President Donald Trump said Tuesday that the United States must decide whether to secure victory over Iran the “nice way or the not nice way,” as his administration weighs further military action to prevent Tehran from rebuilding its nuclear weapons capabilities.
The post Trump Weighs Next Move Against Iran: ‘The Nice Way or the Not Nice Way’ appeared first on Breitbart.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pledged Sunday to “complete the mission” against Iran alongside President Donald Trump after receiving what he called an “extraordinary endorsement” from the president, who warned that replacing Netanyahu could leave America to confront Tehran alone.
The post Netanyahu After Trump Endorsement: ‘Together We Will Complete the Mission’ Against Iran appeared first on Breitbart.
Nel dicembre 2021, la Russia presentò agli Stati Uniti e alla NATO due bozze di accordi formali per ottenere garanzie di sicurezza legalmente vincolanti, facendo intendere che se non fossero state accolte ci sarebbero state delle conseguenze.
In effetti, dopo il rifiuto di Washington di prenderle in considerazione, il 24 febbraio 2022 la Federazione Russa intraprese l’Operazione Militare Speciale in Ucraina, ancora in corso.
Tra le richieste avanzate allora da Mosca sottolineiamo:
Stati Uniti e NATO nel 2021 rifiutarono le richieste principali (in particolare il veto sull’allargamento della NATO e il ritiro delle infrastrutture militari ai confini del 1997), offrendo invece di negoziare su temi specifici come il controllo degli armamenti e la trasparenza delle esercitazioni.
Perciò, il 17 febbraio 2022 Mosca consegnò una contro-risposta formale agli Stati Uniti, lamentando la mancanza di disponibilità a fornire garanzie vincolanti e preannunciando la necessità di adottare misure ‘tecnico-militari’: pochi giorni dopo ci fu l’invasione dell’Ucraina.
La Russia aveva fondati motivi per ritenere che Kiev stesse per entrare nella NATO e uno dei bersagli inziali dei suoi missili balistici (13 marzo e 17 maggio 2022) furono proprio i centri di addestramento ucraini di Yavoriv (nella zona di Leopoli, vicino al confine polacco ma all’interno dei confini ucraini), a tutti gli effetti infrastrutture della NATO, come visibile nelle mappe della stessa Alleanza Atlantica (1).
Tralasciando le questioni diplomatiche e l’auspicata volontà comune di riaffermare i principi delle Nazioni Unite che venivano espressi nel documento presentato da Mosca e sui quali l’Amministrazione Trump ha tirato oggi una riga definitiva, è interessante capire se siano stati compiuti dei passi da parte dell’attuale presidenza statunitense per venire incontro alle richieste russe (2).
All’art. 1: Russia e U.S.A. non intraprenderanno azioni né parteciperanno o sosterranno attività che pregiudichino la sicurezza dell’altra Parte; non attueranno misure di sicurezza – adottate da ciascuna Parte individualmente o nell’ambito di un’organizzazione internazionale, di un’alleanza militare o di una coalizione – che possano compromettere gli interessi fondamentali di sicurezza dell’altra Parte.
Sul supporto decisivo dell’intelligence USA e dei grandi gruppi tecnologici statunitensi (da Starlink a Palantir, entrambi vicini all’Amministrazione Trump) all’Ucraina al fine di colpire il territorio della Federazione Russa ho già ampiamente scritto in precedenza e perciò non mi soffermo (3).
Articolo 2
Le Parti si adopereranno affinché tutte le organizzazioni internazionali, le alleanze militari e le coalizioni a cui partecipa almeno una delle Parti si attengano ai principi sanciti dalla Carta delle Nazioni Unite.
Abbiamo assistito recentemente alla doppia aggressione condotta dalla “Coalizione Epstein” all’Iran, senza alcun fondamento nel diritto internazionale e senza alcuna considerazione dei “principi sanciti dalla Carta delle Nazioni Unite”. Per non parlare del supporto statunitense ai bombardamenti israeliani su Siria, Libano e Yemen (aggressione alla quale contribuisce in gran parte l’Arabia Saudita) o del rapimento illegittimo del Presidente venezuelano Maduro.
Articolo 3
Le Parti non utilizzeranno i territori di altri Stati allo scopo di preparare o compiere un attacco armato contro l’altra Parte o altre azioni che pregiudichino gli interessi fondamentali di sicurezza dell’altra Parte.
Naturalmente, la violazione di questo articolo non avviene solo utilizzando il territorio ucraino per colpire la Russia; recentemente, sul sito del Ministero della Difesa di Mosca è comparso un elenco di venti aziende europee accusate di essere parte integrante dell’apparato militare-industriale ucraino. Quattro hanno sede in Italia, tre in Germania, due in Gran Bretagna, due in Polonia, due in Turchia, due in Repubblica Ceca, poi sono rappresentate anche imprese con basi in Israele, Spagna, Paesi Bassi, Lituania e Lettonia. Tutto ciò avviene con il consenso implicito degli Stati Uniti. Anche le infrastrutture della NATO e le basi militari statunitensi in Europa (Sigonella ad esempio in Italia nel 2022) contribuiscono così ad alimentare questo conflitto (4).
Articolo 4
Gli Stati Uniti d’America si impegneranno a impedire un’ulteriore espansione verso Est dell’Organizzazione del Trattato del Nord Atlantico e a negare l’adesione all’Alleanza agli Stati dell’ex Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche. Gli Stati Uniti d’America non stabiliranno basi militari nel territorio degli Stati dell’ex Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche che non siano membri dell’Organizzazione del Trattato del Nord Atlantico, né utilizzeranno le loro infrastrutture per attività militari di alcun tipo, né svilupperanno con essi una cooperazione militare bilaterale.
Senza trascurare l’immediato ingresso di Svezia e Finlandia nella NATO all’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale, l’attuale Amministrazione a Washington ha annunciato l’invio di ulteriori 5.000 soldati statunitensi in Polonia e l’istituzione di una nuova base militare permanente nel Paese (ridenominata “Fort Trump”). Ma gli U.S.A. non si sono fermati qui; in Armenia, nazione che fa ancora formalmente parte dell’Organizzazione per il Trattato di Sicurezza Collettiva e dell’Unione Economica Eurasiatica, lo scorso settembre Washington e Erevan hanno tenuto un nuovo ciclo di consultazioni bilaterali sulla difesa e firmato un verbale congiunto d’intesa (jointly agreed minutes) per dare seguito alla Charter on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership sottoscritta nel maggio 2026. Gli accordi discussi riguardano:
Supporto alla trasformazione e riforma delle Forze Armate armene.
Addestramento di sottufficiali (NCO), istruttori, comandanti junior e personale per il mantenimento della pace (peacekeeping).
Istruzione militare ed esercitazioni congiunte.
Sviluppo delle capacità industriali della difesa e potenziale fornitura di equipaggiamenti tramite il programma Foreign Military Sales (FMS) e programmi educativi come l’IMET, orientando l’Armenia verso una progressiva modernizzazione degli standard militari occidentali.
Articolo 5
Le Parti si asterranno dallo schierare le proprie Forze Armate e i propri armamenti – anche nell’ambito di organizzazioni internazionali, alleanze militari o coalizioni – in aree in cui tale schieramento potrebbe essere percepito dall’altra Parte come una minaccia alla propria sicurezza nazionale, fatta eccezione per lo schieramento all’interno dei territori nazionali delle Parti stesse. Le Parti si asterranno dal far volare bombardieri pesanti equipaggiati con armamenti nucleari o non nucleari, o dallo schierare navi da guerra di superficie di qualsiasi tipo – anche nell’ambito di organizzazioni internazionali, alleanze militari o coalizioni – in aree situate rispettivamente al di fuori dello spazio aereo nazionale e delle acque territoriali nazionali, dalle quali sia possibile colpire obiettivi nel territorio dell’altra Parte.
Poco più di un mese fa, si è tenuta un’esercitazione aerea della NATO nel nord-est della Polonia, nelle vicinanze di Kaliningrad con alcune decine di velivoli. All’esercitazione hanno partecipato caccia statunitensi e norvegesi, un aereo di sorveglianza NATO E-3A Sentry AWACS, velivoli per il rifornimento in volo e un aereo statunitense EA-37B per la guerra elettronica: Mosca teme che si tratti di manovre preparatorie all’isolamento dell’enclave russa dal resto della Federazione e ha risposto duramente ma soltanto sul piano diplomatico. Inoltre, la NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), la difesa antimissile balistica dell’Alleanza Atlantica, è una rete costituita da sensori e da sistemi missilistici che i Paesi Membri offrono quale contributo nazionale alla struttura, i cui punti di riferimento in Europa sono lo European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), statunitense, con il sistema americano Aegis Ashore schierato in Romania e Polonia e le navi Aegis per la BMD, stazionate nelle acque spagnole. Il sistema radar della IAMD si trova in Turchia, mentre l’infrastruttura di comando e controllo in Germania (5). Nel 2016 (grazie all’annullamento del Trattato ABM deciso da Trump) gli Stati Uniti hanno prima messo in funzione una base ABM in Romania, un sistema che utilizza lanciamissili Aegis potenzialmente in grado di lanciare Tomahawk con testata nucleare ad oltre 2400 chilometri di distanza, successivamente nel 2022 hanno costruito un sito Aegis in Polonia, ancora più vicino ai confini russi. Gli Stati Uniti hanno sempre sostenuto che i siti ABM hanno lo scopo di fermare le testate puntate sull’Europa dall’Iran o dalla Corea del Nord. Mosca ovviamente non la pensa così; François Geleznikoff, direttore delle applicazioni militari presso la Commissione per l’energia atomica e le energie alternative, intervenne nel marzo 2019 in audizione presso l’Assemblea Nazionale francese sull’argomento contraddicendo Washington: “Negli Stati Uniti, la Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) non si rivolge realmente alla Corea del Nord (gli americani hanno armi che permetterebbero loro di vetrificare il Paese più volte) ma piuttosto alla Russia, in risposta alle dichiarazioni del presidente Putin” (6).
Articolo 6
Le Parti si impegnano a non dislocare missili a raggio intermedio e a corto raggio lanciabili da terra al di fuori dei propri territori nazionali, né in aree dei propri territori nazionali dalle quali tali armi possano colpire obiettivi situati nel territorio nazionale dell’altra Parte.
Il 22 settembre 2026, Stati Uniti, Danimarca e Groenlandia hanno firmato a New York un accordo di sicurezza trilaterale che prevede l’apertura e la gestione di due nuove basi militari americane e la modernizzazione di quella esistente. Gli Stati Uniti ottengono ampie libertà di movimento (aria, terra e mare) per collegare le basi e la possibilità di utilizzare l’isola per il sistema di difesa missilistica (la Pituffik Space Base – ex Thule Air Base – nel nord-ovest dell’isola, ospita sistemi radar d’allerta precoce per i missili balistici). Il sistema difensivo pensato dagli Stati Uniti si evolverà da una presenza concentrata in un unico punto a una rete di strutture distribuite su tutta l’isola. Anche perché le due nuove basi non saranno le uniche installazioni militari che si insedieranno sull’isola (7).
Articolo 7
Le Parti si asterranno dal dislocare armi nucleari al di fuori dei propri territori nazionali e riporteranno nei propri territori nazionali le armi già dislocate all’estero al momento dell’entrata in vigore del Trattato. Le Parti elimineranno tutte le infrastrutture esistenti per il dislocamento di armi nucleari al di fuori dei propri territori nazionali. Le Parti non addestreranno personale militare o civile proveniente da Paesi non dotati di armi nucleari all’uso di tali armi. Le Parti non condurranno esercitazioni o attività di addestramento per forze convenzionali che prevedano scenari di impiego di armi nucleari.
A partire dal 13 ottobre 2026, si svolgerà in Italia Steadfast Noon, ‘Mezzogiorno risoluto’, l’esercitazione che l’Alleanza atlantica svolge ogni anno e che coinvolgerà le basi aeree di Aviano, in provincia di Pordenone, e Ghedi, nel Bresciano, oltre a diverse località in tutta l’area di responsabilità ben oltre il Nord del Paese. “È necessario il contributo congiunto di tutti gli Alleati: si tratta di un’iniziativa che non può limitarsi a un singolo Paese”, ha riferito il colonnello David Bull, capo delle operazioni nucleari della Nato, facendo riferimento al fatto che anche lo spazio aereo dei Paesi limitrofi potrebbe essere coinvolto. Vi parteciperanno velivoli in grado di svolgere missioni convenzionali e nucleari, anche se l’esercitazione non prevede l’impiego di armi atomiche. “Ma siamo in sintonia con Roma sul fatto che si tratti di un’esercitazione nucleare”, ha poi precisato Barrows. Gli Stati Uniti saranno presenti con equipaggi di volo e personale addetto alla manutenzione. Secondo gli stessi documenti del Pentagono, in Italia sarebbero dislocate circa 80 ordigni nucleari sotto controllo statunitense nelle basi militare italiane a Ghedi e Aviano (8).
Conclusioni
Il sintetico panorama offerto da questo articolo vuole dimostrare che la Russia non potrà cantare vittoria nemmeno dopo aver completato la conquista del Donbass, perché l’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale in Ucraina è legato a considerazioni di sicurezza geopolitica tuttora irrisolte se non addirittura aggravatesi rispetto al 2022.
Se qualcuno al Cremlino crede che dopo un eventuale accordo con l’attuale Amministrazione U.S.A., la Russia verrà lasciata stare si sbaglia di grosso, perché l’Occidente collettivo si sta già preparando non solo al dopo Putin ma anche al dopo Trump.
L’obiettivo degli Stati Uniti non è altro che prendere tempo in attesa del verificarsi di almeno una delle due condizioni: l’allontanamento di Mosca dalla partnership strategica con Pechino e il conseguente rallentamento della dedollarizzazione – gli Stati Uniti non pagheranno di certo il diesel russo in rubli – e la fine della preparazione da parte della NATO ad un conflitto diretto contro la Russia – termine individuato nel 2030, quando sicuramente Trump non sarà più alla Casa Bianca.
Dal punto di vista occidentale la considerazione della Russia non è cambiata molto da quando il direttore della rivista “Foreign Policy”, l’israelo-statunitense John Feffer, la definì una “Nigeria con le armi nucleari”; secondo questa visione, Mosca deve tornare ad essere una sorta di ‘colonia estrattiva’ o ‘appendice di materie prime’ a esclusivo vantaggio delle industrie euro-statunitensi. A maggior ragione nel momento in cui la competizione tecnologica con la Cina necessita da parte degli Stati Uniti di quelle risorse strategiche di cui la Federazione Russa è ricca.
Pochi giorni fa, i 32 membri del Comitato Militare della NATO (quello statunitense in primis), erano a Kiev per ribadire il loro sostegno incondizionato all’Ucraina “rimasta costantemente al centro delle valutazioni, delle decisioni e della pianificazione futura dell’Alleanza”. Prima di fare qualsiasi altra concessione a Washington, Vladimir Putin dovrebbe pensarci bene: passare da una vittoria tattica ad una sconfitta strategica potrebbe essere più semplice di quanto sembra.
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(1) https://www.nato.int/structur/nmlo/links/yavoriv-training-centre.pdf. Il sito internet è oggi irraggiungibile (forse per mascherare le prove?), ma la sua presenza come infrastruttura dell’Alleanza Atlantica era rintracciabile ancora nel giugno 2024. Come ammise anche il “Corriere della Sera”, i morti furono più di 300 e tra di essi numerosi soldati e addestratori della NATO: Giulia Fasano, Nella base militare di Yavoriv i morti sono stati trecento, 26 marzo 2022. Anche secondo il quotidiano “Repubblica”: “Il ‘Centro internazionale per la pace e la sicurezza’ di Yavoriv ospitava istruttori occidentali, come conferma il Ministro della Difesa di Kiev”.
(2) Il documento completo è stato pubblicato sul sito internet del Ministero degli Esteri della Federazione Russa: Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees, 17 dicembre 2021.
(3) Ad esempio, cfr. Le basi della CIA in Ucraina: chiave del contenimento anti-russo in Europa, “Strategic Culture Foundation”, 11 aprile 2026.
(4) Nel contesto del conflitto in Ucraina e della postura di deterrenza della NATO, le basi militari presenti sul territorio italiano (gestite sia dalle Forze Armate italiane che dagli Stati Uniti) svolgono funzioni chiave di sorveglianza aerea, intelligence, logistica e comando, cfr. ad esempio Federico Petrangeli, Supporting Kyiv: Italy’s Military Assistance between Strategic Continuity and Political Division, IAI, 11 giugno 2026.
(5) Senato della Repubblica italiana, Schema di decreto ministeriale di approvazione del programma pluriennale di A/R n. SMD 32/2025, relativo all’ammodernamento, al rinnovamento e al potenziamento della capacità nazionale di difesa aerea e missilistica a protezione del territorio nazionale e dell’Alleanza Atlantica, alla protezione di teatro delle forze schierate in aree di operazione, inclusa la componente navale (n. 377), Resoconto sommario del 4 febbraio 2026.
(6) Stefano Vernole, La forza di dissuasione nucleare francese, Focus CeSEM, 3 maggio 2022.
(7) Stefano Vernole, Gli Stati Uniti hanno messo le mani sulla Groenlandia dimostrando la totale irrilevanza dell’Unione Europea, “Strategic Culture Foundation”, 5 ottobre 2026.
(8) Redazione Peacelink, L’esercitazione nucleare della NATO Steadfast Noon 2026 comincerà sui cieli italiani il 13 ottobre.
Zelensky et son régime à Kiev sont les « plus grands obstacles à la paix », selon son ancienne porte-parole.
Cela aurait dû faire la une des journaux la semaine dernière, mais cela n’a pas été le cas. L’ancienne porte-parole du pseudo-président de l’Ukraine, Vladimir Zelensky, s’est vu interdire de s’adresser au Parlement européen.
Pourquoi ? Parce qu’Iuliia Mendel devait livrer des révélations accablantes sur la corruption endémique dans le régime de Zelensky et sur la façon dont la guerre soutenue par l’OTAN dans son pays est une combine pour s’enrichir.
Quelle ironie que un tel témoignage ne soit pas autorisé dans ce qui est censé être le siège de la démocratie et des valeurs européennes. Si la liberté d’expression remet en cause le récit officiel, alors elle est interdite. Le seul récit autorisé est que l’Ukraine est un modèle de démocratie cherchant à adhérer à l’Union européenne et à l’OTAN, mais qu’elle est contrariée par « l’agression russe ». Combien fragile est cette représentation, pour que quiconque ayant un point de vue différent et des faits soit purement et simplement réduit au silence et diffamé comme propagandiste russe ?
Remarquablement, presque aucun média occidental n’a rapporté ce fiasco.
Iuliia Mendel a été conseillère personnelle de Zelensky pour les médias de 2019 à 2021, date à laquelle elle a démissionné, désillusionnée par sa corruption. Elle a observé de près les tractations, le comportement maniaque de Zelensky et de ses acolytes, et son mépris pour la démocratie. Elle décrit son témoignage comme un « devoir moral » de dire à ses concitoyens ukrainiens et au reste du monde la vraie nature de son ancien patron. Qu’il est un escroc aux tendances psychopathiques qui se moque éperdument de la vie du peuple ukrainien. Sa seule préoccupation est de rester au pouvoir le plus longtemps possible et de s’enrichir avec les milliards d’argent des contribuables occidentaux qui sont acheminés vers son régime.
Zelensky et son régime à Kiev sont les « plus grands obstacles à la paix », dit Mendel, qui a donné cette interview à Weltwoche, après avoir été empêchée d’entrer au Parlement européen. La corruption en Ukraine, dit-elle, dépend de la poursuite de la guerre, et c’est pourquoi le régime de Kiev oppose son veto à tout effort diplomatique visant à mettre fin au conflit qui dure depuis près de cinq ans. Quiconque s’oppose à la guerre et appelle à la diplomatie est sanctionné, emprisonné ou envoyé au front pour mourir. Zelensky supervise une junte militaire (que l’Occident appelle « démocratie ») dans laquelle ses sbires traquent les gens dans les rues pour la conscription. Pour échapper au hachoir à viande, ils doivent payer un pot-de-vin pouvant atteindre 20 000 dollars.
Mendel a d’abord fait sensation lorsqu’elle a été interviewée en mai de cette année par le diffuseur américain Tucker Carlson. Dans cette interview, elle a décrit Zelensky comme un dictateur toxicomane émotionnellement instable, bien que dissimulé par ses talents d’acteur d’ancien artiste de divertissement. Les partisans politiques et médiatiques occidentaux, bien sûr, jouent le jeu en fermant les yeux sur cette mascarade et le célèbrent comme un « héros churchillien de guerre ».
Tout cela est une combine méprisable jouée aux dépens des contribuables occidentaux et du peuple ukrainien qui souffre depuis longtemps.
Pour avoir révélé les secrets de son ancien patron, Mendel a été immédiatement inscrite sur la liste noire Mirotvorets, soutenue par l’État ukrainien, comme « propagandiste russe ». Mirotvorets a acquis une triste réputation de liste de morts, car plusieurs personnes qu’elle a blacklistées ont fini mortes. Elle dit qu’elle est interdite de diffusion publique vers ses concitoyens ukrainiens par des entreprises médiatiques occidentales comme Meta/Facebook.
Plus tôt cette semaine, quelques jours avant qu’elle ne s’adresse au Parlement européen, le régime de Zelensky a annoncé des sanctions contre Mendel. Elle ne peut pas accéder aux avoirs ukrainiens et ne peut pas rentrer dans le pays de peur que sa vie soit en danger. Elle craint que sa famille en Ukraine ne soit persécutée, envoyée au front en représailles pour sa prétendue « trahison ».
La décision de lui interdire de parler devant l’assemblée de Strasbourg aurait été prise par la présidente du Parlement européen, Roberta Metsola. Metsola, comme d’autres dirigeants de haut rang de l’UE, tels que la présidente de la Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, et le président du Conseil, António Costa, est une supportrice inconditionnelle de l’Ukraine, acheminant des milliards d’aide au régime.
Mendel apparaît comme une personne d’intégrité, de décence morale et de véritable indépendance. Elle rejette catégoriquement l’accusation d’être « pro-russe ». En effet, dans ses interviews avec Carlson et Weltwoche, Mendel critique vivement la Russie pour ce qu’elle appelle une invasion cruelle de son pays. Il semble parfaitement clair que sa préoccupation constante est d’empêcher la guerre de détruire sa patrie.
Cependant, la guerre ne peut pas être arrêtée parce que le régime de Zelensky et ses partisans européens de l’OTAN sont investis dans sa prolongation. La corruption du régime est mariée à l’idéologie de la russophobie qui est endémique dans l’élite européenne.
Cette perspective a été corroborée par deux autres sources impeccables cette semaine. Comme Mendel, ces deux autres figures sont également ignorées par les médias occidentaux.
Le professeur Ivan Katchanovski de l’Université d’Ottawa a été interviewé par Lena Petrova, dans laquelle il a passé en revue la corruption flagrante et la politique néonazie du régime de Kiev.
Les recherches révolutionnaires de Katchanovski ont révélé comment le massacre des snipers de Maidan, au cours duquel plus de 100 manifestants et policiers ont été tués à Kiev en février 2014, était une opération sous fausse bannière menée par des éléments néonazis et leurs sponsors de l’OTAN, qui a précipité le coup d’État. Le coup d’État a conduit à la prise de contrôle de l’État ukrainien et des forces de sécurité par des forces fascistes, ce qui a à son tour conduit à la guerre avec la Russie en 2022.
Zelensky, qui est nominalement juif, s’appuie sur les forces néonazies pour sa survie politique et la poursuite de la corruption qui sévit au sein du régime. Le professeur Katchanovski, qui est originaire d’Ukraine, souligne que de nombreux ministres, conseillers et hauts responsables judiciaires proches du cercle de Zelensky ont dû démissionner ou fuir le pays à la suite d’innombrables scandales de corruption. Il est difficile de croire que Zelensky ne soit pas lui aussi jusqu’au cou dans le racket. Corruption, guerre et néonazisme sont tous inextricablement liés en raison de l’implication de l’OTAN dans le pays depuis son indépendance en 1991 vis-à-vis de l’Union soviétique après l’effondrement de cette dernière.
Une autre vue corroborante est celle de l’éminent universitaire américain le professeur John Mearsheimer. Il a donné cette semaine un compte rendu très large d’une récente visite en Russie au cours de laquelle il a rencontré de hauts responsables gouvernementaux, des décideurs politiques et des diplomates. Mearsheimer a déclaré, peut-être à la surprise de certains, que lors de ses nombreuses conversations, il n’a décelé aucune animosité profonde envers l’Ukraine ou le peuple ukrainien parmi ses interlocuteurs russes, ni d’ailleurs parmi les Russes ordinaires. « Beaucoup de Russes que j’ai rencontrés ont de la famille en Ukraine… partagent un héritage culturel », a-t-il remarqué.
Mearsheimer attribue la disparition tragique de l’Ukraine et de ses liens historiques avec la Russie à la politique de l’OTAN visant à faire entrer le pays nouvellement indépendant dans l’alliance militaire dirigée par les États-Unis en 2008 avec la Déclaration de Bucarest. Cette politique a garanti que les deux pays seraient désormais sur une trajectoire de collision menant au conflit, qui a finalement éclaté en 2022. L’objectif occidental plus large était d’utiliser l’Ukraine comme proxy pour mener la guerre et déstabiliser la Russie. En bref, pour la « défaite stratégique de la Russie ».
En poursuivant cet objectif impérialiste, l’Ukraine a été infectée par le néonazisme, la corruption et une dictature de facto dirigée par un clown toxicomane qui réprime impitoyablement toute opposition. Des millions de personnes ont été déplacées, tuées et mutilées ; la société et l’économie sont en ruines abyssales.
Mais cette vérité ne doit pas être permise par les idéologues occidentaux et leurs médias contrôlés, qui persistent dans leurs fantasmes russophobes malgré la destruction et la souffrance déchaînées et le danger très réel d’une guerre totale explosant en Europe. Les élites occidentales se livreront à toutes sortes de maux dans leur poursuite de la tentative de vaincre la Russie. L’Ukraine a été totalement détruite par les objectifs impérialistes occidentaux. Et pourtant, la Russie est blâmée comme le méchant dans cette entreprise horrible et criminelle.
Classical nuclear deterrence is dead. New START expired, tripolarity returns, verification gone. Iran proves nonproliferation is a trap.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
A contingency mistaken for law
We have often discussed nuclear deterrence and how the doctrine has changed, especially in the context of hybrid wars and the new weapons now available. Precisely on this point, at the 23rd annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, my friend Nelson Wong put forward a thesis that deserves attention precisely because it is presented without fanfare.
The classic theory of nuclear deterrence, developed during the Cold War around the concept of mutually assured destruction, was based on historical conditions that have largely ceased to exist today. The framework isn’t entirely wrong: mutual vulnerability remains, and the threat of unacceptable retaliation is perhaps still the only thing preventing a direct war between major powers. But too many features of the landscape have changed for that map to serve as a guide. My argument is that the individual factors eroding deterrence share a common root: the transition from unipolarity to a tripolar system, managed by elites trained in an era when competition among equals had been declared over.
Classical deterrence arose from specific circumstances: two main actors, fairly predictable escalation ladders, and functioning channels of communication. That shared grammar was not a given, but the product of costly learning. Thomas Schelling described the diplomacy of violence as a tacit bargaining process in which a threat is valued for what it communicates; the code of bipolarism was written through crises in which the two sides teetered on the brink and drew institutional consequences from them, from the 1963 hotline to the 1972 ABM Treaty. Atlantic simulations confirm this. Carte Blanche (1955) and Proud Prophet (1983) showed that stopping a Warsaw Pact offensive with tactical weapons would have killed about 1.7 million Germans and that keeping the war at the “tactical” level was an illusion, because the leap to the strategic level seemed almost automatic. Deterrence worked in part because those who planned it knew that once the threshold was crossed, it would no longer work. It was a culture of limits rather than a theory of calculation.
The guardrail has shattered
In February 2026, New START expired, and for the first time in over half a century, Russia and the United States are not bound by any binding bilateral nuclear treaty; verification, notifications, and data exchanges have ceased. That same year, the NPT Review Conference ended without results. Verification was not merely a technical mechanism: it was the arena where two military bureaucracies learned to understand one another. With that channel closed, each side has reverted to assessing the other based on worst-case scenarios – the very raw material of the security dilemma.
Added to this is the end of bipolarity. In the realist interpretation that John Mearsheimer has revived with Glenn Diesen, the current disorder stems from the transition toward multipolarity and the persistence of problems inherited from the unipolar era. The liberal order was the global projection of the Western order of the Cold War, possible only as long as the sole remaining great power was a liberal state. Today there are three powers, each with a different conception of order. A tripolar system is not simply a bipolar system with an extra player: with two actors, it is sufficient for one dyad to be stable; with three, all must be stable, and each measures its own arsenal against the potential combined strength of the other two. This is why the growth of China’s arsenal weighs on U.S. planning, regardless of Beijing’s intentions.
Thus, the security dilemma returns to the forefront: China’s intercontinental missiles are defensive for Beijing and offensive for Washington; Taiwan’s weapons are defensive for the United States and offensive for China. There is also a more troubling element. The stated goal of inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia is not containment, but rollback. During the Cold War, deterrence preserved the status quo; today, the West invokes it while it is itself the revisionist pole, pushing the line forward through NATO expansion and increasingly advanced weapons. This amounts to asking the adversary not to react while one climbs the ladder of escalation. Deterrence that masks a shift in the strategic balance ceases to convey stability and begins to convey an intention.
The Iranian test case
No theater puts these theories to the test quite like Iran. On June 13, 2025, Israel struck the Islamic Republic with Operation Rising Lion; Tehran responded with “True Promise 3.” The paradox was already evident: Iran had signed the NPT, and the Supreme Leader had issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons, while Israel possesses an undeclared arsenal estimated at between 75 and 200 warheads and keeps Dimona off-limits to inspections. I wrote at the time that the attack would not destroy Iran’s program but would push Tehran to view the weapon as a deterrent. The nonproliferation regime promises security to those who renounce nuclear weapons; the Iranian case teaches us that those without them are targeted, while those who possess them are not.
In the summer of 2026, there was open discussion of using tactical nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country, in an air and naval conflict whose stated aim was to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Against whom? Striking the strait would contaminate the waters of the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia; striking the interior would not guarantee surrender. In either case, the nuclear taboo would be broken, setting a precedent for Moscow, Beijing, and Tel Aviv; it is not surprising that, according to available information, Trump’s advisors oppose this. Nina Tannenwald has shown that the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 rests on an established norm, not merely on the calculation of retaliation. Today, that norm holds more because of the prudence of certain advisors than because of its own strength, and a deterrent that depends on the character of individuals is no longer an institution.
The Gulf also shows that the logic of “unacceptable punishment” is shifting toward non-nuclear infrastructure. After the refineries in Tehran, Haifa and the Bapco refineries in Bahrain were struck; and the attack on the desalination plants in Qeshm has effectively legitimized retaliation against Israel’s desalination network – on which over 60 percent of the country’s water supply depends – and against that of the Gulf, where some states derive 80–90 percent of their drinking water. It is an energy-humanitarian “Samson option”: the threshold of unacceptable punishment, which during the Cold War coincided with the nuclear threshold, is now reached by drones launched against a desalination plant. Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder assumed visible and costly steps to climb, but in the Gulf, the steps have been crushed one on top of the other.
The material basis and the fearless machine
Deterrence is also a function of the ability to sustain a war over time. While Washington was burning through interceptors over Iran, Beijing was presenting its 15th Five-Year Plan, featuring “extraordinary measures” for self-sufficiency in critical supply chains. China controls about 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth refining, on which every F-35, every Patriot battery, and every THAAD interceptor depends; starting in 2025, it will subject these materials to export controls, while the Pentagon must eliminate its dependence by January 2027. If the replenishment of conventional deterrence depends on the rival, the threshold beyond which one is tempted to compensate with nuclear weapons is lowered: a deterrent that cannot be replenished tends to become nuclear out of necessity. Whoever controls weapons materials controls the pace of others’ wars.
Then there is artificial intelligence. In 1983, Stanislav Petrov deemed a report of a U.S. launch to be a false alarm; when integrated into command systems, AI can reduce that pause from minutes to seconds, and a system that feels no fear cannot be dissuaded. The immediate danger is not the machine that decides to launch, but the decision-support system that accelerates escalation or excludes de-escalation from the options. I’d like to add a point about the education of decision-makers: if Mearsheimer is correct, the current ruling class came of age after 1991, when the study of the balance of power had all but disappeared from European universities. In 1983, the machine made a mistake, and the human knew it. Today, the risk is that the machine will make a mistake and the human will lack the tools to detect it.
Legitimacy eroded from the center
The NPT established a two-tier system with clear colonial legacies, and the 2017 Prohibition Treaty challenges its legitimacy. But the erosion of the legal framework does not originate at the periphery. It starts at the center. Washington has claimed control over an international strait as national territory and the right to seize Iranian oil tankers; the European Commission has proposed a “reparations loan” of up to 165 billion euros guaranteed by Russian funds frozen at Euroclear. However one judges it, the inviolability of sovereign assets is being called into question by the very states that established it. If sovereign property, freedom of navigation, and nonproliferation are suspended when it suits those who wrote the rules, others draw the most rational conclusion: the only reliable guarantee is one’s own strength.
This does not mean that deterrence is dead. Following the August 26 Storm Shadow attack on Donetsk, Maria Zakharova warned that Moscow could strike British installations “in Ukraine and beyond its borders”: the most explicit threat to date directed at a NATO member, one to be taken seriously without overreacting, as it remains merely verbal. Ratcliffe’s mission to Moscow on August 25 shows that the channels of communication are not closed. The warning system still works; what is missing is the predictability of the response. Deterrence is being practiced, but blindly.
For the 2026–2028 period, based on evidence of moderate quality, the most likely scenario (approximately 55 percent) is unregulated deterrence: no successor to New START, recurring crises managed through unilateral signals and ambiguous thresholds. A minimal restoration (about 30 percent) would establish crisis communication channels, launch notifications, and commitments to human control over nuclear decisions, following the statements made by the United States and China in Lima in November 2024; the indicators would be the resumption of Russian-American consultations and a negotiated formula for the Strait of Hormuz. Breaking the taboo (about 15 percent) – limited use against a non-nuclear state – would be preceded by deployments of low-yield warheads, rhetoric normalizing tactical use, or the depletion of interceptor stockpiles. Everything hinges on one assumption: that no power considers the stakes in peripheral theaters to be existential. A crisis over Taiwan superimposed on the Gulf crisis would bring this assumption crashing down.
Rebuilding crisis communication channels, limiting the integration of AI and nuclear weapons, and giving a voice to the Global South: these are necessary measures, but they are insufficient. Bipolar deterrence was stable because it protected an order that the superpowers – while ideologically opposing it – recognized in practice. Multipolar deterrence requires something analogous: namely, the mutual recognition of security spaces among poles that do not share the same conception of order.
This is not a moral concession but a technical necessity: without a recognized framework, deterrence does not know what to protect. A new map is drawn starting from the territory, and today’s territory consists of three poles: mining supply chains, desalination plants, algorithms, and rules applied intermittently. Understanding this is the minimum requirement – and I emphasize minimum! – for clear-headed thinking to prevail over reassuring formulas.
War is highly probable, but it is not inevitable.
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We are living in an extremely dangerous moment in history. We are also living in an extremely irrational time, at least when it comes to evaluating the mentality, conduct, and words of Western politicians and media in the face of disaster.
On the one hand, Western leaders, pundits, and military commanders clamor with predictions of war with Russia as being imminent. Yet on the other hand, there is an astounding dereliction to avert it. Diplomacy and understanding are boorishly shunned. Indeed, there is an absolutely irrational choice of escalation towards war, especially among European politicians.
Underlying this, of course, is an ideological supremacist belief, a contempt for Russia and other officially designated enemies (China, Iran, and so on), whereby the Western political class sees itself as superior, not as equals. That mentality makes for war and precludes diplomatic engagement and dialogue.
In any objective reading of the situation, there is little doubt that the danger of all-out world war is upon us. Incredibly, for the third time in just over a century, the planet is facing the specter of a massive international conflict. But on this occasion, the outcome would be nuclear conflagration with the extinction of life as we know it. This repeated destruction is a damning indictment of the Western system, its capitalist and imperialist engines for violence, domination and, inevitably, conflict. Surely, such a system should be abolished.
The Doomsday Clock, overseen by the independent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, is at its closest point to midnight in all of 80 years of existence. The clock was inaugurated following the U.S. atomic horror attacks on Japan in 1945. It was meant to serve as a warning of the increasing risk of nuclear war. It is truly a frightening spectacle that today’s danger of global disaster surpasses the many perils that were encountered during the Cold War decades. Today’s tensions surpass even those of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when the United States and the Soviet Union edged towards a nuclear war.
Many Western scholars, legal experts, analysts, and seasoned diplomats have increasingly added their voices warning of the ultimate disaster. We pay respect to the sane voices of people like Alfred de Zayas, Jeffrey Sachs, Larry Johnson, and Scott Ritter, voices in the West that, unlike their political class, are passionately warning of the path to perdition the world is on and needs to urgently get off.
The warning words are flashing like a red light, yet Western leaders keep making decisions and issuing belligerent statements that are driving the world to the precipice.
This week, European politicians have again openly advocated attacking the Russian Federation by blockading Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave between Poland and Lithuania. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and NATO chief Mark Rutte (former Dutch premier) have echoed calls from other European politicians to effectively attack Kaliningrad, that is, to attack the Russian Federation. Russia’s nuclear doctrine explicitly states that such an assault compels it to use nuclear weapons in response.
So, why do NATO leaders keep pushing provocation? Such moves are merely an extension of the NATO proxy war in Ukraine. Their war is a failure. But the Western pro-war politicians cannot admit they are wrong. They are willing to incite a wider war rather than admit defeat and face the political repercussions from their own citizens.
Russia this week issued a grave warning, saying that any attack on Kaliningrad would result in Russian retaliation with nuclear weapons.
Instead of coming to their senses and sobering up, European politicians haughtily dismiss Russia’s warnings as a “bluff” or accuse Moscow of nuclear saber-rattling.
In a plenary address to the Valdai forum in Moscow on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin underlined the infernal precariousness.
“If it comes to a direct attack on the Russian Federation – in this case, Kaliningrad, although it could potentially involve other territories as well – the question of Russia using all the weapons at its disposal would inevitably and immediately arise. That is inevitable,” said Putin.
In an ominous assessment of the reckless direction, he noted:
“We must realise that the moment when nothing can be changed any longer may come very quickly and unexpectedly for everyone. The logic of escalating, increasingly harsh retaliatory measures leads to a fatal point of no return.”
The Russian leader is saying that the West’s relentless escalation in words and deeds is leading to an abyss. Incredibly, the Western politicians refuse to restrain themselves. “At the heart of this escalation lie arrogance and overconfidence… The spiral is tightening, and the devastating consequences are growing.”
This appalling dynamic is redolent of the prelude to the First and Second World Wars, when Western political establishments were insouciant about the impending doom.
But a Third World War is truly a point of no return.
“All the more so today, when the arsenals of the world’s leading powers contain weapons capable of destroying all life or, at the very least, reducing the Earth to a catastrophic state,” Putin said.
What is deplorable is the total propagandizing of public discussion in the West. Anyone who dares to speak about the objective historical causes that have given rise to the current tensions is censored or pilloried as a Russian stooge.
There are eminent voices of sanity in the West, as noted above. But they are systematically excluded from public discourse by the mainstream media and academia. The public has to rely on alternative media sources for information. That has, thankfully, energized critical views among citizens in ever greater numbers, who are questioning the whole warmongering policy of inordinate military spending and weapons for Ukraine to fight a futile war against Russia. Notably, this week German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and NATO’s Mark Rutte were heckled and booed when they appeared in public in Muenster, Germany.
Increasing numbers of people understand that we have been pushed to an existential crisis by Western governments (regimes) who took undemocratic, secret decisions to wage war against Russia years ago.
As former British diplomat Ian Proud pointed out in an excellent podcast this week while attending the Sochi forum, the rulers in London made a conscious decision to go to war with Russia as far back as 2014, when the West sponsored the fascist coup in Kiev.
Other Western figures, like former U.S. state planner Victoria Nuland and former NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg, have also admitted in their own words that NATO deliberately weaponized Ukraine after 2014 for the purpose of confronting Russia. This was before the hostilities erupted in Ukraine in February 2o22.
Thus, the world has been pushed to a nuclear “extinction event” all because of Western policy to pursue confrontation with Russia, using Ukraine as a proxy.
War is highly probable, but it is not inevitable. Western politicians and media, through their arrogance and Russophobia, are certainly doing their worst to make it inevitable. But these criminal elements may not prevail.
There are international structures and laws; there is still diplomacy, albeit abused and trashed; perhaps more importantly, there is mass public opinion against the odious warmongers; and there is a burgeoning social and political uprising against the evidently bankrupt Western political system.
The political elite in the West who are pimping for war may seem dominant, owing to apparently dominant media narratives. But their power is vastly overrated against the huge public opposition to their criminal agenda.
History may rhyme, as with lead-ups to previous infamous wars. This time, however, a crucial difference is that there may be sufficient public awareness so as not to fall for the warmonger ruse of bailing out the rotten system.
We are on the eve of destruction, but there is every sound hope that rather than war, the destruction tomorrow could be that of the Western imperialist system, thereby giving way to a truly better, more just and peaceful world.
The prevailing criticism of the US-China summit in Washington is that it amounted to little more than diplomatic pageantry. But one outcome deserves recognition: it may have helped keep alive the prospect of renewed US-North Korea dialogue. North Korea, after all, was among the global security issues discussed by the two leaders. Details of those […]
The post A spark for dialogue toward halting North Korea’s nuclear buildup appeared first on Asia Times.
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