example,” he continued, referring to the discovery of an explosive-laden drone next to a Ukrainian transport plane at the city’s airport in August.
German authorities have not released any evidence linking the incident to Russia, and Moscow has described the episode as a “hastily cobbled-together provocation” serving “exclusively the aims of Kiev and the militaristic wing of the European political class.” It is “obvious that Germany is pursuing a further course of escalation,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said last month.
Nevertheless, Jaeger claimed that Russia is “waging a shadow war,” and that there is a “real and imminent” threat of attacks against targets in Germany. “No other country currently poses such a direct, comprehensive, and concrete threat to Germany,” he added.
Jaeger is one of dozens of Western political, military, and media figures to accuse Russia of waging a “hybrid war” or “shadow war” against Europe in recent weeks. The accusations are, by their nature, impossible to verify, and Moscow has written them off as pretexts to deepen Western involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, justify military spending hikes, and expand surveillance and persecution of domestic opponents.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has explicitly and without evidence described the country’s most popular political party, the right-wing AfD, as “Russia-backed.” Martina Rosenberg, the head of Germany’s Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD), alluded to this claim during Monday’s briefing, telling lawmakers that the country is “threatened by diverse dangers from both outside and within.”
Jaeger, Rosenberg, and domestic intelligence (BfV) chief Sinan Selen all praised Merz’s recent efforts to grant the BND greater offensive powers, and called for further strengthening of the MAD and BfV’s capabilities.
Despite their allegations of “hybrid war,” European leaders have repeatedly stressed that they do not believe Russia to be planning any actual attacks on NATO territory. The BND has seen “no indication of an imminent large-scale Russian attack on NATO territory,” Jaeger added on Monday.
Amid an unprecedented escalation in the West’s rhetoric toward Russia, RT is tracking the statements, accusations, and threats in our ongoing ‘Escalation Watch’ special. Keep an eye on it here as we sort the facts from the propaganda and debunk the psyops in real time.
Austrian remigration activist and CEO of the Institute for Remigration Martin Sellner stated on Sunday that a rap video circulating on Instagram calls for him to be hunted. He contrasted the clip’s availability online with restrictions he says platforms have placed on the accounts of those on the anti-immigration right.
Sellner posted the roughly 26-second clip on X. In the video, several migrant men stand in a graffiti-marked underpass under colored lights and make a number of threats and statements opposed to Germany
Mystery meat migrant rappers are calling to hunt me.
— Martin Sellner (@MartinSellner_) October 4, 2026
This song is not censored, while we are deplatformed everywhere.
The only thing more embarrassing than their "rap" is, that their corny radical chic is platformed by all media and indirectly funded by state money.
English text overlaid on the rap video includes, “Martin Sellner is in danger from today,” “We are shootin’ with AKs” and “I am hunting Martin Sellner.”
In addition, the rappers claim that “Germany has no right to exist,”
Other on-screen text refers to streets burning and to bombs “like in Dresden ’45.” Dresden was firebombed by the Allies at the end of the Second World War, resulting in at least 25,000 German civilians losing their lives.
In response to the video, Sellner wrote: “Mystery meat migrant rappers are calling to hunt me. This song is not censored, while we are deplatformed everywhere. The only thing more embarrassing than their ‘rap’ is that their corny radical chic is platformed by all media and indirectly funded by state money.”
German criminal law treats certain public threats as offenses independent of whether they are carried out. Artistic freedom may not serve as a defense in this case when the threats are specific, directed at an individual, and describe violent acts.
Section 241 of the German criminal code related to threats penalizes threatening a person with a crime against sexual self-determination, bodily integrity, personal freedom or property of significant value. The penalty rises if the threatened act is a felony or if the threat is made publicly or by distributing content, with maximum terms reaching three years in the aggravated public cases.
Section 126 penalizes threatening specified serious crimes, including murder, aggravated assault or certain explosives offenses, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace, with a maximum of three years’ imprisonment.
Austrian law contains a parallel offense of dangerous threat under Section 107 of the Austrian Criminal Code when a person is menaced with death, serious injury or other grave harm in a way that is capable of causing reasonable fear.
In recent years, German public figures and politicians have brought thousands of Germans into court for various statements online that were not direct threats, but instead mere insults. In some cases, these social media users only sharply criticized these politicians.
Sellner, 37, led the Identitarian Movement of Austria for years and has promoted large-scale returns of migrants. Most recently, he founded the Institute for Remigration. Germany and Switzerland have at times imposed entry bans on him tied to public-order concerns. Some of those measures were later limited or overturned by courts.
The post ‘Mystery meat migrant rappers are calling to hunt me’ – Austrian remigration activist Martin Sellner faces ‘hunting’ threats in new rap video appeared first on Remix News.
Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.
EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.
Find the full transcript below:
Germany shut down its last nuclear power plants in 2023, bringing Angela Merkel’s nuclear exit policy to its conclusion. But now, nuclear power is making a strong comeback everywhere in Europe. Will Germany return to nuclear policy?
Until now, German chancellor Friedrich Merz had been reluctant to bring the nuclear topic on the table, partly because there was no agreement within his coalition. He has even said that Germany’s nuclear phase-out was irreversible. But that position is not shared by everyone in his own party.
And as support for the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany) grows — a party that is strongly in favour of nuclear power — nuclear energy is becoming less politically taboo in Germany.
According to a non-public document sent by Berlin to other EU member states and reported by the media Euractiv (currently Rapporteur), the German government wants nuclear energy to be taken into account when the EU sets its climate targets for 2040.
For now, those discussions focus on renewable energy. Germany is not proposing to abandon renewable-energy targets, but rather to leave room for other low-carbon technologies, including nuclear power and carbon capture.
The logic is similar to the debate over the EU’s 2035 target for new cars: the overall objective remains, but countries could have more flexibility over how they achieve it.
And that proposal is likely to be welcomed in France. But could they convince a majority of EU countries? The picture across Europe is changing.
Many EU countries already operate nuclear power plants, while others are building new reactors or considering a return to nuclear. Italy, for example, is looking to revive a nuclear industry after abandoning nuclear power following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.
Poland has never operated a nuclear power plant, but it is now developing its first one. And several other countries that currently have no reactors are seriously considering building them.
Only a small group of EU countries remain opposed to developing nuclear power, including Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg and Malta.
So why has nuclear power become more politically acceptable again? The legacy of Chernobyl and Fukushima still matters. But Europe’s energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also changed the debate.
The shock of soaring fossil-fuel prices has encouraged governments to look for energy sources that can provide electricity without relying on fossil fuels — and nuclear power is increasingly being presented as one of them. Although there are major questions around that argument.
Nuclear power can provide large amounts of low-carbon electricity once a reactor is operating. But building and renovating reactors is extremely expensive and can take decades.
Take France’s Flamanville reactor: its final cost has been estimated at around €23bn , compared with an initial estimate of around €3bn.
There are also questions over nuclear waste, the risk of accidents, and the security of uranium supplies. European countries remain partly dependent on foreign suppliers, including Russia, for uranium.
Speaking during German Unity Day celebrations, Steinmeier compared the present political climate with divisions associated with the Weimar Republic, while stopping short of saying that Germany had reached such a point.
His intervention follows a difficult September for Merz.
Alternative for Germany won 43.8 per cent in Saxony-Anhalt, while in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania the AfD finished first with 38.2 per cent. Merz’s CDU recorded just 4.9 per cent in the latter state, leaving it outside the regional parliament for the first time.
Berlin produced a different winner but a similar problem for the established parties, with Die Linke taking first place.
The combined results have accelerated the fragmentation of a party system that for much of the post-war period revolved around two large political blocs.
EU Today examined that shift after the September elections, arguing that Germany’s political centre was losing voters in several directions at once.
Steinmeier did not confine his warning to electoral arithmetic.
He criticised the use of political demagoguery and warned that organised disinformation was damaging democratic debate. He referred to material originating from Kremlin-linked actors, domestic extremists and other networks using digital platforms to amplify manipulated information.
The remarks come during an increasingly difficult period for Merz.
The Chancellor took office promising to restore economic momentum and political stability. Instead, Germany continues to face concerns about industrial competitiveness, living standards, energy costs and the ability of its political system to absorb an increasingly fragmented electorate.
The pressure is particularly evident in eastern Germany.
Before September’s elections, EU Today noted that Merz was approaching a political reckoning in the east, where the CDU was losing ground while the AfD converted dissatisfaction over migration, energy, economic policy and distrust of established institutions into electoral support.
The subsequent results were worse for the CDU than many in the party had anticipated.
In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD finished more than 26 percentage points ahead of the CDU. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the CDU failed even to cross the threshold for parliamentary representation.
The consequences extend beyond German domestic politics.
Germany remains the EU’s largest economy and one of the principal states shaping European decisions on Ukraine, defence, migration, fiscal policy and industrial competitiveness. Political instability in Berlin can therefore affect negotiations in Brussels as well as the domestic legislative programme.
Economic policy is central to the dispute.
Germany’s manufacturing sector has faced stronger competition from China, while the rupture of the previous economic relationship with Russia has increased costs for energy-intensive industries. Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine has simultaneously required Berlin to spend more on defence and provide substantial assistance to Kyiv.
The German cabinet’s 2027 budget reflects that change. The government has approved federal expenditure of €555.4 billion, including €109.7 billion for the Defence Ministry and €11.6 billion for continued support to Ukraine.
The political difficulty is that higher security expenditure comes alongside pressure to invest in infrastructure, public services and an economy struggling to recover stronger growth.
The rise of the AfD has consequently become more than a debate over whether other parties should maintain the so-called firewall preventing formal co-operation with it.
The more difficult question for Germany’s established parties is why voters are abandoning them and whether economic and political dissatisfaction can be reversed through government policy rather than coalition arrangements designed chiefly to exclude competitors from office.
Steinmeier’s intervention places that argument inside a historical frame familiar to Germans.
The Federal Republic’s post-war institutions were deliberately designed to avoid the failures of the interwar period. But constitutional safeguards alone cannot prevent political fragmentation if large groups of voters cease to regard established parties as capable of responding to the issues that concern them.
Germany enters the final months of 2026 with that question moving from the margins of its politics to the centre.
Merz visited the Ukrainian capital on Sunday while Russian drone attacks continued against Kyiv.
According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account of the meeting, the package includes more than €1 billion for defence and additional financing for the energy sector ahead of winter. Separate reporting put the energy component at approximately €350 million.
The visit also produced an extensive group of bilateral agreements involving governments and companies.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine and Germany had concluded 15 agreements and documents, most concerning security co-operation, production, procurement, orders for German industry and joint projects in Ukraine. He put the total value of the agreements reached during the visit at more than €8.5 billion.
A narrower set of industrial agreements reported during the visit was valued at about €6.6 billion and included air-defence, radar and drone projects.
The visit went beyond another transfer of military aid.
Germany and Ukraine are increasingly constructing a defence relationship based on procurement, industrial production and the transfer of Ukrainian battlefield experience to European manufacturers.
At the Ukrainian-German Business Forum, Zelenskyy said the new security package would strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces immediately while industrial agreements were intended to build longer-term production capacity.
The direction corresponds with a wider shift in European support for Ukraine.
Military assistance is increasingly moving away from transfers of existing national stocks towards contracts financing new weapons production. In July, the EU released €3.47 billion for Ukrainian defence procurement, including financing intended for drones, missiles, air defence and combat aircraft requirements.
Kyiv has since asked European partners to accelerate further financing as the demands of the war outpace scheduled disbursements. EU Today reported in September that Ukraine was seeking early access to part of its 2027 EU funding to close a military budget gap.
The German agreements add a bilateral industrial track to that European system.
They also reflect changes on the battlefield.
Russia has continued to expand large-scale drone and missile attacks, increasing the importance of interceptor production, radar coverage and lower-cost methods of destroying unmanned aircraft. Ukraine’s air-defence problem is increasingly an industrial one: inexpensive attack drones cannot sustainably be countered only with scarce and costly surface-to-air missiles.
EU Today has previously examined how Ukraine’s air-defence battle has become an industrial equation, determined as much by production rates and cost ratios as by the technical performance of individual systems.
German-Ukrainian co-operation is increasingly being shaped by that requirement.
Merz has presented continuing support for Ukraine as a direct German and European security interest, rather than assistance based solely on solidarity with Kyiv.
The argument has acquired greater force as German authorities investigate Russian-linked sabotage and hybrid operations on German territory.
In September, investigators reportedly traced the attempted bombing of a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport to a suspected Russian military-intelligence organiser, with EU Today reporting details of the alleged GRU-linked logistics network.
For Berlin, support for Ukraine is now increasingly seen as part of Germany’s own security.
Merz’s visit also carries a domestic political dimension. His government is committing Germany to considerably higher defence expenditure at a time when the CDU has suffered severe electoral setbacks in eastern Germany and voters remain concerned over public finances and economic performance.
Yet Germany’s military and industrial engagement with Ukraine is continuing to expand.
The new package announced in Kyiv is important in itself, particularly as Ukraine prepares for another winter of Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure. The wider development, however, lies in the growing number of defence-production agreements accompanying it.
European governments have spent much of the war debating how to replenish their own weapons stocks while sustaining Ukraine.
The German approach increasingly points towards a different model: Ukrainian operational experience, Ukrainian procurement requirements and European industrial capacity being brought into the same defence-production system.
Germany and California parade as climate superpowers – yet both import energy, destroy industry and hand supply chains to Beijing. Western virtue, says Tilak Doshi, is made in Chinese coal-fired factories.
The post Beijing’s Useful Idiots: Germany, California and the Green Road to Chinese Supremacy appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.