Four years of sanctions have not closed the door through which Russian metal still reaches Europe. The EU imported 1.6 million tons of Russian iron and steel products in the first eight months of 2026, paying 682 million euros, down 54% in value year on year, GMK Center, a Ukraine-based consulting company, reports, citing Eurostat data.
Every euro spent on Russian metal is revenue for a state waging war on Ukraine, and the EU has banned most of it: pig iron, direct-reduced iron, iron ore and ferroalloys. Yet one category still flows almost untouched: semi-finished steel, mostly slabs, which made up 97.8% of the imports, or 1.56 million tons worth 670 million euros.
Volumes dropped 55% year on year after the full ban on Russian pig iron and DRI took effect on 1 January 2026, and no pig iron, ferroalloys, iron ore, or DRI reached the EU from Russia in the period, the center found. Iron ore and ferroalloys fall under sectoral limits, and the largest Russian producers are subject to corporate sanctions.
The slab loophole that keeps the money flowing
Slabs are the gap in the wall. Belgium took 767,700 tons of Russian semi-finished steel, nearly half the EU total, and Italy 191,800 tons, the center said.
Demand still outstrips the rules, with a slab quota for the year to September 2026 standing at nearly 3 million tons and effectively used up within four months, the data showed. Scrap was the only other notable inflow, at 41,300 tons worth 11.7 million euros, down about a third.
A ban that keeps getting postponed
The door is closing slowly, and not without a fight. The quota falls to 2.6 million tons for the year to September 2027, and to 2 million for the following year, the center added, yet attempts to halt Russian slab imports early have failed because the biggest consumer countries lobby against it.
Earlier, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy reported that the EU paid Russia €317 billion in goods since February 2022. The sum is €116 billion more than the €201 billion the bloc extended to Ukraine in financial aid over the same period.
Latvia has called for a European Union-wide ban on tourist visas for Russian citizens, reopening a dispute between member states over border security, freedom of movement and the treatment of Russian nationals during Moscow’s continuing war against Ukraine.
Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs is pressing Brussels and other European capitals to adopt a common approach, arguing that continued visa issuance by some Schengen countries weakens restrictions imposed by states bordering Russia.
His intervention comes amid growing concerns over suspected Russian sabotage, espionage and other hostile activities across Europe. The Latvian government regards restrictions on non-essential travel as an additional measure to reduce potential security risks.
According to details of the Latvian proposal, Kulbergs has criticised the continued issuance of tourist visas by countries including France, Italy and Spain, maintaining that the consequences extend beyond the states granting entry.
The proposal would go considerably further than the restrictions already introduced by the EU since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
A divided European visa policy
The European Union suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia in September 2022, ending the preferential conditions previously available to Russian applicants.
The Council’s original decision introduced more demanding documentation requirements, higher application fees and stricter scrutiny, but it did not prohibit Russian citizens from obtaining short-stay visas.
National authorities therefore retained considerable discretion when assessing applications, subject to common Schengen rules.
The EU has also agreed a legal basis for restrictions targeting Russian military personnel and former combatants involved in the invasion of Ukraine, although implementation requires further measures.
Latvia argues that these steps remain insufficient because ordinary tourist visas continue to be available through some European consulates.
Once admitted to the Schengen area, a visitor can generally travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. This creates difficulties for governments seeking to enforce stricter national entry policies.
Security concerns on the eastern border
Latvia shares borders with Russia and Belarus and has repeatedly warned that Moscow’s activities present risks extending beyond conventional military threats.
European governments have investigated incidents involving suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence gathering and interference with transport infrastructure.
Such concerns have intensified following drone incursions and security alerts affecting NATO’s eastern members.
The distinction is relevant to the Latvian proposal. European intelligence agencies have identified Russian-linked activities, but this does not establish that ordinary Russian tourists are collectively involved in intelligence operations.
Supporters of tighter visa restrictions argue that limiting discretionary entry could reduce opportunities for hostile activity and simplify security screening.
Opponents question whether a nationality-based prohibition would be proportionate or effective, particularly when intelligence operations may involve individuals travelling under other nationalities or using established residency arrangements.
Political and legal complications
A comprehensive tourist visa ban would require agreement on its precise scope, legal basis and implementation.
European governments would need to determine how the restrictions apply to Russian citizens with family members in the EU, people travelling for humanitarian purposes and individuals seeking protection from the Russian authorities.
The EU Visa Code already permits refusals where applicants present security risks, but a general prohibition based on nationality would involve a different policy decision.
Humanitarian exceptions would be particularly important for Russian dissidents, independent journalists and other individuals facing political persecution.
France has supported restrictions on entry by Russian combatants, while other member states are considering further measures. That does not necessarily mean they support Latvia’s broader proposal covering ordinary tourists.
Kulbergs is also seeking greater European financial assistance for countries facing the economic and security consequences of their proximity to Russia and Belarus.
Sanctions and Schengen controls
The renewed visa debate coincides with disagreements between Washington and Brussels over economic restrictions on Moscow.
EU leaders have maintained that sanctions should remain in place until Russia ends its aggression against Ukraine. Visa policy, however, requires separate legal and political consideration from economic sanctions.
Latvia’s proposal has not been adopted as an EU-wide rule. The immediate question is whether enough member states are prepared to move from tighter individual screening towards a general restriction on Russian leisure travel.
Until that agreement is reached, European countries will continue to apply different policies within a shared Schengen system, leaving the security concerns raised by Riga unresolved.
The Trump administration’s reported proposal to restore Russian gas supplies to Europe through Ukraine marks a reversal of Washington’s longstanding energy policy. Behind the promise of an economic incentive for peace lies a more consequential question: whether Europe is being asked to restore the very dependence on Moscow that it has spent four years dismantling.
The administration of US President Donald Trump is considering the restoration of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe, including through Ukraine’s pipeline network, as part of a proposed settlement to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The initiative would offer Moscow renewed energy revenues while potentially opening opportunities for American investors to participate in the trade.
According to a New York Times investigation published on 17 October, presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have raised the proposal with Ukrainian and European officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The White House has confirmed that economic incentives for Russia and Ukraine form part of its peace diplomacy, although no agreement on renewed gas transit has been announced.
The proposal would require Ukraine to reopen a transit route that ceased operating for Russian exports in January 2025, while European governments would be expected to resume purchases they have spent years reducing. American negotiators reportedly regard the prospect of renewed commercial revenues as an incentive for President Vladimir Putin to reach a settlement.
There is, however, a considerable difference between offering Russia a commercial opportunity after a verified peace agreement and restoring a source of revenue and political influence before Moscow has demonstrated any willingness to abandon its territorial objectives.
From opposition to Russian gas to facilitating its return
The reported initiative represents a reversal of Trump’s earlier position on European energy security.
During his first presidency, Trump repeatedly warned Germany that its dependence on Russian energy exposed it to political pressure from Moscow. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, he accused Berlin of becoming dangerously dependent on Russian supplies. Members of the German delegation visibly smiled at his remarks.
The episode acquired renewed significance after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Germany had developed an extensive commercial relationship with Gazprom, while the Nord Stream pipelines were intended to facilitate Russian gas deliveries directly to Germany, bypassing traditional transit countries, including Ukraine.
Trump maintained his opposition to those energy relationships well into his second presidency. As EU Today reported in September 2025, he told European governments that continuing to purchase Russian energy amounted to financing the war against themselves.
Washington is now reportedly considering precisely the commercial relationship that Trump previously identified as a strategic danger.
The change cannot be explained solely by the objective of ending the war. It also coincides with discussions about a substantially different economic arrangement, in which American commercial interests could participate in infrastructure and transactions previously dominated by Russia and European energy companies.
American investors and the economics of peace
On 8 October, Reuters disclosed negotiations involving Kushner and Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s investment envoy, concerning possible American investment in the Nord Stream pipelines.
The discussions included the prospect of US investors profiting from renewed Russian gas deliveries to Europe. Separate negotiations have involved assets belonging to the Russian energy company Lukoil.
The White House has denied that Nord Stream was a subject of recent discussions and has said any agreements must benefit American taxpayers and companies. There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally profit from the proposed gas arrangements.
Nevertheless, the possibility of American participation changes the commercial equation. Russian gas returning to Europe through infrastructure involving US investors would no longer be exclusively a Russian-European business relationship.
That distinction matters financially, but it does not necessarily resolve the underlying security problem. American ownership of transit infrastructure would not eliminate Moscow’s ability to influence production, supply volumes or export decisions.
The European Union has already confronted the consequences of allowing an energy relationship to become a source of geopolitical leverage. Introducing American intermediaries would not, by itself, remove that vulnerability.
Europe’s legal and political obstacles
The proposal also conflicts with legislation already adopted by the European Union.
Consequently, restoring substantial Russian supplies would require changes to existing EU policy or the use of legally available exceptions. Neither Washington nor Moscow can make that decision on Europe’s behalf.
Germany has already opposed the reported American initiative. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s security adviser, Günter Sautter, reportedly objected during discussions in Florida, while former economy minister Robert Habeck warned against recreating dependence on an unreliable supplier.
The economic attraction remains understandable. European industry faces substantial energy costs, and cheaper pipeline gas could offer relief to some consumers and manufacturers. Yet commercial prices do not account for the wider costs associated with supply disruption, strategic exposure and the potential use of energy exports as political leverage.
Europe’s decision to reduce Russian gas imports was therefore not simply a change of supplier. It was a response to the security implications of its previous energy model.
The consequences for European politics
The initiative also intersects with divisions inside European politics, particularly in Germany.
Alternative for Germany (AfD) has repeatedly advocated restoring Russian energy imports, arguing that sanctions and expensive replacement supplies have damaged German industry. Sahra Wagenknecht’s left-wing BSW has advanced similar arguments concerning energy prices and relations with Moscow.
A US-backed proposal to restore Russian gas could give these parties an additional argument against the federal government’s existing approach. They would be able to point to Washington’s own negotiations when questioning the economic and strategic rationale for maintaining restrictions on Russian energy.
This does not establish that the Trump administration’s gas initiative is intended to strengthen particular European political movements. It does demonstrate how the same policy could serve several objectives simultaneously: commercial rapprochement with Russia, a negotiating incentive for Moscow and a change in the European debate over sanctions.
A peace incentive that could restore Russian leverage
The central uncertainty concerns the relationship between renewed revenues and Russian military objectives.
Washington’s argument assumes that the prospect of substantial future gas income could persuade Putin to accept a settlement. Yet negotiations over commercial cooperation have so far produced no demonstrated change in Moscow’s fundamental territorial demands.
Meanwhile, Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On 18 October, Zelenskyy reported 76 Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy, oil and gas facilities during the preceding week, despite Trump’s announcement of an energy ceasefire that neither Kyiv nor Moscow had confirmed.
There is also an unresolved contradiction in Washington’s wider sanctions policy. Having previously demanded that Europe stop financing Russia through energy purchases, Trump has recently suspended additional American sanctions against Moscow while his representatives explore new economic arrangements.
For Ukraine, renewed transit could restore revenue lost when the previous gas agreement expired. For Russia, however, the potential benefits extend beyond immediate export earnings. Access to European markets would restore commercial relationships and a degree of political influence that Moscow lost after the invasion.
The distinction is fundamental. A peace settlement that permits carefully regulated economic cooperation after Russian withdrawal and enforceable security guarantees would be different from an agreement that restores Moscow’s commercial advantages in anticipation of concessions that have not yet been secured.
The question for European governments is therefore not merely whether Russian gas could once again become cheaper than alternative supplies. It is whether restoring that trade would leave Europe better protected against another confrontation with Moscow, or recreate the vulnerabilities that became apparent in 2022.
Washington’s proposed economic bargain cannot answer that question on Europe’s behalf.
Diplomats from Belgium, France and Poland were attacked by Israeli settlers during an olive-harvesting visit to the occupied West Bank, prompting calls for further European sanctions and an investigation by Israeli authorities.
The settlers attacked a delegation of European diplomats and Catholic representatives in the occupied West Bank on Saturday, 17th October, assaulting a French mayor and damaging a Belgian diplomatic vehicle during a visit intended to support Palestinian olive farmers.
The delegation included Belgium’s consul general, French and Polish diplomats and representatives of the Catholic Church. The incident occurred near the Palestinian village of Taybeh, where settlers confronted visitors accompanying local residents during the annual olive harvest.
Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot condemned the violence and announced that Brussels would press for additional European Union sanctions against those responsible. He also called on Israel to meet its obligations as the occupying power and protect Palestinians, journalists and foreign diplomatic representatives.
According to accounts of the incident, Bernard Baudoux, mayor of the French town of Aulnoye-Aymeries, was assaulted while attempting to enter a vehicle bearing diplomatic plates. The attack also involved members of a Catholic delegation, including Archbishop Vincent Dollmann of Cambrai.
Three people were reportedly injured. Belgian diplomatic personnel were confirmed to be safe.
Diplomatic incident draws Israeli condemnation
Israel’s military described the attack as a serious act of violence but said that the delegation’s visit had not been coordinated with the Israeli authorities and that soldiers had not been present when the confrontation occurred.
Israeli police subsequently opened an investigation.
Foreign Minister Gideon Saar publicly condemned the actions of the settlers and said his ministry was in contact with the ambassadors of the countries involved. The Israeli government’s response comes amid mounting international criticism of settler violence against Palestinian communities in the West Bank.
The circumstances are particularly sensitive because the victims included accredited diplomatic representatives from three EU member states. The incident therefore extends beyond the continuing disputes over land ownership and Palestinian access to agricultural areas, raising questions about the protection of foreign officials carrying out recognised diplomatic activities.
For Belgium, the attack has reinforced an existing position in favour of stronger European measures against violent settlers and organisations supporting settlement expansion.
Prévot linked the violence to Israeli settlement policy, arguing that the attacks could not be considered separately from the broader circumstances of the occupation.
A growing dispute over European sanctions
The European Union has already introduced targeted restrictive measures against individuals and organisations associated with serious abuses against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.
In May 2026, the Council of the EU imposed additional sanctions on three individuals and four organisations, including the Nachala Settlement Movement and the Amana cooperative association.
The measures were adopted under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime and included asset freezes, prohibitions on making funds available to designated persons and travel restrictions on listed individuals.
The Council said the sanctioned organisations had supported or facilitated activities resulting in the displacement of Palestinian communities and the loss of property.
However, agreement on broader economic measures against Israel has proved substantially more difficult.
As EU Today previously reported, European governments have considered restrictions on trade involving Israeli settlements, while divisions between member states have complicated attempts to establish a common position.
The latest attack gives Belgium, France and Poland a direct diplomatic interest in the outcome of any further discussion. Whether this produces a new sanctions agreement will depend on negotiations between EU governments, rather than unilateral declarations by individual ministers.
Violence during the olive harvest
The incident occurred amid escalating attacks on Palestinian farmers during the annual olive harvest, an important source of income for communities across the West Bank.
Harvesting frequently involves access to agricultural land situated near Israeli settlements or in areas where Palestinians face movement restrictions. Local farmers have complained of intimidation, destruction of trees and attacks by settlers attempting to prevent them from reaching their property.
According to reporting from the area, the Palestinian Health Ministry said at least four people had been killed and more than 100 injured since this year’s harvest began.
The attack on the European delegation followed another serious incident involving American photojournalist Heidi Levine, who was assaulted while covering attacks on Palestinian olive harvesters.
The violence has attracted criticism from international organisations and foreign governments, including those maintaining close diplomatic relations with Israel.
Wider implications for EU–Israel relations
The diplomatic confrontation comes against a background of longstanding disagreement between Brussels and the Israeli government over settlement expansion and the legal status of the occupied territories.
The European Union does not recognise Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and regards settlements established there as contrary to international law. Israel disputes the application of this legal interpretation to the territory.
The latest incident is unlikely, by itself, to determine the future of EU–Israel relations. It does, however, strengthen demands from governments already advocating targeted sanctions and more effective measures against settlement-related violence.
For Belgium, France and Poland, the immediate questions concern the safety of their diplomatic personnel, the Israeli investigation and whether the perpetrators will face prosecution.
For the EU collectively, the matter now extends to whether its existing sanctions framework can address continuing attacks against Palestinians and, increasingly, European representatives themselves.
Despite images from scene of attack and IDF condemnation, PM suggests incident could be part of 'coordinated smear campaign'; Belgium to push for EU sanctions on those involved
Russia has placed five foreign-owned businesses under compulsory administration, including Belgian manufacturer Ontex and French flooring group Tarkett. The latest seizures deepen the confrontation over sanctions, frozen Russian assets and the future of European investment in Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the transfer of five Western-owned businesses into compulsory Russian management, extending a campaign of asset seizures targeting European companies that continued operating in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The decree, signed on 15 October, affects businesses with combined annual revenues exceeding 53 billion roubles, approximately €530 million. They include French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, Belgian hygiene products group Ontex, German packaging producer Menshen, Kappa Rus and Eviosys Packaging Kuban, now linked to American group Sonoco.
Under Presidential Decree No. 738, operational control has been transferred to Centre Capital, a little-known Moscow company established in February 2026 with registered share capital of just 10,000 roubles.
The decision follows similar interventions against Nestlé, Auchan, FM Logistic and Metro in September. Together, the measures demonstrate how Moscow is using foreign-owned businesses as instruments of economic retaliation against countries supporting Ukraine.
Foreign businesses placed under Russian control
Centre Capital is headed by Marat Mirkhaydarov, a former senior official in Russia’s Zabaykalsky region who reportedly served with the Akhmat military formation during Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The scale of the companies placed under his management contrasts sharply with the financial standing of the administrator.
Tarkett’s Russian operations generated approximately 19.3 billion roubles in revenue during 2025, while Kappa Rus recorded 16.5 billion roubles and Ontex RU another 10.3 billion. Eviosys Packaging Kuban and Menshen Packaging CIS reported approximately 6.1 billion and 1.4 billion roubles respectively.
The decree does not formally transfer ownership of the companies to Centre Capital. It does, however, remove the foreign shareholders’ effective control over management, operations and commercial decisions.
For Belgian manufacturer Ontex, the consequences are immediate.
In an official statement issued on 16 October, the Aalst-based company confirmed that a government-appointed administrator had assumed operational control of its Russian subsidiary.
Ontex Russia employs approximately 350 people, operates a manufacturing facility in Noginsk and maintains a sales office in Moscow. The subsidiary accounts for around five per cent of the group’s total revenue and between seven and eight per cent of adjusted EBITDA.
The company said it was examining measures to protect its assets and maintain business continuity.
Tarkett likewise confirmed that it was losing effective control of its Russian operations.
A mechanism established in 2023
The legal framework for such interventions dates to April 2023, when Putin introduced Decree No. 302, allowing the Russian authorities to place assets associated with countries designated as unfriendly under temporary external management.
The appointed administrator can exercise extensive ownership-related powers, although the formal right to dispose of the assets remains excluded.
Crucially, the arrangement can be terminated only by presidential decision. There is no automatic deadline for returning operational control to the original owners.
Moscow maintains that the measures are reversible. Nevertheless, the loss of management authority raises questions about whether businesses could eventually be returned with their financial position, organisational structure and commercial value intact.
The Kremlin’s approach also serves domestic economic objectives. Keeping factories, retail networks and distribution facilities operating under Russian management helps preserve employment, production capacity and established supply chains.
At the same time, appointing Russian administrators allows the authorities to exercise greater influence over businesses originally developed through foreign capital, technology and expertise.
European companies caught in sanctions confrontation
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has explicitly linked the seizures to the nationality of the affected companies and the policies of their governments.
He accused European states of participating in the unlawful seizure of Russian property through sanctions and financial restrictions.
Moscow’s argument centres partly on approximately €210 billion in Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the European Union, most of them held through Belgium-based securities depository Euroclear.
The European Union has used extraordinary revenues generated by those assets to support Ukraine, while further proposals involving the underlying funds remain subject to legal and political debate.
Belgium has been particularly concerned about potential financial exposure and legal claims. As EU Today reported in September, a Belgian Council of State judgment raised additional questions about the administrative procedures governing certain frozen assets.
Moscow’s treatment of European businesses adds another dimension to this confrontation. By retaining control over foreign-owned industrial and commercial assets, Russia possesses a means of exerting pressure on companies whose governments support sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine.
The implications are particularly serious for Western banks that still maintain substantial Russian operations.
Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International and Italy’s UniCredit remain exposed to Russia through local subsidiaries. Any extension of compulsory administration to financial institutions could create additional difficulties involving deposits, capital and banking supervision.
The cost of remaining in Russia
The seizures also expose the financial risks faced by Western companies that delayed their withdrawal after February 2022.
Many initially sought to protect their investments, employees and commercial infrastructure. Others reduced operations but retained ownership, expecting that conditions might eventually permit an orderly sale or renewed business activity.
Russian restrictions have progressively complicated that calculation, requiring foreign investors from designated countries to accept substantial discounts on asset sales and obtain official approval for transactions.
Companies remaining in the country now face the additional possibility that the government will appoint administrators without their consent.
The consequences extend beyond the businesses immediately affected. Russia is establishing a precedent under which foreign investment can remain legally owned by its original shareholders while its economic benefits and operational management are placed beyond their control.
For European governments, the latest decree illustrates the increasing connection between commercial interests and geopolitical decisions.
The Kremlin has demonstrated that sanctions imposed over its invasion of Ukraine can be answered not only through diplomatic or financial measures, but also through direct intervention in European-owned businesses operating on Russian territory.
Any eventual negotiation over sanctions relief and the restoration of economic relations will consequently have to address the status of these assets, the rights of their original shareholders and the question of compensation.
Until then, Western companies remaining in Russia face an investment environment in which the ultimate authority over their businesses rests increasingly with the Kremlin rather than their shareholders.
"We supported Trump's energy ceasefire but we see Russia did not respect it, and so we have to increase the pressure," von der Leyen told journalists, before announcing that the EU is working on a new 22nd package of sanctions against Russia.
Russia has exploited an EU sanctions loophole to unfreeze $3 billion worth of assets held by Belgium's Euroclear, according to a Flemish media report, and Austria's Raiffeisen Bank could be about to execute the same maneuver.
The European Union has adopted an unprecedented package of sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial complex, blacklisting 1,569 companies and individuals involved in supplying weapons for Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
The Council measures announced on 12 October target 826 companies and 743 executives. Unlike earlier sanctions targeting political figures, the latest listings reach deeper into the industrial supply chains needed to manufacture missiles, drones, aircraft and ammunition.
Ballistic missile supply chains
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said more than half the new listings concerned ballistic missile production. The Council identified electronics manufacturers, semiconductor suppliers, radar specialists, navigation equipment firms and producers of explosives.
These businesses occupy positions in production networks that enable Russia to sustain the manufacture of weapons despite restrictions on its access to Western technologies. The Council announcement estimates their combined annual turnover at at least €20 billion and employment at more than 250,000.
The move follows intensive Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and energy installations. European governments increasingly seek to undermine Moscow’s operational capacity by identifying businesses that procure or manufacture components for its armed forces.
Enforcement beyond EU borders
Listed firms face asset freezes, while EU businesses and citizens cannot make funds or economic resources available to them. The named executives also face travel restrictions. Suppliers and financial institutions will need to check commercial transactions for links to sanctioned entities.
The actual impact on Russian output remains uncertain. Businesses with few assets in Europe may experience limited immediate disruption. Moscow has developed alternative procurement channels through third countries, some involving intermediaries that acquire electronics or equipment originally manufactured elsewhere.
Sanctions effectiveness therefore depends on customs intelligence, financial due diligence, international cooperation and the willingness of commercial partners to stop dealing with listed companies. Targeting managers individually is also intended to raise the personal costs of directing Russia’s military production.
A test for Europe’s economic pressure
Precision navigation systems, sophisticated electronics and specialised manufacturing technology remain difficult to substitute rapidly. Nevertheless, listing a supplier cannot by itself prevent components from moving through indirect trading routes.
The sanctions coincide with renewed discussion of a possible halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. Brussels is signalling that negotiations about the war’s conduct need not entail relief from restrictions on Russia’s defence economy.
Whether the measures reduce missile production will depend on changes in procurement and output over the coming months. Their immediate significance is the EU’s decision to extend restrictions beyond the most visible weapons producers into the broader industrial networks sustaining Russia’s war.
The EU adopted its largest-ever round of sanctions listings on 12 October, targeting the suppliers behind Russia’s war industry, the Council of the EU announced. The bloc acted as Russia keeps killing Ukrainian civilians every day, while US President Donald Trump eases sanctions on Russian diesel.
Russia’s planned winter campaign against Ukraine’s infrastructure depends on arms factories fed by a web of component suppliers and on oil revenue that still flows despite Ukraine’s refinery strikes, so every supplier cut off from that web raises the cost of waging it. As Washington eases off, Europe’s own pressure has a gap: its ports still take record volumes of Russian Arctic gas, and a full ban on long-term contracts starts only in 2027.
Missile suppliers top the list
More than half of the new listings hit the supply chain for ballistic missiles that Russia “uses to kill Ukrainian civilians every day,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in the statement. Russian attacks killed more than 150 people in the past week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 11 October.
The list names 826 Russian companies, mid-level firms the Council calls the “core” of Russia’s arms industry, with at least €20 billion in yearly turnover, and 743 people who run them. They make parts for missiles, drones, and military aircraft, from semiconductors and radars to explosives and navigation systems. Their assets are frozen, EU firms may not finance them, and the executives may not enter the EU.
Foreign ministers ratified a deal EU envoys reached on 7 October. Ukraine’s sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said 60% of the listings came from Ukrainian proposals.
Ministers reject the diesel deal
EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg vowed to keep the sanctions despite Trump’s diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Euronews reported. Kallas addressed Washington directly as she arrived.
“The US is our biggest ally, but our message is clear: if we want to end this war, the only way we can do this is (by) putting more pressure on Russia,” Kallas said.
Irish Foreign Minister Helen McEntee called the deal “concerning,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys said it was “not the European way.” Kallas warned that an energy truce covering only refineries would favor Russia, since Ukraine has one refinery and Russia “plenty.”
Trump announced the diesel deal on 9 October, and the US Treasury waived sanctions on Russian diesel until April 2027. Zelenskyy said the EU would provide about €3 billion more in military aid this week.
Washington presses Kyiv
Trump expects Ukraine to stop hitting Russian refineries under his proposed energy ceasefire, a White House official told Axios. Zelenskyy said Kyiv would halt such strikes if Moscow did the same. On 10 October, Trump told reporters it was time for Ukraine to get a new president. Germany’s foreign minister, Britain’s defense secretary, and a senior lawmaker from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party backed Zelenskyy, while the Kremlin sided with Trump.
Zelenskyy offered to hold elections after a 60-day ceasefire, and Kallas said elections are impossible while the war goes on. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia exploits Ukraine’s legal ban on wartime elections to drag out the war.
Europe will not loosen its pressure on Russia after the US-Russia diesel deal, EU Foreign Policy chief Kaja Kallas says. She has announced that EU foreign ministers will approve the bloc’s largest set of sanctions against Russia’s war machine since the full-scale invasion on 12 October.
Washington has just eased the pressure on Russia, letting Russian diesel back onto world markets and handing Moscow more money to wage war. This comes as Russian strikes have killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days, 22 of them on Russian President Vladimir Putin's birthday on 7 October.
Moreover, Russia has stepped up its hybrid attacks against Europe, both EU Member States and NATO Allies. It is now the time to tighten sanctions, not loosen them, Kallas says.
“Suspending sanctions on Russian diesel provides Moscow with more revenues to wage war. This is not the time to ease pressure on Russia, and Europe won’t,” she claims.
A split with Washington
On 9 October, Trump claimed he had agreed with Putin to put more than 300,000 tons of Russian diesel on world markets immediately.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the deal a weak decision by strong partners, arguing that Russia turns oil-product revenue into weapons against Ukraine's civilians, according to the BBC.
The package aims at the missile chain
On 7 October, EU ambassadors approved the 22nd package of sanctions, with about 1,700 listings, Ukrainian President’s Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk notes. It is expected to be formally approved on 12 October.
This package contains the largest number of sanctions targeting Russia’s defence industry. Of these, 60% were drawn from Ukrainian decrees and proposals. The package includes measures targeting machine tools, Lancet drones, ballistic weapons, and related technologies.
“The core of the package is Russia’s missile programme and electronic components: electronics, capacitors, resistors, and semiconductors. It also covers electronic warfare, shipbuilding, and explosives,” Vlasiuk says.
It took just a few weeks from Ukraine's decision to the European one.
"But we are already working on further measures, including sectoral sanctions targeting energy, the defense industry, finance, and trade,” he stated.
Until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Czech Vanadium was among the European companies which clearly had Russian owners.
Since 2007, the company has been controlled through the Evraz group by Russian businessman Roman Abramovich, who is close to Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
The ferrovanadium producer was part of a chain through which vanadium ore mined in Russia reached Europe before being sent on to Abramovich’s factories in the US. Ferrovanadium is an alloy added to steel to help improve its properties. And Czech Republic accounts for six percent of global production.
But sanctions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the oligarch to sell up.
Evraz, the holding company in which Abramovich is the largest shareholder, supplied the Russian army, according to media reports. But Evraz denied this.
In 2024, the Abu Dhabi-based company Metco (now ‘Metco Holding’) became the sole shareholder in the Czech factory, but it is not clear who controls it.
Czech authorities and police suspect the transfer of the vanadium factory to a new parent company in the UAE may conceal the true owner. They are seeking to establish who is really behind the opaque company in the Persian Gulf, and whether it is still Roman Abramovich.
According to Deník N sources familiar with the investigation, specialists from Czech police bodies for organised crime (NCOZ) and the financial intelligence unit (FAÚ) are involved.
“Yes, we are investigating who is behind the company. There are many leads and the suspicion is clear that the company may still be backed by its former owners from Russia,” a source close to the investigation confirmed.
NCOZ spokesperson Jaroslav Ibehej declined to comment in more detail on the search for Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner. “As a rule, we neither confirm nor deny what we are working on,” he said.
According to documents in the Czech judicial database, the company is formally controlled by one owner — a Dubai-based lawyer of Indian origin who provides nominee services for beneficial owners. The lawyer has been linked to money-laundering investigations in Ukraine and Moldova.
Apparent fake owner scheme
The officially declared owner of Czech Vanadium is Nikhil Skariah Kolekunnel. According to the ADGM free zone business register in the UAE, he is both the sole shareholder and director of Metco Holding.
However, the Gulf state’s database does not disclose so-called beneficiaries, who are entitled to the company’s profits and may also secretly control it.
Although the Czech judicial register lists Skariah as Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner, this does not necessarily indicate the person exercising control in the background. For example, trustees of trust funds are also listed in the registers as beneficial owners.
The nature of Skariah Kolekunnel’s business suggests that he performs the specific role of an administrator, a so-called fiduciary — someone who accepts an ownership mandate and effectively manages another person’s assets.
He is a lawyer originally from India who founded two law firms in the UAE years ago. His companies represent large corporations and businesspeople who do not wish to publicly acknowledge ownership of a business.
“South Bridge Legal is an advisory firm for comprehensive business establishment in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and the UAE. Our highly experienced team has been active in the sector for more than 10 years, providing services tailored to the unique needs of every ambitious entrepreneur setting up companies in Dubai,” the company wrote on its website.
“We have all activities, which is tax management, tax consulting, accounting, corporate services, offshore company formation, free zone company formation…everything,” Skariah said in a recently published video on YouTube.
Metco Holding’s address in Abu Dhabi suggests it may be a shell company. And it is headquartered from a WeWork.
Moldova and Ukraine links
‘Skariah’, the name of the Indian administrator, had already emerged eight years ago in connection with the concealment of ownership structures during an investigation into the privatisation of Moldova’s national airline. At the time, Skariah appeared as the owner of the opaque company Gold Craft FZE, established in Dubai in 2015.
“On Monday 1 October 2018, one day before the privatisation agreement for Air Moldova was signed, a plane from Istanbul landed at Chișinău International Airport. One of the passengers, a 39-year-old man, was carrying nearly €2.6m in cash in his luggage. He declared the money to customs officers, which, according to the Office for the Prevention and Fight against Money Laundering, he had borrowed four days earlier from Gold Craft FZE in the United Arab Emirates,” the investigative outlet RISE Moldova reported.
It finds that Andrei Ianovici brought cash from Dubai, equivalent to tens of millions of Czech crowns. Later that day, he deposited the money in a bank, and it ended up in the accounts of Civil Aviation Group SRL. That company privatised Air Moldova, and Ianovici was one of its partners.
The true origin of the money was never established, leading local investigators to suspect that the money had not been earned legally. No charges were brought, however.
According to court records, Skariah was also involved in disputes in Ukraine, where Gold Craft FZE claimed ownership of an Ilyushin aircraft which the company allegedly purchased in 2017.
Skariah’s Russian-linked empire
However, the UAE-based lawyer was not the only individual to have emerged as an administrator of Czech Vanadium. Another is Sergei Gushchin.
A man of this name was formerly a prominent Russian businessman in rail freight transport and, although he withdrew from Russia three years ago, he appears on Ukrainian sanctions lists for supporting the Russian army.
Gushchin became a senior manager at PJSC TransContainer, a Russian rail freight carrier, after Evraz sold its stake. In the past, a quarter of the company was owned by the holding company of Abramovich.
Meanwhile another of Gushchin’s companies, Rail Service, formed a joint venture with Evraz in 2019 focused on the production of railway wheels.
According to a UAE register, Gushchin was a director and shareholder of Metco, which became Czech Vanadium’s parent company from 2022-23.
US credit-rating agency Moody’s shared data with Deník N that listed Gushchin as a recent beneficiary of Metco Holding and as the company’s director.
Moody’s data shows Sergei Gushchin as Metco Holding’s director.
Russia’s ferrovanadium monopoly
Czech Vanadium’s revenues regularly exceed €81m, and in 2024 the company reported profits of more than €8m. This summer, the company sent over €0.6m of that sum to the Dubai company, the remaining funds staying in its retained earnings account.
Last year, the company recorded a modest €0.2m loss. Its accounts retained more than €12m in undistributed profits in total.
Czech Vanadium’s business remains closely tied to Russia. Last year alone, vanadium oxides or hydroxides worth nearly €82m were imported into the Czech Republic from the Russian Federation. Russia is effectively the sole supplier of the raw materials needed to produce ferrovanadium. According to the statistical office database, exports mainly go to the United States, as well as Germany and Taiwan.
Czech Vanadium did not reply to requests for comment or an explanation of its ownership structure.
It also did not answer the question of how a Dubai lawyer had bought the Czech company, which, according to some estimates, is worth more than €40m.
Company representatives have not responded to questions about its owners since 2024, when the company left the Evraz group structure.
Fake owner model in US
Jiří Skuhrovec, an analyst at Datlab, specialises in the global vetting of business partners. He says Abramovich uses a similar model for concealing ownership in the United States.
Sanctions also forced the Russian oligarch, who became better known through his former ownership of the British football club Chelsea, to withdraw from US companies. But Skuhrovec concluded that they were probably still controlled by people linked to Abramovich just like the factory in Czech Republic.
“We mapped the entire chain, from the Russian ore supplier through the Czech smelter to the final recipient: the US company Strategic Alloys LLC. Until recently, all three companies officially belonged to Abramovich, and all three are now controlled by people with links to his Evraz group. Abramovich may therefore still secretly control the entire supply chain for this strategic raw material. This would be a textbook case of sanctions circumvention, as well as an obvious security risk,” Skuhrovec said.
Findings led Datlab and Transparency International to submit a complaint to police. “We believe that the 16m Czech crowns (around €655,000) in distributed profit may have gone to Abramovich, who is on a sanctions list. That would constitute a criminal offence,” the analyst explained.
In brief:
Czech Vanadium, owned by Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich’s holding company until 2024, was taken over by Dubai-based company Metco Holding.
The company is opaque, and Czech authorities are investigating who actually owns the Czech factory. It is suspected it is still linked with former owner.
This would amount to circumventing sanctions imposed by the European Union.
Deník N and Datlab analyst Jiří Skuhrovec found that the company is backed by lawyer Nikhil Skariah Kolekunnel and Sergei Gushchin, who conduct business with Abramovich’s Evraz group.
Skariah has been linked to money laundering in Moldova and Ukraine. He has long covered for companies that are in fact owned by someone else.
Ukraine will seek to have Russian businessmen Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman restored to European sanctions lists after the EU removed both men as part of an agreement that secured a three-year renewal of its wider individual sanctions regime against Russia.
Ukraine is preparing a new sanctions initiative targeting more than 20 Russian businessmen and intends to press for Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman to be placed back under restrictions, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said on Thursday.
Sybiha, speaking to journalists in Kyiv on 1 October, said the Ukrainian government regarded the European Union’s decision to remove the two men from its sanctions list as unacceptable and had tried to prevent it through both public and diplomatic channels.
“Our response will be asymmetric. You removed two oligarchs, and we will add another twenty,” Sybiha said.
He said Kyiv had prepared a list containing more than 20 Russian businessmen for possible sanctions and was also working to restore restrictions against Usmanov and Fridman.
The minister did not specify which EU legal mechanism Kyiv expects to use. Ukraine cannot itself add individuals to the bloc’s restrictive-measures list, meaning any renewed designation would require action by EU member states.
The EU formally removed Usmanov and Fridman from its sanctions list on 22 September. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2160 deleted the entries for Usmanov, Fridman and Russian businessman Andrey Falaleev, as well as Redbird Corporate Services Ltd.
At the same time, EU governments extended the remaining individual sanctions for another 36 months, until 22 September 2029. The regime covers more than 3,000 individuals and entities and provides for asset freezes, travel restrictions and a prohibition on EU citizens and companies making funds or economic resources available to those listed.
The agreement marked a significant change to the previous system under which individual sanctions were renewed every six months.
Kyiv is now seeking to compensate for that decision through national sanctions regimes while pursuing their possible return to the EU list.
Sybiha said President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had approved the Ukrainian approach and that Kyiv was working with partner governments to ensure that restrictions against Usmanov and Fridman remained in force outside the EU framework.
According to the foreign minister, Canada has indicated that it intends to retain its restrictions. Sybiha also pointed to Britain, Japan and Australia as jurisdictions where sanctions remain in place and said Ukraine would seek similar measures elsewhere.
Britain continues to maintain a separate national Russia sanctions regime. The UK government’s current Russia sanctions framework records designations, amendments and removals independently of decisions made by the European Union.
Several EU member states have meanwhile taken or begun preparing national measures following the September decision.
The dispute has exposed one of the structural features of EU sanctions policy: decisions on restrictive measures require agreement among member states, allowing individual listings to become part of wider negotiations over the continuation of an entire sanctions regime.
Moving from six-month to three-year renewals reduces the frequency with which the broader Russia sanctions list has to return to the negotiating table.
It does not, however, prevent individual names from being added again during that period. Kyiv’s new initiative is therefore likely to focus both on persuading individual governments to introduce national restrictions and on building sufficient support inside the EU for Usmanov and Fridman to be designated again.
As European coastal states detain more vessels sailing under false flags and pressure mounts on flag-of-convenience registries to remove sanctioned tonnage, Russia itself is increasingly becoming the destination of last resort for the oil trade’s shadow fleet.
A new analysis published on Friday (25 September) by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) found that 107 vessels joined Russia’s flag registry between January 2025 and June 2026, representing a 36 percent increase. The growth peaked in December 2025, when 25 vessels were added in a single month. Of the 107 vessels, 93 (87 percent) were already under sanctions, while 56 percent had previously operated under a false flag.
The development reflects an evolving enforcement dynamic. Sanctions alone have not stopped many shadow-fleet vessels from operating. Instead, detentions and pressure on the registries that provide the vessels with flags have forced operators to repeatedly change their arrangements.
As open registries come under increasing diplomatic pressure to remove sanctioned Russian-linked vessels, ships are moving between flags, adopting fraudulent ones or, increasingly, registering directly with Russia.
“The fleet keeps adapting, so enforcement is often responding to its latest move,” research fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at the Royal United Services Institute, Gonzalo Saiz Erausquin told EUobserver, describing the development as a growing concern for European countries seeking to restrict Russia’s oil revenues.
The shift is already visible among major open registries.
Barbados, Palau and Panama
Barbados and Palau have cleared their registries of sanctioned vessels, while Panama has reduced its number of sanctioned vessels by almost two-thirds from a peak in May 2025. The world’s largest ship registries have also established the Registry Information Sharing Compact (RISC), a shared database intended to combat flag-hopping and other forms of sanctions circumvention.
But removing vessels from one registry does not make them disappear. Instead, they can migrate to registries with weaker oversight or greater opacity.
By June 2026, 46 unique vessels previously registered under Comoros or Gambia had joined Russia’s registry. Others have moved to Sierra Leone and Equatorial Guinea, while some continue to operate without a recognised flag. The result is a cycle in which vessels move from one jurisdiction to another as enforcement pressure changes.
“Most of the fleet is under sanctions but sanctions themselves do not stop them from sailing,” said Saiz Erausquin.
A ‘game of whack-a-mole’
“Russia’s ‘shadow’ fleet is moving in waves from one open flag registry to the next,” said Luke Wickenden, the report’s main author and an energy analyst at CREA. “As flag registries come under pressure to expel sanctioned Russian ‘shadow’ vessels, the vessels hop between flags, sometimes sailing under fraudulent flags that leave them vulnerable to detention, before settling under the Russian registry as a final safe haven.”
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