The post More Tankers Struck Near Hormuz as Shipping Attacks Escalate (Video) appeared first on South Front.

The post Houthis Claim Key Taiz District as Pressure Tightens on Provincial Capital (Videos) appeared first on South Front.

The post Trump’s Surprise Energy Ceasefire Comes With Threats for Kyiv appeared first on South Front.

• Russian strikes destroyed targets in the Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Odesa, Lutsk, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Vinnytsia, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Ternopil regions, and the DPR;
• According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 160 strike UAVs;
• Russian forces struck the Tenet data center in Odesa and a dry cargo ship in the port of Chornomorsk;
• Russian forces struck the Kyiv electrical substation and an industrial facility in Bucha;
• Russian forces struck the Zmiiv Thermal Power Plant in the Kharkiv region;
• Ukrainian losses amounted to approximately 1,470 troops over the past 24 hours.

---

• Russian forces took control of Reznikovo and Kupino.

---

• Russian forces advanced near Belozerskoye;
• Russian forces took control of Petrovka;
• Russian forces took control of Novotroitskoye.

---

• During the past night, Russian air defenses destroyed 479 Ukrainian drones in the rear regions;
• Russian air defenses intercepted UAVs in the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Tula, Ryazan, Oryol, Lipetsk, Voronezh, Tambov, Nizhny Novgorod, Vladimir, Saratov, Samara, Penza, Volgograd, and Rostov regions, Krasnodar Krai, the Republic of Crimea, and over the Black Sea;
• Ukrainian strikes targeted the Yandex data center in the Energetik district of the Vladimir region;
• Ukrainian drones targeted the Bryansk region. Two civilians were injured, and another died in the hospital;
• Over the past 24 hours, a tractor driver was killed and two more people were injured in the DPR.

---

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Trump Turns to Russian Diesel. Can Britain Keep Zelensky Afloat?
• Ukranian Defenses Crack in Zaporozhye
• Military Situation In Ukraine On October 10, 2026 (Maps Update)

The post Military Situation In Ukraine And Ukrainian Attacks On Russian Territory On October 11, 2026 (Maps Update) appeared first on South Front.

Europe is shortening the time it takes to wage a major war. Military transport approvals are meant to take hours rather than days, intelligence to feed more quickly into strike decisions, and a new generation of missiles to bring targets deep inside Russia within reach. Behind the forward garrisons, Europe is building transport networks, reserves, and ammunition production capacity. Taken together, these measures point beyond deterrence to practical preparations for waging war against Russia, including operations deep inside its territory.

The dates 2027, 2028, and 2030 in European rearmament programs can easily suggest that there is still time. But they mark a schedule for building military capabilities, not a guaranteed period of peace. The central question for the coming months is not whether armies will finish rearming in time, but whether a clash can be avoided before they do.

Estonia: A Narrow Front, a Deep Strike

Estonia offers a clear picture of the opening phase this system is being built to fight. The country’s military budget rose 42% in 2026 to €2.4 billion, or 5.4% of gross domestic product. Arms procurement accounts for €1.27 billion – more than half the total. Meanwhile, the headquarters and elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade are moving from Tapa to Jõhvi, roughly 50 kilometers from the Russian border.

A €20.5 million base is under construction in Narva, with €19 million coming from the European Union. Completion is scheduled for summer 2028. Its permanent garrison will number around 200, but it will accommodate up to 1,000 troops in a crisis. The gap between those figures reveals a base designed for rapid expansion. A small garrison is being equipped to receive reinforcements quickly, right on the border.

Holding that ground requires more than barracks. Procurement programs call for nine American HIMARS and nine South Korean Chunmoo multiple-launch rocket systems, both capable of firing ballistic missiles. The relevant munitions have stated ranges of up to 300 and 290 kilometers, respectively. The new concept combines holding the border with deep strikes from the first day of an invasion.

The scale of the response could far exceed that of the opening clash. A battle for a border town could lead to strikes on targets hundreds of kilometers away. Tallinn wants to deny its opponent the option of fighting a small war by preparing to expand its geographical scope.

This also changes what allied assistance means. Allied planning must account not only for how long a small army can hold out until reinforcements arrive, but also for how far the fighting may spread before they reach the front. A missile can be launched before a major formation completes its deployment. Allies may arrive to find that the conflict has already widened.

In such a situation, Estonia and the other Baltic states could serve not only as defensive positions but also as staging grounds for attacks on Russian territory. For Moscow, the issue is no longer simply the size of Estonian units, but the depth of the strikes they envisage. Tallinn, in turn, faces the question of who will sustain its forward forces if the first battles fail to decide the outcome. Sustaining such a war would require support from beyond Estonia. One national budget and a handful of batteries cannot carry that burden.

Germany: An Industrial Base Behind the Garrison

On October 5, Martin Jäger, head of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service, told the Bundestag: “The point of no return has been passed in the war with Ukraine, and NATO is considering a scenario involving a limited Russian military clash with the Baltic states.” He linked the more immediate danger to limited Russian action in the Baltics that could test the allies’ response. He said intelligence had seen no signs of preparations for a major attack on NATO. The discussion therefore concerns not only a major war after rearmament is complete, but a smaller confrontation capable of triggering an allied response.

In the Baltic scenario, Berlin is publicly discussing the risk of a clash while its forward force is still taking shape. The brigade’s readiness date is not the date on which the threat begins.

In Lithuania, Germany is building a permanent heavy brigade as one element of that support. Full readiness is scheduled for the end of 2027, with 4,800 military personnel and 200 civilian employees. Its core consists of the 122nd Panzergrenadier Battalion, the 203rd Tank Battalion, and a multinational battle group. Until the formation is complete, the Germany-based 37th Brigade is to provide support.

The forward formation is thus tied to forces farther inside Europe. Civilian infrastructure underscores the permanence of the deployment. A school for the children of Bundeswehr personnel opened in Vilnius in September 2025. Units are not simply moving in – families are settling down. A political commitment acquires a permanent address, and the safety of German personnel becomes part of any future crisis in the host country.

Münster, October 1, 2026. Rutte describes a headquarters capable of commanding 50,000 troops and responsible for NATO forces in Estonia and Latvia. Behind the talk of forward battalions lies corps-level command capacity

---

But a permanent garrison needs a steady supply of ammunition. Rheinmetall’s new plant in Unterlüß is scheduled to reach an annual output of 350,000 artillery shells in that same year, 2027. The nearly €500 million facility was built in 15 months. Across its entire production network, including overseas sites, the company is targeting roughly 1.5 million shells a year from 2027.

The brigade answers the question of who will enter the fight. The factories answer how to keep fighting once stockpiles run down. The 2027 target is for strengthening this system, not creating it from scratch. Reaching the factory’s planned capacity determines future supply volumes, but it does not set a date before which a clash is impossible. Initial stocks sustain the opening phase of combat. Regular deliveries determine whether its intensity can be maintained.

Between the factory and the front lies the transport network. Europe’s military mobility proposal calls for cross-border transport permits to be processed within three working days, with an emergency procedure taking no more than six hours. A proposed €17 billion would fund the relevant infrastructure under the 2028–2034 budget. For Germany, a transit country, that means bridges, railways, and the capacity of routes leading east.

On October 7, European Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius called for this work to accelerate, saying Europe was not yet able to deter Russia. Unlike an exercise, infrastructure upgrades remain after the columns return to barracks. A stronger bridge and a faster permit procedure create a lasting ability to concentrate forces.

A border battle thus gains industrial and logistical depth. But sustaining one’s own forward forces is only half the military equation. The other half is disrupting opposing forces’ supply and command systems. That requires more than additional railcars loaded with shells. It requires weapons with much greater reach.

Britain: A European Deep-Strike Arsenal

London is driving precisely this part of Europe’s preparations. On July 8, 2026, it announced an initiative bringing together roughly a dozen partners to invest more than $50 billion in long-range strike capabilities over ten years. The stated range bracket runs from 300 to more than 2,000 kilometers. Britain’s own commitment within the initiative is £3 billion by 2030.

The British-German Deep Precision Strike program envisages stealthy and hypersonic weapons with ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometers, initially focused on ground launch. Britain is investing £770 million over four years, with entry into service expected in the 2030s. Another £1.4 billion over four years is earmarked for Stratus, a program with France and Italy covering strikes against high-value targets and ships, as well as the suppression of air defenses.

Britain’s participation in PrSM (Precision Strike Missile), a precision-guided ballistic missile program with a stated range of up to 500 kilometers, adds another layer. The emerging capabilities span several range bands, from around 300 kilometers for the Estonian systems through 500 for PrSM to more than 2,000 for the British-German development. Although the programs are at different stages, they share a clear direction. Weapons for fighting at the border are being supplemented with weapons for striking deep behind it.

The missiles of the next decade show how far these strike capabilities are intended to expand. But the next crisis will unfold with whatever weapons are available when it begins. A 2,000-kilometer range is not a prerequisite for a clash in the Baltics. It changes the potential scale of the war, not the earliest date on which it can break out.

Turning national purchases into a combined capability requires a common framework for employing them. In July 2025, General Christopher Donahue outlined elements of eastern-flank planning built around compatible launchers, fire control, and data sharing. He cited Kaliningrad as an example of military capabilities that could be neutralized by ground-based means in an exceptionally short time: “We have already planned this. We have already developed this.”

The discussion also included cloud-based data sharing and Palantir’s Maven Smart System, purchased by NATO to analyze information and support command decisions. The aim is to turn disparate reports into a common picture more quickly. When several armies use compatible command systems, their arsenals gain additional value. Range puts the target within reach, while data sharing allows missions to be coordinated.

But the deeper the planned strikes, the harder it becomes to separate support for a border battle from an expansion of the war. To the attacking side, a target may be part of the other side’s military supply system. To the other side, hitting it may signal that the conflict has crossed a new threshold. The use of conventional weapons thus leaves unresolved how to deter a response that would overturn the assumption of a limited clash.

France: The Nuclear Limit of Europe’s Calculations

This is where France’s nuclear deterrent enters the European picture. On October 6, Le Vigilant conducted an acceptance firing of an M51.3 ballistic missile following its refit. The missile carried no nuclear warhead. In service since October 2025, the variant carries new TNO-2 warheads. The French Defense Ministry cites improvements in range, accuracy, and the ability to penetrate missile defenses.

Brittany, October 6, 2026. Le Vigilant launches an M51.3 without a nuclear warhead

---

Macron stated the political message bluntly: “To be free, you must be feared. And to be feared, you must be strong.” France’s modernization adds a nuclear dimension to Europe’s conventional military buildup.

That European dimension is taking a more concrete form. On March 2, 2026, Macron outlined an “advanced deterrence” framework allowing partners to participate in French nuclear exercises and opening the possibility of temporary deployments of strategic forces on allied territory. Germany, Poland and Sweden were among the countries joining the dialogue. But the authority to use nuclear weapons – and to define the vital interests they protect – remains exclusively French. In the Baltic scenario, closer cooperation does not establish an automatic French nuclear response to a border clash. It leaves the decisive threshold in Paris, deliberately undefined.

After the First Clash

Taken together, these national programs suggest that the West is preparing not merely to deter Russia, but to build the capacity for offensive operations against it. In this reading, forward deployments, industrial expansion and deep-strike weapons are interconnected preparations for a war that could extend into Russian territory. They do not, by themselves, establish a single operational plan or prove a decision to initiate hostilities. Conventional forces are meant to make an opposing military operation prohibitively costly, while nuclear forces are meant to deter the most extreme escalation. The weakness is that neither side gets to decide how much damage the other will tolerate.

That problem is especially acute around Kaliningrad, where plans to suppress military infrastructure sit alongside the question of the region’s links to the rest of Russia. If actions during a crisis are perceived as an attempt to cut the region off by force, the argument will no longer be about intentions announced at a press conference. It will be about consequences the other side believes it must stop immediately.

The danger in the coming months lies in the gap between limited intent and an unrestricted response. Berlin is discussing localized action in the Baltics. Tallinn is preparing for deep strikes from day one, while foreign garrisons tie a border battle to allied involvement. Each side may consider its own move limited. Neither can count on the other side accepting its definition of what is permissible.

European capitals therefore need to define where military action would stop after the first clash, whether at the border or after strikes on depots, airfields or targets in Kaliningrad. The programs examined here spell out how to build military power, but offer no mechanism for ending the fighting. Missile range is not strategic foresight. Confidence that escalation can be controlled could turn a system of deterrence into a mechanism for widening the war well before 2030.

---

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Trump Turns to Russian Diesel. Can Britain Keep Zelensky Afloat?
• U.S. Escalates In Hormuz With Strike On Iranian Ship (Video)
• Chasing a Victory That Can’t Be Won, Washington Eyes Attack On Iran Before Elections

The post The Baltic Fuse: How Europe Is Building the Infrastructure for War With Russia appeared first on South Front.

The post Military Situation In Yemen On October 11, 2026 (Map Update) appeared first on South Front.

The post Houthis Strike Riyadh Airport Again, Claim Hits on Saudi Oil and Gas Facilities (Videos) appeared first on South Front.

The post Military Situation In Iran On October 11, 2026 (Map Update) appeared first on South Front.

The post Houthis Split Besieged Forces in Taiz, Eliminate Over 50 Fighters Near Bab al-Mandab (Videos) appeared first on South Front.

The post Trump Turns to Russian Diesel. Can Britain Keep Zelensky Afloat? appeared first on South Front.

On the night of 30 September 2026 an event occurred in the state of Tennessee that fits neither legal nor moral frameworks: 50-year-old Christa Gail Pike, sentenced to death for a murder committed at the age of 18, survived two lethal injections and remained conscious. Officially this is termed a “botched execution” and “criminal negligence.” Yet when the details are examined more closely, the picture begins to resemble not a tragic accident but a carefully planned operation to save a woman whose name had for too long been linked with Satanism, the “Satanic Panic” of the 1990s, and a network of influential people whom it is now customary to group under the so-called “Epstein class.”

To begin with, Christa Pike is not merely a criminal. She became a symbol of an entire era. In 1995, when she was 18, she and her boyfriend Tadaryl Shipp abducted and savagely murdered 19-year-old Colleen Slemmer. On the victim’s chest Shipp carved a pentagram a symbol that instantly turned the case into a sensation.

Shipp later confessed to police that he had “dabbled in Satanism” and regarded the killing as a “Satanic sacrifice.” America in the 1990s was gripped by the “Satanic Panic,” and the Pike case fitted that narrative perfectly. She was sentenced to death and spent three decades on death row.

 

Now to what occurred on 30 September. Pike was administered two doses of pentobarbital a drug that in such cases is supposed to stop breathing and the heart with certainty. She did not die. Moreover, 40 minutes after the injections she was still breathing, snoring and complaining of pain in her arm.

Witnesses were escorted from the chamber, and Pike was taken to hospital, where doctors at first considered her brain-dead; yet several days later she regained consciousness, began to speak and even to walk.

The official version is a “badly inserted needle” or a “ruptured vein.” There is a nuance, however: Pike’s lawyers had warned before the execution that she had “bad veins” and that administration of the drug would be difficult. The needle was inserted seven times.

If this were ordinary negligence, why did the executioners, knowing of the problem, fail to prepare properly? Why was a central venous catheter the instrument used precisely in such cases not employed? Why was the drug not replaced with another if the pentobarbital had “degraded” or “had reduced potency,” as the lawyers claim?

And now the most interesting part. The Pike case is not simply a crime chronicle. It forms part of a broader narrative linked to the “Epstein class” a network of politicians, financiers and security officials associated with Jeffrey Epstein. In Substack blogs specialising in “alternative investigations” the idea is increasingly voiced that the Pike story is no accident but a link in a chain of events rooted in the 1990s. Several coincidences are pointed out. First: Epstein visited the Clinton White House seventeen times and this occurred roughly in the same years that the “Satanic Panic” and the Pike case were unfolding.

Second: in 1996 Bill Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which restricted the ability of federal courts to review state-level death sentences. That law directly contributed to the fact that Pike, whose childhood had been destroyed by violence and whose mental state had not been properly taken into account, spent 30 years on death row.

Supporters of the conspiratorial version go further. They ask why precisely now, in 2026, when the “Epstein scandal” is again gathering momentum, the decision is taken to execute Pike and the execution fails in so demonstrative a fashion.

Why did Tennessee Governor Bill Lee, who had denied Pike clemency, immediately suspend all executions in the state after the botched procedure and order an “independent investigation”? Why did the head of the prison system resign? Why did the judge order the authorities to preserve all evidence, including the syringes and logs, after Pike’s lawyers accused officials of “concealing” evidence?

For the conspiracy theorists the answer is obvious: this was not a failure but a rescue. Pike did not “survive the execution” she was not allowed to be executed. Too many people at the very top had an interest in her remaining alive. Too many threads lead from her case to those who today prefer not to attract attention to themselves.

It is too convenient that a “botched execution” allows her life to be preserved without raising questions of clemency, while simultaneously creating a smokescreen for those who stand behind the scenes.

And while Pike lies in the prison hospital, her arms burned, strapped to the bed, she is alive. Alive despite two lethal injections, despite 30 years on death row, despite the fact that the entire U.S. justice system demanded her death.

Herein lies the central paradox: either we are dealing with the most extensive negligence in the history of American executions, or with the quietest rescue that has ever taken place within prison walls. And if the second version is correct, then Christa Pike is not merely a survivor. She is a pawn in someone else’s game who proved too valuable to be removed.

---

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• U.S. Escalates In Hormuz With Strike On Iranian Ship (Video)
• Chasing a Victory That Can’t Be Won, Washington Eyes Attack On Iran Before Elections
• Trump Blames Iran for Flydubai Incident, Israel Gears Up for Another War

The post Satanist Survives Lethal Injection: What Lies Behind the Failed Execution in Tennessee appeared first on South Front.

The post U.S. Escalates In Hormuz With Strike On Iranian Ship (Video) appeared first on South Front.

The post New Houthi Footage Shows Drones Strikes, Saudi-Backed Fighters Surrendering appeared first on South Front.

By Dan BOSCOV-ELLEN – Joshua FRANK

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Although the social and environmental costs of renewable energy technologies are often gestured at parenthetically in left discourse about climate action, they are rarely given serious and sustained attention. It is generally assumed that because a rapid transition to renewables is necessary to avoid full-on climate disaster, we will simply have to accept these costs without too much critical scrutiny. 

In an interview with Spectre’s Dan Boscov-Ellen, Joshua Frank draws on his recent book Bad Energy: The AI Hucksters, Rogue Lithium Extractors, and Wind Industrialists Who Are Selling Off Our Future (Haymarket 2026) to highlight the dangers of that assumption.

Joshua Frank is the managing editor at CounterPunch. He is an investigative journalist and author of the recent award-winning book Atomic Days: The Untold Story of the Most Toxic Place in America (Haymarket, 2022).

+++

Thank you for speaking with me again, and congratulations on the publication of your new book Bad Energy. The book is a sobering look at the environmental costs of the transition to renewables that explores those made expendable in the name of combating climate change and pushes us to reckon with the material constraints on any construction of a sustainable postcapitalist future. Challenging the complacent path-dependency of much left energy politics without laying out a detailed blueprint for an alternative makes this a potentially unpopular line of questioning; people may not want to confront the harms involved in the only climate solutions that seem to be on offer, especially when there seems to already be so little to feel hopeful about at the moment. What prompted you to take up this project? And were there things that particularly surprised you as you began your research?

I live in California. I grew up in the West, in Montana. The majority of public lands in this country managed by the Bureau of Land Management are in the West; there are 240-some million acres that are managed by the BLM. And many of these huge so-called green energy projects are being built on these public lands. In California, for instance, a lot of big solar farm projects are popping up in the Mojave Desert. I spend a lot of time in those areas, and I see the impact that they’re having.

On a very personal level, when my wife and I moved into our current house, we adopted an endangered desert tortoise that had been living here. It was probably stolen from the Mojave decades ago, but it’s been living here through three different residents. So we’ve gotten to know this desert tortoise really well. When I started learning about what some of these big energy projects are doing to desert tortoise habitat, I really felt like I needed to tell the story and defend these creatures, which have been out there for millions of years and we’ve put them on the brink of extinction in a hundred years. They’re an indicator species of an ecosystem in crisis.

Of course, it’s not just green energy projects; there’s been mining and grazing and drought and weapons testing and all sorts of things that have happened out there. But right now, this big push for green energy has made things much, much worse. So that was really the first thing that prompted me to think about approaching this project; I felt like I needed to do it in defense of this tortoise that I am a steward of here at home.

Obviously, I support a transition away from fossil fuels. So I’ve supported solar and wind projects. But what I didn’t realize until I started my research for the book is who is behind many of these projects or the scale of the moneyed interests involved. One that I write about in the book is an enormous wind project in Wyoming that is being funded by an oil billionaire. It’s going to be five hundred square miles, and they’re going to build a seven-hundred-plus-mile-long transmission line called the Transwest Express that’s going to transmit that power from Wyoming to California. That was just mind boggling to me.

Wind energy in and of itself is not a bad thing, but a huge wind project like this that is four or five states away seems completely crazy to me. And when I visited the town where that project is being built and I talked to residents there, they feel the same way—that this is just another example of resource exploitation in their state. There are many other examples like that. So I started looking at the nuances of some of these technologies and who benefits from implementing them in one way versus another, which was enlightening to me, and hopefully will be to readers.

One of the themes of the book is that focusing too narrowly on climate change can cause us to overlook other aspects of capitalist ecocide—particularly the biodiversity crisis, which is, as you note, “in many ways as serious as climate change itself.” If you’re an oil billionaire who’s trying to diversify with more of an “all-of-the-above” energy strategy, as the Democrats like to say, then perhaps it makes good sense to frame things narrowly in terms of carbon alone. But some climate activists and sections of the left seem to do the same thing unintentionally. Are there ways to talk about and organize around the climate crisis without separating it from the broader context?

I think one of the traps that we fall into is thinking about the planet in a very binary way when it comes to the climate—a problem that has been made worse by the big green outfits that are almost solely focused on climate change. And of course, this isn’t to say that climate chaos isn’t real. It is. But we can fixate on it at the expense of a lot of other problems that are also happening concurrently: industrial farming and the pollution it causes, habitat loss, all sorts of things. So the first thing we need to do is start looking at planetary health holistically. Once we start to see that all these things are interconnected, and then look for answers to climate change that take the impacts of biodiversity and everything else into consideration, we start looking at the problem differently. When we destroy biodiversity (often in the service of capital accumulation), we’re doing so at the expense of the climate, because those deserts and rainforests act as carbon sinks in many cases, too. We can’t approach the answer to one of these problems at the expense of the other.

You take the same stance here when it comes to the social impacts of energy projects. You note that “more than half of critical mining projects are on or near Indigenous lands,” and throughout the book you cover a number of specific examples where the buildout of renewables is harming Indigenous communities and, in some cases, making their existing ways of life impossible. This focus contrasts with the predominant approach of the social-democratic left in this country, which generally prefers to ignore or downplay such concerns as identitarian and politically inconvenient. Why have you centered them here, and how do they connect to the larger argument of the book?

I think if we’re talking about the fossil fuel industry and the impacts that coal mining or oil production have on people, we don’t have the same kind of conversation. There, everybody on the left would agree we need to oppose these things because they’re polluting resources, they’re poisoning water, they’re destroying communities. Well, then why can’t we use that same framework to analyze so-called green energy projects?

For example, I have done a lot of work with folks in the Navajo Nation working against uranium mining, talking to people that have been impacted by that industry, which is being resurrected under the guise of climate change. One of the things that we need to do when we’re looking at all of these projects is to give it the same attention and criticism that we would to the fossil fuel industry, because many of the impacts on the ground for these communities is very similar.

As you and I have discussed before, I also think that there is a lack of environmental ethic on parts of the left, and definitely a lack of respect for Indigenous cultures and Indigenous lifeways. There is so much we can learn from Indigenous cultures, but we also need to understand that if we’re not approaching where we get our energy in a critical way, it is going to play out like all of the earlier extractive, colonial episodes that have come before. As I detail throughout the book, these mining companies and other interests looking to profit off of the transition are using the same playbook that the fossil fuel industry has used. So we need to be critical in the same way that we would if we were talking about oil and gas production.

Part of that playbook is to frame so-called “nonproductive” uses of the land as “waste.” Even when it’s not explicitly stated, I think there’s often an attitude on parts of the left that sees Indigenous land and water protectors as irrationally obstructing necessary “progress”—a (possibly willful) misunderstanding of the concerns of Indigenous communities as they have been sounding the alarm about the dangers of repeating the same harms under a green banner if we fail to acknowledge and address the underlying causes. And those are not just capitalism and ongoing colonialism but a breakdown of proper relations and an unwillingness to acknowledge our full obligations to all those with whom we are in relation.

Often we are talking about how climate chaos is impacting these communities, but we should be talking about all of the things that are impacting these communities, and the book tries to highlight that.

While we’re talking about some of the ways that this book may push or challenge sections of the left, I wanted to ask about another inconvenient truth that you highlight in the book, which is that of non-Western imperialism. In particular, several prominent ecosocialist thinkers (I have in mind John Bellamy Foster and Jason Hickel, but there are numerous others) seem to have a real blind spot when it comes to the social and environmental harms of Chinese imperialism. Why do you think that is, and how should the left position itself vis-à-vis interimperial rivalries in global supply chains for renewables?

One thing that was very enlightening to me when doing research for the book was learning just how much of these so-called critical mineral resources globally are controlled by China and Chinese-backed companies. Congo is example of this: 80 percent of its copper and cobalt is controlled by Chinese interests. It’s a similar story in many other places in Africa and South America. This includes things like cobalt, copper, and nickel, as well as graphite, lithium, and rare earths. And not only do they control something like 70 percent of the world’s current critical mineral reserves, but they also control 90 percent of their refinement.

Of course, critical minerals are not just used in “green” technologies—they are used in military tech and AI chips and all sorts of things. They are increasingly crucial to the capitalist economic system, and so we have seen these geopolitical tensions arise over them, with Trump aiming to secure access to minerals by strong-arming countries through tariffs and threatening to withhold military aid, and so on.

But the opposition to the United States can mask the on-the-ground reality of Chinese mining, which is no less brutal than that of US-based corporations. When you start digging into it, you see that there is rampant abuse of miners that are many times children working in horrible conditions in toxic places. I have a lot of respect for Jason and John, but I think that it’s naive to see this relationship that China has with some of these places, which generally aren’t seeing the benefit of all this extraction, and to not to see that as a form of economic imperialism.

Of course, it’s not just mining in places like the Congo; China is funding huge so-called green energy projects all over the world. And on the surface, that might seem like a good thing for those places. China is loaning billions to construct well over three hundred huge hydroelectric dam projects in seventy countries under the guise of providing energy and creating jobs. But when you look at the fine print, you see that these loans are all resource-backed loans, which means in many of the cases the funding is tied to giving China access to critical minerals and other resources. So that also is a form of economic imperialism. If the United States or the IMF or the World Bank were doing it, that’s what we’d be calling it, right? And the United States certainly wishes that they had been doing this decades ago, because China is ahead of the game.

I don’t know where the ecosocialist thinkers have lost the narrative on this, but I hope that they can look at the reality on the ground and come to a different conclusion.

Although the book challenges various kinds of complacency that we find on the left, the point is not to argue that all renewable energy is inherently “bad” energy. No energy source is without impacts, but you note that “not all renewable energies are created equal.” For example, you suggest that solar and wind are generally less harmful than nuclear reactors and large dams. You also discuss how different approaches to these technologies can lower their impact (encouraging distributed rooftop solar rather than large solar farms in the Mojave, and so on). Some of this may be context dependent—if you’re in a place that has good wind corridors that are less frequented by migratory birds, maybe it makes sense to put wind there instead of in certain sensitive offshore habitats, for instance. But are there any overarching principles to keep in mind when thinking through our energy options?

I generally think local is better in many ways. Local communities have a better sense of their needs and of what their ecology means to them. I think about an example that I wrote about in the book, which is how these big solar projects in California are rolling out. In investigating that, I came to the conclusion that it is the big utility companies in California that wanted to destroy the rooftop solar program, which was making really great strides here in the state, because it wasn’t profitable to them. They are looking to maximize profits; they’re publicly traded companies, so there’s a fiduciary responsibility for them to provide endless returns on their investments. Rooftop solar was a threat to that; and so Gavin Newsom, who is in the back pocket of these big utilities, destroyed rooftop solar. And what they’ve done instead is to open up enormous swaths—millions and millions of acres—of public lands across the West to develop solar farms, in some cases in very ecological important areas.

So I think understanding that economic dynamic is important, first and foremost, before we even start talking about the nuances of these technologies and what those impacts might be at the local level. You can contrast the placelessness of capital with the people I talked to in the book, including people from a lot of different Native American communities. People, especially in rural communities, have a lot of ideas about what their needs are and how they could be met. There’s an example in the book of a community in Northern California that has very inconsistent energy. Yet there is no guarantee that this massive wind farm that’s being proposed off the coast of Northern California is going to help bring energy to that local community.

Those kind of contradictions, I think, are really important to look at. And this gets into larger questions of democratic decision-making. These communities, in many cases Indigenous communities, are once again being set up as “sacrifice zones,” only now in the name of green energy. Once we recognize that, then it seems clear that they should have a bigger say in what happens on those lands than, say, those who live hundreds of miles away who would enjoy the fruits of their resources.

In terms of what energy strategies we choose, of course it is partly geographically dependent. Obviously in parts of the US West, sun is very plentiful. I don’t really get into geothermal in the book, but in some places geothermal can be very efficient, but that’s not possible everywhere. But I think the main thing to keep in mind is that we can’t simply replace fossil fuels with green energy without interrogating the system itself, which is the capitalist system that promotes the myth of endless growth. That we don’t have endless resources on this planet, and no matter if it’s fossil fuels or green energy, there are limits to what we can take without doing irreparable harm. And the attention to the local helps us to see that, which is part of why thinking local is really important. It might be an oversimplification, but it’s a pretty good one.

I want to come back to the question of democratic decision-making in a moment, but first, can I quickly follow-up about the question of endless growth? You write that expansionism is “the foundation of capitalist ideology…markets (both foreign and domestic) require new territory and resources to grow.” A number of ecosocialist thinkers, from James O’Connor to Jason W. Moore, have argued that the finitude you’re highlighting here is at some point going to become a fatal problem for capitalism itself—that it’s going to run out of new frontiers and it won’t be able to sustain its growth. Renewable energy seems to be part of a new frontier of accumulation; you cite a mining analyst for BNEF arguing that “the energy transition could lead to a super-cycle for the metals and mining industry,” and you look at how capitalists are scouring the planet, including the depths of the ocean, for critical minerals (some now have their eyes set on asteroids, perhaps the true “final frontier”). Could this boom keep capitalism running, despite the harm to the planet?

In the immediate future, capitalism can absolutely run on this strategy of continuing to burn fossil fuels and also expanding overall energy consumption, with renewables being a portion of that. In no way are we seeing renewables push fossil fuels out. I think that’s by intention, that’s by design. I don’t know how long that can go on despite the impacts that it will continue to have on the planet and people, but I suspect that it could still work for a long time.

If we’re talking geological time, yes, capitalism will eventually have to face physics—the reality that this planet has resources and sinks that are finite and at a certain point we will have exhausted them. I think left to its own devices, eventually capitalism will run into a wall that it doesn’t care about driving into, unfortunately. But we can’t wait for that moment to arrive on its own because we all live here, too; we need to come up with a better strategy to slow down, as Kohei Saito would say. To use less resources and try to live more equitably and comfortably. I write in the book that the world does have a population problem, and it’s the growing population of billionaires. Not regular people.

Naomi Klein and Astra Taylor have a new book coming out called End Times Fascism, and I gather that part of the argument is that many of these billionaires recognize that they’re destroying the world, but they think that they can insulate themselves and their progeny from an apocalypse that they themselves are hastening, perhaps intervening technologically where necessary to keep the profits flowing as long as possible (Elon Musk has been talking a lot about the need for geoengineering lately). On that note, one of the interesting sites of resistance today here in the United States at the moment is the growing popular movement against data centers. The companies relying on the AI boom do not want democratic oversight, and many of them are quite happy to embrace fascism—and to create the repressive technologies that enable it—if it allows them to keep profits flowing. In the book, you discuss Musk’s “we’ll coup whoever we want” attitude toward Bolivian lithium, but it’s clear that this applies equally in the imperial core too. Do you see anti-data-center organizing, which concerns the right of communities to have a say over what technological infrastructure is built and for what purposes, as a hopeful model of resistance to the narrative of inevitability the tech giants are promoting (with the help of some ecomodernists)? As it interacts with the climate movement and the fight for a free Palestine and so on, could this kind of popular movement begin to center the concerns raised in Bad Energy more comprehensively, or are there obstacles that would seem to preclude that possibility?

My hope is that people who may not have really analyzed the underlying economic system of climate chaos walk away from reading Bad Energy and begin to question more as they see that capitalism is still running the show. I think data centers is another great example of that; despite the supposedly intangible nature of the cloud, for many communities this is a very tangible thing that capitalism is throwing at us. I see the movement against data centers across this country as perhaps the biggest opening for the left and the environmental movement to fight big tech and this exploitative capitalism that is infiltrating our lives in the form of AI. I think we begin to understand capitalism in a different way when it’s in our own backyard, when big tech is in our own backyard using our resources. There are a lot of things with data centers that people talk about with energy use and water, and those are really important. But another that’s very rarely talked about is how many critical minerals are needed in these data centers. You know, a big data center, for example, uses tens of thousands of pounds of copper, and that equates to more and more mining; mining for copper is exploding because copper is used in every green energy product, in transmission lines and batteries, as well as data centers.

When we fight data centers, we’re really fighting capitalism; we’re fighting a symptom of capitalism. So I’m really hopeful that we can use this movement against data centers as a tool to help educate people about the wrath of capitalism. Poll after poll shows that Americans don’t support data centers, and many polls are also starting to show that people look at socialism as being better than capitalism. So it’s our duty to provide that alternative, and to help connect the dots. But I’m really invigorated by this movement; it’s an exciting cross-section of all sorts of people, and if we are going to save this planet, we need that kind of mobilization to do it.

I agree, which makes it all the more baffling when ecosocialists like Matt Huber and Holly Buck come out against the anti-data-center protests as being somehow naïve or misinformed, arguing that what we really need is a socialist version of AI development. It seems not just ecologically wrongheaded, but incredibly politically short-sighted not to see the opening in this genuinely grassroots popular resistance to help advance a mass socialist politics based in local democratic decision-making about energy and growth. On that note, I have one final question for you. A central theme throughout the book is the importance of making informed decisions about the relative benefits and harms of various energy sources, and that leaving these decisions to capitalists is a recipe for disaster. Yet even democratic decision-making may fail to adequately register the interests of the nonhuman world and future generations when faced with the exigencies of present poverty (often the legacy of racialized and colonial exploitation). For example, as you detail in the book, some Indigenous communities are split on whether to support mining or infrastructure projects that could bring even temporary income. This pressure can understandably override concern for nonhuman beings and future generations. You mentioned earlier that you started this project in part because you felt a responsibility to speak for the desert tortoise you adopted (and to whose species this book is dedicated) because it can’t represent itself. Do you have any thoughts about how the interests of those who cannot speak for themselves, but who have a great deal at stake in these decisions, could be more consistently integrated into left energy politics?

To harken back to our discussion of Musk a moment ago, some of these billionaires do consider themselves to be environmentalists. The discourse of environmentalism isn’t exclusive to the left, and it can be a very slippery slope into ecofascism as resources are scarcer, things get worse, and capitalism continues to wreak havoc. So I think it is very important to challenge that through democratic processes, and to pull everybody into the conversation. The more people that are part of the conversation, the less chance there is of slipping into a sort of ecofascist hellscape.

It’s true that people often think first about the needs most pressing for them and their communities, and it’s easy not to connect that to the larger picture. It’s easy to be totally disconnected from the farmers that grow your food, or the people that assemble your iPhones, or the mines where the copper in your electric vehicle engine came from. Being more democratic about that process is inherently anticapitalist, because capitalism doesn’t want us to think about any of that: it doesn’t want us to be connected to the people that supply these things to us and the wreckage that is left behind. So I think part of our job as activists and as writers and as academics and people on the left is to bring those conversations forward for people. If we can do that, I think that we will ultimately have a bigger and deeper conversation about what’s really going on and what’s really at stake. And I think that we can together develop a better approach to this problem that we face.

Josh, thank you again for taking the time to speak with me. I hope people will pick up Bad Energy; I think it’s mandatory reading for those who want to understand the constraints within which we’ll need to operate as we try to envision, and ultimately to build, a more sane and livable future.

Original article:  www.counterpunch.org

The story of infrastructure in capitalist vs. socialist systems

By Hua BIN

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

A friend visited Germany recently and told a story how a delayed train caused him to miss the flight home.

I was shocked since you could set your watch by the Deutsche Bahn when I was living in Germany back in 1997.

I was doing an internship at Mercedes Benz in Stuttgart in those days. I could time my walk from the apartment to the bus stop, then connect with a train to the office with less than 5 minutes in total waiting time.

The bus and train schedules were synced so perfectly that you could count on a two-minutes’ walk and exactly 2 minutes wait in between. Both buses and trains were on time to a fault.

I had a particular fondness for DB since I traveled around Germany almost every weekend with its 35 Mark Schones-Wochenende Ticket (happy weekend ticket). Unfortunately that service was discontinued in 2019.

In the winter of 1997, I got lost on a hike with several friends in the Black Forest near Baden-Baden.

We were only able to walk out of the cold night after stumbling upon a rail track that led us to a small rural train stop. I can still remember the warm platform light to this day.

I’ve held German rail in high regard ever since.

So you can imagine how incredulous I was about the delay and bad service my friend complained about.

This prompted me to read about what happened to Deutsche Bahn over the last 30 years. In a nutshell, things certainly have changed for the worse.

Deutsche Bahn today defines an on-time train as one arriving less than 6 minutes behind schedule – a long cry from the clock-setting punctuality of the late 90s.

Even by such a low bar, punctuality hovers around 50 to 60%, well below DB’s own target of 70%.

The official explanation is aging infrastructure, heavy construction, and overloaded tracks.

However, as I dig a bit deeper, the decline of the German rail efficiency seems to stem from a deeply flawed privatization in 1994 which led to decades of extreme infrastructure underinvestment.

The 1994 Bahnreform merged the old East and West state railways with a clear mandate: DB was supposed to operate as a profit-seeking private corporation to prepare for an eventual stock market IPO.

To attract investors, DB prioritized extreme cost-cutting over public service.

They aggressively cut staff, outsourced maintenance, and began divesting into global logistics companies (like DB Schenker) rather than focusing on domestic rail.

Under the guise of maximizing efficiency, DB severely downsized its physical network to save money.

Nearly 8,000 kilometers of secondary rail lines were completely dismantled. Thousands of track crossovers, passing loops, and spare sidetracks were removed.

In 1997, if a train broke down or was delayed, a dispatcher could easily reroute it around the problem using these spare tracks.

Today, the network is stripped of its buffers. If one commuter train stalls near Frankfurt, it acts like a broken-down car on a single-lane highway, causing immediate, cascading delays across the entire country.

The problem is compounded by a mixed-rail system where fast Intercity Express (ICE) trains share the same physical tracks with slow regional commuter trains and heavy freight cargo.

In comparison, Chinese high-speed rail or France’s TGV networks mostly operate on dedicated high-speed tracks.

As the DB physical network was drastically thinned out, annual passenger numbers went up from 1.5 billion passengers in 1994 to 2.4 billion today.

Back in the 90s, it was still very common to live near where you worked in Germany. Over the last 30 years, skyrocketing housing costs in major hubs like Frankfurt, Munich, Berlin, and Hamburg forced a massive portion of the workforce to move further out into surrounding suburban regions and smaller towns.

As a result, Germany experienced a commuter explosion, with millions of people traveling significantly longer distances back and forth every single day.

Now, the Deutsche Bahn system runs at 100% capacity nearly constantly. Any small delays can quickly snowball into network chaos.

To make things even harder, Germany’s strict structural debt limits have restricted state spending.

For years, Germany spends only a fraction of what its neighbors do on rail. For example, Switzerland invests over €400 per citizen annually into rail infrastructure. Germany routinely spends around €100.

DB’s disastrous experience with privatization mirrors what happened with other similar projects such as the Thames Water in the UK.

When Margaret Thatcher’s government privatized the UK water sector in 1989, Thames Water was handed to private investors with a clean slate and zero debt.

However, successive private owners treated the utility—which serves 16 million customers across London and southern England—as a corporate cash cow.

Private investors – Wall Street banks and hedge funds – loaded the utility with a mountain of debt and extracted hundreds of millions in management fees and dividends.

Instead of using revenue to upgrade Victorian-era pipes and treatment centers, money was funneled to shareholders and executive bonuses. By 2026, that debt has ballooned to roughly £20 billion.

While the financial engineering generated short-term returns for private equity, the physical infrastructure rotted.

Thames Water has become a national scandal as it has spilled billions of liters of raw sewage directly into the River Thames and local waterways.

Due to aging infrastructure, 25% of all treated water leaks straight out of the pipes before ever reaching customer homes.

Amid severe dry spells and record temperatures, Thames Water repeatedly implements prolonged hosepipe bans because the system lacks structural resilience to manage the region’s water security.

Most privatization projects of public utilities have witnessed a similar pattern of chronic underinvestment, extreme operational cost cutting, and unsustainable debt leverage while enriching financial investors.

Deutsche Bahn and Thames Water are symbols of public goods degradation for private investor gains in rentier capitalist economies.

In stark contrast, Chinese infrastructure remains firmly in the domain of public ownership.

While Europe and the US follow a policy of reactive, austerity-driven, rent-collecting management of their nations’ infrastructure, China has adopted a strategy of anticipatory, supply-led construction – often years ahead of demand.

Back in the 90s, China still was heavily reliant on decades-old, technically backward rail networks that suffered regular breakdowns.

I still remember sitting in rail cars with no air-conditioning in the height of summer for hours when the train from Beijing to Chongqing broke down due to an engine failure during a trip home from college.

The ride used to take 40 hours by scheduled timetable. Today the same trip takes less than 7 hours on highspeed rail.

When China started building its national highspeed rail network in 2004, there was an avalanche of negative press from the West.

Western “experts” eagerly called out how wasteful the project was and how the rail would never generate a positive return on investment.

Despite the nay-sayers, the country has built over 50,000 kilometers of highspeed rail in the last 20 years, over 70% of the world’s total capacity.

Just today, China announced the completion of 4 new highspeed rail lines in 4 provinces, adding another 1,142 kilometers to the network.

One of the lines is the 318-km Harbin–Yichun Line, which is now China’s northernmost highspeed rail traversing alpine permafrost.

The network now covers 97% of all cities with over 500,000 residents. It operates on dedicated rail lines and achieves 98% departure punctuality and 95% arrival punctuality.

Rather than aiming to achieve profitability and high return for every single line, the Chinese highspeed rail system serves as a public good that generate system-level benefits for the entire economy and the public.

Deutsche Bahn and China Rail represent two systems that operate on completely opposite philosophies, leading to radically different outcomes in rail performance and economic impact.

Building ahead of demand vs. Managing declining assets

China’s infrastructure strategy rests on the philosophy that building massive, high-capacity transport networks creates economic growth and future demand, rather than just responding to it.

By constructing the world’s largest highspeed rail network, largely ahead of full demand saturation, China bypassed the bottleneck phase entirely.

On the other hand, Germany operates on a strict “just-in-time” for-profit corporate framework.

Investments are only approved if existing capacity is mathematically proven to be completely exhausted.

This means that by the time a project is planned, funded, and built, the demand has already vastly outpaced the upgrade, leaving the network perpetually lagging behind.

China recognized early on that mixing slow freight and fast passenger trains limits a network’s ultimate capacity. Beijing built an entirely separate, dedicated network for the high-speed Fuxing and Hexie trains.

On the other side, because Germany tried to save money by avoiding the construction of entirely new corridors, they forced ultra-fast commuter trains to share the exact same physical tracks with heavy cargo trains.

When one slow freight train breaks down, the entire national express system grinds to a halt.

Economic Multiplier vs. Direct Profit

The Chinese state views high-speed rail as a public utility and an economic multiplier.

Even if individual rail lines operate at a financial loss or carry high debt, the investment is justified by the massive economic productivity, regional integration, and urban development it unlocks.

As part of the 1994 privatization, the German government treated Deutsche Bahn like a standard commercial enterprise.

Success was measured by cutting operational costs and generating a direct financial profit, which directly starved the physical tracks of preventative maintenance.

One would probably think the German model at least achieved higher ROI for investors even though China achieves higher total societal benefits.

Yet, reality has an ironic twist – the German model ultimately failed the investors, too.

Deutsche Bahn ended up in a financial worst-of-both-worlds scenario.

In a standard capitalist system, starving an asset of maintenance to boost short-term balance sheets usually generates high dividends for investors or pushes stock prices up.

But because DB’s privatization was half-baked, it achieved neither. The only investor in Deutsche Bahn is still the German Federal Government as its IPO plan was abandoned 2 decades ago.

Because the network was run into the ground to cut short-term corporate costs, the long-term liabilities eventually caught up.

Rather than paying rich dividends, DB has cost taxpayers billions in bailouts. The company recently reported a €2.3 billion net loss.

To manage its staggering debts, DB was forced to sell off its highly profitable global logistics subsidiary, DB Schenker, just to artificially steady its balance sheet.

By treating a core public monopoly like a private business, Germany didn’t create a highly profitable enterprise; they created an operational bottleneck that costs the broader German economy billions in lost corporate productivity every year.

China’s model operates on the opposite financial wavelength.

In a socialist market economy, critical infrastructure is heavily state directed through State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

While China Rail carries a massive debt load from building its expansive high-speed network, the losses are directly absorbed by the state.

From Beijing’s perspective, the direct financial return on investment of the railway itself is secondary. The real payoff is the societal and macroeconomic ROI.

By connecting far-flung cities, the state slashes shipping friction, drives real estate value, unlocks regional labor markets, and creates economic mobility.

The state effectively subsidizes the train ticket to capture a massive tax and economic growth harvest across the rest of society.

A prime example is the Greater Bay Area in Guangdong, where 7 metropolises, including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong, are connected into an integrated web via highspeed rail, metro subways, and a network of highways.

The region enjoys unprecedented supply chain density and is ranked as the No. 1 most innovative cluster of cities in the world by the UN’s World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), ahead of Silicon Valley.

The same formula is repeated in nearly every natural monopoly domain – telecom, electric and water utilities, national highway network, and banking.

Rather than allowing private capital to derive rentier-income from such assets, as what happens in capitalist societies, Beijing firmly controls these commanding-heights of the economy in the public hands.

The German capitalist model tries to draw a neat box around Deutsche Bahn and demand that the box itself be profitable. China’s state-led model views the railway as just one cog in a larger national engine.

Ultimately, Deutsche Bahn’s 30-year experiment has proved that for critical public monopolies like rail, trying to squeeze out the last penny of corporate micro-profits usually breaks the system entirely.

Original article:  huabinoliver.substack.com

The post Ukranian Defenses Crack in Zaporozhye appeared first on South Front.

The post Military Situation In Yemen On October 10, 2026 (Map Update) appeared first on South Front.

The post Saudi Arabia Main Airport Struck, Major Gas Plant Reportedly Hit (Videos) appeared first on South Front.

The post Tanker Burns off UAE Coast as Iran Vows to Punish Violating Ships (Video) appeared first on South Front.

Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

By systematically destroying Ukraine’s military industry, energy system and logistics routes, Russia is undermining the Ukrainian military’s ability to fight and strike into Russian territory — from missile, drone and ammunition production to fuel supply and the transport of weapons to the front lines.

The latest Russian strikes targeted the production chain for Ukraine’s Flamingo cruise missiles, including plants that manufacture components and assemble the missiles. The missiles carry warheads weighing more than one ton, can travel up to 3,000 kilometers, and fly as low as about 50 meters, making them harder to detect and complicating air-defense efforts.

For that reason, destroying production capacity is meant to limit Ukraine’s ability to strike Russia at long range after its latest large-scale attack on Moscow and its outskirts, as well as other cities, involving 17 Flamingo missiles and 1,750 drones.

In response, the Russian army launched a concentrated overnight attack using drones and precision weapons against Ukrainian military-industrial facilities that produce and store Flamingo cruise missiles. The strikes also targeted Fire Point plants in the Kiev, Chernigov, Kirovograd, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltova, and Kharkov regions that produce the long-range FP-1 and FP-2 drones. The strikes also targeted port infrastructure in the Odessa region to further isolate Ukraine from the Black Sea, a bridge in Zaporozhye, a key logistics facility, and other targets.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that a large share of drone production and component manufacturing has shifted from Ukraine to European countries, including Germany, where a factory has opened to produce weapons for the Ukrainian army. During a recent visit to Kiev, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced support for developing and completing the FP-9 ballistic missile. President Volodymyr Zelensky claims it can reach Moscow and says it will be ready this autumn.

Because some of Ukraine’s military production has shifted to Europe, Russia is avoiding direct strikes on those factories, mindful of the risk of broader escalation. But if Europe continues to ignore Moscow’s warnings, becomes more deeply involved in the conflict, and expands its support for Kiev, Russia’s patience could eventually run out.

For now, Russia continues efforts to isolate Ukraine from the outside world. Moscow is gradually closing the country’s key supply routes to restrict Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea and sever its logistics links with Romania. Ships no longer sail directly to the Odessa region. Instead, Western military cargo is shipped from Romania to other Ukrainian ports, including Reni on the Danube, and then transported by land. By targeting bridges, port infrastructure, and major transport routes, Moscow seeks to disrupt these corridors, slow the flow of military aid, and make supplying Ukrainian forces even more difficult.

In addition, strikes hit the Southern and Northern bridges over the Dnipro, which connect the eastern and western parts of Kiev. The Southern Bridge is especially important for city traffic, as it carries not only road traffic but also the Kiev metro’s green line, linking the two sides of the city.

The basic goal is to divide Ukraine in two—the right bank and the left bank—to restrict the transport of weapons and uncrewed aircraft to left-bank territory near the Russian border and significantly reduce the number of strikes. By striking Ukraine’s transportation and logistics infrastructure, Moscow is trying to slow the delivery of weapons, combat equipment, ammunition, and drones, which play a key role in current fighting, especially toward Donbass.

Ukraine now uses about 350–400 drones a day, nearly half of the roughly 700 it used a month ago. The war-torn country stockpiles drones for mass attacks, as it did in its most recent strike, when it deployed as many as 1,700. However, this decline is not due to production capacity.

Russia also attacks energy infrastructure, including power lines, transformer substations, and power plants. Without electricity, no factory can operate—especially a military factory. In this way, Russia also reduces the production capacity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and their ability to continue the war in Donbass and to strike Russian territory.

Ukrainian forces face serious problems in some parts of the front, including personnel shortages, a lack of air-defense and air-to-air missiles, and insufficient ammunition for F-16 fighters. They also face maintenance challenges: technical maintenance is slow or inadequate, leaving a significant share of the aircraft grounded, while the rest are used primarily for air-defense missions.

These factors are severely weakening the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, consequently, their ability to resist on multiple fronts. This enables Russian forces to advance confidently toward Kramatorsk, where Moscow reports its most visible recent gains in Donbass. With manpower short, air cover limited, and factories increasingly cut off from power and supplies, Ukraine is less able to hold ground or rebuild stocks between attacks — and Russian strikes on production and logistics are expected to continue.

---

MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Military Situation In Ukraine On October 10, 2026 (Maps Update)
• Four Ukrainians Arrested in Vienna Amid Growing Sabotage in Europe
• When the Draft Comes Home: Ukraine’s Mobilization Conflicts Spill Into Civilian Life

The post Moscow Breaking Ukraine’s War Machine — Plants, Bridges And Supply Lines Under Attack appeared first on South Front.