The European Parliament has awarded the 2026 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its officials, recognising the Hague-based tribunal’s work in investigating and prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

Announcing the decision in Strasbourg on Thursday, 22 October, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said the award reflected the European Union’s commitment to multilateralism and international institutions.

Metsola praised the Court for its work in upholding international law and justice. The announcement was met with a standing ovation in the parliamentary chamber.

The decision comes amid an escalating confrontation between the European Union and the administration of US President Donald Trump over the ICC’s jurisdiction and independence.

Washington’s sanctions against the Court

On 9 October, the United States imposed sanctions on the ICC as an institution, extending measures previously directed against individual judges and prosecutors.

The restrictions place the Court under the US Treasury’s sanctions regime, limiting financial transactions involving American individuals, businesses and institutions. Washington has issued several temporary and limited exemptions intended to allow specified operations to continue.

The measures followed earlier sanctions against senior ICC officials, including Court President Tomoko Akane, and form part of Washington’s campaign to prevent the tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over American personnel.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that the ICC threatens American sovereignty by asserting authority over nationals of countries that have not accepted its founding treaty.

The Court rejected the latest restrictions, describing them as an attempt to obstruct the administration of international justice.

Established under the Rome Statute, the ICC operates independently of national governments and investigates serious international crimes where its jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.

Neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute.

Arrest warrants involving Russia and Israel

The dispute with Washington has intensified since the ICC issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected with military operations in Gaza.

Israel rejects the Court’s jurisdiction and disputes the allegations. Washington has similarly opposed the proceedings against Israeli officials.

The ICC has also pursued investigations into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In March 2023, its judges issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.

Further warrants followed in 2024 against senior Russian military commanders and officials in connection with attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.

The proceedings demonstrate the geographical scope of the Court’s investigations, although its ability to secure arrests depends heavily on cooperation from individual states.

The ICC has no independent police force and relies on national authorities to execute its warrants.

European Parliament backs international justice

The ICC’s nomination for the Sakharov Prize was submitted by the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament.

Its selection comes as European lawmakers examine how the EU should respond to American sanctions affecting the Court and organisations supporting its activities.

The October restrictions have raised practical questions about access to banking, technology services and other infrastructure required by the tribunal.

European governments must also consider how to support an institution established through an international treaty while maintaining relations with Washington.

The Sakharov Prize carries no legal authority to reverse American sanctions or compel governments to cooperate with ICC investigations. Nevertheless, the award represents an explicit institutional endorsement of the tribunal at a time when its operations face increasing external pressure.

Other nominees and award ceremony

The ICC was selected from three finalists announced earlier this month.

The other nominees were Tanzanian opposition leader Tundu Lissu and Iranian sisters Taraneh and Romina Rahimi, whose cases have attracted international attention over political persecution and judicial proceedings.

The Sakharov Prize, established by the European Parliament in 1988, is named after Soviet physicist, dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov.

It recognises individuals and organisations defending human rights, freedom of expression and fundamental liberties. The award includes €50,000.

Previous recipients include Nelson Mandela, Malala Yousafzai and imprisoned journalists.

In 2025, the prize was awarded jointly to Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut and Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli.

The formal presentation of the 2026 prize is scheduled for 16 December at the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

The award places the ICC alongside previous Sakharov laureates while drawing further attention to the unresolved dispute between Washington and European governments over international criminal jurisdiction.

Russia’s demands for the extradition of International Criminal Court judges and Washington’s sweeping sanctions against the institution have converged within days. The two governments have different grievances, but the consequences of their actions increasingly overlap, raising questions about the political relationship between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the future of international criminal justice.

Russia and the United States have intensified their campaigns against the International Criminal Court (ICC) almost simultaneously, exposing an increasingly consequential convergence between the policies of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.

On 8 October, Moscow demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and eight other current and former officials. The following day, Washington announced sanctions against the court as an institution, extending earlier measures against individual judges and prosecutors.

The timing raises an obvious question: are these independent campaigns arising from different disputes with international justice, or do they reflect a broader political understanding between Washington and Moscow?

There is no publicly established evidence of a coordinated operation or an agreement between Trump and Putin to undermine the ICC. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of their respective actions are remarkably similar. Both weaken an institution pursuing criminal proceedings against political leaders whom the two governments seek to protect.

Different grievances, overlapping interests

Russia’s hostility towards the ICC is directly connected to the arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories.

The court subsequently issued warrants against senior Russian military commanders, including Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over alleged crimes involving attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

Moscow’s response has been to pursue ICC personnel through its own criminal justice system. The latest extradition demands follow convictions handed down in absentia by a Russian court in December 2025.

Washington’s confrontation with the ICC has a different immediate origin. The Trump administration objects to the court’s jurisdiction over American nationals and Israeli officials, particularly following the arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has presented the American campaign as a defence of US sovereignty. Yet the sanctions announced on 9 October are not confined to the Israeli proceedings or any investigation involving American personnel.

They target the institution itself, potentially disrupting financial transactions and commercial relationships essential to its operation. This distinction matters because a court-wide restriction necessarily affects investigations beyond those cited by Washington. That includes Ukraine.

The Anchorage question

The political context cannot be separated from the relationship between Trump and Putin, including their meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in August 2025.

The summit formed part of Trump’s efforts to negotiate directly with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. The American president has repeatedly treated relations with Putin as a question of diplomatic bargaining, seeking arrangements that might produce an agreement where conventional Western pressure has failed.

Against this background, suggestions that pressure on the ICC might form part of a wider accommodation with Moscow warrant scrutiny. However, the proposition that Trump specifically offered Putin assistance in neutralising the court during their Anchorage discussions remains unsubstantiated. There is no verified public account establishing such a commitment.

A more defensible conclusion is that Washington’s independently declared campaign against the ICC also advances an important Russian interest. For Putin, the benefit is clear. Measures designed to restrict the court’s financial and administrative capacity could complicate investigations into Russian conduct, irrespective of the American administration’s stated intentions.

The relationship therefore need not involve explicit coordination to produce politically significant results.

Why sanctions against the institution matter

The escalation from targeting individual prosecutors to sanctioning the entire ICC represents a substantial change. Previous American measures imposed personal and financial restrictions on selected officials. The latest approach threatens the broader infrastructure upon which international criminal proceedings depend.

The court requires banking facilities, secure communications, technology services and commercial suppliers. American sanctions can reach beyond US territory because of the international financial system’s dependence on dollar transactions and American service providers.

The ICC had already anticipated this vulnerability. According to details disclosed in September, the institution has pursued alternatives to American software and financial services to reduce its exposure.

Nevertheless, operational continuity and investigative effectiveness are not necessarily the same thing. The court may remain formally functional while facing additional costs, delays and restrictions affecting prosecutors, investigators and international cooperation.

For Ukraine, this is particularly significant. The ICC holds and evaluates evidence connected to alleged Russian war crimes, including the deportation of children and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Its proceedings preserve a judicial process independent of whatever diplomatic settlement Washington and Moscow might eventually negotiate.

Weakening that capacity would not invalidate existing warrants or automatically destroy evidence, but it could make the pursuit of accountability more difficult.

Europe’s response and its limitations

The European Union now faces a dispute with Washington over an institution that European governments have spent decades supporting.

On 9 October, eight governments issued a joint statement, reaffirming their support for the ICC and rejecting the American sanctions. The signatories included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, Japan and Canada.

The European Commission also indicated that the EU was prepared to take measures necessary to preserve the court’s operations. Such assurances are politically important, but they do not automatically resolve the practical consequences of American restrictions.

European financial institutions and technology suppliers must consider their own exposure to US sanctions. Sustaining the court may require alternative payment arrangements, commercial protections and potentially further European regulatory intervention.

The EU has discussed extending its blocking statute to shield European operators from the effects of American sanctions. Whether that mechanism can provide sufficient protection remains uncertain.

The dispute also extends beyond the ICC’s current investigations. Ukraine and the Council of Europe are developing a separate Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, designed to address jurisdictional limitations preventing the ICC from prosecuting Russia’s leadership for the decision to launch the invasion.

The two institutions have distinct legal mandates, although cooperation between them is envisaged. Undermining the ICC would not automatically prevent the special tribunal from operating, but it would weaken an important part of the wider international accountability framework.

A convergence with consequences for Ukraine

Washington and Moscow have not adopted identical positions towards the ICC. Russia seeks to discredit and punish the officials responsible for pursuing Putin. The Trump administration is attempting to restrict the court’s authority and operational capacity, principally in response to proceedings involving Americans and Israelis.

Yet their actions converge at precisely the point where the ICC’s independence becomes politically inconvenient. The distinction between motive and consequence is essential. It would be premature to describe the American sanctions as evidence of a secret bargain struck in Anchorage. It would be equally mistaken to overlook the assistance these measures could provide to Moscow.

The broader concern is that the United States, traditionally central to Western efforts to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine, is now applying pressure to one of the principal institutions carrying out that work.

For European governments, the immediate question is no longer simply whether they support the International Criminal Court. It is whether they are prepared to protect its practical independence when the political and financial pressure comes not only from Russia, but also from Washington.

Russian prosecutors have asked the Netherlands to surrender Tomoko Akane and eight other International Criminal Court officials convicted in absentia by a Moscow court, extending the Kremlin’s retaliation against those investigating alleged war crimes in Ukraine.

Russia has demanded the extradition of International Criminal Court (ICC) President Tomoko Akane from the Netherlands, seeking to enforce criminal sentences against judges and prosecutors involved in issuing arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military officials.

The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office announced on Thursday, 8 October, that it had submitted requests to several governments for the extradition of nine current and former ICC officials, including Karim Khan, who served as the court’s chief prosecutor when the arrest warrant against Putin was issued in March 2023.

The requests follow a ruling by Moscow City Court on 12 December 2025, when nine ICC officials were convicted in absentia and sentenced to prison terms ranging from three and a half to 15 years. Their alleged offences arose from their participation in investigations and judicial decisions concerning Russian officials suspected of international crimes.

Moscow’s latest move is unlikely to secure Akane’s extradition from the Netherlands, which hosts the ICC and is among its principal supporters. Russian authorities are nevertheless seeking cooperation from several countries, potentially exposing court officials to arrest when travelling to jurisdictions maintaining close relations with Moscow.

Japan Protests Against Russian Demands

Japan has condemned the proceedings against Akane, a Japanese national who became ICC president in March 2024.

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masanao Ozaki said Tokyo had repeatedly protested to Moscow over its treatment of ICC personnel and regarded the latest measures as unjustified and unacceptable.

He indicated that Japan would consider further diplomatic action in consultation with the court and other states parties to the Rome Statute.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reaffirmed Japan’s support for the ICC during a parliamentary session on Friday, 9 October, saying Tokyo would continue to defend the institution as part of its commitment to international law.

Akane, who was elected president for a three-year term in March 2024, served on the judicial panel responsible for the arrest warrants against Putin and Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova.

Russian investigators opened criminal proceedings against the judges shortly after those warrants were announced, subsequently adding other ICC officials to their wanted lists as investigations concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine progressed.

Moscow’s Retaliation Against the Court

The confrontation began on 17 March 2023, when the ICC issued arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas to Russia.

The judges found reasonable grounds to believe that both officials bore individual criminal responsibility for the alleged offences. The warrants remain in force, although neither suspect has been brought before the court.

The investigation concerns the removal of children from Ukrainian territory following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ukrainian authorities have documented cases involving children transferred to Russia, placed with Russian families or subjected to measures intended to integrate them into Russian society.

Russia maintains that the transfers were humanitarian evacuations. The ICC’s investigation concerns whether children were unlawfully deported or transferred from occupied territory, conduct prohibited under international humanitarian law.

The court subsequently issued further warrants against senior Russian commanders. In June 2024, former defence minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov were accused of responsibility for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected to attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

Russian prosecutors responded by expanding their criminal cases against ICC personnel. The charges included knowingly prosecuting innocent individuals and attacking representatives of a foreign state.

The December 2025 convictions provided Moscow with the domestic judgments it is now attempting to enforce through extradition requests.

Extradition Requests Raise Questions Over Travel

The Netherlands has not indicated any intention to surrender Akane. Dutch authorities have consistently supported the ICC’s independence, and the Russian convictions concern actions undertaken by officials in the exercise of their judicial responsibilities.

The position may be less predictable in countries maintaining extradition arrangements with Moscow. Although Russian convictions would not automatically require another state to surrender an ICC official, the existence of arrest warrants could complicate international travel and expose those named to detention pending legal proceedings.

The situation recalls the difficulties surrounding Putin’s own international movements since March 2023. His arrest warrant has restricted travel to ICC member states, which are generally required to cooperate with the court’s requests for arrest and surrender.

Russia’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016 did not prevent the ICC from investigating alleged crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine had already accepted the court’s jurisdiction and became a full member on 1 January 2025.

The ICC investigation into Ukraine continues, covering alleged offences committed since 21 November 2013 within the scope of Ukraine’s acceptance of jurisdiction.

US Sanctions Add to Difficulties Facing ICC

The Russian extradition demands coincide with a separate dispute between the ICC and the United States, whose government has sanctioned several members of the court.

On 18 August 2026, President Donald Trump’s administration imposed sanctions on Akane and senior ICC trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye. Washington has objected to investigations involving American personnel and Israeli officials, arguing that the court has exceeded its jurisdiction.

The ICC condemned the additional American sanctions, warning that restrictions targeting judges and prosecutors interfere with its judicial work.

The American measures primarily involve financial restrictions, while Russia has pursued criminal convictions and extradition requests. Both have placed ICC personnel under pressure for their involvement in proceedings opposed by governments outside the Rome Statute system.

The European Union has repeatedly defended the ICC against attempts to interfere with its investigations. The Netherlands, as host country, has particular responsibilities concerning the court’s operations and the security of its personnel.

Moscow’s latest requests are therefore expected to meet resistance from European governments. Their possible consequences elsewhere will depend on the countries approached and whether local authorities are prepared to act on Russian arrest warrants.

The Kremlin has so far failed to halt the ICC’s proceedings against Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Its response has been to pursue the judges and prosecutors responsible, seeking prison sentences against international judicial officials while the allegations against Russia’s own leadership remain before the court.