France is accelerating work on the Rafale F5 standard, bringing forward development of a major new configuration of its combat aircraft at a time when the country’s planned next-generation fighter with Germany has effectively collapsed in its original form. The contracts cover the equipment judged to have the highest technical risk, ahead of the overall development contract for the F5 standard, expected for the end of this year.

The French defense procurement agency, the Direction générale de l’armement (DGA), ordered the first upstream development work for F5 from Dassault Aviation, Thales, MBDA, and Safran. The contracts cover key areas including navigation, datalinks, radar, electronic warfare, and propulsion, laying the groundwork for the next configuration of the Rafale, which is planned to enter service with the French Air and Space Force and the French Navy starting around 2033.

#Commande | Rafale F5

La DGA commande les 1ers travaux en amont du prochain lancement en réalisation du standard F5 du Rafale

Ils concernent notamment :
la centrale inertielle
le moteur
le radar
la suite d’autoprotection de l’avion
pic.twitter.com/n3uhBYqIvi

— Direction générale de l'armement (@DGA) September 9, 2026

The most extensive modernization of the Rafale yet, the F5 standard was originally part of a longer transition toward France’s next-generation combat-air capability. But with the Franco-German New Generation Fighter (NGF) effort now effectively dead in its original configuration, the accelerated F5 program is taking on a much larger strategic role.

Rather than simply keeping the Rafale relevant until NGF arrives, France is now developing a version of the aircraft that is set to carry much of the country’s high-end combat-air capability well into the 2030s and potentially beyond.

The increasingly capable F5 could, in turn, reduce the urgency of finding a replacement for the Rafale — while potentially adding to the fighter’s export appeal. After a slow start, Dassault has recorded export sales of 299 new-build Rafales to eight nations.

The DGA’s contracts engage four of France’s principal combat-aircraft industrial players. Dassault Aviation remains responsible for the aircraft and its overall integration; Thales is involved in major sensor, electronic warfare, and communications capabilities; MBDA is responsible for much of the weapons system; and Safran is responsible for propulsion.

Previous Rafale standards have largely consisted of incremental upgrades, focusing on software and other improvements to the existing aircraft configuration. F5 is notably more extensive, addressing many of the critical systems that determine how the aircraft senses the battlespace, communicates with other platforms, conducts electronic warfare, and generates the power needed to operate increasingly demanding equipment.

The DGA has specifically identified the Thales RBE2-XG radar as one of the major technological advances associated with F5.

The RBE2-XG is expected to feature gallium nitride (GaN) semiconductors. Compared with previous technology, GaN generates less heat and has the capacity to operate at higher voltages, meaning that output power can be increased, while component size can be reduced. Overall, using GaN should help to get more power out of the radar without increasing its size.

According to the DGA, “This new radar will benefit from a substantial increase in power, and consequently in detection range, as well as improvements in the identification of targets with an extremely low radar cross-section (RCS). Its computing capabilities will also be enhanced to facilitate the integration of artificial intelligence.”

The RBE2-XG will also be “designed with collaborative combat in mind, featuring sensors capable of working together without the need for pilot intervention.” It is also planned to have enhanced resilience, including against cyber threats.

France is already working on the concept of a combat drone to accompany the Rafale, with the future F5 standard providing the crewed aircraft around which those systems can operate.

The new radar will be combined with more capable electronic warfare equipment, improved communications and datalinks, expanded processing capacity, and a more capable propulsion system.

To be developed by MBDA and Thales, the forthcoming F5 version of the SPECTRA self-protection suite is intended to significantly improve detection and jamming capabilities, the DGA says, “through a fully digital approach, enabling a complete overhaul of the core electronic warfare system to counter the increasing density and broadening of the threat spectrum, as well as the growing complexity of threat waveforms, expected by 2035.”

Thales will also be responsible for the new Inter-Vehicle Data Link (IVDL) system, described as a “stealthy and resilient datalink.” The DGA says the new datalink will expand connectivity “thanks to a new high-speed, discreet, and jamming-resistant waveform. IVDL will allow the Rafale to penetrate hostile areas where jammers are widespread, while maintaining optimal quality of communication and dialogue between aircraft.”

Safran will begin preliminary design work on the M88 T-Rex engine, which is planned to increase the turbofan’s thrust from around 16,500 pounds to nearly 19,850 pounds, an increase of roughly 20 percent.

In terms of armament, the contract announcement mentions the ASN4G missile, set to be introduced to service by 2035, which will allow the Rafale F5 to continue to serve as the airborne nuclear component. The munition remains in the early stages of development, but it will be capable of hypersonic speeds — defined as speeds greater than Mach 5 — with a range in excess of 1,000 kilometers (621 miles).

Other likely new missiles include a beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile to succeed the current Meteor. As you can read about here, France’s Comet program, apparently led by the French side of MBDA, is already looking into this requirement, with an apparent plan to introduce the weapon around 2030.

An older video from MBDA showing some of the company’s weapons integrated on earlier versions of the Rafale:

For France, the original logic behind the pan-European FCAS program was that Rafale would eventually give way to the NGF as its principal crewed combat aircraft, operating from land bases and aircraft carriers.

With the collapse of the Franco-German effort, France cannot simply wait for a next-generation fighter program whose industrial and political future is uncertain. Instead, the Rafale has to remain capable against rapidly evolving threats throughout the 2030s and beyond.

With the F5 standard, however, France is looking to incorporate some of the concepts envisaged for NGF. These include distributed architectures in which crewed fighters, uncrewed aircraft, remote carriers, missiles, and offboard sensors cooperate across a battlespace.

A highly upgraded Rafale operating as the crewed controller of uncrewed combat aircraft and remote weapons could perform some of the missions that France originally expected from NGF.

For now, F5 also sidesteps the central problem in the now-defunct Franco-German effort: whether the two countries could agree on the requirements, industrial structure, and workshare behind a new-generation combat aircraft.

Despite its advances, the F5 airframe remains derived from a design dating back to the 1980s, which first entered French service in the early 2000s. In particular, it falls well short of fifth-generation designs — let alone sixth-generation ones — in terms of low observability. This is one area where collaborative drones could potentially help compensate for the Rafale’s inherent limitations.

France has therefore bought itself some time with the F5 program. But it may eventually decide that it needs a future high-end crewed fighter to provide capabilities that an upgraded fourth-generation airframe cannot fully replicate, particularly in terms of survivability against advanced integrated air-defense systems, signature reduction, internal weapons carriage, and operations deep inside heavily contested airspace.

On an industrial level, F5 is also significant because it brings together the same French industrial heavyweights that would have formed the backbone of its FCAS effort. Dassault Aviation, Thales, Safran, and MBDA are now well-positioned to work together on whatever comes after F5, whether that is a crewed combat aircraft, uncrewed CCA-type platforms, or a combination of both. Based on its experience with the nEUROn program, France would be well placed to develop a UCAV that can work cooperatively as well as independently, taking over the deeper-penetrating fighter mission set, and potentially skipping a sixth-generation fighter altogether.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=frNsu7g7r94

Meanwhile, success with F5 — and, in particular, with the wider combat ecosystem planned around it — could put France in an even stronger position when it comes to any future European fighter project.

For the time being, Britain, Italy, and Japan are pursuing the GCAP/Tempest pathway toward a new combat aircraft. Germany and Spain remain tied to the wider FCAS architecture, even as the original Franco-German NGF arrangement has fractured. Sweden’s position is less clear, with indications that it could collaborate with either France or Germany.

France, for its part, is now investing heavily in an increasingly sophisticated Rafale architecture while maintaining its own sovereign industrial base.

In terms of acqusition, France is expected to pursue a mixed approach, buying new-build Rafales while upgrading suitable aircraft already in service to the F5 standard. The oldest jets are unlikely to receive the full F5 treatment, however.

The irony is that the failure of the NGF effort may ultimately make Rafale F5 more important — and potentially more capable — than it was ever expected to be.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post France Accelerates Rafale F5 Upgrade After Collapse Of FCAS Next-Gen Fighter Project appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine has unveiled a new domestically developed surface-to-air missile system designed to turn a diverse collection of air-to-air missiles into a flexible ground-based air defense capability. Called Shershen, Ukrainian for hornet, the system combines a locally-developed command-and-control architecture, a dedicated surveillance radar, and multiple launchers that can employ both Ukrainian and Western missiles.

The system was displayed at the MSPO defense exhibition in Kielce, Poland, by the National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries (NAUDI). The example shown is reportedly the second operational prototype and is described as being close to its production configuration.

At the ongoing MSPO-2026 defense and industrial exhibition in Poland, the launcher of the Ukrainian Shershen air defense system, developed by Radionix, has been presented for the first time, along with the R-120K surface-to-air guided missile specially developed for it (second… pic.twitter.com/5RfZWHWuxl

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) September 9, 2026

The appearance of Shershen comes as Ukraine continues to develop an increasingly diverse family of indigenous air defense systems, while simultaneously adapting older missiles and foreign-supplied weapons to address a severe shortage of interceptors.

That effort has produced some distinctly unconventional combinations. Ukraine’s so-called FrankenSAM programs have paired existing Soviet-era launchers and radars with Western missiles, while other systems have adapted Soviet R-73 air-to-air missiles for ground launch. The United Kingdom and Denmark have also worked with Ukraine on the containerized Gravehawk system, another concept built around repurposed air-to-air missiles.

Shershen takes that philosophy a step further by making missile interchangeability a central feature of the system.

The Shershen battery consists of a Perun command-and-control vehicle, an Athena radar, and four Borei launchers.

According to the developer, the system’s architecture is deliberately open. This allows it to use different missiles from different manufacturers and also permits the integration of third-party surveillance and guidance radars.

The company says Shershen can currently employ the R-27 (AA-10 Alamo), R-73 (AA-11 Archer), AIM-9 Sidewinder, and AIM-132 ASRAAM, while compatibility with the R-60 is also being explored. These weapons come with a mix of semi-active radar or infrared homing seeker heads.

Air-to-air missiles are already available in considerable variety across Ukraine’s arsenal and those of its foreign partners. Being able to employ several types from a common ground-based system provides much more flexibility than a conventional SAM designed around one dedicated interceptor.

It also offers a way to exploit missiles that were never originally intended to be fired from the ground. That means Shershen’s launcher and fire-control system are meant to be interceptor agnostic, at least to a certain degree.

Shershen’s Athena radar is reported to be capable of detecting targets at ranges of up to 85 kilometers (53 miles).

In terms of the engagement envelope, Shershen is claimed to be capable of engaging aircraft, cruise missiles, and drones at ranges of up to 25 kilometers (16 miles) and altitudes of up to 10,000 meters (32,800 feet). Clearly, these figures will vary widely depending on the type of interceptor.

When employing radar-guided missiles, the system’s engagement architecture can reportedly guide as many as six missiles simultaneously.

The advertised performance figures have not been independently verified, and it remains unclear what target types and engagement conditions were used to establish them.

Україна представила складові мультикаліберного зенітного ракетного комплексу «Шершень» на міжнародній виставці MSPO 2026 у польському місті Кельце.

Міжнародний консорціум компаній Shershen Group, який створює ЗРК в інтересах України представив, показав командний пункт,… pic.twitter.com/9wAS7ewxzg

— Мілітарний (@mil_in_ua) September 10, 2026

The developer says the second prototype has completed initial testing, including successful interceptions at a test range.

One of the Borei launchers displayed at MSPO were armed with an R-120K, a new Ukrainian missile equipped with a radar seeker and is intended to be capable of both air-to-air and surface-to-air employment.

The R-120K remains under development, however. Work is reportedly continuing on its rocket motor, meaning that its eventual performance and production status remain uncertain. Still, having the option of including the R-120K on the Shershen system in the future is significant.

Rather than relying indefinitely on stocks of Soviet and Western air-to-air missiles, Ukraine could eventually have a domestically produced interceptor specifically tailored to its growing family of ground-based air-defense systems. That will become increasingly important as stocks of legacy missiles are depleted. Earlier this year, it was reported that Ukrainian F-16s were running low on their air-to-air missiles, which include the same AIM-9s that are used in some FrankenSAM systems, as well as being compatible with Shershen. But even before that, it was clear that Western-supplied missile stocks in Ukraine across the board were diminishing, in some cases drastically, with critical interceptors like the AMRAAM and Patriot being badly affected.

Ukraine’s need for additional surface-to-air missiles has become increasingly acute during the full-scale war, especially as Russian drone and missile barrages have stepped up.

The shortage has encouraged Ukraine to pursue a combination of indigenous development and unconventional adaptations.

The FrankenSAM initiative, conducted with U.S. support, demonstrated how existing Ukrainian systems could be combined with foreign missiles to rapidly create additional air-defense capacity. Ukraine has also fielded modified Osa systems armed with R-73 air-to-air missiles rather than their original 9M33 interceptors. Other R-73-based concepts have even been demonstrated aboard Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels.

Shershen appears to reflect the next logical step in that evolution: rather than creating a one-off FrankenSAM combination, build an architecture from the outset that can accept multiple missiles. Additionally, with so many different ground-based air defense systems now being fielded, it comes with the significant advantage of a standardized launcher and control interface that can accommodate a range of interceptors.

At the same time, Ukraine is pursuing substantially more ambitious indigenous SAM projects.

Earlier this year, a previously secretive Ukrainian missile identified as the Koral made what appeared to be its first public appearance. The program dates back to at least 2021, when Ukraine’s Luch design bureau presented a concept for a medium-range surface-to-air missile.

Koral is intended to provide a much longer-range capability, potentially filling some of the gap left by Ukraine’s aging Soviet systems and supplementing the Western-supplied Patriot and SAMP/T.

Shershen, by contrast, is clearly focused on the short-range layer.

Together, the programs illustrate the breadth of Ukraine’s emerging domestic air-defense effort: from relatively inexpensive systems built around repurposed air-to-air missiles to new, purpose-designed interceptors intended to replace or augment Soviet-era systems.

Ukraine’s experience with FrankenSAM has demonstrated the value of getting unconventional air defense combinations into service quickly.

Once fielded, Shershen, with its architecture capable of accepting different Soviet-origin and Western-made interceptors, and eventually a Ukrainian one, gives Ukraine another way to stretch its missile inventory and enhance its air defense capabilities.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ukraine’s New Shershen SAM Can Fire A Wild Mix Of Adapted Air-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.

The Oregon Air National Guard’s 142nd Wing has taken another significant step toward turning the F-15EX Eagle II into a true multirole fighter, conducting the first live-bomb drops from operational F-15EXs during training at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The milestone came during a roughly three-week deployment to Nellis in late August and early September in support of the U.S. Air Force’s Weapons Instructor Course (WIC).

Photographs released by the Air National Guard yesterday show F-15EXs from the 142nd Wing carrying live bombs on the flight line and departing Nellis with the weapons loaded. Official imagery shows the jets armed with a single 500-pound Mk 82 freefall bomb on the fuselage centerline, while spotters also captured F-15EXs carrying a 2,000-pound Mk 84 freefall bomb in the same position.

View this post on Instagram

The 142nd’s F-15EXs are only now acquiring a capability that was deliberately absent from the wing’s previous F-15C fleet. The Portland, Oregon-based unit was an air-superiority organization when it operated the F-15C, while the F-15EX is ultimately derived from the F-15E Strike Eagle and has considerably more inherent multirole potential.

As we reported in July, the wing had already begun laying the groundwork for this transition. In May, 142nd personnel traveled to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, where they loaded and dropped inert BDU-50 and BDU-56 training bombs from their F-15EXs. Those weapons replicate the size and weight of 500-pound-class Mk 82-series and 2,000-pound-class Mk 84-series bombs. Over 10 missions, the crews dropped 24 BDU-50s and 12 BDU-56s.

While the F-15EX had already been tested in an air-to-ground role by the Air Force’s test community, the Mountain Home deployment was the first time an operational Eagle II unit had loaded and dropped bombs. The next step, the wing said at the time, would be live weapons employment at Nellis.

The Air Force has emphasized that the F-15EX’s primary mission remains defensive and offensive counter-air, particularly in the homeland-defense role. At the same time, the service’s plans call for the aircraft to provide combatant commanders with strike packages capable of operating in contested environments.

The F-15EX is inherently well suited to such a mission. Derived from the Strike Eagle lineage, it combines that aircraft’s large payload capacity and long range with substantially modernized avionics and electronic warfare systems. The aircraft’s design leaves considerable room for additional weapons and mission equipment, making an expansion into air-to-ground operations relatively straightforward compared with trying to add that capability to the F-15C.

The 142nd has been building the institutional knowledge required to make that transition. Three of its pilots underwent a nine-month course covering the science, tactics, and procedures associated with air-to-ground weapons employment before returning to help establish the wing’s training program. Weapons personnel also traveled to Nellis earlier this year to work with F-15Es assigned to the 59th Test and Evaluation Squadron and become certified in bomb loading procedures.

As well as teaching pilots how to release a weapon, the wing had to develop an entirely new air-to-ground training pipeline for pilots, maintainers, and weapons personnel at a unit that had not previously operated an aircraft with an operational bombing mission.

Nellis is home to the Air Force’s Weapons School and is central to the Weapons Instructor Course, making it one of the most important locations in the service for developing and evaluating advanced tactics. The 142nd’s participation therefore places its emerging F-15EX air-to-ground capability in an environment specifically focused on integrating advanced weapons, tactics, and mission planning.

The wing’s new live bomb-dropping capability also comes as the Air Force continues to explore how broadly the Eagle II can be employed.

Test and evaluation units have already demonstrated that the aircraft can accommodate sophisticated air-to-ground weapons. Earlier this year, an F-15EX from the 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron participated in a munitions-load training event at Kadena Air Base in Japan, where Air Force personnel practiced loading live GBU-53/B Small Diameter Bomb IIs onto the aircraft.

The F-15EX is also capable of carrying the conformal fuel tanks used by the F-15E, which can provide additional fuel as well as additional weapons stations. The operational F-15EXs delivered to the 142nd have so far been seen without CFTs, however, and the status of the plan to equip the Oregon aircraft with them remains unclear.

CFTs could become increasingly important if the Air Force moves toward more demanding air-to-ground missions for the Eagle II, particularly those requiring substantial weapons loads and long-range operations.

Another unresolved question is how the Air Force will ultimately crew F-15EXs when they are performing more complex multirole missions.

The Eagle II retains the F-15E family’s two-seat cockpit, although the Air Force’s initial operational concept has generally involved flying the aircraft with a single pilot. That leaves an unused cockpit that could potentially become an important asset as the mission set expands.

Former 142nd Wing commander Col. Michael Kosderka previously told TWZ that the addition of a weapons systems officer or other specialist in the rear cockpit could open the door to more air-to-ground capabilities.

“We can start talking about putting all kinds of air-to-ground capabilities into the airplane, potentially putting WSOs or other experts in the backseat as well to have us do any number of multi-role capabilities that it’s just physically not possible to in the C model,” Kosderka told TWZ in an interview back in 2024. “So the X has tremendous growth capability. It’s really exciting.”

Two crew would be particularly relevant to complex strike missions, where managing sensors, weapons, communications, electronic warfare, and other mission systems can place substantial demands on a single pilot. As we have discussed in the past, a back-seater would also be highly beneficial for the emerging drone controller role.

The Weapons School has also been associated with developing two-seat F-15EX operations, indicating that the second cockpit’s utility is already being considered at the tactical-development level.

For now, it would be premature to characterize the F-15EX as an operational replacement for the F-15E Strike Eagle in the air-to-ground role. The 142nd’s newly demonstrated bombing capability remains part of an ongoing training and development process.

Meanwhile, the Air Force is preparing to field substantially larger numbers of F-15EXs. Beyond the 142nd, additional Guard units are planned to receive the type, in California and Louisiana, as well as Michigan.

The Air Force has announced plans to base F-15EXs at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, where they will eventually replace older F-15Es, which, in turn, are slated to move to Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, as part of a broader realignment of the Eagle fleet.

Another two active-duty F-15EX squadrons are slated to replace the former F-15C force at Kadena. The first F-15EX for permanent assignment at Kadena recently departed Boeing’s St. Louis, Missouri, facility for the 142nd Wing, where it will undergo final preparations before its eventual deployment to sprawling Okinawa.

The operational implications of the air-to-ground training therefore extend well beyond Portland.

The Eagle II’s generous weapons payload, long range, modern sensors and electronic warfare systems, and ability to carry both air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons give the Air Force a platform that can potentially perform several missions without sacrificing the characteristics that make the F-15 attractive for homeland defense and counter-air operations. The same characteristics are also extremely relevant to any export operator, which would expect to operate the Eagle II in a multirole capacity.

As well as a weapons-training milestone, the first live-bomb drops by the 142nd Wing provide more evidence that the F-15EX’s mission is continuing to evolve.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Operational F-15EXs Drop Live Bombs For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

Hermeus is developing an expendable ramjet-powered aircraft, Ramjet-X, which will be air-launched from its reusable, F-16-sized Quarterhorse high-speed drone. The result aims to create a two-vehicle architecture intended to make high-speed flight testing less dependent on expensive, single-use test platforms. That would give Hermeus and potential customers a way to conduct repeated high-Mach flight tests without expending a large booster on every mission.

America didn’t lose ground in high-speed flight because of a lack of ideas. We slowed down because flight tests became too expensive, too rare, and too cautious.

Meet Ramjet-X. Air-launched from the Quarterhorse program, it’s a low-cost, repeatable test vehicle built to fly and… pic.twitter.com/rMed6NhcvD

— Zach Shore (@Zsshore) September 9, 2026

The company unveiled the concept today. Hermeus says the Ramjet-X will be carried beneath Quarterhorse and released at a speed of around Mach 3, at which its ramjet can begin operating. The smaller vehicle will then accelerate, climbing to around 100,000 feet, and a speed in the region of Mach 4. Quarterhorse will then return to base and be available for another mission.

Imagery released by Hermeus shows a Quarterhorse carrying a Ramjet-X mounted on a pylon under each wing, indicating that two different high-speed tests can be carried out in a single sortie. Intriguingly, the Quarterhorse is shown with no fewer than six underwing hardpoints in all, suggesting that other kinds of external payloads are envisaged.

Hermeus has not released detailed performance specifications for Ramjet-X, including its range, payload capacity, or the critical expected cost per flight. We have reached out to the company for more information.

Images released by the company show a relatively compact, missile-like vehicle with delta wings incorporating prominent dihedral. There are no horizontal tail surfaces, but a conventional vertical fin is complemented by a ventral fin. Axios reports that Ramjet-X is approximately 22 feet long and 7 feet wide.

In terms of appearance, and also thanks to its ramjet propulsion system, the vehicle is outwardly very reminiscent of the Lockheed’s D-21 Tagboard supersonic spy drone. However, at more than 40 feet long and with a wingspan of 20 feet, the D-21 was significantly bigger. Overall, the entire concept recalls the Cold War-era D-21 and its M-21 mothership, on a smaller scale.

The basic concept aims to address a longstanding problem with ramjet flight testing. Unlike a conventional jet engine, a ramjet cannot provide useful thrust from a standstill. The vehicle therefore has to be accelerated to a sufficiently high speed before the ramjet can take over.

That acceleration can traditionally require another propulsion system, including an expendable rocket booster. Hermeus is proposing to substitute a reusable aircraft for that initial boost. It is unclear if the Ramjet-X vehicles are similarly recoverable, but we have asked Hermeus for more details here, too.

As it stands, flight-test programs of this kind are often constrained not only by the cost and availability of test infrastructure, but also by the limited availability of suitable airspace and range access. A reusable carrier aircraft could help address both challenges, allowing multiple Ramjet-X vehicles to be deployed from airports near a designated test range as required and launched only once the vehicle is within the approved test area. That flexibility could reduce the need for a new large booster for every experiment while also making it easier to conduct tests, including at shorter notice, within increasingly constrained airspace.

Hermeus says Ramjet-X is being designed not just for its own development work but as a potential test platform for outside customers. The company is calling the concept “Flight Test as a Service,” with customers able to fly payloads including sensors, communications equipment, computing and autonomy systems, materials, and propulsion hardware.

The program reflects a broader push toward increasing the availability of commercial high-speed flight testing that has attracted U.S. government interest.

Hermeus was also selected by the Defense Innovation Unit for work under its Hypersonic and High-Cadence Airborne Testing, or HyCAT, effort. That program is intended to use commercial flight-test capabilities to expand the government’s access to relevant high-speed environments.

The company is also pursuing its own increasingly ambitious Quarterhorse aircraft. Its Quarterhorse Mk 2.1 completed an uncrewed supersonic flight earlier this year, reaching Mach 1.21 on its third test flight. The company’s roadmap calls for subsequent Quarterhorse variants to progressively increase speed and address the thermal and propulsion challenges associated with high-Mach flight.

Supersonic. Mach 1.21.

Quarterhorse Mk 2.1 is now the world’s first privately developed, unmanned supersonic jet and the fastest unmanned aircraft flying today.

This flight makes Hermeus the fastest company in aviation history to go from founding to supersonic flight – exactly… pic.twitter.com/wjoIcdiEOj

— Hermeus (@hermeuscorp) May 26, 2026

The imagery released for Ramjet-X shows a different Quarterhorse configuration than the 2.1 version, including beefed-up landing gear with twin nosewheels. The requirement for release of the Ramjet-X at Mach 3 suggests that its launch platform will be the Quarterhorse Mk 2.3, which will be the first to reach this kind of speed. This summer, Hermeus confirmed that its second supersonic aircraft, the Quarterhorse Mk 2.2, and the Mach 3-capable Mk 2.3 aircraft were under construction.

For its future Quarterhorse Mk 3, Hermeus has been developing Chimera, a turbine-based combined-cycle propulsion system. This is intended to transition from turbine operation to ramjet operation as speed increases.

Ramjet-X effectively separates part of that problem into another aircraft and the system could also be useful for experiments that do not require an entire hypersonic aircraft.

For example, an organization developing a high-temperature material might need to know how it behaves in an actual high-speed flight environment, rather than only in a ground test. The same could apply to weapons, sensors, communications systems, guidance hardware, onboard computers, or other components intended for high-speed vehicles.

So far, however, it’s not clear what kind of flight profiles Ramjet-X will provide. Hermeus has mentioned a cruise phase lasting “tens of minutes.”

But a short-duration dash through a high-Mach regime is not equivalent to sustained flight at those speeds. The duration available to an experiment, thermal loads, acceleration, vibration, available electrical power, telemetry, maneuverability, and payload mass will all determine what can actually be tested.

The company says it is already testing the Ramjet-X propulsion system at its High Enthalpy Air-Breathing Test facility in Jacksonville, Florida. High-temperature structures are also under development at its El Segundo, California, headquarters. Integrated vehicle testing is currently planned for 2027.

The HEAT facility itself is part of Hermeus’ effort to establish high-speed propulsion test infrastructure. The company says the facility is being developed to eventually provide continuous high-Mach airflow for more flight-like ground testing.

Ramjet-X has yet to fly, but if it performs as intended, it could help lower one of the major barriers to obtaining real-world flight data at high Mach numbers. At the same time, the company is entering a market that is attracting growing interest from other aerospace firms, which are also expanding their high-speed flight-test capabilities, especially to capitalize on the broader hypersonics boom, including Stratolaunch.

There is fairly clear potential weaponization of this concept, for strike and surveillance missions, as well, although there has been no indication of that being in the works at this time.

The planned 2027 integrated testing should provide the first meaningful indication of whether the concept can progress to become a practical high-speed test capability.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Hermeus Unveils Air-Launched Ramjet Test Vehicle for High-Speed Experiments appeared first on TWZ.

Covenant, a previously little-known defense startup, has emerged with a new long-range strike weapon, named Anthem, which it says is intended to provide a cheaper, more readily producible alternative to existing cruise missiles. Already in testing with the U.S. Army, the missile reflects the growing focus on weapons in this class that can be manufactured quickly in very large numbers, even if they sacrifice a significant degree of individual-weapon capability compared to more ‘exquisite’ and costly alternatives.

Covenant, a U.S.-Israeli company founded in 2024, unveiled its Anthem weapon system today along with plans for production in the United States, Germany, and Israel. The company says it has already conducted more than 200 test flights of the weapon and has secured roughly $150 million in orders.

The announcement comes as the United States and its allies are increasingly focused on the availability of long-range precision weapons, particularly the ability to replenish inventories during a major conflict. Covenant’s central pitch is that existing weapons in this category are too expensive and difficult to manufacture in sufficient numbers for a prolonged war, a reality that has been recognized by a bewildering number of new and established industry players.

Anthem is being positioned accordingly as a high-volume weapon rather than a one-for-one replacement for larger, more expensive cruise missiles. In its initial form, it is ground-launched, although it is unclear exactly how this is achieved. Imagery of the weapon during Pentagon trials show it being handled on the ground using tricycle undercarriage, pointing to the use of a runway for launch.

Covenant has not publicly disclosed the weapon’s range, although unconfirmed reports put it at roughly 1,200 kilometers — over 740 miles. The company is also being somewhat deliberate about how it describes Anthem, referring to it as a “deep precision-strike munition” rather than consistently classifying it as a cruise missile.

On the other hand, Reuters reports Covenant executives saying that the missile was developed ‌with an ⁠eye toward future conflicts in the Pacific. “We were designed for the China fight,” said Covenant President Abby Denburg. That would also seem to point toward significant range.

However, more concrete details of its performance, as well as guidance type and projected level of survivability, remain undisclosed.

The company says Anthem can carry a warhead weighing more than 200 kilograms (441 pounds). That is substantially less than the roughly 1,000-pound-class warhead associated with the Tomahawk cruise missile, which can hit targets at over 1,000 miles depending on the exact configuration. Covenant argues that lower cost and much higher production rates would make it possible to employ larger numbers of their weapons against a given target set.

Anthem uses a solid rocket motor for launch and a heavy-fuel jet engine, underslung below the missile body, for cruise flight. Covenant says the system was designed from the outset around readily available components and a supply chain that would avoid dependence on individual suppliers. The company states that it has, for example, multiple solid-rocket-motor suppliers and long-term agreements covering thousands of jet engines.

Overall, the production ambitions are significant. Covenant’s new Grand Prairie, Texas, facility covers approximately 105,000 square feet and is expected to begin serial production during the first quarter of 2027, eventually reaching a stated capacity of 5,000 Anthems per year. Its facility in Saxony, Germany, is intended to reach a similar production rate, while the smaller Israeli site is planned to produce as many as 2,000 weapons annually.

“Germany possesses an exceptionally strong industrial foundation,” Denburg told Bloomberg News. “While its automotive sector is currently undergoing a structural transformation, decades of manufacturing excellence have created precisely the expertise we require.”

That would put the company’s eventual combined production target at up to 12,000 weapons per year, assuming all three facilities reach their planned capacities.

Covenant’s U.S. facility is intended primarily to support American customers, while the German operation is being established around a European supply chain, responding to growing demand for long-range strike weapons across that continent. The company says an unidentified international customer is expected to begin receiving German-built weapons before the end of this year. Meanwhile, U.S. Army deliveries are expected in 2027, under an accelerated qualification contract.

The weapon has already been subjected to U.S.-linked testing. In August, an unnamed defense-industry partner conducted a live-fire demonstration at the Africa Multidomain Training and Experimentation Center in Morocco. The U.S. military’s public material about that event did not identify the weapon or company, but subsequent reporting identified the missile as Covenant’s Anthem.

Covenant now says the system has flown more than 200 times over the past year, including testing involving U.S. government organizations. The company also says Anthem participated in the Army’s Project Convergence Capstone 6 experiments and that its August test helped demonstrate a new framework for allowing industry to use the Moroccan test infrastructure.

Beyond the ground-launched version, Covenant is working on a naval derivative. The company says it has a roughly $70-million contract with the Navy’s Rapid Capabilities Office to adapt Anthem into what it calls Maritime Anthem. The effort includes Defense Exportability Features intended to make the weapon easier to provide to U.S. allies and partners.

The emergence of Anthem also illustrates how the defense industry’s current emphasis on mass production is extending into the long-range strike arena.

The United States already fields weapons such as Tomahawk and JASSM-ER, but those systems are expensive, and production capacity is limited. Covenant is betting that a weapon available in much larger quantities can provide commanders with another layer of long-range strike capacity, even if the destructive power of a single round falls well below that of a Tomahawk. Reuters reports that Covenant expects the weapon to eventually cost in the mid-six-figure range, although the company has not provided a final unit price. Compared to other competitors in the field, Covenant appears to be the crudest design we have seen so far, underscored by its apparent launch method, in which it takes off from an airstrip under power of its booster.

Recent combat operations have increased concerns about the rate at which more traditional precision weapons can actually be manufactured. Once stockpiles begin to reduce, long-range missiles have proven among the most difficult munitions to replace. That would only become more problematic during a major conflict.

Covenant has attracted venture-capital backing to pursue that problem. The company says it has raised more than $250 million from investors including Andreessen Horowitz, Founders Fund, Lux Capital, 8VC, Aleph, and Lightspeed. Its stated focus, however, is now shifting from development to production.

The key question will be whether Covenant can turn the promised production numbers into sustained deliveries. Building thousands of long-range weapons per year requires not only an assembly plant, but also a resilient supply chain, reliable propulsion production, testing capacity, quality control, and the ability to integrate those elements at scale. It will also rely on securing more contracts from domestic and allied customers.

For now, however, Anthem represents an intriguing entrant into a crowded but increasingly important segment of the weapons market.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Army Now Testing Anthem Long-Range Strike Weapon Built for Mass Production appeared first on TWZ.

Poland has unveiled a full-sized demonstrator of a new heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) intended to put more armor and firepower between mechanized troops and the increasingly lethal threats of the modern battlefield. The unveiling comes as Poland undertakes a sweeping modernization of its armored forces, driven in large part by the threat posed by Russia.

Huta Stalowa Wola, part of state-owned Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa, presented the Ciężki Bojowy Wóz Piechoty (CBWP), or Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle, at the MSPO defense exhibition in Kielce, Poland, today. The vehicle, commonly referred to as Ratel (honey badger), is the latest step in a Polish effort to develop a heavily protected tracked combat platform that can complement the lighter, amphibious Borsuk (badger) infantry fighting vehicle.

“The demonstrator presented today confirms that Polish companies possess the expertise to design and develop advanced combat platforms that meet the demands of the modern battlefield,” Adam Leszkiewicz, president of PGZ’s management board, said during the unveiling.

OTO ON. CIĘŻKI BOJOWY WÓZ PIECHOTY.

Po dniach odliczania i pokazywania tylko fragmentów odsłaniamy najważniejszą premierę PGZ na #MSPO2026.

CBWP to nowa ciężka platforma opracowana przez Hutę Stalowa Wola – z wysokim poziomem ochrony, dużą mobilnością i siłą ognia… pic.twitter.com/kazs4ciGMj

— Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (@PGZ_pl) September 8, 2026

At approximately 40 tons, the CBWP is about 12 tons heavier than the roughly 28-ton Borsuk (and adds an axle, for seven road wheels on each side), the result of a fundamental difference in design philosophy.

Borsuk was conceived as a relatively lightweight IFV able to operate alongside mechanized infantry while retaining the ability to swim. The CBWP instead prioritizes protection and battlefield survivability, placing it in the growing category of heavy IFVs being developed and operated by NATO countries and others.

The vehicle will have a three-person crew and carry up to eight infantrymen. Its primary role is to transport those troops safely into contested areas while providing direct fire support once they reach the objective.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how quickly armored vehicles can be exposed to anti-tank guided missiles, mines, artillery fragments, loitering munitions, and small drones. Even vehicles that survive direct attacks can be functionally disabled by damage to tracks, sensors, or external equipment.

A Ukrainian M2A2 Bradley engaging and damaging a Russian T-90M in a close-range fight. After a mission kill, the T-90M is subsequently finished by an FPV drone:

The Ukrainian Bradley IFV damaged the no-analogue russian T-90M "Breakthrough" in a close fight. Then an FPV drone finished this long-suffering tank.

Maybe, the T-90M tanks should be renamed into "Broken".

: 47th Mechanized Brigade pic.twitter.com/b3ShfqbTd9

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) January 13, 2024

While Ukraine has shown that armor is increasingly easy to find and attack, and thus less relevant, Warsaw is far from convinced that armored vehicles are now irrelevant, with multiple acquisition projects underway. However, Ukraine does change what these vehicles need to be able to do and how they must be employed to have a chance of survival. In certain circumstances, when properly concealed, dispersed, and integrated with counter-drone capabilities, armor is still seen as important for protected mobility and firepower by militaries around the globe.

According to PGZ, the CBWP’s design therefore puts considerable emphasis on survivability. It incorporates advanced ballistic and mine protection designed to meet relevant STANAG standards. It also uses specialized mine-resistant seats intended to reduce the effects of explosions beneath the hull.

The protection architecture can be supplemented by an active protection system (APS). If integrated on a production vehicle, such a system could provide another layer of defense against incoming anti-tank weapons, and potentially small drones, although PGZ has described the APS as an optional component rather than specifying a particular production configuration.

For detecting threats, the vehicle can employ laser-warning equipment including the OBRA-3 system, integrated with smoke grenade launchers. A laser warning can provide the crew with an indication that the vehicle has been illuminated by a rangefinder or targeting system, potentially allowing it to react before an anti-tank weapon is launched.

A video showing a test of the OBRA-3 protection system on a Polish Rosomak wheeled armored fighting vehicle, with a smoke screen being generated to blind hostile optics. The view is from the driver’s compartment:

The CBWP will also carry an integrated nuclear, biological, and chemical protection system, allowing the crew and embarked infantry to operate in contaminated environments.

Firepower comes from the ZSSW-30 remotely operated turret, one of the most important locally developed systems in Poland’s current armored vehicle modernization effort.

The turret is equipped with a 30mm cannon armed with programmable ammunition, plus Rafael Spike anti-tank guided missiles. Together, the weapons are intended to give the CBWP the ability to engage armored vehicles, infantry, and other battlefield targets while also providing a degree of capability against aerial threats. In particular, the programmable ammunition provides greater flexibility against different target types — such as drones — by allowing the projectile’s effects to be tailored to the engagement.

The inclusion of Spike missiles gives the vehicle an extended-range anti-armor option beyond the effective range of its automatic cannon. Much more than a traditional anti-tank guided missile, Spike provides an indirect-fire capability including the option to loiter over a particular area and search for targets, among other attributes.

The ZSSW-30 also gives Poland a degree of commonality across its growing fleet of modern armored vehicles, with the system already being introduced on Borsuk and on some Rosomak wheeled armored fighting vehicles.

The CBWP reflects a trend for fighting vehicles that blur the boundaries between traditional IFV and infantry-support concepts. It is expected to carry a relatively large infantry squad while possessing the sensors and weapons necessary to remain directly involved in combat alongside those troops. At the same time, its high level of protection makes for a notably large vehicle.

The new vehicle is just one part of Poland’s broader military modernization.

Warsaw has embarked on one of NATO’s most ambitious efforts to expand and modernize its ground forces, with major acquisitions of two different types of main battle tank, artillery, rocket systems, and infantry fighting vehicles. Poland is simultaneously expanding domestic production capacity, seeking to ensure that at least part of the equipment needed for a larger army can be produced and sustained within the country.

The Borsuk program is central to that effort and is intended to replace Poland’s aging Soviet-designed BWP-1 (the Polish version of the BMP-1).

The heavier CBWP offers even more capability, but its heavier weight comes with tradeoffs. It will be inherently less flexible than a lighter amphibious IFV, and more costly. In return, it will give Polish commanders another option for missions where survivability matters more than swimming capability or rapid deployment.

Such a vehicle would be particularly important for units operating in heavily contested areas, where the threat from mines, anti-tank weapons, and drones makes protection a higher priority. This provides some indication of what Polish planners expect a conflict with Russia on Europe’s eastern flank to look like. However, lessons from Ukraine show that, whatever its quality, an armored fighting vehicle will only be as survivable as the network and tactics around it.

Still, the CBWP remains some distance from operational service.

PGZ currently has one operational demonstrator, intended for factory trials. The company plans to subsequently construct two fully functional prototypes, with both expected to be ready in 2027.

Those vehicles will then undergo intensive testing with the Polish Armed Forces. The results could lead to changes in the protection architecture, turret integration, or other elements before a production configuration is finalized.

PGZ has indicated that it could be ready for production as early as 2029, but that timeline is not yet a firm procurement schedule. It will depend on the results of testing, any modifications required during development, and negotiations with the customer.

Poland has been reported to be considering a requirement for up to 700 CBWP vehicles. In addition, Poland has so far contracted for 257 Borsuk IFVs, with another roughly 1,000 Borsuk-family combat and specialized vehicles envisioned under a broader framework agreement.

If the program succeeds, Poland will ultimately field a highly capable two-tier tracked IFV force in which the CBWP equips units expected to operate in the most dangerous portions of the battlefield.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post This Is Poland’s New Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle appeared first on TWZ.

Russia is displaying some of its newest air-launched precision weapons in public for the first time at the El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt this week. The S-71K Kovyor and related S-71M Monokhrom, and the S8000 Banderol, reflect Russia’s effort to field larger numbers of relatively inexpensive standoff weapons alongside its more sophisticated and costly missile types. As such, their development and early employment are closely tied to the war in Ukraine, but they also reflect wider global interest in these kinds of weapons.

The weapons, seen in the tweet embedded below, comprise, clockwise from top left: S-71K Kovyor, an unknown smaller guided munition, S8000 Banderol, and S-71M Monokhrom:

Novel munitions for the Russian aircraft, on an expo. pic.twitter.com/L1UPTb8qhX

— krakek (@krakek1) September 6, 2026

For Russia, the requirement has become increasingly important as the war in Ukraine has evolved into a prolonged contest in which industrial capacity is as critical as technology. Russia has expended huge numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets while also developing an enormous strike-drone campaign. At the same time, Ukrainian air defenses have become progressively more capable, forcing Moscow to use combinations of missiles, drones, decoys, and different flight profiles to penetrate or saturate the defensive network. One lesson is the fact that a weapon does not necessarily have to be as capable as a high-end cruise missile if it can be manufactured in much greater numbers and still present a credible threat to the target.

The S-71M, which TWZ previously reported on in detail after Ukrainian intelligence obtained an example, is a compact, turbojet-powered weapon with a distinctly angular airframe intended to reduce its radar signature. Imagery from Egypt gives a better look at its front end, including a faceted nose flowing into a broad central fuselage. The nose has at least one optically flat transparency for an infrared or TV seeker. Its wings are sharply swept and fold against the belly of the weapon for carriage, while the rear of the weapon terminates in an inverted-V tail arrangement. The overall shape is notably different from Russia’s more conventional cruise missiles of the past.

Ukrainian analysis found that the S-71M incorporates an OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb as its warhead and relies primarily on inertial guidance, rather than carrying a sophisticated terminal seeker, although the seeker window raises questions about that.

Ukrainian intelligence also described its construction as being relatively straightforward, with fiberglass composite material making up much of the outer structure and no evidence identified of specialized radar-absorbing coatings.

As we noted previously, the weapon appears intended as a less expensive, but still survivable standoff weapon option that can be produced in significant numbers.

The S-71M has been tested from the Su-57 Felon fighter, also present at El Alamein. In a press release, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), responsible for the Su-57, said that the S-71M and the S-71K displayed alongside it “were designed for fifth-generation fighters,” although there is no reason why they couldn’t be launched from a wide variety of platforms.

A Su-57 performing at El Alamein, with one of its main internal weapons bays apparently loaded with Kh-69 standoff missiles:

T-50-9 in El-Alamein, opening both main weapon bays. Two, presumably, Kh-69 can be seen in the front one.

Source: @ T汪汪T pic.twitter.com/f6csKc6Y9D

— George N. (@GeorgeN28581) September 8, 2026

Regardless of launch platform, the nature of the war in Ukraine makes the S-71M particularly useful. Russia has increasingly relied on extemporized glide bombs for attacks against targets relatively close to the front, but those weapons require the launching aircraft to operate within a certain distance of Ukrainian defenses. At least in their earlier iterations, such weapons were also crude and prone to failure. Longer-range cruise missiles offer considerably greater standoff but are more complex and expensive. The S-71M sits somewhere between those categories, providing an air-launched, powered weapon with a relatively large warhead and some degree of low observability without the cost and complexity of a full-size, truly stealthy cruise missile.

The S-71K appears to represent a more capable version of the basic concept. Public information remains limited, but the weapon has been associated with electro-optical guidance and greater onboard processing, potentially giving it a capability to deal with targets in a more flexible manner than the largely pre-programmed S-71M. Exactly how that capability is employed, and how autonomous the weapon actually is, remain less clear from the imagery and information released to date.

As displayed at El Alamein, the S-71K retains the overall faceted, low-observable appearance of the S-71M but has a visibly different airframe and wing arrangement. Its body is notably broad and compact relative to its length, with folding wings that are relatively thick, and a more refined inverted-V tail giving it more the appearance of a small uncrewed aircraft than a conventional air-to-surface missile.

Meanwhile, the Banderol represents a somewhat different path to the same general problem. Ukraine’s intelligence service previously obtained and analyzed an example of the small jet-powered cruise missile, which TWZ reported on last year. The weapon is considerably smaller than Russia’s principal cruise missiles and has been associated with launch from drones and helicopters. Its reported range of around 500 kilometers (311 miles) and relatively small warhead make it something of a complementary system intended to provide another, more economical way of putting a precision weapon onto a target from the air.

In terms of its appearance, the Banderol is more conventionally missile-like, with an ogival central fuselage, a pointed nose, and sharply swept folding wings. Its proportions underline just how small it is compared with Russia’s better-known air-launched cruise missiles.

The Banderol is particularly relevant in the context of the economics of the Ukraine conflict. Russian forces have increasingly used combinations of relatively inexpensive one-way attack drones and more expensive cruise and ballistic missiles. The drones can be produced in large numbers and used to complicate air-defense operations, while the more capable missiles provide greater speed, range, payload, or penetration capability. A small turbojet-powered weapon such as Banderol offers another point on that spectrum.

At least one image has recently emerged showing a Banderol carried by a Russian Mi-28NM Havoc attack helicopter. This would be in line with unconfirmed reports from Ukraine last month that Russia was using the Mi-28 as an additional launch platform for the weapon, including firing them from over the Sea of Azov to attack targets around Odesa.

An S8000 “Banderol” (“Dan-T”) small cruise missile mounted on a Russian Mi-28NM attack helicopter. pic.twitter.com/Xcx3MmFK3B

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) September 6, 2026

Its reported use also illustrates how the distinction between a cruise missile and a large one-way attack drone is becoming increasingly blurred. The Banderol incorporates a conventional missile-like airframe and jet propulsion but has been associated with drone operations and makes extensive use of commercially available components. TWZ’s earlier examination of the weapon also highlighted the extent to which modern Russian weapons programs can combine relatively simple airframes with foreign-sourced electronics and propulsion technology.

Russia has revealed an Orion (Inokhodets) UAV carrying the S8000 Banderol air-launched cruise missile, marking the clearest Russian footage yet of the weapon integrated with the drone. #Russia #Orion #CruiseMissile #Defense pic.twitter.com/yLHb7h1oW9

— Drone Wars (@Drone_Wars_) July 13, 2026

Likely Banderol loitering munition on the ground (perspective exaggerates it's size) and under Orion drone.

Banderol has been reported as one of the munition used in recent strikes and appears to use a jet engine and a FAB-100 warhead or similar. pic.twitter.com/j50DUsNuVe

— krakek (@krakek1) April 27, 2025

Seen together at El Alamein, the three weapons provide an unusually useful snapshot of where Russian air-launched strike development is heading. They are presented alongside a fourth, so-far unidentified munition. This unnamed weapon is notably short and fat, with a cruciform tail, and an optical window in the nose. Its overall size and shape suggest it may have been developed specifically to arm drones.

The appearance of the weapons at an arms fair underscores the fact that Russia is not the only country confronting the problem of producing and fielding sufficient precision weapons at an acceptable cost. The growing interest in lower-cost cruise missiles, loitering munitions, attritable aircraft, and other forms of expendable precision strike is now evident well beyond Russia.

Russia is also clearly trying to make these weapons harder to intercept, an increasingly important consideration as Ukrainian air defenses have demonstrated an ability to shoot down even glide bombs in some circumstances. The S-71K in particular incorporates unusually pronounced low-observable shaping, suggesting that survivability was also a central requirement from the outset.

There is, however, a significant complication to Russia’s attempt to turn its wartime experience into an export opportunity. Buying any kind of weapons from Moscow has become considerably more difficult because of sanctions, restrictions on access to foreign technology and financing, and the wider political risks associated with maintaining a Russian defense relationship. Those factors matter just as much to a prospective customer as the performance of the weapon itself.

Author’s note: earlier reporting on the S-71 family appears to have transposed the S-71K and S-71M versions. Most authoritative accounts now indicate that the more refined, more stealthy version is the S-71K Kovyor (meaning carpet), while the simpler weapon is the S-71M Monokhrom.

Update, September 9:

Rostec, the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate, has provided more details of the weapon identified at El Alamein as the Banderol. Rostec calls this weapon the ‘Dan-T’ loitering munition, which is an export designation for Banderol.

According to Rostec:

The ‘Dan-T’ munition operates on a ‘fire-and-forget’ principle and is adapted for launch from Russian and foreign aircraft and helicopters. The munition is equipped with a compact jet engine and can strike targets at a range of hundreds of kilometers. The ‘Dan-T’ features a special flight mode designed to evade enemy air defence systems.

Rostec adds that the Dan-T has been combat-tested in the war in Ukraine, where it claims there have been “hundreds of successful launches” against enemy targets in the Special Military Operation zone. “We expect this munition to attract widespread interest from foreign customers,” said Rostec.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Russia’s New Stealthy Lower-Cost Air-Launched Standoff Weapons On Display In Egypt appeared first on TWZ.

New imagery appearing out of China provides the best look yet at one of the country’s most enigmatic aircraft: the very large, low-observable, flying-wing drone widely referred to as the WZ-X. Seen previously primarily in satellite imagery, TWZ broke the story of the existence of this monster high-altitude, long-endurance drone. The new views that emerged today help clear up one of the most puzzling aspects of the aircraft’s appearance, namely the unusual shape of its enormous wings.

The aircraft was first identified in satellite imagery collected in May 2025 showing the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) sprawling test facility at Malan in Xinjiang. At the time, it was difficult to determine whether some of the apparent discontinuities in the wing planform were genuine features, visual countermeasures, or artifacts of the imagery.

The new photograph, seen at the top of the article and below, as well as a new satellite image, shows that the aircraft has a broader-chord inner wing section that transitions into a substantially narrower outer section. Rather than tapering continuously from the center section toward the tips, the wing effectively becomes much more slender over its outer portion in a ‘step down’-like fashion. The resulting planform gives the aircraft an exceptionally long, narrow outer wing. The wing arrangement differs from the B-2 and other stealthy flying wing designs because it has two outer wing sections, in addition to its diamond-like central fuselage, instead of just one.

We still can’t say for sure if this feature is just the way the aircraft’s wing was designed or if it also is due to some other exotic feature, such as wing folding or removable outboard sections. While a more novel explanation is possible, it is somewhat improbable at this point.

Seen from behind, the aircraft has a relatively shallow central fuselage section, with extremely long wings extending outward from it. The landing gear is extended, revealing large main undercarriage doors and substantial landing gear consistent with an aircraft of this size. Split rudders are visible toward the outer wing areas, broadly reminiscent of those used on the B-2.

As in previous imagery, the rear of the center section of the aircraft may also reveal slot-like exhaust openings, supporting the assessment that it is twin-engined.

For an aircraft intended to spend long periods operating at high altitude, a very long overall span combined with a relatively narrow outer wing could be advantageous. Such an arrangement would increase effective aspect ratio and reduce induced drag during efficient cruise, potentially improving endurance and high-altitude performance.

It may also allow the designers to concentrate structural mass and internal volume closer to the center of the aircraft while still achieving a very large span.

There is a potential low-observable tradeoff, however. A significant change in chord introduces additional planform geometry and potential edge-alignment discontinuities that must be reconciled with the requirements of a stealth aircraft. The transition will influence radar reflections depending on its precise shape, orientation, and relationship to the aircraft’s other edges and surfaces. This will also be highly dependent on the aspect the radar is viewing the aircraft from. Modern very low observable designs try to minimize these exact types of features, with large continuous structures being the most advantageous to radar signature. This philosophy can be seen in the design of the B-21’s planform, which was also how the B-2 was supposed to look originally. You can read all about this here.

Regardless, the WZ-X does indeed have a semi-sawtooth trailing edge due to this intriguing feature.

The overall scale of the aircraft is also becoming increasingly apparent. Our initial analysis of satellite imagery put its wingspan at approximately 170 feet, roughly comparable to the 172-foot span of the B-2. That would make it considerably larger than other Chinese flying-wing drones identified to date.

Andreas Rupprecht, an analyst specializing in Chinese military aviation and TWZ contributor, assesses that the WZ-X is likely a twin-engined design similar in configuration to the supposed U.S. RQ-180, but considerably larger.

Rupprecht estimates a length of approximately 46 feet. He also assesses the aircraft as having a relatively spacious central fuselage and a dorsal satellite communications antenna. His estimates of a range exceeding 12,000 miles and a normal cruising altitude of somewhere between 59,000 and 66,000 feet remain unconfirmed.

The WZ-X is notably different from China’s smaller flying-wing designs. The CH-7, for example, has a deeper and more curved center section and is substantially smaller. The WZ-X’s broad, relatively flattened center body and enormous span instead appear particularly compatible with high-altitude endurance.

Its apparent configuration also makes a long-duration surveillance mission plausible. The central body and inner wing section would provide substantial space for fuel, sensors, and communications systems, while the outer wing, combined with its lifting central body, could support highly efficient flight at high altitude.

A low-observable platform of this size could potentially conduct many types of wide-area surveillance and networking assistance while operating in or very near contested airspace where conventional high-altitude UAVs would face greater risks. A strike capability cannot be ruled out, particularly given China’s broader development of combat-capable flying-wing UCAVs, but the aircraft’s proportions appear especially well suited to persistence and reconnaissance.

While the location of the latest imagery is unconfirmed, Malan has developed into a massive center for Chinese drone testing, with satellite imagery showing extensive expansion of its infrastructure in recent years. The facility has been associated with multiple flying-wing designs, including the WZ-X and the similarly mysterious and also very large GJ-X. This substantially different flying-wing aircraft with a cranked-kite planform is also undergoing flight testing. That aircraft is estimated to have a wingspan of around 137 feet, underscoring the breadth of China’s experimentation with large low-observable uncrewed aircraft.

China is pursuing tailless/flying-wing designs across an increasingly wide range of sizes and missions, alongside larger crewed aircraft programs including the J-36 and J-XDS and, eventually, the H-20 stealth bomber.

The WZ-X appears to be part of a much broader effort to develop highly integrated, low-observable aircraft optimized for different combinations of range, endurance, payload, and survivability.

For now, its official designation, manufacturer, propulsion system, performance, and intended mission remain unknown.

However, its configuration appears well suited to the requirements of a very large high-altitude endurance aircraft, although the trade-off between its performance and its stealth characteristics remains equally mysterious.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post China’s Huge WZ-X Stealth Drone’s Strange Wing Configuration Confirmed appeared first on TWZ.

Ukrainian crews operating Australian-supplied M1A1 Abrams tanks say the battlefield has become so saturated with Russian drones that their tanks cannot currently be used in combat, but they reject the idea that main battle tanks have become forever obsolete.

Since receiving these tanks last year, the crews, serving with Ukraine’s 425th Separate Assault Regiment “Skala,” have used the Abrams in two combat operations in the fight for Pokrovsk, a key Ukrainian logistics hub and part of a defensive belt of towns in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region. They recounted their experiences to Hromadske, an independent media channel in Ukraine.

Fighting around Pokrovsk

The first major deployment described by the crews took place in December of last year, when Abrams tanks were used to support assault groups entering Pokrovsk.

The crewmember with the callsign Kent described moving into the city behind a mine-clearing tank and ahead of two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) carrying assault troops, during a mission that was deliberately aggressive.

“Since a tank is a priority target — my task was to draw their attention, while our infantry dismounted and moved in successfully.”

The Abrams was also assigned three target points to engage along the route.

“We went right in there, poured it on, and drove back out,” he recalled.

A video showing the 425th Separate Assault Regiment in action in August 2025, soon after receiving the Abrams:

The second operation, on March 31, involved an attempt to enter and hold an industrial area near Pokrovsk to help block Russian movement toward Hryshyne, a contested village in the district.

The operation was prepared for more than two weeks. Ukrainian forces conducted reconnaissance flights, examined difficult sections of the planned routes, and provided crews with extensive video and imagery.

“They knew every meter of the route,” another of the unit’s commanders, with the callsign Kubik, said.

Weather was considered essential. The Ukrainians waited for fog and rain, hoping to limit the effectiveness of Russian drones.

“Without the right weather we wouldn’t have been able to pull off operations like that,” Kubik said.

The operation nevertheless resulted in the destruction of four out of five armored vehicles, some of which are seen in the video embedded below.

Russia's Rubicon Drone Center FPV drones destroyed a Ukrainian assault group near Pokrovsk, hitting an M1A1 Abrams tank, M1117 APC and BMP-2 as the unit tried to advance near Hryshyne under fog cover. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/ZzE52qAYxp

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) April 1, 2026

The commander acknowledged that the Russian side may have had advance knowledge of the operation.

“I can’t rule out the possibility that the enemy knew our plan,” he said.

His Abrams was not immediately destroyed. According to the crew, it completed its task and the assault troops dismounted before the weather changed.

“Once the fog lifted, they started working on it with an FPV drone,” the commander said.

Why use tanks at all?

The losses prompted criticism from Ukrainian military commentators, particularly after footage of the destroyed vehicles was published.

However, the crews defend the decision to use armored vehicles for the missions. According to the men of the Skala interviewed, the alternative was often to send infantry over several miles on foot while carrying weapons, ammunition, water, and other supplies.

“That takes more time,” Kubik explained. “And the enemy isn’t standing still — the enemy is moving toward them.”

Australia-supplied M1A1 Abrams AIM main battle tank in service of the Ukrainian 425th Separate Assault Regiment "Skala."

The tanks of such type recently saw combat in the area of Pokrovsk. pic.twitter.com/qhjSyGbhH6

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) December 23, 2025

The argument that infantry could simply move more stealthily on foot also has limitations.

“Every day the Mavic drones are flying, the fixed-wing drones are flying,” he said. “No fog, guys are visible.”

Combined with IFVs, the Abrams can provide the ability to rapidly move troops while simultaneously delivering heavy direct fire against enemy positions and offering substantial protection to its crew.

The crews argue that this capability remains worthwhile even when the tank itself may eventually be lost.

One commander was asked whether deploying a roughly $5-million tank makes sense if a single sortie can result in its destruction.

“Yes, of course it makes sense to deploy it,” he replied.

“First and foremost — it saves the lives of the crew inside it.”

Russian forces captured a relatively lightly damaged M1A1SA Abrams main battle tank operated by the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade in the Pokrovsk direction.

The tank is equipped with added cage armor, as well as Kontakt and ARAT ERA. pic.twitter.com/mHyKk1xNRY

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) October 27, 2024

A tank under attack by drones

The Ukrainian crews repeatedly highlighted the Abrams’ accuracy and survivability.

“What are the biggest advantages of the Abrams?” Kent was asked.

“Accuracy.”

Its biggest disadvantage, he said, is equally obvious on a modern battlefield: “It’s very tall — and very large — so it’s hard to conceal.”

A video showing a U.S.-supplied Abrams under attack from Russian FPV drones:

An Abrams tank withstands 9 FPV drones hits. Eventually, the tank was destroyed, but the tank crew successfully survived. pic.twitter.com/4NBKdg2zmW

— PS01 □ (@PStyle0ne1) July 7, 2024

Kent described surviving an engagement in which his tank was struck repeatedly while on the move.

“More than 20 drones hit me,” he said of one operation into Pokrovsk.

He attributed the Abrams’ survival to the combination of its armor and additional anti-drone protection fitted to the vehicle.

“All of it together is effective,” he said.

He pointed to fairly basic modifications including rubber strips and a foldable wire cage mounted on the turret, as additional layers of protection against drone attacks.

“A drone doesn’t hit the actual penetrating element directly — it just can’t reach it,” he explained. “It hits the rubber, and then the blast wave travels from there.”

Even with their tanks festooned with explosive reactive armor (ERA) bricks, the crews acknowledge that such protection has limits.

US-supplied M1A1 Abrams tank in service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with added Kontakt-1 ERA on the frontal hull and standard ARAT ERA on the sides. pic.twitter.com/PC2kDfxefO

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) May 21, 2024

Kent also noted that the Abrams was still missing the ‘hedgehog’-type protective coverings that have been seen on Russian tanks.

“They also protect very well. An effective thing,” he said.

For now, the drone threat has led the regiment to keep its Abrams out of combat, as we will return to later.

The Abrams as a machine

The crews’ assessment of the Abrams included praise for its mobility, roomy interior, gun, and fire-control system.

Kubik said he had personally driven an Abrams to 50 miles per hour cross-country.

“The engine is an absolute beast,” he added.

The tank can also rapidly perform a pivot turn, which the crews consider particularly useful when maneuvering in confined spaces. Despite its prodiguous weight, it only rarely becomes bogged down after the kind of very heavy snow-melt that effects all vehicles on the battlefield.

Loading a 120mm M1028 canister cartridge into an M1A1 AIM Abrams main battle tank of the tank battalion of the 425th Assault Regiment. pic.twitter.com/tMd8QcROQe

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) June 21, 2026

Its disadvantages include its demanding maintenance requirements. The running gear was described as particularly sensitive, with crews inspecting, lubricating, and replacing components after every sortie.

Fuel consumption is another major burden. The crew cited roughly 400 to 700 liters (106 to 185 gallons) per 100 kilometers (62 miles) depending on terrain and operating conditions.

“On asphalt it burns about 400 liters,” one said. In boggy terrain, consumption can reach “700 liters or more.”

The Abrams thirsty gas turbine engine and extreme logistical demands have always been a criticism of the platform.

The crews said the vehicle’s ability to operate on different fuels is useful, although diesel provides the best engine-hour performance in their experience. Prior to delivery, the gas turbine engines of the tanks were reconfigured to use diesel fuel instead of the standard JP-8 aviation kerosene, according to earlier reports.

They also praised the Abrams’ protected ammunition storage and crew space compared with Soviet-designed tanks.

The version operated by the Ukrainians is an M1A1 rather than the latest Abrams configuration, with less sophisticated electronics than newer variants. It also lacks the classified armor found on its U.S. Army counterpart.

“For me — as a tanker — this configuration, what we have right now, is more than enough,” Kubik said. “The sight is absolutely excellent. The gun is also great.”

Abrams destroys a house with Russian infantry in the Pokrovsk direction. pic.twitter.com/StUoZoMTO3

— MAKS 26 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) August 25, 2024

Waiting for a solution to the drone problem

The interview ultimately presents a more complicated picture than the declaration that tanks are obsolete on the Ukrainian battlefield.

At the time of writing, at least 25 Abrams have been confirmed visually to have been destroyed, damaged, or abandoned in Ukrainian service. This is from a total of 31 provided by the United States and 49 from Australia.

“For now, we’re not using them further — there’s no way to,” Kubik said. “The enemy has developed their drone component very heavily, and for now we don’t have the means to counter that.”

While tanks remain exceptionally powerful direct-fire and protected mobility platforms, the proliferation of inexpensive uncrewed aircraft has made operating them increasingly difficult.

M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks of the 425th Assault Regiment .
The reinforced upper glacis and turret roofs are clearly visible. pic.twitter.com/Sn9h8OWZ9P

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) June 21, 2026

“If someone had told me, as a tanker, back in 2022: ‘Take this — we’re giving you an Abrams, we’ll give you time to train and you’ll fight in it,’” Kubik said, “I would never have climbed out of it.”

“I’d only be saying: ‘Bring me shells. I’ll drive non-stop wherever needed, arrive and work.’”

As it stands, reconnaissance drones can find the Abrams, FPV drones can attack it, and persistent surveillance makes concealment difficult. Experience has shown that without more effective counter-drone capabilities, even a heavily protected tank can eventually be overwhelmed.

But Kubik believes that will change.

“The day will come when one of our bright minds figures out some excellent solution against drones — and we’ll start using them again.”

Asked whether the era of tanks is over, his answer was unequivocal.

“It’s not over … They’re just waiting it out for now, biding their time. Writing off tanks — in my opinion — is still too early.”

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post How Russian Drones Forced Ukraine To Park Its M1 Abrams Tanks appeared first on TWZ.

The first F-15EX Eagle II destined for permanent assignment at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa departed Boeing’s St. Louis, Missouri, facility on August 28, 2026. The aircraft left St. Louis for the 142nd Wing at Portland Air National Guard Base, Oregon, where it will undergo final staging and integration preparations before its eventual deployment to the sprawling Okinawa installation it will call home. The Oregon unit is acting as a coordination and preperation unit for the 18th Wing, a function you can read more about in our interview with the wing’s commander.

This departure represents a critical, long-awaited milestone for the 18th Wing, which has been working toward the permanent stationing of the service’s most advanced Eagle variant to replace its now-withdrawn F-15C/D fleet. The arrival of the F-15EX in Japan, expected to begin in fiscal year 2027, which begins on October 1, 2026, will be a central pillar in the Air Force’s modernization of tactical airpower in the Indo-Pacific region.

EXciting progress for F-15EX!

We've delivered the 22nd F-15EX to the @usairforce. The aircraft will be the first F-15EX destined for @KadenaAirBase in Japan. pic.twitter.com/RlrTKuCCFl

— Boeing Defense (@BoeingDefense) September 3, 2026

“This is an important next step toward bringing the F-15EX home to Kadena,” said Brig. Gen. John Gallemore, 18th Wing commander, in an Air Force release. “Our team is ready to welcome the F-15EX, and this is another milestone that brings us closer to putting this capability in the hands of the airmen who will fly, maintain and employ it from Japan.”

The first F-15EX for Kadena’s 18th Wing, serial 22-0022, was noted flying test sorties from St. Louis in early August, initially in primer paint. By the middle of the month its was flying with its full livery, including the famous “ZZ” tail code.

View this post on Instagram

The F-15EX is a significant jump in capability over the legacy Eagles. With modernized avionics, flight controls, an expanded electronic warfare suite, and increased weapons carriage — as well as potentially new and longer-reaching weapons — the jet is well-suited to operating in the vast Western Pacific. As Kadena prepares for the permanent arrival, the 18th Wing plans to integrate the EX with regional allies, including the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, building upon existing bilateral training exercises.

Two active-duty squadrons of F-15EXs are set to be established at Kadena, taking the place of units previously based there that had flown F-15Cs. The Air Force has been deploying F-15Es, F-22s and other fighters to the base on a rotational basis to fill the gap in the meantime.

The F-15EX will give U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific a high-capacity platform that complements the fifth-generation F-22 and F-35. With its ability to carry large air-to-air and air-to-surface payloads, the Eagle II can serve as a long-range “missile truck,” extending the reach and firepower of stealth aircraft operating closer to contested airspace. Its open-architecture systems also allow it to incorporate new sensors, weapons, and electronic warfare capabilities more readily than the aging F-15C/D fleet.

The aircraft’s value is also tied to its role in networked operations. Exercises such as Valiant Shield have demonstrated how the F-15EX can work with uncrewed aircraft like the  MQ-28 Ghost Bat, pointing toward mixed formations in which crewed fighters provide weapons, sensing, and command-and-control capacity for autonomous wingmen. Operating from strategic locations such as Kadena, the Eagle II could help the Air Force generate more combat power across the vast Pacific while reducing the burden on its limited number of stealth fighters.

Kadena will become the second Air Force location with combat-coded F-15EX aircraft, following the Oregon Air National Guard’s 142nd Wing.

The Air Force has previously announced plans to stand up National Guard F-15EX squadrons in California, Louisiana, and Michigan. Most recently, the Air Force announced plans to put F-15EX fighters at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, to replace older F-15E Strike Eagle jets that will move to Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.

While the movement of this first Kadena-bound F-15EX is a positive step, the wider Eagle II program is currently navigating some issues. According to a new Pentagon selected acquisition report released in August, the Air Force’s decision to aggressively expand its F-15EX fleet from 129 to 267 jets — intended to recapitalize the older F-15E force — has introduced substantial cost and schedule uncertainties that officials are now scrambling to manage.

The report warns that the extended acquisition strategy, which shifted from eight production lots to 12, will require Boeing to execute a “major technical refresh” to combat diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages. As systems like the radar, mission computer, and engines face potential obsolescence over the now-lengthened production timeline, the service faces what the report characterizes as a “significant redesign effort.” Program managers are planning to mitigate these risks by integrating upgrades through operational flight program releases scheduled between 2031 and 2035, a strategy they describe as a “structured, risk-reduced pathway” to avoid production line gaps.

Compounding these technical challenges are tangible production delays, largely stemming from a labor strike at the St. Louis plant from August to November 2025. The report notes that these are “unrecoverable delays,” forcing a cascading schedule slip. While Boeing was contracted to deliver all 12 jets from Lot 3 by early 2026, the company will only be able to field half of those by the end of the year. This has directly impacted the timeline for the Kadena deployment, which was originally envisioned for earlier in 2026, and has left the Air Force relying on “bridging strategies” and rotations to cover operational requirements until the Eagle IIs can fully stand up in Okinawa.

The Pentagon is now moving toward an aggressive production ramp-up, tasking Boeing to hit a rate of two jets per month. Keeping the F-15EX schedule on track will be a challenge, however, requiring successfully navigating ongoing parts shortages for critical systems, all while balancing the needs of foreign military sales customers who are also integrated into the supply chain.

For the 18th Wing, the arrival of the first F-15EX will bring a major advance in capabilities in a part of the world that needs them badly. At the same time, the program’s overall trajectory suggests that the wider transition to the new Eagle will come with some complex logistical and industrial challenges.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post First USAF F-15EX To Be Based In Japan Departs Boeing’s St. Louis Plant appeared first on TWZ.

The United Kingdom is moving toward adding a flying-boom aerial refueling capability to the Royal Air Force (RAF), a requirement being driven in large part by the future Tempest combat jet, being developed under the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) initiative.

In a written response to opposition MP Ben Obese-Jecty, U.K. Defense Minister Luke Pollard confirmed that the RAF’s existing probe-and-drogue aerial refueling capability will eventually be complemented by a boom system. The move would give Britain a sovereign capability to refuel aircraft equipped with the U.S.-standard boom receptacle, including the Tempest, while also improving interoperability with other NATO and allied air forces.

“The Royal Air Force currently operates a probe and drogue air-to-air refueling system and will complement this with the development of a boom system,” Pollard said. “This will ensure we have a sovereign air-to-air refueling capability for the future Royal Air Force fleet that enhances interoperability with NATO allies and partners.”

For the first time we have a Minister confirming the Boom is coming to Royal Air Force tankers, although the when and the how currently remain very much up in the air.

Still significant to have it through government voices and not just through the RAF itself. pic.twitter.com/esRN7NVoPy

— Gabriele Molinelli (@Gabriel64869839) September 2, 2026

The decision follows comments by a senior RAF official in July indicating that the service was already examining how to meet the requirement.

“We currently do not have boom [-equipped tankers] in the UK. We have a requirement for a boom from GCAP, so we have to resolve that requirement and that is what we are now looking at,” the official said at the Air Power Association Global Air and Space Chiefs’ Conference in London, according to Janes. “I [am] certain that at some point we are going to have to work out how we deliver a sovereign boom capability for our own combat aircraft.”

The requirement is particularly significant because GCAP’s Tempest is being designed with a fuselage-mounted receptacle for boom refueling. Unlike the probe-and-drogue arrangement used by the RAF’s existing Voyager tankers, a flying boom uses a rigid, telescoping refueling tube that is maneuvered by an operator aboard the tanker into the receiver aircraft’s receptacle.

One of the major advantages of the boom system is its higher fuel-transfer rate. That makes it especially useful for large aircraft and combat aircraft that need to take on substantial quantities of fuel quickly, reducing the time spent on the tanker.

Tempest is not, however, the only RAF aircraft that depends on the boom standard. The RAF already operates several boom-equipped receiver aircraft, including P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, RC-135W Rivet Joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, and C-17A Globemaster III airlifters. The E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning aircraft also uses a boom receptacle, while the forthcoming RAF F-35A fleet will add another major boom receiver to the service.

Currently, the RAF has no boom-equipped tanker to support them.

Its principal tanker fleet consists of Airbus A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) Voyager aircraft operated by the AirTanker consortium and leased to the RAF under a private finance initiative. Unlike many A330 MRTT operators around the world, which acquired the aircraft with a flying boom, the British Voyagers were configured exclusively around hose-and-drogue refueling.

The Voyager K2 is equipped with two wing-mounted Cobham 905E hose-and-drogue refueling units. The K3 adds a third refueling point in the form of a Cobham 805E fuselage refueling unit, or FRU, located at the rear of the aircraft. The latter provides a higher fuel-transfer rate than the wing-mounted units.

Since the fuel is stored in existing tanks, the Voyager’s cabin is still available to accommodate up to 291 passengers and the cargo hold for freight. One Voyager, serial ZZ336, nicknamed Vespina, is modified for long-range VIP transport but still functions as a fully capable tanker.

A video showing Voyager ZZ336 refueling RAF and German Eurofighter Typhoons during the enhanced Air Policing mission in Romania:

Up to 14 Voyagers are available to the RAF under the current arrangement.

The future of those aircraft is now one of the key questions surrounding Britain’s planned boom capability.

One possibility would be to modify some of the existing Voyagers, installing a boom system in the rear fuselage. The baseline Airbus’ A330 MRTT design already incorporates a provision for a flying boom. At the time the United Kingdom ordered its Voyagers, boom refueling was not considered essential, so the capability was deleted to save weight, complexity, and cost — a decision which was to prove very shortsighted.

Such a conversion, however, would involve engineering, certification, ownership, and contractual considerations, particularly given that the RAF does not directly own the Voyager fleet.

Britain could also decide that modifying the existing aircraft is not worthwhile. The current Voyager private-finance arrangement runs until 2035, by which point the airframes will be considerably older. Rather than investing heavily in aircraft approaching the end of their contracted service period, the government could opt to acquire new A330 MRTTs or another tanker type equipped with a boom from the outset.

Another, more remote possibility could involve a podded boom arrangement, a concept that has been around for a while now, but which is gaining traction with the U.S. Air Force as it weighs options for future tanker capabilities. 

It remains unclear, however, whether a podded boom would offer the performance and integration characteristics required for Tempest and the RAF’s wider fleet. There is also a question about what platform it could be installed on.

At the same time, TWZ has previously highlighted how drones equipped with buddy stores could operate in a hub-and-spoke model, ferrying fuel from tankers positioned outside the threat envelope to aircraft operating at the tactical edge. This could be another option that might gain traction as the U.K. Ministry of Defense increasingly looks to unlock the potential of uncrewed capabilities, but must also be considered less likely, especially as a primary solution.

There is also a potential requirement for the tankers themselves to be capable of receiving fuel. Equipping a tanker with a receiver system would allow tanker-to-tanker refueling, extending the flexibility and reach of the RAF’s future air-to-air refueling force during long-range operations. Other A330 MRTT operators already benefit from this feature.

While Tempest is providing the immediate catalyst, a refueling boom capability would also close an increasingly conspicuous gap in the RAF’s tanker force. The service is acquiring and operating an increasing number of aircraft built around the boom standard while relying on a tanker fleet configured around the alternative hose-and-drogue system.

Whether Britain modifies its existing Voyagers, replaces them, or adopts another solution entirely could become an important part of the RAF’s long-term force structure as the Tempest program advances.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post UK Government Commits To Boom Refueling For RAF Tankers appeared first on TWZ.

The German Navy has demonstrated the launch of Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) LORA ballistic missile from an F125 frigate, with at least two missiles fired from the Sachsen-Anhalt during a test in the North Atlantic last night. The demonstration points to a potentially significant new long-range strike capability for Germany’s surface fleet, should it be adopted.

Video released by the German Ministry of Defense alongside the test shows two LORA launch canisters positioned on the frigate’s flight deck, followed by a missile launching from each container.

Die Fregatte „Sachsen-Anhalt" (Klasse 125) hat im Nordatlantik mindestens zwei ballistische Raketen vom Typ LORA (IAI) verschossen – gestartet aus Kanistern auf dem Flugdeck. Die Erprobung erfolgte im Rahmen der OPEX-Serie.

Video: Deutsche Marine pic.twitter.com/eV3yzjrcgg

— Clemens Speer (@clemens_speer) September 2, 2026

The launches were conducted as part of the Bundeswehr’s operational experimentation (OPEX) program in cooperation with the Bundeswehr Innovation Center in Erding. Reportedly, two German frigates were deployed to the waters between Ireland and Iceland for the test, and a warning was issued to maritime and air traffic 45 days beforehand.

The test marks a notable expansion of the weapons capabilities demonstrated by Germany’s F125 frigates and could provide a pathway toward a new long-range naval strike capability.

German Navy Inspector General Vice Adm. Jan Christian Kaack described the event in a statement distributed through the Bundeswehr’s official WhatsApp channel:

“With the successful launch of a ballistic missile last night in the North Atlantic, we have made naval history. I am extremely pleased with this achievement. The system can be successfully deployed by our units, and its potential range exceeds anything we have seen before. For the protection of Germany and our allies, this test marks a new chapter in deterrence and defense readiness at sea.”

IAI also confirmed the results of the test, stating that both missiles followed their planned trajectories and struck their targets with high precision.

The exact targets, engagement ranges, flight profiles, and missile configurations used during the test have not been disclosed.

There is no possibility that Sachsen-Anhalt will retain the launchers in their current location, since they mean the F125’s flight deck cannot be used, depriving it of a critical capability. Potentially, they could be installed elsewhere on the vessel, but, moreover, it is unclear if the current experiment will lead to a formal acquisition program.

At the same time, LORA is a substantially different weapon from the anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles normally associated with modern surface combatants.

Available for ship- and ground-launch, the missile is approximately 17 feet long, 25 inches in diameter, and weighs around 3,500 pounds. It follows a quasi-ballistic trajectory and has an officially stated range of approximately 60 to 270 miles. An air-launched derivative has also been developed.

A weapon capable of reaching targets hundreds of miles away would give German surface combatants a long-range strike option extending far beyond the range of traditional naval guns and many shorter-range precision weapons.

Its quasi-ballistic flight profile also differentiates LORA from a conventional cruise missile. A ballistic-style trajectory allows the weapon to cover distance rapidly and presents an air-defense challenge different from that posed by a low-flying cruise missile. This type of missile also impacts its target with much greater kinetic energy, making it especially useful for striking more hardened target sets.

LORA uses a navigation architecture combining GNSS satellite navigation with an inertial navigation system and can achieve a circular error probable, or CEP, of approximately 33 feet. IAI also says LORA can be launched within minutes, including from unprepared positions, and can attack a target within its range in less than 10 minutes after a decision to launch.

Back in 2017, as you can read about here, IAI successfully test-fired LORA from a containerized launcher on the back of a truck sitting on the deck of a cargo ship. The missile successfully struck a target on land.

What is less clear is its ability to strike targets at sea.

A long-range anti-surface application would be particularly interesting for the German Navy, although the weapon, in its basic form, has no terminal seeker. This limits the missile to use against targets with a fixed location, rather than autonomously finding and tracking a maneuvering warship during the terminal phase of flight.

In a 2020 test, IAI demonstrated firing two LORA missiles from a ship before hitting separate floating targets at approximately 60 miles and 250 miles. However, striking a static floating target is different from an enemy warship that is maneuvering and potentially employing electronic warfare and air defenses.

Regardless, Germany has an even clearer requirement for land attack capabilities, which LORA is fully capable of fulfilling, as we will return to later.

As for Germany’s F125 frigates, these were designed primarily for long-duration deployments, maritime security, stabilization operations, and other missions requiring a persistent naval presence. Their overall lack of firepower is something we have examined in detail before now.

The latest test involving the Sachsen-Anhalt is in line with the Bundeswehr’s OPEX framework, which is intended to evaluate emerging technologies and operational concepts under realistic conditions before decisions are made about wider adoption.

There is precedent for such experimentation leading to operational capabilities. Israeli-developed systems, including IAI’s Blue Whale autonomous underwater vehicle, have previously been evaluated through German naval experimentation efforts and subsequently moved toward formal adoption.

As well as the four F125 hulls, Germany might look to incorporate LORA from the start on its future F127 multi-purpose frigates and/or its planned Large Remote Missile Vessels (LRMV), uncrewed vessels that will serve as arsenal ship ‘wingmen,’ supporting conventional surface combatants.

It is worth noting that Germany has recently acquired various other Israeli-made missile and rocket systems. These include the Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system — the largest-ever Israeli defense export deal — and the PULS multiple rocket launcher. A German purchase of the land-based version of LORA would also be an option, with the truck-mounted system also able to be launched from ships at sea.

Meanwhile, Germany is a major provider of weapons systems to Israel, among them its most powerful surface combatants and submarines.

The LORA test also reflects a broader European push toward longer-range precision fires.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of ballistic and cruise missiles, while NATO countries have increasingly sought weapons capable of holding targets at greater distances at risk.

Germany has historically possessed comparatively limited deep-strike capability. The Bundeswehr is now working to expand its ability to conduct long-range precision engagement, both independently and within NATO structures. This includes planned procurement of land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles, with a range exceeding 1,000 miles depending on the exact configuration.

Very deliberate NATO messaging right here – interesting to see the alliance using this kind of signalling https://t.co/BYvpzkq0Vq

— Deborah Haynes (@haynesdeborah) September 2, 2026

A naval LORA capability could add another layer to that effort and would allow Germany to distribute long-range fires across surface combatants, complicating an adversary’s targeting problem while giving its naval forces a more meaningful role in high-end combat operations. With the security situation in Europe deteriorating, the potential deterrence factor that such a weapon would bring to Germany, and to NATO, should also not be underestimated.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Israeli LORA Ballistic Missiles Fired From German Frigate appeared first on TWZ.

Germany has now formally accused Russia of directing an attempted explosive-drone attack against Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport, a story we previously reported on. At the same time, authorities are separately investigating a sophisticated sabotage attack against a critical power-grid node in Brandenburg, underscoring Germany’s growing concern over hybrid threats to its critical infrastructure.

The two incidents, occurring against the backdrop of growing German and European warnings about Russian hybrid warfare, underscore the expanding range of vulnerabilities facing critical infrastructure across the country.

We now know that Russia is responsible for the attempted explosive attack at Leipzig airport. Russia's repeated hybrid attacks on Germany and Europe are unacceptable. (1/4) pic.twitter.com/o3vBjgpeb1

— German Embassy Washington (@GermanyinUSA) September 1, 2026

German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said Tuesday that the Russian state had apparently provided the equipment and technical know-how for the Leipzig operation, with locally recruited “low-level agents” allegedly tasked with carrying it out.

The drone, discovered inside the secured area of Leipzig/Halle Airport during the night of August 4-5, was carrying approximately 1.3 pounds of explosives and was found close to a Ukrainian-operated Antonov An-124 heavy cargo aircraft used to transport weapons to Ukraine.

New footage of yet another act of Russian terrorism on EU soil, showing the drone loaded with explosives on the tarmac at Leipzig/Halle Airport, just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft.

According to German authorities, the drone was carrying an improvised… https://t.co/eCZaLfz9yx pic.twitter.com/DbRz87wgIv

— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) August 5, 2026

The detonator on the device apparently failed, preventing what German officials said could have been a catastrophe.

The incident appears to have combined several characteristics of the emerging European hybrid threat: a relatively inexpensive drone, military-grade explosives, a strategically significant target, and the alleged use of local operatives to provide distance between the attack and its suspected state sponsor.

As we discussed at the time, the choice of target at Leipzig/Halle is particularly significant. The airport is an important cargo hub, and Ukrainian Antonov aircraft operating there have been used to move weapons to Ukraine. At the very least, an explosive device detonating near one of those aircraft could have disrupted a logistics link supporting Kyiv while simultaneously creating a major aviation safety incident.

A successful attack on one of Antonov’s cargo aircraft could have caused casualties, damaged or even destroyed the aircraft, and disrupted airport operations. The presence of explosive material inside a secured airport area also demonstrates the potential for covert actors to penetrate or exploit security around critical aviation infrastructure. But above all else, the loss of an Antonov Airlines An-124 would have been highly symbolic as the huge aircraft are a global symbol of Ukraine and its resilience.

Investigators later found traces of hexogen, or RDX, a military explosive near the airport on August 14, together with another drone.

Authorities initially believed the second drone could have been part of the planned attack, although investigators have since expressed doubts about that assessment. Nevertheless, German officials now say there is sufficient evidence to attribute the attempted operation to Russia, an accusation that Moscow rejects.

The Leipzig incident was not the only major security concern confronting Germany on Tuesday.

In the eastern state of Brandenburg, authorities said the power grid was deliberately targeted with specially prepared incendiary devices and rockets carrying conductive material. The attack targeted the Turnow-Preilack substation, a critical high-voltage node connecting the Jänschwalde power plant to the 50Hertz transmission network.

According to Brandenburg Interior Minister Jan Redmann, rockets carrying conductive material were fired into extra-high-voltage transmission lines, producing two short circuits. Authorities recovered more than a dozen devices at the site, with the number still increasing as the search continued. Redmann said the design and deployment of the devices required substantial preparation.

The attack caused a brief power interruption, but 50Hertz said all affected lines had returned to operation and that the general electricity supply was never disrupted.

At the Jänschwalde power plant, the incident triggered an automatic shutdown of one generating unit. The unit was expected to return to service Tuesday evening.

A substation and Germany’s Jänschwalde coal-fired power plant were attacked today, knocking a generating unit offline.

Local authorities report that the attackers launched rockets carrying payloads of "conductive material," causing short circuits. pic.twitter.com/dxPNmi2i9W

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) September 1, 2026

While the physical damage was limited, the nature of the attack is likely to attract significant attention from German security officials. Unlike Leipzig, German authorities are not currently attributing the Brandenburg sabotage to Russia. Redmann said authorities could not rule out the involvement of a foreign power, while also declining to exclude domestic extremist or activist groups. Left-wing activists have previously attacked German electricity infrastructure.

But the incident demonstrates the same underlying vulnerability Berlin is increasingly concerned about. In an age of hybrid warfare, relatively small-scale acts of sabotage exploiting weaknesses in infrastructure can have outsized consequences. Redmann described Germany’s critical infrastructure as excessively vulnerable.

“When it comes to our critical infrastructure, we in Germany are far too vulnerable,” he said, adding that the vulnerability extended to airports.

Taken together, the incidents illustrate the breadth of the threat German officials are attempting to address.

Germany’s assessment of the Leipzig operation also points to an increasingly familiar model of suspected Russian covert activity. German officials say Russian state actors supplied the expertise and equipment but relied on local agents to conduct the physical operation. That type of operation could provide Moscow with additional deniability while allowing sabotage to be conducted by individuals already inside the target country. It also complicates the security challenge for European governments.

German intelligence sources cited by German media have reportedly identified possible links between drone, explosive, and weapons incidents in Germany and other European countries, including Bulgaria, Italy, Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom. Investigators are understood to be examining the incidents in parallel.

If those links are confirmed, the Leipzig operation could represent one element of a broader campaign involving recruited personnel, explosives, and uncrewed systems operating across multiple European countries. Europe has spent much of the past several years strengthening conventional military deterrence while simultaneously confronting an expanding gray zone of cyberattacks, espionage, sabotage, and influence operations. Critical infrastructure is an especially attractive target in that environment. Power grids, airports, railways, telecommunications networks, ports, undersea cables, and industrial facilities are typically dispersed, difficult to protect comprehensively, and often interconnected.

An attacker does not necessarily need to destroy infrastructure to achieve an effect. A temporary shutdown, disruption to logistics or forced security response can itself create economic and operational costs, and help generate a climate of fear and mistrust. This has already been seen in the mass drone incursions over sensitive locations across NATO countries, and especially in Germany.

There has been a growing acknowledgement of a new kind of threat, in which state-backed or state-directed actors could potentially use inexpensive systems, local recruits, and covert methods to create disruption without crossing the threshold of an overt military attack, for years now. Germany is now preparing measures aimed at increasing the costs of executing these kinds of operations for Moscow. The Russian consulate in Bonn is scheduled to close later this month. Berlin also intends to remove Russian House, a cultural and scientific organization in the German capital that German authorities have associated with alleged Russian intelligence activity.

Berlin is also preparing additional measures against Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, vessels used to transport Russian oil and other commodities while circumventing Western restrictions.

Germany also plans additional sanctions and tighter border controls for Russian nationals entering the country.

At the European level, Berlin is supporting the European Commission’s proposed 22nd sanctions package against Russia, reportedly covering approximately 1,600 additional companies and organizations linked to Russia. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said Russia would respond to what she called Berlin’s “anti-Russian action.”

NATO and EU officials have backed Germany following the Leipzig attribution. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said Berlin had presented clear evidence supporting its assessment of Russian involvement. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen likewise pledged European solidarity.

I just spoke with @Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz. NATO stands in full solidarity with Germany after the Russian hybrid attack in Leipzig on 4 August.

The evidence is clear. And I welcome the measures announced by Germany in response. NATO will continue to strengthen our ability…

— Mark Rutte (@SecGenNATO) September 1, 2026

This morning I spoke with Chancellor Merz to discuss the hybrid attack at Leipzig airport.

I assured him that the EU stands in full solidarity with Germany in the face of this attack by Russia.

We will keep the EU united despite these escalating and serious acts. The German…

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) September 1, 2026

The incidents at Leipzig/Halle Airport and in Brandenburg underscore Germany’s growing concern over hybrid threats to its critical infrastructure. Both demonstrate how an adversary could potentially impose costs on a NATO country while operating below the threshold of open warfare.

At the same time, these actions come as concerns grow that Russia could openly and directly challenge NATO’s resolve militarily.

Regardless, for Germany and its European allies, the biggest question that needs to be answered may now be how many apparently isolated incidents could actually be pieces of a larger campaign?

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Germany Formally Accuses Russia Of Attempted Drone Strike On Ukrainian An-124 Cargo Jet appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Navy’s newest stated requirements for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) effort point toward a drone that sounds very much like an advanced uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), rather than a smaller and less capable autonomous ‘loyal wingman’ intended to economically augment crewed fighters. Overall, the new requirements serve as a tacit admission that the Navy is still looking for the kind of drone that it previously explored with extreme promise in the X-47B and Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program. The UCLASS requirements were abruptly shelved and replaced with an uncrewed carrier-based tanker effort, which resulted in the MQ-25 Stingray. This act was seen by some as one of the most controversial and puzzling procurement decisions in modern naval aviation history.

The traditional loyal wingman or CCA concept generally envisions uncrewed ‘fighter’ aircraft whose primary purpose is to complement crewed companions. This typically involves extending the crewed platform’s sensor reach, carrying additional weapons, and opening up a greatly expanded tactics playbook. An advanced UCAV, by contrast, is fundamentally an independent combat aircraft in its own right, designed to deliver weapons and other effects similar to what a crewed platform can provide without requiring a crew onboard or nearby. As such, it is more capable, survivable, and an overall ‘exquisite’ asset with a heavier payload, more capable of taking the place of a crewed aircraft in certain roles, rather than augmenting them, although there is nothing keeping them from working in a loyal wingman type role if required.

Yesterday, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) released a new Request for Information (RFI) that lays out an unusually demanding set of requirements for a CCA Increment 1 prototype. Among other things, the Navy wants an aircraft capable of operating from its aircraft carriers, carrying plentiful weapons, conducting strike missions in highly contested environments, and operating both independently and as part of a larger crewed-uncrewed team.

The combination of these requirements provides a much clearer picture of what the Navy wants its future carrier-based combat drones to be capable of.

Perhaps the most striking requirement concerns weapons carriage. The Navy says the Increment 1 CCA must have the ability to carry four externally mounted weapons weighing up to 2,500 pounds each throughout the target flight envelope and during carrier certification activities. That equates to a potential external weapons load of 10,000 pounds, although it should not necessarily be interpreted as the aircraft’s normal operational configuration. By way of comparison, a very heavily loaded F/A-18E/F Super Hornet might launch with close to 17,000 pounds of weapons and stores — though that is far from common.

Meanwhile, the kinds of drones that the U.S. Air Force is currently exploring under its own separate CCA Increment 1 effort, namely the General Atomics YFQ-42A Dark Merlin and Anduril YFQ-44A Fury, are air-to-air optimized. Their primary loadout is widely expected to be a pair of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, which is just a fraction of the Navy’s newly stated payload requirement.

The RFI NAVAIR put out yesterday also specifically asks respondents to address internal weapons carriage, with both capacity and survivability among the factors the Navy will consider. Internal stores carriage would offer obvious advantages in reducing an aircraft’s radar signature and preserving aerodynamic performance.

The Navy also wants the aircraft to have a substantial combat radius while carrying its required weapons load, as well as the ability to spend at least 30 minutes on station while retaining sufficient fuel reserves to return to the carrier.

For a CCA, carrier operations add another layer of complexity. The aircraft must be capable of catapult launches and arrested landings from both Ford and Nimitz class carriers, while operating within existing carrier deck, elevator, hangar, and support constraints.

Autonomy is similarly central to the concept. The Navy wants mission and flight autonomy that can support the aircraft from launch through recovery, along with the ability to incorporate third-party mission software. The prototype is also expected to demonstrate both individual and multi-aircraft autonomous operations. While crewed-uncrewed teaming is a fundamental part of the concept, the latest requirements make it clear that the aircraft will not depend on a crewed aircraft continuously supervising its actions.

The video below from Collins Aerospace offers a notional look at what crewed-uncrewed teaming involving carrier- and land-based CCA-type drones might look like in the future.

In terms of the survivability requirement, the Navy specifically wants the aircraft to operate in highly contested environments and is asking industry to provide approaches for assessing and managing survivability during collaborative operations. The consideration of internal weapons carriage is another indication that signature reduction and survivability are important design considerations, pointing to a low-observable (stealthy) platform.

All of this begins to blur the distinction between the Navy’s Increment 1 CCA plan and a traditional survivable UCAV concept.

That does not necessarily mean the Navy is abandoning the CCA concept entirely in favor of resurrecting the carrier-based UCAV concept. Rather, it suggests that the distinction between the two becomes blurred as requirements overlap. There also remains the strong possibility (or more likely probability) that the Navy will seek to explore CCA designs closer to what the Air Force, as well as the U.S. Marine Corps, are pursuing. This could potentially include development of carrier-based versions of one or more of those designs under a future increment.

The new RFI is also consistent with the Navy’s broader Air Wing of the Future effort (AWOTF).

An earlier NAVAIR sources-sought notice released in July outlined an expansive vision for future carrier-based uncrewed aircraft covering missions including surface warfare; strike warfare; anti-submarine warfare; air warfare; electronic warfare; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR&T); mobility; and logistics. That notice also pointed toward aircraft capable of attacking targets at least 1,000 nautical miles from the carrier without requiring aerial refueling, while leaving open the possibility of extending that reach with tankers.

Intriguingly, the new RFI does not include an explicit maximum range target, but based on the payload requirements alone, this would be very considerable, reflecting the Navy’s concerns about fighting a future conflict across the vast distances of the Pacific. Traditional advanced UCAVs usually have a combat radius measured in thousands of miles, not hundreds, far exceeding the reach of their crewed fighter counterparts.

Whatever the possible range target, the planned weapons load also points to a substantial airframe. Indeed, the deck-space requirement outlined in the RFI is relevant here. The CCA’s “spot factor” cannot exceed that of an existing fourth-generation fighter, meaning that it could potentially be as large as an F/A-18E/F.

Otherwise, however, the latest CCA Increment 1 RFI is considerably more concrete.

The Navy wants a first flight of a prototype within 24 months of a contract award and carrier certification during a three-year development effort. It also wants a path toward an affordability target of around $30 million per aircraft. This kind of price point would put it at the top end of the CCA concepts we have seen so far, and is fairly ambitious for a higher-end UCAV.

Navy officials said in 2024 that the CCA’s unit cost target was around $15 million, reflecting the idea that the aircraft would be sufficiently inexpensive to be expendable under some circumstances. The new RFI instead asks industry to outline a path toward an affordability target of $30 million per aircraft. That is still a fraction of the cost of a modern carrier-based fighter, but it suggests the Navy is willing to pay considerably more for an aircraft with substantially greater weapons capacity, range, autonomy, and survivability.

As to the companies that might respond to the RFI, in August of last year, the Navy confirmed that Anduril, Boeing, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman were all on contract for “conceptual” CCA designs. At that time, the service also said Lockheed Martin had been hired to work on a common control architecture for the drones. Lockheed Martin is already the prime contractor for the control stations and associated software the service is integrating onto its carriers now to support the MQ-25.

The new RFI, however, marks a shift from the conceptual studies described last year toward a specific prototype effort. The Navy is seeking industry input as it shapes the acquisition strategy, with responses due September 18.

In the past, the Navy has said it is aiming for the total makeup of carrier air wings to eventually be 60 percent or more uncrewed, although the precise balance is still to be determined and will certainly be informed by the lessons of Navy CCA Increment 1. Exactly how the CCA might fit in with the Navy’s sixth-generation crewed fighter – known as F/A-XX – is another intriguing prospect, but would clearly be optimized to work alongside that platform.

Now, back to the Navy’s earlier effort to develop a high-end, stealthy, carrier-based UCAV capability. Northrop Grumman built two X-47B demonstrators for that program, both of which underwent extensive flight testing, including carrier operations and aerial refueling. The aircraft flew from 2011 for around half a decade. As of 2022, both X-47Bs had been earmarked for eventual public display at museums.

The two X-47Bs had offered far more than a glimpse of what a carrier-based UCAV capability might look like, and the base design was set to evolve into an operational type. These were large, stealthy UCAVs with thousands of pounds of payload and endurance that far outstripped crewed naval fighter aircraft. The follow-on UCLASS program aimed to see the capabilities the X-47 demonstrated put into operation via a new aircraft procurement effort. However, it transformed into the radically different, less ambitious, tanker-focused Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) program in the mid-2010s. This, as noted, led to the MQ-25 Stingray.

To this day, the cancellation of UCLASS remains a very sore spot and is widely seen as a nearsighted and even reckless decision. This mirrored earlier moves by the USAF, which had demonstrated how revolutionary UCAV capabilities could be, only to entirely walk away from the concept. In fact, that service went even further, appearing to erase those developments from recent memory. You can read all about this bizarre and troubling inflection point in American air power history and the glaring questions surrounding it in this past feature.

Fast forward to today, and the Navy is getting the MQ-25, which is primarily a tanker, but clearly, that was not the only mission set that influenced its exotic design. In fact, these Navy requirements could open the door for the Stingray platform to potentially fulfill at least parts of the Navy uncrewed combat drone role in a ‘cleaned-up,’ stealthier configuration, something we have explored in depth in the past.

Overall, the takeaway here is that the Navy’s latest CCA requirements raise the intriguing possibility that its earlier UCAV ambitions are resurfacing, this time under the CCA banner. This is happening as China is moving very quickly with its own stealthy UCAVs, a number of which are in testing, and one of which is very mature and is navalized for shipboard operations – the GJ-11 Sharp Sword. The GJ-11 sounds very similar to the Navy’s requirements wish list, including its ability to act independently and teamed with crewed counterparts, as well as its general size and need for survivability.

While an RFI only represents an early part of the contracting process, in practical terms, it looks like the Navy is asking whether industry can finally make good on the past promise of a U.S. Navy UCAV.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Navy Sounds Like It Now Wants The Air Combat Drone It Notoriously Passed Over A Decade Ago appeared first on TWZ.

A new Ukrainian intelligence report details the complex production chain behind Russia’s shadowy 3M22 Zircon missile and identifies U.S.-origin electronics inside one of Russia’s most advanced weapons. New details also add weight to the theory that the weapon is a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile rather than a true hypersonic cruise missile.

The unusually detailed new breakdown of the Zircon missile identifies 70 enterprises and 84 individuals involved in its development and production while providing a component-by-component look at one of Moscow’s most closely watched — and least-understood — weapons.

DIU exposes details of russia’s 3M22 Zircon ballistic missile — including its components, production chain, 70 companies involved, key personnel, and foreign equipment used to manufacture the weapon: https://t.co/oOBqjUb8dS pic.twitter.com/VqRSSA41iV

— Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (@DI_Ukraine) August 31, 2026

The first evidence of Zircon’s combat use emerged in February 2024, when Ukrainian officials displayed recovered debris after a Russian strike. The wreckage included distinctive engine and steering-system components that Ukrainian specialists used to identify the weapon.

Russia has since employed the missile on other occasions. Ukrainian authorities reported that a Zircon was launched from occupied Crimea during a major missile and drone strike in January 2026, as we reported at the time.

While initially developed for use from warships and submarines, Zircon is understood to have been employed from ground-based launchers against Ukraine, with modified launchers from the K-300P Bastion coastal defense system considered the most likely candidate.

The new entry on Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) War & Sanctions portal includes an interactive 3D model and identifies systems ranging from the missile’s radar seeker and onboard computer to its propulsion system and warhead. It also identifies foreign-origin electronics, including components associated with U.S. manufacturers.

Among them, according to the GUR report, is a TGA2704 amplifier associated with TriQuint Semiconductor, now part of U.S. company Qorvo. The GUR also identifies an Altera Cyclone II EP2C5T144I8N field-programmable gate array (FPGA) associated with Altera Corporation, now part of Intel, and lists it as originating in the United States.

The alleged findings do not establish that either company knowingly supplied Russia’s defense industry, nor do they explain precisely how the components reached Russian production lines. The GUR says it’s seeking additional information on their origins and supply chains. Bearing in mind previous precedents, China could potentially be one source, being a known vector globally for recycled chips.

Nevertheless, the disclosure highlights the continued presence of Western-origin electronics in Russia’s advanced weapons programs despite sanctions and export controls.

The GUR lists the Zircon as approximately 26 feet long, with a body diameter of 2.2 feet, and a warhead weighing about 265 pounds.

The agency gives a maximum speed of Mach 8-9, a flight altitude of approximately 19-25 miles, and a separate “maximum fixed speed” (presumably, sustained cruising speed) of Mach 6.8. These are Ukrainian intelligence assessments and cannot be independently verified.

The database identifies the 3B222 active radar-homing head, manufactured by NPP Radar MMS, and a Baget-83 onboard digital computer produced by KB Korund-M.

It also identifies the 3B915 guidance units, the 3G22 warhead, and the 3L2211 solid-fuel rocket motor manufactured by NPO Iskra. Other Russian companies provide altimeters, control systems, power supplies, and other components.

The reported propulsion information is particularly significant.

Russian and other sources have consistently described Zircon as a hypersonic cruise missile, implying an air-breathing propulsion system burning liquid propellant, capable of sustaining hypersonic flight.

However, the physical evidence for such a propulsion system has always been less clear.

Open-source analysis by Fabian Hinz has highlighted the apparent absence of a conventional air intake on Zircon. A scramjet- or ramjet-powered missile requires an intake to bring atmospheric oxygen into the engine, yet available imagery does not clearly show one. A Russian patent associated with the missile’s jettisonable launch cap likewise does not reveal an obvious intake arrangement.

Just published my new OSINT investigation into Russia's secretive Zircon missile whose combat use has risen sharply in 2026.

Available evidence suggests that Zircon is not a hypersonic cruise missile but rather a quasi-ballistic system.

Link: https://t.co/8DoQePRpX3 pic.twitter.com/bIBS532FUB

— Fabian Hinz (@fab_hinz) June 17, 2026

More significant is evidence from recovered missile debris.

Material examined by Ukraine’s Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise included a circular metal structure interpreted as part of a solid-propellant rocket motor. The hardware appeared to be associated with Zircon’s second stage rather than simply its launch booster (which would be used on a true hypersonic cruise missile to bring it up to operating speed). This suggests a two-stage weapon, with a solid-propellant rocket in each. This would match with what we have seen during shipboard launches.

That finding is consistent with Russian patent activity involving NPO Mashinostroyeniya and NPO Iskra. Patents associated with the companies describe solid-propellant rocket motors incorporating arrangements for aerodynamic-control equipment around the motor’s exhaust system.

There is also evidence that Russian engineers developed advanced composite solid propellants specifically for Zircon.

None of this conclusively proves the missile lacks an air-breathing engine, but it certainly raises more questions about its classification. It should be noted that there are also some solid-fuel ramjet concepts, but these are much rarer applications.

If Zircon is primarily rocket-powered, it may be better understood as a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile that nonetheless reaches hypersonic speeds.

Such a weapon would use rocket propulsion to accelerate rapidly and climb to high altitude before descending toward its target along a trajectory that is partly ballistic but incorporates aerodynamic maneuvering — a so-called ‘porpoising’ or ‘skip-glide’ trajectory. It could therefore reach hypersonic speeds without requiring sustained cruise under the power of an air-breathing system. The combination of high speed and unpredictable trajectory also makes it notably difficult for air defenses to deal with, characteristics shared with the air-launched Kinzhal, another Russian quasi-ballistic missile.

That interpretation could also help explain reports of a highly variable Zircon speed profile.

Russian officials have claimed that the missile can reach approximately Mach 9. During a 2020 test, Russian military leadership said Zircon reached more than Mach 8 while flying to an altitude of roughly 17 miles.

A Russian Ministry of Defense video that claims to show the Zircon test in the White Sea on Oct. 6, 2020:

Ukrainian assessments have described a more complicated profile, with the missile reportedly flying at around Mach 5.5, accelerating to approximately Mach 7.5 near the target, and then slowing before impact. Those figures cannot be independently confirmed, but a boost-and-glide or quasi-ballistic trajectory could produce such a profile more naturally than sustained powered cruise.

Ru MoD released a somewhat better Zircon launch footage. pic.twitter.com/bxHa6DsFG7

— krakek (@krakek1) December 3, 2024

At the same time, it should be recalled that ‘hypersonic’ does not necessarily imply a ‘hypersonic cruise missile.’ A ballistic or quasi-ballistic weapon can travel well above Mach 5, which appears to be the case here. The characteristics of the Zircon, as presented by the GUR, would also help explain official Ukrainian claims that the missiles have been intercepted successfully by Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems.

There is also a relevant technological precedent. NPO Mashinostroyeniya has previously patented solid-propellant missiles using quasi-ballistic trajectories, including designs intended to maneuver at high-supersonic and hypersonic speeds. That does not establish a direct lineage to Zircon, but it does show that the concept is consistent with the company’s history.

The other major takeaway from the release is the scale of Zircon’s production network.

One of Russia’s leading missile houses, NPO Mashinostroyeniya is identified as the missile’s main designer and manufacturer and prime contractor for Russian Ministry of Defense contracts covering its development and production.

But the weapon depends on dozens of other organizations. NPO Iskra supplies the solid-fuel motor; NPP Radar MMS provides the radar seeker; KB Korund-M produces the onboard computer; and other enterprises supply guidance systems, altimeters, control electronics, warheads, power systems, and other specialized equipment.

Another video, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense in May 2022, is said to show the Gorshkov launching a Zircon, although the missile is seen only at a distance with no details visible:

The U.S.-origin electronics claimed to have been identified by GUR are particularly notable because they demonstrate how Russia’s sophisticated weapons production remains connected to international semiconductor supply chains.

By linking specific enterprises and individuals to individual missile components, Ukraine has provided governments and investigators with new information that could be used to pursue sanctions, export-control enforcement, and efforts to disrupt Russia’s supply chain.

The report also adds weight to continued open-source assessments of what kind of missile Zircon actually is.

Regardless of its classification, Zircon remains a formidable weapon. A rocket-powered missile capable of reaching hypersonic speeds, flying at high altitude, maneuvering, and potentially accelerating during its terminal approach presents a serious challenge to missile defenses. With Ukraine’s ability to intercept even more conventional ballistic missiles already severely eroded, the weapon further complicates the country’s troubling air defense picture.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Russia’s Zircon May Not Be A Hypersonic Cruise Missile After All appeared first on TWZ.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense has included an intriguing description of the ASM-3 Kai missile in its record fiscal year 2027 defense budget request, referring to the weapon as an “air-to-surface/anti-air missile.” Until now, the ASM-3 family has been publicly associated with the air-launched anti-ship (anti-surface) mission, and the wording potentially hints at an additional capability or intended role for the upgraded weapon.

The reference appears in Japan’s FY2027 defense budget request, submitted today, which seeks a record ¥8.89 trillion (approximately $56 billion) for the fiscal year beginning in April 2027. The request is part of a broader push by Tokyo to expand standoff strike, air defense, uncrewed systems, and other advanced capabilities.

The reference appears under a sub-section entitled Durability and Resilience, which calls for funds to “secure ammunition and fuel, increase the number of operational units (by addressing parts shortages, etc.), enhance the resilience of facilities (through facility upgrades associated with the formation of new units and the introduction of new equipment, etc.), and strengthen the operational infrastructure (by enhancing manufacturing capabilities, etc.).”

https://t.co/ntiASteLJx
というわけで概算要求ですが、個人的にはずっと導入を訴えてきたAARGM-ERの導入決定が嬉しい。あとは、ASM-3（改）がまさかの「空対艦/対空ミサイル」とは。 pic.twitter.com/XX09mrx2cE

— 因幡のよっちゃん（稲葉義泰 Yoshihiro Inaba） (@japanesepatrio6) August 31, 2026

In terms of securing ammunition, the document highlights the breadth of weapons systems involved, ranging from 5.56mm small arms ammunition and 30mm cannon rounds, via 155mm precision artillery rounds, up to advanced missiles including the Type 23 ship-launched air defense missile and the ASM-3 Kai.

The Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) ASM-3 is Japan’s domestically developed supersonic air-launched anti-ship missile, originally intended to arm the Mitsubishi F-2 fighter. The improved ASM-3 Kai (“Kai” meaning modified or revised) represents a significant evolution of the weapon, although the full nature of its capabilities and performance have not been officially revealed. The missile has already been observed undergoing testing on F-2s.

2年半振り以上？に飛んでいる102号機を撮影しました
ASM-3改にカメラポット吊してありがたや

2026.06.01
岐阜基地 RJNG
F-2B 102 pic.twitter.com/oUJImUagsI

— ボボ・AKEBOVO (@AKEBOVO) June 1, 2026

The ASM-3 program has also gone through a number of different configurations over its development history, with at least five distinct external configurations identified in previous reporting. The existence of multiple iterations leaves open the possibility that the newly identified “anti-air” designation could ultimately correspond to a dedicated air-to-air variant or derivative of the ASM-3 family, rather than simply a secondary capability of the baseline ASM-3 Kai.

Reportedly, the ASM-3 Kai is capable of flying more than 400 kilometers (about 250 miles), although the exact range of the operational weapon remains classified. It is powered by a ramjet engine, giving it sustained high-speed performance — reportedly around Mach 3. If it indeed has an air-to-air capability, this would be an advantage in some scenarios, compared to relying solely on a brief but very powerful rocket boost as many air-to-air missiles do.

The weapon is also understood to employ an active/passive radar seeker, providing it with both an active radar mode for detecting and engaging targets and a passive mode that can home in on their electromagnetic emissions. While an active radar seeker is common on long-range air-to-air missiles, the latter passive capability could also be of extreme value in an air-to-air application.

岐阜基地
九州から岐阜へ移動しました。
F-2 101号機、ASM-32発
スペマと離陸しました。#岐阜基地　#ASM3 pic.twitter.com/oFjetR3rWZ

— K.otani (@kotaken8022) December 9, 2025

The ASM-3 is also a substantially larger missile than typical fighter-launched air-to-air weapons. While that imposes obvious carriage and aerodynamic penalties, it also allows for a larger propulsion system, seeker, and warhead than would be practical in a smaller missile.

A weapon capable of traveling hundreds of miles at high speed, while carrying an active/passive radar seeker, could potentially be especially useful against high-value airborne assets such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. These platforms provide vital wide-area surveillance, battle management, and targeting capabilities. At the same time, their powerful radars are necessarily emitting, potentially making them detectable and trackable by a missile employing a passive seeker.

China’s rapidly expanding AEW&C fleet is an increasingly important part of its ability to generate situational awareness, coordinate fighters, and extend its sensor coverage well beyond its immediate borders. The force, which already numbers dozens of increasingly capable fixed-wing aircraft, is a growing operational challenge for Japan and other regional air forces.

The ability to threaten such aircraft from well beyond the range of conventional air-to-air engagements could force an opponent to operate its AEW&C fleet even further from contested airspace, reducing the effectiveness of its sensors and command-and-control architecture. Although a passive seeker could also offer an avenue for homing in on relevant radar emissions, exactly how the ASM-3 Kai’s seeker would operate against airborne targets is not publicly known. Equally, a different variant of the missile, optimized for anti-air missions, could incorporate both passive and active seekers specially adapted for that mission set, although it is very possible a single configuration can accomplish both missions. As well as AEW&C aircraft, such a missile would be just as relevant for other high-value, non-maneuvering targets at long ranges, including intelligence-gathering platforms, tankers, and other support aircraft.

The budget language by itself falls short of establishing whether the ASM-3 Kai has been tested or validated against aircraft. The designation could reflect a broader classification within the budget documents, or it could point toward a genuine expansion of the weapon’s intended target set.

Such a weapon would not necessarily be a replacement for Japan’s existing air-to-air missile arsenal. Instead, an “anti-air” ASM-3 Kai could occupy a specialized niche focused on high-value or otherwise particularly important airborne targets at extended ranges.

The possibility is consistent with Japan’s broader effort to expand the flexibility and reach of its air-launched weapons. Tokyo is pursuing a growing family of standoff weapons as part of a major expansion of its counterstrike and deterrence capabilities, including longer-range missiles capable of striking targets well beyond the immediate vicinity of Japan.

Other air-to-air missiles mentioned in the same section of the document comprise the U.S.-made AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the domestically developed AAM-4B, another medium-range weapon, thought to be the first of its kind to be fitted with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) antenna.

Between the exclusive AESA radar and Japan's labour cost, Mitsubishi's AAM-4B might be the most expensive air-to-air missile on the planet pic.twitter.com/rfBnXB8RzS

— Lia Wong (@LiaWong__) May 3, 2022

The FY2027 defense budget request also mentions another apparently new air-launched weapon for Japan, the AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range (AARGM-ER). Japan has not previously been publicly documented as an international AARGM-ER customer, but the weapon would be an obvious candidate for integration with its F-35 fighters if it wishes to bolster their suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) capabilities.

In terms of F-2-related developments, the document calls for the upgrade of an initial 10 of these aircraft to make them compatible with the air-launched version of the Upgraded Type 12 anti-ship guided missile, a significant new weapon that you can read more about here.

TWZ has contacted Japan’s Ministry of Defense seeking clarification on the “air-to-surface/anti-air” designation and what it means for the ASM-3 Kai’s intended capabilities and target set. It could also be the case that the description is an error in the budget document.

However, the emergence of such a capability would also come at a time when very-long-range air-to-air weapons are becoming increasingly important as anti-access/area-denial challenges make it harder for fighters to get close to enemy aircraft and the high-value assets supporting them. China has fielded weapons such as the PL-15 and the much larger PL-17, while the United States is developing the AIM-260 and has just revealed the AIM-424 Malice, a U.S. Navy missile reportedly capable of reaching more than 250 nautical miles. The U.S. Navy is also fielding the AIM-174B, a very-long-range weapon developed very much with the Chinese threat in mind, and which we discuss in the video below.

For now, exactly what prompted the “air-to-surface/anti-air” designation for the missile is unclear, but if it reflects a genuine expansion of the ASM-3 Kai’s mission set, it would represent a particularly interesting development in Japan’s rapidly evolving air-launched weapons portfolio.

Hat-tip to Yoshihiro Inaba for bringing this development to our attention.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Japan’s ASM-3 Kai Supersonic Cruise Missile May Have An Air-To-Air Capability appeared first on TWZ.

Indonesia is about to become the second Southeast Asian country to operate an aircraft carrier, nearly three decades after Thailand became the first with HTMS Chakri Naruebet. The latest addition to the region’s small carrier club is the former Italian Navy carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi, which departed Italy earlier this week, bound for Indonesia, where it will eventually become KRI Gajah Mada. Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Muhammad Ali confirmed the ship’s departure on Tuesday.

Garibaldi is expected to spend more than 20 days making the journey from Italy to Indonesia, passing through the Suez Canal and Red Sea. Italian frigates are accompanying the carrier during the transit.

According to Admiral Ali, the ship is scheduled to reach Indonesia between September 15 and 20.

The carrier will retain its Italian identity throughout the voyage, sailing as Giuseppe Garibaldi under the Italian flag until the formal transfer, when it will be renamed and placed under Indonesian command.

Commissioned in 1985, Garibaldi was initially described as a “helicopter cruiser” before being redesignated as an aircraft-carrying cruiser in 1989 and receiving the Italian Navy’s AV-8B Harrier II jump jets. The ship subsequently served as Italy’s flagship and later shifted toward amphibious operations and command-and-control duties after the larger Cavour entered service.

At around 13,850 tons full load, Garibaldi combined a relatively compact aviation capability with a multirole weapon and sensor fit, at least in its early period of service. Its armament historically included two octuple launchers for Sea Sparrow/Aspide surface-to-air missiles, four Otomat Mk 2 anti-ship missiles, two 2 triple torpedo tubes, and three twin Oto Melara 40mm guns.

Indonesia is acquiring the ship through an intergovernmental grant arrangement rather than purchasing it through a conventional commercial transaction.

Although it has spent almost four decades in Italian service, the ship offers considerable flexibility, combining a large aviation facility with the ability to serve as a command and support platform.

Jakarta says it plans to use the ship primarily as a helicopter-capable aviation platform, with aircraft from the Indonesian Navy, Air Force, and Army expected to operate from its deck.

Ahead of the ship’s arrival, preparations have included establishing a training facility at Juanda Naval Air Station/International Airport in Sidoarjo, East Java. Here, the large outline of a carrier flight deck has been painted on an apron/helipad area on the southern side of the installation, to familiarize naval pilots and deck crews with carrier flight-deck procedures.

Thailand’s experience provides useful context here. When Chakri Naruebet entered service in 1997, it was configured to operate AV-8S Harriers as well as helicopters. The Harriers were subsequently retired, leaving the ship to perform a much broader range of roles, including helicopter operations, disaster response, training, and VIP duties. TWZ has previously examined that unusual evolution in detail.

Once in service, Indonesia will likely operate the Gajah Mada as a mobile aviation base. This will allow helicopters to provide transport, surveillance, logistics, search and rescue, disaster relief, and potentially anti-submarine warfare and amphibious support capabilities over much greater distances than when operating from land bases, and in much larger numbers than operating from other Indonesian Navy vessels.

The potential mission set is particularly relevant for Indonesia, whose territory stretches across thousands of islands.

Occupying a strategic position at the southern end of the South China Sea, Indonesia is also locked in a maritime dispute with China, including incidents in which Chinese fishing boats accompanied by Chinese Coast Guard vessels have entered Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea. The tense situation as regards China seems to be driving something of a defense spending spree in Indonesia, with high-profile acquisitions including French-made Rafale fighters and submarines.

Meanwhile, in peacetime, disaster response is also a significant consideration for Indonesia. The Gajah Mada will be able to bring helicopters, personnel, supplies, and command-and-control capabilities to areas where local infrastructure has been damaged or where access is otherwise difficult.

The ship is also likely to take part in maritime security missions and regional deployments including multinational training exercises.

There is potential for Indonesia to adapt the warship for drone operations too, something that Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri has previously proposed. While Indonesia has not announced such a capability as part of the ship’s initial configuration, it has acquired Turkish-made Bayraktar TB3 drones, which have demonstrated operations from carrier decks.

As well as Turkey’s Anadolu, which has evolved into a platform for operating drones after Turkey lost access to the F-35B program, other navies are similarly experimenting with integrating uncrewed aircraft into helicopter-carrier-sized ships, reflecting a broader shift toward using large flight decks for mixed crewed and uncrewed aviation. The trend includes experiments with fixed-wing drones on amphibious assault ships, including in China and the United States.

For Indonesia, a future combination of helicopters and drones could provide the Gajah Mada with persistent surveillance and potentially strike capabilities without requiring the country to develop a conventional fixed-wing carrier air wing.

How extensively Indonesia eventually makes use of any of its capabilities will depend on its ability to sustain the ship and build the associated aviation infrastructure and expertise.

The Indonesian Navy is constructing the warship’s future base in Lampung, on the southern tip of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The facility is expected to be finished around the time the ship arrives and operational by the end of September.

The ship’s formal transformation into an Indonesian warship is planned for September 25. A commissioning and flag-changing ceremony is scheduled for that date, with President Prabowo Subianto expected to attend and officiate.

At that point, the carrier will become KRI Gajah Mada, taking its name from the famous Majapahit-era military commander and statesman.

The Navy plans to include the ship in celebrations marking the 81st anniversary of the Indonesian National Defense Forces, or TNI, in October.

Thailand’s experience with the Chakri Naruebet, which only very rarely goes to sea for any length of time, underscores the fact that buying a carrier is the relatively easy part. Creating a sustainable carrier aviation capability around it is much more challenging.

Nevertheless, the Gajah Mada gives Jakarta something it has never previously possessed: a large, dedicated maritime aviation platform capable of carrying helicopters from multiple services. As such, it could prove useful across a wide spectrum of missions.

Ciontact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Indonesia’s First Aircraft Carrier Is On Its Way From Italy appeared first on TWZ.

Saab’s first Gripen F two-seat fighter has taken to the air, marking the beginning of the flight-test campaign for a variant being developed in close cooperation with Brazil.

The aircraft departed Saab’s airfield at Linköping, Sweden, at 9:40 a.m. local time today and remained airborne for approximately 40 minutes. Saab chief test pilot Jakob Högberg and Brazilian Air Force test pilot Lt. Col. Aviator Abdon de Rezende Vasconcelos were in the cockpit for the inaugural sortie.

According to Saab, the flight was intended primarily to verify the aircraft’s core systems and initial flying characteristics. The company says the aircraft will now enter a more extensive test program, including progressive expansion of its permitted flight envelope.

That work will eventually cover the aircraft’s speed, altitude, G-loading, and angle-of-attack limits, as well as the tactical capabilities and systems associated specifically with the rear cockpit.

“This first flight represents an important step forward for both Saab and the Brazilian Air Force,” said Lars Tossman, head of Saab business area Aeronautics.  “Seeing Gripen F take to the skies is particularly significant for all the Swedish and Brazilian teams whose years of engineering work have helped turn this aircraft into a reality. It is designed to accelerate pilot training while enhancing operational performance in advanced combat missions.”

The Gripen F is the two-seat derivative of the Gripen E, but it is not simply a conventional trainer version of the single-seat fighter. Saab has designed the rear cockpit to be independently functional, allowing the aircraft to retain an operational combat role while carrying a second crew member.

The configuration is therefore intended to support conversion training and mission preparation while also offering potential advantages during complex combat missions through the division of cockpit workload. This could also include as a ‘drone controller,’ a growing area of interest for many air forces and something that Saab is also working toward with its uncrewed aircraft plans.

Combining the Gripen F, in particular, with a high-end drone of the kind that Saab envisages, would make a good deal of sense.

Saab has already pitched its stealthy, supersonic Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP) ‘fighter drone’ as an adjunct for the single-seater, describing it as “a great asset to the Gripen E.” Saab envisages the Gripen E serving as a tactical mission commander for one or more ACPs, working in conjunction with the company’s GlobalEye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft.

The dual-crew benefits of the Gripen F, combined with the ACP, could give Saab an even more compelling route into the CCA market. After all, a fourth-generation fighter like the Gripen (Saab, it should be noted, rigorously avoids using this generational terminology), can remain highly relevant when teamed with CCAs, and a high-performance, stealthy drone like the ACP could make that combination even more potent. It could, at least possibly in some cases, allow air forces to skip the sixth-generation crewed combat air platforms altogether, or at least greatly reduce the need for them.

Brazil is central to the Gripen F program. The country was the launch customer for the two-seat variant and participated directly in its development as part of the broader technology-transfer arrangement underpinning its Gripen acquisition.

The first Gripen F was formally rolled out at Saab’s Linköping facility in June. Brazil’s original 2014 agreement with Saab covers 36 aircraft, in the form of 28 single-seat Gripen E fighters and eight Gripen F two-seaters. Deliveries of Brazilian Gripens began in 2020.

The F-model has also attracted interest beyond Brazil. Saab has subsequently received Gripen F orders from Thailand and Colombia. The South American nation will get two Gripen Fs, while the breakdown of Thailand’s Gripen E/F order has not been revealed. According to Saab, the 16 new-build Gripens ordered for Ukraine will all be single-seaters.

As for the Swedish Air Force, it plans to buy 60 single-seat Gripen Es, but bearing in mind the changing security situation in Europe, and the increasing focus on uncrewed aircraft, a future Gripen F order should not be ruled out. In particular, Saab has said it expects the Swedish government to acquire new Gripen E/Fs to backfill the 12 earlier Gripen C/D variants it has donated to Kyiv, and which are expected to arrive in Ukraine early next year.

Ukraine intends to purchase 20 Gripen E/F aircraft. In conjunction with the sale, Sweden will donate up to 16 Gripen C/D, including advanced ammunition. To replace the donated aircraft, new modern Gripen E/F will be procured for the Swedish Air Force. https://t.co/kPHjVDXnSb pic.twitter.com/IxEhsy2yvN

— Försvarsdepartementet (@ForsvarsdepSv) May 28, 2026

Saab also remains upbeat about the prospect of a Canadian order for the Gripen E/F.

Sweden has made a strong push to sell Gripen to Ottawa, and Saab offered to build the jet in Canada, in an effort to secure support for its previous bid, which it lost to Lockheed Martin and the F-35. Since then, Saab has also emerged as the preferred candidate to supply Canada with its future AEW&C capabilities via its GlobalEye.

Days after trade talks between Ottawa and Washington collapsed this month, further straining the Canada-United States relationship, Saab chief executive Micael Johansson told TWZ and other journalists that Gripen would be the “perfect” option if Canada moves ahead with a joint fighter purchase. The Swedish jet would add “combat mass” alongside the F-35, according to Johansson.

“I don’t think Canada will give up the F-35 completely; they will go forward with that to some extent,” Johansson said.

Johansson also pointed to the Gripen’s ability to operate from highway strips as well as conventional runways: “You get to use all kinds of airstrips that you cannot use with the F-35,” he added.

Part of the Saab pitch to Canada is the establishment of a new domestic final assembly line for the Gripen E/F, which would be the third such facility after Sweden and Brazil.

As for the Brazilian connection, this extends well beyond aircraft procurement. Saab says more than 350 Brazilian engineers, technicians, and pilots have participated in activities covering Gripen development, production, flight testing, and maintenance. Brazilian industry, including Embraer, has consequently become deeply involved in the program.

Meanwhile, Saab is continuing to expand what the fighter can actually do once it leaves the factory.

Recent work has included a test launch of the Taurus KEPD 350 cruise missile, as well as last year’s integration of Helsing’s Centaur AI agent, which was tested in a beyond-visual-range combat scenario.

TAURUS LAUNCH
Today a TAURUS KEPD 350 cruise missile was launched from a Swedish JAS 39 Gripen for the first time. The test was conducted at the Vidsel Test Range in Norrbotten.
Today TAURUS is a long-range cruise missile that introduces a new deep-strike capability.
FMV pic.twitter.com/vYcL75Lu4p

— Flygvapnet (@flygvapnet) August 21, 2026

Speaking last week, Johan Segertoft, head of Saab’s Gripen business unit, points to the fighter’s digital architecture as a key enabler of the rapid integration of new capabilities. The company says the Centaur integration took just 10 weeks.

“We chose BVR because it’s one of the most complex things to prove that we could take third-party software and do it, but there’s a lot of things in an aircraft and outside an aircraft that benefit from the advancement of software,” Segertoft said.

Since the Gripen E first flew in 2017, Saab has implemented around 300 capability upgrades, according to Segertoft. He contrasts that with what he describes as a theoretical maximum of around five upgrades for competing aircraft.

That approach is summed up by Saab’s internal mantra, Segertoft says: “code in the evening, deploy in the morning, learn by lunch.”

The Gripen F test campaign will now move beyond basic systems checks toward progressively more demanding flight conditions. Saab’s Flight Test Center in Sweden will conduct the campaign before the aircraft undergoes the remaining acceptance procedures and is eventually handed over to the Brazilian Air Force.

The first flight therefore represents a milestone not only for Saab’s new two-seat fighter but also for the industrial partnership that produced it. Potentially, that model could be repeated in Canada in the future.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Saab’s Gripen F Two-Seater Takes To The Air For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

Europe is entering an interesting, and potentially highly consequential, period in the development of beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air weapons. While the public emergence of new U.S. weapons in this class has unsurprisingly grabbed the headlines in recent months, Europe is meanwhile working on several projects that ultimately seek to field its next generation of far-reaching air-to-air missiles.

As in the United States, the immediate catalyst is the rapid evolution of Chinese air-to-air missiles, particularly the PL-15 and newer systems that are emerging around it. The India-Pakistan air combat experience from last year has brought the issue into sharper focus, demonstrating the operational consequences of underestimating an opponent’s long-range air-to-air capabilities. However, while Pakistan said its Chinese-made fighters and missiles shot down several Indian aircraft, the precise circumstances, numbers, and tactics involved remain the subject of competing claims and outside analysis.

For Europe, the MBDA Meteor is currently the state of the art in terms of BVR air-to-air missiles, and its unique set of capabilites is something we have discussed in depth in the past. The question is increasingly not simply how to improve the Meteor, but what should come after it, and what kind of weapons architecture (or ‘kill chain’) will be needed for the next generation of crewed and uncrewed combat aircraft and their weapons.

One of the most intriguing current developments is France’s Comet program, which appears to be led by the French side of the pan-European MBDA consortium. Very little is publicly known about the weapon, and its exact specifications remain unclear. It nevertheless appears to represent an effort to provide a significant step beyond the current MICA family, offering greater range and speed. If the apparent timeline of around 2030 is correct, Comet could be viewed as a relatively near-term response to an increasingly demanding threat environment.

Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) research institute in London, told TWZ that Comet looks like “a response to the exchanges between the Pakistanis and the Indians, where, on day one, the Indians underestimated how aggressive the Pakistanis were going to be, particularly with PL-15. It seems coincidental at the very least that this kind of thing has just popped up onto the horizon.”

That would distinguish Comet from the U.K.’s Future Air Superiority Effectors, or FASE, program which appears to be associated much more closely with the longer-term requirements of the U.K.’s Future Combat Air System and GCAP/Tempest.

Talking to TWZ, Justin Bronk, a research fellow for airpower at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), explained that FASE “is likely aimed at providing significantly better combat capabilities by the early-mid 2030s than a mid-life upgrade of the Meteor missile would be able to offer within the bounds of its basic layout and size.”

Creating an interesting overlap with FASE and Comet is a joint Franco-British study looking at what comes after Meteor. In April, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding launching the 12-month effort that will assess future air-combat threats and potential next-generation missile concepts. The study is intended to identify the technologies required for a successor weapon and establish a development roadmap. While the two countries are at least formally examining the same post-Meteor problem, their longer-term combat air priorities appear to be diverging.

Beyond Meteor

Meteor remains one of Europe’s most capable air-to-air weapons. Its ramjet propulsion system gives it an important advantage over conventional solid-rocket missiles by allowing it to retain propulsion and energy much further into an engagement.

However, the threat environment that Meteor was designed against is changing. Meteor’s requirements were established in an environment dominated by the Soviet/Russian air-to-air missile threat. Today’s planning increasingly has to account for Chinese weapons such as the PL-15 and newer systems that may combine very long range with substantially greater speed.

“Since the Meteor is still more than a match for current Russian air-to-air missiles in air-to-air engagements, it is likely that the capability goals for the FASE program will use far more capable Chinese air-to-air missiles, aircraft, and sensors as pacing threats,” Bronk ​​​​added.

That raises the uncomfortable question of what happens when both sides can launch extremely capable BVR weapons against each other?

Simply put, higher speed now matters more, because it reduces the target’s reaction time and can make the terminal engagement substantially more demanding. One of Meteor’s advantages is the considerable energy it retains when it reaches the terminal phase, but the tradeoff is a slower average speed across the entirety of its flight envelope.

Barrie explained: “Meteor’s fly-out speed is somewhere between Mach 3.5 and somewhere below Mach 4. If you launch a PL-15 off a J-20, which is doing Mach 2, that weapon probably stays above Mach 5 for an awfully long time, which is one of the issues. It’s that risk of a mutual kill. Obviously, if the weapon against the J-20 is coming out at Mach 3.5 to Mach 4, then you have a bit an issue there.”

At the same time, a missile’s effectiveness depends on many other factors, including launch conditions, flight profile, midcourse guidance, seeker performance, electronic warfare environment, and target maneuvering.

However, the nature of the threat may push the next generation of European weapons toward a combination of greater range, substantially higher speed and greater terminal energy rather than simply another incremental improvement to Meteor. Indeed, the United Kingdom has dropped its plans for a Meteor mid-life upgrade, presumably to focus its efforts on an altogether more ambitious and capable successor, or successors.

Does the next weapon need a ramjet?

The Meteor was designed around a ramjet motor, especially since it was expected to face a ramjet version of the Russian R-77 (AA-12 Adder) missile. This was never fielded, and, as far as we know, China doesn’t have a weapon in this class either. A Meteor successor therefore won’t necessarily use the same kind of propulsion.

Meteor demonstrated the advantages of air-breathing propulsion, but there are trade-offs involved in using a ramjet or another air-breathing system. Achieving very high speeds while maintaining useful range and maneuverability can become increasingly difficult, and propulsion complexity adds cost and potentially consumes valuable internal volume.

The performance being attributed in open sources to Chinese solid-propellant weapons like the PL-15 suggests that another approach is possible.

Barrie would not be surprised if the ramjet is dropped. “The issue with a ramjet is it’s not impossible to get above Mach 5, but it’s difficult, and there are lots of compromises you probably have to make … I wonder if they may just look at energetic solids.”

A future European missile could therefore use a substantially larger solid-propellant motor, potentially coupled with a different boost and sustain architecture, to achieve the required combination of speed and range. Using more than one stage, or a multi-pulse solid rocket motor could be other solutions to the issue.

The size problem

Perhaps the biggest opportunity for a new European BVR weapon comes from the aircraft that will carry it.

Meteor was developed within the physical constraints imposed by existing fighter aircraft and their weapons-carriage arrangements, including internal carriage in the F-35. A future combat aircraft such as Tempest is expected to have significantly greater internal volume available for weapons.

“One of the drivers for Tempest is internal carriage, obviously, but lots of it,” Barrie continued. “A big main bay, and then probably sizeable side bays as well. That lets you carry a considerably larger weapon mass internally than an F-35. If you look at size of the platform in terms of what they’ve released, it’s a big aircraft, and one would assume it has a very significant internal weapons bay.”

A larger missile can carry more propellant, potentially support a more powerful propulsion system, accommodate a larger or more capable seeker, and provide additional volume for electronics and other subsystems.

As we have explained in the past:

There are different ways of increasing the range of an air-to-air missile, but this process is always easier if the weapon can be made larger. Bigger dimensions can translate to a bigger engine, more fuel, multi-stage rocket motors, and air-breathing engines, like the ramjet used in the Meteor. Other range-extending options that the United States has examined include throttleable “multi-pulse solid rocket motors” and more exotic “propellants, grain configurations, cases, and liners,” all of which would also be able to ensure greater range — as well as higher speed — compared to existing weapons.

The result could be a weapon that is considerably larger than Meteor but still fully compatible with the aircraft for which it was designed.

This reality, and the use of the plural effectors in the U.K.’s FASE terminology raises the possibility that the future European BVR requirement may not be for one missile, but for a family of weapons — at least as far as the British are concerned.

Why “effectors” may matter

If FASE ultimately refers to multiple effectors rather than a single missile, that could point to the broader direction of future air combat, involving crewed aircraft as well as various uncrewed wingmen.

Tempest is expected to operate as a so-called quarterback, supported by a number of uncrewed combat aircraft, remote carriers, or other systems operating considerably farther forward. Those uncrewed systems will have different size, payload and weapons-carriage constraints from the crewed aircraft.

This means that not every platform will need the same BVR weapon, or even be able to accommodate them, when it comes to the larger missiles.

Instead, a future force might require something resembling a family:

• A large, long-range, high-speed weapon for the crewed Tempest aircraft, optimized for the highest-end air-superiority engagements.
• A medium-sized weapon suitable for existing fighters and potentially future aircraft with more constrained weapons carriage.
• A smaller weapon optimized for CCAs or other uncrewed systems where internal bay dimensions, payload and cost are more restrictive.

A modular missile could possibly cover two of these categories at once. More broadly, these weapons could share technologies without necessarily being identical missiles. Common seekers, electronics, datalinks, software, guidance technologies or other subsystems could potentially be reused across the family.

The result would be a fundamentally different approach from simply developing a single Meteor replacement.

The seeker may be as important as the motor

The front end of a future European BVR weapon is another area where significant change is likely.

An active electronically scanned array (AESA) seeker would seem a logical baseline for a next-generation weapon. The United Kingdom’s previous work with Japan on the Joint New Air-to-Air Missile program, or JNAAM effort was particularly interesting in this regard, given Japan’s experience with active electronically scanned air-to-air seekers.

A future weapon could also incorporate a passive radio-frequency capability alongside its active radar. That would provide another means of detecting or tracking emitting targets and could increase the weapon’s resilience in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment.

For its PL-17 ultra-long-range air-to-air missile, China appears to have chosen a combination of active and passive seekers, although, as Barrie points out, it also appears to have been designed around a very specific target set: E-7 Wedgetail, E-2 Hawkeye, other airborne early warning and control platforms, and support assets, like tankers and strategic electronic surveillance and attack aircraft.

Whether such a capability is worth the additional cost and complexity is another question. A highly sophisticated multimode missile will inevitably be expensive, however, the same technologies could potentially provide utility against a broader range of targets than conventional fighter-on-fighter engagements. An air-to-surface capability should also not be ruled out, with a passive seeker potentially bestowing an anti-radiation missile (ARM) capability on the weapon.

Another passive seeker alternative could be based on an imaging infrared (IIR) sensor. This could provide an interesting complement to an active-radar seeker, making use of the same kind of two-way datalinked midcourse guidance system already included in Meteor. It could be especially relevant for engaging small or low-signature (stealthy) targets and in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment.

The weapon is becoming part of the network

Perhaps the biggest change will be the extent to which future BVR missiles exploit the wider kill chain, becoming much more than weapons guided by the aircraft that launches them.

The key requirement is for the missile to be track-source agnostic. This means a future long-range air-to-air missile could receive targeting information from a CCA, an airborne early warning aircraft, another fighter, a naval platform, or potentially space-based sensors.

For example, with Tempest operating alongside forward-deployed CCAs, the sensor that initially detects a target could be the CCA. The launching aircraft could then receive the track, launch a weapon, and continue receiving updates from multiple platforms.

Alternatively, a CCA could launch the weapon using targeting information generated by the crewed aircraft or another sensor elsewhere in the force, provided it is on the network.

Two-way datalinks, midcourse guidance, electronic warfare resilience, and the ability to accept high-quality third-party targeting information become central requirements. Some of this functionality is available, to varying extents, on some current air-to-air missiles, but it will be even more important as air combat becomes increasingly reliant on distributed sensor networks and crewed/uncrewed aircraft teaming.

If it can rely on offboard sensors, the missile’s engagement range no longer needs to be constrained by the organic sensor range of the launching fighter. Faced increasingly by the realities of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment, this could enable weapons that fly far beyond what the launch platform could independently detect and engage. The A2/AD threat is already pushing research into much farther-reaching air defense missiles, potentially with a range of up to 1,000 miles.

This also opens the door to more exotic propulsion concepts, including multi-stage weapons designed to combine very high-speed boost with a separate sustain or terminal stage.

The next generation of long-range air-to-air missile may therefore be defined as much by the kill chain they plug into as by the architecture and performance of the missile itself.

What happens to Meteor?

Meteor is one of Europe’s strongest examples of a successful multinational defense program. Six European nations participated in its development, and the program eventually produced a weapon that is widely regarded as a highly capable system.

Now, however, the countries that developed Meteor do not necessarily have identical requirements for the next generation.

The United Kingdom is moving toward GCAP/Tempest with Japan and Italy. Its future combat air requirements will increasingly be shaped by that program and by the threat assessment driving it.

The United Kingdom appears to want a very large, very high-performance weapon optimized for Tempest and the future air-superiority mission, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan likely needs very much the same.

Meanwhile, other Meteor users may prioritize a weapon that can be integrated onto existing fighters and remain affordable in larger numbers.

France’s Comet effort could meet that requirement, since it appears to be a comparatively rapid response to the emerging threat. With that in mind, France could eventually find itself with a near-term weapon, a future clean-sheet requirement, and a continuing relationship with the Meteor family, all while pursuing its own future combat air requirements.

Overall, it is far from clear whether the Meteor consortium will survive for another generation, at least in its current form.

Could Japan become part of the answer?

Given that it’s a partner in GCAP/Tempest, and based on its previous air-to-air missile studies with the British, Japan is particularly interesting in this context.

Japan faces a threat environment in which long-range air combat is of obvious importance, and Japan has already demonstrated advanced capabilities in active electronically scanned air-to-air seekers. The Japanese-developed Mitsubishi AAM-4B became the first air-to-air missile to feature an AESA seeker.

Although earlier air-to-air missile cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom did not evolve into an operational program, the two countries are now developing a combat aircraft together through GCAP.

With Britain and Japan designing the future combat aircraft together, they could eventually develop some of its principal weapons together as well, although Italy’s requirements are likely very different.

Thinking beyond the missile

Europe can almost certainly build a faster missile than Meteor, but there are plenty more questions about what kind of air combat system that missile — or missiles — will fit into.

A future BVR weapon will have to operate from multiple types of platforms (crewed and uncrewed), receive targeting data from offboard sensors, communicate with CCAs, function in a highly contested electromagnetic environment, engage maneuvering targets at extreme range, and retain enough energy to remain dangerous in the terminal phase.

Increasingly, it seems that, rather than a single weapon, a family of effectors will be the solution.

For the United Kingdom, FASE may become one of the most important programs to watch because it could reveal how Britain intends to bridge the gap between Meteor and the weapons of the GCAP/Tempest era. At this stage, FASE appears to be ‘for U.K. eyes only,’ although Japan and Italy would appear to be likely beneficiaries, due to their teaming on GCAP.

Elsewhere, Comet could provide an early indication of how France intends to respond to the emerging long-range missile threat while maintaining flexibility for a future system.

And for the wider Meteor consortium, it remains to be seen whether the program’s success can be carried forward into another multinational weapon, or whether the emergence of GCAP/Tempest and increasingly divergent national requirements marks the beginning of the end for the Meteor model.

Either way, the next generation of European BVR weapons is likely to be larger, faster, more networked, and more deeply integrated with the combat air system around it. At the same time, the need to create a family of effectors designed around a distributed force of crewed aircraft, CCAs, and offboard sensors will bring some formidable challenges.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post What Europe Needs Next In Beyond-Visual-Range Air-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.