The German government has announced plans to terminate the agreement governing the activities of the Russian House in Berlin and to close Russia’s Consulate General in Bonn by September 18. The German Foreign Office has cited security concerns as the reason for the decision.

The announcement follows the discovery of an unidentified drone carrying explosives near Leipzig Airport. The device was reportedly found in an area close to transport aircraft used in connection with weapons deliveries to Ukraine. Moscow has rejected the allegations, describing them as unsupported by evidence.

Against the backdrop of this latest deterioration in diplomatic relations, three politicians from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) have spoken out in favor of keeping the Russian House open. They argue that the institution should primarily be regarded as a venue for cultural exchange rather than as an arena for political confrontation.

Ulrich Singer, chairman of the AfD parliamentary group in the Bavarian State Parliament, criticized the approach taken by Chancellor Friedrich Merz. In Singer’s view, sanctions are placing an additional burden on the German economy. He also considers the proposed closure of both the Russian House and the consulate in Bonn to be based on allegations of suspected subversive activity that are being used as a pretext.

Singer stressed that for decades the Russian House has provided opportunities for people to learn about the Russian language, culture and history. Any potential violations of the law, he argued, should be investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted through the courts. Suspicions, Singer said, “cannot replace proceedings conducted under the rule of law,” while assessments made by foreign intelligence agencies “must not lead to political prejudgment.”

Precisely because relations between Germany and Russia are strained, Singer believes there should be more dialogue rather than less. In his assessment, dismantling cultural bridges would only deepen the breakdown in communication.

He also called for sanctions to be reviewed, arguing that they should not become an end in themselves. According to Singer, they impose costs on German companies and, when directed against individuals, must comply with the principles of legality, transparency and proportionality.

Singer additionally warned of possible reciprocal measures. Closing the Russian House could have consequences for German cultural institutions operating in Russia, particularly the Goethe-Institut. Commentators cited by klamm.de have noted that the two institutions are connected through a longstanding reciprocal arrangement.

Singer concluded that “the true strength of a state” does not lie in constant escalation but in its ability to prevent wars. In his words, peace is achieved not by closing doors, but by keeping them open.

Andreas Jurca, another AfD member of the Bavarian State Parliament, expressed a similar position. He argues that during a period of worsening relations between Berlin and Moscow, channels for cultural, social and humanitarian exchange are particularly important and should be preserved.

“If such places of encounter disappear, the distance between the two societies will continue to grow,” Jurca said.

He also maintained that allegations concerning possible intelligence activities should be based on evidence that can be verified and publicly scrutinized rather than solely on political assessments. New-facts.eu notes that Jurca’s statements, like those made by Sahra Wagenknecht, represent political assessments rather than the findings of official investigations.

AfD Bundestag member Rainer Rothfuß, who has previously organized so-called “peace trips” to Moscow, also criticized the planned measures. He described the proposed closure of the Russian House and the consulate in Bad Godesberg as “disastrous.”

Rothfuß claimed that “the government is carrying out an agenda dictated by globalists” and is taking steps that, in his view, “were avoided even during the Cold War.”

“Good and peaceful relations between Germany and Russia are in Germany’s interest,” Rothfuß said.

According to him, the AfD has defended this position for years. He also criticized mainstream media outlets, accusing them of contributing to the further “destruction” of German-Russian relations.

Klamm.de and new-facts.eu have also reported criticism voiced by Sahra Wagenknecht. She argues that Merz is intensifying tensions with Russia while failing to demonstrate the same determination in his approach toward Ukraine. In this context, she pointed to the arrests of Ukrainian citizens suspected of involvement in the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines.

“Merz is bringing us ever closer to a war with Russia,” Wagenknecht wrote on her blog.

The future of the Russian House and the Russian consulate in Bonn now rests with the German government and the diplomatic process. Singer, Jurca and Rothfuß are calling for a clear distinction between suspected violations of the law—which, they argue, should be investigated and dealt with through the courts—and cultural channels, which they believe should remain open.

The German government, meanwhile, has linked the planned closures to national-security concerns following the incident near Leipzig. Moscow continues to reject the allegations.

An international sports camp bringing together nearly 100 young Ukrainian athletes from ten different sports has concluded in France.

The camp was held at the initiative and with the support of Philippe Lamblin, President of the Hauts-de-France Athletics League, in partnership with the Ukrainian side. The Kyiv City State Administration, “The Future for Children” Charitable Foundation with its Olympic Dreams project, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine with the nationwide multisport project “Path of Champions” also contributed to the organization of the camp.

This year, the camp brought together athletes representing ten sports: rhythmic gymnastics, volleyball, judo, sport climbing, boxing, basketball, athletics, rowing, taekwondo, and floorball.

The young Ukrainian athletes had the opportunity to train in safe conditions, take part in sports and team activities, relax, and discover France. The camp programme included a mountain hike, a trip to the seaside, a visit to an oceanarium, and attendance at a football match.

“For us, it is very important to see more and more people in different countries coming together to support Ukrainian sport, with France becoming a systemic partner. Camps like this give Ukrainian children an opportunity, at least for a while, to return to a normal childhood: to train in safe conditions, make new friends, and see a world without borders,” said Anatoliy Boyko, initiator and patron of the Olympic Dreams project.
 

: Anatoliy Boyko, Philippe Lamblin, Olena Hovorova, Vadym Omelchenko, Yasmina Merzi

An important highlight of the programme was the official reception for the camp participants at Paris City Hall on 21 August.

The meeting was attended by Vadym Omelchenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the French Republic; Yasmina Merzi, Deputy Mayor of Paris responsible for child welfare and protection; Olena Hovorova, Deputy Head of the Kyiv City State Administration, Adviser to the Office of the President of Ukraine and Olympic bronze medallist; Philippe Lamblin, President of the Hauts-de-France Athletics League; and Anatoliy Boyko, initiator and patron of the Olympic Dreams project.

The meeting at Paris City Hall provided an opportunity to thank the French partners for their support of Ukrainian athletes and to discuss the importance of international sports cooperation amid the full-scale war.

The organizers and Ukrainian partners also express their gratitude to the Hauts-de-France Athletics League, the regional prefecture, the City of Lille, the management of Parc d’Olhain, as well as all French partners and patrons who contributed to the organization of the camp.

For Olympic Dreams, a project launched in 2022, participation in such international initiatives is part of its ongoing efforts to provide Ukrainian athletes with opportunities for safe training, athletic development, and international preparation during the full-scale war.

Photos by Roman Horbun

This year has proved that the era of the strongman is undoubtedly upon us. Littered throughout the highest offices across government and international organisations, they have proved time and again that due process is for suckers and that you, too, can bribe your way to the desired outcome.

Take Gianni Infantino who is seeking to sell off 20% of the world’s most cherished football tournament. He, like Trump, has dug in his heels, choosing to strategically dole out favours, and then use their power to pit people against each other, rather than following the rules. Having leveraged their positions to fulfil their agenda, no matter the cost, they deny anything they don’t wish to confront, deflect questions they don’t like, and gaslight anyone who dares to call them out.

Whilst Infantino and Trump have dominated headlines of late, the actions of the world’s health agency head have - despite years of alarm bells - received comparatively little scrutiny; a concern when you consider how instrumental effective healthcare is to our everyday lives.

Like Infantino, Dr Tedros wedges countries and leaders apart in order to defy institutional processes and push through his agenda. In 2025, Dr Tedros pared down his leadership team by nearly 30%. Most recently, the WHO’s top scientist, Dr Jeremy Farrar, was replaced with a highly “controversial” and apparent confidant of Dr Tedros. The pattern of replacing officials with faithful advisers is a classic move of the strongman and underlines how institutional structures can be leveraged to advance personal aims.

One of those aims appears to be purging WHO of those who challenge the opaque bureaucratic functions that Dr Tedros oversees. Dr Farrar’s surprise resignation was said to have been due to increasing frustrations with the WHO’s internal politics. Curiously, in an all-staff email, Dr Tedros reframed Dr Farrar’s departure as a retirement and, in communications with the press, the organisation refused to comment on

r’s relationship with (read: criticisms of) the WHO. 

Now, Dr Tedros is allegedly bulldozing through the replacement of the WHO’s Regional Director for its South-East Asia Regional Office (SEARO), Saima Wazed. Ms Wazed has been on administrative leave for over a year following unfounded allegations made against her by Bangladesh’s Interim Government. As the nation roiled under an intense period of political unrest, Ms Wazed was falsely accused of absconding from the country when, in reality, she was stationed in New Delhi, acting in her capacity as the SEARO Regional Director. The WHO knew this but put her on administrative leave without pay anyways. In that time other, unfounded allegations bubbled up, including claims Ms Wazed requested reimbursement from WHO for personal travel to China, which, it would appear, was an entirely fabricated allegation.

The WHO’s handling of Ms Wazed’s leave has been deeply flawed and discussed at length by top-level jurists and a UN Special Rapporteur. Since the allegations were made, a new Bangladeshi government has been elected and two of WHO’s Officers-in-Charge have been appointed to “temporarily” oversee the SEARO. Still, no information about the veracity of the allegations against Ms Wazed have been made public despite the fact that WHO’s own guidelines explicitly say that administrative leave is not a punishment. If allegations are not verified in a reasonable timeframe, WHO has a duty to end the leave.

For her part, Ms Wazed has called for an investigation into Dr Tedros, alleging that he or his office leaked confidential documents, provided false or misleading information to Member States, and breached confidentiality requirements and the WHO’s Code of Conduct by directly engaging with the former government of Bangladesh.

While the WHO has the responsibility to investigate allegations against its staff, claims from a national authority should not automatically be treated as proven fact for a supposedly apolitical organisation. It has now been over a year since Ms Wazed was put on leave. This, combined with the absence of any apparent independent investigation into the allegations points to a fast and loose approach to proper administrative processes, one in which the attempt to hold Ms Wazed in administrative purgatory exists as a vehicle to quietly remove her from the organisation.

Just as Infantino is leveraging greater funding for African nations to gather support for his upcoming presidential bid, Dr Tedros is using what amounts to an uncosted holiday jaunt to the South Pacific to bring a forced-end to this saga. Reports suggest that the Director General is directing SEARO nations to do away with due processes and install Ms Wazed’s successor. For their trouble, fielty, and feigned ignorance to standard administrative practices, Dr Tedros is organising a regional meeting, spending at least €163k to fly in the SEARO directors and staff for a face-to-face meeting in Timor Leste. Despite years of cutting the WHO to the bone and a record budget shortfall, for Dr Tedros no expense is too great to push through his agenda.

Ultimately, this is a clear attempt by Dr Tedros to circumvent proper levels of scrutiny about this crucial decision, and to hide his undermining of the WHO’s standard procedures by sweetening the deal for other regional staff. Pulling directly from the Infantino playbook, Dr Tedros has escaped public outcry which would hold him responsible. But his treatment of Saima Wazed, what many would call an organised witch-hunt, should concern us all, as yet another international organisation sees the erosion of due processes.

i have been struggling in the last couple of days to get the facts right and make an update on that horror story of the dead infant found in a deep freezer at an Airbrb apartment in Kypseli district of Athens on August 31. The more I delay to write down and post the update, […]

The post Infant in the freezer stabbed 18 times. Big fail of social services appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

Quer receber os textos desta coluna em primeira mão no seu e-mail? Assine a Newsletter da Pública, enviada sempre às sextas-feiras, 8h. Para receber as próximas edições, inscreva-se aqui.

A neutralidade da Justiça nunca foi uma característica brasileira, como sabem mulheres, pretos e pobres que já enfrentaram um tribunal – como réus ou como vítimas. Interesses econômicos, lealdade de classe ou gênero, preconceitos, e em alguns casos, corrupção, desequilibram a balança que deveria julgar todos os cidadãos com mesmo peso e medida. 

Esse é o papel principal do Supremo Tribunal Federal, guardião da Constituição, que pode corrigir erros das instâncias inferiores e declarar inconstitucionais medidas e leis do Legislativo ou do Executivo, como vimos tantas vezes no governo Bolsonaro. O que não significa imunidade contra distorções de juízo, como em qualquer tribunal, nem que os ministros individualmente não tenham seus próprios interesses políticos e econômicos, como foi escancarado nesta semana. 

Por isso as decisões coletivas, teoricamente tomadas por técnicos de excelência jurídica, são tão importantes para fazer valer a Constituição e a legalidade dos processos judiciais, prevalecendo as provas e os direitos dos réus, como ocorreu na condenação de Jair Bolsonaro, generais e outros golpistas pela 1a turma do STF por um placar de 4×1 em julgamento com transmissão ao vivo para todo mundo acompanhar.  

Por outro lado, os juízes do Supremo são indicados por políticos – os presidentes – e referendados por outros políticos, os senadores. A lealdade esperada pelos que os indicaram supera o critério técnico, e a representatividade social não existe, como prova a minguada presença de mulheres e de negros na história do tribunal. 

Alexandre de Moraes, ex-DEM e filiado ao PSDB quando foi indicado por Michel Temer para o STF, era seu amigo há mais de 20 anos e ocupou o cargo de ministro da Justiça em seu governo. Também agradava à base aliada no Congresso (leia-se centrão e extrema-direita), que meses depois de derrubar Dilma Rousseff “com Supremo com tudo”, estava preocupada com as denúncias da Lava Jato – das quais o próprio Temer seria alvo, depois do empresário Joesley Batista ter gravado um diálogo comprometedor com ele na garagem do Palácio Jaburu. 

André Mendonça, como todos sabem, foi indicado pelo presidente Jair Bolsonaro, de quem era ministro da Justiça, o que por si só não o compromete, como mostra a atitude de ministros indicados por Lula. Um exemplo gritante é o que ocorreu quando Lula estava preso e o ministro Dias Tóffoli, indicado por ele dez anos antes para o STF, o proibiu de comparecer ao velório do irmão. 

O que não se pode esquecer, quando se pensa no motivo, forma e momento que Mendonça escolheu para tornar públicas as relações no mínimo impróprias de Alexandre de Moraes com o banqueiro Daniel Vorcaro, é que Mendonça está longe de ser neutro – ou ingênuo politicamente. Quando era ministro da Justiça de Bolsonaro, pediu à PF a abertura de inquéritos com base na Lei de Segurança Nacional da ditadura contra opositores políticos do presidente e até contra jornalistas. Também sob seu comando, o Ministério da Justiça produziu um dossiê contra 576 servidores e três professores universitários, identificados e monitorados por eles como integrantes do “movimento antifascista”, o que resultou em determinação do STF para suspender qualquer ato do Ministério da Justiça de produção ou compartilhamento de informações. A atuação do MJ foi qualificada como “uma afronta direta ao regime democrático” pela ministra Cármen Lúcia.

Com esse histórico, fica difícil imaginar que Mendonça agiu puramente no interesse da Justiça ao atropelar ritos internos e encomendar um relatório da PF, visando Moraes, Paulo Gonet (PGR) e Andrei Rodrigues (PF), no dia 24 de agosto com prazo de 72 horas para ser concluído, e levantar o sigilo na manhã de 1º de setembro, quando já estava sendo vazado pelo Estadão. O material, esmiuçado pela imprensa, é devastador, e coloca Moraes na posição de informante ou consultor jurídico do banqueiro, com imenso impacto para o STF, o país e para as eleições, que já vinham sofrendo interferência dos Estados Unidos. 

Se antes o ódio a Moraes era provocado sobretudo pela prisão dos golpistas, agora o lobby de Eduardo Bolsonaro e Paulo Figueiredo pode instrumentalizar politicamente as suspeitas de corrupção sobre o ministro, que já havia sido incluído na Lei Magnitsky pelo governo Trump, com o objetivo de se intrometer na nossa política interna.  

O contrato de 130 milhões de reais entre Daniel Vorcaro e o escritório da mulher de Alexandre de Moraes, firmado em janeiro de 2024 – com a revisão do ministro como se sabe agora – já havia sido revelado pelo Globo em dezembro de 2025. Em março, a jornalista Malu Gaspar divulgou parte das mensagens obtidas pela PF no celular do banqueiro já muito comprometedoras para o ministro.

Por que Mendonça tomou a decisão de pedir só agora o relatório da PF? Por que tanta pressa em divulgá-lo para a imprensa se Vorcaro está preso desde novembro do ano passado? Por que não disse que ele também teve contato com o banqueiro? Por que as investigações do caso Dark Horse, com documentos e mensagens contra Flávio Bolsonaro anda tão devagar, enquanto o caso Lulinha é alvo de vazamentos constantes e seletivos?

Já as razões de Alexandre de Moraes para atacar Mendonça são auto-explicativas mas nem por isso menos danosas. Ao contrário. Além de tentar desviar-se de responder a fatos que não tem como explicar, o ministro apelou mais uma vez para o inquérito das Fake News, há sete anos sob seu comando e alvo de diversas acusações de abuso de autoridade, e movimentou a PF – sendo ele próprio alvo de investigações – para jogar suspeitas sobre Mendonça apenas para defender seus interesses. 

Para nós, cidadãos, sobra um gosto amargo, uma desilusão profunda, que também impacta o clima das eleições. Quando uma instituição tão fundamental para a democracia, como o STF, que livrou o país de um golpe nas eleições passadas, parece afundar na lama e a disputa eleitoral se transforma em guerra de acusações, o risco é esquecer o principal: a diferença entre os projetos de país e de atuação política entre os principais candidatos à presidência e ao Congresso. 

The body of a 90-year-old woman was found covered in sheets and hidden in the basement of a house in Marathonas village in eastern Attica on Friday. The woman’s daughter and grandson have been arrested. The woman’s death was not registered with the authorities and the daughter allegedly kept receiving her mother’s pension for about […]

The post Daughter hides body of dead mother in order to collect pension payments appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

At a conformation show, purebred dogs are evaluated by judges according to written documents that strive to capture the exemplary features of each breed. (These standards are searchable via the American Kennel Club; my dog’s breed standard, for instance, is “interested and even mischievous” in expression, but might be faulted for a “short, prancing, or choppy gait.” Noted.) Hannah Berger files a remarkably observed dispatch from one such show in Virginia, where she has traveled to consider show dogs as signifiers, “the ideal against its approximation.” There’s plenty of human folly here, not limited to the interpretation of a “breed standard” and its pursuit over time. A janitor ceaselessly sweeps away dog hair; a mother silences her child as one might a yapping pet. Berger layers her observations into an ending so clever that I gasped.

Now under the jurisdiction of the American Kennel Club in the U.S., conformation shows measure the degree to which a dog “conforms” to its “breed standard,” a document that transmutes historical function into superficially measurable and marketable qualities: proportions, attitude, gaiting patterns. These documents vary widely in length and style. The greyhound’s standard, for example, is a spare two-hundred-word document that strays from sobriety just once in its description of the eyes: “dark, bright, intelligent, indicating spirit.” The standard of the Coton de Tulear, the bichon-like “national dog” of Madagascar, is nearly eight times as long, describing colors and shapes in percentages and angles. Its “joie de vivre” is mentioned twice. 

On September 1, the leaders of some of Eurasia’s most consequential states gathered in Bishkek for the 26th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Council of Heads of State. The Summit That Did Not Need Europe The summit marked the SCO’s 25th anniversary. Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Narendra Modi, Masoud Pezeshkian, Shehbaz Sharif, Aleksandr Lukashenko, […]

While the country queues for petrol, import licences are being given to the network behind Mongolia’s largest corporate fraud. Mongolia spent August rationing petrol, as the country faces an ‘unprecedented’ fuel crisis. In response, the Government has made importing fuel more profitable, and has sped up the process for issuing new licences.[1]

By opening the gates, the government has allowed existing networks to exploit the crisis, including the one connected to Jononbayar Erdenesuren, the disgraced Mongolian businessman reportedly as being allegedly responsible for the $1.1 bn fraud scheme operated through Lex Oil, the fuel importer that was run by his aunt.[2]

Mongolia is heavily reliant on foreign oil, primarily from Russia. To import it, businesses need an ‘all-types fuel import licence’, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources, which decides through paperwork checks.[3] Foreign businesses cannot import directly — they must sell through a Mongolian-licensed entity.[4]

Some 164 companies hold an import licence. Of these, 34 have been granted since 2025.[5] The number of companies licensed to import fuel has more than doubled in under five years.[6]

They have also become considerably more valuable. Duty and excise on fuel have been zeroed, importers offered preferential loans and subsidised storage for reserves, and the customs service has been told to expedite clearance of petrol consignments.[7]

A number of companies granted all-types fuel import licences in 2025 and 2026 are connected to Jononbayar Erdenesuren and the Lex Oil network behind his $1.1bn scheme. That scheme was executed through the very exploitation of import licences.

None of these importers are required to disclose the amount of oil they import. Only 11 of the 164 licence holders imported fuel in the first days of August. When asked which 11, and how much each imported, the Customs General Administration refused to answer, citing customs law.

Lex Oil’s network is growing

Since 2025, two former Lex Oil CEOs have taken positions in dormant companies that then received fuel licences. In one case, the licence was obtained the same day the shareholding was registered.

Following five years of inactivity,[8] Standard Oil Gas appointed a new Director, Erdenebat Indra, in December 2025. Indra ran Lex Oil from January 2019 until February 2024 – nearly the whole period in which the losses accrued.[9] Six weeks later, Standard Oil was granted an import licence. Indra became a shareholder that same day.[10]

The pattern was replicated by Indra’s successor at Lex Oil, Banzragch Batdavaa.[11] Batdavaa bought into Best Dragon, a company with no prior fuel operations, in July 2025. It was granted import permits just two months later.[12] Batdavaa remains in business with both Mongolian and offshore entities linked to the scheme,[13] amongst them two Dubai entities – Peak Solutions (co-managed with Jononbayar’s mother)[14], and his own APEXPP commodities.[15]

Two other companies, granted licences in the spring of 2025, were already owned by individuals in the network. Tod Oil received its first licence in April 2025, although the company was incorporated six years earlier by entities closely tied to Jononbayar.[16] Its founder, Tod Petroleum, was co-founded by Lex Oil and former VS Oil CEO Bataa Anarchuluu.[17] Bataa continues to operate within the network, serving as the Executive Director of the helicopter business linked to both the scheme and the son of former Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene.[18]

Another, Apex Petroleum, was incorporated in October 2024 – the month the $1.1bn provision was made public.[19] Three of the five founding shareholders had previously founded businesses with Jononbayar himself.[20] These three include Mönkhjargal Javkhlan (son of a licensed importer linked to the Government)[21] and Jononbayar’s rumoured mistress, Yalaltbayar Khongorzul.[22]

Three further entities — ABR Eco Trans, Petro Spark and Standard Energy and Oil — have links to Jononbayar’s network. ABR was incorporated in October 2024 and licensed to import fuel in April 2025.[23] It has since taken on the founder of BID Energy, Bold Luvsandagva, as its shareholder and executive director.[24] In February 2026, ABR moved into the same unit BID Energy had occupied until that December.[25] BID Energy is Indra's other licensed importer. It was granted import licences in 2024, 11 weeks after Indra left Lex Oil.[26] Indra bought into the company and is now its ultimate beneficial owner.[27]

Another, Petro Spark, was licensed on the same day as Apex Petroleum.[28] Its owner, Yadamsüren Dorjchanga, holds a network of businesses with Yondon Uuganbayar.[29] Uuganbayar bought shares in Jononbayar’s family’s meat business, Erdenet Makh Market, two weeks after the Lex Oil scheme was disclosed in October 2024.[30]

The seventh company, Standard Energy and Oil, was licensed in 2025.[31] In May 2026, it was taken over by N. Monsor.[32] Monsor is a reported close contact of Jononbayar.[33] He was director of a Mongolian company, Sky Professional Logistics,[34] when it received over $7.5 million from an offshore entity called Class Trading Limited,[35] and distributed it the same day among nine recipients. These included Jocondy, a company owned by Jononbayar’s aunt, the founder of Lex Oil.[36] Jocondy was reportedly directed by Jononbayar at the time.[37] It is reported that Jononbayar had previously made transfers into Class Trading.[38]

These are not the network's first import licences. Nine companies linked to Jononbayar, the first being Lex Oil itself in 2019, were granted import licences before 2025,[39] meaning at least 16 of the 164 importers are connected to his network.

New Licences, Existing Networks

Even outside that seven, what distinguishes a successful candidate is often the individual owner, as opposed to the company profile. One grantee, TES Petroleum Trade,[40] is owned by the reported son of Baagaa Battömör,[41] a sitting MP who had previously run both Mongolia’s tax and customs administrations.[42] Two licences went to companies owned separately by partners in an existing fuel business.[43] Four more went to Chinese-controlled businesses, two of them on the same day. None was set up as a fuel business, and three were still unregistered for fuel activity when they were licensed.[44]

Of the 34 companies granted import licences by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources in 2025 and 2026, 14 had been incorporated less than two years before the award.[45] Eight more of the organisations granted licences changed hands shortly before they were licensed.[46]

The Government’s Response

On 17 August, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources warned that importers who failed to keep filling stations supplied could lose their licences. The Minister admitted that some importers were holding stock and not selling it.

Revoking a licence removes a registration but has no bearing on the individuals behind the businesses. With fewer regulatory checks, and more demand than ever, the doors are being left open to actors who previously exploited Mongolia’s fuel import regulations.

Mongolia scored 31 out of 100 on Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking 124th of 182 countries, its worst score on record. In September 2025 the US State Department reported that businesses in Mongolia face "substantial and unpredictable regulatory burdens at every level", with officials across ministries and agencies routinely contravening existing law and regulation. Unless the country creates laws transparently and implements them predictably, it warned, "investors may find Mongolia too risky and opt for more competitive countries."[47]

The victim of Jononbayar’s fraud scheme, Trafigura, used to be one of the most important importers of oil into Mongolia.[48] The fraud orchestrated by the playboy,[49] which personally enriched both himself and his family,[50] put that to an end. Now, the individuals involved are being allowed back in to exploit the crisis at the expense of ordinary Mongolians.

The crisis was a chance to show that direction had changed. Instead, the Government zeroed duty, offered importers preferential loans and subsidised storage, and issued 34 new licences — leaving at least 16 of the 164 with one network.  Now agents known to have exploited the same system previously, are being allowed in again.

Photo by Zbynek Burival on Unsplash

---

[1] Government’s announcement that fuel import licence applications should be processed quickly and the licences granted, reported: https://ikon.mn/n/3pep and https://sonin.mn/newsDetail/18284

[2] Lex-Oil LLC granted fuel import licence in 2019: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979. Owned through his aunt, Dorjgochoo Erdenetul.

[3] In order to gain these, an applicant must produce its registration documents, prove membership of the relevant professional association, and file its contract with the fuel supplier in original: https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail?lawId=208190

[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-02/trafigura-mongolia-oil-fraud-how-trader-faces-1-billion-loss

[5] Data as of 20 August, taken from https://license.mn/  (official electronic licence system)

[6] 80 companies Eighty companies held a licence to import fuel into Mongolia on 1 January 2022, recorded in the Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry's register of petroleum products special licences, 22 March 2022: https://mmhi.gov.mn/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ГТБ-тусгай-зөвшөөрлийн-жагсаалт-2022.03.22.pdf. 164 currently hold licences, per license.mn, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources official register, as of September 2026: https://license.mn/.

[7] Tax and lending measures: https://mmhi.gov.mn/2026/08/06/. Expedited customs clearance: E. Oyun-Erdene, GoGo.mn, 17 August 2026, https://cmsm.mongolcontent.mn/r/6k9g8

[8] Standard Oil Gas LLC’s fuel import licence expired in 2020, and it recorded no other activity in the intervening period: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6120954  

[9] CEO of Lex Oil 2019-224: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979

[10] 6 February 2026: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6120954

[11] Batdavaa sat as Executive Director of Lex Oil from Feb-April 2014: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979

[12] Best Dragon, incorporated 2020, dormant until 2025 when ownership was transferred to Batdavaa. Fuel import licence granted 26 September 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6574246

[13] B.Batdavaa is currently a shareholder of Diamond Oil and Energy alongside Oyunbileg Sainbileg https://opendatalab.mn/search/6552544. Sainbeleg is known to a key actor alongside Jononbayer, and remains director of one of the family’s  companies, Zuunnaim Oil: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5272378  

[14] Cedar Rose UAE corporate data accessed via Sayari, 21 August 2026: PEAK SOLUTION DMCC, commercial register DMCC194234, licence DMCC-855346, incorporated 5 August 2022;

[15] Offshore link reported in https://www.eureporter.co/world/mongolia/2026/08/13/the-helicopter-that-helped-topple-mongolias-prime-minister-linked-to-lex-oil-scheme/, Batdaava’s Linkedin states him as CEO of APEXPP Commodities: www.linkedin.com/in/batdavaa-banzragch-46120115a

[16] Tod Oil, incorporated 2019 by Tod Petroleum, granted licence 23 April 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6415636

[17] Tod Petroleum, founded Lex Oil and Bataa Anarchuluu https://opendatalab.mn/search/6104894. Bataa served as VS Oil CEO https://www.opendatalab.mn/search/6225578.

[18] Listed as UBO of Alpha Aurora Aviation: https://www.opendatalab.mn/search/8376344

[19] Apex Petroleum was incorporated 17 October 2024 (https://opendatalab.mn/search/7078633). Trafigura’s statement on losses 30 October 2024: https://www.trafigura.com/news-and-insights/press-releases/2024/statement-re-trafiguras-petroleum-products-business-in-mongolia/

[20] Three founders:  Bayardalai Erdenezaya (founded Kem Tek with Jononbayar in 2016, and Commodity Trans with his mother in 2019); Mönkhjargal Javkhlan (registered at the same two businesses, alongside Diamond Oil and Energy), Yalaltbayar Khongorzul (co-founded Khongorfinance with Jononbayar in 2015),

[21] Reported to be the brother in-law and former campaign manager for the Minister of Economic Development: https://ergelt.mn/news/22/singile/40012

[22] Archived article: https://web.archive.org/web/20241113103634/https://www.reelnews.mn/a/1225 and X: https://x.com/miigaasbntv/status/1852208500715459004

[23] ABR Eco Trans LLC, incorporated 15 October 2024; wholesale permit 0016 from 20 March 2025 and all-types fuel import licence 0015 from 25 April 2025; https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609

[24] Luvsandagva registered as ABR shareholder and joint beneficial owner on 24 November 2025 and as executive director on 29 January 2026; he founded BID Energy on 13 December 2023 with Baterdene Lkhagvadulam and was its first executive director: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609 and https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485

[25] BID Energy moved from Bayanzürkh, 3rd khoroo, 12th microdistrict, Tsendgüni 30b, unit 53 on 1 December 2025; ABR moved into that unit on 2 February 2026, from Tokio 24a, unit 134 in the same microdistrict: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485 and https://opendatalab.mn/search/7077609

[26] BID Energy LLC, import licence 0015 granted 24 April 2024; https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485. Indra was executive director of Lex Oil from January 2019 to February 2024: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979.

[27] Indra registered as BID Energy shareholder and executive director on 16 August 2024 and as sole ultimate beneficial owner on 1 December 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485

[28] Petro Spark LLC, incorporated 8 May 2024, sole shareholder and beneficial owner Yadamsüren Dorjchanga; import licence 19 May 2025, the same date as Apex Petroleum: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7025169

[29] Joint holdings with Yondon Uuganbayar: Mongolian Truck Union Group LLC, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6840175; Novel Development Union LLC: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6894402; and the Gobi Genetics, https://opendatalab.mn/search/3646203  

[30] Uuganbayar owns Mon Beef Cattle: https://opendatalab.mn/search/8324328 . Mon Beef Cattle acquired Erdenet Makh Market LLC, from Dorjgochoo Erdenetuyaa 24 October 2024, days before the scheme was disclosed.

[31] Standard Energy and Oil, received wholesale permit in June, the import licence that September:  https://opendatalab.mn/search/6754244

[32] Monsor became the director of Standard Energy and Oil on 5 May 2026. It was acquired the same day by an investment fund, then owned by Dorj Enkhtuya (renamed KK Real Estate private fund two days later): https://opendatalab.mn/search/6607829. Mansor was the previous manager of that fund, and founded it himself through another vehicle he still owns and manages, Ulaanbaatar Asset Management: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5493498 . He became the CEO of Standard Energy and Oil on the day it was taken over by KK Real Estate.

[33] Reported in https://www.livetv.mn/p/11193/ and in https://www.polit.mn/a/69636

[34] Monsor is reported to have run Sky Professional Logistics: https://www.livetv.mn/p/11193. Court records state the executive director of Sky Professional Logistics concluded a wagon-transport agreement with the head of Ulaanbaatar Railway on 28 July 2017, naming him as Н.Монсов: https://shuukh.mn/single_case/19024

[35] Reporting states that US$7,545,900 was transferred from Class Trading Limited to Sky Professional Logistics on 8 August 2017 https://gogo.mn/r/5292y. Class Trading Limited was incorporated in the Turks and Caicos Islands and registered a Hong Kong place of business on 13 May 2015: Hong Kong Companies Registry, Company Particulars, BRN 64752427.

[36] Jocondy was founded by Dorjgochoo Erdenetuul, https://opendatalab.mn/search/5247632. She is Jononbayar's maternal aunt and the owner of Lex Oil LLC: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979 and https://zuv.mn/n/16a3.

[37] Reporting records US$612,400 paid to Jocondy and describes Jononbayar as its director at the time: https://gogo.mn/r/5292y and https://dardas.mn/news/view/2970

[38] Reported that Jononbayar sent $500,000 to Class Trading in 2014: https://dardas.mn/news/view/2970

[39] 2019: Lex Oil, 2019 https://opendatalab.mn/search/5623979,Tod Petroleum, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6104894. 2020: ICIC, https://opendatalab.mn/search/5288193 VS Oil, https://opendatalab.mn/search/6225578, Zuunnaim Oil https://opendatalab.mn/search/5272378. 2022: Argal Oil https://opendatalab.mn/search/6309011. 2023: Alpha Aviation Fuel https://opendatalab.mn/search/8403473. 2024:  BID Energy https://opendatalab.mn/search/8454485 · Interasia Energy Mongolia, 2024 https://opendatalab.mn/search/6902987. Register of all 164 holders: https://opendatalab.mn/licences/15

[40] Tes Petroleum Trade, licenced 21 February 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6373135

[41] Paternity reported in: https://ergelt.mn/news/22/single/40012

[42] Battömör has sat in the State great Khural since 2016, he was deputy head, then head of the State Customs General Administration from 2008-11 and Head of the Tax General Administration from 2011-13: https://www.24tsag.mn/a/227052  

[43] Greenjob, owned by Batsukh Baigalmaa, granted licence in October 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5645867; and Gobi Petroleum GPT, owned by Onurbat Ragchaa, granted a licence September 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7121913. Together they are exclusive owners and directors of Green Oil Trade since incorporation in 2020: https://opendatalab.mn/search/6528716 

[44] Tana Khiimori Oil - received import licence 11 August 2025, First registered for fuel-related activities 15 August 2025

: https://opendatalab.mn/search/7080033; Talnutgiin Ayalal - received import licence 11 August 2025, First registered for fuel-related activities 15 August 2025: https://opendatalab.mn/search/5887488; 

Achit Güür MS - received import licence 14 Jan 2026, Remains unregistered for any kind of fuel-related activity (registration codes are for freight, agriculture, tourism and motor vehicle sales): https://opendatalab.mn/search/6891802; Söüd Mont Forest - received import licence 11 December 2025, Registered for fuel wholesaling 6 December 2025,  (previous registration codes are for motor vehicles, freight, automotive sales and machinery),  https://opendatalab.mn/search/7058649.

[45] Data as of 20 August, taken from https://licence.mn/  (official electronic licence system)

[46] Data as of https://licence.mn/ checked against https://opendatalab.mn/search/[registration number]. “Changed hands” to mean change of shareholder, director or beneficial owner within twelve months on either side of grant.

[47] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/638719_2025-Mongolia-Investment-Climate-Statement.pdf

[48] Trafigura supplied around a third of the region’s oil products, particularly diesel: https://eulerpool.com/news/markets/trafigura-in-crisis-mongolian-oil-credit-causes-million-loss; deals undertaken through the scheme said to account for around 80% of Mongolia's imported oil products: https://eguur.mn/556936/

[49] Jononbayar known for “parties he threw for friends and contacts” per Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-02/trafigura-mongolia-oil-fraud-how-trader-faces-1-billion-loss; reported to have thrown some of the “most expensive parties in Mongolia” https://eguur.mn/556936/

[50] https://zuv.mn/n/16a3; https://itoim.mn/a/2024/07/22/news-break/ugg

Wendell Berry, who died this week at the age of 92, published dozens of books of poetry, fiction, and essays, any of which might make for meaningful connection with Berry’s ideas about place and how we engage with it. But this conversation with Amanda Petrusich, which bloomed from a personal correspondence between the two writers, feels like an especially vital tribute to Berry. Here, his decades of thought on sustainability and its human limits find gloriously vivid expression; after all, place shapes our voices, too. Throughout, Berry is luminous and pithy and discerning: “We’re alive only in some place in particular.” “Every generation is a bridge between something that’s past and something that’s coming.” “Our conversation is worth more right now than either one of us thinking separately.” The last is a perfect sentiment for any dialogue, including those on the page.

Part of manners used to be to say to somebody you just met, “Where you from?” And I quit asking it, because so many people say they’re from everywhere or nowhere. I’ll tell you a little bit of my history that may be pertinent. My mother was born and grew up in Port Royal, my father about four miles south. Both of their families had lived here since about the beginning of the nineteenth century. When I came to teach at the University of Kentucky, Tanya and I thought we would live in Lexington, and we would have “a country place.” And we hardly had laid our hands to this house, which needed some preservation work, when we realized, we’re not going to have a country place; we’re going to live here. And so we have. We bought this home and twelve acres in the fall of 1964, and moved in, in the midst of renovations, in the summer of 1965. That put our children here, and now we’ve got grandchildren who are at home here. That comes from a decision that we made to be here, and to be here permanently.

In Germania, una riforma organica del sistema pensionistico prevede l’introduzione di una componente obbligatoria a capitalizzazione, ispirata al modello svedese. Il suo successo dipende da costi contenuti e indipendenza dalle ingerenze politiche.

L'articolo Una pensione alla svedese per la Germania proviene da Lavoce.info.

A Calgary aid worker is helping Nepal earthquake survivors while the city's Nepalese community supports loved ones affected by the disaster.

A Calgary aid worker is helping Nepal earthquake survivors while the city's Nepalese community supports loved ones affected by the disaster.

ATO 1 – André Mendonça x Alexandre de Moraes

Em 24 de agosto, o ministro André Mendonça, relator dos inquéritos do Banco Master, teria mandado a Polícia Federal (PF) identificar, em 72 horas, “as pessoas que participaram e foram mencionadas” em certas páginas de dois relatórios de fevereiro, incluindo “eventuais detentoras de foro por prerrogativa de função, inclusive aquelas eventualmente sujeitas à incidência do art. 5º, I, do Regimento Interno” do Supremo. Mendonça, no entanto, não teria citado Alexandre de Moraes, seu colega de Corte.

Demandada, a PF entregou a Mendonça 218 páginas na quinta-feira, 27 de agosto. No relatório, 181 dessas páginas tratam de um contato que o banqueiro registrou na agenda do celular como “Alexandre de Moraes BRASILIA”; outras dezoito dessas páginas tratam do procurador-geral Paulo Gonet e do próprio diretor-geral da PF, Andrei Rodrigues. Na página 5, os investigadores registraram que se limitaram aos “dados brutos” e não realizaram “quaisquer atos de aprofundamento investigativo direcionados a magistrados”.

O conteúdo publicado primeiramente por Metrópoles e Estadão e depois esmiuçado por praticamente toda a imprensa, após o sigilo ter sido levantado nesta terça-feira, 1 de setembro, mostra que o escritório de Viviane Barci de Moraes fechou com o Master um contrato de R$ 131 milhões — R$ 3,6 milhões por mês, por três anos — assinado em 23 de janeiro de 2024, doze dias depois de um suposto almoço do ministro Moraes numa propriedade de Vorcaro em Campos do Jordão. Os metadados da versão final do arquivo do contrato indicam um usuário com nome de “Ministro Alexandre de Moraes” como o último a editar o documento. Vorcaro instruiu uma funcionária: “esse Barci de Moraes por favor não deixe atrasar um dia (…) É o pgto mais importante que temos”. E completou: “Pode pagar sempre, sem nota.”

Depois vêm as séries de mensagens que ninguém consegue desler. Em 30 de outubro de 2025, sabendo por “turma do banco central” que o Bacen estava sob pressão, Vorcaro escreveu ao contato identificado como sendo de Alexandre de Moraes: “É importante reforçar com Andrei e Paulo pra não deixar ninguém de baixo fazer uma sacanagem.” Em 15 de novembro, às vésperas da prisão, uma nova mensagem: “Acha que segunda já tenho que estar fora?” E no dia da prisão, em 18 de novembro: “Conseguiu ter notícia ou bloquear?”.

Aqui entram as ressalvas, e são igualmente complexas. A PF, ao que se sabe publicamente, não recuperou uma única resposta de Moraes — os dois trocavam prints de bloco de notas com visualização única, e sobrou o lado de quem escrevia, não o de quem lia. Não há indício de que o ministro tenha falado com Andrei, com Gonet ou com Galípolo, por exemplo.

O escritório Barci de Moraes, que celebrou o contrato com Vorcaro em condições, no mínimo, extraordinárias, divulgou uma nota bastante confusa dizendo que consultou o ministro apenas para checar impedimentos e que ele “jamais julgou qualquer causa envolvendo o Banco Master” — o que é verdade, mas não resolve a questão: a suspeita é sobre a compra de influência de Vorcaro que está preso desde março deste ano.

Entre fevereiro e março passados, quando vazou o contrato do escritório da esposa de Moraes com o Master, o próprio ministro publicou ao menos cinco notas para negar qualquer relação com Vorcaro. Em uma delas, sua assessoria disse: “O Ministro Alexandre de Moraes não recebeu essas mensagens referidas na matéria. Trata-se de ilação mentirosa no sentido, novamente, de atacar o Supremo Tribunal Federal”. A nota se referia às revelações da jornalista Malu Gaspar, que foi quem primeiro trouxe o nome de Moraes ao tabuleiro do Caso Master em sua coluna no Globo.

Agora, com as novas revelações, o problema pode estar na forma como o material veio à luz, pois criou, por si só, a possibilidade de ser anulado. Em 28 de agosto, Mendonça desentranhou o relatório e só em 31 de agosto abriu vista à PGR, com prazo de 5 dias. E no primeiro dia de setembro, com o prazo correndo, levantou o sigilo de tudo, escrevendo que “independentemente” da PGR, o caminho do caso deveria ser debatido no Plenário da Corte. Gonet respondeu em menos de doze horas – poderia responder, lembremos, em até cinco dias – e pediu nulidade dupla: o juiz não investiga, e o ministro não manda investigar colega sem o Plenário. Andrei Rodrigues teria dito que houve abuso de autoridade, segundo a coluna de Natália Portinari, no UOL. E na PF a reunião de 24 de agosto virou “cilada”: os delegados foram convocados para outro assunto e saíram com um mandado de 72 horas na mão, contou Fábio Serapião, também no UOL.

A dúvida que se pode levantar – e é legítima – é sobre o timing dos acontecimentos a um mês da eleição. Para muita gente soa estranho que André Mendonça, indicado ao Supremo por Bolsonaro, concentre suas intervenções nos assuntos de uma investigação que serviria à narrativa da direita. A pergunta que se pode fazer é porque Mendonça pediu, especificamente, esse relatório agora quando já sabia do possível envolvimento de Moraes desde março, quando vazaram as primeiras mensagens.

Por outro lado, se o Plenário anular tudo, como se aventa e pede o PGR, o país terá lido 218 páginas que juridicamente não existem, por vício de forma, diante de uma opinião pública que não tem obrigação de entender por que isso importa. Dois dos principais jornais do país, Folha de S. Paulo e Estadão, já pediram a cabeça do ministro em seus editoriais. Moraes segue em silêncio, e ninguém sabe qual será sua linha de defesa até o momento.

Ato 2 — Flávio, Dark Horse e mais uma mentira?

Enquanto o Supremo era implodido com as revelações, a piauí, em reportagem de Breno Pires, revelou, na manhã da mesma terça-feira, um relatório inédito do Coaf. Em 16 de setembro de 2025, Vorcaro mandou mais 1,6 milhão de dólares ao Havengate Development Fund, o fundo texano que administrava o dinheiro de Dark Horse, a cinebiografia de Jair Bolsonaro. O dinheiro saiu oito dias depois de uma cobrança de Flávio por parcelas em atraso — e menos de duas semanas depois do Banco Central negar a venda do Master ao BRB. O total, portanto, passa de 10,6 milhões de dólares para 12,3 milhões de dólares, o que equivale a cerca de R$ 65 milhões, em relação a uma promessa de 24 milhões de dólares. Há indício de mais uma parcela em outubro: “Consegue liberar as parcelas do filme?”, pergunta o publicitário Thiago Miranda no dia 22; “Sim. Liberei mais uma hoje”, responde Vorcaro — horas depois de Flávio cobrar.

O detalhe que importa não é só o valor. É a data. Em maio, à GloboNews, Flávio disse que “o último pagamento que ele fez foi em maio de 2025” e que, desde a primeira informação pública sobre Vorcaro, “esse fundo foi fechado, isolado”. O Coaf diz outra coisa. Procurado no Senado nesta terça-feira, o candidato do PL não corrigiu a versão nem a defendeu: terceirizou. “Essas informações eu não tenho como saber porque eu não trato disso. Tem que perguntar para a produtora”, disse diante de vários jornalistas. É uma não-resposta que reforça que o candidato continua a se esquivar do tema, já que ele próprio negociou as parcelas com o financiador Vorcaro — e que, na véspera da prisão dele, escreveu: “Irmão, estou e estarei contigo sempre, não tem meia conversa entre a gente.”

A tática de repetir que o dinheiro é privado é frágil pois sua origem é objeto do inquérito que Mendonça abriu em julho por evasão de divisas, lavagem e corrupção e que apura se emendas de Flávio favoreceram o Master. Dos R$ 47,3 bilhões do rombo, R$ 41 bilhões saíram do FGC.

E, no mesmo dia, no mesmo corredor do Senado, o mesmo Flávio exigiu a renúncia de Alexandre de Moraes: “Não tem mais condição dele continuar sendo ministro.” A simetria é quase literária. Flávio pede que o ministro explique o dinheiro do Master; questionado sobre o dinheiro do Master que financiou o filme sobre o próprio pai, manda perguntar à produtora. A PF apura se parte dos recursos bancou a estadia de Eduardo Bolsonaro nos EUA — o “agente legal” do Havengate, destino de parte dos recursos recebidos pelo Master, é um escritório com vínculos com o próprio ex-deputado, que nega a suspeita, mas mantém, como mostrou a Agência Pública, uma vida de luxo nos EUA junto de seu parceiro, o influenciador Paulo Figueiredo — tudo isso sem explicar a origem do dinheiro. Sobre o filme, a Europa Filmes já avisou que Dark Horse só estreia depois das eleições. O filme que era para ser uma peça de campanha virou o telhado de vidro de Flávio com a revelação do The Intercept Brasil meses atrás.

Ato 3 — Mendonça também esteve com Vorcaro: “Uma única vez”

Como a cronologia importa, na manhã desta quarta-feira, 2 de setembro, o jornalista Paulo Motoryn publicou, na newsletter Noites Húngaras, áudios extraídos do mesmo celular de Vorcaro. Em 14 de março de 2025, Mendonça recebeu Vorcaro por duas horas, em São Paulo, num instituto fundado pelo próprio ministro, o Iter. Ciro Soares, então advogado do Master, e o deputado Cezinha de Madureira levaram semanas para articular o encontro. Em fevereiro, Ciro mandou um áudio ao cliente: “Fala, Vorcarinho, trabalhando por você! Levei o André lá no Vasco agora, pra fazer um terno.” Em outro: “O André Mendonça disse que quer te receber junto comigo. (…) Ele sabe, soube da situação do Banco Central toda.”

Mendonça confirmou em nota: encontrou Vorcaro “uma única vez”, segundo o ministro, a pedido do banqueiro, para tratar de uma tutela provisória sobre precatórios que estava com vista de outro ministro — e diz ter atuado contra a posição de Vorcaro. Acrescenta que o empresário buscou “interlocução semelhante com outros integrantes do STF”. Sobre os áudios do advogado, Mendonça não comentou.

É verdade que um ministro pode receber uma parte e decidir contra ela; se isso virar crime, o Supremo deveria fechar. É praxe que ministros recebam as partes de um processo, principalmente os advogados. Mas veja o que o terceiro ato faz com o primeiro. O relator que mandou a PF vasculhar o celular de Vorcaro estava, ele próprio, na agenda de Vorcaro. É o mesmo Ciro Soares que o levou ao alfaiate que aparece nas 18 páginas sobre Gonet, intermediando fotos, telefonemas e o convite do filho do procurador-geral para uma viagem a Londres paga pelo Master. Gonet, que pediu a nulidade, deveria se declarar impedido? Fábio Faria, ex-ministro de Bolsonaro, aparece como quem aproximou Vorcaro de Moraes, como mostrou a excelente reportagem da piauí. Toffoli, por sua vez, deixara a relatoria em fevereiro, depois que a imprensa revelou repasses de ao menos R$ 35 milhões de fundos ligados a Vorcaro ao resort paranaense de que era sócio; Fachin reuniu os ministros a portas fechadas, aceitou a renúncia e recusou declará-lo suspeito. Toffoli negou irregularidades e a relatoria do caso Master foi parar nas mãos de Mendonça.

Vorcaro expôs a República; STF é parte dela

O que Daniel Vorcaro tem causado na República é inédito. Para além da quebra do banco e de suas extensões que gerou um rombo estimado em cerca de R$ 47,3 bilhões, resultando no maior ressarcimento da história do Fundo Garantidor de Crédito (FGC), seus tentáculos parecem atingir cada vez mais gente, em maior ou menor grau de comprometimento, como mostra um levantamento do Estadão chamado de Vorcarosfera, ferramenta que detalha a rede de contatos do dono do Banco Master com os Três Poderes em Brasília, e que está distribuído entre direita e esquerda — mais entre a direita, é importante registrar.

O saldo institucional, a depender do desfecho, já será pior do que o saldo moral. Fachin prometeu anunciar as “medidas cabíveis e necessárias” e “sem precipitação” — a frase mais desanimadora da semana, porque aparentemente não há rito para o Plenário julgar um dos onze, e há pelo menos três outros ministros roçados pelo Master: além de Toffoli, Nunes Marques, cujo filho advogado recebeu R$ 281,6 mil de uma consultoria paga pelo banco, e Fux, cujo filho recebeu convites do banqueiro e diz não ter fechado negócio. São pesos distintos, é verdade, mas todos resvalam na instituição STF.

A impressão geral é que a credibilidade da corte, que já vinha claudicante, está indo pelo ralo com essas novas revelações, e a consequência para a eleição de outubro ainda parece nebulosa – pleito, vale lembrar, em que a pauta anti-STF já era bandeira da extrema direita. Agora, as ações acertadas do Supremo que mantiveram nossa democracia de pé, como no caso da prisão de Bolsonaro e dos generais, fruto da tentativa de golpe de 8 de janeiro, serão novamente questionadas pela mesma turma que fomentou o golpe. De todo modo, é importante, para tudo o que vem sendo divulgado, não confundir indício, suspeita e prova.

Ao tirar o sigilo das conversas entre o ex-banqueiro Daniel Vorcaro, do caso Master e Alexandre de Moraes, o ministro André Mendonça colocou o colega de toga em situação delicadíssima e levou à praça pública a divisão entre os ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). E a briga ferve no meio das eleições. Seria por acaso?

Com a medida, Mendonça implode o STF sem cerimônias e leva a Corte mais uma vez para o centro de um debate político polarizado. O “terrivelmente evangélico” Mendonça foi indicado por Jair Bolsonaro e aprovado pelo Senado Federal para o STF em 2021, após ocupar os cargos de Advogado-Geral da União e de Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública no governo do ex-presidente. O mesmo que está, atualmente, preso em casa após ter sido condenado por golpe de Estado em processo relatado por Alexandre de Moraes.

As dúvidas que cercam a ação de Mendonça

Daniel Vorcaro era investigado na Justiça Federal de Brasília por um esquema bilionário de fraudes financeiras, lavagem de dinheiro e corrupção. Por ter chegado a nomes de pessoas com foro privilegiado, o caso foi encaminhado ao STF e distribuído primeiramente ao ministro Dias Toffoli.

Em fevereiro deste ano, após vazarem informações de que Vorcaro havia comprado participações no resort Tayayá, de propriedade da família do ministro, no Paraná, Dias Toffoli passou a ser considerado suspeito para seguir com o caso e é pressionado a deixar a relatoria. Na mesma reunião em que foi decidida a saída de Toffoli, o presidente do STF, Edson Fachin, indicou Mendonça para assumir o caso Master no Supremo.

Àquela altura já existiam informações de que outras autoridades com prerrogativa de foro no STF poderiam ter relações com o banqueiro, uma vez que já se sabia, por exemplo, que a advogada Viviane Barci de Moraes, esposa de Alexandre de Moraes, tinha um contrato de prestação de serviços com o banco.

Agora, com as mensagens de Vorcaro enviadas a Moraes reveladas, os membros do STF terão que decidir entre duas teses. A primeira já foi apresentada pelo procurador-geral da República, Paulo Gonet, que também é citado nas mensagens do ex-banqueiro. Gonet sustenta que a investigação da PF seria nula, pois Mendonça teria agido como um juiz de instrução e investigado ilegalmente um colega de corte.

Isso porque o relator determinou à PF, em agosto, que fossem detalhadas as conversas de Vorcaro, “inclusive aquelas eventualmente sujeitas à incidência do art. 5º, I, do Regimento Interno do Supremo Tribunal Federal”. O artigo citado refere-se à competência do plenário do STF em julgar autoridades como o presidente, o vice-presidente, deputados federais e senadores, ministros de Estado, ministros do próprio STF e o procurador-geral da República. Portanto, Mendonça sabia o que estava procurando.

A outra tese à disposição dos ministros é entender que as medidas de André Mendonça só foram tomadas agora justamente para preservar as regras de investigação a ministros do Supremo. Tanto que Mendonça, por isso, teria levado o caso ao plenário.

A quem interessa?

O momento escolhido pelo ministro André Mendonça de soltar a bomba não poderia ser mais propício ao candidato à presidência da República pelo Partido Liberal (PL), Flávio Bolsonaro, o filho 01 de Jair. Com base em relatórios de inteligência do Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras (COAF), a revista Piauí mostrou, em reportagem publicada na mesma segunda-feira, 1.º de setembro, que o candidato a presidente havia mentido nas entrevistas, ao dizer que o último repasse do banqueiro ao filme “Dark Horse” — a edulcorada cinebiografia de Jair Bolsonaro — teria sido em maio de 2025, seis meses antes da prisão do doador geral do Brasil, Daniel Vorcaro.

Os relatórios do COAF mostraram que Vorcaro transferiu 1,6 milhão de dólares (R$ 8 milhões) ao fundo Havengate, que administra o orçamento do filme, em setembro de 2025. A última doação ocorreu dois meses antes de o banqueiro ser preso na Operação Compliance Zero, em 17 de novembro de 2025, na pista do aeroporto de Guarulhos, quando preparava-se para deixar o país.

No mesmo dia da revelação da revista, Mendonça quebrou o sigilo das conversas de Moraes e o ex-banqueiro, com direito a prints de tela e muitas dúvidas. Segundo as investigações, o banqueiro desenvolveu uma forma para conversar com o ministro. Anotava o que queria no bloco de notas do celular, tirava uma foto da tela e enviava para o ministro, que respondia em imagens de visualização única no celular do destinatário e que, por esse motivo, não teriam sido localizadas, segundo a Polícia Federal (PF).

Nas últimas mensagens de Vorcaro ao ministro, no dia 15 de novembro de 2025, dois dias antes de sua prisão, o banqueiro perguntava se Galípolo havia respondido a Moraes e perguntava: “Acha que segunda já tenho que estar fora?”. Se Moraes respondeu, não se sabe, mas na segunda, 17 de novembro, lá estava Vorcaro na pista de Guarulhos, sonhando em dar uma banana para o país pela janela do seu jatinho, como um certo personagem de novela, mas não deu tempo.

Falando em novela, o relatório da PF liberado por Mendonça inclui personagens importantes de Brasília. Mensagens de Vorcaro para Moraes supostamente mencionam o diretor-geral da PF, Andrei Rodrigues, desafeto de Mendonça, e o Procurador-Geral da República, Paulo Gonet.

“É importante reforçar com Andrei e Paulo pra nao deixar ninguem de baixo fazer uma sacanagem que ai vai tudo pro saco. Estou disponivel pra tratar e explicar qq coisa, so nao pode ter sacanagem. Vou te mandar os nomes que tem ido ao Bacen alegando que farao algo em breve”, afirma Vorcaro em uma das mensagens que teriam sido enviadas a Moraes. A grafia transcrita é a original.

O relatório mostra ainda que Gonet teria conversado com Vorcaro por intermédio do advogado Ciro Soares, que tentou negociar a ida dele e de Pedro Gonet, filho do PGR, para um evento em Londres, em 2025, que Vorcaro financiaria, mas acabou não ocorrendo.

Gonet, que tem a prerrogativa de investigar e, eventualmente, denunciar ministros do STF, já se manifestou ontem mesmo sobre o despacho de Mendonça e disse que é nula uma investigação ordenada por um ministro do STF contra outro. Segundo ele, a nulidade ocorreu porque a decisão de processar e julgar ministros da Corte cabe ao plenário do STF e não a um ministro isoladamente.

“Se a autoridade policial deve interromper as suas investigações para que sobre elas delibere o órgão do Judiciário encarregado do julgamento, com maioria de razão não deve o relator admitir e nem determinar que um Colega da Corte seja escrutinado. Na realidade, o relator nem sequer detém competência para dirigir as ações policiais”, afirma Gonet, que acrescentou: “ao juiz não cabe acusar, menos ainda ao juiz cabe realizar investigações pré-processuais”.

Reações do Congresso, na imprensa e no próprio STF

No centro da praça dos Três Poderes, a temperatura subiu terrivelmente e já chega a 54 o número de pedidos de impeachment do ministro Alexandre de Moraes no Senado. A atitude do senador Davi Alcolumbre (União-AP), presidente do Congresso, a quem cabe abrir processos políticos contra ministros do STF, deve ser a mesma dos demais 53 pedidos e negar a abertura de processo.

Paralelamente, duas outras correntes de comentários jurídicos e políticos se formam: uma defende a renúncia de Moraes, outra que ele deve se afastar para se defender. Na segunda-feira, dois grandes jornais de São Paulo soltaram editoriais defendendo a renúncia de Alexandre de Moraes, a Folha de S.Paulo e O Estado de S. Paulo.

Além do PGR, que já se manifestou, Mendonça dirigiu sua manifestação ao plenário do STF, “instância soberana para analisar, de modo técnico e estritamente jurídico, os novos elementos trazidos pela autoridade policial”. Segundo o relator do caso Master, o debate sobre o novo relatório da PF deve ocorrer “em sessão presencial do Colegiado, a partir de data a ser definida pelo eminente Presidente deste Supremo Tribunal Federal, de acordo com o pleno exercício das suas atribuições regimentais”, o que não tem prazo para acontecer.

Os ministros estariam agora divididos sobre os próximos passos. Ao lado de Moraes, em tese, estariam Flávio Dino, Gilmar Mendes e Cristiano Zanin. De Mendonça, Kassio Nunes, Luiz Fux e Edson Fachin. Carmen Lúcia, mais independente, seria a dúvida. Toffoli, que se afastou do caso Master, não poderia participar da discussão.

Hoje Brasília acordou com a revelação do jornalista Paulo Motoryn, do ICL, de que Mendonça também esteve com Vorcaro, em 14 de março de 2025, numa reunião em São Paulo no instituto do ministro. Vazaram áudios e mensagens do celular do banqueiro. O ministro admitiu e disse que o assunto da conversa, de duas horas, foram precatórios.

E as eleições?

A pauta de impeachment de ministros do STF sempre foi da oposição ao governo Lula, especialmente após as investigações que culminaram na condenação de Jair Bolsonaro por tentativa de golpe de Estado. O assunto virá com força. A discussão vai afetar as pautas de interesse do governo negociadas entre Lula e Alcolumbre?

De outra parte, a relatoria da investigação que apura o financiamento do filme “Dark Horse” está a cargo do ministro Flávio Dino, que requisitou recentemente informações ao Ministério Público e à Polícia Civil de São Paulo para apurar eventuais crimes federais no caso, em especial o uso de um fundo no exterior, o Havengate, e o financiamento da película por Vorcaro. A investigação apura se o dinheiro do fundo e do Master estariam amparando a vida de luxo de Eduardo Bolsonaro nos EUA, como mostrou a Agência Pública, e a campanha pró-sanções ao Brasil, que alimenta os interesses por trás da interferência dos Estados Unidos na eleição brasileira.

Ou seja, o caso Master continuará sendo um dos principais motores dos embates da campanha presidencial entre Lula e Flávio Bolsonaro. E, pelo menos no período eleitoral, é possível que o debate sobre a moralidade da mais alta corte do país fique para depois.

The report said Harry was deeply moved by the gesture because Althorp holds significant personal and family memories.

The post Harry and Meghan decline Charles Spencer’s Althorp Estate offer appeared first on BOL News.

KARACHI: Pakistan LNG Limited has issued a fresh tender on Wednesday to procure a spot LNG cargo for delivery between September 8 and 12, after rejecting the sole bid received for an earlier delivery window as too expensive. The state-owned buyer turned down an offer from BP Singapore at $26.969 per million British thermal units ... Read more

The post Pakistan floats fresh LNG tender after rejecting costly single bid appeared first on BOL News.

A fruitarian diet can provide fiber and antioxidants but may leave the body short of protein and essential nutrients.

The post What happens to your body when you eat only fruit? appeared first on BOL News.

The world’s most sensitive dark matter observatory, the LUX-ZEPLIN (LZ) experiment, has detected a particle interaction that cannot be explained by conventional background radiation models, a finding that, although still far from being confirmed as a definitive discovery, has sparked cautious optimism in the international scientific community. The event, recorded nearly a mile underground at […]

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has used the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek and a wide-ranging interview with China’s Xinhua news agency to set out a closely connected vision of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy — combining deeper economic and technological cooperation with China with a broader commitment to multilateralism, Eurasian connectivity and reform of global institutions.

Speaking as leaders gathered in Bishkek for the 26th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its SCO Plus format, Tokayev presented Kazakhstan as both a committed regional partner and an increasingly active “middle power” seeking to bridge geopolitical divisions.

His summit remarks were reinforced by an exclusive written interview with Xinhua, published on 1 September, in which the Kazakh leader described relations with China as being at an “unprecedentedly high level” and said Astana intended to continue strengthening what the two countries describe as an “eternal comprehensive strategic partnership”.

Taken together, the two interventions offer a clear picture of Kazakhstan’s current diplomatic strategy: maintain close relations with its major neighbours, promote trade routes linking Asia with Europe, embrace technological cooperation and at the same time argue for international relations based on dialogue rather than confrontation.

China partnership moves beyond traditional trade

In his Xinhua interview, Tokayev stressed that Kazakhstan-China relations now extend well beyond traditional energy and commodity ties.

Cooperation encompasses trade, investment, transport, industrial production, agriculture, digitalisation, healthcare, science, education and culture, he said. China is now Kazakhstan’s largest foreign trading partner, while transport and logistics have assumed an increasingly strategic role.

That emphasis is particularly significant for Europe.

Kazakhstan occupies a central geographical position between China and European markets, and Tokayev argued that the country was working with China to transform that location into a modern Eurasian transport and logistics network.

He specifically highlighted the Belt and Road Initiative, new railway construction, dry ports, logistics terminals and modernisation of border infrastructure.

Central to this strategy is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor, which links China with Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus and onward towards European markets.

Tokayev described making the route more competitive as a shared priority, pointing to “smart customs”, digital documentation, interconnected information systems and automated border procedures as necessary elements in reducing transit times.

That message closely reflected his position at the SCO summit, where Kazakhstan again offered to help develop transport initiatives throughout the organisation and called attention to the potential integration of the Belt and Road Initiative, Middle Corridor, North-South Corridor and routes connecting Central and South Asia.

For the European Union, which has increasingly sought alternative and resilient connections with Central Asia and China, the development of the Middle Corridor gives Kazakhstan an importance that extends considerably beyond the size of its domestic economy.

Artificial intelligence becomes a new pillar

Tokayev also placed technology and artificial intelligence near the centre of the emerging Kazakhstan-China relationship.

China's position in AI, robotics, digital technology, new energy and advanced manufacturing complements Kazakhstan's own ambition to accelerate its digital transformation, he argued.

Kazakhstan has declared 2026 its Year of Digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence, and Tokayev referred to meetings with leading Chinese technology companies during his recent participation in the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai.

He said there was mutual interest in projects involving the digital economy, intelligent manufacturing, e-commerce, research and skills development.

The subject moved seamlessly from the bilateral interview into Tokayev's multilateral message in Bishkek.

Addressing the SCO Plus meeting, he warned that global stability increasingly depends upon the responsible development of artificial intelligence and called for universal rules capable of encouraging innovation while preventing uncontrolled use and narrowing the digital divide.

Kazakhstan is also establishing an Asia-Pacific digital solutions centre in Almaty under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, which Tokayev said should help developing countries gain access to technological expertise.

In his Xinhua interview he went further, arguing that AI should ultimately serve humanity as a whole and that countries should have equitable access to technology, knowledge and computing resources. Kazakhstan was among the founding participants this year in a new international AI cooperation initiative launched in Shanghai.

The ‘Shanghai spirit’ as an alternative to bloc politics

Underlying both the interview and Tokayev's summit speech was a wider political argument.

The Kazakh president portrayed the SCO not simply as an economic or security grouping but as a potential model for cooperation between states with different political systems and interests.

In Bishkek, he said the organisation's principles of equality and consensus had become a “gold standard” for multilateral cooperation. He proposed that core SCO principles should ultimately be reflected in a UN General Assembly resolution linked to the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace.

The formulation is consistent with Kazakhstan's long-standing attempt to avoid being drawn exclusively into competing geopolitical camps.

Tokayev reiterated that Kazakhstan would maintain what he described as a balanced, constructive and peaceful foreign policy, while arguing that the international order should move away from the “cult of force and confrontation” towards collective responsibility and long-term cooperation.

In his interview with Xinhua, he similarly said Kazakhstan and China shared support for the central role of the United Nations, international law, mediation, multilateralism and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

A stronger voice for middle powers

One of the more significant elements of Tokayev's Bishkek intervention was his argument that responsible middle powers should have greater influence within global governance.

With tensions between major powers putting pressure on existing international institutions, Tokayev suggested countries such as Kazakhstan could facilitate dialogue between competing centres of power and help develop collective solutions.

“Kazakhstan is ready to actively contribute to this process,” he told the summit.

At the same time, he resisted suggestions that shortcomings within the United Nations justified weakening the organisation.

Despite criticism of the UN, Tokayev said there was no viable alternative to it. Kazakhstan's position, he argued, was that the UN should remain at the centre of the international system and that its Charter should continue to provide the universal foundation of international law.

The President called for closer interaction between the UN and regional organisations such as the SCO, stronger preventive diplomacy and greater emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes.

Water security joins the global agenda

Tokayev also used the summit to promote another issue of growing importance to Central Asia: water.

Climate pressures, population growth and competing demands on shared water resources make the issue increasingly important to Kazakhstan and neighbouring states.

Tokayev proposed creating an International Water Organisation under UN auspices, arguing that although numerous UN bodies deal with water, no universal intergovernmental organisation currently has a comprehensive mandate.

He also proposed an SCO Water Problems Analysis Centre as a regional complement to such a global organisation.

The proposal fits into Kazakhstan's broader effort to move environmental and resource-security questions higher up the international agenda.

A Eurasian crossroads

Perhaps the strongest thread connecting Tokayev's interview with his SCO appearance is Kazakhstan's determination to turn geography into diplomatic and economic influence.

Astana is simultaneously strengthening its relationship with Beijing, maintaining important relationships with Russia and other neighbours, developing transport corridors towards Europe, expanding cooperation with Western partners and presenting itself as an advocate of multilateral diplomacy.

Tokayev's description of relations with China therefore carries a wider meaning.

He quoted a Kazakh proverb in the Xinhua interview: “Those travelling the same road share a common destiny.”

Yet the message emerging from Bishkek suggests Kazakhstan sees that road not as one running exclusively eastwards towards China, but as part of a much larger network connecting East and West.

As competition between the world's major powers becomes more pronounced, Kazakhstan is attempting to position itself at the centre of those connections — geographically through trade and transport corridors, technologically through digital cooperation, and diplomatically through its advocacy of multilateralism.

For Europe, that makes developments in Kazakhstan-China relations increasingly relevant. The more successfully Kazakhstan develops the Middle Corridor and other east-west transport links, the more the country becomes not simply a Central Asian partner but a strategic gateway connecting European and Asian economies.

And that, ultimately, appears to be the common theme running through Tokayev's words both to Xinhua and to the leaders assembled at the SCO summit: Kazakhstan believes its future influence will come not from choosing between competing blocs, but from connecting them.