Saudi Arabia on Friday announced it had to temporarily shut down the key east-west pipeline after drone attacks on Thursday from an Iranian-backed militia group in Iraq. As we have explained in the past, the Kingdom has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to hostilities near the Persian Gulf that have closed the Strait of Hormuz. 

The pipeline was shut down a day after the Houthi rebels of Yemen increased their control over the crucial Bab al-Mandab Strait (BAM), a narrow body of water separating the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden. Combined with Iran vastly curtailing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, this gives Tehran significant control over two of the world’s most crucial passageways for the flow of oil.

3. The Houthis have reportedly attempted to seize ROYG-controlled islands in the Red Sea from which Houthi fighters could launch attacks on international shipping. Houthi forces reportedly landed on the Hanish Islands in the southern Red Sea on the morning of September 10 after… pic.twitter.com/tiFPgNDOHZ

— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) September 11, 2026

“The East-West pipeline, in the regions of Riyadh and Medina, was subjected to several attacks on Thursday morning, September 10, 2026,” Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry posted on X. “The line was shut down as a precaution. The attacks resulted in some injuries, and medical care has been provided to those injured.”

“Emergency teams and specialized technical teams began work immediately after the attacks occurred, and took the necessary measures to secure the line and verify its safety, in accordance with approved safety procedures and emergency plans, and in coordination with relevant authorities,” the ministry added. “Any updates will be announced in due course.”

A before and after of the East-West Pipeline pumping station showed that it wasn’t just “hit”, it was absolutely MANGLED.

The past 24 hours have been nothing short of catastrophic for the global energy markets, but the harsh reality?

The pain is just getting started. pic.twitter.com/aei8HPplB3

— Brett Erickson (@BrettErickson28) September 11, 2026

Showing the complexity of this situation and the high degree of coordination among various Iranian-backed proxies, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Iranian proxies in Iraq of carrying out the attack. The Kingdom subsequently said it would hold off on responding to “give the brotherly Iraqi government an opportunity to take the necessary measures to prevent attacks launched from Iraqi territory against the Kingdom and neighboring countries,” according to the Arab News.

Officials in Baghdad quickly responded to that request, firing a regional commander overseeing operations where the attack was launched from.

“The Prime Minister, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Mr. Ali Falih Al-Zaidi, directed the formation of an investigative committee regarding the Maysan Operations Command,” the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office announced on X. “His Excellency ordered the dismissal of the Operations Commander from his position, following confirmation that the attacks targeting the brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were launched from one of the sites within the province.”

وجّه رئيس مجلس الوزراء، القائد العام للقوات المسلحة، السيد علي فالح الزيدي بتشكيل مجلس تحقيقي بحق قيادة عمليات ميسان.

وأمر سيادته بإعفاء قائد العمليات من منصبه، على خلفية ثبوت انطلاق الاعتداءات التي طالت الأشقاء في المملكة العربية السعودية من أحد المواقع داخل المحافظة.…

— المكتب الإعلامي لرئيس الوزراء (@IraqiPMO) September 11, 2026

On Friday, the Houthis acknowledged that they captured new stretches of Red Sea coast from the Saudi-backed factions they’ve been battling. This includes the port of Mokha and the key islands of Perim (also known as Mayun) and Zuqar.

In a quick recap of what’s changed, the port provides a potential new surveillance and launching point for the Houthis. From here they can deploy mines, standoff weapons, as well as uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) that can be used to attack shipping. The islands give the Houthis a presence in the middle of shipping lanes. This is especially true for Perim, which sits in the narrowest part of the BAM, less than two miles west of Yemen and about 13 miles east of Djibouti, giving the Houthis a commanding presence at the mouth of the Red Sea. Its position could even allow Houthis to launch attacks on shipping using lower-end munitions, such as anti-tank guided missiles and even rocket artillery.

However, maintaining a major military presence on these islands would be a challenge logistically, especially should the U.S. or its allies attack positions there. You can read more about how the fall of the islands unfolded in our report here.

As they swept through the coastal region, the Houthis captured a treasure trove of U.S.-made Oshkosh M-ATV mine-resistant vehicles, pickup trucks mounted with heavy weapons, artillery pieces, and large quantities of ammunition and small arms abandoned by retreating National Resistance and Giants Brigade forces.

Videos show the scale of equipment the Houthis captured during the western coast offensive.

The "booty" footage from Mokha and surrounding positions includes U.S.-made Oshkosh M-ATV mine-resistant vehicles, pickup trucks mounted with heavy weapons (technicals), armored… pic.twitter.com/n3VPyoSmHk

— Clash Report (@clashreport) September 11, 2026

Houthis Display Vehicles and Weapons Seized in Mocha

Yemen’s Houthis have displayed vehicles, weapons and military supplies they say they captured in the Red Sea port city of Mocha after Yemeni government forces backed by Saudi Arabia and its allies withdrew from the city.… pic.twitter.com/JmTMNY6wIS

— GAROWE ONLINE (@GaroweOnline) September 11, 2026

Iran, which has held off on getting the Houthis directly involved during Epic Fury, has now played its hand and is putting the Houthis in a better position to close the strait than ever before. This was always a ‘sum of all fears’ scenario for oil exports from the Middle East and now Iran could put maximum pressure on the United States and the world to end the conflict in their favor, with oil potentially being cut off from both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Houthis are likely preparing to close the strait with a much better position than they had before. Having both straits closed has long been a 'sum of all fears' middle east energy crisis. Been writing about this exact scenario for over a decade. U.S. stretched thin, especially in…

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) September 11, 2026

Still, on Friday, the Houthis tried to allay those concerns, promising they would limit their control of the BAM to just Saudi vessels. 

“The Yemeni armed forces confirm that maritime navigation is safe for all companies, except for Saudi Arabian ships, which have previously been placed under a ban,” Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree proclaimed. “We are continuing to uphold the equation of blockade with blockade, striking enemy Saudi Arabian troop concentrations, and escalating in response to their actions, until the aggression ceases and the blockade is lifted from our dear people.”

Their rationale is that this campaign is all about defending against attacks by the Saudis and their proxies.

The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis grew out of a civil war in Yemen that erupted in 2014. It expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis and raged on until the parties reached a tenuous ceasefire in 2022. Tensions, however, reignited after that conflict ended when the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter. In addition to a blockade on Saudi shipping, the Houthis began striking Saudi refineries and other oil infrastructure, including pipelines near the coast.

Houthi assurances about their intentions have meant little in the past. In 2023, when they launched their earlier campaign against Red Sea shipping, the Houthis also claimed a narrow rationale. They said they were doing so on behalf of Palestinians being killed during the Israel-Hamas war. The reality turned out to be that the Houthis were striking even ships not connected to Israel. This ultimately led to the U.S. and allies deploying warships to protect commercial vessels, battles with the rebel group on the water and a campaign of airstrikes on Houthi land targets.

It should be noted that the Saudis held off on getting involved that fight.

Amid all this, the per-barrel price of Brent crude rose to more than $109 yesterday, but was back down to $104 today, according to OilPrice.com.

We have long suggested that the U.S. could get pulled back into a new conflict with the Houthis. Now the rebel group’s rapid defeat of the Saudi-backed forces has reportedly already led to an American role in that fight.

“More than 100 US military advisers are on the ground in Saudi Arabia providing intelligence and targeting support to the Kingdom in its military campaign against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen,” CNN reported on Thursday, citing multiple sources familiar with the effort. “The US military personnel are working as part of a newly-established joint forces command, which was formed in recent weeks amid signs Iran was ramping up its own efforts to aid Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, one of the sources, a US official, said. That official put the total at roughly 200 troops.”

Still, there are limits on the U.S. role.

“The US is sharing intelligence with Saudi Arabia — as it routinely does already — but it is not participating directly in strikes,” CNN noted. “The US is also not helping refuel Saudi warplanes or providing other operational support, as it has in past fighting with the Houthis.”

Then-Defense Secretary James Mattis ended that in 2018 during the first Trump presidency after growing concerns over the large number of civilian casualties being inflicted. The Saudi coalition’s fight against the Houthis also complicated the U.S. counterterrorism campaign against Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper “flew to the kingdom overnight Thursday as Yemen’s Riyadh-backed forces crumbled in the face of a lightning Houthi offensive southward along Yemen’s western coast this week,” Al-Monitor reported. “He was expected to meet with top Saudi officials as they seek to consolidate the battered military effort by forces aligned with Yemen’s government.”

Trump, as we noted at the top of this story, has already declined to intervene kinetically.

“Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) called President Trump twice Thursday, urging him to launch strikes against the Houthis as the Iran-backed group closed in on a vital Red Sea chokepoint,” Axios reported, citing two U.S. officials. “Trump declined, and U.S. officials stressed the administration has no plans to intervene directly against the Houthis for now.”

Asked if the U.S. would take direct military action against the Houthis, a senior White House official didn’t rule it out but said it is currently relying on regional partners to carry the burden. 

“The United States is focused on protecting our core national security interests—such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea—while empowering our regional partners to take the lead in managing and resolving regional security challenges,” the senior official told us. “We are in continuous dialogue with Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen Government regarding regional stability.”

The war against Iran and the ongoing mission to try to protect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz have already strained the U.S. military. There have been 18 troops killed, more than 800 wounded and wide scale destruction of U.S. bases and equipment. U.S. commanders have warned that the ongoing conflict is unsustainable without deeply degrading America’s ability to respond to other contingencies. How much the U.S. could commit to a fight against the Houthis is an open question, especially if the Iran war spun-up again. During the Red Sea operation, at times two carrier strike groups and many other assets in the air and on the sea, were needed to sustain that operation.

“A second front potentially adds more U.S. military risk as we try to sustain a military that has been involved in a protracted deployment to support our economic pressure-focused strategy,” former CENTCOM commander Joseph Votel told us on Friday. “The U.S. can do just about anything, but it will be a choice that will impact sustainment, create longer-term deployments and impact other national security priorities.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com 

The post The Outlook Is Getting Grimmer By The Day For Oil Exports From The Red Sea appeared first on TWZ.

The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have captured Mokha – a key Red Sea port in southwestern Yemen near the Bab al-Mandab (BAM) Strait. There are also reports they seized two islands located in the Red Sea shipping lanes. These moves against the Saudi Arabian-backed forces that previously held these areas could further cement the Houthis’ control over the narrow chokepoint to the Gulf of Aden, where the group has already imposed a blockade on Saudi oil exports.

The Houthis’ drive to control the BAM has been emboldened by the U.S. being stretched thin in its ongoing fight against Iran. Combined with Tehran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, this threatens to add to the Islamic Republic’s command over the flow of oil from the Middle East. It is a maximum pressure campaign on the U.S. and global markets, something we have predicted for years. Amid all this activity, the per-barrel price of Brent Crude is well over the $100 mark now.

The rapid advance on Mokha was planned and backed by Iran, according to the leader of Saudi-backed forces that retreated from Mokha, which is about 50 miles north of the BAM. It took place as Tehran has taken a more belligerent stance in the region that has seen it reportedly damage U.S. aircraft in a recent attack on Jordan earlier this week and get closer to striking U.S. Navy warships with ballistic missiles.

“The Joint Forces have formed a command center south of the city of Mokha, following Houthi breakthroughs across various combat axes under heavy fire, in which the Houthis used various types of weapons,” Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Lt. Gen. Tareq Saleh, said in his acknowledgment that his forces lost the port. The PLC was created in 2022 to represent the internationally recognized government of Yemen.

“The armed forces on the West Coast — the National Resistance, the Giants [Brigades], and the Homeland Shield — in addition to units of the Taiz axis west of the governorate, have paid a heavy price, martyrs and wounded, over the past days as they confronted the Houthi attack, which was planned by Iran, supported by it, and carried out with the participation of its various proxies/tools.”

“Thanks to God, our armed forces were able to repel an enemy combat formation a short time ago in the province of Taiz, forcing it to withdraw,” Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree proclaimed. “This was achieved by targeting it with a number of locally manufactured surface-to-air missiles.”

Videos have emerged showing Houthi forces inside Mokha and its airport and a large amount of equipment being seized.

The people of the port city of Al-Mokha gave a warm reception to Yemeni armed forces fighters following the city's strategic liberation. pic.twitter.com/0XDrveJPxU

— IRNA News Agency ☫ (@IrnaEnglish) September 10, 2026

BREAKING: The Houthis have announced a Cessation of Combat Operations along the Coast of Bab al-Mandab Strait following the Collapse of Pro-Saudi Forces

The Core Military of the Houthis has entered the City of Mokha

Additionally, all Islands Key to Controlling the Bab… pic.twitter.com/95HI4TJ6Bm

— Iran Observer (@IranObserver0) September 10, 2026

Houthi forces captured the key coastal city of Mokha overnight after Saudi/UAE backed forces retreated.

Seen here, Houthi fighters pose with an abandoned M-ATV MRAP at the city’s critical seaport. pic.twitter.com/1WD6l08MVc

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) September 10, 2026

Houthi fighters were filmed on the runway of Mokha international airport after capturing the city. pic.twitter.com/56Rc4BwsNf

— Open Source Intel (@Osint613) September 10, 2026

Holy score. This footage from Al Jazeera shows some of the equipment that was left behind for the Yemeni to capture in Mokha. https://t.co/yc0nwRlIse pic.twitter.com/Jn8VT571LY

— Reno (@theRenoNara) September 10, 2026

Even before the capture of Mokha, the rebel group held the BAM under threat with its array of drones and missiles, some of which it launched from deeper in Yemen. In fact, the group became the first to fire anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) at vessels during its campaign against Red Sea shipping.

Mokha, however, provides a potential new surveillance and launching point for the Houthis to deploy mines as well as aerial drones and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) they can use to attack shipping. As we have reported previously, the rebel group pioneered the operational use of some of these weapons.

The Houthis “are determined to control the ports in order to use booby-trapped boats from areas close to shipping lanes,” Col. Abdul Basit Al-Baher, a Yemeni army officer and military analyst, told Arab News last month as the rebels were pushing closer to the port.

You can see video and images of a Houthi USV that struck the Greek-owned ship Tutor in the Red Sea in 2024 below.

Photos of Houthi kamikaze USV right before it struck Greek-owned cargo ship Tutor.

The ship's guard were totally confused as to what they were observing.

They couldn't even react before it hit the ship. https://t.co/ZwFlWnsFAR pic.twitter.com/8ORRrvZWH6

— Clash Report (@clashreport) June 17, 2024

In addition to Mokha, the Houthis also reportedly captured two important islands that could also add to its control over shipping through the strait. However, TWZ cannot independently confirm this.

There are claims that the Houthis seized Perim Island, which sits right in the middle of the BAM. In 2021, satellite images we obtained showed completion of a new, approximately 6,150-foot-long runway on the island as well as hangars and other facilities. The installation was supposedly meant primarily to support drone operations and was built by the United Arab Emirates.

This strategically located island sits in the narrowest part of the BAM, less than two miles west of Yemen and about 13 miles east of Djibouti, giving the Houthis a commanding presence at the mouth of the Red Sea.

Zuqar Island, which was also reportedly captured, sits in the middle of the Red Sea about 80 miles north of Perim Island. In the custody of the Yemeni government since 1998, it was being “used by government forces to track shipping traffic, monitor movements by Houthi rebels and stop weapons smuggling in the Red Sea,” according to The National.

Last year, images emerged of construction of a runway on the island.

It is unclear who built this island runway, though there have been indications that it could have been the United Arab Emirates once again.

A closer look at the new 2.1 km runway on Yemen’s Jabal Zuqar Island in the southern Red Sea shows a small apron with one completed aircraft hangar and another likely under construction, plus a taxiway leading to two military emplacements, likely to shelter aircraft or UAVs. https://t.co/cnphe6yCeO pic.twitter.com/iOwr7C6I91

— Rich Tedd (@AfriMEOSINT) October 20, 2025

Zuqar Island sits about 7 km east of the northbound shipping lane in the Red Sea. Control over these two islands could allow the Houthis to mirror the pattern Iran established in the Strait of Hormuz by directing traffic to pass through a narrow passage between Qeshm and Larak islands.

The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis grew out of a civil war in Yemen that erupted in 2014. It expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis and raged on until the parties reached a tenuous ceasefire in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis, and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. Tensions, however, reignited after that conflict ended when the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter. In addition to the aforementioned blockade, the Houthis began striking Saudi refineries.

The Houthis already control the port of Hodeidah, about 100 miles to the north. Capturing Mokha and the two islands extends their reach even closer to the BAM. 

In the wake of the Houthi blockade imposed in July, traffic in the BAM fell by 15%, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence.

“On average, 273 ships sailed through the chokepoint each week between 27 July and 23 August,” the organization reported. “The naval ban on Saudi Arabia came into effect on 20 July, and the weekly average in the run up date was 319. Still, traffic remains above volumes seen before the crisis in the Middle East Gulf that led to a flurry of activity in the Red Sea as Saudi oil was redirected to Yanbu.”

As we have explained in the past, Saudi Arabia has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities near the Persian Gulf.

The biggest impact of the blockade, Lloyd’s List Intelligence notes, is that it is driving up the cost to deliver oil by forcing traffic north through the Suez Canal, “extending voyage times and tying up capacity. In the Middle East, rising use of Hormuz shuttle tankers and multiple STS transfers is creating delays and increasing vessel utilization. Combined, these rising inefficiencies have led to the third VLCC spot-rate spike since the beginning of the crisis in the Middle East Gulf.” 

The Houthi strikes on Saudi’s oil infrastructure, including a Houthi missile and drone attack against the Saudi Aramco refinery at Jazan on the Red Sea earlier this week, add a further dilemma for Riyadh, making it harder to get its product to points of shipment.

Video of of the aftermath of those strikes, which you can see below, emerged on social media.

Following Houthi strikes, fires can be seen raging at the Jizan oil refinery in Saudi Arabia. pic.twitter.com/tAqOPlsmvS

— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) September 8, 2026

All this is raising the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations, if supporting such an operation is even possible at all at this point. The Navy, and other key elements of the U.S. military, is overstretched and worn down by continuous deployments for many months leading up to Venezuela and then Iran, and now six months after Operation Epic Fury.

U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf are under increasing pressure as tensions with Iran continue to simmer. On Tuesday, several U.S. Air Force jets were damaged in an Iranian missile barrage on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, according to CBS News. An A-10 Thunderbolt II close support jet lost a wing and about eight F-15E Strike Eagle multi-role fighters were slightly damaged and returned to service, the network noted.

There is also a report that Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao said Iranian forces “blew the hell out of Bahrain” where the U.S. military has a number of key facilities, including the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The country has been the subject of frequent Iranian barrages since the U.S. and Israel first attacked on Feb. 28.

Cao’s assessment matches what we have seen and heard prior to his comments and raises anew the question of whether the U.S. will return to Bahrain and other bases in the region heavily attacked by Iran.

In an exclusive interview, Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao told me that Iranian forces "blew the hell out of Bahrain."

While open-source analyses have long indicated that the U.S. Fifth Fleet Headquarters at Naval Support Activity Bahrain sustained extensive damage in the early…

— Ryan Morgan (@R_S_Morgan) September 10, 2026

On the sea, Iranian missiles are getting closer to hitting U.S. Navy warships, the Wall Street Journal reported.

“At least three times in the past week, Iranian forces have launched missiles at American warships, including an aircraft carrier, taking direct aim at the U.S. Navy in a way it hasn’t done since the start of the war,” the newspaper noted. “The attempted strikes on warships have led to much closer calls than previous attempts, with Iran using maneuverable warheads, people familiar with the attacks said.”

Amid this activity, traffic through the Strait remains suppressed.

“Vessel transits via the Strait of Hormuz fell on Wednesday to seven from 12 ​the previous day, preliminary ship-tracking data showed on Thursday, with ‌levels also below the 10-day average of 14,” Reuters reported. “Out of these seven ships, four vessels exited and three entered, according to the data.”

However, an exact figure is hard to come by. Some vessels could be sailing through the ​waterway with their transponders turned off and would not be counted ​toward the totals, the outlet added.

As it is, oil prices are skyrocketing. As of noon Thursday, the per barrel price of Brent Crude exceeded $107, the highest price since July when it fell to just over $77 per barrel, according to OilPrice.com.

It will take some time before we get a better picture of how the Houthi seizure of the port of Mokha, and possibly Perim and Zuqar islands, will affect the global economy due to rising oil prices, either through reduced supply, increased cost of delivery or some combination of the two. With no end in sight to the U.S. conflict with Iran that helped to drive these actions, the Yemeni rebel group has incentives to inflict economic pain wherever it can.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Houthis’ Stranglehold On Strategic Bab Al-Mandab Strait Grows Stronger appeared first on TWZ.

Recently released pictures have highlighted a particularly interesting feature on the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Mustin: a piggy-backed point defense system with a .50 caliber machine gun mounted on top of a 30mm chain gun. The Mk 38 Mod 4 Gun Weapon System (GWS) is interesting to examine as it offers significant boosts in firepower and other capabilities, including against drones, compared to preceding Mk 38 types.

Yesterday, Destroyer Squadron 15’s (DESRON 15) public affairs office released several pictures showing USS Mustin replenishing at sea in the Indian Ocean, including one highlighting the ship’s Mk 38 Mod 4 GWS (also sometimes confusingly referred to as a Machine Gun System, or MGS). DESRON 15 had put out another group of pictures late last month showing the weapon system being fired during routine training. Mustin was the first vessel in the Navy to receive Mod 4, and still looks to be the service’s only warship with this new version.

Though designated as a Mk 38 variant, the Mod 4 is fundamentally different from other Mk 38 types currently in service in the U.S. Navy, as well as several foreign naval arms.

“The Mk 38 Mod 4 Machine Gun System (MGS) is an upgrade … to address deficiencies in meeting Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) requirements,” the Navy has said in the past. “In addition, the upgrade will also improve performance against surface targets and maintain Anti-Terrorist / Force Protection capabilities.”

To take a step back quickly, the original Mk 38 Mod 0 was developed internally by the Navy in the late 1970s and was simply a manually operated deck-mounted 25mm M242 Bushmaster chain gun with a maximum rate of fire of 180 rounds per minute. The M242 was entering U.S. Army service at around the same time as the main armament for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. A product improved Mod 1 version was the first Mk 38 to actually enter serial production and began to be fitted to Navy ships in the late 1980s.

Following the deadly terrorist attack on the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Cole in the port of Aden in Yemen in 2000, the Navy began to acquire Mk 38 Mod 2s, also known as the Typhoon Weapon System, from United Defense (later BAE Systems).

The Mod 2 “introduced remote-control operation and mount stabilization and allowed the weapon to maintain aim even as the ship pitched and rolled. It also added a new electro-optical/infrared sensor and a laser rangefinder, giving the system reliable day/night target performance,” according to the Navy. “Beyond sensors, Mod 2 brought improved ammunition handling and enhanced interfaces – resulting in faster and more reliable engagement. Testing showed it delivered two to three times the strike accuracy of its predecessor.”

The Mk 38 Mod 2 otherwise featured the same M242 gun as the Mod 0/1 types, feeding from a magazine on the mount that could be loaded with up to 168 rounds. It is worth noting here that this is less than a minute of total firing time at the weapon’s maximum rate of fire. However, it can also be fired in single-shot and three-round burst modes, as well as at a lower automatic rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute.

In the 2010s, the Navy began acquiring the Mk 38 Mod 3 from BAE Systems, which added a smaller 7.62x51mm Mk 52 Mod 0 chain gun feeding from a 750-round magazine to the complete weapon system. The Mk 52 is also a much faster-firing weapon than the M242, with a maximum rate of fire of 570 rounds per minute.

The Mod 3 “also incorporated an improved EO/IR sensor that provides 330-degree surveillance capability and multiple fields of view,” per the Navy. “This sensor is decoupled from the gun, allowing operators to scan independently of the weapon and reducing the chance of alerting an adversary that they’ve been detected.”

Over the years, Mk 38 1/2/3 types have been integrated on a wide array of Navy ships, including Ticonderoga class cruisers, Arleigh Burke class destroyers, Nimitz and Ford class aircraft carriers, as well as a host of other amphibious warfare ships and auxiliaries.

All of this brings us back to the Mk 38 Mod 4, the Navy’s designation for a version of the Seahawk DS30 series from MSI Defense Systems, which the service first began acquiring in the late 2010s. The Mk 38 Mod 4’s main weapon is a 30mm Mk 44 Mod 3 Bushmaster II chain gun. Like the M242, the Mk 44 also has single-shot and burst modes, as well as low and high fully automatic settings (100 and 200 rounds per minute, respectively). The Mk 44 is also found on versions of the Mk 46 Gun Weapon System installed on stealthy Zumwalt class destroyers and San Antonio class amphibious warfare ships. It is used in a variety of ground-based applications and on the U.S. Air Force’s AC-130J Ghostrider gunship aircraft. As mentioned, the Mk 38 Mod 4 also has a .50 caliber M2 machine gun with a rate of fire of around 500 rounds per minute. The system’s magazine capacity for each gun is not immediately clear.

The complete Mk 38 Mod 4 also comes with a new Mk 48 Mod 2 electro-optical sight system (EOSS), which is mounted separately on the ship, and a Mk 134 Mod 0 operator console for remote operation. Furthermore, the complete system is designed to be fully integrated with the Aegis Combat System on Arleigh Burke class destroyers like USS Mustin. The optical turret appears to replace the older EOSS system mounted atop the bridge that was primarily used to target the ship’s 5-inch gun. It isn’t clear how these new mounts are individually targeted simultaneously as they don’t appear to have their own optics. Radar targeting through Aegis would be a big advancement for at least some targets types, like drones. The older Mk 38s had their own individual FLIR systems. It’s still possible these new turrets could have a basic boresighted electro-optical system as well.

In a July 2022 test, a Mk 38 Mod 4 system “successfully identified, tracked and engaged both surface and aerial targets using live ammunition against fixed and moving targets,” according to the Navy. The event “also highlighted the enhanced fire-control chain, the 30 mm gun’s improved performance and its ability to counter new challenges.”

The USS Mustin received its Mk 38 Mod 4 in 2024 and, as noted, this destroyer still appears to be the only ship in the Navy with this new weapon system, for reasons that are not entirely clear. The service had signed a contract with MSI Defense for an initial low-rate production batch of 15 systems in 2023. Other versions of the Seahawk DS30 are in use today on several classes of naval vessels globally, including British Type 23 frigates.

“USS Mustin (DDG 89), an Arleigh Burke class Aegis guided missile destroyer, was the first U.S. Navy warship to receive the upgrade. [The Naval Surface Warfare Center] Dahlgren Division is now finalizing the configuration so the system can be introduced to a wider set of platforms as fleet requirements evolve,” according to an official news item from Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) just this past February.

The Navy’s 2027 fiscal year budget request, released earlier this year, makes clear the plan is still to integrate the Mk 38 Mod 4 at least on all Flight IIA and Flight III subvariants of the Arleigh Burke destroyer. The Mk 38 Mod 4 is also set to be a feature on future U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers, which will also have combat systems derived from Aegis.

All remaining Mk 38 Mod 2s in Navy service are being brought up to the Mod 3 standard, as well.

For the Navy’s Arleigh Burke class destroyers, specifically, the Mk 38 Mod 4 reflects broader efforts to improve and expand the shorter-range defensive capabilities of those ships, especially against growing drone threats. An increasing number of these destroyers are also being equipped with new anti-drone interceptors. In addition, the service is working to replace the 20mm Vulcan cannon-armed Mk 15 Phalanx Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) on all subvariants in the class with different launchers for RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) to further bolster defenses against drones, as well as incoming missiles and other aerial threats.

In general, the Navy has been investing heavily in new counter-drone defenses for ships across its fleets in recent years. These efforts include laser and high-power microwave directed energy weapons, as well as various types of physical interceptors and electronic warfare systems. Lessons learned from the ongoing conflict with Iran, as well as recent operations in and around the Red Sea, together with observations from the war in Ukraine, have only underscored the increasingly critical need for additional layers of protection against uncrewed attackers in the air and at sea. Small crewed boats attacking in large groups remain a real threat, too.

Mustin may not be the only Navy warship equipped with the Mk 38 Mod 4 for much longer, if the system has not already started finding its way at least onto more Arleigh Burke class destroyers.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Navy Destroyer Packs New ‘Piggy-Backed’ Point Defense System That Combines 30mm And .50 Cal Guns appeared first on TWZ.

The Navy says it is making a concerted effort to apply the hard lessons learned from the marathon deployments of the USS Gerald R. Ford and USS Abraham Lincoln, both in combat and in quality of life for the crew, according to a new video posted by the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Daryl Caudle. The changes will be rolled out when USS Theodore Roosevelt deploys following a brief, last-minute, and previously unreported maintenance availability, TWZ has learned. Meanwhile, the United States and Iran are quickly climbing the escalation ladder again, as the latest series of tit-for-tat strikes has resulted in a massive overnight ballistic missile attack on a Jordanian base hosting U.S. forces and the destruction of 10 Iranian commercial oil tankers over the past week.

Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), using publicly available open-source information. Check out last week’s report here.

George Washington Strike Group Evades Iranian Ballistic Missiles

Less than a month after taking up station in the Middle East, elements of the George Washington CSG reportedly came under ballistic missile fire from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on September 5, according to Iranian media. “A U.S. aircraft carrier and guided-missile destroyer successfully evaded multiple unprovoked Iranian attacks,” U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed in a statement, without identifying which warships were targeted. TWZ cannot independently verify the Iranian reports, and the Islamic Republic has frequently leveraged disinformation throughout the war.

U.S. forces responded swiftly the same day, striking three Iranian commercial oil tankers, part of the “shadow fleet” that funds IRGC operations, in a notable step beyond U.S. President Donald Trump’s recently announced tanker-for-tanker policy. “Let the message to the IRGC be clear: If you shoot at two of our ships, we will impose an even higher economic cost – taking out three of yours,” Adm. Brad Cooper, the CENTCOM commander, warned. “We will not hesitate to defend American forces, and if necessary, destroy Iran’s limited and exposed oil fleet,” he added. No U.S. casualties or damage to the American ships was reported.

Details surrounding the attack on September 5 are limited, but Iranian-affiliated channels claimed the IRGC fired the Qassem Basir medium-range anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) for the first time. If true, it would represent the first known combat employment of the ASBM since it was unveiled in May 2025 and poses a new threat to Navy warships operating within the 1,200-kilometer, or roughly 750-mile, stated range (although that figure is more than likely overstated). Generally speaking, American cruisers and destroyers can engage ASBMs in two layers, in some cases using Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) in the midcourse phase and SM-6 during the terminal phase. Both are finite resources, and only so many can be loaded in their Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells.

Since the initial exchange on September 5, the tit-for-tat strikes have continued to escalate. CENTCOM destroyed another five crude oil tankers on September 8, bringing the total to 10 in a week, after the IRGC targeted an unidentified Navy warship again with ballistic missiles. Iran answered overnight, launching a huge salvo of ballistic missiles toward Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, where a significant contingent of U.S. forces is forward-deployed. Dramatic videos on social media show Patriot batteries firing against the incoming projectiles, with open-source analysts counting at least 60 interceptors employed.

The USS George Washington arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) on or around August 19, escorted by a single guided-missile destroyer, USS Shoup. The pairing matches the composition described in CENTCOM’s statement about the IRGC attack on September 5. Washington’s public affairs team reposted the statement on their social media accounts.

The possibility that the second Nimitz class flattop operating alongside Washington in the Middle East, the USS George H.W. Bush, was the target of the attack cannot be ruled out. Both carriers are the same class and look alike from a distance (or through a seeker). The George H.W. Bush CSG is currently composed of a guided-missile cruiser, USS Princeton, and two guided-missile destroyers, USS Ross and USS Donald Cook.

Bush was pictured conducting nighttime flight ops in CENTCOM’s most recent update detailing the status of the ongoing blockade: U.S. forces redirected 94 commercial vessels, kinetically disabled three, and boarded two to ensure compliance, as of September 7.

USS Theodore Roosevelt Undergoes Last-Minute Maintenance Ahead of Deployment

The next carrier scheduled to deploy from the U.S., the USS Theodore Roosevelt, recently got underway after a brief maintenance period. While there was no mention of an upcoming availability in budget documents, we noticed what appeared to be pierside work in commercial satellite imagery, similar to the brief stints Washington and Vinson completed recently while in homeport. In response to our inquiry, a Navy official told TWZ, “Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) is currently in port at Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego conducting routine, planned maintenance. While we do not comment on future operations or movements due to operations security, aircraft carriers follow an optimized fleet response plan that provides full realignment of maintenance, training, and deployment cycles to fit in a standard 36-month rotation.”

Roosevelt’s upcoming deployment has been the subject of heavy speculation, as there will soon be no carriers available in Asia should a contingency arise. While Lincoln is currently in the South China Sea, she’s at the tail end of her deployment and in the process of heading home. The same official addressed the coverage gap, telling us, “U.S. Pacific Fleet’s posture across the region remains strong, adaptive, and ready. The U.S. Navy is purpose-built to flex, surge, and sustain across multiple theaters simultaneously – and that flexibility is a strategic advantage, not a vulnerability. U.S. Pacific Fleet’s commitment to the region is enduring – backed by the Joint Force and a strong network of allies and partners – and we will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows to support a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Roosevelt departed San Diego on September 5 and is still at sea as of publication. Imagery posted two days later on DVIDS, the military’s content-sharing platform, shows the flattop carrying out flight operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet AOR and conducting “advanced training to bolster strike group readiness and capability.” The carrier was last tracked broadcasting a position publicly with her Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder on, operating to the west of Baja California, Mexico, according to MarineTraffic. It’s unclear if the maintenance has been completed or if additional modifications and training will be required before the CSG deploys.

As noted above, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Daryl Caudle, alongside Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) John Perryman, posted a video yesterday with new information on Roosevelt’s upcoming deployment. “The lessons you’re bringing home are helping us better prepare the next team to deploy,” Perryman explained, addressing Lincoln’s crew. “Right now USS Theodore Roosevelt is putting those lessons into action using what we learned from Abraham Lincoln and Gerald R. Ford,” Caudle added. On logistics, that means maximizing the loadout of food, retail products, and hygiene items by converting available spaces into additional storage facilities. Regarding quality of life, improvements include new entertainment, more fitness equipment, and holiday materials purchased in advance.

“Small things matter during a long deployment because taking care of our Sailors is part of maintaining combat readiness,” Perryman noted. Watch the full video below.

Three other U.S.-based carriers, USS Carl Vinson, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, and USS Ronald Reagan, were recently underway for training but have returned to their respective homeports since our last report on September 1.

Eisenhower returned to Pier 14S at Naval Station Norfolk on September 2 after a 12-day underway for Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) and Training Command (TRACOM) Carrier Qualifications (CQ) in the Virginia Capes and Jacksonville operating areas. Vinson completed 25 days of Tailored Ship’s Training Availability (TSTA) and Final Evaluation Period (FEP) before mooring at Juliet Pier on Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, on September 4. And Reagan, which just finished a nearly 18-month Drydocking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA), returned to Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton in Washington state on September 7 after a four-day post-availability shakedown and sea trials. It’s unknown how many rounds of sea trials will be required before Reagan returns to the fleet.

For the time being, America has one carrier coming back online, but the net gain will be short-lived, as Lincoln is expected to begin a DPIA after returning home.

USS Abraham Lincoln Leaves Thailand Looking Like A Different Ship

Elements of the Abraham Lincoln CSG, as well as escort cruiser USS Robert Smalls, arrived in Thailand on September 2 for what the Navy characterized as the “first full port call” of their nine-plus-month deployment. The crew of roughly 5,000 Sailors and Marines was finally able to leave the ship for liberty, with the majority standing on solid ground for the first time since November 2025.

“This port visit to Pattaya was a tremendous opportunity for this crew to recharge and a highlight for the strike group,” Abraham Lincoln’s commanding officer, Capt. Dan Keeler, said in a press release. “Thailand has such a rich culture and history, coupled with incredible hospitality, and that all shone through in this port visit. We are grateful to our Thai allies for hosting us, and we look forward to continuing our mission here in 7th Fleet, alongside Thailand and our other regional allies and partners.”

According to the press release, the crew “experienced all the sights and sounds Thailand has to offer, deepening their understanding of the Thai people and strengthening interpersonal bonds.” Lincoln pulled into port looking worse for wear after 286 days at sea, with noticeable algae and rust spots, conditions that are expected given the high operational tempo endured during nearly seven months of combat. Videos surfaced of the hull being scrubbed by Thai contract crews at a fraction of what the same job would cost stateside. The carrier departed five days later on September 6 in much better shape.

Lincoln is now continuing the journey home to San Diego, though whether any additional stops will be made along the way is unknown. A single-sourced report from Newsweek, which TWZ has not verified, claimed that another port call might be added, according to the wife of an officer aboard. As of publication, Lincoln is 293 days into the deployment, just 33 days short of the 326-day record set by USS Gerald R. Ford earlier this year.

U.S. Navy Big-Deck Fleet At A Glance

Overall, three U.S. carriers are deployed (with one heading home), one is preparing to deploy in the near term, three are working up in various states of readiness, three are in current or upcoming maintenance, and one is being used primarily for training before deactivation next year. One amphibious ready group is deployed, one is forward-deployed and at homeport, four are working up or in port, and three are in maintenance.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io

The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers?: September 9, 2026 appeared first on TWZ.

The unilateral declaration of two marine parks by Turkey in international waters in the Aegean Sea has caused heavy waves and threatens to drown the “calm waters” policy between the two neighboring countries and has led to sharp rhetoric from both sides. “Any move that could lead to uncontrolled escalation must be avoided,” Foreign Minister […]

The post “Marine Parks” drown “calm waters” policy between Greece and Turkey appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

The U.S. Navy has lost an advanced uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV), and it is now in Iranian hands. Here’s what we know about the Dive-LD drone and its apparent seizure, and its implications.

Authorities in Iran said earlier today that they had retrieved a U.S. Dive-LD uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) largely intact near the Strait of Hormuz. The regime in Tehran subsequently released pictures and video clips of the UUV being lifted out of the water, seen at various points below. This looks to be the first known instance of an operational deployment of the Dive-LD. This is still a relatively new capability for the U.S. Navy that only began entering service a little more than a year and a half ago. American officials have previously confirmed the use of UUVs, in general, to help keep the Strait of Hormuz free of Iranian naval mines, one of many threats that have dramatically slowed maritime traffic through this critical waterway.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “captured one of the most modern, unmanned, and smart submarines … at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz in a complex intelligence and operational action at dawn today,” according to a statement shared earlier today via Iranian state media. The exact circumstances surrounding the seizure remain unconfirmed.

“An underwater drone operated by U.S. forces malfunctioned more than a day ago,” a U.S. official said in response to our queries about the Iranian claims. “It was surveying regional waters in support of ongoing operations. The defective drone was an older model that neither collected sensitive data nor carried any classified sonar or radar equipment. U.S. operations in area waters continue.”

The official did not confirm or deny the type of UUV in question, or that Iran had retrieved it. They also did not elaborate on the nature of the malfunction. TWZ also reached out to Anduril, which initially deferred any questions to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). However, they subsequently confirmed the loss of a Dive-LD operating in the region.

“Dive-LD is an attritable autonomous system, meaning it is designed from the outset to operate in dangerous environments where loss of the vehicle is an expected possibility. Its purpose is to keep warfighters out of the most dangerous parts of the undersea mission,” an Anduril spokesperson told us in a statement. “This vehicle had already delivered significant value operating thousands of hours in months-long operations in CENTCOM.”

Categorized as a large UUV, the Dive-LD is 19 feet (approximately 5.8 meters) long, four feet (around 1.2 meters) in diameter, and has a gross weight of close to three tons. The design features a 3D-printed exterior, but is said to be capable of diving down to depths of some 19,685 feet (3.7 miles or 6,000 meters). The UUVs can also remain at sea for around 10 days at a time, depending on their exact configuration, and do so with a high degree of autonomy. Dive-LD was originally developed by U.S.-based Dive Technologies, which was founded in 2018 and then acquired by Anduril in 2022.

Anduril announced the delivery of the first Dive-LD to the U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Group One (UUVGRU-1) in April 2025. The Navy had already released a picture of personnel training with one of these UUVs five months earlier. How many Dive-LDs are now in U.S. service is unclear.

The Dive-LD has a highly modular design. Anduril’s website says that the UUV can be configured for various military missions, including so-called intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE); general intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); mine warfare; and precision placement of objects underwater. IPOE refers to the collection of various types of intelligence on a specific area as part of planning for upcoming operations.

As mentioned, U.S. officials have previously stated that UUVs have been supporting mine-clearance operations in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Broadly speaking, uncrewed underwater platforms offer a way to find and record the location of naval mines using sonars, cameras, and other sensors, while helping keep friendly forces further away from potential threats. Afterward, depending on the type of mines that are found, various methods can be employed to neutralize them. Mine sweeping is time-consuming and dangerous, even in permissive environments, let alone when conducted under the threat of enemy attack.

This past weekend, the Financial Times newspaper in the United Kingdom published a story saying U.S. forces have been using UUVs in exactly this way to help clear Iranian mines, citing “people familiar with the operation.”

“Mostly at night, it [the U.S. military] sent Navy Seal [sic SEAL] divers, robot boats and specialised underwater craft into the perilous strait for a four-month mine-clearance mission,” according to FT‘s report. “U.S. Navy divers worked in small teams using inflatable-hulled craft. They located Iranian mines with the help of robot boats and submersibles – such as the U.S. Navy’s Common Uncrewed Surface Vessel – operating towed sonar arrays.”

The Common Uncrewed Surface Vessel (CUSV) is a speedboat-sized drone boat that has been in Navy inventory since the early 2020s, explicitly for counter-mine operations. FT‘s story does not say where any USVs, UUVs, and/or boats full of divers were launched from as part of these operations in and around the Strait of Hormuz, but it posited that the Navy’s Expeditionary Sea Base ship USS Miguel Keith could have been involved.

A trio of Independence class Littoral Combat Ships specifically configured for mine-sweeping duties, including using CUSVs, had been forward deployed in Bahrain before the start of the conflict with Iran in February. At least two of those ships, USS Santa Fe and USS Tulsa, emerged thousands of miles away in Southeast Asia in March, something TWZ was the first to report on. At the time of writing, those ships currently appear to be in Singapore. The exact disposition of the third of these LCSs, the USS Canberra, is unclear, but USNI News reported today that it is sailing in the South China Sea.

The Navy has a host of other warships in the Middle East that could support counter-mine missions. With a 10-day endurance, Dive-LDs, specifically, could potentially have been launched from locations away from the Strait of Hormuz, including friendly ports.

Dive-LDs could also be used for other missions beyond mine clearance in the region. As mentioned, the U.S. official told TWZ the UUV had malfunctioned while “surveying regional waters.” While this would be a relevant task in the context of a larger mine-sweeping operation, underwater surveys would be valuable for other purposes, too. For months now, U.S. forces have been facilitating the movement of ships in and out of the Persian Gulf via a route that hugs the Omani coastline, keeping them as far from Iranian threats as possible. Having up-to-date and highly accurate maps of the seafloor in these areas would be critical to ensuring they are deep enough for large commercial vessels to pass through safely.

IPOE and general ISR support, above and below the waves, would be part of any current or future U.S. activities in the region. This includes a new campaign of strikes targeting Iranian tanker ships that began last month and monitoring general port activity in Iran as part of the ongoing blockade.

Employing Dive-LDs in operations against Iran also provides a valuable real-world opportunity to prove out new UUV capabilities and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures, which could prove critical in a future high-end fight against a peer opponent like China. Dive-LD has been feeding into Anduril’s development of an even more capable large UUV called Ghost Shark, the first customer for which is the Royal Australian Navy. Ghost Shark is a militarized version of a design called the Dive-XL that followed the Dive-LD. In March, Anduril announced it was among those selected for the Combat Autonomous Maritime Platform Project (CAMP), an extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle rapid prototyping effort being run by the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Navy. Anduril did not say what platform it would be supplying for that project, but used a picture of Ghost Shark to illustrate the announcement.

The U.S. military is already known to have taken advantage of the ongoing conflict with Iran to demonstrate new weapon systems and other capabilities, including uncrewed maritime systems. In June, a Saronic Corsair drone boat conducted a first-of-its-kind at-sea rescue of the crew of a U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter that had gone down in the Gulf of Oman. The following month, U.S. forces launched their first known kamikaze USV attack on Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base using explosive-laden Corsairs.

With all this in mind, it is worth noting that the apparent loss of a Dive-LD intact to Iran is still significant, even if the core design is not brand new and if it does not have any especially sensitive mission systems onboard. It is not necessarily ‘exquisite,’ bleeding-edge technology as it is designed to be optionally attritable, but is still an advanced modern system in operational U.S. service now. Insights into its capabilities and limitations would certainly be of interest to Iran and others. What attempts the U.S. military made to recover the Dive-LD are also unknown. However, the fact that it was not destroyed before or while the Iranians were retrieving it points to American forces having completely lost any sense of its location beforehand.

For its part, Iran has long been a collector of foreign military hardware, primarily U.S. and Israeli, including drones of all types. The capture of a largely intact RQ-170 Sentinel in 2011 is the most famous (or infamous) example. The regime in Tehran also regularly works to reverse engineer what it recovers to varying degrees, and has promised to do the same with the Dive-LD. It could also share its latest prize with its own international partners, including Russia and China, for further analysis and exploitation. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) notably has its own very active UUV programs.

On top of all this, the seizure offers propaganda benefits for the Iranian government, which is already making heavy use of the information space to push back against U.S. military and economic pressure.

Countries seizing foreign USVs and UUVs is certainly not new at this point, even in ostensible peacetime periods. TWZ pointed out that this was only likely to become commonplace, and that steps would need to be taken to address these risks, after a pair of incidents involving Iran in 2022. On August 29 of that year, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attempted to capture a U.S. Navy Saildrone USV in the Persian Gulf. Just days later, the IRGC briefly commandeered a pair of American Saildrones in the Red Sea.

The current conflict with Iran has only further underscored the important roles that uncrewed maritime platforms are playing in U.S. operations now, which are only set to keep growing as time goes on. As those same operations expand, so will the risks of capture and other losses.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Everything We Know About The U.S. Navy’s Submersible Drone Iran Just Captured appeared first on TWZ.

Underwater archaeology is experiencing a silent revolution. For decades, researchers have measured the importance of ancient ports by looking almost exclusively at what they could see: piers, breakwaters, and the size of the inner basins. But an international team of researchers has shown that this approach is incomplete. Ships did not only dock at the […]

After pulling into Thailand looking very much like it just spent 286 days at sea, the U.S. Navy’s supercarrier USS Abraham Lincoln is now getting much-needed TLC. When the Lincoln arrived in the Thai port of Laem Chabang on Sept. 2, it had so-called “running rust” and algae caked all along the sides of the hull. Other parts of the ship, especially around the edges of the flight deck and sponsons on either side, also looked rough. The ship’s condition was a stark, visible reminder of the hardships endured by the carrier and its crew during a long deployment that included a key role in the war against Iran.

Video emerged on social media of local workers cleaning the carrier. Two of them can be seen on a scaffolding platform, dressed in silver-colored protective clothing, yellow helmets, face shields and black boots, spraying the side of the big ship. You can see that most of the rust, as well as all of the green swath of algae, was removed from the section where they are working.

The camera also pans across the ship, showing the extent of the work still needed. 

Those recent viral rust photos/footage of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) in Thailand overstated the story.

Yes, the hull looked rough in pictures, but the ship itself was never in question, that's the part the headlines skipped.

Today at Laem Chabang Port in Thailand, local… pic.twitter.com/b8SP2oyrJZ

— Comandante (@commandante_) September 4, 2026

It is unclear whether this work had already been scheduled as part of routine maintenance or whether it had been ordered after images of the ship emerged showing its rough condition. The ship was a huge focus of attention even before it got to Thailand.

Lincoln and Carrier Strike Group 3 took part in the opening salvo of strikes on Iran on February 28 as part of what the U.S. military dubbed Operation Epic Fury. Lincoln and the rest of the strike group continued to support Epic Fury and subsequent operations against Iran for months thereafter. The decision was finally made to rotate the carrier out of the region last month following a raft of reports of severely flagging morale and mental health among the crew. One sailor had to be rescued last month after deliberately jumping overboard. There were reports that at least one other individual onboard had attempted to do the same. President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, among others, have pushed back on concerns about mental health and other issues on the ship.

Interest in the Lincoln flared up anew after it arrived in Thailand due to its condition, as well as intense curiosity about how the crew would fare in a Thai port call after being at sea for so long.

As we noted in our initial story about the Lincoln’s arrival in Thailand, running rust on U.S. Navy ships has sparked criticism over the years, including from President Donald Trump. This is in part due to the negative optics of such visible wear and tear on American naval vessels, especially during calls in foreign ports.

“It’s terrible. I think they should be ashamed,” John Phelan told members of Congress at a hearing last year, when he was then-nominee for Secretary of the Navy, after being shown pictures of a very worn-looking Arleigh Burke class destroyer, the USS Dewey, during a stopover in Singapore. “Would you want to go on that ship?”

One driving factor in the condition of ships like Lincoln is the operational tempo of deployments, a Navy official noted earlier this year.

“We know what to do, but we choose not to do it,” Mark Lattner, director of the Navy’s Ship Integrity and Performance Engineering, Naval Systems Engineering Directorate, said in January during a panel at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium that TWZ attended. “And we choose not to do it because there’s always some other problem I’ve got to fix. I don’t have time. Our corrosion can wait. And so we don’t implement the fixes.”

Finding a solution to the Navy’s rust problem became one of Lattner’s main missions in the wake of the fallout from Trump’s late-night texts to Navy officials demanding answers about the condition of the Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer USS Dewey after he saw pictures of it covered in running rust as it pulled into Singapore last year.

Port calls offer critical time to fix long-standing issues and resupply the ship of pretty much everything you can think of, from jet fuel to food. So it’s no surprise that the Lincoln would be swarmed with support personnel and supplies while much of her crew enjoys being on land once again for a few days.

It’s unclear how long the clean-up work on the Lincoln will last or how much of it will be finished by the time the ship and crew leave port. Either way, from what we have seen so far, it will look much better leaving Thailand than when it arrived.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post USS Abraham Lincoln Is Getting A Badly Needed Scrubbing While In Thailand appeared first on TWZ.

Three foreign frigates – Japan’s Mogami class, the South Korean Chungnam class, and the Istanbul class from Turkey – are reportedly included in a study of ships the U.S. Navy could procure. The Trump administration has been openly pushing to leverage ships designed in friendly countries to rapidly bolster the Navy’s fleet while also working to rebuild America’s shrunken domestic shipbuilding capacity. So, it is worth examining what each design brings to the table, as well as the broader opportunities and major hurdles procuring any of them would represent.

USNI News was first to report on Tuesday that the Japanese, South Korean, and Turkish frigates are included in an ongoing Navy study, citing anonymous sources. The review is in direct response to one of the provisions in a larger memo President Trump sent out last month, titled “Rebuilding the United States Navy and America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base.” This also comes amid strong opposition in Congress to the basic idea of buying foreign warships for the Navy.

Per that memo, the Secretary of the Navy (currently Acting Secretary Hung Cao) was directed to “submit a plan to the President … that includes timelines and resourcing requirements, for a new competitive acquisition approach for surface combatants with sufficient inherent capabilities to perform anti‑submarine warfare, surface warfare, and convoy escort duties.” The memo also said the “plan should address meeting the requirements for Consolidated Cargo Replenishment at Sea (CONSOL) Tankers and — separately — Roll-On, Roll-Off Vessels.”

The study could lead to “an international warship competition [that] could include building up to two of the ships in foreign shipyards before transitioning to domestic yards as part of the Trump administration’s push to rapidly expand the fleet, three industry sources familiar with the deliberations confirmed,” according to USNI News‘ report. The outlet also said the Navy declined to “directly address the potential for an open competition for a new frigate” when asked.

The acquisition approach described here is in line with what the Trump administration is currently calling the “Finland Model,” which entails construction of an initial batch of ships overseas before moving further production to yards in the United States. The name comes from a partnership the U.S. and Finnish governments announced last year regarding the construction of new icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard. Canada’s Seaspan Shipyards is also involved in that plan.

Broader plans to explore foreign surface combatant designs for the U.S. Navy, and potentially more to acquire one of those ships, were mentioned in the Pentagon’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request released earlier this year. President Trump, former Secretary of the Navy John Phelan, and other U.S. officials have also openly raised the possibility of cooperation with shipbuilders in Japan and South Korea, specifically, including with regard to surface combatants. USNI‘s report says that the Istanbul class was included in the current review after it came up in discussions between Trump and Turkish officials on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara in July.

Many questions remain, but there are clear signs the Trump administration wants to move in pursuing the acquisition of foreign naval vessels. The particular focus on frigates also aligns with a clear Navy need for new ships in that size class.

Why frigates?

Before exploring the specific designs the Navy is now said to be reviewing, it is worth taking a step back to understand why frigates are so important to the service’s shipbuilding plans, in general. The United States has not technically operated frigates since the retirement of its last Oliver Hazard Perry class type in 2015. The expectation had been that the Freedom and Independence class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) would fill the resulting gaps. However, those ships struggled for years with a variety of major issues over the years and still have not lived up to their promised potential, despite certain strides having been made in expanding their operational employment in recent years.

The Navy’s announcement of a new frigate program in 2019, dubbed FFG(X), was widely seen as a rebuke of the core concepts behind the LCS. This, in turn, led to the Constellation class frigate, which became a debacle unto itself and was finally cancelled last year. It is important to point out the Constellation design was based on the established Franco-Italian FREMM frigate. The expectation was that only relatively minor changes would be made before putting the ship in American service. In the end, the U.S. derivative had only 15 percent design commonality with its European ‘parent,’ which directly contributed to the demise of the program.

A new FF(X) frigate program has since emerged. Through that effort, the Navy is now in line to get ships derived from the U.S. Coast Guard’s Legend class National Security Cutter (NSC), with the goal being to have the first one in the water by 2028. However, those frigates, at least the ones built in the initial tranche, will lack a Vertical Launch System (VLS) and certain other features that were seen as critical for the preceding Constellation class. This has immediately raised questions about the operational utility of these new small surface combatants, as TWZ has previously explored in detail.

None of this diminishes the Navy’s current desire for new frigates, and more of them, to provide smaller, lower-cost platforms that can be used to bolster larger surface action groups or operate more independently in roles that do not require larger, more capable designs. When fielded in sufficient volume, they can also free up other types of surface combatants for other, higher priority duties or similar help to relieve strain on those fleets.

Today, the Navy’s fleet of Arleigh Burke class destroyers “gets used with a very high demand signal combatant commanders. The Navy can’t operate with only one size of ship,” Rear Adm. Brian Metcalf, the Navy’s Deputy Portfolio Acquisition Executive Maritime for Combatants, said in an official video in June. “The [FF(X)] frigate will fill that gap. They can be used in less contentious waters. They can be used as high-value escorts. There are all kinds of things the frigate can fill the gap for and allow destroyers to execute the high-end mission set.”

With all this in mind, it is not surprising that the Navy would be seeking to further bolster its future frigate fleets on a shorter timetable by leveraging foreign shipbuilders. There are also clear benefits to taking advantage of capable, in-production designs, which leads us to the Mogami, Chungnam, and Istanbul classes.

The Mogami class

Japan’s Mogami class, with its stealthy design characteristics, has long been a standout among modern frigates currently in production globally. The ship is designed as a multi-mission platform with anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and mine warfare capabilities, the latter of which includes both mine-hunting and mine-laying.

TWZ has covered the ship in detail in the past, writing:

“The original Mogami class design (also known as the 30FFM), the first of which only entered Japanese service in 2022, is already a very modern design with its shape featuring some stealthy characteristics. The 436-foot-long, 53-and-a-half-foot-wide, 5,500-metric-ton displacement frigates have a combined diesel and gas (CODAG) propulsion system that allows for fuel-efficient normal cruising operations and an additional burst of speed in combat. The ships have an active electronically scanned array (AESA) main radar, as well as a host of other advanced sensors and mission systems. One of the Mogami‘s most distinctive features is its NORA-50 UNIted COmbined Radio aNtenna (UNICORN) mast on top of the main superstructure, which contains various antennas. The frigates also have especially futuristic-looking Combat Information Centers (CIC)…”

“Armament-wise, the baseline Mogami class frigate has two four-round launchers for Type 17 anti-ship cruise missiles, a SeaRAM close-in defense system loaded with RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM), and a five-inch main gun in a turret at the bow. There are also two remote weapon stations, each armed with a .50 caliber machine gun, on top of the bridge for additional protection against close-in low-end threats.”

“The Mogami design was originally slated to feature a 16-cell Mk 41 launch system array, but the seventh ship in the class, the JS Niyodo, which was commissioned in May, was the first to be fitted with it. The first six of these frigates were delivered without this capability, but they are expected to be back-fitted with it in the future. Mk 41 cells on Mogami class frigates are expected to be primarily filled with domestically-developed A-SAM or U.S.-designed RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles. Four ESSMs can notably be loaded in a single Mk 41 cell.”

The Mogami class frigates also have a flight deck and hangar designed to accommodate a single Seahawk helicopter. The ships can also deploy uncrewed underwater and surface vessels (UUV/USV), as well as rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs), via a ramp at the stern.

MHI in Japan has also developed an enlarged derivative that is close to 466 feet long, almost 56 feet at its widest, and displaces some 6,200 metric tons. This version also features a 32-cell VLS array, along with an upgraded radar, other improved sensors, and updated mission systems. Last year, the Australian government announced it would be acquiring a fleet of these ships with certain unspecified country-specific features as part of its SEA 3000 program.

The Australian deal is one of, if not still the most significant foreign arms sale for Japan since the end of World War II. It also helps ensure that the Mogami production line will remain hot for years to come. For the U.S. Navy, sharing a frigate with two of America’s highest-profile allies in the Pacific, and which could therefore be readily serviced in those countries, would be very advantageous.

The Mogami is also a contender to become New Zealand’s next frigate, and there have also been discussions about sales to Indonesia. The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force only has two more of these frigates on order, the last of which is expected to be commissioned into service by March of next year.

The Chungnam class

The Chungnam class (also sometimes referred to as the FFX-III or FFG-III) is the latest frigate for the South Korean Navy, and features a mix of anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities. The first example entered service in that country in 2024. These ships are just over 423 feet long, approach 49 feet at the widest point in the hull, and displace some 4,300 tons with a full combat load. The design is based on the earlier Daegu class, which was itself an evolution of the preceding Incheon class that traces its roots back to the late 1990s.

As was the case on the Daegu class, the Chungnam class uses combined diesel–electric or gas (CODLOG) propulsion, which offers benefits for power management and efficiency, as well as when it comes to reducing maintenance requirements and operating costs. The design features a prominent integrated mast structure with four fixed-face arrays for the main multi-function AESA radar near the top. The ships have additional radars and other sensors, as well as an electronic warfare suite.

Each one of the Chungnam class frigates has a 16-cell K-VLS array. Domestically developed K-SAAM surface-to-air missiles and Haeseong I anti-ship cruise missiles (also called the SSM-700L or C-Star), as well as K745A1 Hong Sang Eo (Red Shark) vertically-launched anti-submarine rockets, can be loaded into these cells.

The armament package on these ships also includes a five-inch main gun in a turret at the bow, a pair of triple torpedo tubes, and a Close-in Weapon System II (CIWS II) armed with a seven-barrel 30mm Gatling-type cannon.

The Chungnam class frigates also have a flight deck and hangar for a single helicopter at the stern.

As it stands now, the South Korean Navy has two Chungnam class frigates in service and has plans to acquire four more over the next few years. The lead ship in the class was built by HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, which is also one of the principal designers of the ship. A different shipbuilder, SK Oceanplant, built the second ship in the class, ROKS Gyeoungbuk, and is now working on the third and fourth examples. Hanwha Ocean is reportedly in line to build the last two ships in the class for South Korea. Hyundai and Hanwha have pitched export designs based on the Chungnam class, with both firms notably in the running to supply new frigates to Thailand.

Hanwha has already been making steady inroads in the shipbuilding industry in the United States, including the acquisition of the Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 2024. Hyundai has reportedly been working to do the same. Just last month, Hanwha publicly announced a new $1.2 billion bid to buy out Australian shipbuilder Austal’s U.S. subsidiary, Austal USA. Austal notably built the Independence class LCSs for the U.S. Navy and continues to supply that service with other vessels. Austal subsequently said it was considering the South Korean offer.

The Istanbul class

Turkey’s Istanbul class (also known as the Istif class or just I class), developed under the country’s MILGEM national warship program, is not a design that has typically come up in previous discussions about potential foreign-made frigates for the U.S. Navy. It is described as a multi-role frigate with anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine capabilities. The lead ship in this class, TCG Istanbul, entered Turkish Navy service in 2024.

At around 371 and a half feet long and with a beam of just over 47 feet, as well as a displacement of some 3,000 tons with a full combat load, the Istanbul class is notably smaller than either the Mogami class or Chungnam class. Like the Mogami, it uses CODAG propulsion. The Turkish design is understood to have leveraged lessons learned from the Project GENESIS program to upgrade the country’s second-hand ex-U.S. Navy Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, as you can learn more about here.

TCG Istanbul is armed with a 16-cell MiDLAS VLS array, with past reports saying it is primarily configured to fire Hisar short-to-medium-range surface-to-air missiles. However, just in August, it was revealed that the second ship in the class, the future TCG Izmir, which is undergoing sea trials now, has a new 16-cell version of MiDLAS with visibly longer cells. This would allow the ship to fire larger weapons vertically, such as the Siper medium-range surface-to-air missiles, Atmaca anti-ship cruise missiles, and/or Gezgin land-attack cruise missiles. MiDLAS is a scalable VLS design developed in Turkey as an alternative to the U.S.-made Mk 41.

The initial Istanbul class design already had four deck-mounted launchers that can be loaded with up to 16 Atmaca missiles, in total. The frigates also have a 76mm cannon in a turret on the bow, a Gokdeniz CIWS with a twin-barrel 35mm cannon, two 25mm cannon-armed remote weapon stations, and a pair of twin torpedo tubes.

The main sensor on the Istanbul class is a rotating AESA radar mounted on top of the ship’s main integrated mast structure. It has additional radars and other sensors, as well as electronic support measures and electronic countermeasures systems.

The Istanbul class design also features a flight deck and hangar at the stern, sized around the Seahawk helicopter.

As mentioned, the second Istanbul class frigate for the Turkish Navy is now in sea trials, and the country plans to eventually acquire eight of these warships in total. They are being built through several shipyards in Turkey. Last year, Turkey’s TAIS Shipyards also secured a contract to build at least two Istanbul class frigates for Indonesia.

Growing U.S. roadblocks to any foreign warships

Much remains to be seen about how the U.S. Navy might proceed with the acquisition of new frigates, or any other naval vessels, via foreign shipbuilders. Whether any other relevant, in-production designs are being considered, or could be in the future, is unknown. USNI News‘ report says the current study is scheduled to wrap up in November.

Furthermore, what the Navy might want to do could well turn out to be moot. Members of Congress on both sides of the political aisle have been very vocally pushing back on any plans to acquire foreign warships amid concerns about negative impacts on the U.S. shipbuilding industry.

Current U.S. law would already require the Trump administration to issue a national security waiver to pursue foreign-made naval vessels. A draft of the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for the 2027 Fiscal Year now making its way through the Senate would eliminate the ability to issue such a waiver. In June, members of the House Armed Services Committee separately moved to outright block any spending on foreign-built warships in a separate draft NDAA.

The aforementioned Finland Model, as outlined in Trump’s August memo, is clearly intended to try to assuage Congressional concerns. Under the stated plan, foreign shipbuilders would be required to make major investments in U.S. shipbuilding enterprises and hire American workers as part of any future contract, even if an initial tranche of vessels is built overseas.

“The Administration strongly opposes section 1025, which would prohibit the use of funds for procurement of initial battle force ships to be built in a foreign shipyard, especially while, in accordance with the ‘Finland Model’ first employed with the Coast Guard’s medium icebreaker program, long-term investments are being made in an American brown or greenfield shipyard,” the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) wrote in a statement of Administration Policy in July, specifically in response to provisions in the the House’s NDAA draft. “This prohibition fails to seriously address the challenges posed by current shipbuilding backlogs across six major programs in our ‘prime’ shipyards.”

This latter point here speaks to an already worrisome and still-widening gap between U.S. shipbuilding capacity and that of chief global competitor China. The U.S. government has tried to take steps in recent years to revitalize the American side of the equation, but workforce retention and other factors have continued to present serious hurdles. There are additional concerns now about how the addition of work on the Trump class battleship program will affect America’s naval shipbuilding ecosystem, which the Trump administration has separately pushed back on.

Continuing U.S. shipyard capacity and quality issues raise their own questions about the viability of the Finland Model. The construct inherently limits the U.S. government’s ability to make use of yards overseas and is heavily contingent on the shipbuilding industry in the United States expanding at a rate where it will be able to absorb the additional production demands. With the naval shipbuilding deficit already becoming extremely problematic, buying examples of relevant classes with minimal changes and having them built where production is already established could arguably be the priority, especially in light of the failures of the LCS and Constellation programs.

Ensuring that any U.S.-specific changes to the design are minimal will also be critical for any such plan to be successful. As mentioned, the Constellation class was undone in large part due to a near-constant stream of changes ordered by the Navy, which negated the benefits of choosing a derivative of an in-production design. The service has stressed its intention to avoid any similar pitfalls with its existing FF(X) frigate program, which also has to be factored into the larger domestic shipyard capacity question.

“The President has directed the Navy to aggressively increase domestic shipbuilding capacity, including leveraging the proven shipbuilding skills and industrial expertise of our allies,” Navy Capt. Ron Flanders said in a statement on Tuesday, according to USNI News. “We are actively developing options to fulfill the President’s intent to deliver ships faster while ensuring long-term investment, technology transfer, and workforce expansion within United States shipyards.”

Signs are certainly growing that the Navy is moving closer to kicking off a formal process to acquire foreign-designed warships, which could include Mogami, Chungnam, and/or Istanbul frigates, to help grow its fleets, especially in the face of growing challenges posed by China.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post The Three Foreign Frigates Being Studied For Possible U.S. Navy Service appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine carried out one of its farthest uncrewed surface vessel (USV) attacks from Ukrainian shores, striking the Nefrit, a multipurpose offshore vessel, in the Russian Black Sea resort city of Sochi. The seaside getaway is located about 350 miles on a direct line from the nearest Ukrainian-held territory, but the trip is a lot longer if originating from Ukrainian-held shores.

This marks the first known USV attack on this city that Russian President Vladimir Putin often visits. As we have reported in the past, it has been attacked several times by Ukrainian aerial drones.

The Ukrainian Navy said it carried out the attack as part of the country’s campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure. The Nefrit supported that infrastructure, the Ukrainian Navy claimed.

“The multipurpose support vessel, flying the Russian flag, was hit by an unmanned naval vessel of the Ukrainian Navy,” the service said on Telegram. “A powerful explosion and smoke were observed in the area of the vessel.”

“The NEFRIT is part of Russia’s maritime and energy infrastructure, providing support for oil and gas operations, servicing offshore facilities, transporting cargo and personnel, and carrying out underwater technical work,” the Ukrainian Navy explained. “Its activities directly supported the enemy’s war economy and financed the criminal aggression against Ukraine.”

“The damage to the NEFRIT is a blow to the enemy’s logistics, special capabilities, and military-economic infrastructure,” the Ukrainian Navy added. “The Ukrainian Navy continues to deprive the enemy of resources and capabilities for waging war, and once again demonstrates that even Russian territory is not a safe haven.”

ВМС України уразили судно забезпечення рф NEFRIT у порту Сочі
Багатоцільове судно забезпечення під прапором рф було уражене морським безекіпажним катером Військово-Морських Сил. У районі судна зафіксовано потужний вибух та задимлення.

Детальніше https://t.co/DTfnO15nYO pic.twitter.com/yPDFkks37r

— Військово-Морські Сили ЗС України (@UA_NAVY) September 3, 2026

While the Ukrainian Navy claimed the Nefrit was damaged, the extent of that is hard to determine from imagery emerging on social media.

Some video, shot from inside the city, shows a large explosion at the port.

The moment of today’s explosion of a Ukrainian surface kamikaze drone next to a Russian ship in Sochi. pic.twitter.com/zpavwj97BW

— MilitaryNewsUA (@front_ukrainian) September 3, 2026

The port in Sochi, Russia, came under attack from Ukrainian naval drones. pic.twitter.com/XygeQLaAWi

— Open Source Intel (@Osint613) September 3, 2026

A still picture shows smoke wafting from the Nefrit; however, the quality of the image makes it hard to determine the vessel’s condition.

Sochi: footage of this morning’s USV raid on the seaport.

The likely target was a Multipurpose Supply Vessel (MPSV) used to support offshore oil and gas operations. pic.twitter.com/Ndr5bRAYV5

— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) September 3, 2026

There is also video of one of the USVs being destroyed before it could reach its target.

Ukrainian sea drone sails into Sochi port in fascist Russia – appears to be hit by machine gun or cannon fire. https://t.co/GaCZHPu1DJ

— Euan MacDonald (@Euan_MacDonald) September 3, 2026

Starting at about 6 a.m. local time, Sochi Mayor Andrey Proshunin declared an emergency.

“ATTENTION! THREAT OF A USV ATTACK IN SOCHI,” he warned on Telegram. “All forces and resources are working to defend the city. Take shelter in a safe place, remain calm.”

About a half hour later, Proshunin issued an all-clear notice, but did not provide any details about what happened.

There was no immediate response from the Kremlin.

Ukraine has carried out long-distance USV attacks on Russian Black Sea targets in the past, including one in 2023 on the Ropucha class vessel Olenegorsky Gornyak, located in Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. A major Russian port on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, it sits roughly 420 miles from Ukrainian-held shores. Sochi is about 110 miles southeast of Novorossiysk, meaning the USVs in today’s attack would have had to travel an even longer distance if launched from Ukrainian-held shores. However, the launch point of the Sochi USV strike is not publicly known and there is always the possibility that a mothership could have been used.

The attack occurring during broad daylight is also interesting, as Ukraine has often taken advantage of the cover of darkness for USV strike operations on port facilities.

You can see a video of that strike below:

Footage of the Ukrainian USV hitting the Russian Ropucha class LST. pic.twitter.com/ksLP9PZfE5

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) August 4, 2023

The strike on the Nefrit is the latest in Ukraine’s long-running drone boat campaign in the Black Sea. This onslaught has already kept Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) at bay, forcing it to retreat from Crimea to Novorossiysk. Ukrainian USVs have also damaged enemy military facilities in occupied Crimea and the Kerch Bridge.

The Houthi rebels of Yemen actually pioneered the operational use of kamikaze USVs years ago. We first reported about this capability in January 2017, when an explosive-laden Houthi USV struck a Saudi frigate. Before that, Iran developed various crude kamikaze USVs and those capabilities soon migrated to their Houthi proxies, which put them to use in the Red Sea for the first time.

In July, the U.S. military used USVs as combat weapons for the first time, striking Iranian targets in Bandar Abbas. The following video shows that attack.

Yesterday, using multiple one-way attack surface drones, CENTCOM forces successfully struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran. Three Corsair unmanned surface vessels hit the port at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, marking the first time American forces have employed sea… pic.twitter.com/bOM2kmgRxz

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 13, 2026

It may be a day or so before we get a better picture of the extent of the damage to the Nefrit. Regardless, the attack itself is another sign that Ukraine can reach targets with sea drones far from its own shores.

The Latest

All across the battlefield, Ukrainian forces are largely holding off continued Russian attacks or are making small advances. Overall, in August, “Russian forces advanced or infiltrated into about 123.53 square kilometers — an average pace of 3.98 square kilometers per day,” according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). “Russian forces’ main territorial gains in August 2026 have been in the Fortress Belt area, Donetsk Oblast. Even there, Russian forces managed to achieve only marginal tactical gains and have thus far failed to complete the seizure of Kostyantynivka.”

Here are some key takeaways from the ISW assessment.

• Kharkiv: Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 1 and 2 but did not advance. Russian forces also continued offensive operations in the Borova and Kupyansk directions on September 2 but did not advance. However, Moscow’s troops continued attempts to secure and expand the bridgehead on the left bank of the Oskil River to enable further infiltrations into Kupyansk.

• Donetsk: Ukrainian forces recently defeated a Russian infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction. They also recently maintained positions or advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 1 and 2 but did not advance. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Oleksandrivka direction on September 2.

• Zaporizhia: Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 1 and 2 but did not advance. Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 1 and 2 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Orikhiv.

• Kherson: Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 2.

MORE (1/3): ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces consolidated positions in or seized about 90.35 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine in August 2026, averaging 2.91 square kilometers seized per day. Including Russian infiltrations, Russian forces… https://t.co/0RlwRfBdhs pic.twitter.com/Cp2Knry2Du

— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) September 2, 2026

Air traffic around Moscow continued to be disrupted on Thursday as Russian authorities responded to another large-scale Ukrainian drone operation, according to EU Today. The disruptions came two days after President Volodymyr Zelensky warned international airlines and insurers that Russian airspace was becoming increasingly unsafe for civilian aviation due to Ukrainian drone attacks.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said that 548 drones had flown towards the wider Moscow region between 8 a.m. on Wednesday and midday Thursday local time. However, Russian authorities claimed that most were intercepted before they could reach the Moscow area while 143 were destroyed on approaches to the Russian capital.

“Temporary restrictions were again imposed at Moscow’s principal airports,” EU Today noted. “Vnukovo and Domodedovo stopped arrivals and departures for periods during the operation, while Sheremetyevo handled flights under additional restrictions. The measures produced cancellations, delays and diversions extending beyond the periods in which individual airports were formally closed.”

The disruption “had already become extensive on Wednesday,” the publication added. “Flight-tracking data showed 21 cancellations and 235 delayed services at Sheremetyevo, Russia’s largest airport, while Vnukovo recorded 22 cancellations and 94 delays.”

Moscow airports cancel flights after Zelensky's 'closed skies' warning

"Temporary restrictions on the arrival and departure of aircraft have been introduced," Russia's Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsia) said.https://t.co/BAlAASaDv5

— The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) September 3, 2026

Putin on Thursday said there is a chance of resolving the “Ukrainian conflict” but Kyiv’s campaign to shut down Russian airspace is “complicating the negotiation process.”

Russia and Ukraine themselves must reach an agreement, while other countries can only support and assist, the Russian leader added, according to a translation from former Ukrainian government official Anton Gerashchenko.

Russia is in contact with the White House and President Donald Trump “is committed to positive and constructive engagement,” Putin proclaimed. “Russia has many friends in the United States. One of them is Steven Seagal, the ‘best envoy of peace.'”

Putin said there is a chance of resolving the "Ukrainian conflict" but Ukraine's threats to shut down Russian airspace are "complicating the negotiation process."

Comment from me: Putin's orders to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure aren't complicating anything, it seems… https://t.co/QYJ3AKXjou pic.twitter.com/C1NKz3V7cH

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) September 3, 2026

A Russian drone strike on an Odesa apartment building injured at least 17 people, including three children, Zelensky stated on X.

In Odesa, emergency services continue working at the site of a drone strike on an apartment building. Damage to apartments from the 10th through the 17th floors left 17 people injured, including three children. Efforts are also ongoing to deal with the aftermath of the strikes in… pic.twitter.com/FWAmFNJSYp

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) September 3, 2026

Overall, Ukraine says its air defenses downed or suppressed 135 of 163 Russian drones launched overnight, including Shahed-type UAVs, about half of which were jet-powered. Russia also used S-8000 Banderol, Gerbera and decoy drones. Hits were recorded at 15 locations and debris fell at four.

Ukraine says air defenses downed or suppressed 135 of 163 Russian drones launched overnight, including Shahed-type UAVs, about half of them jet-powered. Russia also used S-8000 Banderol, Gerbera and decoy drones. Hits were recorded at 15 locations and debris fell at four.… pic.twitter.com/JyxTS6QBzL

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) September 3, 2026

Russia has been increasingly using jet-powered drones to attack Ukraine. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry released video it says shows troops from the 208th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade downing one of those drones. The jet powered Shahed-like one-way attack drones fly higher and faster than their propeller-driven cousins, making them harder to intercept by more cost effective and plentiful means, such as Ukraine’s many drone interceptors. Instead, much more expensive and increasingly scare missile must be used in some circumstances.

Shaheds down!

Jet-powered Russian strike drones intercepted on September 2.

: 208th Anti-aircraft Missile Brigade pic.twitter.com/ZXkbZMO5an

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) September 3, 2026

What appears to be the first video of Ukrainian troops using Cold War-era Leopard 1 tanks with turrets swapped out for the Rheinmetall Skyranger 35 short-range air defense system has emerged on social media. The @deaidua X account that tracks German war materiel donations to Ukraine said the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment recently took delivery of this system, designed to be a highly mobile counter to a range of aerial threats.

The Skyranger 35 “is equipped with a KDG 35/1000 revolver cannon in 35 mm x 228 caliber with a firing rate of 1,000 rounds per minute,” according to Rheinmetall, which began delivering these to Ukraine in January. “It has an effective range of up to 4,000 meters and a high degree of commonality with the Oerlikon Revolver Gun Mk 3. Thanks to AHEAD technology, the Skyranger 35 is airburst-capable. In the future, it will also be possible to equip it with modern guided missiles.”

It seems that Ukraine's 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment which belongs to the Ground Forces has taken delivery of the first Skyranger 35 SPAAGs mounted on a Leopard 1 chassis made by @RheinmetallAG.

A contract for the delivery of the Skyranger 35 SPAAGs was signed in H2 of… pic.twitter.com/VRWhGx1LCa

— GAU (@deaidua) September 3, 2026

A new documentary about Ukraine’s use of the combat-proven National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) air defense system debuts tomorrow.

“Sky Defenders is a new documentary taking audiences inside the increasingly critical battle to protect the skies of Europe and Ukraine,” according to the film’s producers. “Launching globally on Apple TV and Amazon Prime on Sept. 4, the 50-minute film explores the people, technology and strategy behind modern air defense and the race to stop missiles and drones before they reach their targets.”

A new video shows a Russian soldier being attacked by three Ukrainian kamikaze drones simultaneously, underscoring just how dense the drone threat has become to troops near the front.

That kind of attrition is also visible around Pokrovsk, where Ukrainian kamikaze drones are increasingly coordinating strikes against individual Russian infantrymen and small assault groups.https://t.co/HfKBCW7ZOm

— ZSU News (@ZSUNews) September 3, 2026

It’s been more than three years since the Russians captured the town of Bakhmut in the eastern Donetsk region after a long battle that incurred a tremendous toll on personnel and equipment on both sides of the fight. New drone video has emerged showing the city remains in ruins, with blocks and blocks of vacant and destroyed buildings.

A harrowing new video from Bakhmut, filmed in the summer of 2026. The Ukrainian city was captured by the Russians three years ago and has lain in ruins ever since.

In this once-vibrant city of 72,000 inhabitants, there are no longer any shops, schools, kindergartens, cafés,… pic.twitter.com/clFfLu5jkq

— Jürgen Nauditt (@jurgen_nauditt) September 3, 2026

That’s it for now. We’ll update this story with new details when they emerge.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Ukrainian Sea Drones Strike Russian Black Sea Resort Town Of Sochi For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Navy’s supercarrier USS Abraham Lincoln is now in Thailand for a much-deserved and highly publicized liberty port call. The carrier had gone 286 days without making such a stop, with much of that time spent executing grueling combat operations against Iran. The ship has been run very hard, relying on at times a rickety conveyor of sea replenishments to continue operating for months on end, and it has the scars to show for it. The Lincoln looks very much worse for wear, with so-called “running rust” and algae caked all along the sides of the hull, as well as around the edges of the flight deck and sponsons on either side. It’s something of a startling appearance for one of the most powerful ships on the planet and a major symbol of U.S. power projection, but it is also a reminder of what the vessel and its crew have endured for months on end.

The Lincoln arrived in the Thai port of Laem Chabang earlier today. The carrier did make a stop in Guam in December 2025 and reportedly made another one somewhere in the Middle East in July. However, in both cases, these have been characterized as brief logistical stopovers that did not offer any real opportunity for personnel onboard to disembark. Thai media reports say the carrier is expected to remain in Laem Chabang through the end of the weekend.

“Our arrival in Laem Chabang provides a well-deserved opportunity for our Sailors and Marines to rest and recharge. It also underscores the strong and enduring partnership and alliance between the United States and Thailand,” Rear Adm. Robert E. Loughran, commander of Carrier Strike Group 3 (CSG-3), said in a statement in a press release today. “What this strike group has accomplished is truly historic. I could not be prouder of the exceptional professionalism and expertise demonstrated by every member of this team during our operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.”

Lincoln and its strike group had left port in San Diego in November 2025 for what was originally expected to be a routine cruise in the Pacific. The carrier, its air wing, and escorts were subsequently directed to the Middle East and arrived in that region in January 2026.

CSG-3 took part in the opening salvo of strikes on Iran on February 28 as part of what the U.S. military dubbed Operation Epic Fury. Lincoln and the rest of the strike group continued to support Epic Fury and subsequent operations against Iran for months thereafter. The decision was finally made to rotate the carrier out of the region last month following a raft of reports of severely flagging morale and mental health among the crew, which we will come back to later.

Two of the Arleigh Burke class destroyers assigned to CSG-3, the USS Michael Murphy and the USS Spruance, are still understood to be operating in the Western end of the Indian Ocean. A third destroyer in the strike group, the USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., accompanied the Lincoln to Thailand and is now docked in a separate port in Sriracha, near Laem Chabang. The Ticonderoga class cruiser USS Robert Smalls also helped escort the carrier, and that warship “also arrived in Map Ta Phut, Thailand for their own scheduled port visit,” according to the Navy.

As mentioned, Lincoln definitely looks like it’s been at sea more or less continuously for the last nine and a half months or so. Pictures and videos of the ship in Laem Chabang seen throughout this story plainly show big dark rust stains all around the hull and other similar signs of wear elsewhere. There is also a bright green ring of algae layered on the hull at the waterline. While carriers have very large crews and usually keep the ship’s appearance up relatively well while on cruise, there is only so much that can be done out of port on particularly long deployments, where all resources are focused on sustained high-tempo combat operations.

Running rust on U.S. Navy ships has been something of a lightning rod for criticism in recent years, including from President Donald Trump. This is in part due to the negative optics of such visible wear and tear on American naval vessels, especially during calls in foreign ports.

“It’s terrible. I think they should be ashamed,” John Phelan told members of Congress at a hearing last year after being shown pictures of a very worn-looking Arleigh Burke class destroyer, the USS Dewey, during a stopover in Singapore. “Would you want to go on that ship?”

Phelan was testifying at the time regarding his nomination to be Secretary of the Navy. At the time, he said that President Trump had already been texting him in the middle of the night regarding the issue. Phelan was subsequently confirmed and served as the Navy’s top civilian until he was unexpectedly fired in April, reportedly over disagreements regarding the new Trump class battleships and other more general friction within the administration,

Lincoln‘s current condition is, of course, an extreme case that is the result of very specific operational circumstances. The carrier has already been in the news for weeks now due to the aforementioned morale issues, which family members of those onboard have been very vocally calling attention to through the media. One sailor had to be rescued last month after deliberately jumping overboard. There were reports that at least one other individual onboard had attempted to do the same. President Donald Trump and Secretary Pete Hegseth, among others, have pushed back on concerns about mental health and other issues on the ship. In a statement shared on social media on August 16, Navy Adm. Brad Cooper, head of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), acknowledged, but still downplayed, the seriousness of the mental health situation, in particular.

At the same time, the carrier’s marathon deployment is indicative of larger shipbuilding, readiness, and other issues that the Navy continues to struggle with. Strains on the service carrier fleets in particular have been steadily building for years and are now becoming a low-level crisis. The USS Gerald R. Ford wrapped up a historic 326-day-long deployment in May. The Navy has publicly said that the USS Theodore Roosevelt, which is set to begin its latest cruise soon, could be away from home for at least eight months. The longer the ships remain deployed, the longer they typically have to spend in port afterward, further compounding the situation with each passing day during months-long extensions. This all has very worrisome cascading impacts on even routine maintenance cycles, let alone deep overhauls and upgrade efforts, as well as personnel management matters, as we have explored in detail in the past.

“It’s my earnest attempt to really try to keep those [deployments] at seven months,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle, the Navy’s top officer, said during a question-and-answer session at Fort Meade, Maryland, Monday, which was livestreamed. He also said he wanted a Navy “that can sustain a seven-month deployment and still give our combatant commanders the amount of naval force they need to accomplish their missions, solve their key operational problems, and make sure they have all the naval force necessary to do what they need to do.”

Caudle had notably acknowledged concerns about strains on the Ford while speaking to TWZ and other outlets at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium back in January.

The Lincoln‘s visibly worn state certainly draws new attention to the stress on America’s carrier fleets as personnel onboard are now finally getting a much-earned reprieve in Laem Chabang.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post USS Abraham Lincoln Looks Like It’s Been Through Hell After 286 Days At Sea appeared first on TWZ.

The German Navy has demonstrated the launch of Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) LORA ballistic missile from an F125 frigate, with at least two missiles fired from the Sachsen-Anhalt during a test in the North Atlantic last night. The demonstration points to a potentially significant new long-range strike capability for Germany’s surface fleet, should it be adopted.

Video released by the German Ministry of Defense alongside the test shows two LORA launch canisters positioned on the frigate’s flight deck, followed by a missile launching from each container.

Die Fregatte „Sachsen-Anhalt" (Klasse 125) hat im Nordatlantik mindestens zwei ballistische Raketen vom Typ LORA (IAI) verschossen – gestartet aus Kanistern auf dem Flugdeck. Die Erprobung erfolgte im Rahmen der OPEX-Serie.

Video: Deutsche Marine pic.twitter.com/eV3yzjrcgg

— Clemens Speer (@clemens_speer) September 2, 2026

The launches were conducted as part of the Bundeswehr’s operational experimentation (OPEX) program in cooperation with the Bundeswehr Innovation Center in Erding. Reportedly, two German frigates were deployed to the waters between Ireland and Iceland for the test, and a warning was issued to maritime and air traffic 45 days beforehand.

The test marks a notable expansion of the weapons capabilities demonstrated by Germany’s F125 frigates and could provide a pathway toward a new long-range naval strike capability.

German Navy Inspector General Vice Adm. Jan Christian Kaack described the event in a statement distributed through the Bundeswehr’s official WhatsApp channel:

“With the successful launch of a ballistic missile last night in the North Atlantic, we have made naval history. I am extremely pleased with this achievement. The system can be successfully deployed by our units, and its potential range exceeds anything we have seen before. For the protection of Germany and our allies, this test marks a new chapter in deterrence and defense readiness at sea.”

IAI also confirmed the results of the test, stating that both missiles followed their planned trajectories and struck their targets with high precision.

The exact targets, engagement ranges, flight profiles, and missile configurations used during the test have not been disclosed.

There is no possibility that Sachsen-Anhalt will retain the launchers in their current location, since they mean the F125’s flight deck cannot be used, depriving it of a critical capability. Potentially, they could be installed elsewhere on the vessel, but, moreover, it is unclear if the current experiment will lead to a formal acquisition program.

At the same time, LORA is a substantially different weapon from the anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles normally associated with modern surface combatants.

Available for ship- and ground-launch, the missile is approximately 17 feet long, 25 inches in diameter, and weighs around 3,500 pounds. It follows a quasi-ballistic trajectory and has an officially stated range of approximately 60 to 270 miles. An air-launched derivative has also been developed.

A weapon capable of reaching targets hundreds of miles away would give German surface combatants a long-range strike option extending far beyond the range of traditional naval guns and many shorter-range precision weapons.

Its quasi-ballistic flight profile also differentiates LORA from a conventional cruise missile. A ballistic-style trajectory allows the weapon to cover distance rapidly and presents an air-defense challenge different from that posed by a low-flying cruise missile. This type of missile also impacts its target with much greater kinetic energy, making it especially useful for striking more hardened target sets.

LORA uses a navigation architecture combining GNSS satellite navigation with an inertial navigation system and can achieve a circular error probable, or CEP, of approximately 33 feet. IAI also says LORA can be launched within minutes, including from unprepared positions, and can attack a target within its range in less than 10 minutes after a decision to launch.

Back in 2017, as you can read about here, IAI successfully test-fired LORA from a containerized launcher on the back of a truck sitting on the deck of a cargo ship. The missile successfully struck a target on land.

What is less clear is its ability to strike targets at sea.

A long-range anti-surface application would be particularly interesting for the German Navy, although the weapon, in its basic form, has no terminal seeker. This limits the missile to use against targets with a fixed location, rather than autonomously finding and tracking a maneuvering warship during the terminal phase of flight.

In a 2020 test, IAI demonstrated firing two LORA missiles from a ship before hitting separate floating targets at approximately 60 miles and 250 miles. However, striking a static floating target is different from an enemy warship that is maneuvering and potentially employing electronic warfare and air defenses.

Regardless, Germany has an even clearer requirement for land attack capabilities, which LORA is fully capable of fulfilling, as we will return to later.

As for Germany’s F125 frigates, these were designed primarily for long-duration deployments, maritime security, stabilization operations, and other missions requiring a persistent naval presence. Their overall lack of firepower is something we have examined in detail before now.

The latest test involving the Sachsen-Anhalt is in line with the Bundeswehr’s OPEX framework, which is intended to evaluate emerging technologies and operational concepts under realistic conditions before decisions are made about wider adoption.

There is precedent for such experimentation leading to operational capabilities. Israeli-developed systems, including IAI’s Blue Whale autonomous underwater vehicle, have previously been evaluated through German naval experimentation efforts and subsequently moved toward formal adoption.

As well as the four F125 hulls, Germany might look to incorporate LORA from the start on its future F127 multi-purpose frigates and/or its planned Large Remote Missile Vessels (LRMV), uncrewed vessels that will serve as arsenal ship ‘wingmen,’ supporting conventional surface combatants.

It is worth noting that Germany has recently acquired various other Israeli-made missile and rocket systems. These include the Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system — the largest-ever Israeli defense export deal — and the PULS multiple rocket launcher. A German purchase of the land-based version of LORA would also be an option, with the truck-mounted system also able to be launched from ships at sea.

Meanwhile, Germany is a major provider of weapons systems to Israel, among them its most powerful surface combatants and submarines.

The LORA test also reflects a broader European push toward longer-range precision fires.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of ballistic and cruise missiles, while NATO countries have increasingly sought weapons capable of holding targets at greater distances at risk.

Germany has historically possessed comparatively limited deep-strike capability. The Bundeswehr is now working to expand its ability to conduct long-range precision engagement, both independently and within NATO structures. This includes planned procurement of land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles, with a range exceeding 1,000 miles depending on the exact configuration.

Very deliberate NATO messaging right here – interesting to see the alliance using this kind of signalling https://t.co/BYvpzkq0Vq

— Deborah Haynes (@haynesdeborah) September 2, 2026

A naval LORA capability could add another layer to that effort and would allow Germany to distribute long-range fires across surface combatants, complicating an adversary’s targeting problem while giving its naval forces a more meaningful role in high-end combat operations. With the security situation in Europe deteriorating, the potential deterrence factor that such a weapon would bring to Germany, and to NATO, should also not be underestimated.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Israeli LORA Ballistic Missiles Fired From German Frigate appeared first on TWZ.

The bus crashed on the road between the tourist towns of Dahab and Nuweiba in South Sinai, with 10 Jordanians reportedly among those killed.

The post Bus crash on Egypt’s Red Sea coast kills 22, injures 28 appeared first on BOL News.

The move makes Fernandez the first player to be sold for more than £100 million twice in his career.

The post Manchester city sparks transfer frenzy with midfielder Fernandez’s £125 million move appeared first on BOL News.

Under heavy escort, the USS Abraham Lincoln transited the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait over the weekend, en route to Thailand for a highly publicized and much-needed liberty port call. Guided-missile cruiser USS Robert Smalls led the three-ship column, with guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. following astern of the supercarrier as she entered the South China Sea. Multiple Thai officials have confirmed the upcoming port visit since it was first reported by USA Today last week, with the flattop expected to pull into port at Laem Chabang in the coming days. Meanwhile, America’s other two deployed carrier groups are in the Middle East enforcing the ongoing blockade as the U.S. and Iran exchange fire for the first time since July.

Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), using publicly available open-source information. Check out last week’s report here.

Lincoln Enters The South China Sea, Again, En Route To Thailand For Liberty

Abraham Lincoln flipped her Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder on ahead of the transit, broadcasting the flattop’s position publicly for the first time since January 28, 2026, when the CSG made the transit in the opposite direction prior to Operation Epic Fury. Lincoln has now been deployed for 285 days without a liberty call, but that streak is set to end this week.

For friends and family, we anticipate an arrival back home in late September or early October, depending on how long the crew stays in Thailand and whether any other stops are made along the way. When all is said and done, Abraham Lincoln’s deployment will likely become the second-longest in the modern carrier era behind the historic 326 days logged by the USS Gerald R. Ford earlier this year.

While the composition of the Abraham Lincoln CSG has shifted over the nine-plus-month deployment, Frank E. Petersen Jr., a Flight IIA Technology Insertion (TI) Arleigh Burke class destroyer and one of the newest in the fleet, embarked the commander of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) throughout the six months of almost nonstop combat operations against Iran. The IAMD commander is responsible for coordinating the detection, response, and interception of inbound aerial threats, and Petersen Jr. is equipped with the world’s foremost integrated naval combat system – the Aegis Combat System Baseline 9 – which delivers quick reaction times, concentrated and networked firepower, and advanced electronic countermeasure capabilities for anti-air warfare.

The unannounced addition of Ticonderoga class cruiser USS Robert Smalls, which has historically served as the IAMD commander for the carriers forward-deployed out of Yokosuka, Japan, adds 122 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells packed with missiles for protection and firepower. The rationale for the additional Tico cruiser, an iconic class that will be completely retired over the coming years without a comparable replacement, is unclear. TWZ has not received an on-the-record response from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) or U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) public affairs explaining the redirection.

Robert Smalls was part of the George Washington CSG as recently as August 18, making the northwest-bound Malacca Strait transit with the strike group the week prior, before peeling off to escort the Abraham Lincoln back through.

U.S. Launches Another Round of Strikes Against Iran Today As Tensions Escalate

Ahead of publication on Tuesday, CENTCOM announced a fresh round of strikes against targets in Iran that began at noon Eastern Time. “The strikes follow recent attempted attacks by the IRGC against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and against American service members deployed to the region,” the command posted in a statement on social media.

George Washington, which is currently accompanied by a single destroyer, USS Shoup, relieved the Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East earlier this month. Other U.S. 5th Fleet ships are reportedly moving in and out of the CSG, but the situation is fluid and TWZ cannot confirm the current, complete composition of the group. It’s unknown which warship, if any, is currently serving as IAMD commander for the CSG, which chopped into the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) on or around August 19.

Also operating in the Middle East, the four-ship George H.W. Bush CSG is underway at an undisclosed location in the Arabian Sea. Alongside USS George H.W. Bush is Tico cruiser USS Princeton, the IAMD commander, and two Burke destroyers, USS Ross and USS Donald Cook.

The carriers are enforcing the ongoing blockade of Iran – and presumably participating in the latest round of airstrikes – although they are both officially on station to “support maritime security and stability in the Middle East,” according to DVIDS, the military’s content-sharing platform. CENTCOM forces have redirected 84 commercial vessels, disabled three using kinetic force, and boarded another two since the blockade resumed, as of September 1.

Over the weekend, the United States and Iran traded blows for the first time in over a month. CENTCOM opened the tit-for-tat exchange on Sunday by targeting rocket systems on Larak Island, located in the Strait of Hormuz on the Iranian side of the northern corridor, that are fitted to launch naval mines, after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was observed making preparations to fire into the contested waterway.

“I can confirm that earlier today U.S. forces struck two Iranian launchers on Larak Island,” Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, CENTCOM’s spokesman, told TWZ. “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces were observed preparing to launch rockets with sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz,” he added. The IRGC retaliated by launching a salvo of ballistic missiles at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, a Jordanian installation the U.S. military operates from. Jordan’s military said it successfully intercepted eight missiles.

The preemptive strikes to prevent Iran from deploying additional mines came just days after CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper said U.S. forces “successfully cleared” Iranian sea mines from international shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. Commercial traffic through the strait is slowly recovering but still well below pre-war levels.

Ongoing Maintenance Delays Stateside Impact Fleet Readiness

On the other side of the world, in the United States, three carriers are active: two are underway training while one is in homeport getting ready for an upcoming deployment. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, which left Norfolk on August 21, transited south in the Atlantic Ocean and was last operating approximately 70 nautical miles off the coast of Florida, well into East Coast Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) and Training Command (TRACOM) Carrier Qualifications (CQ). After departing San Diego on August 10, USS Carl Vinson was spotted on satellite imagery off the California coast by ship-tracker MT Anderson, in the process of completing Tailored Ship’s Training Availability (TSTA) and Final Evaluation Period (FEP) training.

USS Theodore Roosevelt, the next carrier slated to deploy from the continental U.S., is pierside at Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego, based on commercial satellite imagery. Speculation is rampant about where Theodore Roosevelt will deploy, but as the Navy has told us many times, “we do not discuss future operations or timelines.”

The balance of America’s carriers (excluding USS Nimitz, which will begin deactivation in 2027) is either in maintenance or scheduled to begin an availability in the future.

The next flattop that will re-enter service, USS Ronald Reagan, is expected to finish a roughly 17-month Docking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA) soon. “The docking planned incremental availability for Ronald Reagan is on track for its scheduled completion at the end of August 2026,” Catherine Norton, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) for Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, told Stars and Stripes earlier this month. However, the ship has not gotten underway as of publication, even though yesterday was the end of the month, and it appears the DPIA will stretch into September. TWZ reached out to Puget Sound’s PAO but has not received a response yet. For the latest status of the other three carriers in current or upcoming maintenance, marked in red on the map above, check out our recent deep-dive here.

Current Big Deck Force Posture At A Glance

Overall carrier force posture is unchanged compared to our previous report on August 24. Three U.S. carriers are deployed (although one is on the tail end of her deployment and heading home to San Diego), one is preparing to deploy in the near term, two are working up in various states of readiness, four are in maintenance, and another, the USS Nimitz, is being used primarily for training before deactivating next year. One amphibious ready group is deployed, one is forward-deployed and at homeport, four are working up or in port, and three are in maintenance.

Update as of September 2: The USS Abraham Lincoln arrived in Laem Chabang, Thailand, on Wednesday, local time. “Our arrival in Laem Chabang provides a well-deserved opportunity for our Sailors and Marines to rest and recharge. It also underscores the strong and enduring partnership and alliance between the United States and Thailand,” Rear Adm. Robert E. Loughran, commander, CSG-3, said in a statement released by the ship’s public affairs team. “What this strike group has accomplished is truly historic. I could not be prouder of the exceptional professionalism and expertise demonstrated by every member of this team during our operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility,” he added.

Check out our full report on the carrier, which has been run very hard over the past nine months and has the scars to show for it, here.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io

The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers?: USS Abraham Lincoln Escorted To Thailand As The Middle East Heats Up appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Navy’s newest stated requirements for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) effort point toward a drone that sounds very much like an advanced uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), rather than a smaller and less capable autonomous ‘loyal wingman’ intended to economically augment crewed fighters. Overall, the new requirements serve as a tacit admission that the Navy is still looking for the kind of drone that it previously explored with extreme promise in the X-47B and Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program. The UCLASS requirements were abruptly shelved and replaced with an uncrewed carrier-based tanker effort, which resulted in the MQ-25 Stingray. This act was seen by some as one of the most controversial and puzzling procurement decisions in modern naval aviation history.

The traditional loyal wingman or CCA concept generally envisions uncrewed ‘fighter’ aircraft whose primary purpose is to complement crewed companions. This typically involves extending the crewed platform’s sensor reach, carrying additional weapons, and opening up a greatly expanded tactics playbook. An advanced UCAV, by contrast, is fundamentally an independent combat aircraft in its own right, designed to deliver weapons and other effects similar to what a crewed platform can provide without requiring a crew onboard or nearby. As such, it is more capable, survivable, and an overall ‘exquisite’ asset with a heavier payload, more capable of taking the place of a crewed aircraft in certain roles, rather than augmenting them, although there is nothing keeping them from working in a loyal wingman type role if required.

Yesterday, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) released a new Request for Information (RFI) that lays out an unusually demanding set of requirements for a CCA Increment 1 prototype. Among other things, the Navy wants an aircraft capable of operating from its aircraft carriers, carrying plentiful weapons, conducting strike missions in highly contested environments, and operating both independently and as part of a larger crewed-uncrewed team.

The combination of these requirements provides a much clearer picture of what the Navy wants its future carrier-based combat drones to be capable of.

Perhaps the most striking requirement concerns weapons carriage. The Navy says the Increment 1 CCA must have the ability to carry four externally mounted weapons weighing up to 2,500 pounds each throughout the target flight envelope and during carrier certification activities. That equates to a potential external weapons load of 10,000 pounds, although it should not necessarily be interpreted as the aircraft’s normal operational configuration. By way of comparison, a very heavily loaded F/A-18E/F Super Hornet might launch with close to 17,000 pounds of weapons and stores — though that is far from common.

Meanwhile, the kinds of drones that the U.S. Air Force is currently exploring under its own separate CCA Increment 1 effort, namely the General Atomics YFQ-42A Dark Merlin and Anduril YFQ-44A Fury, are air-to-air optimized. Their primary loadout is widely expected to be a pair of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, which is just a fraction of the Navy’s newly stated payload requirement.

The RFI NAVAIR put out yesterday also specifically asks respondents to address internal weapons carriage, with both capacity and survivability among the factors the Navy will consider. Internal stores carriage would offer obvious advantages in reducing an aircraft’s radar signature and preserving aerodynamic performance.

The Navy also wants the aircraft to have a substantial combat radius while carrying its required weapons load, as well as the ability to spend at least 30 minutes on station while retaining sufficient fuel reserves to return to the carrier.

For a CCA, carrier operations add another layer of complexity. The aircraft must be capable of catapult launches and arrested landings from both Ford and Nimitz class carriers, while operating within existing carrier deck, elevator, hangar, and support constraints.

Autonomy is similarly central to the concept. The Navy wants mission and flight autonomy that can support the aircraft from launch through recovery, along with the ability to incorporate third-party mission software. The prototype is also expected to demonstrate both individual and multi-aircraft autonomous operations. While crewed-uncrewed teaming is a fundamental part of the concept, the latest requirements make it clear that the aircraft will not depend on a crewed aircraft continuously supervising its actions.

The video below from Collins Aerospace offers a notional look at what crewed-uncrewed teaming involving carrier- and land-based CCA-type drones might look like in the future.

In terms of the survivability requirement, the Navy specifically wants the aircraft to operate in highly contested environments and is asking industry to provide approaches for assessing and managing survivability during collaborative operations. The consideration of internal weapons carriage is another indication that signature reduction and survivability are important design considerations, pointing to a low-observable (stealthy) platform.

All of this begins to blur the distinction between the Navy’s Increment 1 CCA plan and a traditional survivable UCAV concept.

That does not necessarily mean the Navy is abandoning the CCA concept entirely in favor of resurrecting the carrier-based UCAV concept. Rather, it suggests that the distinction between the two becomes blurred as requirements overlap. There also remains the strong possibility (or more likely probability) that the Navy will seek to explore CCA designs closer to what the Air Force, as well as the U.S. Marine Corps, are pursuing. This could potentially include development of carrier-based versions of one or more of those designs under a future increment.

The new RFI is also consistent with the Navy’s broader Air Wing of the Future effort (AWOTF).

An earlier NAVAIR sources-sought notice released in July outlined an expansive vision for future carrier-based uncrewed aircraft covering missions including surface warfare; strike warfare; anti-submarine warfare; air warfare; electronic warfare; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR&T); mobility; and logistics. That notice also pointed toward aircraft capable of attacking targets at least 1,000 nautical miles from the carrier without requiring aerial refueling, while leaving open the possibility of extending that reach with tankers.

Intriguingly, the new RFI does not include an explicit maximum range target, but based on the payload requirements alone, this would be very considerable, reflecting the Navy’s concerns about fighting a future conflict across the vast distances of the Pacific. Traditional advanced UCAVs usually have a combat radius measured in thousands of miles, not hundreds, far exceeding the reach of their crewed fighter counterparts.

Whatever the possible range target, the planned weapons load also points to a substantial airframe. Indeed, the deck-space requirement outlined in the RFI is relevant here. The CCA’s “spot factor” cannot exceed that of an existing fourth-generation fighter, meaning that it could potentially be as large as an F/A-18E/F.

Otherwise, however, the latest CCA Increment 1 RFI is considerably more concrete.

The Navy wants a first flight of a prototype within 24 months of a contract award and carrier certification during a three-year development effort. It also wants a path toward an affordability target of around $30 million per aircraft. This kind of price point would put it at the top end of the CCA concepts we have seen so far, and is fairly ambitious for a higher-end UCAV.

Navy officials said in 2024 that the CCA’s unit cost target was around $15 million, reflecting the idea that the aircraft would be sufficiently inexpensive to be expendable under some circumstances. The new RFI instead asks industry to outline a path toward an affordability target of $30 million per aircraft. That is still a fraction of the cost of a modern carrier-based fighter, but it suggests the Navy is willing to pay considerably more for an aircraft with substantially greater weapons capacity, range, autonomy, and survivability.

As to the companies that might respond to the RFI, in August of last year, the Navy confirmed that Anduril, Boeing, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman were all on contract for “conceptual” CCA designs. At that time, the service also said Lockheed Martin had been hired to work on a common control architecture for the drones. Lockheed Martin is already the prime contractor for the control stations and associated software the service is integrating onto its carriers now to support the MQ-25.

The new RFI, however, marks a shift from the conceptual studies described last year toward a specific prototype effort. The Navy is seeking industry input as it shapes the acquisition strategy, with responses due September 18.

In the past, the Navy has said it is aiming for the total makeup of carrier air wings to eventually be 60 percent or more uncrewed, although the precise balance is still to be determined and will certainly be informed by the lessons of Navy CCA Increment 1. Exactly how the CCA might fit in with the Navy’s sixth-generation crewed fighter – known as F/A-XX – is another intriguing prospect, but would clearly be optimized to work alongside that platform.

Now, back to the Navy’s earlier effort to develop a high-end, stealthy, carrier-based UCAV capability. Northrop Grumman built two X-47B demonstrators for that program, both of which underwent extensive flight testing, including carrier operations and aerial refueling. The aircraft flew from 2011 for around half a decade. As of 2022, both X-47Bs had been earmarked for eventual public display at museums.

The two X-47Bs had offered far more than a glimpse of what a carrier-based UCAV capability might look like, and the base design was set to evolve into an operational type. These were large, stealthy UCAVs with thousands of pounds of payload and endurance that far outstripped crewed naval fighter aircraft. The follow-on UCLASS program aimed to see the capabilities the X-47 demonstrated put into operation via a new aircraft procurement effort. However, it transformed into the radically different, less ambitious, tanker-focused Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) program in the mid-2010s. This, as noted, led to the MQ-25 Stingray.

To this day, the cancellation of UCLASS remains a very sore spot and is widely seen as a nearsighted and even reckless decision. This mirrored earlier moves by the USAF, which had demonstrated how revolutionary UCAV capabilities could be, only to entirely walk away from the concept. In fact, that service went even further, appearing to erase those developments from recent memory. You can read all about this bizarre and troubling inflection point in American air power history and the glaring questions surrounding it in this past feature.

Fast forward to today, and the Navy is getting the MQ-25, which is primarily a tanker, but clearly, that was not the only mission set that influenced its exotic design. In fact, these Navy requirements could open the door for the Stingray platform to potentially fulfill at least parts of the Navy uncrewed combat drone role in a ‘cleaned-up,’ stealthier configuration, something we have explored in depth in the past.

Overall, the takeaway here is that the Navy’s latest CCA requirements raise the intriguing possibility that its earlier UCAV ambitions are resurfacing, this time under the CCA banner. This is happening as China is moving very quickly with its own stealthy UCAVs, a number of which are in testing, and one of which is very mature and is navalized for shipboard operations – the GJ-11 Sharp Sword. The GJ-11 sounds very similar to the Navy’s requirements wish list, including its ability to act independently and teamed with crewed counterparts, as well as its general size and need for survivability.

While an RFI only represents an early part of the contracting process, in practical terms, it looks like the Navy is asking whether industry can finally make good on the past promise of a U.S. Navy UCAV.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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For about a month, the United States had refrained from attacking Iranian targets as the Trump administration turned toward economic warfare against the Islamic Republic. However, that changed last night when U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) struck what it said were Iranian rocket launchers preparing to fire naval mines into the Strait of Hormuz. The problem is that mine-deploying rockets are not a common capability, so much so that the statement seemed bizarre at first glance. But it just turns out that Iran does claim to have such a system and that system would have a glaring application in the current state of play of the conflict. In fact, it would be absolutely critical to do exactly what CENTCOM did, blowing them up prior to launching, because if they didn’t, the final and very fragile energy lifeline between the Persian Gulf and the world could be severed at the worst possible time.

“I can confirm that earlier today U.S. forces struck two Iranian launchers on Larak Island,” Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, CENTCOM’s spokesman, told us Sunday evening. “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces were observed preparing to launch rockets with sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz.”

The U.S. strikes against the launchers on Sunday spurred Iran to respond with ballistic missile attacks on a Jordanian air base housing U.S. troops. Jordanian officials said all eight missiles were intercepted, and no casualties or damage was inflicted.

#JORDAN INTERCEPTS 8 MISSILES

Jordan's @ArmedForcesJO say air defense systems intercepted eight missiles that entered the Kingdom's airspace early Monday.

The military said the missiles were destroyed before posing a threat to civilians or property.

Details:

A…

— Dana Zureikat Daoud دانا زريقات (@DanaZkat) August 31, 2026

Hawkins did not specify what exact type of rocket launcher was struck or whether this was the first time CENTCOM had seen Iran use this type of system to launch sea mines.

Though CENTCOM won’t comment on what kind of system was attacked, Iran did tout just this kind of a system last year with exactly the kind of range needed to be a huge problem for the U.S. and its allies. This system uses a variant of the Fajr-5 rocket that is converted with a sea mine warhead.

You can see a video of that system below.

Video of the Iranian rocket deployed naval mine system which is claimed to be able to deploy hundreds of mines in the sea from the coast in an hour. pic.twitter.com/ba897On0nV

— Mehdi H. (@mhmiranusa) January 24, 2025

The clip shows the rockets being fired from a truck-mounted multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). The video later cuts to nose cone-shaped mines that appear to float on the surface above the spent missile body, however, little is known about the Fajr-5 sea mine warhead conversion process that allows them to be delivered by rocket.

We also don’t know the full extent to which Iran has developed and/or fielded this particular capability, or whether it has other options for similarly deploying naval mines by rocket. Neither Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) think tank, nor the Ambrey maritime security firm has seen any indication that Tehran has used an MLRS to launch sea mines in the past.

At the same time, “the Fajr-5 is an Iranian calling card, a 333mm caliber rocket that can reportedly travel 75 km carrying between an estimated 90 to 170 kg warhead, depending on the payload,” Taleblu, an expert on Iranian weapons systems, told TWZ.

The Fajr-5 is an established design that traces its roots back to the 1990s and has been evolving since then. “The Fajr class was initially designed as unguided artillery rockets, though Iran claims to have developed a guided version,” Taleblu added.

In general terms, being able to seed naval mines via artillery rockets would offer several advantages for Iran, most immediately by offering an alternative to traditional maritime mine-laying platforms. The destruction of Iran’s naval forces was a top stated objective for the U.S. military during the opening phases of the conflict earlier this year. Iranian vessels, including ones capable of laying mines, were heavily targeted. Still, Iran has retained a large number of its smaller boats that can be used for seeding minefields.

Regardless of what boats they have left, mining the area that actually matters most would be impossible to do as any vessel approaching the southern coast of the Strait of Hormuz would be destroyed. It’s through these tight and complex littorals that a reduced flow of commercial vessels are still traveling, under the kinetic umbrella of the U.S. and its Gulf state allies. The Fajr-5, fired from Iranian controlled islands in the strait, has the range to land in these waterways, seeding mines without risking any boat crews or other platforms. If the rocket-delivered mines splash down, the de-mining process would have to begin, which can be arduous and last weeks, potentially shutting down all shipping.

With that in mind, Iran’s weapon is remarkably relevant to the situation, assuming it works. But even if it doesn’t, it could still pose a risk to mariners even if its efficacy is questionable.

Furthermore, being able to turn any launcher for Fajr-5s (and/or potentially ones for other types of artillery rockets) into a naval mine layer rather than having to rely on specialized systems would be a boon unto itself. Artillery rockets and launchers are something Iran had deep stockpiles of before the war with the United States and Israel started earlier this year. How many naval mine rockets Iran might have, and whether it might be possible to convert existing types to that configuration, are open questions.

Using a road-mobile launcher would also give Iranians a ‘shoot-and-scoot’ option for deploying naval mines where the launch could be exposed only for a short period of time. This, in turn, would create additional targeting challenges for U.S. forces. It is possible that, as it does elsewhere, Iran has constructed tunnels under Larak Island to hide these systems, as well. 

Overall, the “deployment of naval mines by missile significantly speeds up the deployment process, improves the ability to penetrate airspace, and increases the standoff distance between the minelayer and the field, making it the least risky minelaying method,” a piece published by the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) think tank last year, which also highlighted Iran’s apparent demonstration of the Fajr-5-based capability, noted.

While the Fajr-5’s estimated payload capacity is “light compared to U.S. or Chinese naval mines,” the mines the rockets could deliver “are still heavier than diver-delivered limpet mines and could conceivably disable a ship if struck by enough mines from the field,” the piece added. “Most importantly, this field could be delivered rapidly and with little warning. Even though the explosive capacity of this mine individually is small, the psychological impact from inflicting minor damage on a small number of merchants could still be enough to force shipping companies to avoid the area.”

“Though it’s a bit unconventional, using a rocket launcher again signals that the regime is sensitive to cost and risk, and is trying to deploy mines in a way that doesn’t put as much personnel at risk as by dropping them overboard,” Taleblu posited. “It was reported in the military exercise over a year ago that the regime had used an MLRS system like the Fajr to deploy these, but I haven’t seen significant video confirmation of this most recent round.”

With all this in mind, the point about “psychological impact” mentioned in the CIMSEC piece could be particularly relevant in this case. By launching the attacks on Larak Island, CENTCOM has in a way given credence to Iran having a real capability to launch mines via rocket into the Strait of Hormuz. That threat by itself could be enough to cause commercial ship crews, their corporate operators, and insurance companies to think twice about attempted transits.

This is exactly the issue that President Trump, among others, has repeatedly sought to downplay, including multiple times just within the past week.

“We’re taking them in,” Trump told Glenn Beck last week. “The mines are gone. You probably saw that, we put it out yesterday, all the mines. We got rid of the mines. But the strait, it’s functioning, it’s a functioning strait. Uh, yes, every once in a while, there’ll be a drone or a rocket or something shot, but it is a very functioning strait.”

“Last week, CENTCOM completed clearing sea mines from the strait’s international shipping routes,” Hawkins, the CENTCOM spokesman, told us yesterday. “U.S. forces are monitoring the area closely and remain prepared to protect the free flow of commerce through this essential waterway.”

“The U.S. military has achieved a major milestone in the Strait of Hormuz,” Adm. Brad Cooper, CENTCOM’s commander, stated last week. “We have successfully cleared sea mines in the strait’s international shipping lanes that were laid months ago by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Internationally recognized transit routes in the strait are free of Iranian sea mines, thanks to the incredible work of the U.S. military.”

Update from CENTCOM Commander: pic.twitter.com/osPbltjJ1C

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) August 28, 2026

CENTCOM pushed back Monday on Iranian claims that an oil tanker was hit by mines in the command’s preferred transit route.

“CLAIM: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claims that a supertanker passing through the southern route of the Strait of Hormuz struck two mines and was brought to a complete stop. This is FALSE,” the command stated on X. “FACT: No ships have hit mines in the Strait of Hormuz. This is yet another IRGC attempt to intimidate regional commercial shipping through disinformation.”

CLAIM: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claims that a supertanker passing through the southern route of the Strait of Hormuz struck two mines and was brought to a complete stop. This is FALSE.

FACT: No ships have hit mines in the Strait of Hormuz. This is… pic.twitter.com/spkaogBx81

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) August 31, 2026

Still, the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) — a group of international navies which provides timely information to the shipping industry — sees mines as an ongoing risk in the strait.

“Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained at reduced levels, with a modest uptick from recent lows, still far below baseline,” JMIC stated on Sunday. “Independent tracking data indicated suppression with single-digit numbers transiting in both directions. There remained a continued risk of drifting or uncharted mines in and near the TSS, with mine danger areas still active.”

JMIC Advisory Note Update 091

Released by UKMTO on behalf of the Joint Maritime Information Centre.

Click here to view the full advisory note https://t.co/jHInhBdVRt#MaritimeSecurity #MarSec pic.twitter.com/T6VzzxSdPD

— UKMTO Operations Centre (@UK_MTO) August 30, 2026

The combination of ongoing dangers in the strait continues to result in reduced traffic, the global trade intelligence firm Kpler noted on X.

“Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb declined on 25 August, while the IMO [International Maritime Organization] verified no additional attacks,” Kpler added. “Five vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz, down 28.6% day on day from seven. All five used the Iranian Unilateral Scheme, with two entering the Middle East Gulf and three exiting. Four were classified as shadow vessels and one as sanctioned.”

Strait crossings remain subdued

Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb declined on 25 August, while the IMO verified no additional attacks. Five vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz, down 28.6% day on day from seven. All five used the Iranian Unilateral… pic.twitter.com/BI9cFAaJRy

— Kpler (@Kpler) August 26, 2026

The latest flare-up in fighting came after the Trump administration last week unleashed the threat of harsh new sanctions to further isolate Iran. However, that failed to move Tehran to change its position on maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, its nuclear ambitions or support for proxies like the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Monday morning, Trump told Fox News reporter Trey Yingst that he was going to retaliate for Iran launching ballistic missiles last night after the U.S. strike on Larak Island.

“We’re going to hit them hard,” Trump told the network. “There will be a response.”

President Trump says the United States will respond to the Iranian missile attack on U.S. forces overnight.

"We're going to hit them hard," President Trump told Fox News. "There will be a response." pic.twitter.com/sjLOLSxm4g

— Trey Yingst (@TreyYingst) August 31, 2026

Trump and his senior aides “have been considering waging limited strikes in the Strait of Hormuz to prevent Iran from reconstituting its radar and missile capabilities to attack ships,” Axios reported, according to three U.S. officials. 

“One U.S. official said the idea behind the plan is to reduce the risk of Iranian attacks on oil tankers, U.S. Navy ships and Air Force aircraft — to ‘mow the lawn,’ as this person put it.”

It is unclear if Iran has used rockets to mine the strait or how well this system works if it did. However, the fact the U.S. resumed hostilities just to attack sea-mine-launching rocket systems shows the level of concern they engendered and the options Iran may still have to threaten the strait.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Iranian Launchers Struck By U.S. Held Exotic And Highly Concerning Rocket-Delivered Sea Mines appeared first on TWZ.

A new Ukrainian intelligence report details the complex production chain behind Russia’s shadowy 3M22 Zircon missile and identifies U.S.-origin electronics inside one of Russia’s most advanced weapons. New details also add weight to the theory that the weapon is a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile rather than a true hypersonic cruise missile.

The unusually detailed new breakdown of the Zircon missile identifies 70 enterprises and 84 individuals involved in its development and production while providing a component-by-component look at one of Moscow’s most closely watched — and least-understood — weapons.

DIU exposes details of russia’s 3M22 Zircon ballistic missile — including its components, production chain, 70 companies involved, key personnel, and foreign equipment used to manufacture the weapon: https://t.co/oOBqjUb8dS pic.twitter.com/VqRSSA41iV

— Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (@DI_Ukraine) August 31, 2026

The first evidence of Zircon’s combat use emerged in February 2024, when Ukrainian officials displayed recovered debris after a Russian strike. The wreckage included distinctive engine and steering-system components that Ukrainian specialists used to identify the weapon.

Russia has since employed the missile on other occasions. Ukrainian authorities reported that a Zircon was launched from occupied Crimea during a major missile and drone strike in January 2026, as we reported at the time.

While initially developed for use from warships and submarines, Zircon is understood to have been employed from ground-based launchers against Ukraine, with modified launchers from the K-300P Bastion coastal defense system considered the most likely candidate.

The new entry on Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) War & Sanctions portal includes an interactive 3D model and identifies systems ranging from the missile’s radar seeker and onboard computer to its propulsion system and warhead. It also identifies foreign-origin electronics, including components associated with U.S. manufacturers.

Among them, according to the GUR report, is a TGA2704 amplifier associated with TriQuint Semiconductor, now part of U.S. company Qorvo. The GUR also identifies an Altera Cyclone II EP2C5T144I8N field-programmable gate array (FPGA) associated with Altera Corporation, now part of Intel, and lists it as originating in the United States.

The alleged findings do not establish that either company knowingly supplied Russia’s defense industry, nor do they explain precisely how the components reached Russian production lines. The GUR says it’s seeking additional information on their origins and supply chains. Bearing in mind previous precedents, China could potentially be one source, being a known vector globally for recycled chips.

Nevertheless, the disclosure highlights the continued presence of Western-origin electronics in Russia’s advanced weapons programs despite sanctions and export controls.

The GUR lists the Zircon as approximately 26 feet long, with a body diameter of 2.2 feet, and a warhead weighing about 265 pounds.

The agency gives a maximum speed of Mach 8-9, a flight altitude of approximately 19-25 miles, and a separate “maximum fixed speed” (presumably, sustained cruising speed) of Mach 6.8. These are Ukrainian intelligence assessments and cannot be independently verified.

The database identifies the 3B222 active radar-homing head, manufactured by NPP Radar MMS, and a Baget-83 onboard digital computer produced by KB Korund-M.

It also identifies the 3B915 guidance units, the 3G22 warhead, and the 3L2211 solid-fuel rocket motor manufactured by NPO Iskra. Other Russian companies provide altimeters, control systems, power supplies, and other components.

The reported propulsion information is particularly significant.

Russian and other sources have consistently described Zircon as a hypersonic cruise missile, implying an air-breathing propulsion system burning liquid propellant, capable of sustaining hypersonic flight.

However, the physical evidence for such a propulsion system has always been less clear.

Open-source analysis by Fabian Hinz has highlighted the apparent absence of a conventional air intake on Zircon. A scramjet- or ramjet-powered missile requires an intake to bring atmospheric oxygen into the engine, yet available imagery does not clearly show one. A Russian patent associated with the missile’s jettisonable launch cap likewise does not reveal an obvious intake arrangement.

Just published my new OSINT investigation into Russia's secretive Zircon missile whose combat use has risen sharply in 2026.

Available evidence suggests that Zircon is not a hypersonic cruise missile but rather a quasi-ballistic system.

Link: https://t.co/8DoQePRpX3 pic.twitter.com/bIBS532FUB

— Fabian Hinz (@fab_hinz) June 17, 2026

More significant is evidence from recovered missile debris.

Material examined by Ukraine’s Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise included a circular metal structure interpreted as part of a solid-propellant rocket motor. The hardware appeared to be associated with Zircon’s second stage rather than simply its launch booster (which would be used on a true hypersonic cruise missile to bring it up to operating speed). This suggests a two-stage weapon, with a solid-propellant rocket in each. This would match with what we have seen during shipboard launches.

That finding is consistent with Russian patent activity involving NPO Mashinostroyeniya and NPO Iskra. Patents associated with the companies describe solid-propellant rocket motors incorporating arrangements for aerodynamic-control equipment around the motor’s exhaust system.

There is also evidence that Russian engineers developed advanced composite solid propellants specifically for Zircon.

None of this conclusively proves the missile lacks an air-breathing engine, but it certainly raises more questions about its classification. It should be noted that there are also some solid-fuel ramjet concepts, but these are much rarer applications.

If Zircon is primarily rocket-powered, it may be better understood as a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile that nonetheless reaches hypersonic speeds.

Such a weapon would use rocket propulsion to accelerate rapidly and climb to high altitude before descending toward its target along a trajectory that is partly ballistic but incorporates aerodynamic maneuvering — a so-called ‘porpoising’ or ‘skip-glide’ trajectory. It could therefore reach hypersonic speeds without requiring sustained cruise under the power of an air-breathing system. The combination of high speed and unpredictable trajectory also makes it notably difficult for air defenses to deal with, characteristics shared with the air-launched Kinzhal, another Russian quasi-ballistic missile.

That interpretation could also help explain reports of a highly variable Zircon speed profile.

Russian officials have claimed that the missile can reach approximately Mach 9. During a 2020 test, Russian military leadership said Zircon reached more than Mach 8 while flying to an altitude of roughly 17 miles.

A Russian Ministry of Defense video that claims to show the Zircon test in the White Sea on Oct. 6, 2020:

Ukrainian assessments have described a more complicated profile, with the missile reportedly flying at around Mach 5.5, accelerating to approximately Mach 7.5 near the target, and then slowing before impact. Those figures cannot be independently confirmed, but a boost-and-glide or quasi-ballistic trajectory could produce such a profile more naturally than sustained powered cruise.

Ru MoD released a somewhat better Zircon launch footage. pic.twitter.com/bxHa6DsFG7

— krakek (@krakek1) December 3, 2024

At the same time, it should be recalled that ‘hypersonic’ does not necessarily imply a ‘hypersonic cruise missile.’ A ballistic or quasi-ballistic weapon can travel well above Mach 5, which appears to be the case here. The characteristics of the Zircon, as presented by the GUR, would also help explain official Ukrainian claims that the missiles have been intercepted successfully by Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems.

There is also a relevant technological precedent. NPO Mashinostroyeniya has previously patented solid-propellant missiles using quasi-ballistic trajectories, including designs intended to maneuver at high-supersonic and hypersonic speeds. That does not establish a direct lineage to Zircon, but it does show that the concept is consistent with the company’s history.

The other major takeaway from the release is the scale of Zircon’s production network.

One of Russia’s leading missile houses, NPO Mashinostroyeniya is identified as the missile’s main designer and manufacturer and prime contractor for Russian Ministry of Defense contracts covering its development and production.

But the weapon depends on dozens of other organizations. NPO Iskra supplies the solid-fuel motor; NPP Radar MMS provides the radar seeker; KB Korund-M produces the onboard computer; and other enterprises supply guidance systems, altimeters, control electronics, warheads, power systems, and other specialized equipment.

Another video, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense in May 2022, is said to show the Gorshkov launching a Zircon, although the missile is seen only at a distance with no details visible:

The U.S.-origin electronics claimed to have been identified by GUR are particularly notable because they demonstrate how Russia’s sophisticated weapons production remains connected to international semiconductor supply chains.

By linking specific enterprises and individuals to individual missile components, Ukraine has provided governments and investigators with new information that could be used to pursue sanctions, export-control enforcement, and efforts to disrupt Russia’s supply chain.

The report also adds weight to continued open-source assessments of what kind of missile Zircon actually is.

Regardless of its classification, Zircon remains a formidable weapon. A rocket-powered missile capable of reaching hypersonic speeds, flying at high altitude, maneuvering, and potentially accelerating during its terminal approach presents a serious challenge to missile defenses. With Ukraine’s ability to intercept even more conventional ballistic missiles already severely eroded, the weapon further complicates the country’s troubling air defense picture.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Russia’s Zircon May Not Be A Hypersonic Cruise Missile After All appeared first on TWZ.

The first of Japan’s two new cruiser-sized Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV) is continuing to take shape, recently receiving its huge main integrated mast, giving the vessel a new and remarkably imposing silhouette. The four very large fixed arrays for the ship’s powerful AN/SPY-7(V)1 radar will eventually be integrated onto this structure. The ASEV’s stated primary mission is missile defense, but Japanese authorities plan to give the vessels additional counter-drone, anti-ship, and land attack capabilities in the future. Tomahawk cruise missiles are notably set to be added to the ship’s arsenal down the line.

The ASEVs are large surface combatants, set to be some 620 feet long, have a beam (the widest point of the hull) of some 82 feet, and a standard displacement of 12,000 tons. For comparison, Japan’s largest surface combatants today, its Maya class destroyers, are just over 557 feet long, have a beam of some 73 feet, and a standard displacement of around 8,200 tons. It is worth noting here that the size of new and advanced destroyers, often optimized for anti-air warfare missions, has been trending upward globally in recent years. This, in turn, has caused the line between destroyers and what have more historically been categorized as cruisers in certain cases.

The first ASEV was laid down at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ (MHI) shipyard in Nagasaki in July 2025. The second was laid down in February of this year at Japan Marine United Isogo shipyard, which is situated in Yokohama City near Tokyo, according to a past report from Naval News. The Japanese Ministry of Defense is currently aiming to have the first of these vessels in service before the end of the country’s 2027 Fiscal Year, which runs from April 2027 to March 2028. The second is expected to follow in the 2028 fiscal cycle, which extends into 2029.

Significant progress in the overall construction of the first ship has been made just this year. The addition of the main mast structure, installed on top of the main superstructure, as seen in pictures at the top of this story and below, has drawn particular attention in recent weeks.

Japanese are very fast with ship building.

March 26 and today. ASEV-class destroyer.

190 m hull, SPY-7 Aegis, 128cell Mk 41 VLS. SM-3 for ballistic missiles, SM-6, plus Japan’s long range Type 12 SSM. pic.twitter.com/RQZixtqWwe

— 信濃 Æýà (@Shinano_AEya) August 30, 2026

The especially large size of the ASEV’s integrated mast is driven by that of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar from Lockheed Martin. Each one of the radar’s four rectangular arrays is reportedly around 14 feet (nearly 4.3 meters) tall. This would put them in the same general size category as the arrays for Raytheon’s AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) found on U.S. Navy Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyers. That being said, the pictures we have now raise the question of whether the AN/SPY-7(V)1 arrays are bigger than previously assessed. The AMDR is another notably large design heavily optimized for missile defense.

The size and location of the mast provide a centralized, elevated position for the AN/SPY-7(V)1’s large arrays, which will also require significant power generation capacity and thermal management to keep everything cool. This is a notable departure from the placement of the arrays on the main superstructure on existing Japanese destroyers, as well as the U.S. Arleigh Burke class, and offers an unobstructed, elevated line-of-sight to the horizon. Beyond the ballistic missile defense mission, this view farther out over the horizon would be important for tracking and engaging low-flying drones and cruise missiles, which might be targeting the ship itself. This is something we will come back to later on.

“With five times the tracking capability of the SPY-1, it [the AN/SPY-7(V)1] counters lofted trajectories and simultaneous multiple ballistic missile threats,” according to a machine translation of a section of the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s 2026 defense policy white paper, which was released earlier this month.

The passive electronically-scanned array (PESA) AN/SPY-1 was the first radar to be paired with the Aegis Combat System, and both were first introduced in the 1970s. Variants of the SPY-1 are still found on a variety of U.S. and foreign Aegis-equipped warships, including Japan’s Kongo, Atago, and Maya class destroyers.

The AN/SPY-7(V)1 is also a derivative of the U.S. military’s static, land-based Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Alaska. Japan also originally planned to employ the AN/SPY-7(V)1 on land at a pair of Aegis Ashore missile defense sites. However, that effort was subsequently cancelled, with the ASEV emerging to fill the resulting gap.

Additional versions of the AN/SPY-7 with much smaller arrays are also being integrated onto new F110 Bonifaz class frigates for the Spanish Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy’s forthcoming River class destroyers (also known as the Canadian Surface Combatant). The use of the AN/SPY-7(V)1 on the ASEV could impact decisions regarding new radars for other future and existing Japanese warships. Raytheon is also pitching versions of its increasingly popular AN/SPY-6 family for use on a successor to the Kongo class and for refit on the Maya class, according to a recent report from Naval News.

When it comes to the ASEV, as already noted, the AN/SPY-7(V)1 is central to the ship’s main stated missile defense mission. As the name makes clear, the ship will also feature the Aegis Combat System. The vessel will be capable of “remote engagement and guidance against anti-air targets tracked by other vessels” via a “Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC),” per the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual defense white paper.

The video below provides details about the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) developments, which are likely very similar to what Japan has planned for the ASEV.

In terms of armament, when the ASEVs first enter service, their main weaponry is expected to be a mix of variants of the Standard Missile-3 and -6 (SM-3 and SM-6). The SM-3 family is designed to engage ballistic missile threats during the mid-course portion of their flights while they are traveling outside of the Earth’s atmosphere. The SM-3 also has a demonstrated anti-satellite capability. The SM-6 is a multi-purpose missile that was originally designed with an anti-air focus. It can be used to target incoming ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight and also has at least a degree of capability for engaging hypersonic weapons. SM-6 can be used in a surface-to-surface mode, including against ships, as well. Japan is also a partner in the U.S.-led development of a new Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), which is being designed specifically to intercept unpowered, but highly maneuverable hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.

SM-3, SM-6, and future GPIs will be loaded into either of the ASEV’s two Vertical Launch System (VLS) arrays, one at the bow end and another toward the stern. Each one of the ships will have a total of 128 VLS cells. For comparison, Japan’s Maya class destroyers, as well as the U.S. Navy’s Flight IIA and III Arleigh Burke class destroyers, have 96 VLS cells apiece. The U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga class cruisers each have 122 VLS cells, and 128 is also the number of VLSs currently expected to be found on the future Trump class battleships.

At the time of writing, Japanese authorities do not appear to have explicitly mentioned plans to arm the ASEVs with other missiles when they first enter service. That being said, any VLS array capable of accommodating SM-3s and SM-6s should be able to fire a variety of other weapons, including shorter-ranged SM-2s and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), which the ship could use for more localized air and missile defense, as well as protecting the ship itself.

Renderings and models of the ASEV do show the design also armed with a five-inch naval gun in a turret on the bow, along with two Phalanx Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) and other automatic cannons for point defense.

As mentioned, while missile defense is the immediate focus for the ASEVs, there are already plans to significantly expand their capability to engage other ships and targets on land. Tomahawk cruise missiles and a new, extended-range version of the Type 12 anti-ship cruise missile are set to be added to the arsenal of these vessels in the 2032 timeframe, according to the latest official Japanese defense white paper.

Japanese authorities want the ASEVs to eventually be able to help fend off waves of enemy drones, too. High-energy laser-directed energy weapons are set to be integrated onto the ships down the line to help address those threats. The overall size and other general characteristics of the ships would leave the door open to the possible addition of high-power microwaves and other capabilities in the future.

TWZ has long noted that the ASEVs will bring huge new boosts in naval air and missile defense and long-strike capability to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces. The vessels also reflect a significant evolution in post-World War II Japanese doctrine, toward what officials currently frame as a “stand-off defense” construct that remains within the bounds of the country’s current pacifist constitution.

Just with SM-3, SM-6, and GPI, the ASEVs will offer an important addition to the air and missile defense bubbles around Japan’s home islands and outlying territories in the face of growing geopolitical friction with China and Russia, two countries that are increasingly cooperating militarily. The vessels will also add to Japan’s deterrent against long-standing and still evolving threats posed by the regime in North Korea, which has its own close ties to the Chinese and Russian governments. All three of these nations continue to expand their arsenals of ever-more capable ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. Long-range one-way-attack drones are another growing part of the equation, with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and fighting in the Middle East in recent years underscoring just how real a threat they pose.

With the addition of Tomahawks, the ASEVs, along with other Japanese warships, will gain the additional ability to threaten counterstrikes against targets on land (and potentially at sea) at least around 1,000 miles in any direction. As part of the broader stand-off defense strategy, the Japan Self Defense Forces is developing new land-based long-range strike capabilities, including hypersonic missiles, as well.

It is worth noting that with current plans to acquire only two ASEVs, these will be high-value but also low-density assets, which will have to be very deliberately deployed for maximum effect. They will also stand out as top-priority targets in any future conflict, and will need to be protected as such.

It is possible that the roles and missions of the ASEVs, just like their designs, could evolve further as time goes on. The threat ecosystem facing Japan will continue to evolve, likely more rapidly, in the coming years. The country is also expanding its naval capabilities in other ways, and with an eye toward more blue water operations. This includes expanded light carrier capabilities through refits of existing Izumo class ships. Anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles, among large volumes of more traditional threats, could see the ASEVs used as escorts, even if experimentally. While just two hulls are barely enough to keep one on patrol to protect Japan, more could be built for expeditionary applications.

Regardless, the ASEVs are set to be a major addition to the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s fleets that will have big ramifications. From the progress that is visible at the shipyard in Nagasaki, MHI looks to be well on track to deliver the first of these ships next year or two.

Special thanks to @kensakai9310 on X, who also goes by “Sakai,” for sharing recently taken pictures of the first ASEV under construction at MHI’s yard in Nagasaki with us.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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