The United States and its energy industry are making a killing selling crude oil and its derivatives to the rest of the world. The world’s largest economy is filling part of the gap left by supply cuts from Gulf countries due to the war in Iran, and from Russia due to Ukrainian attacks on its refineries. But everything has its limits, and the breaking point was reached on Tuesday, September 22, when diesel surpassed $6.50 a gallon at U.S. pumps.
Several key German industry groups and energy analysts are warning that Germany could face severe gas supply issues, and potentially entirely deplete its storage, if an exceptionally cold winter occurs. Of course, predictions of this sort have been made off and on in recent years. Germany has never actually run out of gas before. The question is now how alarmist these warnings are and how realistic an actual gas and energy shortage is this time around.
Currently, the government argues there will be no gas shortage. However, storage operators, energy executives and some economists argue that a mild winter should be manageable and a brutally cold one could get tight enough to force industry to cut production and send prices soaring.
One of the most dire warnings comes from Markus Krebber, chief executive of RWE, Germany’s largest power producer.
“If we get a mild winter, everything will be fine,” he told Focus in an interview. “If the winter is hard, there can be significantly higher prices. And it can get tight.”
Krebber said Germany is entering the season “with the lowest gas storage levels of the past 20 years” – lower even than in 2022, when Russian pipeline flows collapsed. “That works if we have a normal winter. If we get a particularly cold winter, it can get scarce.”
He has also warned that if Germany does not add more power supply, “there will be distribution battles for electricity” among industry, data centers and the electrification of heat and transport.
The data supports Krebber’s concerns. The German gas storage association (INES) warns that Germany entered September at its lowest storage levels in 15 years, at around 53 to 56 percent. INES models show that if refills remain sluggish and if Germany experiences an extremely cold winter, similar to the weather of 2010, storage reserves could be exhausted as early as January or February, potentially leaving daily supply shortfalls of up to 25 percent.
German underground gas caverns are roughly 20 percentage points below last year’s level and far under the seasonal norm. While Berlin’s own rules call for most gas storage sites to reach 80 percent by Nov. 1, almost no one now expects that to happen.
“By now all the experts agree: these 80 percent are already technically almost impossible to achieve and also not realistic,” Klaus Müller, president of the Federal Network Agency, said in a Phoenix television interview. He added that storage is not the whole story. “We have created our own capacities with four liquefied natural gas terminals. We can obtain gas from Norway, Belgium, Holland, France.”
Energy market consultants and industry group analyses point out that weak summer gas refills – driven by unfavorable price spreads between summer and winter gas and price volatility from global conflicts – have left Germany reliant on steady ongoing imports. They point out that cold weather is not the only factor, as disruptions could be exacerbated by pipeline outages, reduced LNG flows, escalating conflict in Ukraine or the Middle East, and various other scenarios. All of this comes at a time when Germany’s buffer is much thinner than in previous years.
Not everyone is panicking, though. The Federal Network Agency, Germany’s energy regulator, has also acknowledged the low storage levels but stated they do not currently indicate an imminent crisis or inevitable shortage.
Claudia Kemfert, an energy economist at the German Institute for Economic Research, says that a distinction must be made between shortages and higher prices. She has said an acute shortage is not her base case, but that low stocks leave the system more exposed if cold weather, high LNG prices and supply interruptions hit at once. Relying on last-minute cargoes, she has argued, is “risky and expensive.”
Historical weather data supports less extreme gas shortage scenarios. On average, the past ten winters have been extremely mild in Germany, with the exception of last year’s winter, which was exceptionally cold. If there is a repeat this year or the winter is even colder, it could indeed tip Germany into an energy crisis, but the odds appear to be against such a scenario.
In the meantime, industrial companies in Germany are already taking precautionary measures, as a severe cold snap would likely force curtailments on industrial consumers first to stretch remaining gas through February and March to protect vital natural gas deliveries to households.
Another piece of good news it that the European Union as a whole is near 70 percent in terms of gas storage, far better than Germany. This means that the crisis is unlikely to grip all of Europe. Still, Germany is Europe’s largest economy and a key hub of industry. Any gas or energy crisis in the country would have broad repercussions across Europe.
“Electricity self-consumption” and “energy democracy” are the new fancy terms the Greek government has introduced to convince citizens of its new policy framework and promotion of increased personal responsibility regarding lower energy cost in exchange of personal investments. A new framework for “electricity self-consumption” came into force on Monday, following a ministerial decision by Environment […]
With the national price of diesel hitting $6.05 as California hits $8.00 per gallon, one wonders what will happen to the trucking industry that delivers the goods across America. Labor is the largest expense for trucking, so many trucking companies are planning to switch to autonomous trucks. In the meantime, a slew of independent trucking companies are biting the dust. This is a fundamental change in our economic system. ⁃ Patrick Wood Editor.
Swedish freight company Einride’s announcement last month that it plans to deploy 500 Tesla Semis on US roads, the largest publicly announced commitment to electric Class 8 trucks, suggests a shift toward fleet electrification. It also brings the next phase of trucking technology into focus: the gradual commercialization of autonomous freight.
Tesla CEO Elon Musk has targeted late 2026 or early 2027 for self-driving capabilities to begin working on the Semi. That remains a Musk target, not a confirmed commercial rollout. Any version requiring a human operator would be supervised automation, like FSD on Tesla sedans, SUVs, and the Cybertruck.
NEWS: Google announced a major electric trucking project in Texas featuring Tesla Semi.
Google, Nevoya and Center for Green Market Activation will deploy:
• 25 electric semi trucks.
• Dedicated charging infrastructure
• An all-electric freight route between Houston & Dallas. pic.twitter.com/ZxSbFIJk5C
Needham analysts Chris Pierce and Mackenzie Holleran see a broader industry inflection point approaching in 2027, as factory-integrated autonomous trucks begin reaching fleets in greater numbers. Their note to clients says automation in trucking will lower operating costs, while longer operating hours could accelerate deliveries and shift market share toward larger carriers.
The analysts said that driverless trucking is already moving beyond technical demonstrations as developers expand routes, remove onboard safety observers and secure carrier commitments. The next test is whether carriers enter a mass-adoption supercycle to automate their fleets and drive down labor costs.
“We believe the debate has shifted from ‘can autonomous trucking work?’ to ‘how quickly can it scale?'” the analysts said.
They continued, “We see compelling benefits for early adopters and eventual trucking industry consolidation, underwritten by the increasing rate of adoption as industry participants see autonomy as a driver of share gain tilting the capacity playing field to lower cost providers capable of driving longer routes in shorter timeframes better satisfying customer demand.”
The analysts identified Aurora as the industry leader, citing expanded routes and operating conditions, customer contracts and the removal of safety observers from certain trucks in July. Kodiak targets observer removal by year-end, with Plus AI targeting driverless operations in 2027.
They noted that long-haul freight “represents the earliest commercial opportunity for autonomous trucking.”
Diesel prices are breaking records across Europe, and Poland is no exception, with prices for the essential fuel currently hitting record highs. Now, the conservative Polish opposition is pointing out that the situation may only get much worse.
“We will soon see increases in product prices as well,” warns Mariusz Błaszczak, the vice president of Law and Justice (PiS) and head of the PiS parliamentary club, in a new X post.
“Diesel the most expensive ever! This may be just the beginning,” he wrote. “All it took was for the government to scrap the fuel price reduction mechanism, and within a week prices shot up. The effect? Drivers, farmers, and carriers are paying for the government’s decisions today. And soon we’ll see hikes in product prices too.”
DIESEL NAJDROŻSZY W HISTORII!
8,75 zł za litr oleju napędowego – a na niektórych stacjach drożej. Pb95 dobija 8 zł. A to może być dopiero początek.
Wystarczyło, że rząd wygasił mechanizm obniżający ceny paliw, a w ciągu tygodnia ceny wystrzeliły w górę.
“PLN 8.75 per liter of diesel — and even more at some stations. 95-octane petrol is reaching PLN 8. And this may be just the beginning,” he added.
“The government should immediately reinstate the fuel-price reduction mechanism and keep it in place as long as the crisis in the Middle East continues. Poles cannot pay for the government’s inaction every time they fill up!” Błaszczak wrote.
According to the e-petrol.pl price report, on Wednesday, a liter of diesel cost an average of PLN 8.75 (€2.02) at Polish gas stations, PLN 0.36 more than a week earlier. A liter of 95-octane unleaded petrol rose by an average of PLN 0.26, to PLN 7.89, within a week. The average price of a liter of LPG, which cost PLN 2.95 on Wednesday, increased by PLN 0.06.
E-petrol analysts emphasize that the average diesel price recorded on Wednesday is the highest in the portal’s history. In their view, the unfavorable prices at stations are due both to the systematic rise in oil prices that has been underway since the end of August and to significant increases in wholesale fuel prices. They added that, in the case of LPG, higher bills are related to the more expensive supply of this fuel to stations.
On Sept. 1, the government ended the Fuel Price Reduction (CPN) package, which had been in place for the final weeks of the school holidays, from Aug. 17 to 31. Under the program, the VAT rate on certain fuels, in particular gas and diesel, was reduced from 23 percent to 8 percent. At the same time, maximum prices announced by the Minister of Energy were in force. Sales above the maximum price were punishable by a fine of up to PLN 1 million.
Neighboring Germany currently has higher diesel prices, at €2.32 a liter, also a record high. Only a few EU countries have a higher price, such as Denmark, which is currently at €2.60 a liter.
There are fears that rising diesel and natural gas prices across Europecould result in a major energy crisis over the coming months. European natural gas prices also rose to a three-year high of €80 per megawatt-hour (€/MWh) and many countries, such as Germany, are significantly behind on efforts to fill their reserves before the cold winter months arrive.
The EU energy label, as provided for by Regulation (EU) 2017/1369, aims at promoting the uptake of more efficient energy-related products. It aims to help consumers make informed choices by facilitating comparisons of product alternatives with different features. The label focuses on the energy efficiency of the product during the use phase, but can also include other environment-related aspects.
For decades, Washington has justified its military presence in the Middle East as necessary to protect global energy security. American naval forces would safeguard shipping, military partnerships would deter attacks on oil-producing states, and sanctions would restrain governments regarded as threats to the US-led regional order. The promise was simple: American power would keep energy […]
Brussels/Copenhage (enr) – Increasing the uptake of renewable energy is key to safeguarding Europe’s energy security as the EU seeks to heavily reduce CO2 emissions and become independent from imported fossil fuels, European Environment Agency (EEA) Executive Director Leena Ylä-Mononen said.
“Shifting to the sustainable future by improving our circular economy, uptake of renewables, improving energy efficiency – all this is central to Europe’s push to reduce our dependency and reliance on energy imports, fossil fuels, and imports of natural resources,” she said in an interview with the European Newsroom (enr) published Tuesday.
Following a summer leaving Europe scarred by heatwaves, drought and wildfires across the continent, the EEA chief renewed calls to speed up the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate “the increasing magnitude of climate-related disasters and related losses.” She argued that breaking away from fossil fuels and accelerating the transition to renewable energy is a crucial piece of the puzzle.
At the same time, she pointed to the typical increase of gas prices during “a period of cold weather.” Ylä-Mononen called for for “flexibilities” when it comes to energy storage, “so that we would have a bit of more buffer for the citizens when the hard times come.”
In a report published in July, the EEA warned that the EU “remains vulnerable to external fossil fuel supply shocks, as gas prices still drive EU wholesale electricity prices.” The report said gas price fluctuations in early 2026 cost the EU 13 billion Euro by mid-April while consumers saved 29 billion Euro thanks to renewable energy, making it “the system’s most effective shock absorber.”
Ylä-Mononen said that “many aspects and solutions are needed indeed to protect also the most vulnerable households.” She cited innovative solutions such as using electric vehicles’ batteries to power homes “as a specific reserve then to feed back in electricity when the prices are high.”
The EEA chief pointed out that ramping up local renewable energy sources was particularly difficult for cities. “Cities in particular have a challenge because their whole energy and also the mobility infrastructure is based very much still on the fossil economy.”
Cities had “limited possibilities to have individual windmills,” she said. However, she added, solar panels are “a feasible option, especially if the city or the national authorities are supporting that type of investment.”
The European Environment Agency (EEA) is the EU agency that provides independent environmental data, assessments and analysis to support policymaking in Europe.
Cover image: picture alliance / Hans Lucas | Imen Ben Youssef
The profile of social activism in North Africa is changing. Young people in the region shifted away from demanding regime change after the thwarted hopes of the 2011 Arab uprisings and the 2019 Hirak movement in Algeria. Now, they tend to seek practical improvements in their social and economic conditions rather than wholesale political reform.
Many of these new social movements focus on environmental concerns, and increasingly on the impact of global warming. North Africa is among the regions in the world most affected by climate change. But its countries are also some of the most promising sites for renewable energy generation, given their abundant sunshine and proximity to the European market. Activists have targeted some renewables projects, testifying to a feeling that authorities are failing to ensure energy transitions are fair and meaningful.
These trends in activism in North Africa match a recent turn in European engagement with the region, away from support for political reform and towards socioeconomic issues. This includes cooperation on clean energy projects. But Europeans should bear in mind that cooperation with North African governments on projects that ignore local interests will fall short of the objective of promoting greater opportunity and long-term stability in the region. This underlines the importance of including local businesses and civil society representatives in initiatives from the very start.
Changing social movements
The Arab uprisings and Hirak protests were driven in large part by social and economic concerns, and sought a political remedy by calling for a change of government. But hopes for better politics have since foundered across North Africa. The region’s protests and social movements now tend to focus on practical and often locally based demands for a more effective state and better services for communities. The 2025 Gen Z protests in Morocco, for example, began as a response to failings in maternity health care before swelling into wider calls for social justice. The shift to more issue-based activism reflects North Africans’ disappointment in past attempts at political reform as well as long-simmering social tensions. These include anger at poor governance and the strain rapid urbanisation puts on jobs and housing.
The shift to more issue-based activism reflects North Africans’ disappointment in past attempts at political reform as well as long-simmering social tensions
But climate change is also encroaching ever more on North Africans’ quality of life. Historically a water-scarce region, North Africa is now experiencing extreme temperatures, rising sea levels, drought and desertification. Once-fertile agricultural land is becoming barren, and flooding from extreme weather events exacerbates the problems for farmers and food supplies. Climate change is also contributing to power cuts and water shortages, as well as catastrophes from flash floods to wildfires. One opinion poll in 2024 showed that one in six people in North Africa had experienced harm from climate change in the previous two years (or knew somebody who had), and that 71% of North Africans saw it as a threat.
With governments often failing to implement policies to mitigate climate impacts, social movements have adopted an environmental focus. These movements sometimes blend protest with community self-help initiatives, and are often local rather than national. Their less explicitly political nature brings them a measure of tolerance by authorities, as does the fact that the movements often pursue environmental objectives that governments also embrace. But activists still face similar restrictions to all civil society movements in North Africa, at times drawing surveillance and repression.
Changing the environment
Such climate-related movements have sprung up across North Africa. In Morocco, a group of Tangier-based NGOs and unions halted a building development that would have involved deforestation, and they now publish an annual report on local environmental issues. Youth for Climate Tunisia trains young people to mobilise on climate issues and organises digital campaigns. The Egyptian group Greenish promotes climate education and capacity building for local communities. Algeria has several community-based groups that work on improving access to water and countering desertification.
Other groups focus on wider environmental concerns. Egypt’s VeryNile pioneered efforts to work with local fishers to collect and recycle plastic pollution from the Nile. In Tunisia, local protests against the impact of phosphate processing in Gabès snowballed after a series of toxic gas leaks in October 2025, becoming a mass movement that continues almost a year later.
But North African social movements also mobilise when green transitions disadvantage local communities and marginalised groups. As North African countries increasingly seek foreign investment in renewable energy projects, some communities worry that land and water resources will be diverted to benefit wealthy elites and foreign investors. In Tunisia, solar projects have aroused local opposition because they take land out of community use and reinforce regional inequalities. In Morocco, solar megaprojects such as the plant in Ouarzazate have prompted anger in nearby communities because of the amount of water they consume.
Changing European policy
One thing that unites these disparate movements is that activists seek concrete improvements in quality of life, as well as a bigger role in determining their countries’ futures. This aligns with an increasing sense in Europe that the best way for the EU and member states to promote rights and opportunity in North Africa is through a focus on socioeconomic development.
As the EU’s 2025 Pact for the Mediterranean showed, European policymakers aim to cooperate with North African partners on tangible initiatives that match local government priorities, including in green energy and water management. But the environment-focused social movements should remind European policymakers that working only with governments is not enough to ensure progress on economic and social rights, as I argued in an ECFR policy brief last year. The EU must frame its projects in a way that gives local populations as much agency as possible, by breaking down barriers for small businesses and including civil society in project design and planning.
The EU must also ensure that the projects it supports genuinely offer mutual benefit. In climate policy, the pact’s logic of “a partnership of equals” means European support for renewable energy projects including solar and wind power and the production of green hydrogen. Such projects would then supply clean energy for Europe and promote North African development as well as reduce local energy costs. In turn, greater opportunities and lower prices in the region could help promote the stability that European policymakers also seek.
But not all climate and environmental projects meet these goals—as the local criticisms show. To fulfil the promise of clean energy projects for both sides, Europeans must complement their investment in power generation with other measures to limit environmental trade-offs and to help benefits to flow to local communities. These should include infrastructure development and technology transfer to build up a local clean energy ecosystem. That is the best way for Europe to help ensure that the aspirations expressed in North African environmental movements are met.
In July 2026, the price of fuels and lubricants for personal transport in the EU increased by 16.9% compared with July 2025. This followed year-on-year increases of 20.7% in May and 13.7% in June.
In 25 of 27 EU countries, fuels and lubricants prices were higher in July 2026, compared with July 2025. In 13 countries, July annual increases were larger than those in June 2026. However, in most countries (24), the annual rate of change in July was lower than in May 2026, when 4 countries registered annual price increases exceeding 30%.
In July 2026, compared with July 2025, the highest increases were recorded in Romania (+24.2%), Germany and Lithuania (+22.9% each), Bulgaria (+22.2%), the Netherlands (+22.0%) and Finland (+20.5%). Prices dropped slightly in Hungary (-0.1%), while the lowest increases were recorded in Sweden (+1.2%) and Ireland (+3.2%).
Diesel prices up 4.3%, petrol up 4.7% compared with June 2026
On a monthly basis, in July 2026, EU consumers saw diesel prices increase by 4.3% and petrol by 4.7%, compared with the previous month. In June 2026, diesel had dropped by 6.4%, and petrol by 4.2% relative to May 2026.
Between June and July 2026, diesel prices increased in 17 EU countries. The highest increases were registered in Poland (+13.4%), Germany (+12.7%) and Greece (+12.1%). The prices dropped in 9 EU countries, with the largest decreases in Cyprus (-7.9%), Sweden (-7.4%) and Ireland (-6.4%).
When it comes to petrol prices, 14 countries recorded increases and 12 countries recorded decreases in prices between June and July 2026. The largest increases were in Poland (+17.2%), Germany (+11.0%) and Spain (+7.1%), while the largest decreases were recorded in Sweden (-11.1%), Cyprus (-5.4%) and Ireland (-4.1%).
This data comes from Eurostat data collection for the compilation of the harmonized index of consumer prices(HICP), which is used to measure inflation in the EU.
Fuel prices in Malta have been fixed since 2020, therefore there was no change.
More than a decade ago, a group of snipers shot up an electrical substation in Silicon Valley, striking power transformers and disabling the substation for nearly a month. The shooters were never identified; similar substation shootings, some by neo-Nazis, have taken place since. The longer Christopher Cox studies the American power grid—looking at aging infrastructure and ongoing transformer shortages, specialized manufacturing and rising demand, the massive energy consumption of data centers and whiplash usage of large language models—the more vulnerable it seems. “Somehow, we’ve made the industrial equivalent of a Fabergé egg the linchpin of our civilization,” Cox writes. “What would happen if someone started breaking them?”
The hope of restoring the grid would fade as fossil fuel supplies were exhausted, because so many utilities rely on them to “black-start” their generating units. A 2010 report called “High-Impact, Low-Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System,” prepared by the Energy Department and NERC, condensed the entire disaster movie that would follow into a single paragraph: “The supply of food, water and fuel would degrade within days. The facile communication of information to the general population would be greatly complicated by the loss of cellphones, internet access and television. The economy would virtually shut down as electronic transactions could no longer be processed. After several days, widespread social unrest and confusion would ensue.” Thirsty, starved, dirty and surrounded by the useless machines we once depended on, we would be lucky if our misery ended at “confusion.”
The Commission adopted a legislative proposal to simplify Regulation (EU) 2017/1369 on Energy Labelling and Regulation (EU) 2020/740 on Tyre Labelling on 24 June 2026 (COM (2026) 565 final). The objective of this proposal is to ensure simpler and more effective implementation of the rules without undermining the original policy objectives that give customers the right to have energy and tyre labels in display at the point of sale.
This adopted act and its accompanying impact assessment are now open for feedback for a period of 8 weeks until 15 October 2026. All feedback received will be summarised by the European Commission and presented to the European Parliament and Council with the aim of feeding into the legislative debate.
Greece’s Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced the establishment of an inter-ministerial group responsible for scientific research and the development of a legal framework for the potential deployment of nuclear energy. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is championing small modular reactors. The country could reportedly participate in an investment round for the French EDF’s Nuward. The […]
Cover image: picture alliance / Sipa USA | Davide Bonaldo
Problem
Industrial decarbonisation is not easy. While EU leadership in the field has brought some benefits—it was the first to offer innovative, low-carbon products to the global market, for example—there are also transition costs, especially in sectors such as steel and chemicals.
Now Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine and the US-Israel-Iran conflict are pushing up energy prices; there is fierce competition from China and others for products such as chemicals, fertilisers and steel. At the same time, companies also face growing emission trading costs. Other parts of the world are not moving fast enough to reduce cost differences for European front-runner companies; the 2025 IEA Breakthrough Agenda report shows that global low-carbon industrial transitions are happening too slowly to achieve the targets of the Paris Agreement.
At the EU level, climate diplomacy is not sufficiently prioritising partnerships for industrial decarbonisation and instead focuses on general mitigation and financing issues. While the launch of the EU Task Force for International Carbon Pricing and Markets Diplomacy in 2024 was an important step, it did not address how Europeans can help develop the infrastructure, access to finance, intellectual property rights and personnel skills necessary for industrial decarbonisation.
The EU thus requires a stronger and more coherent diplomatic approach to industrial transformation. Most of all, it needs to focus on improving its outreach and expanding its offers on finance, market demand and innovation cooperation.
Solution
An informal meeting of environment and climate ministers (ENVI) is taking place on July 23rd-July 24th. It has two relevant items on the agenda: decarbonisation and competitiveness, and climate diplomacy. But these items are interconnected, and ministers should take an integrated approach when addressing them.
The EU should learn from the more active industrial policies of China, Japan and South Korea, which have the institutional capacity to make strategic choices about which technology to support, and have designed a good mix of policy instruments to promote them. Europeans should also look at how European coal regions, for example in Poland, have transitioned to create new green jobs. Such areas provide a blueprint for other countries trying to build public acceptance for closing mines and winding down fossil-dependent manufacturing.
The EU needs to devote more resources to international cooperation with partner countries on industrial transformation, for example by lowering the climate impact of steel and cement production. Such partnerships should be long term and include innovation cooperation for emerging clean technologies. Ministers should include industrial transformation diplomacy in the strategic roadmap document that underpins their discussions, and push for adequate funding in the next “Global Europe” instrument for development policy.
The EU must address the lack of coherence between EU and member state initiatives and promote a “Team Europe” approach. To meet the China challenge, even big member states such as Germany cannot build strong enough partnerships alone. But this requires a more cooperative culture; staffing for climate diplomacy in Brussels and at EU delegations should be increased to facilitate this.
Finally, ministers should engage more positively in the industrial decarbonisation agenda under the Paris Agreement. This could follow Brazil’s 2025 initiative to launch a process for accelerating low-carbon transformations of industry, and Turkey’s ambition to continue this work at COP31 in November 2026.
Context
The EU has set ambitious climate targets for 2030 and 2040, with the bloc aiming to become climate neutral by 2050. However, policy instruments are being hotly debated. For example, on July 17th the European Commission proposed weakening EU emission trading to accommodate industry while simultaneously strengthening its support mechanism for green transitions.
In parallel, EU environment ministers and their climate negotiators have started a process to improve climate diplomacy after what many saw as disappointing, weak language on reducing overall emissions at the 2025 COP30 in Belém. The process has so far focused on improving preparations for formal climate negotiations, such as the upcoming COP31 in Turkey—and less on broader partnerships around, for example, industrial decarbonisation.
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