Welcome to Bunker Talk. This is a weekend open discussion post for the best commenting crew on the net, in which we can chat about all the stuff that went on this week that we didn’t cover. We can also talk about the stuff we did or whatever else grabs your interest. In other words, it’s an off-topic thread.
This week’s caption reads:
BERLIN, GERMANY JUNE 16: Heavy iron doors between different rooms during a media event on June 16, 2026, at the former Cold War-era Pankstraße subway station, now used as a nuclear fallout shelter. Built in the 1970s, the bunker offers sleeping accommodations for 3,339 people, has independent water and electricity supplies, and is hermetically sealed off from the outside world by massive steel doors. The bunker will be open to the public as part of guided tours of Berlin’s underground. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has rekindled German authorities’ interest in providing nuclear fallout shelters in the event of war. (Photo: Carsten Koall/Getty Images)
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The U.S. Navy has given us the first look at Blackbeard hypersonic strike missiles under the wings of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets during actual flight testing. The Navy is hoping to have Blackbeard in at least limited service no later than 2028, giving its carrier air wings an all-new fast-flying standoff weapon, particularly for engaging enemy ships. The missile is also being designed to be relatively cheap and quick to manufacture.
The Navy’s Office of the Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Aviation (PAE-A) has released a video montage of Blackbeard undergoing flight testing, seen in the social media post below. The service confirmed that it had at least begun test-loading the missiles onto F/A-18E/F Super Hornets in a presentation at the Tailhook Association’s annual convention last month. Now we know the program has moved ahead substantially from that point.
The company behind Blackbeard, defense start-up Castelion, has received several multi-million-dollar contracts from the Navy just this year explicitly to support integration of the weapon onto the Super Hornet, as well as otherwise accelerating its development. In its daily contracting on September 14, the Pentagon announced the Navy had struck yet another deal with Castelion, valued at $43.65 million, “for the manufacturing, assembly, testing, and delivery of the first production lot of 444 All-Up Rounds (AURs), defined as fully functional tactical missiles packaged within specialized shipping and storage containers.”
A screen capture from the Blackbeard flight testing video montage the Navy released today. USN capture
In terms of what we know today about Blackbeard’s design and capabilities, as we have previously written:
“A profile photo [seen below] at the company’s headquarters reveals a weapon with a ballistic missile-like booster, on top of which is mounted what could be an unpowered hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). A booster brings an HGV to the desired velocity and altitude before releasing it toward its target. The concept is in contrast to air-breathing cruise missiles capable of traveling at hypersonic speeds. Hypersonic speed is generally defined as anything above Mach 5, which larger ballistic missiles also reach in the course of their flights. More precise performance figures for Blackbeard are lacking, but Castelion has previously hinted it could hit targets out to just under 500 miles. Alternatively, the second stage may also have its own motor, allowing it to continue accelerating or sustain high-speed flight. A similar arrangement has been suggested as the propulsion system for the Russian Zircon missile.”
Castelion
“Both stages of the weapon have cruciform fins, while the upper one features a prominent ‘chine’ line along the length of its body, and a slightly beaklike nose. The trolley on which the weapon is mounted provides some idea of its overall size. The blue stripes seen on each stage normally signify that a munition is an inert, non-explosive round utilized for training or tracking purposes. This would indicate a real (unarmed) missile rather than a dummy or mockup.”
A picture shown at Tailhook had also offered a new look at the front of the missile, exposing what looked to be an aperture on one side of the design’s wedge-shaped nose. As we wrote after that image emerged:
“The apparent apertures are also seen pointed up, but many air-launched munitions do flip down after release.”
“How exactly Blackbeard is guided remains unknown, but a downward-angled aperture at the nose end for a seeker system would make sense for this weapon, which the Navy is pursuing primarily as a new way to target enemy ships. In particular, a wide array of existing anti-ship and land attack missiles, as well as certain anti-air types, have variously shaped apertures in their noses for imaging infrared seekers. Imaging infrared has the benefit of being immune to radio frequency electronic warfare jamming. In addition, it is a passive capability that does not send out signals that can give an opponent advance notice of an incoming attack. Blackbeard’s full guidance package very likely also includes some means of navigating to a target area first, and it could have multiple modes of operation.”
The new flight testing footage released today also underscores the relatively small size of Blackbeard overall. While the Super Hornet is set to be the first operational launch platform, it is very likely to be integrated on other aircraft quickly thereafter. The Navy is acquiring Blackbeard under a program called the Multi-mission Affordable Capacity Effector (MACE).
Another screen capture from the new Navy video offering a different of Blackbeards under the wings of a Super Hornet, underscoring their relatively small size. USN capture
Requirements for MACE that the Navy put out previously explicitly called for a design compact enough for carrier-based F-35C (and land-based F-35A) Joint Strike Fighters to carry four of them internally. Whether that remains a goal in any way is unclear. Still, being able to carry some number of Blackbeards internally would not only give those jets a hypersonic strike weapon, but one that they could carry in the most stealthy configuration. The Navy also notably does operate the F-35A outside of the test and evaluation community, which might point to air-launched Blackbeards entering service elsewhere in the future. As an aside, the U.S. Army is pursuing a ground-launched version of this missile, as well.
As mentioned, the Navy’s stated goal now is to reach an early operational capability with Blackbeard by 2028, if not sooner. What the exact fielding plan for those missiles might be is unclear. PAE-A did write “Coming soon to a theater near you” in its post on X containing the video montage, and tagged the official accounts for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). CENTCOM oversees U.S. military activities in and around the Middle East, including ongoing operations against Iran. U.S. military officials have also long touted hypersonic weapons, in general, as key to success in any future conflict in the Pacific, especially a high-end fight against China.
NATO member Latvia is moving toward acquiring Anduril Industries’ Barracuda family of long-range strike missiles, with Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs highlighting the effort during a visit to the U.S. defense technology company and a series of new defense-industry cooperation agreements involving Latvia. If the acquisition goes through, Latvia would be the first of the Baltic states to field a strike weapon in this category.
“It was great to visit Anduril to meet with Palmer Luckey and to witness signing of memoranda of cooperation with MOD of Latvia and Origin Robotics,” Rinkēvičs said in a post on X. “Looking forward to complete acquisition of Barracuda long-range missiles and [Latvian-U.S.] defense industry cooperation.”
It was great to visit @anduriltech to meet with @PalmerLuckey and to witness signing of memoranda of cooperation with MOD of Latvia and @OriginRobotics. Looking forward to complete acquisition of Baracuda longe range missiles and defense industry cooperation pic.twitter.com/JafnNy5RAe
The statement does not specify the precise Barracuda variant involved, the number of missiles Latvia intends to acquire, the expected delivery schedule, or the value of the prospective purchase. We have reached out to Anduril for more details.
A likely candidate weapon is the Barracuda-500M, one member of Anduril’s family of autonomous, jet-powered cruise missiles, alongside the Barracuda-100M and -250M variants. Official descriptions put its range at more than 500 nautical miles, with a stated speed range of approximately 190 to 500 knots. The missile can be air-launched, for which it has received the official U.S. military designation AGM-189A. But with only a handful of utility biplanes and helicopters in its inventory, Latvia would acquire the surface-launched version, designated SLB-500M.
The announcement points to a potentially significant expansion of Latvia’s precision-strike capabilities as NATO’s eastern flank continues to build out longer-range conventional fires.
Latvia has already ordered the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which will be fired from M142 HIMARS launchers. The system is expected to enter Latvian service in 2027 and has a maximum range of about 186 miles.
A U.S. Army M142 HIMARS launcher involved in an exercise at at Spilve Airfield and Liepāja Airport in Latvia. Latvian Armed Forces Eriks Kukutis
Latvia’s ATACMS capability will give the country a foundation for ground-launched precision fires, but the broader European trend is toward significantly greater reach.
Ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems capable of hitting targets at between 1,000 and 2,000 kilometers (620 and 1,242 miles) or more are an emerging target for several European NATO members. France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom are pursuing combinations of indigenous development and foreign procurement to address this requirement.
Latvia’s neighbor Poland, for example, has been building a layered long-range strike architecture combining JASSM/JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missiles with HIMARS and ATACMS. Warsaw’s ambitions are extending toward ground-launched weapons with ranges potentially reaching 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) and the country has previously expressed openness to hosting U.S.-owned nuclear weapons on its territory, too.
A M142 HIMARS launcher is seen during Poland’s Armed Forces Day parade in 2025. Photo by Artur Widak/NurPhoto/Getty Artur Widak
Latvian interest in Barracuda fits into the same larger transformation in European conventional strike capabilities.
For NATO’s Baltic members, the logic is particularly straightforward, with mobile, ground-launched weapons providing an additional means of striking military targets at depth without requiring control of the air over the launch area.
Dragon’s teeth obstacles are among the anti-mobility measures on Latvia’s eastern border with Russia. Latvian Armed Forces
The potential Barracuda acquisition would represent another step in a broader European shift toward deep precision strike, a term increasingly used to describe conventional weapons capable of holding targets hundreds or thousands of miles away at risk.
Deep precision strike is widely acknowledged as an increasingly important European capability gap. European NATO members have historically relied heavily on air-launched cruise missiles and other aircraft-delivered weapons, while ground-launched long-range systems have been comparatively scarce.
The deterioration of the European security environment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, together with the 2019 collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, are important factors behind renewed European interest in long-range conventional strike.
A key driver behind Europe’s push for longer-range conventional strike is the desire to build a credible deterrent capable of holding targets deep inside Russia at risk, potentially including Moscow. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has demonstrated the strategic value of being able to impose costs at significant distances, while also underscoring the importance of having sufficient stocks of precision weapons. For NATO’s eastern flank, systems such as the ground-launched Barracuda could therefore provide not just another fires capability, but an additional means of imposing costs on an adversary without relying exclusively on airpower.
Importantly for Latvia, the emerging European approach is not limited to large air forces. NATO’s prospective deep-strike requirements are likely to place significant emphasis on mobile ground-launched systems because they can be dispersed and offer survivability advantages while avoiding the cost and vulnerability associated with relying exclusively on aircraft or ships as launch platforms.
An Anduril Barracuda 500, top, and a Barracuda 100, displayed during Modern Day Marine 2026 in Washington, D.C. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Abigail Hutcheson Cpl. Abigail Hutcheson
That makes systems such as the surface-launched Barracuda particularly relevant to countries on NATO’s eastern flank.
Anduril has positioned Barracuda as part of an effort to address what it describes as a shortfall in affordable, producible long-range precision weapons. A prototype surface-launched Barracuda-500 successfully demonstrated its launcher, missile, and booster concept in testing in 2025. Anduril has emphasized that the family is intended to be more producible and affordable than many existing “exquisite” long-range weapons.
European governments are increasingly wrestling with the same issue. However, there is a fundamental tension between rapidly filling capability gaps through off-the-shelf purchases and developing indigenous European weapons that can strengthen the continent’s defense-industrial base, which is also a critical political consideration.
Latvia’s emerging relationship with Anduril appears to combine elements of both approaches, by acquiring an American-developed strike capability while simultaneously pursuing industrial cooperation with U.S. defense companies.
Ground launch of Anduril’s Barracuda-500M. Anduril
There is also a recent European precedent for combining Barracuda procurement with local industrial participation.
In July 2026, Anduril signed a strategic agreement with Polish national maintenance, repair and overhaul provider Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr 2 (WZL-2) to establish production of the Barracuda-500M at WZL-2 facilities in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Polish state-owned defence group Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa said Poland was the first European country to sign such an agreement with Anduril.
Bezpieczeństwo zaczyna się od silnych sojuszy.
Dziś została podpisana umowa o współpracy @PGZ_pl i WZL-2 z firmą Anduril Industries, która umożliwi utworzenie w Polsce miejsc montażu i produkcji autonomicznych rakietowych pocisków manewrujących dalekiego zasięgu… pic.twitter.com/JnmM6lQZ7L
— Ministerstwo Aktywów Państwowych (@MAPGOVPL) July 6, 2026
Polish officials have also emphasized the missile’s intended low production cost relative to higher-end U.S. cruise missiles. The planned Polish program is expected to progressively increase Polish content and eventually incorporate broader European elements, including software solutions from Anduril.
Latvia has not publicly detailed whether any Barracuda-related production, assembly, or other industrial work would be conducted in the country.
However, Latvia’s Investment and Development Agency says the country’s defense-technology delegation in the United States is seeking opportunities involving joint development, testing, manufacturing, system integration and supply chains. Origin Robotics is among the Latvian companies participating in that effort.
The broader Latvian delegation includes companies working across unmanned and counter-unmanned systems, communications, electronics, sensors, software, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and manufacturing.
A Latvian Army soldier shows drone video footage to U.S. Marines during a HIMARS live-fire exercise at Adazi Training Area, Latvia. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Niles Lee Sgt. Niles Lee
Exactly how Latvia intends to employ Barracuda, how many missiles it plans to acquire, and whether any portion of the system will eventually be produced or integrated in Latvia remain unclear from the president’s announcement.
For now, the development marks another indication that long-range precision fires are moving from a capability concentrated among Europe’s largest military powers toward a broader requirement across NATO’s highly strategic eastern flank.
Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) announced it had awarded a sole-source deal to Anduril, valued at $15,711,445.50, for an unspecified number of Pulsar-Ls, yesterday. This follows a statement of intent the Command put out last month. Anduril first unveiled Pulsar-L, a lightweight addition to its larger Pulsar family of electronic warfare systems, in April 2025.
The Marine Corps had 150 baseline personnel carrier variants of the ACV (or ACV-Ps), as well as 21 command-and-control ACV-C versions, in inventory as of April 2026. The default armament for ACV-P currently is just a single .50 caliber M2 machine gun in a remote weapon station on top of the hull. The service’s goal is to eventually acquire 389 ACV-Ps and 33 ACV-Cs, as well as 152 ACV-30s with new 30mm cannon-armed turrets and 34 ACV-R armored recovery vehicle variants. The ACV family has already supplanted the Marine Corps’ previous fleet of tracked Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV).
From left to right, an Amphibious Combat Vehicle command and control variant (ACV-C), a 30mm cannon-armed ACV-30, and a standard ACV personnel carrier version (ACV-P). The ACV-R recovery variant is not shown here. USMC/Sgt. Alexis Sanchez
“The Anduril Pulsar-L system is a platform-integrated omni-directional SK C-UAS [soft-kill counter-uncrewed aerial systems] with a combined sensor/jammer package that detects, tracks, identifies, and defeats radio frequency-dependent Group 1 and Group 2 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs),” MARCORSYSCOM wrote in a justification for the sole-source contract, which was also released yesterday. “Additionally, the system provides counter positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities.”
The U.S. military definition of a Group 1 drone is any design weighing up to 20 pounds, that is able to fly up to an altitude of 1,200 feet, and that can reach speeds of up to 100 knots. Group 2 is the next tier up, encompassing types with gross weights between 21 and 55 pounds, that can get up to an altitude of 3,500 feet, and hit top speeds of up to 250 knots. Kamikaze drones and other small weaponized types that fall into Groups 1 and 2 are used on a daily basis in Ukraine to attack armored vehicles, as well as unarmored vehicles and personnel. These are threats that have been steadily expanding to other hotspots globally, and that we will come back to later on.
Furthermore, “the Pulsar-L is the only solution capable of being mounted on the ACV to provide a mobile and organic means to effectively and simultaneously execute the entire kill-chain against hostile UASs in the deployed land and maritime/littoral environment while not exceeding the limited ACV space, weight, and power claim allotted to the SK C-UAS solution,” according to MARCORSYSCOM. “This will provide the ACV with an essential defensive capability, directly contributing to increased survivability and force protection while not sacrificing the mobility and operational tempo of the ACV.”
A row of Marine ACVs seen during training. USMC
Pulsar-L is already “in use by the Special Operations Command due to the system’s low weight, proven performance in engaging multiple UASs, and simultaneous execution of the full kill-chain while static or on the move,” the justification document adds. “Additionally, it is the only known commercially available system that meets the minimum requirement to rapidly identify and respond to emerging UAS technologies and tactics without frequent updates to predefined threat data libraries. The Pulsar-L is the only solution that uses machine based learning to continually adapt to these ever-changing threats without requiring vendor updates, allowing the warfighters to continually be effective in the fight.”
The latter point here is a particularly important consideration for electronic warfare systems, in general, which need to be able to accurately detect, categorize, and respond to different waveforms to be most effective. The emergence of new waveforms, as well as changes to how existing ones are emitted, together with new tactics, techniques, and procedures, can all negatively impact a system’s performance. Historically, the process of responding to those developments with updates to built-in threat libraries has been lengthy and complex. The conflict in Ukraine has shown that the cycle of new developments in the electromagnetic spectrum and then the need for new countermeasures can be regularly measured in weeks.
The U.S. military has been heavily investing in so-called cognitive electronic warfare capabilities to help automate and otherwise accelerate various aspects of this process. The ability of a particular electronic warfare suite to adapt autonomously in real-time, even in the middle of operations, has been viewed as the absolute ‘holy grail’ of this concept, which you can read more about here. How exactly Pulsar-L leverages machine-learning and artificial intelligence to this end, and the speed with which it can adapt to changing threats, is still not entirely clear.
Regardless, “there is an unusual and compelling need for the rapid deployment of SK C-UASs to forward-deployed ground units as Marines currently lack the ability to conduct self-defense against emerging UAS threats,” the justification document stresses. “Failure to deliver this capability places Marines at unnecessary risk, potentially leading to mission failure and loss of life, and hampers the Government’s ability to keep them safe during forward deployments.”
MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the sole-source deal to Anduril does not otherwise elaborate on the urgent requirements that drove the deal, which it says were only formalized on April 7. That is notably roughly a week after the United States and Israel first launched major combat operations against Iran, which is a prolific developer and user of various tiers of weaponized drones. There is no explicit confirmation of any link, but Iranian drones, as well as missiles and other capabilities, have been a real threat to U.S. forces in the region. We have also just gained more insights recently into how forward-deployed Marine Corps elements contributed to those operations. Counter-drone capabilities would also be especially critical in any future amphibious landing operation, wherever it might occur.
Marines prepare to load an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) onto a KC-130J aircraft somewhere in the Middle East in July 2026. USAF
All that being said, threats posed by armed Group 1 and 2 drones are not at all limited to Iran and the Middle East, nor are they new. They are only likely to become a more ubiquitous feature in the hands of nation-state armed forces and non-state actors in conflict zones globally as time goes on. The nature of these threats is also expanding significantly in scale and scope, especially when it comes to more automated targeting capabilities, thanks heavily to the increasing democratization of AI-driven technologies, something TWZ has explored in depth in the past.
A number of other significant developments in this arena have emerged from the conflict in Ukraine, where electronic warfare systems are heavily employed against drones. This includes the introduction of physical fiber-optic control links that cannot be jammed, as well as the use of mesh-like and often ad-hoc networks to increase resiliency.
The fighting in Ukraine has also underscored the threat that even small kamikaze drones pose to armored vehicles, including types that are far more heavily protected to start with than the Marine Corps’ ACVs. As mentioned, Ukrainian forces have been sidelining their M1 Abrams and other main battle tanks in the face of constant drone attacks.
MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the Pulsar-L order makes clear that this is just one part of a larger plan to boost the ACV’s defenses.
“Marine Corps program of record for SK C-UAS is planned to initiate in FY27,” the document mentions toward the very end. “The components of this future program will be procured through full and open competition as it is expected that advanced non-kinetic and SK defeat technologies should be mature by this time.”
Another look at a Marine Corps ACV-P, showing the general configuration of these vehicles today. USMC
“We’re constantly looking at what the next generation of APS is and how we can get that onto the [ACV] platform in a lightweight form factor,” Chris Melkonian, the Marine Corps’ Program Manager for Advanced Amphibious Assault (PM AAA), told TWZ and other attendees at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition in April.
Improved “situational awareness, that’s kind of a gateway to counter-UAS, in terms of the ability to sense your environment,” Melkonian also highlighted at that time. “Take all that video on board and then be able to feed that into [a] counter-UAS system.”
Additional “overhead protection right now is a critical thing that we’re working on right now for this platform,” he added. The practice of adding on anti-drone armor screens on armored vehicles (and now other platforms), especially to protect against top-down attacks, first emerged in Russia in the lead-up to the all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, the installation of this kind of so-called ‘cope cage’ type armor has now become a global trend, including in the U.S. military.
When it comes to the Marine Corps ACV fleet, the rush order for Pulsar-Ls is an important new step in boosting those vehicles’ defenses against threats that exist now. At the same time, drones are increasingly calling the role of armored vehicles in future conflicts into question.
In a live television interview Thursday night Paris time, French President Emmanuel Macron said he was sending an unspecified number of troops and equipment to Saudi Arabia to protect the Yanbu energy hub, located on the Red Sea.
“This is the agreement we have finalized with the Saudis,” Macron explained. “We are going to send military resources, that is to say, soldiers, radar systems and defense systems, to protect this site — not to get us involved in any conflicts, but to protect this site.”
The French leader did not elaborate on the exact equipment he would send, how many troops, or when they would arrive. Nor did he address what would happen if French personnel were killed or injured or equipment damaged or destroyed. We have reached out to the French Embassy for further details. Based on his mention of radars and seeing that the threat to Saudi oil infrastructure is almost entirely from aerial attacks from drones and missiles, these will likely be air defense forces.
Nous agissons pour protéger nos compatriotes des conséquences de la crise au Moyen-Orient. Objectifs : sécuriser les approvisionnements et faire baisser les prix à la pompe. pic.twitter.com/kvrgHcV4E4
An infographic illustrating how Saudi Arabia has diverted oil from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. (Photo by Murat Usubali/Anadolu via Getty Images) Anadolu
Before Macron’s announcement on Thursday, the Houthis claimed they had carried out two more waves of attacks on Saudi targets, including one on the Saudi Aramco facility in Yanbu, “using a number of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones.”
In addition, the Houthis claimed they struck Riyadh.
Earlier in the day, the Houthis said they struck “enemy command and control centers, operations rooms, weapon depots, missile launch platforms, and military sites belonging to Saudi-led enemy formations in Jizan,” a Red Sea port city.
“The Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen said on Thursday that it had shot down six ballistic missiles fired by the Iran-backed Houthi militia, in what appeared to be one of the largest cross-border attacks by the group since its conflict with Saudi Arabia [flared back up],” The New York Times reported.
The missiles were aimed at the Saudi cities of Taif and Yanbu, Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki, a spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition, claimed on X. “Escalations and violations by the terrorist Houthi militia will be dealt with firmly,” he stated, without specifying where the missiles were intercepted.
TWZ cannot independently verify any of these claims.
Today’s attacks are the latest in the escalating conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. Earlier this year, the Houthis imposed a blockade on the Bab al-Mandab Strait (BAM) and began striking Saudi ships in the southern part of the Red Sea as well as critical energy terminals on that body of water and Saudi refineries. Iranian proxies have also struck the vital East-West pipeline that carries oil to the Red Sea to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran vastly curtailed shipping after the launch of Operation Epic Fury. The East-West pipeline reportedly reopened after being shut down following a long-range drone attack.
The stark reality facing Macron is that if Saudi oil infrastructure and transport nodes near the Red Sea are destroyed or the pipeline that feeds it is shut down for months, the last major oil lifeline from the region — and especially to Europe — will be closed off, sparking a deeper energy crisis.
Iran has already severely curtailed the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz since the U.S. and Israel attacked it on Feb. 28. The movement of oil has been further impeded by a U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. However, transits have been increasing as of late, thanks in large measure to U.S. military escorts that U.S. Central Command claims have allowed more than a billion barrels of crude to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Still, the traffic is far below what it was before the war broke out.
Having both the Strait of Hormuz largely closed and energy exports out of the Red Sea shut down simultaneously is a nightmare scenario. By Thursday evening Eastern time, the per-barrel price of Brent crude oil shot up to nearly $107, according to OilPrice.com. It had fallen below $100 per barrel just two days earlier.
Given all this, the French president sought to offer reassurance about oil supplies, according to France 24.
“He said he had carried out ‘intense diplomatic activity,’ meeting in recent weeks with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Nigeria, all hydrocarbon suppliers, to ensure France keeps receiving the same volumes,” the publication noted.
“We have replenished gas stocks and also oil stocks” for the months ahead, the French president also said.
“Escalating tensions in the Gulf could have negative consequences here in the UK—such as rising prices, disruptions to energy supplies, and increased costs for British businesses,” the U.K. Defense Ministry (MoD) explained in announcing the deployment. “The Houthis pose a threat to stability in the Middle East; therefore, it is in the UK’s national interest—economically and in terms of security—that they do not succeed in their aims.”
“We unequivocally condemn Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, and our position is clear: both Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government have the right to self-defense,” the ministry added.
The jet will operate from a U.K. air base in Cyprus and will begin air-to-air refueling operations in the coming days, the BBC reported.
A Royal Saudi Air Force Voyager aerial refueling jet. (Air Tanker)
The French and British deployments contrast decisions by the U.S. and other nations not to get involved with the Saudi-Houthi fight.
Last week, Trump turned down a direct plea from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom’s de facto leader, to attack the Houthis. Meanwhile, Pakistan and Turkey, which signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia, have yet to provide any direct military aid. The pact holds that an attack on one is considered an attack on all; however, it doesn’t stipulate exactly what actions should be taken.
The security situation in Yemen has drastically deteriorated since the launch of Epic Fury after the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter.
The Houthis have been directly attacking Saudi Arabia over claims that the kingdom has imposed a blockade on them. Beyond that, the mostly dormant civil war between the Houthis and internationally recognized Yemeni government forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, reignited in the wake of Operation Epic Fury. The Houthis have made large territorial gains in the renewed conflict, including capturing the port city of Mokha and two key islands in the Red Sea. This has strengthened the Houthi hold on the BAM. You can read more about that in our story here.
3. The Houthis have reportedly attempted to seize ROYG-controlled islands in the Red Sea from which Houthi fighters could launch attacks on international shipping. Houthi forces reportedly landed on the Hanish Islands in the southern Red Sea on the morning of September 10 after… pic.twitter.com/tiFPgNDOHZ
The civil war in Yemen erupted in 2014 and expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis. The fighting between Saudi-led forces and the Houthis largely abated after a tenuous ceasefire took hold in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict, which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. The United Kingdom was another significant player in that air campaign.
Meanwhile, exacerbating concerns about the flow of oil from the Red Sea, “a senior adviser to Iran’s supreme leader warned Thursday that Iranian forces and their Houthi allies in Yemen could respond to any new U.S. attacks by opening ‘a new front’ in its war with the U.S. by targeting energy supplies in the Red Sea,” CBS News reported.
The statements came after U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday once again threatened Iran.
“Will a deal be made with Iran that lets them rebuild and create a far greater country than it ever was before?” Trump asked rhetorically. “Or do I annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly, never giving them a chance to kill and destroy people and countries again?”
Trump added that he believed he would make a peace deal with Iran after the upcoming U.S. midterm elections, which will decide the control of Congress.
Trump to the UN: "Do I annihilate the Islamic Republic, and do it quickly? Do I drive them into hell?" pic.twitter.com/cIYBO1Mp3w
The fact that France is sending forces to Saudi Arabia is an ominous development and another indication that the current spate of unrest that began with Epic Fury does not appear to show any signs of ending anytime soon.
For the past six months or so, a curious-looking vessel with a very boxy superstructure has been taking shape at a shipyard in the Chinese city of Shanghai. A new satellite image lends credence to an earlier assessment that this is a mothership to support China’s growing fleets of ever-larger submersible drones, though it could also have other roles.
TWZ obtained the image of the ship in question, which was taken on September 10, from Vantor. Since then, it has also received an overall coat of gray paint, pointing to future service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). It is some 669 feet (204 meters) long and around 98 feet (30 meters) at its widest. In terms of basic length and width, the vessel being built now is very roughly comparable to China’s Type 071 amphibious warfare ship. However, it appears to be much taller overall than the Type 071.
The new ship has been under construction at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard on Changxing Island in Shanghai since at least April. This yard produces a variety of naval vessels, including surface combatants and amphibious assault ships, as well as commercial designs.
The September 10 image, which shows the ship from the stern, is interesting for a number of reasons. It notably confirms that the design not only has a well deck, but that it is sized around what looks to be a large cradle-like platform visible in the shot. The very roughly 164-feet (50-meter) long rectangular platform has an arch-shaped structure at one end and two teardrop-shaped ones at the other, as well as six pillars, three on each side, in between. The teardrop-shaped structures, in particular, point to the platform being at least a semi-submersible, as they would help with stability and otherwise guide the flow of water while being pulled along.
The satellite image also clearly shows six large struts extending from the top of the stern end of the superstructure, each one which is paired with a shorter strut, for a total of 12. Earlier this month, independent naval analyst H.I. Sutton, who tracks undersea warfare developments in particular, posited that these struts could be used to lower a platform or some other similar structure below the hull of the ship. He also assessed that they could be used as part of a larger system capable of moving payloads between decks internally. This would help account for the configuration of the core superstructure, especially how high it is all the way from the front to the back. Overall, signs point to the inside of the superstructure being largely hangars and other open work spaces, allowing for multiple large UUVs to be carried and supported. Individual UUVs would be launched and recovered, one at a time, via the cradle.
In making his assessment, Sutton drew specific attention to a previously shown rendering of a proposed Chinese scientific research vessel with a roughly similar strut-based system at the stern for deploying submersibles and other large payloads. However, on that design, the system was entirely exposed rather than contained with an extended superstructure.
The rendering of the proposed scientific research vessel with a system for deploying payloads at the stern that features four struts. Chinese internet via H.I. Sutton
The platform seen immediately behind the ship being built at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard aligns with Sutton’s assessment about the purpose of the struts. At the same time, launches and recoveries could also be conducted in a more traditional manner via the well deck. The design of the cradle-like platform would seem to suggest the latter option is at least part of the plan.
The image from September 10, as well as other recent views of the ship, highlight other features that are now taking shape. This includes a large opening on the starboard side, which could be for launching and/or recovering lifeboats or other watercraft, or moving payloads to and from the pier while docked, as well as a multi-pronged mast on top of the bridge. An additional part of the ship’s superstructure extends behind the bridge area, and there is what looks to be a hangar inside. There is no attached helipad present now, but one could well be added later on somewhere on top of the superstructure. Many naval auxiliaries, as well as commercial ships designed for offshore support and other specialized tasks, have open helipads on raised frames attached to different parts of the superstructures.
Though there is growing clarity about the ship’s design, many questions do remain about the full breadth of its intended purpose. In Sutton’s view, the PLAN has a need, just in general, for a dedicated mothership to support its growing uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) fleets. The PLAN is pursuing various tiers of UUVs to perform a host of different missions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as mine-laying, special operations support, and even launching direct attacks on enemy vessels. Larger and larger UUV designs have been steadily emerging in China, which could require more specialized launch and recovery options to be feasibly employed operationally, especially from other vessels at sea. Deployment and retrieval at sea could, in turn, support very long duration missions far from China’s own shores.
“With smaller UUVs, even up to 20 meters like the AJX-002 and HSU-100 paraded in Beijing last year, they are road mobile. Truck mounted cranes should be sufficient for getting them in and out of the water making operations much simpler. With these latest, much larger XXLUUVs [extra-extra large uncrewed underwater vehicles] however, China will start to need dedicated port facilities,” Sutton wrote previously on his website. “Until now China has been using floating docks to house the two XXLUUV prototypes being tested on Hainan. One of these docks was purpose built while the other may have been taken up from general use.”
A Chinese AJX-002 UUV, or a mockup thereof, seen ahead of a major military parade in Beijing in 2025. Chinese internet via X
China's naval unmanned systems.
Consisting of (in order), AI enabled unmanned submersible (HSU-100), used for detection and attack.
Unmanned patrol boat.
Unmanned mine-laying/attack submersible (AJX-002), this was previously mistaken for a nuclear powered torpedo. Because the… pic.twitter.com/Mlj55XLNBH
“This arrangement also has a significant drawback: each floating dock can only carry a single XXLUUV,” Sutton added. “Or if more than one, then they both need to be placed in the water at the same time. Because the whole dock floods, there cannot be one undergoing maintenance while another is being launched or recovered.”
A mothership vessel able to discreetly deploy and recover large uncrewed and crewed submersibles and other large payloads underwater could be tasked with more specialized missions, including cutting cables, retrieving objects from the seabed, and other kinds of undersea espionage. There is overlap here with more benign roles, such as submarine rescue, salvage, and even deep-sea scientific research. There is also the matter of servicing an expanding array of Chinese underwater infrastructure, including sensor and communications networks. As something of a corollary, Russia’s spy ship Yantar is officially described as an oceanic research vessel. In China, the line between military and non-military assets and capabilities, including ships, is often very blurry, to begin with, as TWZ regularly highlights. This dichotomy was observed right at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard around the end of last year after pictures of a commercial cargo ship being used to showcase a new family of containerized weapons, sensors, and other systems went viral online.
It is also worth pointing out that the boxy and largely enclosed design of the ship now being built at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard will inherently make it difficult to observe any activities onboard. This will have the additional knock-on effect of helping keep any payloads, as well as the crew, shielded from the elements. This could be valuable for operations in harsher locales, including waters in and around the Arctic, an ever-more strategic part of the world where China is working to be more engaged.
We also do not know if the apparent mothership vessel is intended to be a one-off or part of a larger class. It could be a stepping stone to broader plans or be part of an already extensive fleet of bespoke naval auxiliaries, as well as unique ostensibly commercial vessels, in service in China today. The PLAN’s aforementioned UUV ambitions will bring along significant test and evaluation requirements, as well as the need to support actual future operations.
If nothing else, evidence is only growing that the new ship under construction at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard is intended to serve, at least in part, as a mothership for large submersible drones.
Chinese authorities have reportedly taken possession of an F-35 cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door that were inexplicably diverted to Hong Kong while being shipped from Australia to the United States. The incident appears to have left physical components that incorporate aspects of the fighter’s low-observable design in the hands of a country that has spent years doing whatever it could to gain information on the aircraft and America’s stealth technology secrets in general.
So, what does all this mean? Let’s put it in perspective.
The parts in question were being shipped by UPS from Australia to the United States in late May, according to people familiar with the matter cited by Bloomberg. The components from a Royal Australian Air Force F-35A were being sent to the United States for inspection and possible repair or disposal.
A Royal Australian Air Force F-35A from 75 Squadron taxiing at RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory. Australian Defense Force
F-35 sustainment procedures explicitly cover the movement of F-35 parts, including unserviceable components, through the program’s logistics network. The U.S. Air Force’s transportation guidance directs F-35 shipments outside the Defense Transportation System to follow approved Joint Program Office procedures. In other words, moving an unserviceable Australian F-35 component to the United States for inspection, repair, or disposition is consistent with the normal sustainment process.
What is highly unusual is where this particular shipment ended up. F-35 components moving through an established international logistics system apparently stopped in South Korea, and were then routed to Hong Kong. Chinese authorities subsequently took possession of the parts and have not returned them, according to the sources cited by Bloomberg.
F-35 canopy component replacement at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ridge ShanSecretary of War Pete Hegseth autographs the weapons bay door of an F-35 at Lockheed Martin Air Force Plant 4, in Fort Worth, Texas. DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza
“For security reasons, we can’t discuss the status of specific shipments or our shipping procedures,” Lockheed Martin told us in response to a request for clarification about the incident. The company added that it “follows all U.S. regulations established by the Department of War and regulated by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) regarding the shipment of aircraft components. Our teams handle every shipment with the utmost diligence and safeguards to ensure the integrity of the F-35 program and the security of our allied partners.”
The Pentagon’s F-35 Joint Program Office has acknowledged a “shipment issue” involving F-35 components and said U.S. authorities and industry partners are working to recover them and investigate what happened.
Lockheed Martin, UPS, and the Pentagon have not publicly provided a detailed account of how the shipment was diverted or what happened to the parts after they reached Hong Kong.
Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles also confirmed that Canberra was aware of the incident and was working with the United States and Lockheed Martin.
Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Defense, Richard Marles, accompanied by Chief of Air Force Air Marshal Stephen Chappell at RAAF Base Edinburgh, South Australia. Australian Defense Force
Marles has sought to play down the potential security implications of the components, saying his understanding was that the shipment did not contain sensitive equipment or sensitive parts. That does not by itself answer the more specific question of what could potentially be learned from these particular pieces of an F-35. After all, not every physical component of an F-35 is necessarily highly classified or capable of revealing meaningful information about the aircraft’s design. At the same time, a cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door involve structures, materials, interfaces, tolerances, and treatments that all have to work within the aircraft’s low-observable design. If radar-absorbing material or other specialized treatments remain on the components, that could potentially make them far more sensitive from a technological exploitation standpoint.
The condition of the parts is also unknown. We do not know how much of their coatings or other treatments remain intact, whether Chinese authorities have examined them, or what information could actually be extracted from them in their current state.
Above all else, there is little specific information in the public domain about what F-35-related technical information Chinese intelligence already has acquired over the years, what physical components or materials it may already possess, or what additional information could be gained through espionage, cyber operations, industrial access, observation of deployed aircraft, or other means.
Without these facts, it is impossible to gauge what damage could have been done by this loss. Still, viewed in a vacuum of those unknowns, simply having an F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door in Chinese possession represents a significant loss of control over sensitive physical hardware — there is no way around that reality — and the severity of that loss could be substantial depending on the physical state of the parts.
The circumstances are particularly sensitive because, as we mentioned in the opening of this article, China has pursued multiple avenues for acquiring information on the F-35 for many years, with publicly documented cases involving cyber operations, technical information, supply chains, and human expertise. Some aspects of China’s subsequent stealth aircraft designs have also prompted comparisons with U.S. aircraft, although claims that China simply ‘cloned’ entire aircraft are not supported by the available evidence.
China And The F-35: A History Of Espionage
In 2014, U.S. authorities charged Chinese businessman Su Bin with conspiring with two other Chinese hackers to break into the computer systems of U.S. defense contractors. Prosecutors alleged that the group targeted information on aircraft including the F-35 and F-22. The alleged hacking campaign ran from 2009 to 2013.
Su Bin later pleaded guilty and was sentenced to nearly four years in prison. The Justice Department’s 2026 case against former Air Force fighter pilot Gerald “Runner” Brown connects the two cases. Prosecutors allege that Brown used a co-conspirator to negotiate his work training Chinese military pilots with Su Bin.
Brown, a retired U.S. Air Force major who spent more than 24 years in the service, subsequently worked as a contract simulator instructor training U.S. military pilots on the A-10 and F-35. In February 2026, the Justice Department charged him with providing and conspiring to provide unauthorized defense services to Chinese military pilots.
According to the criminal complaint, Brown traveled to China in December 2023, where he allegedly began training People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) personnel. Prosecutors say he also answered questions about the U.S. Air Force for three hours on his first day in China. Brown has been charged, and the allegations have not been adjudicated. He is one of multiple former Western aviators alleged to have provided training services and/or intelligence to Beijing.
The Honeywell case provides yet another example, this time involving the defense industry’s supply of technical information.
In 2021, the State Department reached a $13-million administrative settlement with Honeywell over alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Honeywell had voluntarily disclosed alleged unauthorized exports and retransfers of ITAR-controlled technical data.
The case involved 71 engineering drawings containing dimensions, geometries and layouts for manufacturing castings and finished parts used across multiple aircraft, engines and military systems. The State Department said the unauthorized exports and retransfers involved Canada, Ireland, Mexico, China, and Taiwan.
Among the systems covered by the drawings were components associated with the F-35 and F-22. The case did not allege that Honeywell deliberately sought to provide China with sensitive military technology; rather, it concerned alleged violations of export-control requirements.
A U.S. Air Force F-22 (nearest camera) flies alongside an F-35A. U.S. Air Force photo by Lt. Sam Eckholm
There has also been a physical supply-chain precedent.
In 2022, F-35 deliveries were temporarily halted after the Pentagon discovered that a magnet in the aircraft’s Honeywell-built turbomachine pumps —which provide critical power functions to the jet — contained a cobalt and samarium alloy produced in China. The material itself was not considered a security or flight-safety threat, but the discovery demonstrated how difficult it can be to maintain complete visibility over a global supply chain involving thousands of companies and multiple tiers of subcontractors.
Taken together, these cases demonstrate several different pathways through which China has appeared in the F-35 security story: cyber theft, unauthorized technical-data transfers, supply-chain exposure, and alleged exploitation of former Western military expertise.
The Hong Kong incident would add another major category: physical access to actual F-35 components.
These are only some of the publicly documented examples. There is no public way to know the full extent of information or physical material Chinese intelligence may have acquired over the years, but is very likely far larger in scope than what is available in the open source.
Chinese Access Concerns Have Shaped F-35 Export Policy
The proposed sale of F-35s to the United Arab Emirates became deeply entangled in U.S. concerns about Abu Dhabi’s growing military and technology relationship with China.
A 34th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron F-35A conducts inflight refueling above the United Arab Emirates. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Kat Justen
Washington had approved a potential package involving 50 F-35As, but U.S. officials and lawmakers expressed concerns about Chinese intelligence activity and technology in the UAE. Among the broader concerns were Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and the possibility of Chinese military or intelligence access to facilities associated with advanced U.S. weapons. A Congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report later cited the potential presence of Chinese intelligence collection capabilities and military facilities in the UAE as risks to the proposed F-35 sale.
The State Department recently approved a potential $24.3-billion sale to the Kingdom involving 48 F-35s and associated equipment. But U.S. intelligence agencies have reportedly warned that China’s military and technology relationship with Saudi Arabia could create opportunities for Beijing to obtain sensitive F-35 information.
According to reporting based on U.S. officials familiar with intelligence assessments, a Defense Intelligence Agency report raised concerns about Chinese military access to Saudi bases, Chinese technology in Saudi telecommunications infrastructure, and whether secure facilities could be maintained for F-35 operations. The assessments also questioned whether Saudi Arabia would limit contact between Chinese military and intelligence personnel and F-35-related sites.
What Could The Components Reveal?
As we noted earlier, there is no way to gauge the intelligence impact of the loss at this stage. The central unknown of what China already knows about the F-35, and what it may already have in its possession — especially related to these components — is the key variable here.
Regardless, an F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door can provide information that cannot otherwise be easily obtained and gives a different level of fidelity in terms of material exploitation than what construction data and blueprints alone could.
The F-35’s low observability is the product of an extremely complex combination of airframe shaping, construction materials, external coatings, manufacturing tolerances, speciality apertures, and more.
U.S. Air Force 325th Maintenance Squadron low-observable maintainers work on an F-35A at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, in August 2024. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Victoria Moehlman
A canopy is a particularly demanding part of any stealth aircraft. It has to satisfy optical and structural requirements while also controlling radar reflections. The cockpit is historically a major source of radar reflectivity, including the pilot’s helmet. Therefore the canopy’s materials, construction, interfaces, and specialized treatments can be critical to the aircraft’s overall low-observable performance, and especially from the critical frontal aspect.
The F-35’s canopy has been an ongoing work in progress for many years. It has had chronic material issues, especially when it comes to delamination. Multiple iterations spread over two decades have recently resulted in a major improvement of the issue. The tight balancing act of keeping the canopy transparent enough, while controlling the F-35’s stealthy signature and having that mix of materials be robust enough to last for a reasonable amount of time has been a major investment for the program. If the canopy is of a later variation, that loss alone could be substantial and could help China with their own low-observable canopy development programs even if they already had original information on the F-35’s canopy original design dating back years.
Evidence of the F-35’s canopy delamination issue on an early example of the F-35B. Crown Copyright
The F-35’s canopy has been a notorious work in progress, specifically the low observable coating/delamination issue which has improved a lot in recent years with new materials and processes. So no, you do NOT want to lose that in to China! https://t.co/9V0jdRAiwA
The F-35’s weapons-bay door has its own sensitivity issues. It is effectively a major section of the aircraft’s outer shell, with its structure, edges, interfaces, tolerances and treatments all having to function without creating unacceptable radar signatures. Its construction and material attributes can be reasonably extrapolated for the rest of much of the F-35’s outer mold-line. Above all else, if the radar absorbent material remained intact on the door, that would signify a major loss when viewed without any understanding of what China already knows about the F-35’s radar absorbing surface treatments. Historically speaking, RAM technology is among America’s closely guarded material sciences secrets.
A Belgian Air Force service member inspects the open weapons bay of an F-35A at Luke AFB, Arizona. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Tekorey Watkins
For the time being, Australian officials have said they do not understand the parts to be sensitive. The investigation will ultimately have to establish what the components actually contain and what could be learned from them.
The incident comes at a moment when China’s own stealth fighter efforts are undergoing an extraordinary expansion.
The PLAAF is now operating the J-20, China’s first operational fifth-generation stealth fighter, in increasingly large numbers. The smaller J-35 is also moving toward broader service, including a carrier role for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
Aircraft maintainers clean the fuselage of a J-20 fighter during the Changchun Air Show in the Jilin Province of China, in September 2025. Photo by Zhang Xiangyi/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images
China has also moved into what Western observers generally describe as sixth-generation fighter development.
Two new tailless combat-aircraft designs emerged publicly in December 2024. One is the large Chengdu aircraft commonly referred to as the J-36, while the other is associated with Shenyang and is variously called the J-XDS or J-50. Both have continued flight testing and yielded several prototypes with individual refinements.
The exact capabilities and eventual operational roles of these aircraft remain uncertain. They are developmental designs, not established operational equivalents of the F-35 or other sixth-generation systems. However, China is clearly building an increasingly broad ecosystem of fifth- and next-generation low-observable combat aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed. In the latter category is a growing number of stealthy drones, including long-endurance types.
China didn’t likely need physical access to an F-35 canopy or weapons-bay door to develop the J-20, J-35, or its next-generation aircraft. But additional information about how a mature Western stealth aircraft handles materials, coatings, interfaces, manufacturing, and the integration of those elements can still have great potential value to an industry developing its own systems. This includes technologies intended to counter the U.S. combat aircraft and their low-observable characteristics.
The F-35 has been produced in large numbers, is operated by a growing coalition of countries, and has been subjected to years of testing and operational experience. Its low-observable design represents decades of accumulated U.S. research and industrial know-how. At the same time, the global scale of the program inevitably makes control over sensitive information more complicated. More aircraft, more maintainers, more industrial partners, and more international logistics mean more points at which information and physical hardware have to be controlled. Over time, a program of this size will see an erosion in its secrets, but a major loss can drastically accelerate what should be a more gradual and controlled decline in security.
The Lockheed Martin F-35 production line at Fort Worth, Texas. Lockheed Martin photo by Alexander H Groves
The potential intelligence value of the components also has to be considered in the context of foreign material exploitation, or FME. Major military powers maintain dedicated capabilities to recover, examine and characterize foreign weapons, aircraft, sensors, materials and other equipment. The objective is not necessarily to reproduce an entire system. More important is determining how something is built, what materials and manufacturing techniques are used, how individual components perform, and where industrial strengths or limitations may lie.
That is why countries have historically gone to extraordinary lengths to recover even crashed or damaged pieces of sensitive military hardware. The bigger the prize, the more risk an intelligence service would be willing to take in order to realize a recovery.
The sensitivity surrounding the physical remnants of an F-35 is not new. When a Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-35A disappeared over the Pacific in 2019, the search quickly became more than a rescue operation. U.S. and Japanese forces mounted an extensive effort to locate the wreckage, with U.S. Navy P-8A aircraft and a destroyer joining the search. TWZnoted at the time that even scattered F-35 wreckage could expose valuable technological secrets, while the aircraft’s location on the seabed raised the prospect of an underwater espionage and recovery operation.
That concern has also been evident in subsequent F-35 recovery operations. In 2022, the U.S. Navy recovered an F-35C from roughly 12,400 feet in the South China Sea after a carrier landing accident, removing the possibility that the aircraft could be accessed by another country.
At this point, there is no public evidence that the Hong Kong diversion was a deliberate Chinese intelligence operation, although it is certainly possible. It is also unclear whether Chinese authorities have examined the F-35 parts or what level of new and useful information has been recovered from them.
If, as reported, Chinese authorities have taken possession of the parts and have not returned them, that would be an extraordinary development. If the diversion was genuinely the result of a shipping or logistics error, the outcome would itself be extraordinary. It would raise serious questions about the security controls surrounding the movement of F-35 hardware even without evidence of deliberate interference.
The timing is also notable. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Washington this week for a state visit with President Donald Trump, with the two leaders meeting amid broader disputes involving technology, security, and the future of U.S.-China relations. Whether the F-35 shipment comes up directly in those discussions is not known, but it would be an obvious subject for U.S. and Chinese officials to address through diplomatic channels.
"Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States Donald J. Trump and First Lady Melania Trump, accompanied by the President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping and Madame Peng Liyuan." pic.twitter.com/hyPHOBC99Q
For now, however, the central question remains how the parts got there. Until that is answered, we won’t know if this was a simple logistics failure or a deliberate intelligence operation. And beyond that, what China already knew about the components it now may have in its possession — a question we may never truly get an answer to.
Ukraine claims it has recently regained about 125 sq. km. of territory near the town of Lyman in the eastern Donetsk region during what has been dubbed Operation Vivaldi. Rodion Kudryashov, a Ukrainian colonel and deputy commander of the Third Army Corps, offered some insights into this offensive and what made it different.
Though the operation is still ongoing, the success of Vivaldi began long before any troop movements, Kudryashov explained in an editorial he published in Ukrainian Pravda.
Ukraine is making advances near the town of Lyman, located in the Donetsk region. (Google Earth)
“After the Third Army Corps was formed, we changed the command system of its subordinate units,” he noted. “Some brigades came to the corps after very heavy fighting, with losses, manning problems and, most importantly, eroded trust in their leadership.”
Third Army Corps Commander Brig. Gen. Andriy Biletsky “then set out one of our key principles: a commander must be responsible for the entire cycle, from training a soldier to the result on the battlefield,” Kudryashov pointed out. “In some places that meant replacing a commander. In others it meant restructuring a staff or strengthening the NCO chain. In some cases we had to build, almost from scratch, processes that on paper should have been working long ago.”
At issue was changing the culture from a more rigid Soviet-era model, with a cumbersome chain of command, to a modern, more flexible one better suited for the current conflict.
“A modern commander has to handle an enormous flow of information and make decisions quickly,” the deputy commander proffered. “He has to understand what unmanned systems, logistics, reconnaissance and adjacent units can do, while not smothering initiative at lower levels with endless approvals. An army where every decision takes hours to travel up and down the chain loses to an army that makes the same trip in minutes.”
Once those changes were put in place, the Third Army Corps had to first stop Russian advances in the sector before it could move forward.
VIVALDI
GoPro footage from Ukrainian assault troops who took part in the Vivaldi counteroffensive, which resulted in the liberation of five settlements in the Lyman direction. pic.twitter.com/2SVXSKlEX0
“When the corps took over its area of responsibility, our first task was not an offensive,” the officer said. “We had to stop the situation from deteriorating and stabilize the forward edge.”
“The enemy was pressing. In some sectors our combat formations were losing cohesion,” he underscored. “The Russians were actively using infiltration tactics: small groups seeped between positions, massed in our rear, threatened logistics and gradually eroded the defensive line.”
“We had to stabilize the forward edge and stop the infiltration,” Kudryashov said. “We had to rebuild command, put in commanders capable of making decisions, form new teams and reconstitute units. We had to set up the surveillance-and-strike system and sustain the front line. We had to stockpile ammunition, drones and other resources, understand the enemy, and plan the next step before the previous one was finished. Only after that could we move forward.”
By June, the corps was able to secure the front “in the sector from Borova to Lyman and eliminate the enemy’s infiltration zones,” Kudryashov continued. “That sounds less impressive than the word ‘offensive,’ but no offensive ever happens without it.”
“You cannot plan a complex operation if you don’t know where your forward edge will be tomorrow,” the deputy commander extrapolated. “You cannot build up forces if your logistics are constantly under threat. And you cannot form a strike group if your units are always forced to patch new breaches. So the first phase of ‘Vivaldi’ was not an advance at all. It was creating the conditions that made an advance possible in the first place.”
Once the front was stabilized, the next step was shaping the battlefield for the offensive. The corps’ unmanned systems units went to work against Russian logistics, striking a pipeline and depots. That forced the enemy to change its fuel and lubricant supply routes.
Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps released new footage of search-and-strike operations on the Lyman front. FPV drone operators from the 60th Mechanized Brigade’s FATUM unit targeted Russian armored vehicles, a Grad multiple rocket launcher and personnel. #Ukrainepic.twitter.com/1iNG7z2N1c
“The operation also involved the corps’ brigades, its reconnaissance and unmanned units, and attached forces from the SSO (Special Operations Forces), GUR (Defense Intelligence) and DPSU (State Border Guard Service),” the deputy commander said. “To counter infiltration, a joint headquarters was set up to coordinate special and reconnaissance units at the tactical level under a single concept.”
“In my view, this is one of the main characteristics of modern war,” he further stated. “It is not 10 strong units that each fight well on their own. It is 10 different elements that start working as one system at the right moment.”
An interesting new detail from Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps about Operation Vivaldi on the Lyman axis.
The Corps says Ukrainian forces carried out a flanking maneuver and, for the first time, airlifted unmanned ground vehicles behind Russian lines, while also suppressing Russian… https://t.co/ZEq8C75bN4pic.twitter.com/KgKcZ0Zs2P
The influential, Kremlin-connected Rybar Telegram channel has acknowledged Ukrainian gains in this sector.
“In the first half of summer, Russian units gradually advanced in Lyman,” Rybar wrote this morning. “However, in August, the enemy launched counterattacks and, by the first week of September, regained some positions, and also began attempts to recapture Shandryholovo and Zarechnoye.”
“The enemy did not inflict significant losses on Russian troops, as the concentration of units of the West group of forces in the salient remained relatively low,” Rybar added. “However, later, the UAF deployed reserves to launch an offensive towards Zherebets in order to align the front along the water barrier and return it to the configuration of the end of 2025.”
rybar now saying the 144th division is still falling back. the 3rd corps is still advancing and destroying an entire army group as they move. this is historic. pic.twitter.com/2jOa8KR9oA
Though the battle is still in flux, Kudryashov said there are lessons the rest of the Ukrainian military should heed.
“Winning one battle is not yet winning the war,” he said. “The enemy is learning too. He changes tactics, looks for weak spots and tries to scale what works for him.”
“So our task is to be faster, not only in physically moving forward but also in our ability to see, think, decide and put into practice what delivers results,” the deputy commander avowed. “And to do everything possible so that our soldiers pay the lowest possible price for every next kilometer of Ukrainian land.”
The Latest
On the battlefield, in addition to the gains Ukraine has made near Lyman, it has also largely been able to hold off Russian advances across the front lines. Here are some key takeaways from the latest Institute for the Study of War assessment of frontline operations:
Sumy: Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission east of Sumy City, and they continue to conduct glide bomb strikes against frontline settlements in northern Sumy Oblast to set conditions for future offensives.
Kharkiv: Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Borova, Kupyansk and Velykyi Burluk directions on Sept. 21 and 22 but did not advance.
Donetsk: Ukrainian forces reportedly continue counterattacks in the Lyman direction, including southeast of Lyman, as Russian forces are attempting to use redeployments to stabilize the area. Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Slovyansk near Rai-Oleksandrivka and toward Mykolaivka and Fedorivka Druha on Sept. 21 and 22 but did not advance. During this period, they also tried to advance in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions but made no gains, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in both areas.
Zaporizhia: Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Kherson: Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 22.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 22, 2026: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) falsely claimed that Russian forces have encircled Dobropillya — an intensification of the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare campaign alleging encirclements across various sectors of the… pic.twitter.com/yMoAcyVIme
In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly this afternoon, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for Russia to end its war and said it was paying a heavy price — and exacting a terrible toll — for little territorial gain.
“This ridiculous and never-ending war with Ukraine must be ended,” the Ukrainian leader urged. “I do not know a single world leader who would say otherwise. I do not know anyone who is openly for this war, except one man.”
He was referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
“Ladies and gentlemen, for almost five years now, Russian generals have been trying to carry out Putin’s crazy order to seize our eastern land, the Donetsk region,” Zelensky continued. “And just this year, from January through August, the Russian army lost 248,964 people on the battlefield in Ukraine in eight months. Twenty-one countries in the world have smaller populations… than the number of Russian troops lost in just eight months.”
“It’s madness, but they still keep going there to die because that is what Putin wants,” Zelensky suggested. “After losing so many people, Russia managed to capture just over 1,000 square kilometers of our land this year, and we have already liberated a significant part of it. Russia is a country that already has 17 million square kilometers of its own land without any Ukrainian territory, by the way. So to add another 1,000 square kilometers, Putin is paying with 248 people for every kilometer. Does anyone still think that he is reasonable? And moderate?”
“Russia’s leader, Patient Zero, the man from whom this war began and spread into the world, becoming the largest war in Europe since World War II, will inevitably leave this war,” Zelensky proffered. “But the longer Putin is able to wage war, the more evil he will leave behind in this world. Today, nothing in war works the same way it did, by the way, in 2022, except the courage of people.”
Russian missile and drone barrages have “caused damage, but they didn’t break us,” the president proclaimed. “We build our defense. What is really difficult for us now is Russian ballistic missiles and their new jet-powered Shaheds — Iranian technologies.”
Residential buildings stand against the backdrop of smoke from a Russian attack on Kyiv. (Photo by Bohdan Diev/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images) Tatyana Kudel’s’ka
“Just imagine this: since the beginning of this year, Russia has already used more than 2,100 missiles of different types again against us, against Ukraine, our people and our children,” Zelensky stated. “More than 950 of them were ballistic missiles. In eight months of this year, Russia used 63,000 attack drones of different types against Ukraine, our people, and more than 7,700 of them were jet-powered Shaheds, truly destructive and very dangerous weapons. Just think about it. The Russians launch jet-powered Shaheds every hour, every hour, against our cities, our economy, our infrastructure. Our combat aircraft are fighting them 24/7, and this is part of Russia’s strategy to create a new threat every hour, to make life harder for the economy and to disrupt people’s lives, and to stop children from being able to study, to study at school.”
Speaking at the Sixth Summit of the International Crimea Platform in New York on Wednesday, Zelensky said the return of Crimea is a condition for any return to normal relations with Russia.
“Disrespect for international law began in 2014, when Russia entered Crimea,” the Ukrainian leader stated. “There can be no full return to normality without Crimea, the restoration of security, the protection of people and lives, the release of prisoners held by Russia, and a return to the fundamental principles of international law. Territorial integrity matters, state sovereignty matters, and human lives matter. And Russia must learn this.”
Tuesday, Zelensky met with U.S. President Donald Trump.
Among the topics of their three-hour meeting were a path to end the war and a renewed discussion about the licensing of Patriot air defense interceptors so they can be built in Ukraine. The country is struggling to defend against Russian ballistic missiles because of the dearth of these munitions.
“Just had a positive and productive meeting with President Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly,” the Ukrainian leader stated on X. “Both the United States and Ukraine want this senseless Russian war to end before winter. We discussed possible de-escalation steps that could pave the way to diplomacy.”
“I am grateful that, in parallel with this, our teams continue to work on launching the production of Patriot interceptor missiles in Ukraine,” Zelensky noted. “This is exactly what will help protect lives if Russia rejects negotiations and continues to rely on ballistic terror against our people this winter and beyond. We also discussed other bilateral and multilateral issues, including the winter air defense package for Ukraine. Thank you to President Trump, his team, and all the American people for their support.”
I just had a positive and productive meeting with President Trump @POTUS at UNGA. Both the U.S. and Ukraine want to see this senseless Russian war ended before winter. We discussed potential de-escalatory steps that can open up the way to diplomacy. I am grateful that in the… pic.twitter.com/Ayvsj9It3m
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) September 22, 2026
For his part, Trump said negotiations about Patriots are ongoing but offered no commitments.
“We’re talking about that,” Trump stated. “We’ll be talking about that now. If you would have come in at the end, we would have had an answer. But we’ll be talking about that. I mean, we talk about it all the time. Very capable people, really amazingly capable people.”
This isn’t the first time the two leaders have talked about a Patriot licensing deal. The issue came up back in July. As we noted at the time, such a deal faces big challenges.
First of all, it could face bureaucratic and regulatory hurdles, like getting congressional approval. Major security concerns exist, not just by having license production of a very sensitive weapon in Ukraine but also having to do with whatever facility will perform the work, which would become a top target for Russia. Even if they got the clearance to move forward, delivery of new weapons will still take years due to the time it takes to build the facility and to source long-lead components.
Even Lockheed Martin, one of the world’s biggest arms makers, currently produces only about 650 PAC-3 MSE interceptors a year, or just shy of two per day. However, under a contract with the Pentagon inked in January, Lockheed is committed to boosting Patriot PAC-3 MSE annual production to 2,000 in the years to come.
You can read more about the headwinds a Patriot licensing deal would face, even if it were to come to fruition, in our initial story here.
A Patriot interceptor. (DOW) Department of Defense
Ukraine’s president also confirmed that “Kyiv is ready to agree to an energy truce on the condition that Russia does not attack its energy, electricity and heating infrastructure as well as its water supplies,” CNBC reported. “Trump has previously called on Ukraine to stop targeting Russian oil refineries with drone strikes, which he says are ‘hurting the world’ as fuel supply disruptions from the Ukraine and Iran wars propel U.S. diesel prices to a record high.”
Ukraine’s repeated attacks on Russian oil infrastructure is having a major impact.
“Russian refinery throughput fell to 3.8 mb/d, its lowest level in more than 20 years and roughly 30% below a year earlier,” according to a recent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA). “Reported gasoline output is down by 20% compared with 2025 levels, while diesel production is estimated to have fallen by nearly 30%, prompting the government to restrict fuel exports to protect domestic supplies.”
Amid the U.N. General Assembly meeting, strikes by both sides continued.
“At least 16 people were killed and 59 others injured in Russian attacks across Ukraine over the past day, as Russia launched several waves of ballistic missiles at Kyiv overnight,” the Kyiv Independent reported, citing local authorities.
“Two people were killed and eight others injured in Kyiv, where Russian ballistic missiles struck the capital in three waves overnight,” the publication added. “Residential buildings, a maternity hospital, energy, and logistics infrastructure were among the sites damaged, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky.”
“Russia launched 282 attack drones of various types overnight, including jet-powered drones, as well as Zircon anti-ship missiles and Iskander-M, S-400, and KN-23 ballistic missiles,” the news outlet stated, citing the Ukrainian Air Force. “Ukrainian air defenses shot down 227 aerial targets, including 219 drones, four Zircon missiles, three ballistic missiles, and one Banderol munition. Strikes were recorded at 13 locations, while debris from downed targets fell at 10 locations.”
A difficult night for Ukraine as Russia continued attacking our civilians, launching a ballistic missile attack on Kyiv, and attacking Kyiv and other Ukrainian regions with drones. The air raid alert in Kyiv was turned on at 3:28 a.m. and hasn't turned off since.
Ukraine’s strikes on Russian energy infrastructure continued.
“Over the past 24 hours, two oil refineries were hit – one in Bashkortostan and one in the Samara region. There were also strikes in the Black Sea,” the Ukrainian Defense Ministry stated on X. “We are taking the war back to where it came from. We are bringing peace closer for Ukraine. I thank the units involved for their precision.”
I thank our warriors for the results they achieve every day in carrying out Ukraine’s long-range sanctions. Over the past 24 hours, two oil refineries were hit – one in Bashkortostan and one in the Samara region. There were also strikes in the Black Sea.
In an effort to defend against Ukrainian attacks, Russia continues to use netting to protect its energy facilities. You can see a recent example in the video below.
After more frequent Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries and fuel depots, Moscow and the Moscow region decided to cover potential targets with anti-drone nets.
Finland’s President Alexander Stubband Zelensky this morning “signed an Agreement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation under the Drone Deal format,” the Finnish Defense Ministry said in a statement. “It will enable defense materiel cooperation between the two countries.”
“The agreement will enable Finland and Ukraine to transfer technology and knowledge, pursue research, development and innovation cooperation and promote joint manufacturing and drone technology development between their industries,” the MoD stated. “Another objective is to simplify administrative processes, for example regarding the granting of export authorizations, to make the transfer of defense materiel and technologies between the two countries as efficient as possible.”
Finland and Ukraine take their defence cooperation to the next level
Today, we signed a drone deal with @ZelenskyyUa. The agreement enables, among other things, the joint production of defence materiel. Defence sector companies in Finland are ready, and the joint effort can now… pic.twitter.com/UUh2kZPPpk
With electronic warfare interfering with how drones controlled by radio frequencies operate, Ukraine is testing a new system of small radio beacons placed on the ground that allow drones to navigate without GNSS — including missions deep inside Russia. While many systems might not need this fix, some of the lower-end drones might.
Ukraine is testing and scaling this technology as part of a layered navigation system designed to keep drones autonomous in heavily jammed environments.
“The concept is quite simple,” the BBC wrote. “If the enemy jams the signal coming from above—specifically from GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) satellites, which determine the precise coordinates, speed, and time of any object on Earth—then specific points must be created to provide that same signal from below.”
The idea is to guide the drones by triangulating their location.
“To achieve this, special small devices—radio beacons—are either installed on the ground or air-dropped across a specific area. Their coordinates are known; thus, when a drone flies through the area, it receives coordinate data and signal transmission timing from several beacons. From there, it is a matter of basic geometry: the UAV calculates its own spatial position using data on the distance to the beacon and its altitude above the ground.”
GPS can be jammed. Ukrainian drones still need to fly.
A new beacon network is helping solve that problem.
Small radio beacons placed on the ground allow drones to navigate without GNSS or a constant communications link — including missions deep inside russia.
In the age of robots, uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) are playing a larger role in combat. The following video shows one UGV rescuing another one by pushing it back on its wheels.
A Ukrainian logistics UGV comes to the rescue of its overturned teammate, helping get the stranded ground robot back on its wheels. pic.twitter.com/q7d5I2tyOe
Taiwan has provided the first public look at its new 105mm 8×8 mobile gun system in action, with the domestically developed vehicle engaging moving and stationary targets during a live-fire demonstration in southern Taiwan. The vehicle is being developed as Taiwan continues to modernize its ground forces in response to the growing capabilities and increasingly frequent military activity of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around the island.
During the demonstration, held by the Republic of China Army (ROCA) at a training area in Tainan today, the vehicle reportedly engaged a moving target at approximately 0.75 miles and a stationary target at around 0.6 miles. It also fired against targets positioned 90 degrees to the side of the vehicle while operating on a gentle slope, demonstrating the gun system’s ability to engage targets while the vehicle is positioned on uneven terrain.
— 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan) (@MoNDefense) September 23, 2026
The vehicle subsequently fired its 7.62mm coaxial machine gun simultaneously with its main gun as part of a scenario intended to demonstrate engagement of multiple targets, including simulated amphibious assault vehicles.
An apparent weapon malfunction was also recorded during the demonstration. One of the 105mm rounds initially failed to fire, according to reports. The crew waited approximately two minutes in accordance with safety procedures before reloading the weapon, after which the vehicle fired normally. Maj. Gen. Chen Chien-chung, head of Taiwan’s Arsenal 202, the Production and Manufacturing Center of the Armament Bureau, said an investigation would be conducted into the misfire.
The 155 mm infantry fighting vehicle showcased to media before entering production phase. pic.twitter.com/DBhs66aw5Q
Despite the incident, the demonstration provided an important look at a vehicle that Taiwan is developing specifically around the country’s geography and battlefield requirements, including a potential amphibious invasion by the Chinese PLA.
A new direct fire support variant of the Clouded Leopard 8×8 infantry fighting vehicle was first publicly displayed at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition in 2023. It passed initial combat readiness testing with the ROCA in October 2023, and it was authorized for mass production in April 2024.
A pre-production prototype of the Taiwanese 105mm 8×8 mobile gun system. Ministry of National Defense
The production configuration has undergone significant changes since then.
Its height has been reduced by approximately 12 inches, bringing the overall vehicle height to below 9 feet 10 inches. Its turning radius has also been reduced from 36 feet to 26 feet. The reduction in turning radius was achieved by providing steering to three pairs of wheels, rather than two pairs on the earlier configuration.
Those changes are especially relevant to Taiwan, where large sections of the island feature restrictive terrain, dense urban development, narrow roads, drainage channels, and other obstacles that can limit the movement of heavy armored vehicles.
Taiwan’s 105mm 8×8 mobile gun system takes part in a live-fire demonstration in Tainan on September 23, 2026. Photo by CHENG Yu-chen / AFP
Taiwanese officials specifically highlighted the system’s suitability for culverts and urban areas, as well as the challenging terrain of Hualien and Taitung on the island’s mountainous east coast.
The vehicle’s principal weapon is a 105mm gun. The weapon can fire the general-purpose ammunition already developed for tank guns, in addition to ammunition developed specifically for the new system. The ROCA displayed armor-piercing, anti-personnel, and training ammunition during the demonstration. The gun also offers useful ammunition commonality with Taiwan’s older, but still active M60A3 and CM11 tanks.
A Taiwanese soldier inspects an M60A3 tank during an overnight cross-region deployment from Hualien during the annual Han Kuang military exercises in Yilan on August 9, 2026. Photo by Chiang Ying-ying / POOL / AFP
That compatibility potentially gives the vehicle access to an existing ammunition ecosystem while allowing Taiwan to develop specialized rounds for its particular requirements.
Against a PLA assault, the 105mm system would provide mobile direct firepower against amphibious vehicles, armored personnel carriers, fortifications, and other ground targets, complementing Taiwan’s heavier tanks and other anti-armor weapons. Its wheeled configuration also allows the vehicle to rapidly reposition along Taiwan’s road network, giving commanders a mobile source of direct firepower that could respond to amphibious landings and reinforce threatened sectors.
The system falls into the same broad category as other modern 8×8 mobile gun systems, including Italy’s Centauro family and Japan’s Type 16 Mobile Combat Vehicle.
Italian soldiers of the 6th Cavalry Regiment, Aosta Mechanized Brigade, observe their sector of fire with a Centauro B1 tank destroyer while conducting a simulated assault during Saber Junction 17 at the Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, May 2017. U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Zachery Perkins
Less successful was a mobile gun system version of the U.S. Army Stryker, also with a 105mm gun, but the service divested that in 2021 because of problems with its dated cannon and autoloader. The U.S. Army then received the M10 Booker Combat Vehicle. Armed with a 105mm main gun, the Booker is a tracked vehicle with a much higher degree of armor protection and off-road mobility, but this, too, was canceled in 2025, amid cost and weight increases.
A Stryker Mobile Gun System fires a 105mm round. U.S. Army
A wheeled 105mm gun system can provide substantial direct-fire capability while offering advantages in road mobility and potentially lower logistical demands. It also lacks the combination of protection, cross-country mobility, and heavy armament associated with a tracked main battle tank.
For Taiwan, this kind of vehicle provides a comparatively compact armored platform able to move rapidly between positions and bring heavy direct firepower to areas where larger vehicles could face mobility constraints.
Taiwanese personnel get off a subway car in Taipei carrying a Stinger missile during the annual Han Kuang exercise. Military News Agency/Taiwan Ministry of National Defense capture via Focus Taiwan
The vehicle’s development is also being influenced by the threat of battlefield drones. Taiwanese military officials say the system is expected to receive additional counter-drone capabilities before entering mass production. One planned modification is an anti-drone cage around the vehicle.
More ambitious changes could involve the installation of a larger-caliber automatic weapon. Reportedly, the vehicle could eventually receive another machine gun or larger-caliber automatic cannon, with the 30mm M230 chain gun identified as one possible option. The proposed weapon could use canister-type ammunition designed to disperse numerous fragments against small drones.
Adding dedicated counter-drone equipment to the mobile gun system would therefore give the vehicle another role beyond direct engagement of conventional ground targets.
Taiwan’s new 105mm mobile gun system during a demonstration in Tainan on September 23, 2026. Photo by CHENG Yu-chen / AFP
The prominence of counter-drone measures in the planning of the vehicle also reflects the increasingly contested environment in which Taiwan’s armored forces would have to operate. In a conflict with China, armored units have to operate under the threat of persistent surveillance and attacks from a wide range of uncrewed systems, making concealment, mobility, dispersion, and organic counter-drone capabilities very important to any change of survival. Questioning just how long any armor would last in a full-on invasion scenario is absolutely relevant. As we have seen in Ukraine, the drone threat alone has sidelined even the most capable armor. At the same time, Taiwan is working toward its own drone-heavy battlefield doctrine, part of a broader plan to turn the island into a “hellscape” for any invading force.
Overall, the September 23 demonstration offered a useful glimpse into the thinking behind Taiwan’s indigenous armored vehicle program.
As part of a wider modernization of ROCA armor, the service has also received 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, broadly equivalent to the M1A2 SEPv3 version — or System Enhancement Package version 3 — which you can read more about here.
With production of 178 series examples of the new vehicle scheduled to begin in 2027, Taiwan’s new 105mm mobile gun system is moving toward becoming a significant component of the island’s domestically produced armored fleet.
China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation continues to press ahead with the development of its ‘J-36’ next-generation tailless heavy tactical jet. Recent flight testing has offered interesting new views of the still-evolving stealthy design from the top and behind, prompting discussion about the aircraft’s features. There has also been talk recently about whether the jet might receive a laser directed-energy weapon at some point in the future.
The most recent video of a J-36 test flight, seen in the social media post below, began circulating online yesterday. The footage shows the aircraft coming in to land, providing good general views of the uniquely three-engined jet with its two-seat, side-by-side cockpit configuration, especially from the rear aspect. What is seen underscores a previously observed total revision of the exhausts from a trough style to a two-dimensional thrust-vectoring configuration akin to what is found on the U.S. F-22 Raptor. This and other significant changes to the design, including the addition of divertless supersonic intakes (DSIs) all around, not just on top, first emerged last year. The clip also offers a good reminder of just how wide the aircraft is overall.
Obviously one of the best video recordings of the J-36 so far seen during landing approach … But can anyone read the number under the cockpit? https://t.co/cmQ0AkdsdO
As this particular J-36 passes by, it can be seen to have a lighter-colored radome, as well as at least one relatively large lighter-colored section on top of the dorsal air intake. A similarly colored radome was first spotted on what is said to be the fourth prototype back in July. This coloring could point to the installation of actual radar in the aircraft’s nose. In TWZ‘s first in-depth analysis of the J-36 back in 2024, we assessed that the jet’s very broad radome area could house an absolutely massive primary array.
The lighter section on top of the fuselage could be an aperture for a conformal antenna tied to a beyond-line-of-sight communications and data-sharing suite. In 2024, we posited that the heavyweight J-36 could serve as an intelligence-gathering and communications relay platform in addition to performing tasks more typically associated with tactical combat jets. Reliable and multi-faceted connectivity would be key for employing the J-36 as an airborne controller for advanced air combat drones, as well.
Captures from the video above highlighting the lighter-colored radome and section on top of the center of the fuselage. Chinese internet captures via X
Another J-36 flight testing video that emerged on Monday, seen below, offers an additional view of the top of the jet, showing multiple lighter-colored sections that would appear to be additional conformal apertures for various antennas. There is a lighter-colored rectangular outline painted around part of the intake on top of the center of the fuselage, as well. The jet’s full paint scheme includes lighter-colored leading and trailing edges, which are critical structures on low-observable (stealthy) designs that often contain additional antenna arrays. Overall, the two-tone coloring is very much in line with what is seen on operational J-20 fighters in Chinese service today. The original J-36 prototype, at least, has notably worn a splinter-type camouflage paint scheme.
China's J-36 sixth-gen fighter asserting its dominance in the sky.
My prediction, the J-36 will gain initial operational capability before the American F-47 take its maiden flight. pic.twitter.com/SLmjqZ76Aw
A stock shot of a J-20 fighter with its two-tone scheme. PLAAFA view of the first J-36 prototype with its splinter-type camouflage scheme. Chinese internet via X
Whether or not the two recent video clips show the same J-36 prototype is unclear. The possibility has now been raised that Chengdu may be using a single serial number (36011) on at least some of the J-36 prototypes, a decision that could have been made for counter-intelligence and/or deliberate misinformation/disinformation purposes.
Much still remains unknown about the current or expected future capabilities of the J-36. Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) did have a placard at its booth at the 14th China International Defence Electronics Exhibition earlier this month that has prompted questions about whether the jet could be equipped with a laser directed-energy weapon. Chengdu falls under the umbrella of AVIC, which is a state-run enterprise. The Chinese-language placard in question describes a “laser weapon tracking system” with a power rating of “*00” kilowatts and a weight of “less than” 837.7 pounds (380 kilograms), per a machine translation. The way the power rating is written appears to mean that it is in the hundreds of kilowatts, which would put it firmly in a class capable of doing physical damage to objects, such as incoming missiles and drones.
Furthermore, an associated graphic shows a turreted system and a computer-generated rendering of a J-36 projecting a beam. The render appears to be from a video that depicts a J-36 using a laser to destroy other aircraft. Another computer-generated video that shows a J-36 using retractable lasers to shoot down incoming missiles has been circulating online since at least last year.
AVIC showed this at the 14th China International Defence Electronics Exhibition earlier this month. Chinese internet via X
It is not immediately clear how official either of the clips depicting laser-armed J-36s might be, or whether they at all reflect real planned capabilities. The full placard presented at the China International Defence Electronics Exhibition, as seen in the video below, shows a variety of different laser systems, and not just for aerial applications.
AVIC has confirmed that the J-36 fighter jet is equipped with a laser defense system. pic.twitter.com/4PrSqAfOQK
Despite important U.S. strides more recently when it comes to fielding ground-based and naval laser weapon systems, “there’s nothing that’s on the shelf right now that we are ready to put onto an airplane,” U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Douglas Wickert, the commander of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), told TWZ and other outlets just last week at a roundtable at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference on Tuesday. “The solid-state lasers and the power density and the different ways that you actually – there’s actually a lot of secret sauce in that. How do you make the beam, and how do you form the beam, and how do you pulse the beam, and all that’s in development.”
‘There’s development of the laser itself, but now the power and thermal management system has progressed so much that we can provide the power needed,” Dr. Michael Gregg, head of AFRL’s Air Warfare Directorate, said at the same roundtable. “We’ve also had new designs and engines that we know have the power … to direct that power in certain areas. So, from a system perspective, it’s much more feasible because everything has matured over the last decade.”
A rendering of a US Air Force F-16 fighter with a podded laser directed-energy weapon. Lockheed Martin A rendering of a US Air Force F-16C Viper fighter with a podded laser directed energy weapon. Lockheed Martin
China has certainly made substantial investments of its own in laser and other directed-energy weapon capabilities across domains in recent years, and this is clearly an area of interest for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in general. When it comes to the J-36 specifically, TWZ has explicitly highlighted in the past how the three-engine configuration could be particularly useful for producing sufficient power to support a host of advanced and electricity-hungry sensors and other capabilities, including directed energy weapons.
Larger questions remain about the exact set of roles the J-36 is expected to fill, as well. The basic design is certainly optimized for straight-line performance, combat radius, and payload rather than maneuverability and agility. The jet has already caused a significant amount of debate just when it comes to taxonomy, as it does not seem to fit inside traditional definitions of ‘fighters’ and ‘bombers,’ something we have explored in detail previously.
A composite of other views of the J-36 that have emerged since 2024. Chinese Internet via X
“According to Yang Wei – chief designer of the J-20 –, the new [J-36] fighter can penetrate heavily defended airspace that the J-20 and comparable F-22s or F-35s must avoid, placing it a generation ahead,” Andreas Rupprecht, an analyst specializing in Chinese military aviation and TWZ contributor, wrote in a post on LinkedIn last week. “With lower RCS [radar cross section], high speed, and the capacity to control more drones, it could act as a node and command center for systems including J-20s and, especially, unmanned aircraft, while attacking high-value targets from stand-off range with long-range weapons.”
“The type could therefore represent a new class of ‘fighter,'” he added. “Online terms include ‘theater-level deep-penetration command combat aircraft’ and ‘high-performance fighter,’ analogous to a cruiser ranking above a destroyer within the Navy. Recent evidence gives this theory new weight and warrants continued monitoring.”
A rendering the US Air Force has released of the F-47. USAF
As an aside, based on what has emerged publicly to date, there are signs that the F-47 may reflect a distinctly different design philosophy that puts greater emphasis on maneuverability compared to the J-36, and even likely the J-XDS. As mentioned, the J-36 certainly seems much more focused on payload, range, and level flight performance. In July, TWZ published a deep dive exploring why the U.S. Air Force would pursue a sixth-generation fighter with rear-swept wings, canards, and other features despite steady trends in the opposite direction visible in Chinese designs and ones elsewhere globally.
Regardless, U.S. officials have downplayed questions about China’s gaining ground in the air combat arena, or even surging into the lead in certain areas, in the past. “Chinese sixth-generation aircraft are in the nascent stages of development and expected to be operational by 2035,” the Pentagon wrote in its most recent annual report on military and security developments in China, which was published in December 2025.
In the meantime, the J-36’s design is already steadily being refined, and the total fleet of prototypes has been growing, offering new insights into the aircraft’s expected capabilities and roles.
It’s stunning to comprehend how much has changed since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. The conflict quickly turned into one dominated by artillery, with both sides scrambling to source shells wherever possible. Drones have since replaced tubed artillery as the ‘king of battle’ along the front, but cannons still have an important place on the battlefield. The commander of a new combined drone-artillery brigade offered some fresh insights into how his guns are now being deployed to achieve effects that drones still can’t provide.
As we have frequently documented, the ubiquity of drones has changed the nature of combat, especially when it comes to artillery. Not only can drones hold artillery positions at risk, many are cheaper than shells and easier to produce at scale. Most types are also precision guided munitions capable of hitting moving targets with pinpoint accuracy and can also provide battlefield surveillance. However, they are not a panacea, especially amid the cat-and-mouse game of electronic warfare countermeasures and improving kinetic and passive defenses.
In a recent interview with the Ukrainian Oboronka news outlet, Lt. Col. Vitalii Korniienko, commander of the 7th Artillery Brigade, talked about the changing nature of artillery warfare. Korniienko, whose unit is part of the Ukrainian National Guard, explained what is being done to keep his array of domestically produced Bogdana 155mm systems, donated weapons like M777 howitzers, remaining Soviet-era 2S7 Pion 203mm self-propelled howitzers and other guns, relevant. Here are some takeaways from that discussion.
How The Game Changed
“Guns used to be massed at positions to create an ‘artillery wall’ and a barrage of fire,” the lieutenant colonel said. “That practice is gone now. So, how effective is artillery today? We can create an artillery barrage, but what is the point of mindlessly churning up the earth? I’d rather send 20 FPV drones to destroy the target. The cost of that mission is $20,000.”
A soldier from the 13th Khartiia Brigade of Ukraine’s National Guard hones his FPV drone piloting skills during a training flight in the Kharkiv region, Ukraine. (Photo by Viacheslav Madiievskyi/Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images) Future Publishing
“Alternatively, I could fire 200 shells, but the cost would be astronomical,” he pointed out. “Plus, if we fired 100 shells from a gun in a single day, it likely wouldn’t survive until evening. The sky is full of drones; every shot gives away the position, leading to detection and an attempt to dismantle it using every available means. Nowadays, a typical mission involves a series of up to 10 shots. First, 3–5 shells for ranging, followed by fire on the target. That’s a minimum of five shells, with each costing at least $2,000.”
What Does The Drone-Artillery Brigade Do Differently?
“It is a concept of ours that was approved: combining artillery and drones within a single brigade,” Korniienko said. “Drones take out enemy artillery and logistics, while our guns provide cover for the infantry, destroy targets, and pin the enemy down in their dugouts. This way, we mitigate the limitations of both systems and boost overall effectiveness.”
Ukrainian troops firing a domestically produced 2S22 “Bogdana” self-propelled howitzer against Russian forces near the front line in the Zaporizhia direction. (Photo by Maksym Kishka/Frontliner/Getty Images) Frontliner#VIDEO
“Our primary operations are focused within the corps’ area of responsibility—targeting positions 10 kilometers deep or farther behind enemy lines. Of course, we will also engage closer targets if requested by the brigade holding the defense. In addition, we are shifting logistics tasks from pickup trucks to ground-based robotic systems. They are already transporting ammunition to drone and artillery positions, as well as food and fuel for generators.”
What Artillery Can Do That Drones Can’t
“Let’s be honest: 95% of strikes right now are carried out by drones,” Korniienko explained. “Yet, we cannot simply abandon artillery. The focus of our operations has shifted from merely striking the enemy to destroying, suppressing, and halting the actions of assault groups and armored columns—and the need for that remains as critical as ever. There are tasks that only artillery can handle.”
The high art of war, as practiced by the warriors of the National Guard's Artillery Brigade.
“For instance, we currently have several enemy targets in the Kupyansk sector that drones cannot reach due to electronic warfare (EW) interference, while slow fiber-optic drones are simply shot down,” the officer noted. “What do we do? We call in artillery. Nothing affects its shells. Fog, strong winds, snow, or headwinds—it makes no difference to artillery; it will operate regardless.”
Preparing Artillery For The Modern Battlefield
“At the beginning, both we and the Russians might have had two or three guns at a single position,” Korniienko proffered. “The enemy was doing this as late as 2023. Then it tapered off, because if you deployed six guns, an hour later they’d be gone. No one drives out into an open field anymore. Today, a gun wouldn’t even make it to the position without being spotted.”
Ukrainian National Guard troops prepare a ‘Bogdana-BG’ artillery installation from a dugout position. (Photo by Sofiia Bobok/Anadolu via Getty Images) Anadolu
As a result, the artillery crew’s deployment “is prepared in advance,” the officer stated. “First, anti-aircraft drone teams ‘clear’ the sky above the site of enemy reconnaissance assets. The position itself is a fully underground-dugout caponier with well-camouflaged access routes. We put a lot of effort into ensuring the artillery doesn’t get destroyed. Losing a gun is a huge blow to us.”
Short Range Versus Long Range Shells
“There is currently an ongoing debate about phasing out ‘short’ shells and switching entirely to long-range variants,” the officer stated. “This is intended to protect artillery from drone strikes.”
“What exactly is a ‘short’ shell, and should we stop using it?” he asked rhetorically. “The M107 155mm round is what is known as a ‘short’ shell. It is inexpensive and mass-produced; all our allies—and even our own country—manufacture it. We have sufficient stocks of them for combat operations. While accurate, its range is limited to 14–18 km, depending on the propellant used.”
Army
Long-range options “include the M795 and its foreign equivalents,” Korniienko explained. “These are longer, heavier, and significantly more expensive. With high-quality propellant, they can reach 30 km, or even further if equipped with a base-bleed unit. However, both these shells and the necessary propellants are in short supply.”
Army
“I do not believe abandoning the M107 is the right move,” the officer suggested. “Long-range shells cause faster barrel wear and compromise position concealment; firing a long-range charge produces a massive burst of flame from the muzzle—visible for kilometers at dusk or dawn.” “Besides,” he added, “18 km is a respectable range. If the gun is positioned 15 km back, it still has a 3-km margin to spare. That is sufficient for engaging frontline infantry. In my view, the ideal mix for most brigades would be 60% long-range shells and 40% standard M107 rounds.”
Big Versus Small Guns
“I operated 105mm guns in the Serebryanka area, on the Kharkiv axis,” Korniienko noted. “Based on intercepted communications, the enemy thought it was a mortar and searched for it within a five-to-six-kilometer range. But the howitzer was positioned eight or nine kilometers away and fired out to 10–12 kilometers.”
“There is almost no muzzle flash, just a bit of dust,” he added. “The shell arrives, and the enemy doesn’t even hear the sound of the shot. It’s compact and lightweight—you can transport it on a pickup truck. So yes, it would be useful.”
An L119 lightweight towed howitzer. (Via X)
“I’d also like to see the development of 203mm artillery; why move away from that caliber?” the officer wondered aloud. “Our ‘Pion’ systems fire a massive 100-kilogram shell capable of punching through at least two floors of a building or a bunker. And it’s reasonably accurate, too. You wouldn’t want to be on the receiving end when guns like that are firing at you. Overall, I believe we need competition. Right now, the ‘Bogdana’ is evolving under wartime conditions, which is good. But in a few years, momentum could stall. They might just keep producing the same system without significant upgrades because there’s no incentive to innovate. Yet, the nature of war doesn’t stand still.”
Wary Of Asian Shells
“We have a wide range of shells from different countries, and the ones coming from the West are fine,” Korniienko said. “However, their counterparts produced in certain Asian countries… the quality is frankly poor.”
“What is wrong with them?” queried Korniienko, who did not name the country in question. “On paper, the shell weight is listed as 46 kilograms, but when we weigh them, we find 46.9 or 45.4 kg. And that half-kilogram difference—give or take—has a huge impact on where the shell lands.”
As a result, “we no longer trust the standard firing tables provided with the shells; instead, we compile our own for each manufacturer. We weigh every batch and sort them by weight so that the difference between the ‘piles’ is minimal, ensuring a reasonably tight grouping. I can’t afford to make a mistake that causes a shell to land 2 kilometers off-target—right where our infantry guys are positioned. I should add that our artillerymen are actually wary of shells from one specific country. There have been instances where they tore off the muzzle brake or even caused the barrel to burst. A barrel burst is a disaster.”
Homegrown Is The Best
Korniienko said his unit was one of the first to test the Bogdana system, adding that he prefers it to other guns.
“We tested them and provided feedback to the manufacturer, which was then used to refine the design,” he explained. “It is a solid gun now, and it is my preferred choice. It might not be the absolute best, but I am very satisfied with the support and service.”
“If there’s a breakdown, the gun is back in position within a day or two,” he pointed out. “For instance, a gun broke down today, and we needed a repair team from the manufacturer. I know I’ll have it fixed by the day after tomorrow. They arrive in the morning, and by midday, the gun is ready. Then it takes another day or two to get it back to the position. That is very fast.”
That’s a very different experience than what he sees with donated weapons like the U.S.-made M777.
Ukrainian soldiers prepare to fire an M777 howitzer at Russian forces. (Photo by Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images) Anadolu
“As for the Western partners helping us—we are deeply grateful,” the officer avowed. “However, by the time you actually receive a part—say, a sensor—the gun might have been sitting idle for six months. And you can’t try to fix it yourself, because that would void the warranty.”
While artillery may no longer be the reigning weapon of war, as far as Ukraine is concerned, it has not been relegated to the dustbin of history yet either.
The Royal Air Force (RAF) is deploying one of its Voyager aerial refueling jets to help Saudi Arabia defend against ongoing attacks from the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels of Yemen. The decision marks the first publicly known international military assistance offered to Saudi Arabia specifically for its fight against the Houthis, which erupted over the summer. The move came hours before U.S. President Donald Trump told the United Nations General Assembly meeting that he believes a peace deal with Iran will be reached after the U.S. midterm elections in November.
The British action is significant because, while it involves just one tanker, other key Saudi allies have yet to heed the Kingdom’s request for military help specifically to battle the Houthis. Although it’s important to note some assets already deployed to defend against Iranian attacks could be helping with the Houthi threat now.
A Royal Air Force Typhoon FGR4 accompanies a Voyager tanker during a Quick Reaction Alert training scenario in March 2026. (Crown Copyright) Crown Copyright
Last week, Trump turned down a direct plea from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom’s de facto leader, to attack the Houthis. Meanwhile, Pakistan and Turkey, which signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia, have yet to provide any direct military aid. The pact holds that an attack on one is considered an attack on all; however, it doesn’t stipulate exactly what actions should be taken.
At issue, beyond protecting the Saudis, is growing concern over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a key chokepoint now largely controlled by the Houthis, who are preventing the Saudis from using it to ship oil.
Earlier this year, the Houthis imposed a blockade on the Strait, and began striking Saudi ships in the southern part of the Red Sea as well as critical energy terminals on that body of water. Iranian proxies have also struck the vital East-West pipeline that feeds oil to be transferred and shipped via the Red Sea in order to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran vastly curtailed shipping after the launch of Operation Epic Fury. The pipeline reportedly reopened today after being shut down following a long-range drone attack.
The stark reality is that if Saudi refineries are destroyed and the pipeline is shut down for months, if not longer, the last major lifeline from the region — and especially to Europe — would be closed off, sparking a deeper energy crisis.
Concern over these factors spurred Britain to act, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) noted. It said it was acting on a request from Saudi Arabia and that the jet would “support Saudi Arabia’s defensive operations in aid of the legitimate Yemeni government.”
“Escalating tensions in the Gulf could have negative consequences here in the UK—such as rising prices, disruptions to energy supplies, and increased costs for British businesses,” the ministry explained. “The Houthis pose a threat to stability in the Middle East; therefore, it is in the UK’s national interest—economically and in terms of security—that they do not succeed in their aims.”
“We unequivocally condemn Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, and our position is clear: both Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government have the right to self-defense,” the ministry added.
The jet will operate from a U.K. air base in Cyprus and will begin air-to-air refueling operations in the coming days, the BBC reported.
The MoD said the Voyager will fly only in support of missions to shoot down missiles and drones, though Saudi aircraft are also bombing Houthi ground positions in Yemen, in part to get at drone and missile launchers and storage sites. Houthi officials have accused the Saudis of killing civilians in some of these attacks.
It should be noted that, more than a decade ago, the U.S. was supporting the Saudi coalition’s previous bombing campaign against the Houthis by providing aerial refueling and intelligence. However, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis ended that in 2018 during the first Trump presidency after growing concerns over the large number of civilian casualties.
The Voyager can only refuel the Royal Saudi Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons, Panavia Tornados, and Italian Air Force Typhoons that have been in the Kingdom since before the fighting with the Houthis broke out, as well as any other similarly equipped allied aircraft. That’s because the tanker only has probe-and-drogue aerial refueling, not the boom required for gassing up other receptacle-equipped aircraft. You can read more about this in our story here.
The view from the cockpit of an A400M during air-to-air refueling with a Voyager KC3 using its probe and drogue system, via the fuselage refueling unit. Crown Copyright
The Voyager will not be the first British asset to be sent to help Saudi Arabia since the launch of Epic Fury. In March, the U.K. sent its Sky Sabre air defense system and troops to the Kingdom to help defend against attacks from Iran.
The British Army Sky Sabre state-of-the-art intermediate air defence system. (Corporal Adam J Wakefield) Corporal Adam J Wakefield
“This support builds upon the UK’s existing military contribution to Saudi air defense, which includes the deployment of an air defense system and British personnel to help protect against missile and drone attacks,” the MoD pointed out on Tuesday. “Saudi Arabia and Yemen are steadfast partners of the UK and play a vital role in regional stability. It is in the UK’s interest to safeguard regional stability, protect vital trade and energy supplies, and encourage a diplomatic resolution to the conflict in Yemen.”
The civil war in Yemen erupted in 2014 and expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis. The fighting between Saudi-led forces and the Houthis largely abated after a tenuous ceasefire was signed in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis, and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. The United Kingdom was the other significant player in that air campaign.
Tensions, as we noted earlier in this story, reignited in recent weeks after the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter.
On Tuesday, Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Sare’e claimed that Saudi Arabia conducted 19 airstrikes across rebel-held territory in Yemen that involved the latest round of civilian casualties. The Saudis have not directly responded.
Brig. Gen. Yahya Sare’e. (Houthi Telegram)
As we stated earlier in this story, hours after the U.K. announced it was sending a Voyager tanker to Saudi Arabia, Trump addressed the ongoing conflict with Iran during his speech to the U.N. General Assembly in New York.
The American leader called for international isolation of Iran and repeated his stance that he was at an inflection point on deciding what course to take moving forward. The situation has settled into an uneasy pause interrupted by sporadic Iranian attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. It has been weeks since the U.S. last struck Iranian targets.
“Will a deal be made with Iran that lets them rebuild and create a far greater country than it ever was before?” Trump asked rhetorically. “Or do I annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly, never giving them a chance to kill and destroy people and countries again?”
Trump added that he believes he will make a peace deal with Iran after the upcoming U.S. midterm elections, which could decide which party controls Congress. With gasoline and diesel price increases damaging the economy, the war and Trump’s handling of it have been very unpopular with voters.
In a CNN and SSRS poll, released Tuesday, 64% of those responding said the U.S. is not winning the war in Iran, while 36% disagreed. In addition, 78% of participants said Trump is not doing enough to end the conflict with Iran and 22% said he was.
Trump to the UN: "Do I annihilate the Islamic Republic, and do it quickly? Do I drive them into hell?" pic.twitter.com/cIYBO1Mp3w
“They want to talk to us,” he said. “They have been talking to us, even today they’ve been talking to us, and the relationship is developing. But we can’t let them – and they understand that – we can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.”
A U.S. negotiating team, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, met with Iranian officials on the sidelines of Tuesday’s U.N. meeting. That sideline session lasted about three hours and went well, according to Trump, who offered no details on the discussions.
Trump: US officials met with the Iranian delegation for three hours – "it was a good meeting"
For their part, the Iranians said they are willing to negotiate, but on their terms.
“A senior Iranian official said Iran could reopen the Strait of Hormuz to Gulf shipping within seven days if the U.S. fulfilled Tehran’s demands to ease military pressure and lift an American blockade on Iranian ports,” Reuters reported. “The official added that Tehran had conveyed its latest proposal to Washington via mediators last week.”
North Korea has released imagery of what appears to be a flight test of an updated version of its Hwasong-11Ma hypersonic missile, nearly a year after the weapon first appeared publicly at a military technology exhibition in Pyongyang.
Launch of a Hwasong-11Ma-1 missile from the test facility in Anbyon County, south of Wonsan. North Korean State Media
The September 20 test involved a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) booster fitted with a hypersonic glide vehicle, according to photographs released by North Korean state media. A display screen visible in the imagery identifies the weapon as the Hwasongpho-11Ma-1, or Hwasong-11E-1 in the equivalent English-language designation.
The test was conducted from the east coast near Anbyon County, south of Wonsan, an area North Korea has repeatedly used for missile testing. The launch site allows missiles to be fired eastward over the Sea of Japan, providing a relatively controlled area for testing short- and medium-range systems.
Another two views of the launch of the Hwasong-11Ma-1 missile. North Korean State Media
South Korean and Japanese authorities say they detected two launches on September 20, with the first occurring at approximately 3:00 p.m. local time and the second several hours later.
North Korean photographs show the missile being launched from a coastal location, with Kim Jong Un and senior missile officials observing the test. Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, also appears in the imagery.
Kim Jong Un and Kim Ju Ae monitor the progress of the Hwasong-11Ma-1 test. North Korean State Media
North Korea displayed a mock-up of what it called the Hwasong-11Ma at its Defense Development-2025 exhibition in October 2025. The design uses the basic architecture of the Hwasong-11 family, known in the West as the KN-23 family, but substitutes a distinctive glide wedge-shaped vehicle for the conventional warhead arrangement.
The Hwasong-11Ma, among other weapons, on display at the weapons exhibition in Pyongyang in October 202. North Korean State Media
North Korea claimed another hypersonic missile test that same month, but did not release launch imagery clearly connecting that test to the Hwasong-11Ma. The missile was subsequently shown again during a military parade in Pyongyang.
Hwasong-11Ma missiles on five-axle TELs at last October’s military parade in Pyongyang. North Korean State Media
The latest “-1” designation suggests an iterative evolution of the Hwasong-11Ma, although Pyongyang has not explained what modifications it represents.
Based on the imagery, the new configuration also includes a modified launcher, with the missile carried on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). When the Hwasong-11Ma was first shown, it was mounted on a five-axle TEL. The latest vehicle also appears to incorporate modified retractable covers around the missile.
It remains unclear whether the new TEL represents a standardized operational vehicle or a test configuration.
Preliminary illustration of the new launch vehicle for North Korea's hypersonic missiles. pic.twitter.com/dZ31LA1cbn
As with previous North Korean weapons announcements, the country’s state media claims need to be treated very cautiously. Pyongyang has a long record of publicizing weapons systems and test results that cannot be independently verified, while some of its purported hypersonic tests have left outside analysts unable to determine whether the advertised maneuvering performance was actually demonstrated.
Perhaps the most revealing test-related imagery comes from a display screen photographed at the launch site.
Kim Jong Un and his daughter can be seen watching the screen, which shows the apparent flight trajectory of the Hwasong-11Ma-1. The displayed path initially follows a ballistic trajectory before descending and then performing a pull-up maneuver, regaining altitude before continuing toward the target area.
That type of trajectory is consistent with the basic concept behind a hypersonic glide vehicle. The booster provides the initial velocity and altitude, after which the unpowered glide body follows a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, while maneuvering rather than following a simple ballistic path.
The graphic is useful for understanding what Pyongyang says the weapon is designed to do, but it does not independently demonstrate that the missile actually followed the depicted trajectory.
The flight data visible on the display provides some unusually specific figures.
Enhancing the original image released by North Korea allows for an excellent view of the HS-11Ma hypersonic glide missile trajectory, providing altitude and speed data. Note: Slight inaccuracies in the numbers may occur due to the use of AI tools. pic.twitter.com/M4LkfF5VYu
According to the North Korean imagery, the missile traveled 908.2 kilometers (564.3 miles), reached an altitude of 35.8 kilometers (22.2 miles), and remained in flight for approximately 445 seconds, or 7.4 minutes.
The display gives a velocity of 2,146 meters per second, equivalent to roughly 4,800 mph. That is hypersonic velocity in the aerodynamic sense, but speed alone is not what makes a hypersonic glide weapon particularly challenging to defend against. More consequential parameters include sustained controlled flight, maneuverability, guidance, and accuracy.
Other portions of the display appear to show additional points along the flight, including different times, altitudes, and speeds. None of these figures have been independently verified.
The TEL raises one of its two Hwasong-11Ma-1 missiles into the launch position. North Korean State Media
The claimed range is particularly noteworthy because it does not match the publicly reported tracking data from South Korea and Japan.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea launched two SRBMs from the Wonsan area on September 20. The missiles were assessed to have traveled approximately 450 and 600 kilometers, respectively.
Japan similarly reported two launches, assessing the first at approximately 440 kilometers and the second at approximately 590 kilometers, with maximum altitudes of roughly 60 and 70 kilometers.
Those figures are substantially different from the 908.2-kilometer distance shown on North Korea’s display.
The Hwasong-11Ma-1 climbs after launch. North Korean State Media
The discrepancy does not necessarily establish that either side’s data are incorrect. The North Korean figure could represent a different measurement of the flight path, or could correspond to a portion of the test that was not reflected in the public South Korean and Japanese assessments. It is also possible, if not highly probable, that Pyongyang selectively presented or altered the data.
South Korean analysts have already raised questions about the unusually long distance displayed by North Korea. Yonhap reported that experts suggested Pyongyang may have altered the figure to portray the test as more successful.
Regardless of the range actually achieved in this test, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 is significant because it represents an attempt to combine a relatively compact SRBM with a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.
The underlying Hwasong-11 family is a well-established North Korean missile design. In its KN-23 configuration, members of the family have also been used by Russia against Ukraine. By placing a glide vehicle on this type of booster, Pyongyang could potentially give a regional strike weapon a flight profile substantially different from that of a conventional ballistic missile. The Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 also uses a solid-fuel booster, allowing for faster launches than earlier liquid-fuel designs.
The original North Korean Hwasong-11 short-range ballistic missile. North Korean State Media
In principle, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 could give North Korea an additional hypersonic strike option against more heavily defended targets in South Korea. Having road-mobile TELs would also provide greater operational flexibility despite their relatively limited range, while making it more difficult for adversaries to locate and track the launchers.
A genuine boost-glide weapon creates significant challenges for defending forces since the sheer speed of the weapon bypasses most air defenses. Its trajectory can also become less predictable after the boost phase. Maneuvering at lower altitudes could also reduce the time available to detect, track, and engage the weapon.
A close-up look at the Hwasong-11Ma’s boost-glide-vehicle. North Korean State Media
However, the available imagery does not establish the extent of the vehicle’s maneuverability, its ability to maintain controlled flight, its accuracy, or the reliability of the complete missile system.
North Korea has made similar claims about its hypersonic weapons in the past.
The challenge is not simply reaching hypersonic speed. A weapon has to sustain controlled flight and maneuverability under extreme thermal loads, while also overcoming demanding materials-science, guidance, and navigation requirements. The terminal phase is harder still. Accurately finding and striking a moving target, particularly a ship, requires a highly capable seeker and guidance system. Integrating a nuclear warhead introduces another layer of engineering and weapons-design challenges.
Those demands have made hypersonic weapons a major technological challenge for the United States and other major powers. China is currently widely regarded as the leading country in deploying and developing operational hypersonic systems, although important questions remain about the capabilities and maturity of individual weapons.
Pyongyang said it first flight-tested a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle in 2021 aboard the liquid-fuel Hwasong-8, before pairing a similar-looking vehicle with the solid-fueled Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2024.
VIDEO: Korean Central Television (KCTV) broadcasted footage of North Korea successfully testing the new "Hwasong-16B" hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Tuesday. pic.twitter.com/VNdhLAeyyK
In its coverage of the latest test, North Korean state media initially avoided identifying the weapon, describing the event as a successful trial of a “new-type weapon” that it said was significant for the rapid development of weapons technology.
Kim said the development would give adversaries an “incurable headache” and deliver what he described as a “cruel and unavoidable blow.”
Tal Inbar, the head of the Space and UAV Research Center at Israel’s Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies identifies the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 as a “very significant weapon, bringing hypersonics to the operational/tactical arena and [posing] a challenge to … air and missile defense systems.”
Whatever the exact achievements of the test, the imagery points to continued development of a weapon North Korea first publicly displayed nearly a year ago. The appearance of a new, six-axle TEL, a potentially modified missile, combined with the apparent flight test, suggests that the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 program has progressed since its initial public unveiling.
What remains uncertain is how much of that progress represents a genuine improvement in operational capability.
The latest test therefore provides another indication of the resources and attention Pyongyang is devoting to hypersonic weapons, but the available evidence is still insufficient to determine how closely the Hwasong-11Ma-1’s actual performance matches the capabilities depicted by North Korean state media.
A British Excalibur uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) has fired a U.S. Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo in what is said to be a first-of-its-kind test for both countries. Though just a proof-of-concept so far, this is a significant new step for the United States and the United Kingdom toward future operational fleets of armed UUVs.
U.S. NAVY UPDATE: U.S. Navy and Royal Navy Successfully Test Fire Torpedo from Unmanned Undersea Vehicle
WASHINGTON – On September 13, 2026, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy successfully conducted the proof-of-concept launch of an exercise U.S. Mk 48 Heavyweight Torpedo… pic.twitter.com/lVB4wYSwC0
— Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (@USNavyCNO) September 22, 2026
The test was also carried out under the umbrella of Pillar 2 of the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense cooperation agreement, which was first announced in 2021. AUKUS’ Pillar 2 covers a wide range of advanced technology cooperation, with particular focus on uncrewed platforms and autonomy. Pillar 1 of the agreement centers on support for Australia’s establishment of a nuclear submarine force.
For the September 13 test, the Mk 48 torpedo was slung under the Excalibur UUV. The nearly 40-foot (12-meter) long, 19-metric-ton submersible drone has a large internal payload bay, but it is reportedly not large enough to accommodate the Mk 48, which is the standard heavyweight torpedo in U.S. Navy service today. The 19-foot-long, 21-inch-diameter weapon has been successively upgraded over the years to expand its capabilities and improve its resistance to enemy countermeasures.
Screen captures from a video the US Navy released today showing the release of the Mk 48 torpedo from the Excalibur UUV during the test earlier this month. USN capturesA stock picture of a Mk 48-series torpedo. DODA US Navy infographic detailing just some of the upgrades to the Mk 48 series over the decades. The Navy has now moved on to the further improved Mk 48 Mod 8 variant. USN
The Royal Navy officially unveiled Excalibur, which was developed by U.K.-based MSubs under Project Cetus, last year. The external torpedo launch capability was the result of two additional efforts, called Project Broadsword and Trial Iron, according to the U.S. Navy release.
A picture of an Excalibur UUV at the time of its unveiling in 2025, giving a good general sense of its size. Royal Navy
The September 13 test “successfully validated the mechanical, electrical, and software integration of a U.S. kinetic payload onto an allied autonomous vessel, proving that allied forces can rapidly achieve weapon interchangeability,” the Navy’s release adds. “Approved in February 2026 by the Department of the Navy Rapid Capabilities Office (DONRCO), the project was executed in less than seven months.”
How the Excalibur UUV was controlled during the test and whether the torpedo was launched at a test target of some kind are unknown. TWZ has reached out for more information.
A look at the Excalibur UUV submerged, from the video the US Navy released today. USN capture
“BROADSWORD is a great example of how AUKUS Pillar II drives interoperability in across the alliance. Demonstrating the launch of a US torpedo from a UK extra-large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV) is an important early step in developing lethality in our undersea autonomous systems,” U.S. Navy Vice Adm. Robert Gaucher, Director of Submarine Programs, did say in a statement. “We look forward to continuing to leverage the AUKUS partnership to keep pushing the potential warfighting advantages of unmanned undersea systems.”
“This successful test marks a historic first for allied undersea warfare,” U.S. Navy Adm. Daryl Caudle, Chief of Naval Operations, also said in a statement. “Proving that we can seamlessly launch a U.S. heavyweight torpedo from a Royal Navy autonomous underwater vehicle validates our shared vision for true interchangeability.
“This is a really important moment in our journey towards building a hybrid navy, which is where the Royal Navy will sail with crewed ships and submarines alongside uncrewed and autonomous vessels,” Luke Pollard, U.K. Minister of State for Defence Readiness and Industry, separately said in an interview with LBC radio. “It is a substantial increase in our lethality, to show that torpedoes can be fired not just by the Astute class hunter-killer submarines that we have in the Royal Navy, but also now by our uncrewed systems.”
A Royal Navy Astute class nuclear-powered attack submarine. UK Ministry of Defense
The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy employ various tiers of UUVs operationally today, but primarily for mine-sweeping and reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Future fleets of submersible drones capable of carrying out attacks on other vessels will create entirely new operational possibilities. Operated closely together with crewed surface warships and submarines, torpedo-toting UUVs could be sent ahead into riskier environments and offer an immediate option for engaging any threats they might find. Even a bigger UUV like Excalibur would also be more challenging for opponents to spot and track than a traditional attack submarine.
Excalibur is also in a category of larger and more capable submersible drones that offer significant endurance and higher degrees of autonomy. Adding in the ability to launch torpedoes, in turn, then opens the door to new concepts for employing these UUVs in groups more independently of crewed companions. In the future, for instance, armed Excaliburs or similar UUVs might be deployed to a particular maritime choke point to not just monitor for enemy movements, but actively hold them at risk.
In addition, in general, UUVs offer a way to expand total undersea warfare capacity in a more cost-effective manner compared to acquiring and fielding more traditional submarines. The ability to have more presence below the waves at a lower price point also translates to more persistence across large areas, something that could be especially valuable across the broad expanses of the Pacific, as well as other bodies of water globally. This presents additional targeting challenges and uncertainty for opponents.
“In securing the North Atlantic, especially against those nations that wish to do us harm, like Russia, the ability for us to now say it’s not just where our submarines are that you need to worry about – it is about how we create greater deterrence and question marks in the eyes of our adversary, with uncrewed systems there as well,” U.K. Minister Pollard said in speaking with LBC.
Pollard’s remarks here speak to particular considerations the British government is faced with just in its backyard. This includes the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, which is the main path through which Russian Navy submarines transit to and from bases in the northwestern end of that country and the Atlantic proper. There is also the English Channel and the nearby Baltic Sea. The Royal Navy has limited capacity with its crewed submarines to monitor this and other critical regional chokepoints. UUVs could then help take pressure off its fleet of just five (of a planned seven) Astute class submarines, helping free those boats up for the myriad other missions they are tasked with, including carrier escort and special operations support.
“By converting commercial and allied uncrewed undersea hulls into high-end strike assets, the partnership drastically alters the cost-exchange ratio in contested maritime environments,” the U.S. Navy’s press release today notes, as well.
There are still many questions still to be answered about future larger UUV operations, including just how they will be deployed and recovered. Video the U.S. Navy released today shows that the torpedo-armed Excalibur was launched into the water in Scotland using a commercial truck-mounted crane. U.S. shipbuilders Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) and General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO), among others, have been working on new options for launching and retrieving larger drone submersibles from surface warships. External carriage on the hulls of ships and/or submarines might also be an option in the future.
A picture from a test in 2022 of a prototype portable cradle for launching large UUVs developed by HII. The UUV seen here is that company’s Proteus design. HII
Additional torpedo and other munition options for UUVs beyond the full-size Mk 48 could also be on the horizon. The U.S. Navy has invested heavily in compact and lightweight torpedo designs that could be well suited for employment from underwater drones like Excalibur.
The U.S. Navy says it is working with its international partners on another similar UUV capability demonstration, but this time involving an Anduril Dive-XL, under what is dubbed Project Cutlass. This effort “will tackle advanced payload integration data, command and control architectures, and tactical employment scenarios to further mature uncrewed undersea capabilities,” according to the U.S. Navy’s release.
The Royal Australian Navy is already in the process of acquiring and fielding a militarized version of the Dive-XL, called Ghost Shark. It’s also worth noting that the Dive-XL evolved from the earlier Dive-LD design. The Dive-LD is in at least limited operational U.S. Navy service now, a fact that was revealed by Iran’s capture of one of these submersible drones earlier this month, as you can read more about here.
Excalibur’s ability to launch a standard Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo is already an important show of progress now toward a shared goal of a future underwater ecosystem that includes submersible drones that are able to attack other vessels.
The pilot of a U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon assigned to the 52nd Fighter Wing safely ejected before the aircraft crashed at Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany, according to the wing.
The pilot is still receiving medical treatment, the wing said in a statement. Emergency response teams are still on the scene. The cause of the incident, which took place about 2:30 p.m. local time, is still under investigation and additional details will be released when available.
The crash happened as the jet was on approach to land at the installation, located in the western German region of Rhineland-Palatinate, according to the New York Post.
“Following a plane crash in the vicinity of U.S. Air Base Spangdahlem, fire and emergency response teams from the Eifel District of Bitburg-Pruem were dispatched to the scene,” The Associated Press reported, citing the district.
Images emerged on social media showing smoke rising in the distance.
An F-16 fighter jet has reportedly crashed at the U.S. Spangdahlem Air Base in western Germany on Tuesday afternoon.
Witnesses reported seeing a jet rapidly descend before a large column of black smoke appeared near the runway.
The F-16 crash at Spangdahlem was the second mishap in a week for USAF F-16s. On Sept. 17, an F-16 from the 149th Fighter Wing at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland in Texas crashed in northern Michigan. The pilot in that incident also ejected.
According to air traffic control (ATC) audio, the pilot’s wingman said at the time of the Michigan crash, “we have a possible mayday. My wingman may have taken a bird.” TWZ cannot independently confirm what caused the crash. The audio continues and offers a fairly dramatic and raw look at how the incident occurred over the air waves.
F-16 crash ATC audio, BUCK 11 flt x2 F-16s were flying along the VFR low level route VR634 when the 11 advised MINNEAPOLIS CENTER that his wingman may have hit a bird and was going to eject just south of Traverse City, Michigan
The 52nd Fighter Wing provided some additional information.
“The aircraft was returning to Spangdahlem Air Base following a routine training flight involving four F-16s when the crash occurred,” the wing stated. “The remaining three aircraft diverted to Ramstein Air Base and landed safely. The pilot of the crashed aircraft ejected safely and received medical care.”
“Emergency response personnel responded to the scene, with local German fire departments and emergency medical services providing support,” the wing added. “German emergency response partners have offered their continued assistance as needed. The 52nd Fighter Wing appreciates the swift response and continued support of our German partners.”
Recent satellite imagery of a shipyard in northeastern China offers interesting new insights into the country’s next-generation submarine developments. The images notably show a pumpjet propulsor and other features worth examining on an example of what is generally described as a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine, or SSN.
TWZ has obtained a new image taken on September 18 of the submarine in question, which is being built at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, from Vantor. Janes reported on this submarine earlier today, based on a separate Vantor image from September 1. The outlet also described the boat as a Type 095, a commonly used, but still unofficial designation. This is something we will come back to later on.
As mentioned, the pumpjet propulsor immediately stands out in both images. This is also understood to be a feature on the Type 093B nuclear-powered attack submarine, a significantly improved variation on that earlier design, which first emerged in the early 2020s. Compared to traditional exposed propellers and more basic shrouded types, pumpjets offer benefits for quieter operation and efficiencies, especially at higher submerged speeds.
The recent imagery also highlights the submarine’s X-shaped stern plane arrangement. This is not found on the Type 093B, which is considered to be something of a bridge between that class and the next-generation design. Broadly speaking, an X-shaped configuration offers advantages when it comes to enhanced maneuverability, efficiency, and safety, which can be particularly useful in littoral environments. It can also provide benefits when it comes to acoustic signature reductions across significant parts of the submarine’s operating envelope compared to the cruciform stern planes.
Another Chinese submarine design that emerged in 2024, currently referred to as the Type 041 or Zhou class, and that is understood to feature a hybrid nuclear/conventional propulsion system, also has an X-shaped stern configuration. The first known example of the Type 041 came to light after it appeared to have sunk in a shipyard.
An X-shaped stern arrangement also looks to be a feature on yet another new class of submarine that appeared at the JN (Jiangnan) Shipyard in Shanghai earlier this year. Initial reports also suggested that the design lacked a traditional sail. However, it has been confirmed that it has a sail, but that is very small proportionally to the overall size of the boat. Truncated sails can offer performance and other advantages, but there are trade-offs.
The image of the submarine that Janes obtained also notably shows an open rectangular-shaped section aft of the sail. The September 18 image that we received from Vantor shows a structure placed over that section of that submarine, obscuring ongoing work on that part of the boat. The Type 095 is widely expected to feature some type of vertical launch system (VLS) array able to accommodate a variety of anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, as well as potentially hypersonic types. The Type 095 is also sometimes referred to as a guided missile submarine, or SSGN, as a result. The open area seen in the September 1 shot could be where the VLS array is set to be fitted. It might also provide access to the reactor compartment or another area of the submarine.
The clearest photos we have on the Type 095 SSN!
As we can see, there is one confirmed chamber than could physically fit about 18-24 VLS Cells. There is a big chance that more than one VLS Chamber exists, with an estimate VLS count from 24-48+ VLS pic.twitter.com/0ZJ8gsl4su
Interestingly, the September 18 image also shows what look to be at least two relatively large circular openings, side-by-side, at the bow end of the submarine in front of the sail, the purpose of which is not immediately clear. There is a possibility these could also be for vertically launching munitions or other payloads. As a point of comparison, U.S. Virginia class nuclear attack submarines, starting with the Block III version, have two large-diameter Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT), one in front of the other, in the bow in front of their sails. At the same time, the openings on the submarine in Huludao also appear to be in a position that is very close to where the submarine’s main sonar array would be installed, and they could be tied to that aspect of the design, too.
“I think it’s too early to be sure about the VLS configuration from publicly available imagery. I realize people assume the large rectangular space halfway behind the sail is the VLS, but I am not sure this is the case and I’d caution to jump to conclusions. The space could also be related to work on the reactor compartment,” Alex Luck, a naval analyst who closely tracks submarine and Chinese navy developments, told TWZ. “With Type 093B, the VLS after launch was initially covered with a tarp, and then the installed launchers were readily visible quite quickly during the fitting-out process. The work process may change with these newer boats, but the different appearance during launch and fitting out needs to be considered in that regard.”
“I do expect Type 095 to have a VLS of some sort, but I am not sure as of yet what the configuration would look like, or where exactly it is located,” he added.
The bigger outstanding question may be exactly what type of submarine is currently being built now at the Bohai Shipyard. Based on a review of additional imagery from Planet Labs’ archive, the boat appears to be around 394 feet (120 meters) long. When the first example of what was assessed to be a Type 095 emerged in Huludao in February, it was estimated to have a length of roughly 361 feet (110 meters). The ‘small sail’ design that broke cover earlier this year in Shanghai is also estimated to be some 394 feet/120 meters long based on available imagery, but also looks to be narrower than the boat presumed to be a Type 095 in February.
“One significant question is the nature and difference between the boat launched by Bohai in February, and the two newer hulls launched in late May/early June both by Bohai and at Jiangnan in Shanghai,” Luck, the naval analyst, also told TWZ. “Specifically, we do not quite know whether they are for different operational roles, or rather a two step development for one final configuration of a new SSN. I think the latter is at least plausible.”
“A related question then is what boat we are looking at now with the new imagery, i.e. the February boat or the newer hull Bohai had launched,” he continued. “Without exact and reliable measurements that question for now is unresolved in the public discourse. For now we need more, and more detailed imagery, including of the different boats together, to clarify these aspects.”
“This [September 1] image reinforces my impression that the boat launched in February may have been a one off not including the full spec featured on the notional 095A launched by Bohai and Jiangnan in late May. We’ve already seen both versions side by side in Bohai,” Luck also wrote on X after Janes‘ published its report.
This image reinforces my impression that the boat launched in February may have been a one off not including the full spec featured on the notional 095A launched by Bohai and Jiangnan in late May. We've already seen both versions side by side in Bohai. https://t.co/wBMkB1gmSQ
Regardless, the emergence in recent years of so many new, more modern submarines, and across what appear to be several distinct classes, is significant. It is no secret that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is working to significantly expand the size and capabilities of its submarine force with a clear eye toward extending operations further and further out in the Pacific, at least. In the past, U.S. officials have publicly said the overall quality of newer Chinese submarines has been getting closer in parity to American designs.
“The PLA Navy is executing a significant strategic shift from diesel-electric to all-nuclear construction, representing a fundamental departure from historical construction patterns,” U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mike Brookes, head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote in prepared remarks ahead of a hearing before members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March.
In particular, the Type 095, as well as the new Type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, “represent next-generation platforms expected to enter service during the late 2020s through 2030s,” Brookes also wrote at that time. “These submarines will incorporate substantial advancements in nuclear reactor design, sensor performance, weapons integration, and noise quieting technologies.”
Submarine modernization efforts are just one aspect of a larger effort by the PLAN to expand its capabilities above and below the waves. Chinese shipyards have also been producing ever-more capable aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, destroyers, frigates, and more in recent years, as well. The pace of China’s construction of new surface ships and submarines has also been growing, creating a particularly significant and still-widening disparity in this regard with the U.S. Navy. This is something that has become increasingly concerning, as TWZ routinely highlights.
Work in Huludao, as well as shipyards elsewhere in China, is certainly already revealing interesting new insights into China’s next-generation submarine efforts.
Remnants claimed to be photographed in Iran have been identified as belonging to a Raytheon ADM-160 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD). The wreckage was reportedly recovered after an Iranian interception that occurred earlier in the day, although the exact location and circumstances remain unconfirmed and there is reason for caution. Iranian state and military media have a long record of presenting unverified or exaggerated claims, especially during periods of conflict, and imagery released through those channels warrants independent scrutiny. Still, the MALD identification appears credible based on the visible wreckage, but its provenance, location, and the circumstances of its loss have not yet been independently established. MALDs were likely used at least in the opening stages of Operation Epic Fury, as well.
With that being said, the showing off of the MALD wreckage, regardless of its original use case, is something of a reminder that U.S. and Israeli forces are continuing to evaluate Iran’s electronic order of battle, which can include probing activities that leverage deception and decoys to better understand the state of Iran’s air defenses and command and control architecture. This is critical information that needs to be constantly updated for contingency and future potential air campaign purposes.
Wreckage of the MALD. Iranian media
Iranian sources today reported the destruction of an Orbiter-type reconnaissance drone over the Strait of Hormuz, before the separate imagery emerged showing what appears to be the wreckage of a MALD. It is not yet clear whether the two reports refer to the same incident or separate losses.
A close-up of the wreckage of the MALD. Iranian media
The appearance of the wreckage could also shed a light on how the U.S. and Israel can conduct ongoing air operations against Iran, even if kinetic actions have largely slowed to a trickle.
15090 is the CAGE code for Raytheon, which is visible on the tail fins and other remnants.
MALD is an expendable store, launched from another aircraft. The ADM-160 family was developed to provide a flexible way of decoying and distracting an enemy’s air defenses, while also adding to the survivability of allied aircraft and standoff weapons. Raytheon won the U.S. Air Force development contract for the current-generation ADM-160B in 2003. The B design is significantly different from the initial A-model from Teledyne Ryan (later Northrop Grumman), the development of which had started in the late 1990s. The B also features a more powerful turbojet engine and possesses greater range.
MALDs being prepared for loading onto an aircraft. U.S. Air Force
The ADM-160B is approximately 6.5 feet long, has a wingspan of roughly 5.6 feet when deployed, and is powered by a small turbojet. It has an operational range of around 550 miles.
Rather than carrying a conventional warhead, the MALD carries equipment intended to reproduce the radar signature of specific aircraft or standoff weapons. It can therefore provide additional and often highly enticing tracks for an adversary’s radar operators and surface-to-air missile crews to respond to. It can be programmed to fly intricate routes to better rival the target it is emulating and to provoke the attention of air defenders.
The related ADM-160C MALD-J adds an electronic warfare capability, allowing it to perform stand-in jamming and other forms of active electronic attacks against enemy air defense nodes. Further improved variants of the MALD, which the U.S. Navy has also been acquiring, have since been developed as you can read more about here.
The exact variant involved in today’s incident cannot be established from all publicly available imagery at this stage.
An ADM-160B under the wing of a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber. U.S. Air Force
The possibility that the United States had used MALDs against Iran had already attracted considerable attention following Operation Midnight Hammer, the U.S. strike against Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.
During the operation, U.S. officials described a complex deception plan involving aircraft and other decoy measures designed to prevent Iran from determining the true direction and composition of the attack.
This strongly pointed to MALD as one likely component of that deception architecture.
In the Strait of Hormuz context, the MALD could serve a dual purpose. It could act in its primary role, as a defensive measure for allied aircraft and standoff weapons, drawing Iranian air defense systems away from it and toward the decoy. It can also be used more independently, triggering Iranian defenses and revealing their locations and operating characteristics, as well as the state of Iran’s command and control for those assets. Surveillance platforms, especially those in the air, can then soak up all that signals data. This can then be used to generate intelligence for future operations, and all without putting a person or an expensive piece of equipment at risk.
The unique nature of the current state of the Iran conflict would allow for MALD to be used in this unique manner. While kinetic actions have become sporadic, they are still occurring, so firing a decoy that looks like something much more threatening to Iranian air defenders would not be an unprecedented escalation.
An ADM-160 MALD in flight. Raytheon
Iran has characterized the incident as a shoot-down. If Iranian forces did successfully engage the MALD, that would represent a real air defense interception of a U.S. deception system, although these are expendable by design. It is equally possible that the MALD malfunctioned or just flew its route and ran out of fuel and crashed, as designed.
The wreckage also does not, by itself, identify the aircraft that launched the MALD.
The system has been integrated with a broad range of U.S. aircraft. In the course of U.S. operations against Iran, we have notably seen Air Force A-10C Thunderbolt II attack jets returning from theater with markings depicting MALD missions.
An A-10 with mission marks showing a mix of weapons used against Iranian targets. They include MALDs, Small Diameter Bombs, GBU-12 Paveways, Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) laser-guided rockets, AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface missiles, and generic bombs that probably signify Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). Andrew McKelvey
It is also worth noting that the MALD wreckage has appeared at the same time as reports of unusual, UAP-like objects over Iran, with videos and eyewitness accounts circulating online. Their authenticity and nature remain unclear.
A number of videos are circulating showing an unidentified object in the skies above Tehran, Iran, it’s not immediately clear what is being filmed. pic.twitter.com/bHNAQGFPNv
Such reports come amid an increasingly sophisticated use of low-end drones, decoys, and other forms of deception. These kinds of systems can be employed not only to stimulate adversary air defenses, but also to distract populations and probe how information moves out of a denied area. In such an environment, unusual aerial sightings should be viewed with caution — but not necessarily dismissed as irrelevant. We have been talking about how new forms of misdirection and guile will leverage relatively low-end technologies in future conflicts for many years now. While it isn’t clear if this light show in the sky over Iran was such an activity, it is certainly a reminder to keep that possibility in mind.
I don’t know what this is, or if it’s legit BUT remember we are in a new age of misdirection, decoy and guile. Specifically using low end drone technology. There are more ways to stimulate an enemy air defense system, distract a populous, assess the flow of public info from a… https://t.co/wW7YVlbayB
Meanwhile, the prospect of renewed U.S. strikes is increasingly being raised on both sides. Iran’s central military command said Sunday that it had received information that Washington was preparing to resume attacks, while President Donald Trump toldFox News that he was in a “deciding mode” and was considering further military action alongside economic pressure and a deal.
Trump had also told Axioslast week that he was approaching a major decision on whether to resume large-scale military operations, with U.S. forces in the region being maintained at current levels through the end of the year.
Iranian officials have warned that a renewed U.S. attack would trigger retaliation against American forces and interests across the region. At the same time, Qatar and Pakistan are pursuing diplomatic efforts to restart negotiations.
This situation is exactly why keeping as detailed intelligence on the status of Iran’s air defense overlay would be so critical. Building a highly detailed electronic order of battle and maintaining it is critical to the effectiveness of future air operations. There is usually an observable burst of such activity prior to a major operation kicking off, as well. There are also many unseen assets that help with this, from those in space to those in the air and even those under the sea. There have been reports of Israel’s secretive RA-01 stealth flying wing drone being spotted over Iran and of course the U.S. has its own RQ-170 and RQ-180 aircraft, just to name a couple known penetrating assets that are likely highly capable of collecting this information.
Regardless, the U.S. and Israel will have a lot of ‘maintenance’ to do in order to roll back any air defense capabilities Iran has been able to reconstitute should hostilities break out in full again, and a lot of critical intelligence data will need to be up-to-date in order to support such an operation.
The dire messaging, growing louder by the day, is being delivered amid concerns about intensifying hybrid attacks that Russia is using to spread fear throughout the continent, fray the NATO alliance, and make it think twice about continuing support for Ukraine. Intel has increasingly pointed to the possibility that this could culminate in a much more severe operation, one that would be aimed to challenge NATO at its core.
Our long-range responses had a very significant impact in the Moscow region last night. One of Russia’s key oil industry facilities and the aggressor’s logistics facility were hit. These are billions of dollars that sustain the war machine. The systems used included FP-1, RZ-100,… pic.twitter.com/ka5mlDSgb7
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) September 20, 2026
“There has definitely been an uptick” in Russian so-called hybrid warfare actions of late, a senior NATO military official told TWZ on Monday morning. “Despite its accusatory statements towards NATO, which remains a purely defensive alliance, Russia remains the aggressor. We see that clearly in Ukraine, where Russia is losing more than just the war it started. It therefore may incorrectly perceive the only way out is through increasing its hybrid campaign. That’s a losing proposition, because we are ready to respond, which we have shown.”
The official’s comments come after the shoot down last week of a suspected Russian drone that entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus and in the wake of recent defensive actions by several European nations.
On Friday, French President Emmanuel Macron told reporters that his country had recently been targeted by Russian hybrid attacks. He ordered “the government to prepare a plan to protect our critical infrastructure” and the “most sensitive” defense industry and technology sites against drone and cyberattacks.”
Macron said the “intention behind it is to intimidate us and to derail the effort to support the Ukrainians. The consequence will be the opposite.”
France’s President Emmanuel Macron ordered the preparation of a “plan to protect our critical infrastructure” in the face of “Russian hybrid attacks.” (Photo by Thomas SAMSON / POOL / AFP) THOMAS SAMSON
In addition to Macron’s warnings, the French newspaper Le Monde reported that the French military was carrying out clandestine operations against Russia. However, the unnamed source cited offered no details and TWZ cannot independently verify that claim.
A day before Macron’s statements, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned in a speech to the Polish parliament that Russia is planning hybrid strikes with drones or rockets on European countries supporting Ukraine, including Poland.
The Polish leader offered an assessment about Moscow’s motives similar to Macron’s.
Russia will pretend the attacks are “accidental” in order to “paralyze or at least weaken the motivation of NATO countries” to rush to the defense of the member state coming under attack, The Associated Press noted.
“There is a real risk that drones or other types of projectiles will enter the territory of one or several countries on the eastern flank and even cause destruction,” Tusk cautioned. In July, a Russian AS-23 cruise missile crashed in Poland.
This video grab taken from footage of TVN Poland on July 30, 2026 shows the Polish army securing a large crater from a Russian missile that crashed in Poland. (Photo by various sources / AFP) –
In the face of these growing threats, officials in Lithuania are updating evacuation plans in case of a Russian attack.
“Poland is to be one of the evacuation destinations from the capital,” Žygimantas Solovjovas, head of the Civil Defense Department at Vilnius City Hall, told Polish Radio.
Evacuation should begin before a direct threat arises, Solovjovas stressed. “Vilnius residents should not assume that they will flee the city along an evacuation route while under fire,” Solovjovas explained, adding that in such a situation, one must seek shelter.
“One of the reasons for preparing this plan was to get residents accustomed to the idea that this should be a controlled process,” he noted. “If we allow chaos to ensue, the entire operation will be much more difficult.”
In Germany, where Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Russia could attack by 2029, hospitals are preparing for a future influx of war-related casualties.
“In a report that gamed out potential scenarios should Russia invade NATO territory, the Bundeswehr calculated that as many as 1,000 wounded soldiers could arrive in Germany each day,” Bloomberg News reported last week. “As the country’s five military hospitals would quickly reach capacity — and the law requires that civilian hospitals help during wartime — the system would likely come under unprecedented strain, and could be forced to triage soldier and civilian care.”
As we noted last week, the alliance writ large is taking action against the growing Russian threats as well.
NATO’s air commander, U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Jason T. Hinds, told reporters, including from TWZ, last week that he was tasked with implementing two NATO air and missile defense plans. Hinds is also the Air Force’s top officer in Europe, serving as the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe/U.S. Air Forces Africa (USAFE).
Adding to the concerns about Moscow’s actions, Russia’s client state Belarus just wrapped up mechanized and tank battalion training adjacent to the Suwalki Gap. That’s the border between Poland and Lithuania that separates the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad from Belarus. It has long been considered a potential flashpoint for a war in Europe and the training exercise exacerbated concerns that NATO allies are not prepared for a Russian attack there.
The Suwalki Gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus is also the only land border between Poland and the Baltic states. (Google Earth)
Russia is also making some potentially concerning preparations.
The Defense Ministry is reportedly seeking “an additional 16,000 to 20,000 hospital beds for wounded soldiers in the Northwestern Federal District,” according to the Russian Volya Telegram channel. That district is located near the Baltics.
“Military hospitals have been struggling to cope with the influx of wounded since 2023, so the Ministry of Defense is increasingly using civilian hospitals (including maternity hospitals and specialized medical facilities) for its needs,” Volya stated. “Some of these hospitals are being completely repurposed for military use, but more often, civilian hospitals allocate a few departments to treat the wounded, while continuing to provide care for civilian patients in other departments.”
The expansion “will primarily affect regions within the Northwestern Federal District: Karelia, St. Petersburg, Leningrad and Novgorod regions, as well as Smolensk,” which are near the Baltics “and the Moscow regions.”
Militarnyi: In the fall of 2026, the Russian Federation plans to add 16,000-20,000 military beds in civilian hospitals in the Northwestern Federal District, located near the Baltic states. pic.twitter.com/0sLMvoCxfC
In addition, the Border Service Directorate for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region announced that from September 16 to September 26, 2026, there would be a restriction on access to the border of the Slantsevsky and Kingiseppsky districts near the Estonian border.
“These measures aim to prevent violations regarding border regulations, migration laws, and the protection of aquatic biological resources,” the directorate claimed, according to Russian regional officials.
The new rules prohibit people from being on the shorelines or in small vessels along a portion of the Narva River and from hunting or carrying firearms in the border area. In addition, they forbid the “presence and movement of individuals and vehicles during hours of darkness outside of populated areas within the five-kilometer strip of territory along the state border in the Kingiseppsky and Slantsevsky districts.”
Obviously, the stated reasoning behind this was taken with great skepticism from neighboring Baltic NATO countries who are already on edge.
Russia's FSB imposes a nighttime curfew along the Estonian border near Narva, banning people and vehicles outside towns and villages within 5 km of the border in the Slantsy and Kingisepp districts from Sept 16–26 pic.twitter.com/8Ez8AvMXFy
Though Russia remains bogged down in its war on Ukraine and is suffering heavy losses of personnel and equipment, some European intelligence officials suggest Vladimir Putin could still carry out a small-scale invasion of NATO territory.
“It’s possible,” Michal Koudelka, the head of the Czech Republic’s BIS security service, told The Guardian about a potential Russian thrust into NATO. “It could involve a limited incursion, false-flag provocations, a massive influence campaign,” he told the publication, adding that this scenario could play out in a matter of “months, not years.”
While Russia has been carrying out a range of hybrid actions against Europe for years, including cyberattacks, drone incursions and sabotage, last month’s foiled attack on Germany’s Leipzig-Halle airport is seen in European intelligence circles as an inflection point.
As we previously reported, a drone discovered inside the secured area of Leipzig/Halle Airport during the night of August 4-5, was carrying approximately 1.3 pounds of explosives. It was found close to a Ukrainian-operated Antonov An-124 heavy cargo aircraft used to transport weapons to Ukraine. German authorities blamed Russia for that incident.
“To have an armed UAV drone sent into a busy airport in the middle of Europe … If you have attacks that could result in losses of life or losses of very critical infrastructure that have a huge implication for society, I think that is a gamechanger,” Thomas Nilsson, the head of Sweden’s military intelligence and security service, told The Guardian.
A Ukrainian Antonov AN-124 cargo plane is parked at Leipzig/Halle Airport after specialists from the Federal Police defused a drone equipped with an explosive device that German authorities blamed on Russia. (Photo by Hendrik Schmidt/picture alliance via Getty Images) picture alliance
It is unknown at this point whether Putin will decide to expand his hybrid actions against Europe to a more traditional conflict. However, as the attacks increase, officials across the continent are committing greater resources and planning to be prepared should that happen.
At the same time, the heat is only being turned up on Moscow as Ukraine accelerates its long range attacks. Now it has a whole new weapon, one that has been long in the works, to reach into Russian territory with while bypassing most air defenses.
Zelensky has officially unveiled the FP-7 Pelican ballistic missile and said it was used in the attack on Moscow. This is a monumental advance for Ukraine that has lacked modern ballistic missile capabilities since the war started. Still, Ukrainian media has raised doubts about whether the FP-7 — with an estimated operational range of 200-350 kilometers (124-217 miles) — can reach the Russian capital, which is about 450-500 kilometers (280-311 miles) from the Ukrainian border.
However, one expert suggested “that the ballistic weapon may have played an integral role within a coordinated, multi-axis combined strike,” according to the Kyiv Post.
Regardless, even if it can’t hit Moscow, it can hit plenty of other targets and it represents a major escalation in Ukraine’s weapons capabilities.
Ukrainian President Zelensky said that during an attack on Moscow, Ukraine used its Pelican FP-7 ballistic missile for the first time. pic.twitter.com/KqM9bqk9ur
There is no avoiding the reality that the security situation in Europe is deteriorating, where exactly that leads is unclear apparently to everyone at the moment.
UPDATE: 7:04 PM Eastern –
Airspace restrictions have been imposed over Vilnius Airport due to a suspected “hybrid attack” from Belarus after the detection of what is suspected to be balloons in Lithuanian airspace, airport officials announced.
“Aircraft arrivals are temporarily suspended; however, departures are permitted from 12:55 a.m. subject to all safety requirements,” the airport explained. “These restrictions were introduced due to a hybrid attack by Belarus against Lithuania, civil aviation, and the public, involving the detection of navigational markers—characteristic of balloons—in areas posing risks to aviation.”
Belarus launched balloons toward the Vilnius Airport area, in what Lithuanian authorities are describing as a hybrid attack. pic.twitter.com/U7Etg3xn5o
The newly released picture from General Atomics’ Aeronautical Systems, Inc. division (GA-ASI), seen at the top of this story, shows an FQ-42 in flight together with an F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and an F-15E Strike Eagle. The company has also disclosed the delivery of another Vengeance drone to the Air Force, this time to the service’s main drone operations hub at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada.
“The FQ-42 that arrived at Creech will continue regular test and evaluation operations with the Air Force aimed at experimentation with the new aircraft,” according to a press release GA-ASI put out today. “Previous efforts with Vengeance and other GA-ASI jets, including [the] XQ-67A Off-Board Sensing Station and MQ-20 Avenger – have found the trio of combat jets flying in various scenarios that push the boundaries of combat aviation. GA-ASI’s jets have flown semi-autonomously and autonomously with various AI pilots and under collaborative control of human fighter pilots operating F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II jets.”
From top to bottom, General Atomics MQ-20 Avenger, XQ-67 OBSS, and YFQ-42 drones. GA-ASI
As mentioned, the Air Force is steadily working to broaden the scale and scope of testing involving the FQ-42 and FQ-44 to include more and more operationally relevant scenarios. Both types are set to make their first appearance at a large-force employment (LFE) exercise in December, offering a valuable new opportunity for deeper and more realistic integration with crewed fighters.
The Air Force otherwise continues to lay the groundwork for future CCA operations, including through a major round of testing at Creech in July, which TWZ was first to report on. The service is heavily focused now just on figuring out how the drones will be deployed, launched, recovered, supported, and otherwise operated on a day-to-day basis. A dedicated test squadron called the Experimental Operations Unit (EOU), established at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, has been leading those efforts.
Work is also underway to demonstrate tactical capabilities, such as the FQ-44 launching an AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) for the first time earlier this year.
New test footage: first missile shot from YFQ-44A.
YFQ-44A executed an end-to-end, beyond-line-of-sight strike against a simulated target.
“We’re on path right now to do our air-to-air shot coming up here in the near future,” Mike Shortsleeve, Vice President for Strategy Business Development at GA-ASI, told TWZ‘s Jamie Hunter on the floor of the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference last week.
Last week, GA-ASI separately announced a new demonstration of semi-autonomous air-to-air combat capability involving crewed F-5AT Advanced Tiger jets belonging to private adversary air contractor Tactical Air Support, Inc. and an unspecified “CCA test aircraft.” The company did use a picture of an Avenger drone to illustrate the press release. The F-5s and the CCA surrogate were equipped with infrared search-and-track sensors (IRST) during the testing.
The stock picture of an Avenger drone that General Atomics used to illustrate its press release last week. General Atomics
“The live exercise proved that a CCA and a manned fighter can collaborate to fuse sensor data from AMS-GRA-compliant sensors to track, engage, and eliminate an airborne target while using a Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) data link to accomplish seamless coordination between the two aircraft,” according to the GA-ASI release.
“The demonstration utilized BLOS communication between the CCA and the airborne F-5, enabling the Advanced Tiger to send data about targets from an AMS-GRA-compatible system. These commands were relayed to the CCA’s TacACE [Tactical Autonomy Ecosystem software] system,” the release added. “This flight showed that many companies’ platforms can interoperate using the plug-and-play government reference architectures ecosystem. The U.S. Air Force isn’t locked into using a single vendor or system.”
IRSTs are especially valuable for helping spot stealthy targets with features designed to reduce their radar cross-sections since they detect and track infrared emissions. By extension, IRSTs are also immune to radio frequency electronic warfare jamming. As passive sensors, they do not emit their own signals that could alert a target to the fact they are being tracked, either. IRSTs can still be used to cue or otherwise be linked to other sensors, including active electronically-scanned array radars. Fusing data from multiple sources can provide higher fidelity tracks of multiple targets, as well as improved situational awareness overall.
An Avenger drone with a podded IRST sensor under its wing. General Atomics
Air-to-air combat is expected to be the primary mission set, at least initially, for Air Force CCAs. At the same time, an air-to-ground role for the FQ-42 and FQ-44, and/or other future CCA-type drones the Air Force might acquire, is emerging on the horizon. Anduril has already fit-checked a variety of air-to-ground ordnance on Fury.
As it stands now, the Air Force is looking to have its first operational CCAs in service toward the end of the decade. The service is also presently aiming to have a total fleet of at least 500 CCAs of all types by 2032.
“If we can’t be ready, then certainly you’re not going to have the forces that you need and the numbers that you need going forward. This signifies that mass is certainly important again, but also autonomy is just as important,” General Atomics’ Shortsleeve told us last week in talking about the Air Force’s CCA fleet size target. “So the ability to have these autonomous systems, whether they’re bringing in additional weapons, sensing capability, whatever it is, all of those working in a collaborative environment, whether it’s manned, unmanned teaming, or unmanned and unmanned capabilities, that right there is what’s going to help the warfighter in the future.”
“And when we say autonomy, it’s not just strictly this is going to go off and do its own thing. It’s going to be directed,” he added. “Whether it’s on the ground, in the air, [it] makes no difference to the system itself. It’s going to work hand-in-hand [with humans]. So that human-machine teaming, that’s what they’re really focusing on. There is figuring out how to best use this capability in the advancement of actually having to employ it in [the] real world.”
Though just flying in formation is very different from collaboration with a high degree of autonomy, the new picture of the FQ-42 together with the F-35A and the F-15E is a window into the future teamed operations the Air Force is hoping to build.
Welcome to Bunker Talk. This is a weekend open discussion post for the best commenting crew on the net, in which we can chat about all the stuff that went on this week that we didn’t cover. We can also talk about the stuff we did or whatever else grabs your interest. In other words, it’s an off-topic thread.
This week’s caption reads:
2nd Lt. Michelle Lee and Capt. William Yau conduct pre-operational checks inside of a Launch Control Center used for training purposes at Minot Air Force base, North Dakota, Mar. 7, 2022. The 91st Missile Wing contributes to the nation’s strategic defense by sustaining and operating various Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles and the associated launch facilities.
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