The drone has become the signature weapon of the Russo-Ukraine war. On any day in Ukraine, tens of thousands of drones are out hunting the battlefield for targets. These could be individual enemy soldiers or vehicles, or they could be larger targets such as depots, headquarters, bridges or power plants. Yet, this drone war has […]
The post When the US slows down Starlink in Ukraine appeared first on Asia Times.
Ukraine’s operation to strike Russian targets at operational and strategic depth is continuing, Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Robert “Madiar” Brovdi said. He listed data centers, military and strategic sites, and energy hubs “deep in the swamps,” his usual name for Russia.
The fresh statement lands amid fears that a Starlink disruption could break front-line operations.
Overnight into 14 October, the 7th Air Assault Corps said the faster StarShield military package, an advanced version of Starlink that its units depend on, had been throttled, halting a series of missions. Against that backdrop, Brovdi says his branch’s strikes are not falling.
“A serious brawl is underway in conditions of significantly worse weather, drizzle, fog, and precipitation,” Brovdi says, underscoring that the pace held through conditions that usually ground drones.
Over the first two weeks of October, the drone branch verified 7,306 Russian soldiers killed or wounded, up 59.45% on the same period in August and 24.65% in September, he writes on his Telegram page, calling the trend the opposite of de-escalation.
One sector stands out above the rest. On the Dobropillia-Pokrovsk axis, in the zone of the Azov group, the branch’s drones accounted for 3,221 Russian losses in the first two weeks of October, a 102% jump on August and 42.5 percent on September, Brovdi reports.
The figures cover only the drone branch and are verified in the military’s Delta, the video fixation system, he stresses, so the full count of Russian losses across all Ukrainian forces can be much higher.
The numbers behind the claim are large. Over the first two weeks of October, the branch flew 124,500 combat missions, strike and reconnaissance, and hit 32,172 Russian targets, of which manpower was 22.7%, by his count.
That works out to about 2,298 Russian targets a day, he adds, the kind of tempo that makes any talk of a lull on the front hard to square with what his drones are recording. The deep-strike half of that campaign has grown 1,150% over 2026, reaching military-industrial and energy sites far inside Russia, according to Euromaidan Press.
Ukrainian officials contacted the White House, CIA, and Pentagon after the restrictions, which Ukraine says affected both Starlink and Starshield, Axios reported on 14 October. A senior US official told Axios the Trump administration had nothing to do with the restrictions. On the same day, Elon Musk said on X that Starshield systems are owned and controlled by the US government, and that any speed or usage limits are decided by the US military and ultimately the president.
The restrictions could affect Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian attack drones and carry out mid-range strikes against Russian forces and military targets in occupied Ukrainian territories. A speed cap of 160 km/h was insufficient to intercept some jet-powered drones, an unnamed Ukrainian official told Axios. Ukrainian officials told Axios they suspect SpaceX imposed the restrictions to pressure Kyiv to accept US President Donald Trump’s demand to stop striking Russian oil refineries, though the motive remains unconfirmed. But Starlink does not work inside Russia, and the drones attacking Russian oil facilities use other communications systems, according to Reuters.
Musk did not directly address the throttling, Axios noted. Starlink, he wrote, “is a commercial service owned and controlled by SpaceX,” limited to civilian or defensive use.
White House officials told the Ukrainians they don’t have control over SpaceX, two sources told Axios. One said the administration would reach out to SpaceX to figure out what happened. The White House did not immediately respond to Axios’s request for comment.
Presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov said on 14 October that SpaceX had imposed a 160 km/h limit on Starshield’s “military package” overnight without warning. Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps said mid-range strike drones must reach high speed quickly and that an unstable connection “will make it impossible to launch such aircraft or use them as intended.” One unit on the Huliaipole front had to cancel some missions, the corps told Novynarnia.
Ukrainian officials told Axios the system turned off when drones exceeded 160 km/h, and sometimes 80 km/h, before service was partially restored on 14 October. The Defense Ministry said SpaceX continues to restrict Starlink to 160 km/h and that it remains in communication “with partners and SpaceX regarding stable service conditions and the prevention of sudden restrictions,” Axios reported.
The restrictions followed Trump’s 9 October deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin easing sanctions on Russian diesel. A day later, Trump told reporters: “We said you could do whatever you want to Russia, don’t hit the refineries,” the Kyiv Independent reported.
Russia’s drone and missile attacks on Ukraine’s population and infrastructure continue to dominate coverage of the conflict. But on the ground, Ukraine has been making significant, if still limited, gains. In mid-September, Ukraine formally announced the existence of Operation Vivaldi, which has retaken territory near Lyman and disrupted a Russian advance toward the fortified cities […]
The post Operation Vivaldi: Ukrainian gain on a drone-filled battlefield appeared first on Asia Times.
Ukraine has completed its Operation Vivaldi, aimed at protecting its fortress belt cities of Donetsk Oblast, which helped Kyiv preserve the region from Russian occupation for 12 years. Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi, the commander of the Third Army Corps behind the operation, has reported that the fourth phase secured 101 km² of territory. Among the latest achievements is the liberation of three settlements—Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, and Kolodiazi.
The operation's main objective was to move Ukrainian troops into more advantageous defensive positions, Biletskyi said in the first days after the operation was made public. Vivaldi has now summed up the results of all four phases: Ukraine has established full control over 16 settlements, liberated 277 km² of territory, and inflicted 8,000 casualties on Russian forces.
During Operation Vivaldi, Ukrainian forces have prevented Russian troops from outflanking the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and cutting the Kharkiv–Sloviansk highway, a key supply route for Ukraine’s forces in Donbas, Biletskyi says.
“We thwarted the offensive of the Zapad grouping and forced it to redeploy some units of the 1st Tank Army, which eased pressure on Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi,” Biletskyi announces.
Previously, the Institute for the Study of War noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin was confident that Russian forces would be able to seize the entire Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 — the Kremlin’s latest deadline for achieving this goal.
Ukraine’s military was on a mission to prevent this.
On 15 September 2026, Ukraine’s Third Army Corps announced Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk Oblast. During the first phase, Ukrainian troops cleared Russian groups from 75 km² of territory and liberated another 10 km².
The Third Army Corps said it had struck Russian supply routes and fuel infrastructure, prompting Russia to relocate its fuel and lubricant reserves to Voronezh Oblast. According to the corps, Russian forces lost around 1,500 troops, more than 12,000 drones, and hundreds of pieces of equipment.
On 20 September, the Third Army Corps reported the liberation of Shandryholove and Derylove and the establishment of full control over Drobysheve.
During the second season, Russian forces lost another 800 troops, bringing their total losses across the first two seasons to more than 3,000, according to the corps.
During the first two seasons of the operation, Ukrainian troops and attached units regained control of 125 km² of territory, including 50 km² that had been fully liberated.
The first phase of Vivaldi involved eliminating Russian groups that had infiltrated Ukrainian positions, explained the commander of a battalion in the 125th Brigade, callsign Darwin, per ArmyInform. After clearing those groups, the Defense Forces moved on to the operation’s second phase, using reconnaissance drones to detect Russian forces, he added.
For this, Ukraine used UAVs and ground robotic systems.
“The Third Army Corps was the first in the world to begin deploying ground robotic systems by air. Our heavy bombers deliver kamikaze ground robotic systems more than 10 kilometers behind enemy lines,” Biletskyi noted.
On 28 September, the Third Army Corps reported the liberation of Nove, Ridkodub, and Katerynivka and the restoration of control over Karpivka and Novomykhailivka. Ukrainian forces regained another 51 km² of territory, bringing the total area liberated since the start of the offensive to 176 km². Russian forces lost around 2,000 troops, and more than 250 were taken prisoner, the corps said in its summary of the operation’s third phase.
“The Russians were convinced that the main axis of attack was Shandryholove–Zelena Dolyna. This led it to squander its reserves in counterattacks along that very axis. The Russians slept through the actual strike, which was focused on capturing Nove,” Biletskyi said.
The need for Operation Vivaldi arose amid Russian attempts to encircle Ukraine’s fortified belt in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces conducted preparatory efforts aimed at degrading Russia’s offensive capabilities, including strikes on Russian drone operators, the Institute for the Study of War reported on 9 October.
Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman direction and east of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk were intended to complicate Russian efforts to seize the fortified belt in Donetsk Oblast, the report noted.
The corps advanced gradually, reclaiming small areas instead of attempting a large-scale breakthrough.
Ukraine’s presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov said SpaceX had imposed a 100 mph (160 km/h) speed limit on its military Starshield service overnight into 14 October, disrupting several missions without warning Ukraine’s defense forces.
Ukraine’s forces use Starlink-connected drones to strike Russian positions and logistics, including targets behind the front line. Unlike earlier restrictions introduced at Kyiv’s request to stop Russian forces from exploiting Starlink, the latest change reportedly targets the military Starshield service and was imposed without warning Ukraine’s military.
Beskrestnov wrote that the restriction applies to the “military package” of Starshield services. He said the move “obviously cannot be a coincidence” and was connected with the “current political situation,” but did not explain what he meant.
Activist Serhii Sternenko, a former adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister, reported that connections began disappearing at speeds above 160 km/h. He suggested SpaceX had acted at the Trump administration’s request but provided no evidence. Starlink does not work inside Russia, and the drones hitting Russia’s oil industry use other means of communication, Reuters noted. Sternenko added that the ordinary satellite terminals were still working.
Later on 14 October, Sternenko wrote that, according to military reports, restrictions had been tightened further, with connections starting to drop at 60–70 km/h. Beskrestnov later warned that the restriction also hits Starlink-linked interceptor drones, which he called Ukraine’s most effective current defense against jet-powered Shaheds.
Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps confirmed the disruptions in a statement to Reuters. The corps’ press service told Novynarnia that its units on the Huliaipole front began experiencing problems overnight. The corps said the change affected drones controlled through Starlink in flight and concerned Starshield’s data-transmission speed, which it said had previously been unrestricted.
The corps said connections could disappear for 10–20 seconds at movement speeds of 110–120 km/h, complicating drone control. Flying slower creates its own risk, it said, because “slower targets become more vulnerable to being hit by the enemy.”
Some high-speed drones, particularly mid-range strike models, must reach high speed quickly, the corps said. An unstable connection “will make it impossible to launch such aircraft or use them as intended.” Since the start of the day, one unmanned systems unit on the Huliaipole front had to cancel some missions because of connection problems, the corps said.
In late January, SpaceX began restricting Starlink in Ukraine at Kyiv’s request after Russian forces started mounting terminals on strike drones. After Russian drones struck a passenger train in Kharkiv Oblast on 27 January, Beskrestnov, then an adviser to the defense minister, suggested one of them may have been controlled via Starlink. In early February, Ukraine introduced a whitelist under which only registered terminals could continue operating. Beskrestnov called the earlier countermeasures “temporary” and “emergency.”
SpaceX had not publicly commented on the restriction, and Ukraine’s Defense Ministry was looking into its cause, Radio Svoboda reported. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski asked Elon Musk on X whether he was “playing politics with your products again,” adding: “As your European customers, we are watching you.”
Russia is building a satellite network that could soon put all of Europe within its reach. The “Rassvet” satellite system is an extraordinary threat, first to Ukraine and then to the rest of Europe, Oleksandr Danyliuk, the head of the private European aerospace and defense technology company Destinus, said at the Warsaw Security Forum, according to Ukrinform.
Rassvet is Russia’s answer to Starlink, a low-orbit satellite network built by Bureau 1440 to give Moscow’s forces communications that no one else can switch off. European states must invest more quickly in cheap, effective, mass-produced systems to counter it.
“They will be able to navigate to any point in Europe without problems. This needs to be stopped,” said Danyluik, a former Ukrainian finance minister, said.
Danyliuk’s prescription is already being used on Ukraine’s front. Europe should invest in inexpensive, effective systems that can be mass-produced, he argues, the same approach Ukraine uses, and that Russia also turns against it.
“This gap needs to be filled as quickly as possible,” he said.
He urged allies not to overlook threats that might look secondary today, pointing to Rassvet as exactly that kind of slow-building danger.
Appearing strong is not enough to deter Russia, Danyliuk argued, because Moscow can gauge how ready European states actually are.
Both sides are now scrambling to own the satellite link rather than rent it. Ukraine is building a satellite system of its own, similar to Starlink but beyond any single company’s control, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 4 October.
He argued Kyiv should be free to turn Starlink on Russian military targets, warning that China and other states will share comparable satellite technology with Moscow within months.
By Ukrainian estimates, Russia still needs five to eight years to complete Rassvet, which so far reaches Ukraine only in brief passes. That window is the time Danyliuk says Europe must use.
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham said Russia interfered in the 2016 referendum that took Britain out of the European Union, in podcast excerpts released on 11 October, the Associated Press reported. His remarks are believed to be the first time a British prime minister has publicly acknowledged such meddling.
Russia’s information war keeps running through Europe’s ballots. German security sources said in August that Moscow was escalating disinformation before state elections, and Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation found more than 200 Russian fake news sites aimed at France last year.
Burnham told The Rest Is Politics podcast that he asked his advisers whether Russia had interfered in the 2016 vote. He asked after taking office in July.
“I’ve had the clear answer that yes, there was,” he said.
He argued that such things must now be put clearly on the record. He did not say how Russia interfered or offer evidence, and Moscow has long denied interfering in foreign votes.
Burnham said he had discussed Russian interference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Berlin the previous week. “You know he was saying to me that the AfD are clearly linked to Russia, funded I believe,” Burnham said, referring to Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany party. Putting such interference on the record would help “voters in Germany and France understand that some of this politics is instigated via our enemies, namely Russia,” he added.
In 2020, Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee found that the government had actively avoided investigating whether Russia meddled in the referendum. The report noted open-source signs of Russian attempts to sway the Brexit campaign. The government, it said, had never looked for hard evidence.
The government rejected the committee’s call for a review.
“We have seen no evidence of successful interference in the EU Referendum,” it said.
That same year, London said Russian actors had almost certainly tried to interfere in the 2019 general election. The government said they did it by amplifying leaked UK-US trade documents online.
Three weeks ago, Burnham stopped short of this. At the UN General Assembly on 22 September, he said the Kremlin spends around £1.3 billion each year on manipulating information. That is roughly $1.7 billion at recent exchange rates. He cited evidence that Russian agencies tried to interfere in the 2019 general election, but he did not mention 2016.
In the same speech, he said Britain had already helped Moldova protect its elections from Russian interference.
Russia suffered vastly more casualties than Ukraine in September, a senior NATO military official told Bloomberg. Ukraine’s General Staff put the month’s Russian toll only slightly lower.
September’s toll lands on a recruitment system that was already falling short. Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) estimated that Russian losses outran new contracts in June and July, when monthly losses ran lower. In August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, citing military intelligence, warned that Russia is preparing a mass call-up after its parliamentary elections. That vote ended on 20 September.
Russian casualties passed 50,000 in September, up to 28,000 of them killed, the official said. Ukraine’s losses over the same month came to about 5,000, according to the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Russia does not release casualty figures, Bloomberg noted. In late August, Pavlo Palisa, deputy head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, put Russia’s July losses at 43,000 killed and wounded. Bloomberg could not confirm his figures.
To push forward, Russia keeps feeding troops into “kill zones,” the official said. These are stretches of ground saturated with armed drones, mines, and artillery fire. Maksym, call sign Rumyn, is a deputy company commander in the 46th Airmobile Brigade’s drone battalion. In April, he said the zone once ran 3–5 km deep and is now several times larger.
Russia’s defense spending is expected to near $199 billion this year, Bloomberg reported, citing two sources close to the government. That is about 40% above the plan the government set in late 2025.
Russian President Vladimir Putin would struggle to wind down the invasion without a political cost, Martin Jäger said last week. He heads Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND).
German industry expects Russian sabotage against the country’s companies to persist and take more forms, the deputy head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) told Handelsblatt. His warning follows alarms from Germany’s intelligence services, which describe the country as a main target of Russia’s covert campaign in Europe.
Russia keeps striking Ukrainian cities and power plants every day while trying to weaken the European support that keeps Ukraine fighting. Germany is home to arms makers producing with and for Ukraine, so pressure on its companies targets the supply behind Ukraine’s defense.
The warning came from Holger Lösch, the BDI’s deputy managing director.
“German industry is preparing for the threat to persist and for attack methods to become more varied,” he told Handelsblatt. “Companies don’t end up in the crosshairs by chance,” he added.
Russian influence and sabotage operations are no longer an abstract scenario, and companies, critical infrastructure, and defense supply chains are already among their targets, Lösch said. Companies now receive more threat warnings, and their cooperation with the authorities has improved significantly, he noted. “What is still missing are joint procedures to quickly derive concrete measures from warnings,” Lösch said, calling the protection of the economy a cornerstone of national security.
The warning comes a week after a public hearing of the intelligence oversight panel of the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, on 5 October. There, Martin Jäger, head of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), said Russia was waging a shadow war against Germany. “Germany has become a main obstacle to Russian hegemonic power projection in Europe and thus a target of Russian action,” Jäger said. “The danger of attacks against targets in Germany remains real and present,” he warned.
Sinan Selen, head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, told the same hearing that Russia was showing a readiness for sabotage and killings.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on 1 October that Germany was preparing for further hybrid attacks, “including serious ones,” and would respond “quickly and very clearly,” as it did after the drone attack at Leipzig airport.
In August, a drone carrying Semtex explosives hit the wing of a Ukrainian An-124 cargo plane at Leipzig/Halle Airport but did not explode. Germany blamed Russia on 1 September, and German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said Germany was not at war with Russia but was a “target of war.”
German authorities suspect Russian intelligence of commissioning an arson attack near two Munich defense firms, and a confidential Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) assessment counted more than 165 suspected sabotage cases in Germany between January and August. The same assessment recorded 747 suspicious drone incidents involving 1,068 drones over critical infrastructure, military sites, and defense companies.
Germany’s Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) warns that the threat from low-level agents, locals paid small sums for one-off jobs such as arson or photographing military sites, has increased significantly. European intelligence agencies also report that Russia is increasingly targeting defense company executives, including at smaller drone makers, and the BfV has advised some German firms to hire close protection.
As long as Germany keeps backing Ukraine, Russian pressure on its companies is unlikely to ease, and the gap between warnings and action that industry flagged leaves smaller firms, with fewer resources for security, the most exposed.
During a quarter-century in power, Vladimir Putin has led Russia into three wars, in part aimed at restoring his country’s status as a world power via violent conquest . Each war began in a blitzkrieg-style display of fearsome power meant to climax in a swift victory. Instead, each conflict, whether the 1999-2009 war on the […]
The post Putin’s scorched-city policy hits Ukraine hard appeared first on Asia Times.
European Union leaders are preparing for a two-day summit in Brussels dominated by the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and mounting pressure on governments to reconcile defence commitments with deteriorating public finances.
The European Council meeting on 15–16 October will bring together the leaders of the 27 member states to consider immediate measures addressing high energy prices alongside longer-term decisions on competitiveness, enlargement, migration and the EU’s budget for 2028–2034.
European Council President António Costa has placed economic competitiveness and energy costs at the centre of the discussions, reflecting concerns that the disruption of global oil and gas markets is threatening the bloc’s industrial recovery.
The meeting also takes place against the background of renewed disputes over national spending limits, with Italy and Greece seeking greater freedom to finance energy relief and France facing increasing pressure over the credibility of its budget.
The Middle East conflict has created a renewed energy shock for European economies, raising transport and industrial costs while pushing inflation higher.
The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has also affected global oil supplies, exposing Europe’s continuing dependence on internationally traded fossil fuels despite efforts to diversify imports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
European leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary support measures for households and businesses, as well as longer-term policies intended to reduce energy dependence.
The political disagreement concerns how those measures should be financed.
The European Commission has resisted requests from Italy and Greece for further exemptions from the EU’s fiscal framework. Both governments argue that extraordinary energy costs require additional budgetary flexibility.
Brussels maintains that existing provisions already permit exceptional expenditure within defined limits.
The disagreement is particularly difficult for indebted governments that must simultaneously finance military expansion, maintain public services and protect their economies from energy inflation.
France’s position has added urgency to the debate. Its borrowing costs have increased sharply as investors question whether the government can adopt a credible budget ahead of the 2027 presidential election.
A summit agreement on emergency energy assistance would therefore have to accommodate substantially different national fiscal circumstances.
Support for Ukraine remains a central item on the summit agenda as Russia continues attacks against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure and industrial facilities.
EU leaders are expected to review military and financial assistance, the implementation of sanctions against Moscow and the resilience of Ukraine’s economy.
The discussions take place amid renewed uncertainty surrounding American weapons deliveries.
Washington’s reported threats to suspend supplies under the NATO-backed PURL procurement arrangement have raised further questions about Europe’s dependence on the United States for advanced military equipment.
European governments have increased defence expenditure and committed additional support to Ukraine, but replacing American capabilities remains difficult, particularly in air defence, precision-guided weapons and certain intelligence systems.
The summit is unlikely to resolve those industrial limitations, but the broader question of Europe’s ability to sustain Ukrainian defence over several years will influence discussions.
Member states must also consider how increased defence expenditure will be financed alongside other demands on national budgets.
The EU’s published summit agenda includes Russian-linked hybrid attacks within Europe.
The issue has gained prominence as European governments investigate sabotage, cyber operations, information interference and threats against infrastructure and defence-related industries.
Recent warnings concerning possible Russian assassination operations targeting European defence executives and employees of companies supplying Ukraine illustrate the changing nature of the security threat.
Such activities place additional demands on national intelligence services, police forces and European institutions responsible for cross-border cooperation.
The EU has strengthened its sanctions instruments against hybrid activities, but enforcement remains dependent on coordination between national authorities.
Any further measures would need to address intelligence sharing, protection of critical infrastructure and the relationship between internal security and the Union’s wider Russia policy.
Enlargement will form another important part of the discussions following the Commission’s proposals for preparing a wider Union.
Brussels has outlined possible institutional safeguards intended to prevent future members from undermining democratic standards or blocking common decisions.
Montenegro and Albania are advancing through their accession negotiations, while Ukraine and Moldova remain central to the EU’s geopolitical enlargement strategy.
The financial implications will become increasingly important as governments negotiate the next multiannual financial framework covering 2028–2034.
Existing members are already divided over how much the EU should spend, which programmes should receive priority and whether additional common resources should be raised.
Agricultural expenditure, cohesion funding, defence investment and support for Ukraine will compete for resources within the same budget negotiations.
The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated through targeted reforms, but securing agreement among member states will require decisions on future expenditure and the distribution of financial benefits.
Leaders will also examine progress on the One Europe, One Market agenda, which aims to reduce barriers to economic activity within the EU and improve conditions for European businesses.
The initiative is intended to address structural weaknesses affecting investment, industrial development and the ability of European companies to compete internationally.
High energy prices have made those concerns more immediate, particularly for industries competing against producers in economies where electricity and fuel are cheaper.
The European Council will be asked to provide direction on measures planned for 2026 and 2027, but implementation will depend on subsequent legislation and decisions by member states.
The October meeting brings several unresolved European policy questions into the same negotiation: how to protect economic competitiveness, maintain fiscal credibility, finance defence, sustain Ukraine and prepare for enlargement.
The immediate test will be whether leaders can agree on a credible response to energy prices without reopening broader disputes over national budgets.
More difficult decisions concerning defence financing, institutional reform and the EU’s long-term expenditure commitments will extend well beyond the two-day summit.
Artificial intelligence is rapidly making its way into national defense. Reconnaissance, early warning, target detection, mission planning—everywhere, machine-learning systems promise faster analysis, faster responses, and faster decision-making. In a military context, this sounds like progress. In reality, AI exacerbates a security problem that cannot be solved technically. Anyone who attempts to do so anyway risks […]
The post When AI takes control of weapons systems appeared first on Asia Times.
The Russia-Ukraine War has become a real-time laboratory for the Chinese military, spurring rapid defensive modernization while exposing deep friction between its centralized command hierarchy and the decentralized demands of modern combat. This month, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report detailing how China is aggressively leveraging the Russia-Ukraine war as […]
The post China fast on Ukraine lessons, slow on command reform appeared first on Asia Times.
British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has confirmed that Russia interfered in the 2016 Brexit referendum, marking a significant change in the government’s position on foreign involvement in one of the country’s most consequential political decisions. The acknowledgement comes more than ten years after Britain voted to leave the European Union and six years after a parliamentary intelligence investigation criticised the failure to examine Russian activities surrounding the vote.
Speaking on The Rest Is Politics podcast, Burnham said he had requested an assessment of Russian interference after becoming prime minister in July. He subsequently received confirmation that Moscow had attempted to influence the referendum, although he declined to disclose the intelligence underpinning that conclusion or explain the methods employed.
The statement establishes an important distinction between Russian interference and the referendum’s outcome. The former is now publicly acknowledged by the British government; the latter remains a separate question. No evidence has been presented demonstrating that Russian activities determined the result, which saw 51.9 per cent vote to leave the EU.
The controversy dates back to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 report on Russia, which identified serious weaknesses in Britain’s response to hostile foreign influence.
The committee examined Russian activities targeting British political institutions, including attempts to exploit social divisions through state-controlled information channels and online networks. It found that the British government had failed to conduct a comprehensive assessment of potential Russian interference in the Brexit referendum.
That failure was particularly striking when compared with the United States, where intelligence agencies investigated Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and published conclusions identifying a coordinated campaign.
In Britain, by contrast, responsibility for examining foreign interference had been divided between departments and intelligence agencies. The parliamentary committee found that no organisation had assumed responsibility for assessing the threat to the referendum comprehensively.
The distinction was politically convenient for successive governments. Without a formal investigation, ministers could maintain that there was insufficient evidence to establish interference while avoiding the question of whether the evidence had ever been properly examined.
Burnham’s acknowledgement changes that position, although it does not resolve every question raised by the original inquiry.
Russian information operations have repeatedly targeted political divisions within European societies, particularly disagreements over immigration, national sovereignty, NATO and relations with Brussels.
Research into online activity surrounding the Brexit campaign identified networks of accounts associated with Russian influence operations that circulated divisive political messages. Establishing their precise reach, coordination and effect on individual voters remains considerably more difficult.
Moscow had an identifiable strategic interest in weakening European political cohesion. Britain’s departure from the EU removed one of the bloc’s largest economies, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and an important supporter of sanctions against Russia.
That geopolitical consequence does not establish that Brexit was engineered by Moscow. Britain’s referendum reflected longstanding domestic political divisions, disagreements over European integration and dissatisfaction with successive governments.
Russian interference, however, need not create political divisions to exploit them. Amplifying existing disputes, discrediting institutions and encouraging distrust between political opponents can serve strategic objectives without requiring direct control over a campaign.
The timing of Burnham’s intervention is significant. His government has begun reconsidering Britain’s relationship with the EU, while European governments are confronting increasingly aggressive Russian hybrid operations.
Burnham has also suggested that Britain should be prepared to reconsider EU membership in the future, although such a decision would require a separate political mandate and negotiations with the bloc’s 27 members.
The prime minister’s comments place Russian interference within a broader European security debate. France and Germany are among the countries confronting allegations of foreign information operations, covert political influence and attempts to undermine electoral confidence.
The European Council’s forthcoming October summit will include discussions of Russian-linked hybrid attacks, demonstrating that the problem extends beyond conventional espionage and cyber-security.
For Britain, the outstanding question concerns the intelligence assessment itself. Burnham has not indicated whether further evidence will be published, whether Parliament will receive a classified briefing or whether the government intends to examine failures by previous administrations.
A public acknowledgement without supporting details may establish the government’s position, but it cannot by itself provide a complete historical account.
Ten years after the referendum, Britain is therefore confronting two separate matters: the extent of Russia’s activities during the campaign and the reasons its own institutions took so long to acknowledge them.
The first concerns foreign interference. The second concerns the accountability of the British state.
Units of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces have killed or wounded more than 100,000 Russian troops since the start of 2026. That is more than 150,000 since the force was created on 11 June 2025, the force said on Telegram.
Drones have become the deadliest weapon of this war, accounting for about 96% of Russia’s battlefield casualties earlier this year. These hits are verified on video in the military’s Delta system, which is how the force counts only the losses its own pilots confirm.
“Behind these figures is the daily combat work of our soldiers, thousands of sorties, precise strikes, and the constant improvement of unmanned technologies,” Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces said.
Each strike reduces Russia's combat potential and reflects the coordinated work of the force’s units, it added.
Overall, drone branches of the Ukrainian Army had carried out more than 1 million verified strikes on enemy targets since January, killing or seriously wounding about 193,500 Russian troops, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry reported in July.
Those strikes roughly doubled over the first half of the year, from about 105,800 in January to more than 200,000 in June, the ministry noted.
Meanwhile, Commander of the separate Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Robert “Madiar” Brovdi says the numbers are still growing. In the first five days of October, the force’s pilots killed or wounded 2,699 Russian soldiers, 39.7 percent more than in the same period of September.
He tied the rising number to Russia's assaults in Donbas, as the offensives for the fortress-belt cities that have been Ukraine's protection against full region's occupation since 2014, were ongoing.
The force fields are the cheap, fast weapons that now do most of the killing on the front. Interceptor and strike drones let Ukraine hit troops, logistics, and command posts while keeping its own soldiers farther from the fight.
Aviation is one of the most effective ways to counter Russia’s jet-powered drones. Its effectiveness continues to grow due to pilots’ skill and better coordination, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara says, Glavcom reports.
Russia’s jet-powered Gerans fly several times faster than the propeller Shaheds Ukraine learned to shoot down, and they remain the main challenge for its air defense. Ukraine downs more than 90% of the slow drones but only about 55% of the jet ones.
“Due to them, our aviation now uses fewer munitions per aerial target. We plan to improve this further,” Khmara states.
Air defense works as a layered system because no single type of weapon is enough, he explains. The layers run from surface-to-air and shoulder-fired missiles to turrets, electronic warfare, interceptor-drone crews, and small-scale air defense, topped by aircraft including Mirage and F-16 jets.
Ukraine already has combat results against the jet drones, Khmara notes. In one engagement, five Bars interceptors destroyed five aerial targets, a 100% hit rate in that case, and the task now is to raise the overall destruction rate and quickly scale the solutions that prove themselves.
Heavy-caliber turrets are adding to that. Their number in service already runs into the hundreds, he adds.
“This direction is being scaled, and systems with greater range are being worked on. In parallel, surface-to-air and shoulder-fired missile systems are also proving effective,” he says.
Ukraine is also looking past today’s threats, the minister stresses. The ministry is working to supply interceptor drones, aviation and its munitions, missile and artillery systems, turrets and electronic warfare gear, and to plan several steps ahead with enough stock in reserve.
“We also know what solutions Russia is developing, which concern jet drones with a speed of 800 kilometers per hour. We are working on finding countermeasures to the next generation of threats,” Khmara says.
Producers have been tasked with offering proposals and prototypes, he concludes.
European intelligence agencies have warned that Russia is intensifying efforts to assassinate executives of defence companies supplying Ukraine, extending its campaign of sabotage and intimidation into the European military-industrial sector.
According to intelligence assessments obtained from five European security services, Moscow has ordered an expansion of covert operations targeting senior figures at major arms manufacturers and smaller companies producing drones and military components. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the BfV, has reportedly advised executives to strengthen personal security, while some manufacturers have already increased protection for senior personnel.
The warnings emerged alongside reports of an alleged assassination plot against Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Polish authorities convened an emergency security meeting and subsequently detained a suspect. No connection between the Polish case and Russian intelligence has been established.
The apparent expansion of Russian covert operations reflects a shift in Moscow’s calculations concerning Western military assistance.
President Vladimir Putin had reason to anticipate that Donald Trump’s return to the White House would weaken American support for Kyiv. Trump repeatedly questioned US military expenditure on Ukraine and advocated a negotiated settlement with Russia. A substantial reduction in American weapons deliveries could have increased pressure on Ukraine to accept Moscow’s territorial demands.
Instead, European governments assumed greater responsibility for sustaining Ukrainian defence capabilities, including financing weapons purchases and expanding domestic production.
The European Union’s €90 billion support programme for 2026–2027 allocates €60 billion to defence procurement and industrial capacity. The EU has also established mechanisms allowing Ukraine to participate in European joint procurement programmes.
Disrupting European manufacturers therefore offers Moscow a means of restricting Ukraine’s military capabilities without directly confronting NATO.
Assassination threats can interfere with procurement even when attacks are never carried out. Large manufacturers can afford extensive security arrangements, but smaller companies producing electronics, drone components and specialised equipment often lack comparable resources.
Intimidation could delay contracts, discourage investment and persuade individual suppliers to withdraw from Ukrainian defence programmes.
Russia’s alleged interest in targeting defence executives is not unprecedented. In 2024, American intelligence reportedly uncovered a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, chief executive of Rheinmetall, one of Germany’s principal suppliers of ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine.
As EU Today previously reported, Moscow has also publicly identified European factories involved in Ukrainian drone production, increasing concerns that civilian industrial facilities could become targets of Russian operations.
European authorities have investigated suspected Russian involvement in arson, infrastructure attacks and clandestine networks. An earlier cross-border investigation into alleged assassination and sabotage preparations demonstrated how intermediaries could be recruited to conduct operations while obscuring their sponsors.
Such activity also carries political consequences. Attacks against infrastructure and industrial facilities can reinforce public fears about confrontation with Russia, particularly during elections when parties advocating accommodation with Moscow seek to exploit security concerns.
Poland has already experienced mounting Russian hybrid pressure, including threats to critical infrastructure and information operations intended to aggravate domestic political divisions.
Ukraine’s continuing strikes against Russian refineries and military-industrial facilities have added economic and operational pressures to Moscow’s prolonged war effort. Russia retains substantial military production capacity, but the costs of sustaining the conflict remain considerable.
Interfering with European weapons manufacturing could serve two objectives: restricting Ukraine’s access to equipment and obstructing Europe’s longer-term rearmament.
The Kremlin does not necessarily need European governments to abandon Ukraine formally. Production delays, disrupted contracts and reluctant suppliers could reduce the practical effect of military assistance even while political commitments remain unchanged.
European governments have acknowledged the industrial challenge. In its June conclusions on European defence, the European Council called for accelerated manufacturing capacity, stronger supply chains and closer cooperation with Ukraine’s defence industry.
Russia’s apparent strategy seeks to exploit the dependence of these programmes on private companies and skilled civilian personnel.
The warnings from European intelligence agencies suggest that protecting defence executives, engineers and contractors is becoming part of the continent’s wider security responsibilities.
For Moscow, intimidation offers the possibility of weakening Ukrainian military resistance without an open confrontation with NATO. For European governments, preventing covert operations from disrupting weapons production is increasingly inseparable from their commitment to sustain Ukraine’s defence.
Login