• A major Western drone firm says working in Ukraine is key to getting gear to the standard NATO needs.
• ORQA is partnering with Ukraine's industry to co-produce drone systems, including for the NATO market.
• Its CEO said Ukraine has battlefield experience and operational excellence that can shape gear for NATO.

A Western company developing drone technology for NATO militaries says that working in Ukraine is the best way to ensure its gear meets the alliance's needs for a future fight.

ORQA, a Croatian company that makes drones and drone technology, including controllers, receivers, goggles, video equipment, and flight simulators, already supplies parts and systems to two dozen NATO allies. But it wants to draw on Ukraine's battlefield experience to improve its products.

Working in Ukraine "creates an opportunity to really channel this sort of operational expertise to shape these products. And then these products can be made to a standard that NATO demands," CEO Srđan Kovačević told Business Insider.

ORQA produces components used by Ukrainian defense tech company General Cherry and is partnering with the firm to jointly make drone systems and spread Ukraine's drone expertise.

The war in Ukraine is the most intense drone war ever fought, and getting feedback from the battlefield provides critical insight into what soldiers need most.

"If I'm being blunt, there are only a few parts of the world where you can actively shoot down these unmanned aerial threats in a real-world environment," Kovačević told Business Insider.

That same drive has prompted Western defense companies, ranging from small start-ups to major primes, to set up manufacturing facilities, repair hubs, and offices in Ukraine, seeking battlefield feedback to improve their technology faster.

ORQA is also seeking to better understand how Ukraine's defense industry scales, moves quickly, and works in wartime.

Ukrainian defense firms are producing drones and other weapons at a much faster rate than many of their Western counterparts.

Kovačević said that "the West has a tremendous amount to learn from Ukraine," saying that the "operational excellence that Ukrainian defense forces have developed is unparalleled in the Western world."

He said that while the West "has a very deep technology expertise," it lacks "this lived experience of taking that technology and applying it to the operational reality of the 21st-century warfare."

"Now," he said, "it's time to merge the two and emerge better off on both sides of this partnership."

General Cherry is one of Ukraine's biggest drone companies and has announced partnerships with other Western defense tech companies.

ORQA and General Cherry intend to manufacture in both countries, supplying NATO and its allies with Ukrainian-developed counter-drone technology while expanding domestic production of drone components in Ukraine.

Kovačević said Ukrainian companies like General Cherry have "immensely valuable lived experience of building and scaling under fire," something that is often "neglected by Western companies," but they can learn.

The significant "volumes that Ukrainian drone companies are able to produce really dwarf anything that's happening in the West right now," he added.

Western leaders are encouraging industrial collaboration, and NATO has launched programs to bring Ukrainian and allied defense companies together.

ORQA isn't alone in looking to Ukraine's extensive battlefield experience to develop better weapons for NATO. Latvia-based Origin Robotics, for example, makes BLAZE interceptor drones purchased by several NATO militaries and BEAK, a drone-launched precision-guided weapon used by Ukrainian forces.

Its CEO, Agris Kipurs, previously told Business Insider that the company takes lessons from its work in Ukraine, "but we adapt those weapons systems specifically to be used in a NATO country. And NATO countries and the armies of NATO countries are our customers. That is the user we build for."

Kovačević said Ukrainian technology can't simply be transplanted into NATO militaries. Ukraine has had to develop weapons at breakneck speed and make do with what's available.

NATO, however, has time to take operational knowledge, contextualize it for alliance forces, and build these products to the necessary standards using Western technology, he said.

Kovačević said the goal of these industrial partnerships is to supply NATO without undermining Ukraine's ability to meet its own wartime needs.

ORQA also aims to boost Ukraine's domestic production of drone components and reduce its reliance on foreign suppliers.

Ukraine is "relying heavily on non-Ukrainian and non-European supply chains," Kovačević said, adding that reducing that dependence is strategically important. ORQA says it manufactures key components in-house and avoids Chinese-made parts to strengthen its supply chain.

Sergei Kiriyenko, first deputy chief of staff of the Russian Presidential Administration, set the goals for the Ukraine strand of the operation, launched in early 2023 under the codename "Uganda." Alexander Kharichev, now head of the Kremlin's Directorate for Monitoring and Analysis of Social Processes, oversaw it, according to hacked correspondence published by The Insider on 21 October.

Doppelgänger disguises Russian narratives as local news through cloned media sites, fake accounts, paid ads, and fabricated videos. The FBI named Kiriyenko among its orchestrators in 2024, and its contractor, the Social Design Agency (SDA), run by Ilya Gambashidze, is still expanding, now targeting AI chatbots. The new files go inside the Ukraine campaign and show the operation reporting even exposed fakes to the Kremlin as achievements.

Telegram channels posing as Ukrainian

An internal briefing on narratives says the project ran its Telegram channels on the principles of agent work and psychological operations, the Russian version of the investigation shows. Early on, the team decided to disguise all its outlets as Ukrainian and to run its campaigns without direct Russian propaganda. Every channel carried Ukrainian news to look unconnected to Russia. Dropping pro-Ukrainian themes, the briefing warned, would eventually expose the client and wreck the whole plan.

Explore further

Russia-linked bot networks kept their weekly rhythm after drone strikes on three Yandex data centers—disinformation monitor LetsData

Four goals and a can of stew

Kiriyenko set four goals: discredit Ukraine's military and political leadership, split its elites, demoralize its army, and disorganize its population. The SDA prepared the project's pitch and carried out the work.

Political strategist Alexander Asafov proposed fakes of his own: in May 2023, that soldiers were bribing commanders to avoid the front, and in January 2024, that Ukraine was pulling air defenses back to Kyiv to protect the authorities.

After an Il-76 military transport crashed in Belgorod Oblast on 24 January 2024, Moscow claimed it had been carrying Ukrainian prisoners of war. Kharichev's subordinate Yevgeny Kazakov, chairing a meeting in his place, proposed sending a fake to the widows of Ukrainian soldiers: "They died for an expensive Il-76—the Russians have few of those." The idea was dropped.

The same meeting produced another fake, and three days later the team launched it: that recruitment centers had sent widows a can of stewed meat with a little flag as compensation. The same producers also oversaw letters falsely attributed to Deputy Defense Minister Nataliia Kalmykova, the Russian version says.

Debunks filed as results

The SDA collected coverage of its work in a folder for the Kremlin. It filed the "Zelensky's yacht" story, which JD Vance, then a US senator and now US Vice President, echoed, together with its debunk. The report also included a TikTok campaign about former Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov's family that the BBC had already exposed.

The Insider concludes that the team has had more failures than successes. The US sanctioned Gambashidze and the SDA in March 2024, and the UK followed in October.

• Russia looks to be moving toward 3D printed cruise missiles for its next era of air attacks on Ukraine.
• The threat could be so major, turbojet Shaheds would seem like a small problem, one drone guru said.
• GUR recently posted details of the Filin, a cheap Russian missile reported to fly as fast as 500 mph.

Russia's next big bet in the air war will likely move past jet-powered Shaheds to a deep arsenal of new cruise missiles, two of Ukraine's most prominent drone experts warned on Thursday.

Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov and Serhii Sternenko wrote separately on their Telegram channels about the Filin, an 11-foot Russian winged cruise missile that Ukraine's military intelligence service recently unveiled.

These cheap weapons possess superior capabilities that would easily overshadow the threat posed by the Shahed, according to the pair, both former drone advisors to Ukraine's defense ministry.

"The mass use of this type of aerial attack weapon is what awaits us very soon," wrote Sternenko, who runs a major foundation that crowdfunds for Ukraine's military, in a Telegram post.

"Then we will remember the jet Shaheds only as a small problem compared to this," he added.

Beskrestnov, a drone analyst, said he had "long predicted that our adversary is betting on cheap cruise missiles for the future, not on jet Shaheds."

He wrote on his Telegram channel that the Filin can fly faster, maneuver better, and carry a heavier payload than Russia's current turbojet drones,

"They do not need drone ports, many of them can be launched from helicopters and UAVs. And most importantly, they can be produced from Russian components," Beskrestnov added.

A strike at nearly 500 mph for cheap

On Wednesday, Ukraine's military intelligence agency, GUR, released extensive details on the Filin, which it said Russia had begun deploying at the end of summer 2026.

The Filin, it said, is the "continuation of the trend of the Russian military-industrial complex to develop inexpensive air attack weapons with jet propulsion and ground launch."

The ground-launched missile can carry a 100kg warhead, and Russia has said that it can fly at speeds of almost 500 mph at a range of 745 miles. By comparison, the Kremlin's most advanced jet-powered drone deployed so far, the Geran-5, is known to fly at a maximum speed of 370 mph.

The Filin can also fly at "ultra-low altitudes" and as high as 3.7 miles, GUR said.

Similar to Russia's Shahed drones, the Filin features a carbon and fiberglass fuselage, with some of its parts produced via 3D printing, the intelligence service added.

And as with turbojet Shaheds, GUR also said that the Filin is filled with foreign electronics in its flight controller, inertial navigation system, equipment control unit, and counter-jamming hardware.

The agency listed 35 components from the US, including transistors and converters; 22 from China; and 13 more from Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the Netherlands.

Notably, GUR said the Filin's engine is Russian-made, compared to the Chinese engines used on many of Moscow's turbojet drones. The same engine has been found on other recently unveiled Russian missiles, such as the air-launched Kover and Monochrome.

Much of Russia's ability to reduce the cost of its new cruise missiles is owed to its use of commercial engines and components. Another high-profile Russian missile that also uses civilian tech is the Banderol, which emerged in the spring of 2025 and has been straining Ukraine's air defense networks in the last few months.

The Banderol flies more slowly and has a shorter range than the Filin, but it still reaches a max speed of 435 mph, making it much harder for Ukraine to intercept with drones. Its estimated price is $150,000 per unit — about a sixteenth the cost of a traditional Kh-101 cruise missile — so it's easier to mass-produce.

The frequent use of weapons like the Banderol over the summer has led to fears that Russia will lean into its tactic, often nicknamed "missile spam," to keep pushing Ukrainian air defenses.

"What is the Air Force command doing now to build up countermeasures in advance?" Sternenko wrote on Wednesday about the missile threat.

Ukraine's Defense Forces advanced more than 15 km through underground utility tunnels into Russia's rear on the Kupiansk axis in Kharkiv Oblast, the Khartiia Corps of Ukraine's National Guard reported on 22 October. The corps called it Operation Veles. The underground advance was paired with attacks on the surface and drone strikes, hitting Russian forces from two directions, the corps told Militarnyi.

Russian troops have repeatedly crawled through gas pipelines around Kupiansk to get behind Ukrainian lines, even after Ukraine reported confident control of the city in February. This time, Ukraine went underground itself. The operation took away Russia's chance to get into Kupiansk's rear, the corps said.

The corps reported more than 30 Russian soldiers captured and Russian losses of more than 100. Militarnyi, citing the unit, put the number of Russian troops killed at over 100.

Khartiia studied how Russian troops moved through pipes before going underground itself, the corps commander, Brigadier General Ihor Obolenskyi, said.

"We watched how the enemy works underground and studied how they do it. The Russians intended to use gas pipelines to get into the rear of our troops. So we went underground ourselves. We anticipated the enemy's actions and mastered the tactics of underground combat," he said.

For the operation, troops trained physically and psychologically to fight in confined spaces, sappers and engineers prepared the underground route, and special communications, navigation, silent logistics, and life-support systems were put in place, Khartiia told Militarnyi. The operation was named after Veles, the Slavic pagan god of the underworld.

Khartiia's brigade, the R.U.H. assault regiment, the Lava drone regiment, the Achilles drone brigade, and units of Ukraine's military intelligence, including the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, took part, the corps said.

Russia has used pipelines to infiltrate before

By September 2025, Russian forces had used pipelines to move troops behind Ukrainian lines three times, Ukrainian monitoring project DeepState reported on 12 September 2025. The first was in Avdiivka, the second near Sudzha, and the third near Kupiansk, where groups crossed the Oskil River through a gas pipe.

Near Sudzha in March 2025, Russian special forces walked through a pipeline that until recently had carried Russian gas to Europe, the Associated Press reported. A pro-Kremlin blogger claimed they covered about 15 km and that some spent several days inside.

Russian troops kept using the pipeline near Kupiansk this year. On 27 September, Khartiia's reconnaissance drones recorded Russian forces leading nine civilians, including children, elderly people, and a person on crutches, through the gas pipeline out of the Kupiansk community. Men of military age in civilian clothes walked alongside them, and the corps believes they were Russian soldiers using the group as cover to withdraw. Ukrainian troops held fire because of the civilians, the corps said, adding that the case has been documented for a war crimes investigation.

Why the war is moving underground

Drones, constant surveillance, and AI-assisted targeting have made the battlefield surface transparent and deadly, argue John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at West Point's Modern War Institute, and Col. Drew Craig, principal military engineering staff officer at NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. In an August analysis, they write that soldiers in Ukraine describe a "death zone" of some 30 km, where moving above ground can draw an attack within minutes. When firepower makes the surface too dangerous, armies have historically gone underground, as they did in World War I and Vietnam, and more recently in Gaza and Lebanon.

"Armies that cannot survive above ground must adapt below it," the authors write.

Fighting in tunnels brings its own requirements, the authors write: detecting the enemy by sound and vibration, and specialized unmanned systems that cannot rely on GPS or stable radio links. Long stretches underground also take a severe psychological and physical toll on soldiers.

Western militaries are not ready for this, Spencer and Craig write. No NATO partner maintains even general capabilities for large-scale underground warfare, and US and British efforts focused mainly on detecting and clearing tunnels rather than occupying and operating in them.

Russian forces are preparing to resume mechanized assaults in southern Ukraine after a pause of several months and are moving armored vehicles toward areas where they plan to launch offensives, Anastasiia Shevchenko, deputy spokesperson for the Southern Forces Grouping, told Ukrinform on 22 October. The Huliaipole axis remains the hottest in the Southern grouping’s zone, with 10 to 20 combat engagements reported on an average day, she said.

On the Huliaipole axis, one of Russia’s largest force groupings is fighting Ukrainian forces, comprising units from several Russian combined-arms armies, the spokesperson says. Over the past week, as the weather worsened, Russian forces began local assaults there with infantry, motorcycles, and armored vehicles, seeking to break through toward Zaporizhzhia and blockade the city, Ukraine’s 7th Air Assault Corps reported, adding that the area is one of Russia’s key priorities in southern Ukraine. Russia has used fog this way before: last November, Russian troops moved under its cover to avoid detection by Ukrainian drones as they advanced on Huliaipole, the Institute for the Study of War assessed.

Russian forces have abandoned large-scale assaults across a broad front and are attempting to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in small groups. They periodically use motorcycles and quad bikes for assaults, Shevchenko said, adding that these vehicles are fast and maneuverable.

However, Russian forces should not expect to advance unimpeded, the spokesperson noted. Ukrainian units control Russian supply routes and systematically detect and strike Russian personnel and equipment while they are still moving toward their launch positions, she added.

“Specifically, speaking in numbers, since the beginning of October alone, units of the Southern Forces Grouping (Forces) have destroyed more than 3,000 occupiers and 1,300 pieces of weapons and military equipment. Thus, the enemy is suffering significant losses in the operational zone of the Southern Forces Grouping (Forces),” the spokesperson concluded.

Ukrainian drones disrupt Russian logistics

Russian forces had stopped using military vehicles because Ukraine’s unmanned systems forces controlled their logistics, Shevchenko said in comments to Ukrinform on 16 September. Ukrainian drones spotted Russian troops and equipment in time and struck them mostly on their routes of advance, she said.

Ukrainian air strikes destroyed bridges near Polohy in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, complicating Russian supply operations along the Huliaipole axis, Ukraine’s 7th Air Assault Corps reported on 21 September. Russian forces had used these bridges to move personnel, heavy equipment, and ammunition for their offensive toward Orikhiv. Disruptions to logistics have forced Russian units to rely more on motorcycles, which are more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, the corps said.

Explore further

Ukraine timed its Huliaipole operation around the weather — and it worked. Here’s why that won’t happen again soon

Russian forces are also expected to use fog and rain as cover for assaults, Mykola Zinko, deputy commander of the unmanned systems battalion of the 5th Assault Brigade, said on 19 October. Russia has brought up reserves, and its heavy equipment will move out under the fog, he said.

France, Germany, Austria and Poland are expanding or reviewing the authority of critical infrastructure operators to defend facilities against drones, raising legal and operational questions over the growing role of civilian companies in national security.

European governments are reconsidering who should be authorised to intercept hostile drones as energy companies and critical infrastructure operators confront an increasingly serious threat to electricity networks, transport systems and other essential facilities.

France has already introduced legislation permitting approved operators to deploy counter-drone systems, while Germany is reviewing similar arrangements and Austria has announced plans to extend certain protective powers to infrastructure companies.

Poland has moved further by authorising designated security units to disable or destroy drones entering restricted areas around important energy installations.

The changes reflect concerns that national police and armed forces cannot provide permanent protection for every substation, power station, railway facility or pipeline against relatively inexpensive unmanned aircraft.

France establishes a new approach

In August 2026, the French parliament approved legislation allowing authorised operators of critical infrastructure and their contractors to detect, jam and intercept drones near designated facilities.

The legislation followed a series of reported drone incursions over sensitive locations, including military installations.

Under the French approach, operators of strategically important infrastructure may eventually use approved counter-drone systems without relying exclusively on the immediate intervention of military personnel.

Potential beneficiaries include electricity operators and organisations responsible for transport infrastructure.

French authorities are testing detection equipment, electronic countermeasures and interceptor drones at Brétigny-sur-Orge, south of Paris.

The programme examines systems capable of identifying approaching aircraft, determining whether they present a threat and initiating an appropriate response.

France intends to expand the protection of sites classified as strategically important, with further deployment planned during 2027.

The initiative would introduce responsibilities traditionally associated with military or police operations into the management of civilian infrastructure.

Germany and Austria reconsider existing restrictions

Germany is examining the legal conditions under which private companies and infrastructure operators could participate in active counter-drone operations.

At present, responsibility for neutralising threatening aircraft remains primarily with the competent public authorities.

The debate has intensified following security incidents involving unmanned aircraft, including the discovery of an explosives-laden drone near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle airport in August.

German authorities attributed the incident to Russia, an allegation Moscow denied.

The German government’s review concerns not only the equipment that companies may possess but also whether trained security personnel should be permitted to deploy countermeasures without waiting for a separate police authorisation.

Austria announced plans in September to extend comparable powers to selected critical infrastructure operators, including major energy companies.

The government has acknowledged the practical limitations of protecting a large number of widely dispersed installations using state security personnel alone.

Poland has already established restricted drone zones around sensitive energy facilities, with designated security units authorised to intercept aircraft entering those areas under applicable national rules.

Electricity networks face particular risks

Electricity infrastructure presents a difficult security problem because essential installations are distributed across extensive geographical areas.

Transmission operators manage thousands of kilometres of high-voltage lines, while substations, transformers and switching stations connect generation facilities to consumers.

A successful attack against critical equipment can produce consequences extending well beyond the immediate site.

Large power transformers are particularly difficult to replace. Manufacturing, transporting and installing specialised equipment can require lengthy preparation, making rapid recovery uncertain after serious damage.

European utilities have traditionally concentrated on physical security, maintenance and restoring services after technical failures or accidents.

The spread of drones creates additional demands for surveillance, early warning and the ability to respond before an attack reaches its target.

Russia’s repeated strikes against Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure have demonstrated the extensive disruption that attacks on power systems can cause.

European governments are now evaluating how comparable vulnerabilities could be exploited against their own networks.

Who bears responsibility for an interception?

Giving civilian operators access to counter-drone equipment raises unresolved legal questions.

Electronic jamming can interfere with communications and navigation systems beyond the targeted aircraft. A drone brought down over an industrial or residential area could injure members of the public or damage surrounding property.

Security personnel must also determine whether an unidentified drone is hostile, operating unlawfully or simply present because of an error by its operator.

A mistaken interception could expose infrastructure companies to compensation claims and other legal consequences.

European governments must therefore establish who can authorise an intervention, which countermeasures are permitted and how responsibility is allocated when damage occurs.

There is no uniform European approach.

Some operators support expanding their protective powers, while others argue that the use of force should remain the responsibility of the state.

Finland’s national electricity transmission operator, Fingrid, has expressed reservations about transferring such authority to energy companies.

The position reflects a wider concern that infrastructure operators should concentrate on maintaining essential services rather than assuming responsibilities for armed or coercive security operations.

A growing European security market

The regulatory debate is developing alongside a rapidly expanding market for counter-drone technology.

Manufacturers are offering equipment that integrates radar, optical sensors, electronic detection and software capable of classifying possible threats.

Interceptor drones and electronic countermeasures are increasingly being designed for use around civilian infrastructure rather than exclusively on military installations.

German defence company Rheinmetall has reported growing interest from private infrastructure operators in counter-drone protection.

However, the technology is advancing faster than the legal frameworks governing its use.

The immediate challenge for European governments is to establish protective arrangements that allow rapid intervention while preserving clear accountability.

A counter-drone system can identify an approaching aircraft within seconds. Determining who is authorised to stop it remains a matter for national law.

Intercepting a jet-powered Geran can cost anywhere from $2,000 to $4 million depending on the weapon used. Cheap interceptor drones are the only option that keeps air defense affordable, the foundation of Ukrainian top war volunteer Serhii Sternenko said on Telegram.

Russia’s jet Gerans now carry every characteristic of a small cruise missile, and Russians keep raising their speed in answer to each Ukrainian countermeasure. Former commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi has framed the shift bluntly: an expensive Cold War missile has become a cheap weapon fired in bulk, and the drone is now “a missile in all but name,” affordable to any side, not only wealthy countries.

Sternenko heads a charitable foundation that has purchased 291,502 FPV drones, which have helped Ukraine’s military down more than 12,954 aerial targets. Also, has advised the team of former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

Three ways to kill a jet Geran, and what each costs

The foundation laid out the price of each method:

• Aircraft (F-16, MiG-29, Su-27, Mirage 2000): $25,000 to $1.2 million per kill. Effective, but the stock of missiles is critically low, and some air-to-air types are no longer being replenished.
• Surface-to-air and shoulder-fired systems (IRIS-T, NASAMS, Vampire, Avenger): about $30,000 to $4 million. Good for shielding key sites, but a missile capable of reaching a jet Geran at 6 to 7 kilometers costs $0.5 million to $4 million.
• Interceptor drones (makers undisclosed): from $2,000. Cheap, with trained operators ready, but not yet scalable.

Why the cheapest option is the one that matters

No single tool is enough, the foundation stresses. Downing jet Gerans still needs aircraft, small aviation and missile systems together, but it is the interceptors that make the defense affordable, taking out the cheaper Shaheds and saving costly missiles for targets nothing else can reach.

The foundation says it has found a way to counter drones that already match small cruise missiles, working with Ukrainian manufacturers, without disclosing details. The method is far cheaper than other ways of downing jet Gerans and significantly strengthens air defense, it says, as part of a wider Ukrainian push to field interceptor drones fast enough to catch Russia’s fastest weapons.

The commander of an interceptor battalion in Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps said his unit destroyed several thousand Russian aerial targets during Operation Vivaldi, ArmyInform, the Defense Ministry’s news agency, reported on 21 October.

Operation Vivaldi is a Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast, where the 3rd Army Corps has reported liberating settlements. In its third phase, Ukrainian forces reclaimed five settlements and expanded their gains to 176 square kilometers. Strikes on Russian logistics and electronic warfare likely neutralized Russia’s drone defenses before Ukraine sent in armor, the Institute for the Study of War assessed.

The commander, who uses the callsign “Betsyk,” leads the interceptor battalion of the 1030th Anti-Aircraft Missile-Artillery Regiment “Aquila,” part of the 3rd Army Corps. He said Russian forces deployed large numbers of reconnaissance drones to locate Ukrainian positions after the corps began advancing.

Betsyk named Zala, Orlan, Supercam, Merlin, and Knyaz Veshchiy Oleg among the reconnaissance drones used by Russian forces.

Russia also brought in reinforcements and units operating strike drones, including first-person-view (FPV) quadcopters, Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones, and Lancet crews, he said. At one stage, Russian forces deployed crews from their Rubicon drone unit to disrupt the advance, but the move did not change the situation.

Explore further

Ukraine retook Kolodiazi north of Lyman as its drones hit 200-plus Russian vehicles in Operation Vivaldi’s last phase, Ukrainian drone officer says

Betsyk said his battalion’s work deprived Russian forces of the ability to strike Ukrainian troops and track their movements.

Jet-powered Shaheds: speed is the main challenge

The regiment also works against Russian strike drones heading for targets behind the front line. Betsyk said interceptor crews had destroyed some jet-powered drones, but not in significant numbers.

The main difficulty is speed, he said. Interceptor drones need to reach 500–600 km/h to intercept Russian jet-powered attack drones, according to Betsyk.

For now, the regiment mainly uses conventional air-defense systems against these targets: self-propelled anti-aircraft systems, surface-to-air missile systems, and portable surface-to-air missile systems. Betsyk said these systems were historically designed to engage jet-powered targets.

He compared the current challenge with the early use of piston-powered Shaheds. Those drones initially posed a serious threat but later became easier for Ukrainian air defenses to counter. Russia has largely stopped using piston-powered Shaheds on most fronts since summer, he said, but continues to use piston-powered Gerbera drones, which are relatively cheap and can partly exhaust Ukrainian air defenses. The main drones Russian forces use now are jet-powered Shaheds, he said.

Betsyk expects Russian forces to adapt if Ukraine fields effective interceptors against jet-powered drones. They will seek ways to evade the interceptors, increase speed, improve navigation, and change their tactics, he said. However, he added that the battalion had not observed a major evolution so far and did not expect the drones’ speed to double.

What the corps says Vivaldi achieved

Separately, 3rd Army Corps commander Andrii Biletskyi said Ukrainian forces retook 277 square kilometers and 16 settlements during Operation Vivaldi, Ukrainska Pravda reported. Biletskyi also said Russian losses exceeded 8,000 personnel, according to ArmyInform. These figures are Ukrainian claims and have not been independently verified.

Russia’s Rubicon drone unit, which is sent to hunt Ukrainian drone pilots, was not used to being hunted itself, Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi told journalists on 19 October. He was summing up Operation Vivaldi, which his Third Army Corps fought in northern Donetsk Oblast from May to mid-October. Once its pilots realized they were being killed, Rubicon’s morale dropped sharply, he said.

Russia has fought for 12 years to take all of Donetsk Oblast, and Sloviansk and Kramatorsk anchor the fortress belt of cities Ukraine still holds there. Vivaldi retook 277 km² in northern Donetsk Oblast. Biletskyi says it destroyed Russia’s bridgehead on the Chornyi Zherebets River and forced Moscow to drop its plan to bypass Lyman from the north and encircle the two cities. On that front, the Third Corps had flagged Rubicon, Russia’s elite drone unit, as a threat.

Hunting the hunters

Once a Rubicon position was found, the Third Assault Brigade and the KRAKEN drone regiment committed any number of FPV and bomber drones to destroy its crews, Biletskyi said.

The brigade’s commander, Yaroslav Levenets, said his troops prepared for Rubicon’s arrival and concentrated on killing its pilots. He gave no details.

“Not stable in defense,” Levenets said of Rubicon’s troops.

They dislike sitting in trenches, he said, and under pressure they grow nervous and change positions.

Named for four seasons

Biletskyi said the name was chosen at the very start of planning, in winter 2025–2026, many months before the operation began. The original plan had four stages, one for each season, and later grew to slightly more, ArmyInform reported.

When he first unveiled the operation in September, he put it this way:

“Vivaldi, as is known, has four seasons. And this is only the first one.”

He credited two planners, known by the call signs Yurist and Leshyi. Leshyi, an assault soldier wounded seven times who later moved to staff work, was killed. Yurist was seriously wounded.

Explore further

Ukraine blocks Russia from outflanking its fortress cities in Donbas, retaking 277 square kilometers and hitting 8,000 Russian troops

A new hand at the Third Corps

Major Dmytro Rohoziuk is now acting commander of the Third Army Corps, the corps press service said on 20 October. The press service said the move is not a transfer, and Biletskyi keeps his formal post as corps commander while he leads the “Center” grouping of the Third, 11th, and 19th corps.

Rohoziuk took over the 60th Mechanized Brigade in October 2025. Its previous commander was arrested in January after the State Bureau of Investigation accused him of embezzling about $1 million in weapons procurement. The brigade fought in all four phases of Vivaldi and retook Kolodiazi without street fighting.

Biletskyi also declined command of the Ground Forces, which oversee mobilization.

“There’s no point taking on something you don’t truly believe you can improve,” he said.

Biletskyi’s count

Russian losses in Vivaldi topped 8,000 troops, and about 270 Russian soldiers were taken prisoner, Biletskyi said. More than 20 officers surrendered, including a chief of staff and three company commanders.

The territory matters less than disrupting Russia’s strategic plan, he said. Russian forces still press toward Dobropillia, where Ukraine is counterattacking.

Patrol density along Lithuania’s border with Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave has practically doubled since soldiers joined the border guards there in early October. Lithuanian Armed Forces Commander Raimundas Vaikšnoras told LRT this in an interview. He linked the deployment to provocations and to what he described as Russian preparations for a large-scale mobilization.

Kaliningrad is a piece of Russia wedged between Lithuania and Poland on the Baltic Sea. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said people would naturally flee a Russian mobilization. Earlier, on 11 August, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Russia planned to mobilize several hundred thousand people by the end of 2026, after its parliamentary vote.

Commander: Russia lacks troops for a breakthrough

Vaikšnoras said Russia is struggling in Ukraine and needs to fill gaps in its capabilities. Moscow would probably like a breakthrough but lacks people, he added. In July, Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service estimated that Russia had signed about as many new military contracts this year as it had lost troops.

He also cited provocations. In Latvia, armed men recently tried to push migrants across the border, he noted, leaving open whether they were bandits or criminals. Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka denies everything, he added. On 6 October, Latvian Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava wrote that the escorts stood on the Belarusian side, were armed, and threatened Latvian soldiers.

Mission extended to mid-November

Lithuania decided to send troops after that Latvian incident. On 7 October, Interior Minister Martynas Katelynas asked Defense Minister Kaunas for troops to help the State Border Guard Service. Kaunas then approved up to 100 soldiers until 16 October, LRT reported.

On 16 October, Kaunas extended the mission to mid-November at Katelynas’s request. The Defense Ministry cited possible flows of people fleeing Kaliningrad and related illegal border crossings. It also said military intelligence sees no significant changes in military activity in Kaliningrad. Katelynas had earlier called the step preventive, BNS noted. He cited public, non-intelligence reports of a call-up planned after Russia’s parliamentary elections and said the threat level at the border had not risen.

Commander doubts Moscow’s intentions

Vaikšnoras said Russia and Belarus may not want open incidents that leave their traces right now. He added that he does not believe in their good intentions. He noted it has been said publicly that Russia’s capability in Kaliningrad is sharply reduced, because most of its forces are committed to Ukraine. Back in June 2025, Poland’s foreign minister said that, from what he knew, Russia had withdrawn a large part of its troops from the exclave.

Instead, hybrid attacks and sabotage that cannot be traced at once will probably continue, Vaikšnoras said. LRT noted the interview took place before a Ukrainian drone crashed in Pasvalys district on Sunday and before an attempted arson at premises used by SpaceX in Vilnius.

Reports that SpaceX temporarily restricted its satellite internet service for Ukraine’s armed forces have generated serious concern in Kyiv and among the country’s allies. SpaceX operates the civilian Starlink system and its lesser-known military-grade counterpart, called Starshield. But many news stories leave an important question unanswered: what does a Starshield “slowdown” mean on the battlefield? […]

The post Why Starshield’s slowdown really hurts Ukraine appeared first on Asia Times.

• A new Ukrainian list of foreign parts in Russia's anti-jamming antenna is filled with US electronics.
• GUR published a catalog of US digital processors, chips, and other components found in the Kometa.
• These arrays are used to help Shaheds and Iskander-M missiles navigate and suppress jamming.

Over two dozen US processors, chips, and other components have been found in Russia's anti-jamming antenna systems, according to Ukraine's military intelligence.

The Ukrainian agency, GUR, published a list of foreign parts on Monday that it said were discovered in 16-element Kometa modules, one of Russia's more advanced systems that help drones and ballistic missiles suppress electronic warfare and navigate the skies.

US-headquartered firms produced 28 out of 37 foreign components — or just over three-quarters — listed on Monday, per GUR.

Ten American brands and their components were identified in the catalog, posted on GUR's War and Sanctions page. These include digital processors from Intel subsidiary Altera, radio-frequency and precision components from Analog Devices, a memory chip from Micron, and supporting electronics from Texas Instruments.

Another three components are built by Chinese companies, while the other six come from Japanese, Taiwanese, and Swiss manufacturers, GUR also indicated.

In a statement to Business Insider, a Texas Instruments spokesperson said the company "strongly opposes the use of our chips in Russian military equipment."

"Any shipments of TI chips into Russia are illicit and unauthorized. We devote significant time and resources to developing, implementing, and refining policies and procedures to combat illicit diversion and keep chips out of the hands of bad actors," they added.

Intel, Analog Devices, and Micron did not immediately respond to requests for comment sent outside regular business hours by Business Insider.

The new list from GUR, which regularly publishes information on foreign parts in Russian equipment, comes as the electronic warfare race grows more vital to Ukraine's air defense.

Kyiv's forces try to stop Russian drone and missile attacks with a mix of jamming tools and interceptors, but the latter are facing difficulty as Moscow has begun mass-launching faster, jet-powered drones — the slowest of which can fly at about 185 mph.

Kometa antenna panels are among the most common anti-jamming tools on Russian long-range weapons, such as Shahed drones, Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and glide bombs.

Each antenna receives satellite signals and helps to counter jamming or spoofing.

The 16-element Kometa, which essentially has an array of 16 antennas, is one of Russia's newer versions of the system in mass production. Two years ago, Moscow was regularly using eight-element Kometas on its Shaheds instead.

• The Marines are fielding new medical gear to treat casualties when evacuation is delayed.
• New portable blood coolers and warmers will help corpsmen treat wounded troops closer to combat.
• AI-assisted ultrasounds could help front-line medics identify internal injuries and prioritize evacuation.

The US Marine Corps has begun fielding new medical equipment meant to help troops survive when wounded service members can't be quickly evacuated from the battlefield.

The new technology is designed to store blood, identify internal injuries, and treat wounded service members closer to the battlefield as the military prepares for future wars in which casualties may be unable to reach a hospital for hours or even days.

The equipment includes improved, lighter-weight mobile blood coolers, better blood warmers, and small AI-assisted ultrasound devices and is designed to help Navy corpsmen and other providers treat casualties with less bulky equipment and less reliance on extensive medical infrastructure.

During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US air supremacy frequently allowed helicopters to quickly evacuate wounded troops to well-equipped and defended medical facilities near the battlefield.

The proliferation of drone warfare and other technological advancements seen in Ukraine has, however, raised doubts about whether rapid casualty evacuations will be possible in future conflicts. Now, military planners assume that a sophisticated foe is likely to possess tools that could severely disrupt military tasks such as casualty evacuation, resupply, and communications.

Throughout the post 9/11 wars in the Middle East, the military planned on getting wounded troops to advanced medical facilities within an hour, said Navy Capt. Shari Gentry, the Marine Corps' deputy medical officer, speaking to reporters at a media event near Quantico, Virginia. "And we do not foresee that being the case."

The Corps has already begun distributing the systems to medical units, with some equipment reaching troops deployed to the Middle East.

Among the new devices is a portable refrigerator capable of storing approximately 30 units of blood, potentially enough for four seriously wounded Marines, according to military medical guidance. Each battalion aid station is set to receive one, giving medical personnel a supply of blood closer to the battlefield.

Weighing about 60 pounds, it replaces a system that weighs over twice as much and uses rechargeable batteries already common throughout the Marine Corps. The smaller refrigerator allows medical teams to maintain blood supplies without relying continuously on generators or fuel deliveries, said Navy Cmdr. Kyleigh Hupfl, the Corps' clinical lead for Expeditionary Medical Systems.

The capability has already proved useful in the Middle East, Hupfl said. The Corps accelerated delivery after units raised concerns about the reliability of existing refrigeration equipment. One unit told her that the new device allowed it to maintain a ready supply of blood throughout its deployment.

Small deviations in temperature can render blood and other pharmaceuticals unusable. "We need to be able to bring cold chain distribution forward without relying on heavy generators, and we need to be able to do that in a sustainable way," she said.

The service is also fielding new portable blood warmers that can deliver warmed fluids faster than the previous equipment. The warmer works by passing blood through a tube, warming it before it flows into a patient's veins. Such warmth is crucial to prevent hypothermia, a serious complication in injured patients.

Another major change involves portable ultrasound machines equipped with AI-assisted imaging. Previously held only at higher levels of battlefield medical care, the new machines are now being pushed toward the lowest level of tactical care, known as Role 1 facilities, where Navy corpsmen and physicians provide immediate life-saving care for wounded Marines.

The AI software helps users identify anatomical structures on ultrasound images, allowing providers with less ultrasound experience to spot signs of internal bleeding or other injuries that might otherwise be difficult to detect. That information can also help medical teams determine which casualties need evacuation or surgery most urgently, said Navy Chief Petty Officer Matthew Brown, the chief biomedical equipment technician for the Corps' Expeditionary Medical Systems.

"I have 10 people that are hurt. Who should I get out?" Brown said of the dilemma and the new ultrasounds being fielded to front-line medics to address it. "And at the end of the day, that's what's going to save their life."

• Ukraine is funding air defense missiles with a hard cap of $20,000 per shot, Brave1's chief said.
• That's about a sixth the cost of a Stinger missile, and still cheaper than an APWKS 70mm rocket.
• It's one of Kyiv's responses to Russia's thousands-strong, inexpensive Shahed fleets.

Ukraine has been running a yearslong weapons program to develop cheap surface-to-air missiles that cost no more than $20,000 each, said Andrii Hrytseniuk, the head of its Brave1 startup incubator.

Several firms have been testing prototypes under this framework, and Kyiv is "preparing to put two of these companies into combat," Hrytseniuk said in a video interview published with Ukrainska Pravda on Thursday.

He expressed hope that a third would soon reach a similar stage.

Hrytseniuk said some of these manufacturers have managed to get costs down to $10,000 per missile, though the program has set a hard price cap of $20,000 per shot.

"This is significantly cheaper than the cost of a Shahed. Even if you need two or three missiles, it is still several times cheaper than the cost of a Shahed," said Hrytseniuk of the limit.

Hrytseniuk said the program was launched by Brave1 as a competition between Ukrainian firms to "create the cheapest anti-aircraft missile systems possible."

"Funding for missiles began in 2024, but making a missile takes even more time than making an interceptor drone," he added.

A price limit of $20,000 would make these Ukrainian missiles even cheaper than the AGR-Falco Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, an American-made unguided 70mm rocket fitted with a laser guidance kit.

Costing about $30,000 to $35,000 each, these were traditionally air-to-ground rockets that have now been converted for air defense in Ukraine. The cheapest US standard surface-to-air missile is the shoulder-mounted Stinger, which costs about $120,000 per missile.

The Ukrainian effort to lower air defense costs comes as a response to Russia's extensive Shahed attack drone fleets, which are numerous and cheaper to produce than typical missiles. Ukrainian officials have estimated that the Russian Geran-2, for example, costs $70,000 each, while jet-powered drones like the Geran-3 cost at least $100,000.

Kyiv uses a layered network of defense systems, including machine gun crews, interceptor quadcopters, and electronic warfare, to fight against these drones, which Russia can launch hundreds of at a time.

But Moscow has increasingly used jet-powered Gerans, which fly too fast for regular interceptor drones and human gun crews to keep up with. A new AI-powered terrain mapping system found on some Gerans has also raised concerns that Russia will soon be able to bypass Ukrainian jamming.

Ukraine's alternative has been air-defense missiles, such as the air-launched AIM-9 Sidewinder, which can cost about half a million dollars per shot.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said earlier this month that his country was working on a "small missile program" as a counter to jet-powered Gerans.

"There are several types. We will clearly see the result this month. At the end, in the second half of this month," he told reporters at a press conference.

In September, Hrytseniuk told Business Insider's Jake Epstein that several Ukrainian companies were also integrating artificial intelligence into strike missile systems and were seeing "first successes."

Ukrainian infantry encircled and retook the village of Kolodiazi north of Lyman without getting drawn into street fighting, while a drone battalion kept the sky above them shut, the battalion’s chief of staff told Suspilne on 18 October. The village fell during the fourth and final phase of Operation Vivaldi, Ukraine’s counteroffensive in northern Donetsk Oblast.

For years now, Russia has aimed to seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River. It needs this area to encircle Ukraine’s fortress belt of Donetsk Oblast cities from the northwest, ISW assesses. Vivaldi’s four phases retook 277 km² and 16 settlements on that approach, and a veteran of the operation has said Ukraine’s assault troops suffered more than ten times fewer casualties than Russian forces doing it.

Drones over the infantry

The 60th Mechanized Brigade fought in all four phases of Vivaldi and took Kolodiazi in the last one, said the chief of staff of the brigade’s Fatum unmanned systems battalion, callsign Krash.

“Our task, as an unmanned systems battalion, was to escort and ‘close’ the air in front of our infantry to make it impossible for the enemy to hit it. To suppress all the firing assets possible,” he said.

The brigade’s 3rd Mechanized Battalion, the main striking force, encircled Kolodiazi and retook it without getting drawn into street fighting, Krash said. The 1st Mechanized Battalion kept Russian reinforcements out of the area, while drone crews suppressed artillery, hit supply runs, and worked against Russian drone operators.

Explore further

Vivaldi counteroffensive advanced after Ukraine took Russia’s drones out of the fight, ISW assesses

500 troops and 200-plus vehicles

The drone battalion killed or wounded about 500 Russian troops during the fourth phase and struck Russian armored vehicles, trucks, and motorbikes, its chief of staff said.

“More than two hundred pieces of various equipment: Grad and Uragan multiple rocket launchers, various armored vehicles, tanks, armored combat vehicles. Most of all motorbikes and quad bikes, there the count runs into the hundreds. This is our enemy’s main logistics tool,” he said.

Ghost villages

The villages retaken in northern Donetsk Oblast are nearly empty of civilians, Krash said.

“It’s very typical for de-occupied settlements: these are ghost towns. You can see right away where the occupier stepped. All the settlements are under the control of the Third Army Corps, our forces stand there and prevent enemy infiltration. But civilian life in these towns is either absent or very scarce,” he said.

Third Army Corps commander Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi reported Kolodiazi’s liberation, along with Zelena Dolyna and Lypove, when he summed up Vivaldi’s fourth phase, which secured 101 km².

• Ukraine's drone pilots want masses of cheap, simple drones, a soldier and analyst said.
• Western manufacturers overcomplicate them and "get it so wrong," he added.
• Operators want drones they can tweak near the front and send out in large numbers.

Ukrainian drone operators need masses of relatively simple drones without a bunch of flashy features, a soldier with firsthand experience explained, cautioning the West against making them too complicated as it readies for future drone fights.

Ukraine's fight against Russia's invasion is a grinding war of attrition that is consuming weaponry so fast that combatants need affordable weapons in huge numbers, and battlefield technology becomes obsolete so quickly that soldiers need systems they can update easily to keep them relevant in battle.

Dmytro "Liber" Zhluktenko, a former drone operator who is now a lessons learned analyst in Ukraine's 413th Unmanned Systems Regiment "RAID," told Business Insider that "we need something that works great but doesn't have superfluous features."

"That is something that most of the Western defense technology manufacturers, they get it so wrong," he said. Consider first-person-view attack drones, "we need something that is really basic."

"We are yet to find Western manufacturers that are able to produce, let's say 500,000 FPV drones, simple ones that just work, that are fine-tuned without any extra autonomy or extra navigation or any features like that," he added, describing what Ukraine needs most as something pilots can easily take straight into combat.

Western-made drone tech, he said, is often "too complicated, often detached from the battlefield, and much more expensive than Ukrainian options doing the same job. Therefore, most of the drones used at Ukraine's battlefield are Ukrainian-made."

His assessment of the situations draws on both his experience as a drone operator and his role as an analyst, where he looks at battlefield trends, interviews operators, meets with foreign defense manufacturers, prepares briefs for higher command, and organizes the sharing of information between Ukrainian units.

Simple drones give soldiers more flexibility

Part of the appeal of simpler drones is that Ukrainian operators can adapt them themselves.

Near the front, soldiers routinely modify weapons to keep them useful as the battlefield changes, and some units even have their own R&D centers.

They often want drones and other combat systems that are basic, generic platforms they can rework, upgrade, or configure for different missions, much like ground robots that can be assembled with different weapons or components like Lego sets.

Ukrainian companies and foreign companies that work with units know this is happening, work with unit engineers to help keep products updated, and are often surprised by the ways soldiers modify their gear. Companies are increasingly making their products modular, both so they can upgrade the products more easily and so soldiers can make their own changes near the front.

Zhluktenko said Ukraine's operators want products they can "tune ourselves, we would change the components or whatever as we need, because that's the normal process. But something like the basic platform that it could build upon."

He said it's "bonkers" that, despite the West's "significant industrial capacities," they aren't seeing anyone produce something simple and effective at scale.

Zhluktenko said that many Western manufacturers are still "stuck in this doctrine of building tools in small quantities that maybe yes, they do have some extra features, but that's not something that is way too relevant for Ukraine's combat."

The case for cheaper drones in greater numbers

Zhluktenko's comments echo warnings from Western and Ukrainian officials that this war has shown the West the limits of relying on smaller numbers of exquisite, highly advanced weapons.

Modern, large-scale warfare, as the situation in Ukraine has demonstrated, may also require much larger numbers of cheaper, less capable gear.

Ukraine is still buying and building advanced drone technology with cutting-edge features like autonomy, which can be critical for warfighting tasks such as intercepting Russia's attack drones or executing long-range strikes that need to break through the enemy's electronic warfare.

Zhluktenko said that it's about "balance," arguing that simpler drones remain essential and are often needed in far greater numbers. Ukrainian companies like SkyFall and General Cherry are producing these kinds of drones at scale, he said.

A representative for Ukrainian drone and technology company TechEx told Business Insider that Western manufacturers often have to deal with heavier, peacetime regulations.

They may have "levels of additional software and hardware that's put on top of it instead of making it a bare, functional, ready to go system here and now," she said.

That can "overcomplicate the operation of the system," she added. It can also make the manufacturing process more complex, so it's harder to produce the large volumes that some Ukrainian manufacturers can.

She described it as the contrast between "wartime operations and the peacetime operations." She said Western companies might have different processes and priorities if they needed to work faster and on a bigger scale.

Western officials say the war shows that allies need much larger volumes of cheap weapons, with leaders like Danish defense minister Troels Lund Poulsen previously telling Business Insider that "one of the lessons" from Ukraine is that the West needs far greater quantities of inexpensive weaponry.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said last year that "speed is of the essence, not perfection."

Drones are central to Ukraine's fight, and it says they now cause as much as 95% of Russia's front-line losses. But using drones effectively can require deploying large numbers of them, knowing that many will never reach their targets. That means making systems that are cheap and workable is key.

Zhluktenko said that when it comes to drones, the mindset should be about "spending thousands of dollars, not hundreds of thousands."

A recent breakthrough in airborne drone control has offered a tangible glimpse into the future of US air combat, signaling the US Air Force’s accelerating push to integrate autonomous wingmen alongside frontline fighters. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that a US Air Force F-22 Raptor pilot successfully controlled an uncrewed YFQ-44A Fury fighter […]

The post US racing to field drone wingmen to close fighter gap with China appeared first on Asia Times.