The European Union has taken a significant step towards revising its digital regulatory framework after member states agreed proposals to amend the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), simplify cookie consent requirements and overhaul cybersecurity reporting obligations.

The Council of the European Union adopted its negotiating position on Wednesday, 21st October, clearing the way for negotiations with the European Parliament once MEPs establish their position.

The measures form part of the European Commission’s Digital Omnibus package, introduced in November 2025, and represent one of Brussels’ most substantial attempts to simplify the regulatory obligations imposed on businesses operating across the single market.

Changes to GDPR and personal data rules

The proposed reforms would modify several provisions of the GDPR, which has governed the processing of personal data across the EU since May 2018.

Rather than replacing the legislation, the Council wants to clarify existing obligations, particularly those concerning pseudonymised information, requests for access to personal data and the use of information in scientific research.

The agreed position retains the existing definition of personal data while introducing provisions intended to clarify when pseudonymised information can be linked to an identifiable individual.

Companies would also benefit from simplified procedures for handling manifestly unfounded or excessive data requests and from reduced information requirements in certain low-risk circumstances.

Another proposed change would extend the deadline for notifying authorities of personal data breaches, while establishing more consistent reporting templates across the EU.

For multinational companies, which currently navigate different interpretations of data protection obligations by national authorities, these provisions could reduce compliance costs and administrative duplication.

However, the changes have raised concerns among European privacy regulators.

In a joint opinion published in February, the European Data Protection Board and European Data Protection Supervisor warned that parts of the Commission’s original proposal could create legal uncertainty and undermine existing protections.

They were particularly concerned about proposals affecting the definition of personal data and the Commission’s potential role in determining when pseudonymised information falls outside GDPR requirements.

The Council’s decision to retain the existing definition addresses part of that debate, although the final legislative text remains subject to negotiations.

Fewer cookie banners for internet users

One of the most visible changes would affect the consent notices encountered by Europeans when visiting websites.

Under the Council’s proposal, additional categories of cookies and similar tracking technologies could be used without obtaining explicit consent, provided the relevant legal conditions are satisfied.

The proposed exemptions include technologies necessary to deliver a service, maintain device security or conduct audience measurement.

For website operators, publishers and online businesses, the changes could reduce the number of consent requests displayed to visitors and simplify technical compliance.

The current system has generated extensive legal disputes over whether consent is genuinely voluntary and whether tracking technologies collect information beyond what users have authorised.

EU Today has previously examined the enforcement of these obligations, including a Belgian court ruling concerning the legality of the advertising industry’s consent framework.

The latest proposal would not abolish consent requirements for commercial tracking or behavioural advertising. Technologies falling outside the permitted exemptions would remain subject to the applicable privacy rules.

Cybersecurity reporting and artificial intelligence

The package also addresses the growing number of reporting obligations imposed on European businesses under overlapping cybersecurity legislation.

The Commission originally proposed a single European reporting mechanism for certain data and cybersecurity incidents.

Member states have instead agreed to establish national entry points, supported by an EU-level information system and provisions for coordinating cross-border notifications.

The Council’s position would also clarify the legal grounds for certain uses of personal data in artificial intelligence systems and introduce safeguards for processing sensitive information in specified circumstances.

These provisions follow increasingly complicated disputes over the application of European privacy legislation to AI development and automated decision-making.

As EU Today reported in its coverage of a major GDPR enforcement case involving Uber, automated processing already presents substantial compliance risks for companies operating within the bloc.

Competitiveness drives regulatory reform

The Commission estimates that its wider digital simplification initiative could save European businesses up to €5 billion in administrative costs by 2029.

The initiative reflects pressure from European governments and business organisations to reduce the regulatory fragmentation that makes operating across multiple EU jurisdictions more expensive.

The Digital Omnibus is part of a broader legislative programme influenced by the competitiveness reports produced by former Italian prime ministers Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi.

Under the Council’s negotiating mandate, several existing data-related rules would also be consolidated, while provisions governing the protection of trade secrets would be strengthened.

The European Parliament must now determine its negotiating position before formal discussions between the institutions can begin. Until the legislation is agreed and adopted, existing GDPR, cookie consent and cybersecurity requirements remain in force.

The European Commission has urged Malta to strengthen judicial independence, tackle corruption and improve protection for journalists, as a European Parliament debate exposes continuing disagreements over the country’s rule-of-law record.

The European Commission has called on Malta to accelerate judicial reforms and strengthen safeguards for journalists, nine years after the assassination of investigative reporter Daphne Caruana Galizia, as the European Parliament revisited concerns over corruption and institutional accountability on Wednesday, 21 October.

European Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection Michael McGrath told MEPs in Strasbourg that Malta had made progress in certain areas but had yet to implement several outstanding recommendations concerning judicial independence, high-level corruption and media freedom.

The debate followed the controversial acquittal of businessman Yorgen Fenech, who had been accused of involvement in Caruana Galizia’s murder. Maltese prosecutors appealed the verdict in September, leaving the criminal proceedings subject to further judicial consideration.

Commission identifies continuing weaknesses

The European Commission’s 2026 Rule of Law Report, published in July, assessed Malta’s progress in reforming its justice system, anti-corruption institutions and protections for the media.

The report acknowledged certain improvements, including additional resources allocated to judicial and prosecutorial authorities.

However, it found that progress remained limited on several recommendations.

These include reducing delays in judicial proceedings, improving the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption and ensuring greater judicial involvement in the appointment of the Chief Justice.

The Commission has also expressed concern about the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption arrangements.

Although investigations and prosecutions have increased in some areas, Brussels continues to seek a stronger record of final judgments in major corruption cases.

Court delays and pressure on judicial resources remain significant difficulties.

McGrath told Parliament that the Maltese authorities must continue implementing reforms to address these shortcomings.

Fenech acquittal intensifies accountability debate

Caruana Galizia was killed by a car bomb near her home in Bidnija on 16 October 2017.

The 53-year-old journalist had investigated corruption, money laundering and political connections involving prominent figures in Malta’s business and political establishment.

Her assassination prompted international condemnation, widespread demonstrations and investigations into the circumstances surrounding the killing.

Several men have subsequently been convicted for participating in the murder or supplying the explosives.

However, the criminal proceedings concerning the alleged commissioning of the assassination have remained contentious.

On 2 September 2026, a nine-member jury acquitted businessman Yorgen Fenech of complicity in the murder and criminal association. The verdict was reached by eight votes to one.

Fenech had denied ordering or financing the killing.

The acquittal prompted criticism from Caruana Galizia’s family and organisations campaigning for press freedom.

On 22 September, Malta’s Attorney General formally appealed the verdict, challenging legal decisions made during the trial.

The appeal does not overturn Fenech’s acquittal or establish criminal responsibility.

The Court of Criminal Appeal must determine whether the legal grounds presented justify further proceedings, potentially including a retrial.

The criminal case remains separate from the broader political debate over Malta’s institutional reforms.

Maltese MEPs clash in Strasbourg

Wednesday’s parliamentary debate exposed sharp disagreements between representatives of Malta’s opposition Nationalist Party and governing Labour Party.

Nationalist MEPs Peter Agius and David Casa criticised the authorities’ record on corruption and institutional accountability.

Agius argued that repeated European Commission assessments had failed to produce sufficient improvements and questioned whether Malta’s institutions were effectively addressing allegations of wrongdoing.

Casa referred to the findings of the independent public inquiry into Caruana Galizia’s assassination, which concluded in 2021 that the state had contributed to circumstances in which a climate of impunity enabled the killing.

He argued that significant recommendations arising from that inquiry remained outstanding.

Labour MEP Alex Agius Saliba rejected the criticism, maintaining that Malta had implemented reforms and that its judicial institutions should be allowed to perform their functions independently.

He pointed to the prosecution’s appeal against Fenech’s acquittal as evidence that the judicial process was continuing.

Labour MEP Thomas Bajada concentrated on the protection of journalists and the need to counter misinformation while preserving independent reporting.

The disagreements subsequently prompted a response from Maltese Prime Minister Robert Abela, who accused opposition MEPs of damaging Malta’s reputation through their interventions.

Protection of journalists remains unfinished

Media freedom featured prominently in the Commission’s concerns.

Malta has introduced legislation addressing certain abusive legal proceedings against journalists, including transposing EU protections against strategic lawsuits intended to discourage public participation.

However, the existing measures principally concern civil proceedings with cross-border implications.

The Commission has urged Malta to extend comparable protections to domestic cases.

Other concerns include journalists’ access to official information, protection from intimidation and the need for more comprehensive legislative safeguards.

McGrath indicated that the Maltese government intended to present additional media legislation in the coming weeks.

The Commission has called for consultations with journalists, media organisations and civil society before the measures are adopted.

European institutions are also examining Malta’s implementation of wider EU requirements under the European Media Freedom Act.

Further pressure for reform

The European Parliament’s proceedings form part of the continued scrutiny of Malta’s institutional record following Caruana Galizia’s assassination.

The Commission’s annual rule-of-law assessments provide a mechanism for identifying outstanding problems and monitoring governments’ responses.

However, the implementation of many recommendations remains the responsibility of national authorities.

For Malta, the immediate issues concern the government’s promised media legislation, outstanding judicial reforms and the progression of the appeal in the Fenech case.

The Commission has made clear that further improvements are required, while the Maltese government maintains that substantial institutional changes have already been introduced.

The next assessment will depend on legislative measures actually adopted, their implementation and progress through the relevant judicial proceedings.

MEPs have approved emergency EU funding to help four southern European countries recover from destructive storms and flooding earlier this year, with Portugal receiving the largest allocation.

The European Parliament approved €489.15 million in financial assistance for Portugal, Spain, Italy and Malta on Wednesday, 21 October, following severe storms and flooding that damaged infrastructure and disrupted communities across southern Europe during the opening months of 2026.

The allocation from the European Union Solidarity Fund was approved by 651 votes to 17, with three abstentions. Portugal will receive the largest share, approximately €261.5 million, followed by Spain with €149.1 million, Italy with €74.9 million and Malta with €3.7 million.

The funding is intended to support recovery operations and help national authorities meet the costs of restoring essential public infrastructure and services damaged by the disasters.

Portugal receives largest allocation

Portugal’s €261.5 million allocation follows flooding and storms that affected the country during January and February.

The Portuguese authorities applied for assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund after assessing the extent of the damage and the associated costs of emergency operations and infrastructure recovery.

The funds will contribute to eligible public expenditure arising from the disasters, potentially including the restoration of transport links, damaged public facilities and other essential infrastructure.

Portugal has already received approximately €65.37 million in advance funding, according to the figures accompanying the parliamentary decision.

Spain will receive €149.1 million following destructive weather during the same period, including severe flooding in February.

The Spanish government had also requested European assistance to cover part of the expenditure associated with recovery operations.

Approximately €37.26 million of Spain’s allocation has already been paid in advance.

The two countries together account for the substantial majority of the assistance approved on Wednesday, reflecting the scale of their eligible recovery costs.

Storm Harry damages Italy and Malta

Italy and Malta will receive assistance following Storm Harry, which struck parts of the central Mediterranean in January 2026.

Italy’s allocation amounts to €74.9 million, while Malta will receive €3.7 million.

The storm caused significant disruption in affected Mediterranean areas, with heavy rainfall, strong winds and damaging sea conditions placing pressure on local infrastructure.

Italian authorities sought European support for recovery operations in the affected territories, while Malta submitted its own request following the damage sustained during the storm.

The Maltese allocation includes approximately €931,000 already made available through an advance payment.

The final assistance amounts were proposed by the European Commission after examining the applications submitted by the four governments.

The Commission’s September proposal to mobilise the EU Solidarity Fund set out the amount of assistance required for each country.

The total proposed mobilisation was €489,148,220.

How the EU Solidarity Fund works

The European Union established the Solidarity Fund in 2002 to assist member states and certain countries participating in the EU accession process following major natural disasters.

The mechanism provides financial support for public emergency and recovery expenditure rather than operating as a general insurance scheme for individuals or businesses.

Eligible expenditure can include emergency accommodation, restoring essential infrastructure, securing protective infrastructure, cleaning disaster-affected areas and protecting cultural heritage.

National authorities submit applications to the Commission, which evaluates them against the relevant eligibility requirements and financial thresholds.

Assistance depends on the assessed disaster damage and applicable regulatory criteria, rather than simply reimbursing every euro of economic loss.

The fund is financed through EU budgetary arrangements and is mobilised following the required institutional approvals.

Payments are made to the countries concerned, which remain responsible for ensuring that assistance is used in accordance with EU financial rules.

The Solidarity Fund can therefore help governments manage exceptional recovery costs, but it does not replace national budgets, private insurance or other financial arrangements.

Rising pressure on European disaster funding

The latest allocation comes against a background of increasingly frequent demands on European disaster-response mechanisms.

Southern European countries have experienced damaging floods, storms, heatwaves and wildfires in recent years, leading to repeated requests for assistance.

Recovery expenditure extends beyond immediate emergency operations. Damaged roads, bridges, coastal defences, water systems and public buildings can require prolonged reconstruction.

These costs can place considerable pressure on local authorities, particularly where a disaster affects tourism, transport or economic activity.

The EU faces the additional challenge of maintaining sufficient funds to respond to major disasters affecting several countries within a relatively short period.

Extreme weather events can also expose weaknesses in existing infrastructure, prompting governments to consider whether reconstruction should incorporate additional protection against future disasters.

However, such investments must be assessed against the eligible spending categories of the Solidarity Fund and the availability of other EU financing programmes.

Parliamentary approval and implementation

Wednesday’s vote represents parliamentary approval of the mobilisation proposed by the European Commission.

The decision concerns disasters that occurred earlier in 2026 and does not constitute a new emergency response operation.

The funds will support eligible recovery measures carried out by the national authorities in the four countries.

The payments already made to Portugal, Spain and Malta will be taken into account when the remaining assistance is disbursed.

EU authorities will retain responsibility for monitoring compliance with the relevant financial and reporting requirements.

The substantial parliamentary majority indicates broad support for assistance to the affected countries, although future disaster-funding arrangements will continue to depend on the resources available in the European budget.

For the four governments, the immediate task is to use the approved assistance to meet eligible recovery costs and restore damaged public infrastructure following the storms earlier this year.

European prosecutors have searched offices in Brussels and Strasbourg as an investigation into alleged misuse of parliamentary funds by the former Identity and Democracy group raises questions over financial liabilities inherited by Patriots for Europe.

European prosecutors carried out searches at the European Parliament’s offices in Brussels and Strasbourg on Wednesday, 21 October, as part of an investigation into alleged financial irregularities involving the former Identity and Democracy (ID) parliamentary group.

The investigation concerns approximately €4.33 million in European Union funds that were allegedly improperly spent during the 2019–2024 parliamentary term. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) confirmed that searches had taken place in connection with an ongoing inquiry into the use of EU funds by a former parliamentary group.

The premises searched are now occupied by Patriots for Europe, the European Parliament’s third-largest political group, which includes France’s National Rally, Hungary’s Fidesz, Italy’s Lega and Spain’s Vox. Patriots for Europe insists that it has no legal continuity with Identity and Democracy and denies being involved in the investigation.

Investigation into parliamentary expenditure

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office opened its investigation in July 2025 following concerns identified by the European Parliament’s financial administration about expenditure incurred by Identity and Democracy.

The former group, which dissolved following the 2024 European elections, included representatives of France’s National Rally, Italy’s Lega and Germany’s Alternative for Germany.

According to details of the parliamentary financial examination subsequently reported in France, investigators are examining approximately €3.6 million in contracts awarded to external service providers, including businesses with political connections to parties represented within the former group.

The financial examination also identified more than €700,000 in donations to organisations whose activities were allegedly unrelated to the parliamentary group’s official functions.

The authorities are examining whether parliamentary resources were used in accordance with EU financial rules, including restrictions on using public money for national party-political activities.

These are allegations under investigation, not criminal findings. The EPPO has not announced convictions arising from the current inquiry, and the individuals and organisations concerned retain the presumption of innocence.

Earlier investigative measures were conducted in France, Belgium, Spain and Italy in June 2026. Wednesday’s searches mark a further stage in the proceedings.

Can Patriots for Europe inherit the liabilities?

The investigation has opened a separate dispute over whether Patriots for Europe could be required to repay money allegedly misspent by its predecessor.

Identity and Democracy ceased to exist after the 2024 elections. Several parties previously represented in the group subsequently joined Patriots for Europe, a new parliamentary formation that also brought together Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and Spain’s Vox.

Patriots for Europe maintains that the two groups are legally separate. Its representatives argue that the dissolution of Identity and Democracy ended that group’s institutional existence and that the present parliamentary organisation is not responsible for its predecessor’s financial affairs.

However, the European Parliament’s budgetary authorities have examined whether responsibility for outstanding liabilities can pass to a successor group.

An opinion approved by the Parliament’s Budgetary Control Committee in September considered the circumstances in which continuity between parliamentary groups might establish financial responsibility.

Such an assessment may consider whether members, administrative personnel, operational resources and other assets were transferred from one organisation to another.

The outcome could determine whether the current group is exposed to potential repayment demands, irrespective of whether its present members were personally involved in the expenditure under investigation.

No final determination of such liability has been established through Wednesday’s searches.

Political consequences in Strasbourg

The searches come at a time when Patriots for Europe has become a major political force within the European Parliament.

Its member parties have challenged EU policy on immigration, economic regulation and the distribution of powers between Brussels and national governments. National Rally and Fidesz are also influential actors in the domestic politics of France and Hungary respectively.

An investigation involving their parliamentary organisation is therefore likely to attract scrutiny beyond the immediate financial questions.

Nevertheless, the political influence of the group and the criminal investigation must be considered separately. The presence of prosecutors at parliamentary premises does not establish wrongdoing by the current group’s MEPs.

The case also raises broader questions about financial accountability within the Parliament, particularly when a political group dissolves following an election and its members establish a new organisation.

Unlike national political parties, European parliamentary groups receive funding specifically to support their legislative, administrative and political work inside the institution.

Those resources are subject to financial controls intended to prevent their diversion into activities that should be funded by national parties or other organisations.

Further proceedings

The EPPO is responsible for investigating and prosecuting offences affecting the European Union’s financial interests. It operates independently of national governments and EU political institutions.

The European Parliament has confirmed its cooperation with the authorities but has declined to comment on the substance of the continuing investigation.

Prosecutors must now assess the evidence obtained during the searches alongside financial records and material collected during previous investigative measures.

Any decision to bring criminal proceedings would depend on the evidence available and the relevant national and European legal requirements.

Separately, the Parliament will have to establish whether any recoverable funds are owed by the former group and, if so, which organisation is legally responsible for repayment.

For Patriots for Europe, the immediate issue is not only the progress of the criminal inquiry but whether the financial arrangements of a dissolved parliamentary group can create obligations for its successor.

 

Europe wants cheaper energy, stronger industries, secure borders and the capacity to sustain Ukraine. Its budget negotiations are exposing the difficulty of paying for those ambitions while protecting established spending programmes and containing national contributions.

Wednesday’s European Parliament debate on the October EU summit brought that contradiction into focus. The dispute over the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework is becoming a test of whether Europe can translate geopolitical urgency into durable financial commitments.

According to Parliament’s account of the debate, European Council President António Costa wants agreement before the year’s end. He advocated an ambitious budget while keeping national contributions reasonable, alongside progress on new EU revenue sources.

Those objectives are politically attractive. Reconciling them will require difficult choices over spending, taxation and the distribution of authority.

MEPs challenged the assumption that the Union can keep expanding its responsibilities without providing additional resources. Speakers identified support for Ukraine, industrial competitiveness, agriculture, regional development and household living costs among competing priorities.

Their argument has force. A budget negotiated around yesterday’s compromises risks leaving Europe poorly equipped for tomorrow’s threats. Yet calls for ambition become less persuasive when they avoid specifying which programmes deliver measurable European benefits.

The emerging distribution of cuts illustrates the problem. As EU Today previously reported, the Irish presidency’s compromise proposed reducing the Commission’s plans by approximately €141 billion, with competitiveness and security facing proportionately deeper reductions than agriculture and cohesion spending.

That creates an uncomfortable possibility: the policies most closely associated with Europe’s strategic renewal could become bargaining chips in negotiations dominated by established beneficiaries.

Protecting farmers and poorer regions has clear economic and political justification. Nevertheless, preserving familiar allocations while squeezing newer priorities would undermine leaders’ repeated promises to strengthen European independence.

Energy offers perhaps the clearest example of why spending decisions and structural reform must advance together.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told MEPs that dependence on imported fossil fuels and the absence of a genuine European energy union were weakening Europe. Costa emphasised affordable production and modernised electricity grids.

The implication is significant. Industrial subsidies cannot indefinitely compensate for an energy system that leaves European manufacturers facing persistently high costs. Cross-border connections, infrastructure investment and better market integration therefore belong at the centre of competitiveness policy.

Von der Leyen also pressed governments to complete the single market and avoid making European rules more complicated through national implementation. Her argument highlights a limitation of the budget debate: additional money cannot, by itself, remove regulatory fragmentation.

The same distinction applies to China. The Commission president described heavily subsidised Chinese competitors and promised action on dependencies, supply chains and market access. Such measures require coherent enforcement and political resolve alongside investment.

Ukraine adds a security imperative that cannot readily be postponed. Costa linked Ukrainian and European security, while MEPs warned about the consequences of weakening support. Long-term commitments require predictable financing rather than recurring emergency bargains.

But the budget dispute also concerns who controls the money.

As EU Today’s reporting on regional concerns explained, local leaders fear that restructuring could concentrate investment decisions in national capitals, weakening regional influence and potentially widening disparities.

That warning deserves attention. A larger European budget would not automatically produce more balanced development. Allocation rules, accountability and local participation will help determine whether spending strengthens cohesion or reinforces existing advantages.

New revenue sources could ease pressure on national contributions, but they cannot make financing politically painless. Costs ultimately fall somewhere, and governments must explain the distribution honestly.

The central challenge is therefore broader than securing agreement on a headline figure. Europe needs a settlement that protects essential commitments, finances credible common priorities and demonstrates results.

MEPs are right to demand resources consistent with Europe’s responsibilities. Governments are entitled to demand discipline. The failure would be a compromise that satisfies neither requirement: expensive enough to provoke domestic opposition, yet too fragmented to provide the strategic capacity Europe’s leaders insist is indispensable.

Main Image: Denis LOMME: © European Union 2025 – Source : EP

European Parliament Vice President Pina Picierno has announced a hunger strike to draw international attention to the humanitarian disaster in Russian-occupied Oleshky in Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast, she wrote on X on 20 October. The Italian lawmaker called on associations, citizens, and institutions to join her and demand a humanitarian truce, food and medicine for residents, and safe evacuation for those who want to leave.

Russia has occupied the left bank of the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast since 2022. Its forces have cut Oleshky off, leaving its remaining residents short of food and medicine, Ukrainian officials and UN monitors say. Oleshky had about 24,000 residents before the full-scale invasion. About 1,700 remain, including 47 children, Danielle Bell, head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, said. Picierno’s protest adds to growing international pressure after Pope Leo XIV asked Russian leader Vladimir Putin for a truce to help the town.

“This battle cannot be mine alone”

In Oleshky, thousands of people are trapped in territory occupied by the Russian army, without regular access to food and medicine, Picierno wrote. Mined areas make escape extremely dangerous, she added.

“Those who stay risk dying of hunger, those who try to leave risk their lives,” she wrote. “To draw international attention to this emergency, I have announced a hunger strike. But this battle cannot be mine alone.”

She said the campaign is meant to support the efforts of Pope Leo XIV and others trying to avert a humanitarian tragedy. By the morning of 21 October, 277 people had joined the initiative, Liga reported.

Picierno, who left Italy’s Democratic Party in June and joined the Renew Europe group, has backed military aid to Ukraine, tougher sanctions on Russia, and Ukraine’s bid to join the EU, according to Liga.

A town Kyiv calls a “death trap”

On 16 October, Pope Leo XIV expressed deep concern to Putin about the situation in Oleshky. He asked for a truce so that food and medical aid could be delivered and civilians could leave voluntarily and safely.

A day later, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha urged the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross to help evacuate residents.

“Russians are trying to turn the Ukrainian town of Oleshky into a death trap,” Sybiha wrote. “Dozens of bodies lie in the streets or in homes, as Russians forbid residents from burying them.”

Ukraine has flown tons of food into the town by drone. Russian troops seize some of the parcels and accuse the people who receive them of cooperating with Ukraine, local officials say. A resident said eggs there cost nearly 20 times the US price.

Evacuation talks “moved forward”

Talks with Russia on a ceasefire and evacuation are at the stage of “agreeing the final details,” Ukraine’s human rights ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets said on 18 October. He estimated that about 6,000 civilians, including up to 200 children, remain in Oleshky and six nearby settlements. He gave no timeline.

On 20 October, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine was doing everything it could to help people in Oleshky, calling the situation there “simply terrible.”

European People’s Party, Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens, and the Left agreed on the need for a firm response.

On Tuesday, all political groups in the European Parliament, except the far right, expressed support for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the face of recent sanctions and pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump.

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During a debate in the European Parliament, Kaja Kallas, the European Union (EU) High Representative for Foreign Affairs, warned that the measures adopted by the United States jeopardize the overall functioning of the international court.

Kallas noted that the six-month period during which certain operations will continue provides an opportunity to attempt a diplomatic solution and assess the legal implications of the sanctions.

The EU’s top diplomat also stated that EU member states must work together to ensure that the ICC can continue to function both at its headquarters and in the various locations where it conducts investigations.

Mark Carney just got a standing ovation from European Parliament after he takes a stand against Trump.

The world doesn’t respect us anymore. The world is partnering against us.

America first means America alone. pic.twitter.com/6NgB8H5UtK

— Brian Krassenstein (@krassenstein) September 17, 2026

The EU official acknowledged that the European Union can do more to protect the court and recalled that the leaders of the 27 member states recently called for new initiatives aimed at mitigating the impact of the U.S. measures.

One of the main demands of the MEPs was the activation of the so-called blocking statute, a mechanism that would prevent European companies and operators from having to comply with sanctions imposed by third countries when these sanctions contravene international law.

Representatives from the European People’s Party, Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens, and the Left agreed on the need for a firm response from Brussels to protect the ICC and preserve its independence from external pressures.

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodriguez visited the International Italian-Latin American Organization (IILA) headquarters in Rome to reaffirm Venezuela’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy and to cooperation between Europe and Latin America. She met with IILA Secretary… pic.twitter.com/PqQIc69RFZ

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 13, 2026

teleSUR: JP

Source: EFE

A diverse array of MEPs on Tuesday (20 October) expressed their enthusiasm for the UK ‘correcting the mistake’ of Brexit by rejoining the European Union 10 years after its people narrowly voted to leave.

“Trump, Xi and Putin might form a troika of iliberalism standing in defiance of the achievements of liberal democracy”, warned Barry Andrews, an Irish MEP for Renew, saying that the EU should not treat the United Kingdom “like any other third country”.

His party ally Sandro Gozi, an Italian MEP, added: “Every option must be on the table, from a special partnership to full EU membership.” 

The debate on EU-UK relations in the Strasbourg parliament came a month ahead of a highly-anticipated EU-UK summit in Brussels on 20 November. 

Although the UK rejoining the bloc is still a distant prospect, it is back on the agenda because of new prime minister Andy Burnham.

Brexit had “done more harm than good”, Burnham told delegates at the Labour party conference in late September, adding that “we will not give Britain the clear path we need into the rest of the century until we decide on a long-term relationship with what is still our largest market.” 

Britain could “go all the way” back into the EU, added Burnham.

European parliament president Robert Metsola has given an open invitation for Burnham to address MEPs, her office told EUobserver, in another sign of goodwill.

The UK Treasury, meanwhile, is expected to publish a study in the coming days detailing the scale of the hit to the UK economy from leaving the bloc.

Burnham’s predecessor Keir Starmer, who resigned in July primarily because of dismal opinion poll ratings, had promised a ‘reset’ of EU-UK relations when his government took power in July 2024. But apart from rhetoric, little has changed, though the UK now has access to the Erasmus+ student exchange programme.

Brexit is a “mistake that can be corrected by all of us” and admitting it is “a sign of strength”, said German Green MEP Terry Reintke.

New deals agreed should be “the floor and not the ceiling” of bilateral relations, said David McAllister, a German MEP for the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP).

On the right, Polish MEP for the European Conservatives and Reformists Jadwiga Wiśniewska also welcomed new talks with the UK, calling for them to be based on “concrete elements” like agriculture deals, defence and Erasmus+.

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European lawmakers say Sakharov Prize shortlist shows they are committed to safeguarding the work of the ICC, which in 2024 issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu over Gaza war

The European Parliament has demanded €225 billion for the European Union’s foreign policy and development programmes between 2028 and 2034, challenging proposals by member states to reduce spending under the bloc’s next long-term budget.

The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Development committees approved their negotiating position on the Global Europe Instrument on Monday, 19 October, by 63 votes to 27, with five abstentions. The proposed allocation represents an increase of €25 billion over the European Commission’s original €200 billion proposal.

The decision comes as negotiations over the wider 2028–2034 EU budget have become increasingly contentious, with Germany and several other net contributors opposing higher expenditure while Brussels faces mounting demands for defence, industrial investment, enlargement and support for Ukraine.

Parliament rejects proposed reductions

Under the position adopted by the parliamentary committees, at least €25 billion would be reserved for humanitarian assistance. MEPs also want dedicated funding for reconstruction in Gaza and financial support for countries seeking EU membership.

The committees are proposing that 20 per cent of official development assistance should be directed towards human development, alongside stronger provisions covering democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Global Europe is intended to consolidate several existing financing instruments into a single framework governing much of the Union’s external expenditure. The programme would finance activities ranging from development cooperation and humanitarian assistance to economic partnerships and support for countries preparing to join the EU.

The Commission introduced the original €200 billion proposal in July 2025. However, subsequent negotiations among member states have raised the prospect of substantial reductions.

Germany, the Netherlands and several Nordic countries have argued that the next budget must reflect the financial constraints facing national governments. Their objections have complicated efforts to accommodate additional spending on European security and economic competitiveness.

The European Parliament has taken a different position, maintaining that reducing external expenditure would restrict the Union’s ability to operate internationally when European security and economic interests increasingly depend on developments beyond its borders.

Ukraine and enlargement funding

The parliamentary proposal would preserve support for Ukraine while seeking to prevent assistance connected with Russia’s invasion from reducing resources available to other partner countries.

Ukraine’s reconstruction, institutional reforms and integration with European markets will require substantial financing over the coming years. However, the precise allocation will depend on negotiations over the wider budget and the financing arrangements eventually approved.

For candidate countries, MEPs want clearer incentives linking EU assistance to progress on political and economic reforms. The proposed framework would also provide Brussels with greater powers to suspend funding where democratic standards, human rights or judicial independence deteriorate.

A separate provision would permit the Commission to suspend payments where partner countries seriously fail to meet obligations concerning the readmission of their nationals.

That measure reflects the growing connection between the EU’s development policy and its migration objectives. Brussels has increasingly sought cooperation on returns and border management as part of agreements with countries receiving European assistance.

The committees have also called for stronger parliamentary supervision of Global Europe, including more detailed reporting by the Commission and regular discussions with the commissioners responsible for implementation.

Difficult negotiations ahead

The financial disagreement extends well beyond external policy. The overall seven-year budget remains contested, particularly over agricultural subsidies, regional development funds, defence investment and repayment of borrowing undertaken during the coronavirus pandemic.

As EU Today previously reported, a group of 17 member states has opposed reductions in agricultural and cohesion spending, adding further pressure to negotiations.

The Parliament’s proposed €225 billion allocation has not been agreed by governments and does not constitute an approved spending commitment.

The committees also approved a mandate for negotiations with the Council, although their position still requires endorsement by the full Parliament, provisionally expected in November.

Meanwhile, member states must settle their own negotiating position, including the financial ceilings governing the programme.

The eventual settlement will determine how much Brussels can spend on development cooperation, humanitarian operations and international partnerships after 2027, and how those commitments can be reconciled with the EU’s expanding domestic financial obligations.

Spain’s government has declared that the first phase of its emergency response to the Ceuta migration crisis has been completed, following the arrival of an estimated 80,000 migrants from Morocco at the end of July.

Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska said on Friday, 16 October, that approximately 12,000 people had returned voluntarily to Morocco since August, while the authorities had expanded facilities to process asylum applications and return decisions.

Nevertheless, substantial administrative and humanitarian challenges remain in the Spanish enclave, particularly concerning people awaiting decisions on their legal status and unaccompanied minors. The situation has become an important test of the European Union’s revised migration and asylum legislation.

Unprecedented crossings at the African border

The crisis began on 30 July, when tens of thousands of people entered Ceuta from Morocco by land and sea following the circulation of misleading information on social media about access to Spanish territory.

According to an October briefing by the European Parliament’s Research Service, approximately 80,000 people crossed into the enclave during the incident, overwhelming local reception facilities and creating an emergency at one of the EU’s few land borders with Africa.

A subsequent European Parliament resolution referred to at least 141 deaths associated with the crossings, although the initial figure reported by Spanish authorities was lower. The exact number of people who crossed and the final death toll have remained subjects of uncertainty.

Most entrants returned to Morocco within days. However, thousands remained, leaving Spain responsible for assessing individual claims, arranging lawful returns and providing appropriate accommodation.

Ceuta’s geographical position complicates these procedures. Although the enclave is Spanish and forms part of the EU, travellers departing for mainland Spain remain subject to specific controls at its ports and airports.

Spain expands its processing capacity

During a visit to Ceuta on 16 October, Grande-Marlaska defended the government’s management of the emergency and announced that additional police resources would substantially increase administrative capacity.

The expanded temporary reception and processing facilities at El Tarajal are intended to handle at least 100 files daily, including applications for international protection and return procedures.

According to figures presented by the Interior Minister, approximately 1,200 applications for international protection had been formally submitted, with around 700 decisions already issued.

He also rejected allegations that the authorities had conducted concealed or involuntary returns, insisting that departures to Morocco had followed voluntary decisions or the appropriate legal procedures.

The minister said more than 500 expulsions had been executed through judicial or administrative decisions in recent months. These are distinct from the approximately 12,000 voluntary returns recorded since August.

The treatment of unaccompanied minors remains contentious. The European Parliament’s research briefing estimated that around 1,100 such minors were in Ceuta, including some who arrived before the July emergency.

Responsibility for their care has generated disagreement between the Spanish central government and Ceuta’s autonomous administration, particularly over guardianship, identification and the distribution of minors to other regions.

New EU asylum system faces a practical test

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which began applying in June 2026, was designed to strengthen external border procedures while establishing clearer responsibilities for Member States.

Its provisions include identity and security screening, accelerated procedures for certain asylum applications and a solidarity mechanism allowing countries to support those facing disproportionate migration pressures.

Under the screening rules, the authorities generally have up to seven days to complete the initial checks required for people apprehended after irregular entry.

However, the Ceuta emergency demonstrates the difficulty of applying individual administrative procedures when arrivals occur in exceptionally large numbers within a short period.

The geographical concentration of arrivals means that adequate staffing, interpretation, legal assistance and reception facilities become essential to ensuring the system operates within its prescribed deadlines.

Spain requested assistance from Frontex, Europol and the European Union Agency for Asylum in August. The Commission subsequently announced €114.7 million in emergency assistance in September.

Political dispute over migration policy

The crisis has widened divisions between European governments over border enforcement and the regularisation of migrants already living within the EU.

Italy and several other Member States have questioned whether Spain’s separate regularisation programme could encourage further irregular migration. Madrid rejects the suggestion that the programme caused the Ceuta crossings.

The Spanish scheme covers only people who met the residence requirements by the end of 2025. Those who arrived during the July 2026 crisis are not eligible.

European Parliament members also adopted a resolution in September calling for stronger protection of the EU’s external borders and greater cooperation with Morocco. The resolution characterised the crisis as involving the possible instrumentalisation of migration, although Spain has said it has no evidence establishing Moroccan government involvement.

The continuing administrative backlog, the position of minors and the effectiveness of EU assistance will determine how quickly Ceuta can return to ordinary border operations.

Beyond Spain, the episode raises a practical question for Brussels: whether Europe’s new asylum framework can maintain border controls and individual legal safeguards simultaneously during an exceptionally large and sudden influx.

The European Parliament is preparing to vote on amendments to the as Brussels seeks to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers of minerals essential for defence equipment, electric vehicles, advanced electronics and industrial production.

The proposals, scheduled for debate in Strasbourg on Monday, 19 October, and a vote on Tuesday, would strengthen coordination over strategic supplies and revise the responsibilities of European companies that depend on vulnerable international supply chains.

At the centre of the discussions is a proposal to establish a European Critical Raw Materials Centre, which would coordinate purchasing arrangements, assess supply risks and support the development of strategic reserves.

The initiative comes amid increasing concern over China’s dominant position in the processing and supply of several materials regarded as indispensable to European industry.

Parliament considers stronger European coordination

According to the European Parliament’s October plenary briefing, the proposed Critical Raw Materials Centre would operate as an EU body responsible for several functions currently distributed between European institutions and national authorities.

These would include identifying vulnerabilities in supply chains, conducting risk assessments, coordinating contingency stocks and supporting joint purchasing arrangements.

The objective is to give European governments and manufacturers greater capacity to respond to interruptions in supplies of minerals and processed materials that cannot easily be replaced.

The legislative report has been prepared by the Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, with Dutch Social Democrat MEP Mohammed Chahim serving as rapporteur.

The committee examined amendments to the existing legislation during 2026, with its revised report submitted for plenary consideration on 9th October.

Tuesday’s vote is intended to establish Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council. It would not, by itself, constitute final adoption of the amended regulation.

China’s position creates supply risks

The European Union depends heavily on imported critical raw materials, particularly those required for batteries, permanent magnets, semiconductors and specialist industrial equipment.

China occupies a particularly important position in the refining and processing of rare earth elements, graphite and several other materials used in high-technology manufacturing.

The concentration of production creates vulnerabilities because disruption at a single stage of processing can affect manufacturers operating across multiple European countries.

According to the Council of the European Union’s assessment of strategic mineral supplies, China is the principal supplier to the EU for numerous materials, including gallium, germanium, magnesium and rare earth elements.

These substances are used in applications extending well beyond electric vehicles.

Permanent magnets are required for certain electric motors, wind turbines and defence systems, while other critical materials are used in radar, satellites, aircraft components and advanced electronic equipment.

Restrictions affecting their availability can therefore have consequences for European industrial output, defence procurement and the development of new technology.

The question for EU policymakers is not simply whether minerals can be obtained, but whether Europe has sufficient alternative sources and processing capacity to withstand restrictions imposed by a dominant supplier.

Existing targets remain difficult to achieve

The Critical Raw Materials Act entered into force in May 2024 and established benchmarks intended to strengthen European production and diversify imports by 2030.

Under the existing framework, the EU aims to develop extraction capacity equivalent to at least 10 per cent of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials, where geological reserves allow.

The corresponding benchmarks are 40 per cent for processing and 25 per cent for recycling.

The legislation also seeks to prevent any single non-EU country from supplying more than 65 per cent of the Union’s annual consumption of a particular strategic raw material at any relevant processing stage.

These are policy benchmarks rather than binding production quotas imposed on individual companies.

Their achievement depends on the development of mines, processing facilities and recycling operations, as well as the ability to attract investment.

New extraction projects frequently require lengthy environmental assessments, infrastructure development and extensive capital investment. Processing operations face additional challenges involving energy costs, technical expertise and commercial competitiveness.

Consequently, reducing import dependence involves more than identifying mineral deposits within European territory.

Greater obligations for manufacturers

The proposed amendments also address the responsibilities of major European companies using strategic raw materials.

Under provisions examined by the parliamentary committee, the European Commission would take a greater role in identifying large manufacturers whose operations depend on strategically important supplies.

These companies could face requirements to assess vulnerabilities in their supply chains, including the geographical location of extraction and processing operations and the ownership of relevant facilities.

The arrangements would be particularly significant for businesses producing batteries, aircraft, drones, satellites, advanced chips and other products considered strategically important.

Where significant risks are identified, companies could be expected to consider measures including diversification, improved material efficiency or maintaining stocks.

The proposals also seek to strengthen recycling and the recovery of valuable materials from existing products, reducing the quantity of newly extracted resources required by European industry.

Recycling alone cannot remove the need for imports, particularly where demand for new technologies is increasing, but it can provide an additional source of supply.

Supply security becomes an industrial priority

The legislation forms part of a wider effort to link European industrial policy with economic security.

Brussels has been seeking additional raw materials partnerships with third countries, while manufacturers remain concerned about the commercial cost of building alternative supply chains.

Recent EU discussions concerning cooperation with Vietnam illustrate the emphasis being placed on securing alternative access to minerals such as tungsten and rare earth elements.

However, diversifying supplies does not necessarily mean transferring extraction and processing to Europe. Partnerships with reliable external producers may remain essential, particularly for materials unavailable in sufficient quantities within the Union.

The proposed European centre would therefore have to balance internal production, international purchasing, strategic stocks and commercial demand.

The immediate legislative issue is whether the revised framework gives European institutions sufficient powers to coordinate these activities without placing disproportionate administrative obligations on businesses.

Tuesday’s parliamentary vote will determine the negotiating position MEPs take into discussions with EU governments over how those responsibilities should be distributed.

EU finance ministers have approved a compromise that would expand the European Securities and Markets Authority’s powers while exempting some major trading venues from centralised oversight. The agreement reflects continuing resistance to transferring financial supervision from national authorities to Brussels.

European Union finance ministers have reached an agreement to expand centralised supervision of financial markets, but Germany has secured provisions allowing important parts of Deutsche Börse to remain under national oversight, substantially narrowing the European Commission’s original reform proposals.

The compromise, agreed at a meeting in Luxembourg on 9 October, would transfer responsibility for supervising selected trading venues, clearing houses and securities settlement institutions to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).

However, the agreement introduces exemptions and thresholds that reduce the number of institutions automatically subject to direct European supervision.

The result is a significant political compromise between governments seeking deeper financial integration and those reluctant to surrender oversight of nationally important market operators.

Berlin secures its exemption

The most contentious element of the negotiations concerned Deutsche Börse, the German financial-market group that operates the Frankfurt stock exchange and provides trading, clearing and other financial infrastructure services.

Germany opposed arrangements that would place all major market operators under direct ESMA supervision, arguing that institutions with predominantly domestic activities should continue to be regulated nationally.

The agreed compromise refines the criteria for determining which trading venues qualify for centralised oversight.

These conditions allow certain Deutsche Börse operations to remain outside the new supervisory regime.

The exemption had already become a point of contention during negotiations among European governments.

As EU Today reported in June, Berlin had sought to protect Deutsche Börse from mandatory European supervision despite Germany’s broader support for integrating EU capital markets.

The October agreement formalises a narrower approach within the Council’s negotiating position, although the legislation remains subject to approval by the European Parliament.

Europe’s fragmented financial markets

The European Commission has repeatedly argued that fragmented national supervision weakens the EU’s ability to compete with financial markets in the United States.

Although the Union operates a single market, many financial institutions continue to face differing regulatory interpretations, procedures and supervisory relationships across member states.

These differences can increase operating costs and discourage financial businesses from expanding across borders.

The Market Integration and Supervision Package is intended to simplify those arrangements and strengthen common oversight of financial infrastructure with significant cross-border activity.

Under the Council’s position, ESMA would assume direct supervision of selected trading platforms and institutions involved in clearing and securities settlement.

Such institutions perform essential functions in financial markets, including managing transactions, transferring securities and controlling risks between counterparties.

Differences in supervisory arrangements can complicate the operation of financial services that increasingly function across national borders.

The Commission argues that greater consistency would allow European capital to move more efficiently between member states and provide businesses with improved access to investment.

Compromise reduces original ambitions

The Commission’s original approach envisaged broader centralisation of supervisory responsibilities.

The Council agreement of 9 October introduces more restrictive criteria governing the institutions that would fall under ESMA’s direct authority.

In addition to the treatment of trading venues, ministers agreed that direct supervision of crypto-asset service providers should initially concentrate on businesses with the most significant cross-border operations.

The Council also supported changes to ESMA’s governance arrangements, including the creation of a full-time executive board.

The proposed board would strengthen the authority’s ability to make supervisory decisions independently of individual national regulators, while preserving mechanisms for cooperation with those authorities.

The compromise also introduces arrangements allowing national supervisors collectively to challenge certain decisions.

These provisions reflect concerns about concentrating regulatory powers within an institution that must oversee financial businesses operating under different national legal systems.

Why capital markets matter for European investment

The supervision reforms form part of the EU’s broader Savings and Investments Union initiative.

European policymakers want to increase the availability of private capital for companies investing in technology, defence, infrastructure and industrial development.

The Union has substantial household savings, but much of that money remains in bank deposits or is invested outside the European economy.

Companies seeking capital for expansion may consequently face higher financing costs or more limited investment opportunities than comparable businesses operating in larger and more integrated markets.

The Commission’s Savings and Investments Union programme seeks to improve access to finance and make cross-border investment more attractive.

Financial-market supervision represents only one element of that programme.

Differences in taxation, insolvency law, national investment products and corporate governance requirements also influence where investors allocate their money.

Nevertheless, regulators regard consistent supervision as an important condition for reducing fragmentation.

Parliament faces a political decision

The agreement reached by finance ministers does not conclude the legislative process.

The European Parliament must adopt its position before negotiations can determine the final provisions.

Parliamentary discussions could revisit the exemptions secured by Germany and the criteria determining which institutions fall under direct ESMA supervision.

The debate will expose differences over whether European financial integration should proceed through incremental reforms or a more substantial transfer of regulatory authority.

Governments supporting national exemptions argue that supervision should reflect the actual geographic scope of a company’s activities.

Supporters of broader European oversight contend that major trading businesses can influence financial markets beyond their home jurisdictions even when individual operations appear predominantly domestic.

The Deutsche Börse exemption has become a prominent example of the conflict between those positions.

Europe’s largest economies broadly support the objective of deeper capital markets, but remain divided over the institutional powers needed to achieve it.

The final legislation will determine whether the expanded responsibilities granted to ESMA are sufficient to reduce fragmentation or leave important parts of Europe’s financial infrastructure operating under substantially different national supervisory systems.

As the European Parliament prepares to welcome representatives from six Gulf monarchies, uncomfortable questions are emerging about the moral foundations of Europe’s foreign policy. Can Brussels credibly champion democracy and human rights while deepening relations with governments accused of suppressing dissent, restricting fundamental freedoms and exploiting migrant workers?

The European Union has long presented itself as a global defender of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Yet its growing enthusiasm for closer relations with the Gulf monarchies raises an increasingly uncomfortable question: how much are those principles worth when substantial economic and strategic interests are at stake?

On October 16th, the European Parliament will host senior parliamentary representatives from the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.

The conference, chaired by European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, will address parliamentary cooperation, maritime security and the geopolitical consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

On paper, the initiative represents an entirely reasonable diplomatic exercise. Europe needs reliable energy supplies, secure international shipping routes and constructive relations with influential Middle Eastern governments.

But there is another side to this developing partnership, one that Brussels cannot simply dismiss as an inconvenient complication.

Several Gulf governments maintain political systems in which meaningful democratic opposition is severely restricted, freedom of expression is curtailed and individuals can face imprisonment for challenging those in power.

The question is not whether Europe should maintain diplomatic relations with such countries. It plainly must.

The question is whether those relations should be celebrated as strategic partnerships without demanding meaningful improvements in the treatment of their own citizens.

The uncomfortable reality behind Gulf prosperity

Saudi Arabia’s international image has undergone a remarkable transformation in recent years.

Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom has promoted ambitious economic reforms, tourism projects and international sporting events designed to present a modernising society. Yet this carefully cultivated image sits uneasily alongside its human rights record.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly documented concerns over executions, restrictions on political dissent, arbitrary detention and the treatment of women’s rights activists.

The murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018 remains an enduring symbol of the dangers faced by critics of the Saudi leadership. A 2021 US intelligence assessment concluded that the Crown Prince had approved an operation to capture or kill Khashoggi, an assessment rejected by Saudi Arabia.

Qatar, meanwhile, has attracted sustained criticism over the treatment of migrant workers, particularly during preparations for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Although labour reforms were introduced, human rights organisations continue to question their implementation and the effectiveness of protections against exploitation.

The UAE, despite its reputation for modernity and commercial sophistication, has similarly faced criticism over restrictions on political expression, detention of dissidents and the absence of meaningful electoral democracy at national level.

Bahrain has been criticised for imprisoning opposition figures and restricting political freedoms, while concerns about migrant labour protections and freedom of expression extend across other Gulf states, albeit with important differences in their individual records.

These are not minor administrative shortcomings. They concern fundamental rights that the European Union claims to regard as universal and non-negotiable.

When strategic interests outweigh principles

There is an unmistakable contradiction in Europe’s approach. The European Parliament routinely condemns authoritarian practices in Russia, Belarus and other countries where political freedoms are suppressed. It demands accountability, democratic reform and respect for international law.

Yet when dealing with wealthy Gulf monarchies, the language often becomes considerably more accommodating. Economic opportunity, investment, energy security and regional stability suddenly dominate the conversation.

Such selective emphasis risks creating the impression that Europe’s commitment to human rights is determined less by universal principle than by the commercial and geopolitical importance of the country concerned.

That is a dangerous perception for an institution whose international credibility depends heavily upon its moral authority.

If the imprisonment of political opponents is unacceptable in Moscow or Minsk, why should comparable abuses become less objectionable when committed by governments possessing substantial sovereign wealth funds or strategically important energy reserves?

Europe cannot reasonably demand consistency from others while appearing unwilling to apply it to itself.

The strategic argument remains compelling

None of this diminishes the genuine importance of cooperation with the Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are essential maritime corridors connecting Europe with global energy suppliers and Asian markets. Threats to commercial shipping, regional instability and the activities of Iran-aligned armed groups present legitimate security concerns.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also demonstrated the dangers of excessive dependence upon unreliable external partners. Diversifying energy relationships is therefore a sensible strategic objective.

Moreover, Gulf governments possess considerable diplomatic influence, including relationships with states and political actors that European governments may struggle to engage directly.

But strategic necessity does not automatically confer moral legitimacy.

Indeed, Europe’s previous dependence upon Russian energy offers a particularly sobering lesson. For years, European governments convinced themselves that extensive commercial engagement with Moscow would encourage moderation and political stability.

Instead, economic interdependence failed to prevent Russian aggression, leaving Europe exposed when that relationship collapsed. It would be reckless to assume that expanding commercial relations with authoritarian governments necessarily produces political liberalisation.

What does parliamentary cooperation actually mean?

The proposed conference also raises questions about the meaning of parliamentary dialogue.

The European Parliament is a directly elected institution, accountable to hundreds of millions of citizens through competitive democratic elections.

The political institutions of the Gulf states operate under markedly different arrangements, with varying degrees of appointed representation, limited electoral participation and executive authority concentrated within ruling families.

Describing these relationships simply as parliamentary cooperation risks obscuring fundamental differences in democratic legitimacy.

Dialogue can undoubtedly serve a useful purpose. But it should not be allowed to imply an equivalence between representative democratic institutions and political structures in which citizens have far fewer opportunities to challenge those governing them.

Nor should participation in prestigious European institutional events become an exercise in international reputation management for governments facing serious human rights allegations.

A test of Europe’s credibility

The European Parliament has an opportunity to demonstrate that closer cooperation need not mean abandoning its principles.

It could insist that human rights form a substantive part of future engagement, including scrutiny of political imprisonment, freedom of expression, judicial independence and migrant worker protections.

It could also establish mechanisms for monitoring progress rather than relying upon diplomatic assurances.

Such measures would not necessarily undermine economic cooperation. They would establish that the relationship carries responsibilities as well as benefits.

Ultimately, the issue is not whether Europe should talk to the Gulf monarchies, but whether it possesses the political courage to challenge them.

A European Union that condemns authoritarianism in one part of the world while accommodating it elsewhere risks reducing its professed values to little more than diplomatic convenience.

Europe may need the Gulf’s energy, investment and strategic influence, but it should not have to surrender its conscience to obtain them.

And if Brussels cannot reconcile its commercial ambitions with its democratic principles, it must confront a deeply uncomfortable possibility: that Europe’s foreign policy is increasingly being guided not by the values it proclaims, but by the wealth and influence of those sitting across the negotiating table.

The European Parliament has delivered a sharp rebuke to Ireland’s proposals for the EU’s next seven-year budget, warning that cuts to competitiveness, security and regional development could leave Europe dangerously ill-equipped to confront mounting geopolitical and economic challenges.

The European Union is heading towards a potentially bruising institutional confrontation over its next long-term budget, after senior Members of the European Parliament rejected proposals from the Irish Presidency of the Council to reduce the European Commission’s spending plans by eight per cent.

The dispute concerns the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034, which will determine not merely how much Brussels spends, but the extent to which Europe can deliver on its increasingly ambitious political, economic and security objectives.

At stake is a fundamental question: can the European Union realistically aspire to become a more competitive, strategically independent global power while its member states resist providing the financial resources necessary to achieve those ambitions?

Parliament Draws a Red Line

In a statement published on 10th October, Parliament’s principal budget negotiators, Siegfried Mureșan of the European People’s Party and Carla Tavares of the Socialists and Democrats, firmly rejected the Irish negotiating framework.

They were joined by Danuše Nerudová and Sandra Gómez López, Parliament’s co-rapporteurs responsible for developing new sources of EU revenue.

Their objections centre on the proposed reduction of approximately €141 billion from the Commission’s original spending plans.

Mureșan warned that the reductions would undermine Europe’s ability to respond to growing demands for defence, economic competitiveness and security.

He also highlighted the erosion of the EU budget’s purchasing power, which Parliament estimates has declined by approximately ten per cent because of inflation.

The implication is uncomfortable for national governments: maintaining apparently substantial expenditure figures does not necessarily translate into maintaining Europe’s capacity to act.

Ireland’s Difficult Balancing Act

Ireland, currently holding the rotating Council Presidency, has attempted to reconcile two increasingly contradictory political demands.

On one side stand governments seeking greater investment in defence, technological innovation, economic resilience and geopolitical influence.

On the other are national finance ministries confronting constrained public finances, mounting borrowing costs and electorates increasingly resistant to additional expenditure.

The Irish Presidency’s proposal envisages approximately €1.62 trillion in commitments, expressed in 2025 prices, representing a substantial increase over the existing seven-year framework.

Dublin argues that its negotiating position offers an ambitious but financially realistic compromise, preserving traditional agricultural and cohesion spending while accommodating emerging priorities.

Yet the European Parliament remains unconvinced.

Particularly contentious are proposed reductions of 12.8 per cent in competitiveness expenditure and 17.4 per cent in external action compared with the Commission’s plans.

These are precisely the areas in which Brussels has repeatedly promised greater international influence.

Defence Ambitions Meet Financial Reality

The timing could scarcely be more awkward. Russia’s continuing aggression against Ukraine has exposed Europe’s dependence on American military capabilities, while mounting geopolitical uncertainty has reinforced demands for greater European strategic autonomy.

Meanwhile, competition from China and the United States is placing European industries under unprecedented pressure.

Brussels regularly speaks of technological sovereignty, stronger defence industries and reduced dependence on external suppliers, however, those objectives require sustained investment.

Cutting expenditure intended to strengthen competitiveness while simultaneously demanding that European companies compete more effectively internationally risks becoming an exercise in political contradiction.

Nevertheless, Parliament’s position deserves scrutiny too. Greater expenditure does not automatically produce better outcomes. Europe’s problems with fragmented defence procurement, regulatory complexity and slow implementation cannot simply be resolved by increasing budget allocations.

A credible financial settlement must therefore combine sufficient resources with demonstrably improved efficiency and accountability.

The Battle Over Europe’s Own Resources

Perhaps the most consequential disagreement concerns how the Union should finance its expenditure.

Parliament has repeatedly argued that the EU must develop additional independent revenue streams rather than relying excessively on contributions from national governments.

Its proposals include levies associated with digital services, online gambling and cryptocurrency capital gains. MEPs believe these measures could generate approximately €30 billion beyond the additional revenue already envisaged by the Commission.

The Irish Presidency has advanced a revenue package that it estimates could eventually raise around €55 billion annually, but agreement among member states remains elusive.

This disagreement exposes an enduring weakness in European integration.

Governments frequently demand collective European action while remaining reluctant to surrender control over the financial mechanisms necessary to support it.

A Political Confrontation With Serious Consequences

The institutional arithmetic makes Parliament’s opposition particularly significant. Although member states must unanimously approve the long-term financial framework, the European Parliament must also provide its consent by an absolute majority of MEPs. Consequently, national governments cannot simply impose a settlement over parliamentary objections.

Equally, the European Parliament cannot compel governments to finance its preferred spending programme. Both institutions therefore possess considerable negotiating leverage, raising the possibility of prolonged political deadlock.

The forthcoming European Council discussions on 15–16th October will provide an important indication of whether governments are prepared to reconsider their positions.

Europe’s Credibility Is on the Line

Ultimately, this dispute extends far beyond accounting. The European Union faces an increasingly hostile strategic environment, persistent economic challenges and growing demands for collective action.

Yet its institutional ambitions continue to outpace agreement on the financial commitments required to fulfil them.

Parliament is justified in questioning whether reducing investment in competitiveness and security represents prudent financial management or potentially damaging short-termism. National governments, however, are equally entitled to demand evidence that additional European expenditure will produce measurable benefits.

The solution cannot be unlimited spending, nor can it be indiscriminate austerity. Europe requires a budget that reflects its strategic responsibilities, backed by rigorous financial discipline and transparent political priorities.

Without such a settlement, the Union risks discovering that its greatest obstacle to becoming a serious geopolitical actor is not opposition from Washington, Moscow or Beijing, but its own inability to agree on the price of its ambitions.

The European People’s Party (EPP), the largest and arguably most influential political force in the European Parliament, is meeting in Taormina to chart an ambitious course towards 2029, promising greater competitiveness, less bureaucracy and stronger support for businesses, farmers and ordinary citizens.

Far from being merely another gathering of European politicians beneath the Mediterranean sunshine, the four-day meeting, beginning on Monday, October 12th, represents an opportunity for Europe’s centre-right to consolidate its achievements, confront the challenges ahead and establish a coherent political programme leading towards the 2029 European elections.

The gathering brings together senior figures including European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Italian Deputy Prime Minister Antonio Tajani.

At its centre stands EPP Group Chairman Manfred Weber, whose ambition is to translate the group’s considerable parliamentary influence into practical policies that deliver tangible benefits to European citizens.

The EPP currently commands 184 seats in the European Parliament, giving it a formidable platform from which to influence legislation and shape the European Union’s political direction.

In announcing the meeting, Weber emphasised the importance of taking stock of the group’s legislative achievements while developing a credible programme for the years ahead.

The message is encouraging: Europe needs a political leadership prepared not simply to manage existing difficulties, but to anticipate tomorrow’s challenges.

Competitiveness must become Europe’s priority

Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the Taormina agenda is its emphasis on economic competitiveness, regulatory reform and practical support for European enterprise.

For too long, businesses across the continent have complained about excessive bureaucracy, complicated regulatory requirements and the difficulties of competing against American and Chinese rivals.

Europe possesses extraordinary industrial expertise, technological capabilities and entrepreneurial talent. Yet these strengths are too frequently undermined by administrative obstacles and fragmented markets.

The EPP’s determination to address these weaknesses is therefore welcome.

Herbert Dorfmann MEP, who heads the Südtiroler Volkspartei delegation, has identified the priorities with admirable clarity: reducing bureaucracy, strengthening competitiveness and providing meaningful support for businesses, farmers and rural communities.

These are not abstract ideological ambitions. They concern employment, investment, productivity and the prosperity of millions of Europeans.

As previously examined by EU Today in its analysis of Europe’s competitiveness challenges, the recommendations of former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi have already established the urgent need for economic reform. The challenge now is implementation.

A stronger Europe in a dangerous world

Although the Taormina announcement places particular emphasis on economic and legislative priorities, the EPP’s broader political programme also reflects the increasingly difficult international environment.

Russia’s continuing aggression against Ukraine, strategic competition with China and uncertainties surrounding transatlantic relations have fundamentally altered Europe’s security calculations.

A prosperous Europe must also be a secure Europe.

The centre-right has an important opportunity to advance a coherent approach combining stronger defence capabilities, industrial resilience and continued cooperation with NATO.

Indeed, EU Today’s recent examination of Europe’s defence build-up highlighted the growing momentum behind missile defence, military procurement and European defence-industrial cooperation.

The EPP’s influence could prove particularly valuable in ensuring that such initiatives move beyond political declarations and become operational realities.

Europe’s security and economic strength are increasingly inseparable.

Political leadership beyond Brussels

The choice of Taormina also carries political significance.

As Fulvio Martusciello MEP, head of the Forza Italia delegation, observed, the EPP’s decision to return to southern Italy following its 2024 gathering in Naples demonstrates sustained engagement with the region.

That geographical emphasis is welcome.

European integration cannot succeed if its political priorities are perceived as belonging exclusively to Brussels, Paris or Berlin.

Southern Europe’s economic development, agricultural interests, infrastructure requirements and strategic importance deserve sustained attention.

The EPP‘s approach also builds upon discussions held during its June gathering in Galway, Ireland, previously examined by EU Today in its coverage of the EPP’s Summer University.

There, too, the emphasis was on maintaining Europe’s prosperity, strengthening international partnerships and developing the political confidence necessary to confront an uncertain future.

Turning political ambition into results

The real test of Taormina will not be the speeches delivered or the photographs taken, but the legislative priorities that emerge.

European voters increasingly demand evidence that their representatives understand the pressures facing households, employers and communities.

The EPP appears determined to respond with a programme rooted in economic opportunity, practical reform and political stability.

Its position as Parliament’s largest group provides considerable influence, although delivering legislation will still require cooperation with other political forces and EU institutions.

Nevertheless, there is reason for optimism.

At a time when European politics is frequently characterised by fragmentation and confrontation, the EPP is attempting to articulate a constructive, forward-looking vision.

If the commitments developed in Sicily translate into reduced bureaucracy, greater investment, stronger security and renewed economic confidence, Taormina may ultimately be remembered as something considerably more important than a pleasant Mediterranean political retreat.

This could mark another significant step towards a more competitive, resilient and confident Europe.

Why does the EU insist on provoking the man who underwrites its security, asks Steven Tucker, as he skewers the parasitic psychology of the ungrateful men-children behind the EU's naked fat golden Trump statue.

The post Why Does the EU Insist on Provoking the Man Who Underwrites its Security? appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

 

Patricia Teitelbaum, President of the International Movement for Peace and Coexistence, opened the third-anniversary commemoration of the 7th October 2023 Hamas massacre by welcoming guests to an exhibition named Memory, Dignity and the Duty to Prevent.

Held in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 7th October, it was co-organised by IMPAC and the American Jewish Committee’s Transatlantic Institute, and hosted by Hildegard Bentele, the German EPP MEP who chairs the Parliament’s delegation for relations with Israel. Over 200 were present, including at least 55 MEPs.

Photographs by Israeli Ziv Koren lined the gallery. Sculptures by the Gaza-border blacksmith Yaron Bob, forged from rocket metal, stood among them. Teitelbaum said the gathering was meant to restore dignity stripped from the victims and to commit those present to preventing a repetition. “Our common duty to prevent, to combat extremism and radicalisation, that would be a noble way to honour those who were murdered.”

Benedetta Buttiglione, director of the AJC in Brussels, thanked former hostage Omri Miran for being in the room, and called Bob’s rockets-into-roses a refusal to let destruction have the last word. Memory, she said, because the dead would not be forgotten; dignity, because every victim was a human being and not a statistic; and a duty to prevent, because remembrance meant taking responsibility.

Sarah Mordekhay, from the Eshkol region on the Gaza envelope, then lit candles in memory of some of the victims she knew, such as Bernard Cowan from kibbutz Sufa. She described 7th October as the deadliest massacre of Jews since the Shoah, but this time in their homeland: entire families wiped out, “not for what they did, but for who they were.” Never again, she said, meant no justification for terrorism and no tolerance for antisemitism.

Bentele, as host, recalled that more than 1,200 people were murdered that day, including citizens of EU member states, and that 44 EU citizens were among those taken hostage. Some survivors, she said, later took their own lives because the suffering was unbearable. She turned to Miran, who spent 738 days in Hamas captivity, and called his journey from Israel to Strasbourg an act of courage. “Remembrance is our responsibility,” she said. 

European Parliament President Roberta Metsola spoke next and began with an apology. Two days earlier, French MEP Rima Hassan of La France Insoumise had visited the exhibition and thrown down the Israel flag, causing the EU flag to fall as well. Witnesses said she stepped over the European flag and made no attempt to pick it up.

Addressing Miran, she said she felt she must apologise, nonetheless. “I hope, dear Omri, you know that the actions of one person this week do not reflect the sentiment, ethos or belief of the vast, vast majority of members of this house who are as outraged as me.” The room applauded. She recalled her visit to Kfar Aza and Re’im on 13th October 2023 with the Speaker of the Knesset: the smell of death, a child’s burnt swing, and a make-up brush handed to her in a bus shelter at Re’im, which still sits on her desk.

She named the Bibas children, Ariel and Kfir, and spoke of girls who survived sexual violence in captivity only to meet sceptics. She did not confine the dead to Israel. “So many since also died in Gaza,” she said. “We are not blind to anyone’s suffering.” The way forward, she argued, had to end terror, disband Hamas and its proxies, and renew the fight against antisemitism. “The line between legitimate criticism and antisemitic narratives should be a chasm that no one crosses.”

Yaron Bob then presented Metsola with a sculpture, the Hand of Peace, a hand rising from broken ground to hold a broken olive branch. The branch was broken, he said, because the losses were terrible; the hand still held it because hope had not been given up. “My dream is that one day there will be no more rockets for me to use”, he concluded.

Israel’s ambassador to the EU and NATO, Avi Nir-Feldklein, asked who in the room had woken that morning wondering whether their country would survive the day. He thanked Metsola for speaking when others stayed silent and told Miran that an entire nation had rejoiced at his return.

Miran spoke last. Abducted from Kibbutz Nahal Oz, he described the safe room with his wife Lishay and their daughters Roni, then two, and Alma, six months old; the murder of the kibbutz security coordinator, Ilan Fiorentino; and the moment terrorists used a 17-year-old neighbour to force the family to open the door.

A rifle was pointed at Roni’s head. As he was led away, the child broke free and screamed for her father. He did not look back, afraid they would be shot. He was beaten by a mob on entering Gaza, held in 23 places, including tunnels about 30 metres underground, and filmed for propaganda. His captors, he said, told him they would repeat 7th October “until the last Jew had either left or been slaughtered.”

Asked whether Gaza’s losses had changed their minds, they answered that 50,000 babies had been born that year: “50,000 new martyrs.” Pressure on Israel, and what he called a false symmetry between Hamas and Hezbollah and Israeli self-defence, had been read by those captors as encouragement, not as a call for peace.

Hildegard Bentele, the host MEP, had already given the day’s answer to the flag incident, writing on the evening it happened: “Knocking down the EU and Israeli flags at our commemoration exhibition does nothing to ease that suffering. We should come together to honour the victims and work to ensure such atrocities never happen again. Remembrance deserves respect.”

The European Parliament in Strasbourg has been adorned with a grotesque vision of American power in a 2.5-metre-high statue of a naked and obese US president Donald Trump covered in 23-carat gold.

While some MEPs describe it as an expression of freedom and courage in the face of Trump, Slovak prime minister Robert Fico has said the statue is a symbol of a declining European Union and called for its removal.

Fico said the statue reflects a profound misunderstanding of the times we live in, and reminded his X followers that he and Trump are close.

“At a time that calls for dialogue and mutual respect, insulting our partners on official premises demonstrates a profound failure to understand the times we live in,” he said on social media.

“It is sad that the leadership of the European Parliament, in its blindness, can no longer distinguish between the legitimate right to hold a different opinion and the actions of spiritually bankrupt individuals, adventurers and lunatics,” he added.

Jens Galschiøt is the artists behind the Orange Plague sculpture. The Danish artist says his installation served as a warning that Donald Trump is destroying democracy.

Why call it ‘Orange Plague‘?

“I depicted Donald Trump as an ‘orange plague’ because he is destroying everything I believe in. I believe in democracy and the rule of law. All this needs to be cared for, and Trump is destroying it, as well as the debate on the environment,” Galschiøt said.

The artist chose to portray the US president as a grotesque figure hoping that people would laugh at it. “When you laugh at a dictator, you take away his power,” he said.

And Trump is also naked because of Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tale The Emperor’s New Clothes. In it, the emperor walks through the streets with no clothes, while people tell him how beautifully dressed he is, but no one dares tell him the truth. Only one small child cries out that the ruler is naked.

Galschiøt sees parallels the story and treatment of the US president.

“I think many of us laugh at Donald Trump, but he does not know it. He thinks he is a great leader. He thinks he is an intelligent person. He thinks he gives good speeches. But few people take him seriously. Even if you do take him seriously, it is because he is something like a gang leader, not because of what he says. Most of us actually think he is a ridiculous figure,” Galschiøt said.

His sculpture consists not only of a naked and obese Trump, but also of a slender figure.

“The little man carries the big man, and the big man tells him: ‘Oh, I really want to help you. I really love you, but I do not want to get off your back.’ It is also a story about hypocrisy and double standards, which I combined,” the artist said.

He covered the sculpture in gold because Trump is known to like the precious metal.

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MEPs have backed a more demanding approach to Beijing, linking Europe’s worsening trade imbalance with China’s support for Russia and increasing military pressure on Taiwan. The vote comes as Brussels seeks concessions in negotiations with Chinese officials.

The European Parliament has adopted a recommendation calling for a tougher European Union policy towards China, citing Beijing’s trade practices, support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and growing pressure on Taiwan.

MEPs approved the text on Wednesday, 7 October, by 454 votes to 86, with 110 abstentions, giving substantial parliamentary backing to demands for a more reciprocal economic relationship with China.

The recommendation, prepared by Belgian MEP Hilde Vautmans of Renew Europe, addresses the EU’s increasingly difficult relationship with Beijing at a time when European Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is holding negotiations with Chinese officials.

According to the official parliamentary procedure, the recommendation was adopted following a plenary debate on 6 October. It sets out Parliament’s priorities for the Council, European Commission and EU foreign policy leadership.

Although the text is not legally binding, the size of the majority gives the Commission additional political support as it considers new measures against Chinese imports and seeks greater access to the Chinese market.

Trade Relations Reach Critical Point

The recommendation reflects a growing view within European institutions that the existing economic relationship with China is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

China remains one of the EU’s most important trading partners, but the bloc’s merchandise trade deficit has widened to approximately €360 billion.

European manufacturers face increasing competition from Chinese companies benefiting from extensive domestic production capacity, lower costs and government industrial policies.

The automotive industry has become a particular source of friction, with Chinese manufacturers expanding their presence in Europe following the imposition of EU tariffs on battery-electric vehicles.

Brussels is now considering additional restrictions on hybrid cars after Beijing reportedly rejected requests to limit exports voluntarily.

The concerns extend beyond vehicle manufacturing to chemicals, machinery, renewable-energy technologies and access to critical raw materials.

A European Parliament research briefing published before the vote identified China’s industrial overcapacity, restrictions on market access and dependence on export-led growth as principal causes of the imbalance.

The document also highlighted the increasingly close relationship between economic policy and European security.

China’s Support for Russia Draws Criticism

China’s relationship with Moscow was another major element of Parliament’s recommendation.

MEPs have expressed growing concern about Beijing’s role in sustaining Russia’s military-industrial economy, particularly through the supply of dual-use technology and components used in weapons production.

The EU has repeatedly called on China to use its influence over Russia to help bring an end to the invasion of Ukraine.

Beijing maintains that it is not a party to the conflict and has presented itself as supporting a negotiated settlement. However, its commercial and technological relationship with Moscow continues to attract scrutiny from European governments.

The parliamentary recommendation forms part of an increasingly explicit European effort to connect China policy with the consequences of Russia’s war.

European officials are concerned that Chinese technology, industrial components and financial relationships may reduce the effectiveness of sanctions intended to restrict Russia’s military production.

The consequences reach beyond Ukraine. China’s growing defence relationship with Russia and its military activity in East Asia have reinforced European concerns about the security implications of deeper economic dependence on Beijing.

Taiwan Emerges as Another Source of Disagreement

The recommendation also addresses China’s increasingly confrontational approach towards Taiwan.

Beijing claims sovereignty over the self-governing island and has repeatedly refused to rule out the use of force to establish control.

The EU maintains its one-China policy while opposing unilateral changes to the status quo through force or coercion.

Parliament has consistently supported closer economic and practical relations with Taiwan, particularly in fields involving semiconductors, critical technologies and supply-chain security.

A parliamentary examination of Taiwan’s international position published in June noted the island’s importance to European technological industries and the broader consequences of a confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.

The latest recommendation places those concerns within a wider assessment of EU–China relations.

Taiwan’s semiconductor industry occupies a central position in global electronics manufacturing. Any major interruption to production or shipping would affect European automotive companies, industrial equipment manufacturers and technology businesses.

European governments therefore face a security challenge that cannot be separated from the commercial relationship with China.

Parliament Backs More Assertive EU Policy

The recommendation was adopted after extensive negotiations among parliamentary political groups.

According to the recorded voting results, 454 MEPs supported the text, with opposition and abstentions accounting for 196 votes.

The majority demonstrates considerable support for revising the existing approach to China, although political differences remain over the extent of economic restrictions and diplomatic confrontation.

Some member states favour stronger trade defence measures and tighter scrutiny of Chinese investment, while others remain concerned about retaliation against European exporters.

Germany, France and smaller member states also have different industrial and commercial exposures to China, complicating attempts to establish a common strategy.

The EU must additionally consider whether efforts to reduce strategic dependencies can be reconciled with continued trade and investment.

Parliament’s recommendation does not compel the Commission to introduce new tariffs, restrict Chinese investment or change the Union’s diplomatic position towards Taiwan.

Those decisions remain within the relevant EU institutional procedures and, where applicable, the competence of member states.

Nevertheless, the vote provides a political reference point for forthcoming discussions on trade, technology and European security.

Trade Negotiations Put Parliament’s Position to Test

The timing places the recommendation directly alongside Šefčovič’s negotiations in Beijing.

The Commission is seeking Chinese concessions concerning the trade deficit, industrial overcapacity and access to the Chinese market.

China has resisted European demands for voluntary restrictions on certain exports and has criticised measures it considers protectionist.

The disagreement is likely to feature in discussions among EU leaders on 15–16 October.

The parliamentary vote strengthens the position of those demanding a more assertive European response, but disagreements between member states and the prospect of Chinese retaliation will continue to influence the Commission’s choices.

The immediate test will be whether negotiations can produce concrete changes in trade conditions, rather than another declaration of the need for more balanced relations.