Footage flooded the internet on Saturday, September 19, showing Gaza Health Ministry Director General Dr. Munir al-Bursh asking young men to bring the rest of his son’s body as they carried his remains.
“Bring me his other half!” the grief-stricken father said. “We were supposed to go to heaven together today, but you got there before me, son.”
According to media reports, Dr. Munir’s son, Bashir (28), was struck by a drone shortly after leaving his family’s tent in the al-Zahra neighborhood, near the Civil Defense headquarters, west of the Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza Strip.
Bashir was targeted while helping people fill their water containers, just meters away from his father. For many, the proximity of Dr. Munir implies that he, too, may have been a target of the attack.
Israel’s systematic targeting of health workers
The prominent Palestinian health official has been in the crosshairs of the Israeli forces since the beginning of Israel’s genocidal aggression on Gaza, due to his leading role in managing a crumbling health system that was severely devastated during the war.
Moreover, Dr. Al-Bursh is widely known for frequently reporting on Israeli assaults on the Gaza medical sector, and highlighting the dire conditions of medical facilities inside the besieged areas via international media outlets.
Al-Bursh and his family were previously targeted by Israeli warplanes at the very beginning of the war. In December 2023, his 13-year-old daughter, Jinan, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on a residential building in Jabalia. The aerial attack also resulted in the injury of Dr. Munir and the rest of his family.
The deaths of Bashir and Jinan al-Bursh echo the murder of 15-year-old Ibrahim Abu Safiya by an Israeli drone in October 2024. Ibrahim was the son of the former director of Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza, Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya.
The day Bashir al-Bursh was assassinated, and the days that followed, saw the killing of several people by the Israeli Army across different parts of the war-ravaged enclave.
This took place as world leaders addressed the UN General Assembly. For the third year in a row, these addresses and the deliberations have failed to stop Israel’s aggression against Gaza and its ongoing heinous crimes carried out across West Asia.
In a stunning leaked 2025 recording, AIPAC CEO Elliot Brandt openly bragged about how AIPAC manipulates key figures in Trump’s national security inner circle, pushing them toward another costly war on behalf of Israel – Marco Rubio, CIA head John Ratcliffe, and Congressman Mike Waltz
The speech came a day after U.S. President Donald Trump said he may “annihilate” the Islamic Republic if a deal isn’t reached soon to end the nearly seven-month war.
The speech came a day after U.S. President Donald Trump said he may “annihilate” the Islamic Republic if a deal isn’t reached soon to end the nearly seven-month war.
No primeiro dia da Assembleia Geral da ONU, o governo de Donald Trump publicou um comunicado conjunto com 14 países da América Latina – Argentina, Bolívia, Chile, Colômbia, Costa Rica, República Dominicana, Equador, El Salvador, Guiana, Honduras, Panamá, Paraguai, Peru e Trinidad e Tobago – anunciando ações conjuntas para combater organizações que os EUA designaram como terroristas. Entre elas estão as brasileiras PCC e CV.
Pouco antes, no seu discurso na ONU, Trump afirmara que os cartéis de drogas “são o Estado Islâmico do hemisfério” e seus membros “devem ser executados, exilados ou detidos como inimigos combatentes”.
Um nome, entretanto, chama atenção: o Cartel de Los Soles está listado entre as 24 organizações “narcoterroristas” que devem ser combatidas.
Acontece que o Cartel de Los Soles não existe. O nome é uma gíria que os venezuelanos usam para se referir à corrupção por parte de militares – algo como “petralhas” ou “bolsominions”.
Como a AgênciaPública revelou em uma reportagem no início do ano, a narrativa sobre a existência do Cartel de Los Soles foi criada pelo Departamento de Justiça no primeiro governo de Donald Trump, para embasar o indiciamento criminal de Nicolás Maduro e mais 14 membros do governo venezuelano. A acusação afirmava que Maduro “ajudou a gerir e, por fim, a liderar o Cartel de los Soles à medida que ganhava poder na Venezuela” e que “enquanto a maioria das organizações de tráfico de drogas na América do Sul e Central procurou recuar da importação de narcóticos para os Estados Unidos (…) o Cartel de los Soles, sob a liderança de Maduro Moros e outros, priorizou o uso da cocaína como uma arma contra os Estados Unidos, ao importar o máximo de cocaína possível”.
Depois, em novembro de 2025, a pretensa organização foi designada pelo Departamento de Estado como uma Organização Terrorista Estrangeira. Foi essa designação que deu uma capa de legalidade para a invasão militar da Venezuela.
Mas nem mesmo o Departamento de Justiça tem segurança sobre as acusações de que o Cartel existe. Enquanto no primeiro documento de indiciamento contra Maduro, de 2020, ele é acusado de “chefiar o cartel de Los Soles” e a suposta organização é mencionada 32 vezes, no indiciamento final, emitido depois da captura de Maduro, o Cartel é citado apenas duas vezes, e descrita como um “sistema de patronagem administrado por aqueles no topo” – e não mais como uma organização de tráfico de drogas.
Por que isso importa?
O sequestro do então presidente da Venezuela Nicolás Maduro foi justificado pelos Estados Unidos em função de sua suposta atuação no tráfico de drogas.
A ação norte-americana se baseou em determinações de grupos criminosos venezuelanos como terroristas pelos próprios Estados Unidos. De forma semelhante com o que ocorreu com o PCC e o CV em junho deste ano.
Existem definições técnicas na Convenção contra o Crime Organizado Transnacional da ONU que determinam o que é uma organização criminosa internacional: um corpo organizado com uma estrutura e hierarquia, divisão de tarefas e continuidade temporal; autonomia em relação ao Estado; e comprovação da sua existência por investigações policiais. O Cartel de Los Soles não se enquadra em nenhum destes aspectos.
A adoção ampla de uma organização que não existe pelos 14 países que fazem parte do Escudo das Américas demonstra a supremacia do governo norte-americano nas ações do grupo.
Trump afirmou em discurso que os cartéis de drogas “são o Estado Islâmico do hemisfério” e seus membros “devem ser executados, exilados ou detidos como inimigos combatentes”
O que promete a aliança do Escudo das Américas
Os 14 países que fazem parte do Escudo das Américas, iniciativa lançada em março deste ano, são todos governados por aliados de Trump na direita continental. Ontem, em comunicado conjunto, eles prometeram impor, “congelamento de ativos; restrições de imigração e de visto para membros, associados e apoiadores dessas organizações; e a responsabilização criminal de indivíduos que, conscientemente, forneçam apoio material — incluindo apoio logístico — a tais organizações”.
México e Brasil, os dois maiores e mais ricos países do continente, não fazem parte do Escudo. Ambos sofrem pressões políticas dos EUA para enfraquecer seus governos, com orientação à esquerda.
O grupo também prometeu pedir à OEA (Organização dos Estados Americanos) uma resolução que “promova e facilite a ação coletiva contra organizações narcoterroristas no âmbito do Tratado do Rio”. Assinado em 1947, o Tratado do Rio estabelece que um ataque armado contra qualquer país americano é considerado um ataque contra todos. A ideia seria militarizar de vez o combate ao narcotráfico sob a liderança dos EUA, como uma “Otan” latinoamericana.
Para Fulton Armstrong, ex-diretor para temas interamericanos do Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos EUA, este tipo de iniciativa “não funciona” e pode aumentar tensões continentais.
“À medida que fica claro que designar criminosos como terroristas e atacá-los como alvos militares não funciona, é natural que os países procurem atores externos – incluindo seus vizinhos – para botar a culpa. O exemplo clássico foi a Colômbia, que produz e trafica quantidades recordes, mas transferiu a culpa para a Venezuela. Os Estados Unidos, que consomem as drogas que passam pela América Central e pelo México, culpam esses países pelo problema. A maior parte dos narcóticos que passam pelo Brasil tradicionalmente tem como destino a Europa, mas Washington se reservou o direito de acusar o Brasil de não ser bom parceiro e de resistir às políticas dos EUA. A designação de terrorista politiza a questão e aumenta as tensões entre os vizinhos”, diz.
Para Fulton, a militarização da Guerra às Drogas não funcionou bem no passado. “Gastamos 16 bilhões de dólares no Plano Colômbia, e a produção de cocaína continua batendo recordes. A estratégia, além disso, aumenta a violência que afeta toda a sociedade, como vimos no México e em toda a América Central. Chamar os criminosos de ‘terroristas’ é politicamente conveniente, mas operacionalmente desastroso”.
O governo brasileiro resiste à designação de organizações como CV e PCC como terroristas, pois considera que isso permite ações de interferência dos EUA contra o sistema financeiro brasileiro e também ações militares. Em alerta enviado na semana passada, a Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (Abin) avaliou que o risco de interferência norte-americana contra o Brasil atingiu nível “crítico” justamente pela designação do PCC e CV como terroristas.
Depois de sanções contra pessoas e empresas brasileiras em julho por vínculos ao PCC, a Abin disse que isso “representa mudança de fase na escalada de sanções e interferência estadunidense”. Segundo a Abin, a interferência externa dos EUA sobre o Brasil ocorre de modo “gradual, combinado e adaptativo” que passa pelo enquadramento legal e pela construção de narrativa sobre atuação transnacional dos criminosos e sua vinculação com o sistema financeiro norte-americano.
Os EUA, com isso, “ampliam o potencial de efeitos extraterritoriais sobre bancos, fintechs, empresas, prestadores de serviços e cadeias produtivas brasileiras”, diz a Abin.
This story originally appeared in Panamerican Dispatch on Sep. 21, 2026, and is shared with permission.
The Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) has raised the risk of external influence and interference by the United States in Brazil’s 2026 elections to a “critical level.” The confidential report was sent to the Presidency, the Supreme Electoral Court, and the Ministry of Justice. In it, the agency points to escalating pressure from the administration of Donald Trump on Brazil. It ties Washington’s actions to a broader strategy to politically reorient Latin America.
The document is titled, “Threats to the 2026 electoral process.” It was forwarded to authorities in late August, and its contents were revealed this Saturday, Sept. 19, by journalist Mônica Bergamo’s column in the Folha de S.Paulo newspaper.
According to the report, there is a “trend of escalating pressure on Brazil” and a “selective intensification and reconfiguration of the pressure exerted by the United States,” albeit within a historic pattern of U.S. influence over the region.
The report’s assessment does not mention ballot tampering or altering the election results. The intelligence agency’s warning addresses the possibility that political, economic and diplomatic pressures could interfere with the institutional environment and with public debate during the electoral process.
The agency places these actions within the strategy adopted by the second Trump administration to reaffirm U.S. hegemony in Latin America.
According to the analysis, strategic documents released by the U.S. government between November 2025 and May of this year point to its objectives as reducing the influence of powers considered rivals and preventing their access to the region’s “strategic assets, natural resources and infrastructure.”
ABIN identifies China as one of the primary targets of this policy. In the agency’s assessment, Washington seeks to expand its direct or indirect control over these resources, whether through the U.S. government or the country’s private investment.
Support for conservative governments
The report pays special attention to the actions of U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio. According to ABIN, his policy toward Latin America has an ideological bent and he seeks to “influence and reorient the foreign policy of countries in the region.”
According to the document, this strategy involves steering Latin American countries away from China and promoting a domestic political shift “by supporting the rise of conservative governments.”
The agency cites a U.S. Senate hearing held in June, during which Rubio linked the restoration of U.S. hegemony in Latin America to the presence of governments aligned with Washington.
At the time, Rubio stated that the region had come to rely on several governments “friendly” to the United States during Trump’s second term. He singled out Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as exceptions.
The document also noted statements in which Rubio held Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva responsible for U.S. tariffs on Brazilian products, alleging that Brazil had not negotiated “in good faith.”
In ABIN’s view, this approach personalizes the pressure exerted on the country and has the potential to impact public debate in Brazil during the electoral period.
Brazil targeted for defending autonomy, says ABIN
The intelligence agency assessed that Brazil holds a unique position in U.S. strategy, because it has a government with “greater political will and the means to defend its strategic autonomy” in the face of Washington’s pressure for concessions and geopolitical realignment.
The report states that, despite periods of easing tensions between Lula and Trump, actions taken by the United States since May indicate a trend of increasing pressure.
Among the actions cited is the U.S. designation of Brazilian criminal organizations as terrorist groups and sanctions announced in July against two Brazilians and companies based in Brazil and Portugal. The U.S. government accused them of ties to money-laundering networks linked to the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) drug gang. For ABIN, these sanctions represented a “transition” because they caused U.S. pressure to have concrete effects on Brazilian individuals and companies.
“As a result, U.S. external interference now directly impacts financial relationships, corporate reputation, access to the dollar, international operations, and the exposure of third parties to the risk of secondary sanctions,” states an excerpt from the report released by Folha de S. Paulo.
According to the analysis, the U.S. strategy is happening in a “gradual, combined and adaptive” manner, linking Brazilian organizations to threats against U.S. national security. This is then followed by measures capable of affecting the country’s companies, banks and other institutions.
The Brazilian Intelligence Agency warns that these types of sanctions could prompt Brazilian and foreign economic actors to alter their decisions out of fear of losing access to the U.S. financial system or being impacted by secondary sanctions.
U.S. Makes Demands Over Brazilian Election
The report has also emerged amid tensions between Brasília and Washington directly related to the 2026 elections.
During negotiations held in 2025, the Trump administration presented Brazil with a draft joint statement that outlined a Brazilian commitment to not “arbitrarily” detain, arrest or limit the participation of “political dissidents” in the electoral process. The proposal stated that Brazil should commit to holding “free and fair” elections and ensure the participation of such individuals in the vote.
On Thursday. Sept. 17, Lula stated in an interview with Rádio Itatiaia that the proposal had become a “dead issue” for the Brazilian government. The president also rejected the possibility of granting the United States preferential access to the country’s mineral resources.
The confidential agency report delves deeper into the concerns previously raised in public analyses by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency. In a document released this year regarding intelligence challenges for 2026, the agency identified foreign interference as a threat to sovereignty. It warned that a combination of technological dependence, disinformation, espionage, and coercion could enable foreign actors to influence public debate and decision-making processes in Brazil.
Edited by Geisa Marques. This article was originally published by Brasil de Fato. It can be read in its original form, in Portuguese, here.
Le 22 septembre, à la tribune des Nations Unies, le président des États-Unis a annoncé qu'il lui restait « une grande décision à prendre » : conclure un accord avec l'Iran, ou « anéantir la République islamique ». Il a précisé que l'accord viendrait sans doute après les élections de mi-mandat. Le mot qui manque au débat français n'est ni mondialiste ni isolationniste.
LE COURRIER DES STRATÈGES
Restez libre !
LA NEWSLETTER · GRATUITE
Le Courrier, chaque matin.
L'essentiel de l'actualité, passé au crible par les cinq plumes du Courrier. Dans votre boîte, chaque jour ouvré.
Gratuit. Vous restez libre de partir quand vous voulez.
Il a dit : j'ai une grande décision à prendre. Le verbe est au singulier et le sujet est un homme.
Sept mois après avoir engagé son pays dans une guerre contre l'Iran, Donald Trump est venu la défendre devant l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. Il a posé une alternative en deux branches : un accord qui permettrait à l'Iran de se reconstruire et de devenir, a-t-il dit, l'un des plus grands pays du Moyen-Orient, ou l'anéantissement de la République islamique, et rapidement. Il a ajouté qu'il croyait l'accord probable juste après les élections de mi-mandat de novembre. Il a appelé les nations à isoler Téhéran, répété qu'il ne laisserait jamais l'Iran disposer de l'arme nucléaire, présenté son plan en vingt points pour Gaza et le conseil de paix qui doit l'appliquer, et refusé toute régulation internationale de l'intelligence artificielle, qu'il préfère appeler superintelligence, comparant les inquiétudes qu'elle suscite à celles du climat.
Dans la journée, il a signé avec le Danemark et le Groenland un accord élargissant les pouvoirs américains de défense sur le territoire arctique.
Voilà les faits. Reste à trouver le mot.
LE COURRIER DES STRATÈGES
Restez libre !
ABONNEMENT
Allez au fond des choses.
Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.
Ce que les deux mots disponibles ne recouvrent pas
Le débat français dispose de deux étiquettes et les use jusqu'à la corde.
La première est l'isolationnisme, c'est-à-dire la doctrine qui veut qu'une puissance se tienne hors des affaires du monde et s'en remette à ses propres frontières. On l'attribue à Trump depuis dix ans. Elle ne résiste pas à l'énoncé de sa semaine. Un homme qui conduit une guerre depuis sept mois sur un autre continent, qui somme les autres nations de rompre avec un État tiers, qui rédige un plan de paix pour un territoire qui n'est pas le sien et institue un conseil chargé de l'administrer, qui étend enfin ses droits militaires sur une dépendance danoise, n'est pas en train de se retirer du monde. Il en occupe davantage qu'il n'en occupait.
La seconde est le mondialisme, mot plus flou, qui désigne dans l'usage courant
Wilber Rafael Garces Perez, a food delivery driver in North Austin, Texas, was shot by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents while he was making a delivery on Sunday, September 20. Garces Perez, who survived the shooting but is now partially paralyzed, says his car was rammed by a large black unmarked truck.
ICE claimed they attempted a traffic stop and that Garces Perez fled, but the DoorDash driver and his lawyers’ account contradict this report, saying after he tried to U-turn and pullover, ICE agents rammed his vehicle again, and then an agent got out and aimed his weapon through the passenger side of the car and shot Garces Perez in the back of his neck.
CBP revealed on Tuesday, September 22, that the officer that fired the shot was not wearing a body camera, despite the agency’s body-camera requirements.
“I am not doing well due to the gunshot wound and I have not received the medical attention that I require,” he said through a translator at a press conference in Austin. After receiving no pain medication at the hospital, Garces Perez said that in ICE custody, he was forced to sleep on the floor and repeatedly asked for medical care while in severe pain.
His attorney also said he developed paralysis on his left side.
Local community demands ICE out of Austin
Within hours of the shooting, protests erupted in Austin. Hundreds of residents flooded the streets demanding ICE out of their neighborhoods.
Organizers have connected the shooting to a growing number of fatal and nonfatal encounters involving immigration agents, including the killings of Lorenzo Salgado Araujo in Houston and Ruben Ray Martinez in South Padre Island.
“We cannot be silent as ICE is shooting and killing our neighbors!” a statement by the Austin branch of the Party for Socialism and Liberation said.
Protests have continued across Austin on Monday and Tuesday. Student walkouts were also seen on Tuesday, September 22, by students across Pflugerville, Texas, north of downtown Austin, as well as Navarro Early College High School.
DHS defends the shooting and promises to investigate
After the shooting, the Department of Homeland Security quickly claimed that Garces Perez was an “illegal alien from Venezuela, who illegally entered” the United States.
Garces Perez’s lawyers have refuted these claims, saying he entered the country through CBP One, the US border processing system. “He had a work permit. He was seeking asylum.” They said that a notice of hearing was sent to an old address, despite Garces Perez updating his address with the immigration court. “He didn’t know he had a hearing. So he didn’t go and got a deportation order in absentia, which is a very common thing.”
According to reports, DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are leading an investigation into the ICE shooting of Wilber Rafael Garces Perez.
Austin police and the Travis County district attorney’s office have also said they intend to investigate the shooting. But their investigations come amid strong criticism of federal officials’ handling of previous ICE shootings in Texas. In Houston, Harris County District Attorney Sean Teare has said federal officials did not provide his office with information about the fatal shooting of Lorenzo Salgado Araujo. He is taking his own investigation to a grand jury to force the release of more details.
ICE violence continues in the US
The Austin shooting follows a series of fatal encounters involving federal immigration agents this year, including the killings of Renee Nicole Good and Alex Pretti in Minneapolis and Johan Sebastián Durán Guerrero in Maine.
As federal agents continue to face scrutiny over deadly encounters in Texas and other states, Austin residents and organizers say they will continue protesting and organizing until ICE is out of their communities.
Nesta terça-feira, 22 de setembro, a frase do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva marcou a abertura da Assembleia Geral da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) em Nova York: “o Brasil não cabe no quintal de ninguém”. Além de servir para a campanha eleitoral do petista, a declaração teve um destinatário certo, o presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump.
Os dois políticos discursaram seguidamente na 81ª edição do encontro que reúne os líderes de 193 países membros da organização e demonstraram posições bem diferentes, algumas vezes, diametralmente opostas. Ambos estão em plena corrida eleitoral: Lula em busca da reeleição e Trump em campanha para a eleição chamada de “meio de mandato” nos EUA que define os representantes da Câmara e do Senado norte-americanos.
Um ponto convergente foi a ausência de citações diretas um ao outro. Se Lula não verbalizou o nome de Trump, enviou vários recados indiretos ao republicano. Por outro lado, Trump desconsiderou o Brasil, dirigindo suas críticas ou elogios a outros países.
Trump usou seu discurso para falar sobre o poder militar dos EUA para garantir ‘interesses’ na América Latina
Lula critica guerras enquanto Trump celebra ações militares dos EUA
Lula iniciou seu discurso com uma crítica dura às Nações Unidas. “A ONU está falhando em uma das suas missões mais elevadas: a de livrar a humanidade do flagelo da guerra”, disse Lula. Segundo o presidente, o direito de veto das grandes potências no Conselho de Segurança da ONU é a fonte dos problemas.
“Em 1946, já na primeira sessão desta Assembleia, o Brasil alertava para o alto preço que a comunidade internacional pagaria pelo direito de veto. Esse vício de origem da Carta da ONU conferiu às grandes potências o privilégio da insensatez”, argumentou. O conselho é formado por 15 países e cinco são membros permanentes, com direito a veto: China, Estados Unidos, França, Reino Unido e Rússia.
Alguns minutos depois, Trump agradeceria ao Conselho de Segurança por condenar “ataques terroristas do Irã” contra navios comerciais, declarou que aquela resolução foi a que recebeu maior apoio da ONU na história do Conselho de Segurança e celebrou que a marinha norte-americana já havia retirado “mais de um bilhão” de barris de petróleo do Estreito de Ormuz, o que estaria baixando o preço do combustível fóssil.
Já Lula descreveu um cenário diferente. “O Estreito de Ormuz transformou-se em trincheira da guerra, quando deveria permanecer uma passagem vital para o comércio internacional. Famílias em todo o mundo pagam pelo aumento dos preços de combustíveis, fertilizantes e alimentos”.
Por que isso importa?
A Assembleia-Geral da ONU é uma das principais vitrines da política internacional. Neste ano, Lula realizou a abertura da conferência pela décima vez.
A reunião ocorre em Nova York em um momento de tensão entre os governos do Brasil e dos Estados Unidos em função dos indícios de tentativa de influenciar as eleições no país por Donald Trump.
As visões diferentes, inclusive, geraram duas frases de efeito que devem ser utilizadas em suas respectivas campanhas. Enquanto Lula defendia a necessidade de interferência de outros países nos conflitos e o uso da diplomacia, ao declarar que “a guerra não é a continuação da política por outros meios. É a falência total da política”, Trump destacava sua forma de solucionar as disputas: “enquanto uns falam, eu ajo. Eles falaram em paz, eu fiz a paz”, declarou.
Em seu discurso, Trump afirmou que os Estados Unidos estão construindo 18 fábricas de munição de grandes empresas do setor armamentista e que, em breve, o país poderá enviar mísseis e munições de todos os tipos para os seus aliados.
A guerra em Gaza também foi tratada de maneira oposta pelos dois presidentes. Segundo Trump, na assembleia da ONU de 2025, havia uma guerra brutal em Gaza, com os reféns [israelenses] ainda nos “túneis do [grupo palestino] Hamas, sem solução próxima. Agora, segundo ele, a situação está resolvida, os reféns retornaram e “milhares de vidas desconhecidas foram salvas”.
Já Lula se referiu às “gerações de palestinos carregarão a dor e o trauma deixados pelo genocídio praticado pelo governo Netanyahu contra mulheres e crianças em Gaza”, além de afirmar que “civis israelenses pagaram o preço do radicalismo e da intolerância dos atos terroristas do Hamas”.
Lula disse em discurso que ‘Brasil não cabe no quintal de ninguém’
Nesse ponto, outra diferença veio à tona. Lula argumentou que a situação em Gaza e na Cisjordânia, onde Israel tem realizado “assentamentos ilegais”, nas palavras do presidente, seguirá impune caso o Tribunal Penal Internacional (ICC, na sigla em inglês) e seus integrantes continuem sendo perseguidos.
Trump demonstrou em seu discurso que sua motivação é o contrário disso. Além de declarar que não permitirá que membros das Forças Armadas norte-americanas sejam investigados ou processados pelo ICC, afirmou que se trata de uma corte “antiamericana”, falida, sem jurisdição sobre os Estados Unidos e ainda clamou para que todos os países que fazem parte da instituição “saiam imediatamente”.
Interferência versus Soberania
A interferência norte-americana na política dos países da América Latina foi um dos pontos centrais do desacordo entre Lula e Trump.
O republicano comemorou no seu discurso o acordo com a Dinamarca em que os Estados Unidos passam a ter controle da segurança do território. Ele também anunciou a construção de duas bases militares no local e afirmou que “adversários dos Estados Unidos” não poderão estabelecer “presença militar” no território sem aprovação do governo estadunidense.
O Acordo foi assinado logo após a saída de Trump da Assembleia. Durante a assinatura, a primeira-ministra da Dinamarca, Mette Frederiksen afirmou que se trata de um acordo que será bom para a Groenlândia, para a Dinamarca, para a Otan (Organização do Atlântico Norte, que sustenta a união militar entre os Estados Unidos e países europeus desde o fim da segunda grande guerra) e portanto, bom para a Europa.
Na América Latina, Trump citou como uma ação militar bem-sucedida o sequestro do então presidente da Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, a quem Trump chamou de “verdadeiro criminoso”. Ele comemorou a “libertação de diversos políticos” após a intervenção no país e a assinatura de um acordo com a Venezuela sobre a produção de petróleo do país, que segundo ele, dará aos EUA, 60% de todo o petróleo produzido no planeta.
Sobre Cuba, Trump afirmou que o secretário de Estado de seu governo, Marco Rubio, está envolvido em uma negociação para a retirada do atual regime do país, que segundo Trump, está falido e “vai cair”. O norte-americano também alega que o regime cubano coordena, há décadas, movimentos “radicais de esquerda” e “redes comunistas” dentro dos Estados Unidos e que “o comunismo” nunca chegará ao país.
Já Lula, criticou duramente as intervenções na região, mesmo sem citar diretamente os Estados Unidos e Donald Trump. “Voltamos a presenciar a ingerência externa em processos eleitorais. A divisão do mundo em zonas de influência e investidas neocoloniais por recursos estratégicos constituem gestos anacrônicos”, declarou.
O presidente brasileiro ainda afirmou que “o povo venezuelano merece definir o próprio destino”. Sobre Cuba, Lula chamou de “ilegais” o embargo econômico e o cerco energético ao país, além de ressaltar que o mundo assiste “à punição coletiva imposta a 10 milhões de pessoas.”
Regulação da Inteligência Artificial e das big techs
Se Lula defendeu a regulação da inteligência artificial, Donald Trump foi claro ao afirmar que não pretende regular a tecnologia que agora chama de “superinteligência”, e sim, encorajá-la.
Para Lula, “seria uma omissão histórica imperdoável não enfrentar o desafio da regulamentação das Big Techs e da Inteligência Artificial. Um punhado de tecno-oligarcas quer ressuscitar uma versão de neoliberalismo digital, sem regras nem transparência”. O presidente citou o papa Leão 14 ao declarar que “as decisões sobre tecnologia nunca devem ser separadas da consciência e da responsabilidade”.
As empresas de tecnologia que atuam com apostas, as Bets, também foram criticadas por Lula nesse momento do discurso. “Empresas que conhecem os riscos de seus produtos transferem para as famílias a impossível tarefa de enfrentar os algoritmos. A indústria bilionária das BETs transforma o vício em lucro. Sua disseminação vertiginosa está endividando e destruindo lares. O Brasil não vai tolerar esse modelo de negócio”.
Já Trump optou por usar a desinformação sobre as mudanças climáticas para defender as empresas de tecnologia. “As mesmas pessoas que disseram que todos seriam mortos em 12 anos por causa do clima global”, declarou Trump, “dizem que a inteligência artificial vai nos matar, que os robôs vão nos atacar, que será um desastre”. Sobre as mudanças climáticas, o presidente dos EUA disse que “o planeta não estava pegando fogo, e ninguém morreu”.
Pix, tarifas e feminicídio
Em seu discurso, Lula aproveitou para enviar alguns recados diretos ao líder norte-americano e também destacar pontos de sua campanha à reeleição. Ele defendeu o Pix e salientou que “não vamos ceder às pressões de multinacionais” sobre a tecnologia.
O tarifaço também esteve, de forma sutil, presente no discurso. “Temos autoridade moral para rejeitar medidas protecionistas disfarçadas de apego à causa ambiental”, disse. Entre as alegações dos EUA para elevar as tarifas de produtos brasileiros, estava a falta de políticas eficientes com combate ao desmatamento da Amazônia. Com isso, o presidente aproveitou para levantar uma das bandeiras do seu mandato. “Continuaremos reduzindo o desmatamento, que caiu pela metade na Amazônia e atingiu o menor nível em 11 anos”.
Na defesa da soberania, Lula também afirmou que mudar não significa retroceder, nem “reeditar teorias de supremacia racial ou de submissão feminina”, ou “recolonizar o Sul Global”.
Em um dos momentos que Lula direciona seu discurso aos eleitores no Brasil, ele defendeu que o mundo deveria abraçar como causa “um país livre do feminicídio, onde nenhuma mulher, dentro ou fora de casa, viva sob a ameaça da violência”. Neste momento, ele foi aplaudido pelos demais líderes presentes à assembleia.
Donald Trump’s campaign to bring Greenland under United States control has often been dismissed as bluster. That is a mistake. Behind the language of a property deal lies a serious attempt to revive an old imperial principle: that Washington may decide the political and economic future of the entire Western Hemisphere. Greenland, strategically placed between North America and Europe, has become a test of that claim – and of whether the sovereignty of a small Indigenous nation counts when it conflicts with the ambitions of a great power.
Trump floated buying Greenland during his first presidency in 2019. After his re-election, the proposal became more aggressive. In December 2024 he declared US “ownership and control” of Greenland as an “absolute necessity.” On January 7, 2025, he refused to rule out military or economic coercion against Greenland and the Panama Canal, saying, “We need Greenland for national security purposes.” He subsequently insisted that the United States would obtain the island “one way or the other.” The claim mixed several arguments: Greenland is vital to missile defense, Russia and China threaten the Arctic, Greenland’s rare-earth deposits are strategically valuable, and Greenlanders would supposedly welcome US rule.
The last claim was demonstrably false. A January 2025 survey conducted in both Greenlandic and Danish found that 85% of Greenland’s population opposed leaving the Danish realm to join the United States, while only 6% supported it. Yet the same poll showed a majority favoring eventual independence. That distinction is central. Greenlanders’ desire to end Danish colonial tutelage cannot be converted into consent to US annexation.
A military relationship without annexation
The security case for US ownership is misleading because Washington already enjoys extensive military rights in Greenland. The relationship began during the Second World War. With Denmark occupied by Nazi Germany, its ambassador in Washington signed a 1941 agreement permitting the United States to defend Greenland and construct facilities there. Denmark sought a US withdrawal after the war, but Cold War strategy prevailed.
The 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement, concluded under the North Atlantic Treaty, authorized the United States to establish and operate “defense areas.” It enabled the rapid construction of Thule Air Base – renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023 – at a location ideal for the shortest air and missile routes between the Soviet Union and North America. At its Cold War height, the US operated numerous installations across Greenland. Today Pituffik, Washington’s northernmost military base, performs missile-warning, missile-defense and space-surveillance functions.
The agreement offers Washington wide operational freedom. A 2004 amendment – the Igaliku Agreement – recognized Greenland’s Home Rule government, made Pituffik the sole existing defense area, and required consultation before significant changes or the creation of new defense areas. It also established cooperation on economic, technical, and environmental issues. In other words, if the United States believes more radar, ports, airfields or personnel are necessary, a legal mechanism already exists to negotiate them with Denmark and Greenland. Sovereignty is, therefore, not a military requirement.
The history of the bases also explains why “security” is not a neutral word in Greenland. In 1953, Danish authorities ordered 116 Inughuit – 27 families – to leave the newly established Qaanaaq, while the others relocated to settlements elsewhere in the district. Camp Century was constructed beneath the ice in 1959-60 and was connected with the secret Project Iceworm proposal for an extensive network of nuclear-missile launch sites.
In 1968, a US B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed on the sea ice at Thule Air Base, causing plutonium and other contamination. The accident exposed the inconsistency between Denmark’s publicly declared policy against nuclear weapons on Danish territory in peacetime and the Danish government’s secret permissions for the US to store nuclear weapons in Greenland. Abandoned installations left fuel, waste and other pollution. Greenlandic reporting continues to question who will pay for future clean-ups. The military relationship protected US strategic interests while its human and environmental costs were disproportionately borne by Greenlanders.
Greenland ceased formally to be a colony in 1953, gained Home Rule in 1979 and expanded self-government in 2009. The Self-Government Act recognizes Greenlanders as a people entitled to self-determination and provides a path to independence. Washington reopened its Nuuk consulate in 2020, and cooperation grew in trade, education, mining, and research. Greenland’s governments (from Kuupik Kleist to Jens-Frederik Nielsen) have welcomed economic ties with Washington, but reject the tendency of Washington to want more and more from the island for its military needs.
From Monroe to Donroe
Trump’s Greenland demand belongs to a wider hemispheric policy. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 warned European powers against new colonial intervention in the Americas. Presented as anti-colonial, it evolved into a claim of US supremacy. Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 corollary asserted a right of intervention in Latin America, furnishing ideological cover for occupations, regime changes, and control over strategic assets.
Trump’s supporters rechristened its latest version the “Donroe Doctrine.” The label links pressure on Greenland with demands concerning the Panama Canal, threats against Cuba and Colombia, claims over Canada, and US intervention in Venezuela. In late 2025, the White House formally proclaimed a Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting US leadership throughout “our hemisphere.” Greenland is swept into this sphere because it is geographically part of North America, even though it is politically tied to Denmark and its Inuit people possess their own right of self-determination. This doctrine contains a revealing contradiction. Trump denounces European control of Greenland as an anachronism while demanding that the island be transferred to the United States. Colonialism is not abolished; the proposed colonizer merely changes. Trump’s references to minerals, sea routes, and military geography reduce Greenland to an asset and its 56,000 people to an obstacle in a transaction between powers.
A crisis inside the Western alliance
Trump’s threats produced an extraordinary rupture between the United States and Europe. Denmark is not an adversary, but a NATO ally whose troops fought alongside US soldiers in Afghanistan. A threat to seize territory from one ally by force attacks the premise of the alliance itself. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned that a US attack on another NATO country would bring the post-war security order to an end. European governments rallied behind the principle that borders cannot be changed by coercion, a principle they invoke against Russia in Ukraine.
The crisis exposed Europe’s dependency. NATO has no comfortable procedure for defending one member against its strongest member. European states rely heavily on US military power while being asked to resist US coercion. Copenhagen responded with careful diplomacy, greater Arctic military spending, and insistence that decisions belong to Greenland and Denmark. France, Germany, the Nordic states, and the European Union expressed solidarity, but the episode sharpened calls for European strategic autonomy. It also damaged Washington’s claim to lead an alliance of democracies against authoritarian revisionism.
On September 18, 2026, Trump announced an emerging trilateral security agreement after months of negotiation, claiming “permanent control” over Greenland’s security. Danish and Greenlandic leaders described it more narrowly: an expansion of US military cooperation that preserves sovereignty and Greenlandic self-determination. The full text remains to be signed and approved. If their account holds, the outcome confirms what was apparent from the beginning: the United States could obtain additional security arrangements without owning Greenland. Yet the pressure that preceded the deal remains a warning about negotiations conducted under threats.
Greenland speaks for itself
Greenland’s response has combined rejection, unity, and political complexity. Kalaallit Nunaat – the Greenlandic name for the country – became the center of declarations that Greenland belongs to its people and is not for sale. In March 2025, large demonstrations in Nuuk, Sisimiut, and Qaanaaq marched under the red-and-white Erfalasorput flag. Protesters told Trump to respect Inuit, their country, and their nationality. Greenland’s political parties, despite deep disagreements over the speed and economic terms of independence, jointly condemned external pressure. Parliament prohibited foreign and anonymous political donations, explicitly defending the integrity of Greenlandic democracy amid great-power interest.
Danish colonialism left profound injuries: forced assimilation, social engineering, unequal development, and decisions taken in Copenhagen about Greenlandic land and people (the entire fourth season of the popular television drama, Borgen, in 2022 centered on a conflict between Copenhagen and Nuuk about the discovery of a new oil field with a China and Russia angle). Many Greenlanders want independence, and some see heightened US interest as leverage for investment and a more equal relationship with Denmark.
Greenland reveals the real content of the Donroe Doctrine: a twenty-first-century claim that geography gives Washington superior rights over neighboring peoples. The answer from Greenland is equally modern and universal. Strategic location does not cancel popular sovereignty, minerals do not erase nationhood, and no great power acquires a country merely by declaring that it needs one.
Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books (New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).
Trump has expressed his desire to acquire Greenland since as long ago as 2019 and, during his second term, issued threats to seize the semiautonomous territory from Denmark.
Trump has expressed his desire to acquire Greenland since as long ago as 2019 and, during his second term, issued threats to seize the semiautonomous territory from Denmark.
President Xi Jinping is set to visit to the United States from September 23-25. His visit must be understood as more than an encounter between two heads of state, but it must be seen as an encounter between two possible futures.
In one future, the United States imposes a spiral of confrontation against China. Trade disputes harden into economic warfare, then economic warfare intensifies into technological blockades, technological blockades produce military encirclement, and finally military encirclement creates incidents, and incidents the danger of becoming an unimaginable war.
In the other future, the two countries accept that neither can destroy the other without destroying much of humanity. They recognize that coexistence is not an act of charity and collaboration is not a concession. Both are necessities.
That is the significance of President Xi’s decision to travel to the United States. China’s foreign ministry has described head-of-state diplomacy as having an “irreplaceable” role in guiding relations between the two countries. The visit follows President Donald Trump’s trip to China in May and continuing negotiations over tariffs, trade, and investment. There are indications that President Xi will travel with a substantial delegation of Chinese business leaders. These facts suggest that Beijing wants to move the relationship away from the permanent crisis and towards practical engagement.
But diplomacy between China and the United States cannot merely be a photo opportunity. Nor should it be understood as a negotiation in which one side must surrender to the other. It must be based on a sober recognition of reality. Or to be precise, four realities.
The first reality is that China cannot be contained. China is not a minor country whose development can be suffocated by sanctions. It has a population of more than 1.4 billion people, a vast industrial system, an increasingly sophisticated scientific community, and deep commercial relationships across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Whatever one thinks of China, it is absurd to imagine that it can simply be excluded from the world economy. The attempt to contain China has already produced an extraordinary catalogue of restrictions: tariffs, semiconductor controls, investment prohibitions, sanctions on Chinese companies, naval patrols along China’s coastline, and the construction of new military arrangements from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Each of these measures is presented as defensive. Taken together, however, they form an architecture of confrontation. There is a dangerous illusion in Washington that pressure will force China to abandon its development. No Chinese government could accept such a demand. After the century of humiliation (from the Opium Wars to the Japanese invasion) the restoration of national sovereignty and the improvement of living standards are not negotiable matters for the Chinese people. The United States may slow certain aspects of China’s development, but it cannot persuade China to return to poverty.
The second reality is that economic separation is neither simple nor painless. The United States and China remain deeply connected through trade, investment, supply chains, scientific knowledge, and consumer markets. US farmers depend upon Chinese buyers. US companies depend upon Chinese manufacturing and upon Chinese consumers. China, meanwhile, benefits from access to US technology, agricultural products, and capital. Negotiators are now discussing reciprocal tariff reductions and new mechanisms for trade and investment. These are modest measures, but they acknowledge an important truth: economic warfare injures both countries. Tariffs are announced with nationalist speeches, but their costs appear quietly in grocery bills, factory closures, disrupted supply chains, and lost employment. Working people in the United States do not benefit when China is weakened. Their difficulties are rooted principally in decisions made by their own ruling class: decades of deindustrialization, the power of finance, attacks on trade unions, the privatization of public services, and the refusal to undertake serious social investment. China did not close the factories of the US Midwest. US corporations closed them in search of higher profits. The answer to inequality in either country is not economic nationalism by the United States.
The third reality is that humanity faces problems that cannot be solved by either country acting alone. The climate catastrophe does not carry a passport. Carbon emitted in one country heats the atmosphere everywhere. The United States possesses immense scientific and financial resources, while China has developed enormous productive capacity in solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles, public transport, and renewable-energy infrastructure. Collaboration between them could accelerate a worldwide energy transition. Confrontation will delay it precisely when delay has become intolerable. The same is true of public health. The COVID-19 pandemic showed us the human cost of secrecy, competition, and vaccine nationalism. Artificial intelligence creates another urgent area for cooperation. These technologies cannot be governed adequately by rival military doctrines or private corporations seeking maximum profit. The two countries must develop common safeguards against autonomous weapons, destabilizing cyberattacks, mass surveillance, and the use of artificial intelligence to intensify social inequality.
Finally, the fourth reality is the question of war. China and the United States are nuclear-armed powers. Any direct military conflict between them would have consequences beyond calculation. This is why Taiwan must not be transformed into the trigger for a catastrophic confrontation. The one-China framework and the existing diplomatic understandings must not be hollowed out by provocations, arms sales, or gestures designed for domestic political theater.
Peace requires restraint from both sides, but restraint cannot mean that the United States surrounds China with military bases and warships and then demands that China alone remain calm. Security cannot be achieved through the permanent insecurity of another country. There will, of course, be disagreements. Collaboration does not require agreement on every political question. Nor does coexistence require silence about differences. But disagreement must be conducted through diplomacy, international law, and the institutions of the United Nations, not through sanctions, threats, and military exercises.
The countries of the Global South have a particular interest in the success of this visit. They do not want to be instructed to choose between China and the United States. They do not want their ports, minerals, telecommunications systems, and political institutions turned into battlefields in a new cold war. They want access to finance, technology, medicine, and markets without political subordination. They want development, not recruitment into rival military camps. Xi Jinping’s visit therefore carries a responsibility that extends far beyond Washington and Beijing. The world does not need an agreement merely to divide markets between Chinese and US corporations. It needs a commitment to reduce the danger of war, dismantle unilateral coercive measures, restore normal economic relations, cooperate on climate and public health, and strengthen the principles of the United Nations Charter.
The importance of the visit lies not in ceremony but in possibility. It offers both countries an opportunity to step back from the cliff. The United States must abandon the fantasy that it can preserve its primacy by preventing China’s development. China, for its part, has repeatedly said that it does not seek to replace the United States as a hegemonic power. That principle must become the basis of a durable relationship: no containment, no domination, no war.
There is an old habit among powerful states of treating compromise as weakness. In the nuclear age, the opposite is true. It takes no courage to order another warship into contested waters. It takes political courage to recognize that one’s adversary also has legitimate interests, that coexistence requires reciprocity, and that the survival of humanity is more important than the vanity of supremacy.
This visit should therefore carry a simple message from Washington to the world: collaboration is not surrender, diplomacy is not weakness, and peace is not an abstraction.
Confrontation offers neither country a future.
Collaboration offers the world a chance.
Vijay Prashadis an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director ofTricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor ofLeftWord Books(New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).
On October 4, nearly 160 million Brazilians will go to the polls to elect their next president, vice president, members of Congress, governors, and state legislators from the country’s various states. If no presidential candidate receives more than 50% of the valid votes, a runoff election will be held on October 25.
At this time, 13 presidential candidates are vying for the presidency in Brasília, although polls clearly point to two candidates vying for the presidency of Latin America’s most economically powerful country.
On one side is Brazil’s current president, the former union leader and progressive Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula served as president from 2003 to 2011 with very high approval ratings, although following corruption allegations, he was imprisoned and sentenced to nine years.
However, after over 500 days in detention, a judge ordered his release, ruling that the proceedings were flawed. The Supreme Court of Justice called the incident a “historic error.” Following that, Lula faced off against then-far-right President Jair Bolsonaro and defeated him in the 2022 election. Now Lula hopes to be re-elected once again.
At the forefront is none other than Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro, who has leveraged his father’s reputation to boost his own. This is because Jair Bolsonaro was found guilty of several crimes that, according to the Brazilian justice system, were intended to prevent Lula’s inauguration and promote a coup d’état. Jair Bolsonaro is currently in house arrest for those crimes.
Consequently, a significant portion of Brazilian society, as well as international politicians such as Donald Trump, consider Bolsonaro’s imprisonment to be unjust. This explains how his son Flávio – a lawyer and businessman who currently serves as a senator – has managed to garner significant support in his bid to win the presidency on October 4.
Thus, two clearly distinct political and economic models are pitted against one another. Lula belongs to a political tradition that seeks to strengthen the state, reduce extreme poverty, invest in social programs, and diversify trade partners (such as China and India), all in line with a clearly pro-sovereignty discourse.
For his part, Flávio Bolsonaro promises to continue on his father’s path: economic neoliberalism, reducing the size of the state, building closer ties with the private sector, and – perhaps most importantly – placing Brazil once again under the influence of the Trump administration, which supports the far-right candidate.
Clearly, a victory for the far right – which is close to Washington – would represent a sharp shift in the region’s current economic and political course. Brazil accounts for nearly 50% of the region’s total GDP, so a victory for a Trump ally would drastically alter not only the political landscape but also the economic one. On the other hand, a victory for Lula would signal a “halt” (probably the most significant of all possible outcomes) to the wave of victories by the Latin American right and far right – allies and supporters of US hemispheric and military policy – that have swept the electoral landscape in recent years.
What do the polls say?
Since the start of the presidential race, Lula has maintained a lead over his political opponent. However, that lead has been narrowing as the weeks have gone by, raising the possibility that the runoff election, scheduled for October 25, will be a very close race. This is because, it appears, neither candidate will manage to secure more than 50% of the vote to win in a single round.
According to a poll by the MDA Pesquisa Institute, Lula holds a solid lead over Bolsonaro: 40.06% to 30.4%. Augusto Cury comes in third with 6% of the vote, while the remaining candidates trail behind this mark. According to this poll, in the event of a runoff, Lula would win with 47.3% against Bolsonaro’s likely 40%.
However, other polls paint a different picture, in which Lula remains in the lead but by a very narrow margin. This is according to an AtlasIntel poll, which shows Lula with 46% of the vote, while Bolsonaro would receive 44% in the first round. In the runoff, the gap would disappear, and both candidates would receive nearly 47% of the vote (a technical tie).
A corruption scandal that is shaking up the political landscape
One of the people who has come under scrutiny is Flávio Bolsonaro, who confirmed that he had asked the banker for money to make a film about his father called “Dark Horse”. The Federal Police are investigating this case to determine whether Bolsonaro participated in any illegal activity.
Meanwhile, Lula’s inner circle has also been affected. The judge who ordered Jair Bolsonaro’s arrest, Alexandre de Moraes, is alleged to have exchanged messages with Vorcaro. Moraes has been portrayed as a judge close to Lula and thus Bolsonaro and his supporters have seized on the revelation of the messages to call for Moraes’s removal and indirectly accuse the government of suspicious activities.
The Jamaica–179th Street subway stop in Queens is only about a 10-minute walk from Wareham Place. But an abyss separates the two places. From the crowded low-rise blocks of busy shops, where spotting a white resident is difficult, to single-family homes with manicured yards on quiet streets where cars rarely pass. “Different parts of Queens were rough; this was an oasis,” Donald Trump said in a 2015 New York Times interview. This “oasis” is where the man who is now president of the United States lived as a child, in a house an anonymous family has just bought for $1.93 million.
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