Sudan has had its moment at the United Nations General Assembly. Its next, more consequential, moment comes in October, when the Security Council must decide whether to renew an arms embargo confined to Darfur or extend it across the country.
The Council bought itself time on September 11th, extending the existing sanctions for just one month rather than agreeing to Washington’s proposal for a nationwide embargo. That deadline now falls on October 9th. A further delay would be a decision of its own: to leave restrictions drawn for an earlier Darfur conflict largely unchanged while today’s war rages far beyond Darfur.
This is not an argument for pretending that one side alone is responsible. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias are accused of atrocities in Darfur. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its allies have attacked civilians and used chemical weapons, as was raised in Geneva around the United Nations Human Rights Council. An embargo worth the name must impede weapons reaching both camps and the outside networks that keep them fighting. Otherwise, it would punish selectively rather than protect Sudanese civilians.
The UN’s existing restrictions don’t meet that test. America argues that the Darfur-focused regime is outdated and wants the embargo extended nationwide, alongside tougher grounds for sanctioning perpetrators of sexual violence and attacks on aid workers. Britain has urged Council members to negotiate pragmatically—but after more than three years of war, can a policy of “let’s keep talking” any longer be considered adequate?
France doesn’t think so. President Emmanuel Macron has championed an initiative, developed with Mexico, for permanent Security Council members to refrain voluntarily from using their veto when the Council confronts genocide, crimes against humanity or large-scale war crimes. France says 127 states support it; Britain has recently joined. Its purpose is plain: preserve the Council’s ability to act when civilians are most at risk. Sudan’s embargo debate is a test of that principle.
Washington has already shown it is prepared to confront the SAF’s leadership. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and head of the SAF, did not receive a US visa to address the General Assembly in person. Reuters reported, citing Sudanese and other sources, that US officials had linked his attendance to acceptance of a proposed 90-day ceasefire. Burhan’s refusal was consistent with his entire approach to peace talks that involve his main rival, the RSF. For him the answer is always no.
The State Department declined to comment on the visa itself but it did that neither the army nor the RSF nor their leaders represents legitimate constitutional government, and promised to raise the cost of continued conflict.
That pressure should not be mistaken for a complete Sudan strategy. Denying Burhan a New York platform does not stop a shipment of arms. Nor would an embargo, by itself, deliver a ceasefire. But together they send a message: military commanders cannot claim an automatic right to rule simply because they possess guns, territory and foreign suppliers.
In the Security Council, Russia’s the tough nut to crack. It has said it will not allow “even a hint” of broader restrictions. China has warned against forcing through contentious measures and argues that expanded sanctions could worsen the crisis. Both are the likely hold-outs, but their positions are not identical. Moscow has drawn a red line but Beijing seems to have has left room for discussion. And that would make China the diplomatic hinge.
Trump and Xi have just met in Washington amid efforts to steady their relationship and pursue practical cooperation. It’s hard to imagine Sudan was on top of their agenda. But a warmer channel would give Trump an opportunity to make a focused request: China need not champion a wider embargo, but could it just not veto a measure designed to restrain arms flows to both sides and protect civilians? If Beijing moved, Russia would be under more pressure to reconsider.
This would at least see the big powers deciding to act, and hold in check the regional middle-power military-authoritarian quartet—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan—who would otherwise have their way and consolidate Burhan’s junta in power.
Sudan’s civilians deserve better than a future decided by a force like the SAF in which Islamist networks retain troubling influence. Analysts have warned that Muslim Brotherhood-linked forces have used the war to regain ground within the SAF’s wartime structure. A nationwide embargo, enforced fairly and coupled to a ceasefire and civilian-led negotiations, is the strongest available way to deny armed factions the confidence that they can dictate the settlement alone.
The Security Council cannot hand Sudan democracy. It can refuse to help an Islamist-dominated military order extinguish Sudanese people’s aspirations for it.