By Finian Cunningham | Strategic Culture Foundation | September 26, 2026

So, “Britain is back” and ready to provide glorious leadership to the rest of the world, to “solve shared problems we face.”

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham made his debut at the United Nations this week, addressing the 81st session of the General Assembly in New York.

“You can count on us,” assured Burnham. “Count on us to stand up for those long-standing British values of fairness and justice – our shared values – and for the UN Charter.”

Please, don’t make me vomit. Burnham was oozing noble values on the podium of the UN while Saudi warplanes were massacring Yemeni civilians in their homes – warplanes that are directed and refuelled by Britain (and the United States).

This week, Yemeni media reported that over 100 people, including women and children, were killed as Saudi F-15 and Typhoon fighter jets intensified air strikes on residential areas in the Red Sea cities of Mocha and Taiz. Al Masirah TV showed bloody images of two children killed by a Saudi airstrike in Mocha

On his way to the UN, Burnham announced that he had ordered the deployment of RAF refuelling planes to enable the Saudi air assault on Yemen. Of course, the British media described the move as “defensive aid”.

Earlier this month, Downing Street also approved the dispatch of British military advisors to Saudi Arabia. American advisors are also stationed there to assist in the war of aggression against its southern neighbor.

Yemen’s armed forces and the Ansar Allah militia are hitting back hard. They have overrun Saudi forces in key Red Sea positions and have shut down the Saudi oil industry and pipelines with drone and missile attacks.

But make no mistake, this is a Saudi war of genocidal aggression fully supported by the United States and Britain. The war has been going on since 2015, together with a blockade on Yemen that has resulted in an estimated 400,000 Yemeni deaths. A lull in fighting from 2022 was broken when the Saudis launched air strikes on the Yemeni capital’s airport in July. The Yemenis have hit back with a vengeance, targeting Saudi oil installations.

The Saudi monarchy has begged Trump to give more military assistance. But Trump is bogged down and out of his depth with his losing seven-month war with Iran.

This is where Burnham has entered the fray, responding to Saudi pleas for help by signing off on military deployment. This could prove to be a disastrous strategic blunder. No doubt Burnham is trying to ingratiate himself with Washington. His decision to send the RAF into battle this week came ahead of his first meeting with Trump on the sidelines of the UN. The American president gave him a symbolic pat on the head, saying, “he’s going to be a great prime minister.”

Trump had often ridiculed Burnham’s predecessor, Keir Starmer, for supposedly not offering more military support to the U.S. war aims in the Middle East. Burnham is showing himself to be more amenable, that is, pliable.

The British Butler is slaughtering his way into favor with Washington. Women and children are sacrificed in Yemen all to satisfy the sick “special relationship” between the U.S. and Britain.

Burnham is a fraud with this working-class Manchester accent and glib talk about the “need to do more to help people with the everyday cost of living.”

If you can bear to listen to his speech at the UN, it is a masterclass in British disinformation. It takes a special kind of person to deliver such arrant nonsense with a pose of sincerity.

The thrust of his whole address was to blame Russia for everything. From poverty and inequality in British society, to seething discontent among Britons towards their ruling class, to the war in Ukraine. It truly was a consummate performance in misdirection, the kind of charade that British politicians excel at.

He announced that Britain was launching a new National Centre for Information Defence, purportedly to combat Russian disinformation, which he claimed was “a poisonous tide” sowing division and instability among Britons.

According to Burnham, all that is broken and dysfunctional in British society is due to Russian infiltration. Nothing was said about bankrupt British capitalism and the warmongering of the British state fuelling a proxy war in Ukraine or aggression in the Middle East at the expense of social conditions in Britain.

Burnham’s “solution” to Britain’s endemic problems is to increase “national security” and state control over public information – all under the guise of “defending” Britons from being manipulated by Russian propaganda.

The Orwellian condition that Britain is sliding into is awesome.

This British prime minister dares to speak about British values and leadership and condemn Russia while he is approving the supply of long-range air strikes against Russia with British cruise missiles and drones.

The proof of Burnham’s fraudulence and moral bankruptcy is his decision to materially support Saudi warplanes in committing atrocities in Yemen. Murderous aggression is labelled “defense”.

Burnham’s dubious asset as a politician is his ability to articulate justification for slaughter and war with empty platitudes.

A particularly odious point in his UN speech was his claim that English workers allied with Abraham Lincoln in the American Civil War against slavery. As if English mill workers were representative of British “values”. What Burnham conveniently omitted was the much more heinous role of the British ruling class in creating the Atlantic slave trade.

Britain’s historic role in global exploitation and waging genocidal wars is something that damns its governments forever. Its ongoing role in enabling the slaughter in Ukraine and in Yemen is but two of the latest episodes of this British systemic criminality.

These are the British “values” that Burnham deftly concealed this week with his performative debut at the UN.

By Samyar Rostami – New Eastern Outlook – September 26, 2026

The persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.

For the past ten years, the Southern Red Sea has been a pivotal factor in the UAE’s foreign policy. Over the past decade, the UAE has built a layered maritime, air, and commercial infrastructure network, including military bases, in the Red Sea or near Yemen, Somaliland, Somalia and Sudan, starting from 2015.

According to some estimates, the value of UAE investments along Africa’s coastal regions and the Arabian Peninsula amounts to $60 billion.

In September 2015, the UAE established its first military base in Africa, in Eritrea. These bases possessed strategic advantages: the ‘protection of interests’ and control over the security and economic architecture of international maritime routes.

With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, cooperation between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi in the Red Sea intensified.

The UAE’s approach—channeled through companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports—is centered on controlling ports, strategic waterways, military bases, and key trade and energy routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in coordination with the United States and its allies. Abu Dhabi’s approach also included engagement with non-state armed actors and separatist movements in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.

Factors Behind the UAE’s Diminishing Role

Over the past decade, the UAE emerged as a party to the conflicts in the southern Red Sea. However, geopolitical developments over the past year signal a gradual decline in the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.

Several factors are also significant, stemming from US and Israeli military strikes against Iran, the war between Sanaa and Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Emirati rivalry in the region, and disputes among African states.

Sudan’s value lies in its geopolitics. With 853 kilometres of coastline and several key ports, Sudan constitutes a vital link in the Red Sea.

The Sudan war since April 2023 has created conditions for the expansion of the UAE’s role. The UAE faces accusations of providing training and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Human rights and political demands against the UAE has increased.

The UAE also maintains bases inside Sudanese territory. However, the ongoing war in Sudan and the support of allies for the Sudanese government have led to increased pressure on the UAE.

Riyadh regards the Red Sea as part of its strategic interests and its exclusive backyard. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh each view the other as a direct threat to their position and interests in parts of the southern Red Sea. Thus, the reduction of the UAE’s footprint in the southern Red Sea constitutes a strategic gain for Riyadh. Riyadh has effectively sought to weaken Abu Dhabi’s role.

In late 2025, Saudi Arabia’s support for Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) resulted in pressure being brought to bear on UAE-backed forces.

In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks among 14 countries—including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia—which established a multinational maritime defence alliance. The UAE and Ethiopia were excluded from the list.

The formation of a Riyadh-led Red Sea maritime task force—with the participation of Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea—without coordination with the UAE amounts to a further constriction of the UAE’s role in the region.

Despite ongoing Egyptian–Emirati consultations on guaranteeing maritime navigation security in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, Egypt’s foreign policy is not aligned with the UAE’s interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. Additionally, the alignment and coordination among Israel, India, the UAE, and Ethiopia are not particularly consonant with Egypt’s interests in Ethiopia and the Red Sea.

Until last September, the UAE played a significant role in the southern Yemeni islands of the Red Sea and in southwestern Yemen. However, Sanaa’s advance in the eastern Red Sea—the port of Mokha, Mayun Island, and other archipelagos north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait—in September 2026 inflicted negative and fundamental consequences on the UAE’s regional role.

Sanaa’s advance amounts to the nullification of the presence of Emirati actors in Yemen’s future political sphere. Sanaa is seeking to consolidate itself as a strategic “node” within the Iran-led Axis of Resistance.

Despite Cairo’s opposition to Sanaa’s proposal for maritime navigation coordination in the Red Sea, Sanaa—having secured control over the most important islands and cities overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait on the Yemeni side—is calling for the formulation of new rules to ensure security and navigation in the region. Ansar Allah’s control over Bab al-Mandab could put the UAE under pressure. Any expansion of Sanaa’s role in Sudan could likewise prove detrimental to the UAE.

Amid tensions between the United States and Iran, Abu Dhabi finds itself facing a more constrained strategic space.

The UAE’s alignment with the United States is, in a sense, also an intensification of Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Iran in areas such as the Red Sea. Unlike the UAE, Iran is seeking better relations with the Sudanese government. Many in Iran believe that Israel and the UAE are devising an economic and geopolitical plan to control the vital routes of the Red Sea and Yemen’s ports.

With Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, many in the countries of the southern Red Sea have linked it to the UAE.

After years, Eritrea revoked the UAE’s access to its military infrastructure. Eritrean officials have recently made sharp statements about the UAE and Israel—particularly regarding Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland.

Eritrea is providing frontline support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Any deeper alliance between Eritrea and Sudan, Iran, Russia, China, and Sanaa could diminish the UAE’s regional role in the Red Sea. Additionally, some countries and actors near the Red Sea also hold a negative view of the UAE’s regional role.

The Somali government’s decision in January 2026 to sever relations with the UAE is, in a sense, a counter to the UAE’s role in the Somaliland and Puntland regions. Somalia has revoked all agreements with the UAE, including cooperation as well as security and defence arrangements. This move has negative implications for the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.

Moreover, the southern Red Sea plays a pivotal role in the regional strategy of Russia and Beijing. For example, apart from China’s role in Djibouti, Beijing is Eritrea’s principal creditor and has expanded its influence in Sudan.

The developments of the past year have also contributed to a decline in the standing of the UAE’s allies in the region.

Outlook

The US presence in the Red Sea’s African states is rooted in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.

The European Union’s presence in the region, via Operation ASPIDES, is limited to commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Despite the UAE’s formal withdrawal from some bases, its economic and security influence, as well as its soft-power instruments, remain strong.

A decrease in UAE military deployments in the region could negatively impact its support for allies in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.

The UAE continues to have significant economic potential, secure partnerships, and influence in the southern Red Sea. In a way, this is considered a threat and a risk to certain African nations in the Red Sea region.

Certainly, a more extensive Sanaa presence over Bab al-Mandab, strategic coasts, and islands could confront Abu Dhabi’s maneuver and role in the southern Red Sea with a structural challenge.

The UAE’s approach in ports, logistics, energy, and other strategic infrastructure—along with deeper defense and security coordination with the West in the southern Red Sea—is likely to continue. However, the expansion of the UAE’s role also requires an extensive US presence in the Red Sea.

Moreover, the persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.

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Samyar Rostami is а political observer and senior researcher in international relations.

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