Residents are shaken and demanding answers after ICE agents terrorized a quiet, suburban neighborhood in Frederick, Maryland, earlier this month. On September 4, federal agents swarmed the Tasker’s Chance neighborhood in West Frederick, invaded the home of one family, and eventually left without making any arrests. ICE agents were filmed beating peaceful protestors and menacingly driving their unmarked cars onto sidewalks and private property while local police officers stood by and watched. In this on-the-ground report, TRNN takes you to the very spot in Frederick where these terrifying events transpired, and we speak with an eyewitness who saw everything.

Credits:
Videography: Maximillian Alvarez
Post-Production: Cameron Granadino

Transcript

The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. It will be updated.

Reporter 1:

Breaking story in Frederick. We have been told that ICE agents have been camped out in the Taskers Chance neighborhood. Neighbors

Reporter 2:

Say ICE has made a move on one home under the cover of night. That’s exactly what you are seeing right now.

Soolah:

There were protestors next to me. There are protestors across the street. And then I turned to this car and it was right here. And then I heard out of the side, the siren go off and I turned and here’s this car coming at me from on the sidewalk. By

Reporter 1:

Friday night, protestors were chanting on the sidewalk, also trying to block the street and a home they believed ICE was targeting. That’s when Santos says ICE became aggressive. This video shows when an ICE officer drove up on the sidewalk toward protestors. Santos and local activist Sula Kemp say ICE officers became violent.

Maximillian Alvarez:

I’m standing here in Frederick, Maryland, just over an hour west from Baltimore, and I’m standing in a quiet residential neighborhood where just over a week ago, ICE agents in unmarked cars swarmed this neighborhood, surrounded the house behind me. ICE agents are on video beating peaceful protestors with their batons, menacingly driving their cars onto the curbs into the directions of protestors. And I’m standing here with Sula, who is a local resident of the area and who was here the night of those events. Sula, thanks so much for joining me here. Can you walk listeners through what happened and what you saw that night?

Soolah:

Okay. I was asked by as many people were asked to come and help. So I had that time and I was able to come down and I saw different ICE peoples actually around this whole neighborhood. They were in different pockets and locations. I hadn’t even come to this street. I had gone to two streets down and then the next street right over and you could see where they were positioned. And then there was also one that was driving around that seemed to be sort of intimidating by chasing cars, which I thought was really strange behavior because you didn’t see anything on the vehicle to say who it was. It didn’t say police, it didn’t say anything. Didn’t have any markings on the cars. So we didn’t know who they were. Assumed they were ice and their lights were just kind of on. They’re just sitting in their cars parked on the street.

So then there was a call later. I was there about three hours and then somebody had just said they need people on this street specific. So I was like, “Well, I’ll just walk over.” And they said that there was one car that had a spotlight on protestors. And what they were apparently trying to do on this street was just line the sidewalk, a public space with protestors. So that was fine. So I was like, “All right, let me take my phone and go to the other side and get the perspective of the spotlight being put onto the protestors.” So I did that. I first took a bit of video from this side as an observer and then went to the other side and stood there and watched just cars. And then all of a sudden as I was standing on the sidewalk, I heard a siren go off, just a few bursts of it.

And I happened to turn my camera and there was a car on the sidewalk coming toward me and telling me, and everybody who’s on the sidewalk, “Move, move, get out of the way.” At some point they sa, “You’re impeding a federal investigation.”

Maximillian Alvarez:

We’re talking about a car driving up

Soolah:

Right

Maximillian Alvarez:

Here where we’re standing.

Soolah:

Right. On the sidewalk, public space.

Maximillian Alvarez:

These are people’s houses. They’re driving onto people’s property.

Soolah:

Well, and if you or I had done that, what would’ve happened to us?

Maximillian Alvarez:

Yeah, they’d throw my ass in jail.

Soolah:

Reckless endangerment of people. And it was crazy. They stopped for a hot second and I jumped onto the grass at first and then I stepped back onto the sidewalk because I was like, “I don’t know what’s happening.” Just a natural response. I was like, “Wait a minute, I’m on the sidewalk.” So I stepped back on the sidewalk and then he started really coming. He did not stop and he sped up toward me first and then there was a woman behind me. And then there was another person, another protestor that they did hit and started to push with their car.

Maximillian Alvarez:

So you were standing right around here?

Soolah:

I was right here. And there was a car there. There was a car across the street. So I had my camera on this car. There were protestors next to me. There were protestors across the street. And then I turned to this car and it was right here. And then I heard out of the side, the siren go off and I turned and here’s this car coming at me from on the sidewalk. I jumped over to here. He passed me. He hit another protestor and then pushed that protestor out of the way. And then the protestors at some point have been sitting down, just linked arms, sitting down, singing and chanting right in the middle of the street, which is fine. They can do whatever they want to.

Maximillian Alvarez:

Community members surrounding one of their neighbor’s homes to try to protect them. Yeah. And then agents of the state come in and start beating the hell out of them for it.

Soolah:

Yeah. So they sat in the road and then they did get up and did that protection. And it’s a typical thing that people do to blockade, but peacefully, they didn’t do anything. They just linked arms. You can’t do much when you’re linked arms. And it’s a whole group of people. And then all of a sudden Frederick Police were coming and then they moved up to the porch area and started beating them up.

Maximillian Alvarez:

You and I are standing here right now on this quiet residential street. People who are watching this may have only seen a small slice of this street on line. What they can’t see is that this is the quietest residential street you can imagine. There’s nothing happening here. You would think with all the ICE agents and vehicles that were here last week that this would be a hotbed of overrun with criminals and criminal activity. It’s just families and houses.

Soolah:

Yeah, it’s very quiet here. You can drive around here and people are working, people are doing their lives and that’s it. So it’d be like every day storm into your everyday world in your suburban America, and that’s what happened. And when you look at now, it’s quiet, it’s peaceful here. So they brought a sense of terror and they brought a sense of unsafety. So yeah, the main set of protestors, they’re stationed on the sidewalk here right at the stop sign. There’s a whole group here. And then there was an ice vehicle here. There was an ice vehicle behind –

Maximillian Alvarez:

Right behind

Soolah:

Where I’m standing. Right behind where you’re standing. Because they started sort of parading in, it looked like a little ice parade. And I’m just joking about that because it was so weird. Once they got into the house, I could hear up in one of the rooms them banging stuff around. And another protestor had asked me, who was observing, asked me, “Do you hear that?” I was like, “Oh yeah,” because it was loud. I don’t know how the house was on the inside when this was all done, but this was a lot. And then I actually went and looked through the back part. They had a shed or some kind of building out in the back there, and you could see these guys go into the back and they started searching. They didn’t know how to get open the shed or whatever because it’s big, but eventually they did.

And it was eerie. It was very eerie.

Maximillian Alvarez:

And it feels reminiscent of the Gestapo view.

Soolah:

It does because who bangs down a door like that? Who goes through looking for whomever? And apparently they didn’t take anybody. I don’t understand why it all happened in the first place.

Maximillian Alvarez:

Yeah. So all that terror for nothing?

Soolah:

All that terror for nothing.

Maximillian Alvarez:

How do you move on from something like this? How does this community move on? How are folks responding?

Soolah:

I know right now they’re collecting donations for the people who were beaten because they had hospital bills. And it’s really hard because I don’t know them all personally. I came because just like anybody else, we don’t know each other half the time, but we do see something in need. So they do have a donation set up for them specifically. I am not sure what the next steps are. I know that I have personally tried to contact the attorney general’s office a few times. I haven’t heard anything yet. And I’m hoping that somebody who’s above, in some kind of governmental stance or something, because who feels safe going to the police when you watch the police stand there? There’s the question. I didn’t report anything to them, even though I had a vehicle come at me on the sidewalk. I doubt anybody else is really going to feel comfortable or safe, and maybe that’s the point.

Maybe that was the point too. I can’t speak for that, but it’s just what goes in my head, why would I contact you to tell you what happened? So I want to go higher up.

Maximillian Alvarez:

And so when you were here and you had federal agents and unmarked cars and you also had local police, did you feel in that moment like the police were there to protect you?

Soolah:

No. And the wild thing too is on the car that, at least this car that came at me, you couldn’t tell who they were because their license plate was tinted out. There’s nothing identifying that either. So who are these people? I don’t know if Frederick Police had some kind of directive because I don’t know what even drew them out here in the first place. Maybe they heard that people were getting beat maybe, but they were here before that happened. So maybe they have to take a specific. I don’t know. I literally do not know. And if that’s the case, if they have a specific directive or they don’t know what to do, maybe that needs to be talked about. Maybe something like this, when you have unmarked cars doing reckless behavior with their cars, doing reckless behavior towards other people, what is the community’s protect and serve folks going to do for the community?

Yeah.

Maximillian Alvarez:

Who are you protecting? Who are you

Soolah:

Serving?

Maximillian Alvarez:

Not us.

Soolah:

There are tax dollars going into all of this too, that people are going to step back and go, “Wait a minute, what’s happening here? I’m putting money toward them and it’s whoever was called out here for that night.” Who knows? I don’t know. But at the end of the day, who are they protecting?

💾

An unusual shoulder-fired air defense missile seen in Russian use may be of Chinese or Iranian origin, raising questions about the movement of foreign weapons through the increasingly interconnected military supply networks linking Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran.

The man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) appeared in Russian television footage showing a mobile air defense group operating in the Rostov region, which borders Ukraine. The weapon was shown during an exercise said to have involved one of the elements of Russia’s 51st Air Defense Division. The footage was subsequently highlighted by the X account TheDeadDistrict.

ruSSian's have developed a new “Iva” MANPADS. In the footage, it is in service with one of the mobile fire groups of the 51st Air Defense Division in Rostov Oblast.

Although, no—it is most likely the Iranian Misagh-2 MANPADS.

Imagine, they don't even have enough production… pic.twitter.com/aYrOtSmG6h

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) September 28, 2026

The system does not closely resemble any of the Russian-made MANPADS families otherwise used by the country’s armed forces. Russian personnel seen with the weapon reportedly referred to it as “Iva,” although that designation by itself does not establish the weapon’s origin or model. The word Iva is Russian for willow (a type of tree), of which one particular species is named Verba — also the name of the Russian-made 9K333 MANPADS. This weapon looks very different to the example shown, but the connection is unlikely to be a coincidence.

A visual analysis of the newly observed launcher reveals comparisons with both the Iranian Misagh-3 and Chinese QW-series systems, particularly the QW-18/QW-18A and QW-19. In particular, a closer examination of the imagery highlights an additional box-like component toward the front of the launcher. That feature appears more consistent with photographs of Chinese QW-series systems rather than the Misagh.

There is also a scarcity of publicly available imagery of later Iranian variants to completely exclude an Iranian system. At the same time, the Misagh series itself is understood to be derived, or at least heavily influenced by Chinese designs.

Iranian basij with QW-18/Misagh-2 MANPADS pic.twitter.com/xfc0nMe4f8

— Yuri Lyamin (@imp_navigator) March 26, 2026

Another possibility is that the weapon is a Russian-produced version or derivative of a Chinese or Iranian design, rather than an imported system.

The possibility of foreign-made or foreign-designed equipment appearing in Russian service has to be viewed against the much broader transformation of Moscow’s military relationships since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russia’s relationship with China has deepened substantially since the invasion, with Beijing becoming a critical source of machinery, electronics, and other components that Russia’s defense industry can no longer obtain as readily from Western suppliers. Moscow and Beijing had already declared a “no limits” partnership shortly before the invasion, and their military relationship has subsequently included exercises and expanding military-technical cooperation. U.S. officials have accused China of supplying Russia with components used in weapons production, including microelectronics. Beijing has rejected accusations that it is providing lethal military assistance to Russia.

Iran has also become an important military partner. Russia has used Iranian-designed Shahed-series attack drones extensively in Ukraine and has worked with Tehran on local production and adaptation of those systems. Moscow and Tehran formalized their relationship further with a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in January 2025, which includes provisions for military-technical cooperation and joint exercises.

In return, Russia has supplied Iran with military technology and has cooperated with Tehran on sensitive weapons programs.

The possible Chinese connection takes on additional significance in light of a major reported procurement deal between China and Iran.

In July, Reuters reported that Iran was expected to receive the first shipment of a deal covering 300 to 400 Chinese-made MANPADS, with a reported value of $60 million to $70 million. The weapons identified by sources included the Chinese QW-12 and FN-16 systems.

Chinese missiles the United States fears… an unsleeping eye against drones and low‑flying aircraft

China’s QW‑12 and FN‑16 air‑defense systems intercept low‑altitude targets — including drones — forming a rapid defensive line against close‑range aerial threats. pic.twitter.com/kJZ6mnqmHg

— China Now (@ChinaNow24) August 23, 2026

The reported contract was signed with a Hong Kong-based company that sources described as an intermediary between the Iranian side and the Chinese supplier. Reuters said the initial deliveries were planned from Urumqi in western China, with the weapons then transiting through Pakistan before reaching Iran. Pakistan’s military publicly denied any involvement in such transfers, while China’s Foreign Ministry called the report “groundless.”

Reuters also reported that delivery schedules and quantities could still change.

More significantly for the Russian sighting, a European security source told Reuters that authorities were aware of several contracts under discussion involving the potential sale of QW-12, QW-18, and QW-19 MANPADS to Iran. A Middle Eastern security source separately claimed that Iran had been seeking QW-18 systems.

The operation was carried out using a MANPADS, likely the Chinese “QW-18” anti-aircraft missile or its Iranian copy, the “Misagh-3”. https://t.co/OnPgqHJmQ8 pic.twitter.com/BuKt1MoKp7

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) October 23, 2024

There is currently no evidence tying the launcher seen in Russian hands to the Iranian procurement from China.

At the same time, the possibility of an Iranian connection should not be ruled out, especially since Chinese-designed MANPADS have a documented history of appearing outside conventional state inventories.

Earlier TWZ reporting, drawing on research by the Small Arms Survey monitoring group, examined the illicit proliferation of Chinese-designed MANPADS and identified dozens of cases involving armed groups in multiple countries. That research included QW-series weapons and documented cases in which investigators linked Chinese-designed MANPADS to Iranian supply networks.

One particularly notable case involved the Jihan, a vessel intercepted in 2013 carrying weapons that investigators identified as including QW-18-pattern MANPADS. UN investigators, the U.S. government, and  Conflict Armament Research assessed Iran as the likely source of those weapons.

It is also worth noting that Chinese MANPADS have already appeared on the Ukrainian side of the war. In late 2025 and 2026, Ukrainian units were photographed with Chinese-made FN-6 and FN-16 systems, including an FN-6 associated with an air defense team reportedly engaging a Russian cruise missile. Exactly how the weapons reached Ukraine remains unclear, with possible third-party transfers or diverted shipments among the possible explanations.

A Chinese FN-6 MANPADS in service with the MFG of the 143rd JTC “Podillia.” It is reported that this MANPADS was used this morning to shoot down a ruSSian Kh-101 CM.
The FN-6 was developed in 2000 and supplied, among others, to Sudan, from where it likely found its way to Ukraine pic.twitter.com/9zA012ue3j

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) November 19, 2025

Reported as the downing of an Kh-101 cruise missile this morning using a Chinese FN-6 MANPADS. There is no public information confirming that this system has been supplied to or used by Ukraine, making this a notable development. pic.twitter.com/pUujFB81aH

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) November 19, 2025

Incidents like these demonstrate that Chinese MANPADS can move through indirect supply networks, including networks associated with Tehran.

Regardless of how it arrived in Russia, the appearance of a foreign or foreign-derived MANPADS there is notable.

Mobile fire groups have become an increasingly visible component of Russia’s layered air defense effort, particularly as the war in Ukraine has placed enormous emphasis on countering low-altitude drones and other threats, including deep inside Russia.

A Russian CUAS mobile fire group shown with a Courier UGV for additional counter-drone targeting. https://t.co/7yTPPZ47f0 pic.twitter.com/bDu6MbZLEZ

— Samuel Bendett (@sambendett) September 2, 2026

MANPADS are well suited to this mission because they can be dispersed among small teams, rapidly repositioned, and deployed without the larger radar and vehicle infrastructure associated with conventional surface-to-air missile batteries. In particular, they can be deployed around military installations and other sensitive infrastructure.

A foreign system appearing in a Russian mobile fire group might be an imported weapon, an Iranian-produced derivative, a Chinese system acquired for evaluation, a captured weapon, or even a previously unidentified Russian configuration.

model, or even that it is a brand new Chinese-made variant (its possible that I just hadn't seen it, or seen it from these angles) but it is a notable new addition to Russia's MANPADS inventory.

— Matt Schroeder (@MSchroeder77) September 28, 2026

Another possibility is that the MANPADS is North Korean in origin. Russia’s military relationship with Pyongyang has expanded significantly, including the provision of increasingly advanced military equipment and technology. There is no known North Korean MANPADS matching the configuration seen here, however, and the possibility remains speculative. North Korean weapons have also frequently incorporated or closely followed Chinese designs, meaning a Chinese-looking configuration would not necessarily rule out a North Korean origin.

I was able to geolocate and thus confirm that the photo of North Korean M-1978/1989 Koksan 170mm SPGs was taken in Russia.

56.069386, 92.920244
Krasnoyarsk, central Russiahttps://t.co/BOaR44uLeS https://t.co/mC8solXVOv pic.twitter.com/LUHO2cllKZ

— Status-6 (@Archer83Able) November 14, 2024

Russia has dramatically expanded defense production since 2022, but its industry remains under heavy wartime demand and sanctions-related constraints. Western restrictions have complicated access to advanced electronics, machine tools and other components, while Russia has increasingly relied on domestic substitutes and foreign suppliers.

At the same time, Russia must replenish weapons consumed in Ukraine, meaning foreign supplies could supplement domestic production, fill specific gaps, or allow scarce industrial capacity to be directed elsewhere.

For Russia, even a limited number of additional shoulder-fired systems could therefore have practical value as Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities continue to expand.

For now, the exact model and provenance of the MANPADS in question remain unconfirmed, but the apparent Chinese or Iranian design characteristics are highly noteworthy. Further appearances of the system could provide the clues needed to determine what it is, where it came from, and whether this represents an isolated example or a more significant acquisition effort.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Mystery Shoulder-Fired Surface-To-Air Missile Appears In Russian Service appeared first on TWZ.

EU migrant return hubs became the subject of a summit held in Munich on Saturday (26 September) as interior ministers from member and associate states met the European Commission to advance projects aimed at offshoring rejected asylum seekers. 

But the meeting made little progress, partly because many of the attendees met in Copenhagen on 4 September, where leaders had announced an expected start to the policy by 2027. 

Instead, the main takeaways from Munich included rehashed commitments on improved emergency responses as well as broadened use of Frontex, the EU’s border control agency, and migration diplomacy with third states. 

The EU’s return regulation, approved in June, expects to fly rejected asylum seekers out of Europe and into migrant facilities to be hosted by third countries, for which Rwanda and Uganda are reportedly at the top of the queue.

Though the mass border crossing into Ceuta, the Spanish enclave in North Africa, was a subject of discussion, the 18 EU and non-EU interior ministers present in Munich did not include a representative from Spain, possibly due to Pedro Sánchez’s opposition to the return hubs policy. 

But the UK’s home secretary Shabana Mahmood was present, talking of the need for close cooperation within Europe on migration issues,” Germany’s interior minister and meeting host, Alexander Dobrindt, told reporters on Saturday.  

Despite Donrindt’s focus on “innovative solutions” for those with no right to stay in Europe but no way or returning, Berlin’s migration response would also be significantly dependent on expanded powers for Europe’s border agency, Frontex. 

“We are seeing that the Pact is working. The number of irregular arrivals is dropping across the EU while at the same time the numbers of returns to third countries are increasing. That said, we cannot become complacent,” Jim O’Callaghan, Irish interior minister, told the press before the meeting. 

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

In this story for Dispatch, Lotte Brundle reports on a surprising trend: young women in the UK are pursuing careers in the death care industry. In a time of high unemployment, funeral home apprenticeships offer an alternative to university, where students accumulate significant debt. While the pay is low and the industry needs to do a better job building awareness that the trajectory exists, the young women who speak to Brundle find the work meaningful and rewarding.

Her inspiration to become an undertaker arrived, as many teenage epiphanies now do, via TikTok. Emily was 15 and had been considering becoming a teacher or journalist when she came across an American woman documenting life inside her own funeral home. “I’d never considered it as a career,” she says. “I didn’t know anyone who was an undertaker, but I just thought how interesting it was.”

Two hours later, she was still scrolling through the woman’s profile, engrossed. Running her own funeral home became Emily’s dream.

In Russland gibt es seit 2022 das sogenannte „Internationale öffentliche Tribunal zu den Verbrechen ukrainischer Neonazis“, an dessen Gründung ich beteiligt war und bei dem ich bis heute, wenn auch derzeit passives, Mitglied bin. Das Tribunal ist eine zivilgesellschaftliche Initiative zur Dokumentierung von ukrainischen Kriegsverbrechen und kein Gericht, wie der Name vermuten lassen könnte. Am […]

Während der UN-Generalversammlung hat der deutsche Außenminister Wadephul um ein Treffen mit dem russischen Außenminister Lawrow gebeten und es wurde gewährt, aber wie schon nach dem Treffen von Lawrow mit seiner Vorgängerin Baerbock hat die russische Seite nicht verstanden, was der Sinn des Treffens war, denn Neues hatte Wadephul nicht zu sagen. Überhaupt hatte die […]

Letzte Woche fand die alljährliche UN-Generalversammlung statt, bei der jeder Staat in einer kurzen Grundsatzrede seine wichtigsten Ansichten zur Außenpolitik darlegt. Für Russland hat das dieses Mal der russische Außenminister Lawrow getan, der in seiner Rede die Politik des Westens heftig kritisierte. Ich habe seine Rede übersetzt, weil es in Deutschland nicht viele Möglichkeiten gibt, […]

In New York fand die UN-Generalversammlung statt und der deutsche Außenminister Wadephul hat bei der Gelegenheit überraschend um ein Treffen mit dem russischen Außenminister Lawrow gebeten. Lawrow hat das Treffen gewährt und damit haben zum ersten Mal seit Anfang 2022 wieder ein russischer und ein deutscher Außenminister miteinander gesprochen. Wadephul hat sich dabei jedoch in […]

From Trump’s earlier push to acquire Greenland to the 2026 security agreement with Denmark and Greenland, Washington’s approach has shifted from territorial acquisition to strategic access — a shift that reflects a broader contest for control over the Arctic, supply chains and spheres of influence. Since his first term as the American President, Trump has […]

 Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026

Ireland’s preparations for Sunday’s Nations League match against “Israel” have been thrown into uncertainty after goalkeeper Gavin Bazunu reportedly told teammates that he did not want to participate in the fixture, prompting further discussions within the squad.

The players missed their scheduled training session and press conference in Debrecen, Hungary, as they held lengthy meetings over whether individual players should proceed with the match.

The Ireland squad was due to train at the Nagyerdei Stadium in Debrecen and hold a press conference ahead of Sunday’s Nations League encounter.

Instead, the players remained at their hotel for discussions with head coach Heimir Hallgrímsson and his coaching staff. They had earlier met with Football Association of Ireland (FAI) CEO David Courell.

The scheduled press conference was postponed with only 19 minutes’ notice. Irish and Israeli media had already assembled at the stadium when Irish journalists were informed that the event could be delayed by up to two hours.

The UEFA match delegate was also informed of the delay but was reportedly not given a reason. The team ultimately did not arrive for the scheduled training session.

The disruption followed an initial squad meeting on Friday intended to establish the players’ position on the “Israel” fixture and discuss whether they would stage a protest.

According to reports, a collective boycott was not initially the purpose of the meeting. During the discussions, however, Bazunu indicated that he did not want to participate in the match, with other players subsequently considering whether to join him.

The extent of opposition within the squad remains unclear, and no final collective decision had been announced at the time of reporting.

The developments mark a significant escalation in the controversy surrounding Ireland’s Nations League meetings with “Israel”.

Earlier this week, Ireland captain Dara O’Shea said the squad intended to fulfill the two fixtures, while any decision over a separate protest was to be discussed following Ireland’s opening Nations League match against Kosovo.

The position has since become less certain following the latest internal discussions.

Hallgrímsson had previously acknowledged that Ireland’s players did not share identical views or the same intensity of feeling regarding the “Israel” fixtures. He also said that he would respect a player’s decision if an individual did not want to take part.

Ireland’s match against “Israel” is scheduled for Sunday, September 27, at the Nagyerdei Stadium in Debrecen.

FAI faces pressure over ‘Israel’ games

The latest dispute follows months of controversy over the FAI’s decision to proceed with the fixtures.

In July, an FAI motion endorsing the fulfillment of the Nations League matches against “Israel” passed by 68% to 32%. The association had argued that failing to fulfill the fixtures could expose Irish football to sporting and financial consequences.

The FAI has also acknowledged the strength of public opposition to the fixtures. In September, CEO David Courell said the organization was in a “really difficult position,” arguing that UEFA’s failure to take action over “Israel’s” participation had left the FAI with limited options.

The controversy has extended beyond the football establishment. More than 160 Irish athletes have signed an open letter urging the national team to refuse to participate in the “Israel” fixtures, while protests have been held outside the team’s hotel.

In Deutschland haben viele Menschen heute eine ganz falsche Vorstellung von dem, was der Kern der Ideen der Nazi war. Heute meint man in Deutschland, „Nazi“ würde bedeuten, dass alle in Uniformen herumlaufen und dass gegen Juden gehetzt wird. Da das in der EU nicht geschieht, seien die Vorwürfe aus Russland, in Europa würden die […]

Obwohl ich eine anstrengende Woche als Wahlbeobachter bei den Parlamentswahlen in Russland hatte, haben wir es geschafft, wieder eine Folge von Tacheles mit Röper und Stein aufzuzeichnen, die nun online ist. Sollte YouTube die Sendung löschen, finden Sie sie auch hier bei NuoViso.

The U.S. Marine Corps is buying Anduril Pulsar-L electronic warfare jammers to meet an urgent operational need to better protect its 8×8 wheeled Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACV) from drones. This is part of broader efforts the service is pursuing to boost the ACV’s defenses against uncrewed aerial attackers, as well as incoming anti-tank guided missiles and other threats. Drone threats are real now and have notably sidelined even the most advanced heavy armor in Ukraine.

Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) announced it had awarded a sole-source deal to Anduril, valued at $15,711,445.50, for an unspecified number of Pulsar-Ls, yesterday. This follows a statement of intent the Command put out last month. Anduril first unveiled Pulsar-L, a lightweight addition to its larger Pulsar family of electronic warfare systems, in April 2025.

The Marine Corps had 150 baseline personnel carrier variants of the ACV (or ACV-Ps), as well as 21 command-and-control ACV-C versions, in inventory as of April 2026. The default armament for ACV-P currently is just a single .50 caliber M2 machine gun in a remote weapon station on top of the hull. The service’s goal is to eventually acquire 389 ACV-Ps and 33 ACV-Cs, as well as 152 ACV-30s with new 30mm cannon-armed turrets and 34 ACV-R armored recovery vehicle variants. The ACV family has already supplanted the Marine Corps’ previous fleet of tracked Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV).

“The Anduril Pulsar-L system is a platform-integrated omni-directional SK C-UAS [soft-kill counter-uncrewed aerial systems] with a combined sensor/jammer package that detects, tracks, identifies, and defeats radio frequency-dependent Group 1 and Group 2 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs),” MARCORSYSCOM wrote in a justification for the sole-source contract, which was also released yesterday. “Additionally, the system provides counter positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities.”

The U.S. military definition of a Group 1 drone is any design weighing up to 20 pounds, that is able to fly up to an altitude of 1,200 feet, and that can reach speeds of up to 100 knots. Group 2 is the next tier up, encompassing types with gross weights between 21 and 55 pounds, that can get up to an altitude of 3,500 feet, and hit top speeds of up to 250 knots. Kamikaze drones and other small weaponized types that fall into Groups 1 and 2 are used on a daily basis in Ukraine to attack armored vehicles, as well as unarmored vehicles and personnel. These are threats that have been steadily expanding to other hotspots globally, and that we will come back to later on.

Furthermore, “the Pulsar-L is the only solution capable of being mounted on the ACV to provide a mobile and organic means to effectively and simultaneously execute the entire kill-chain against hostile UASs in the deployed land and maritime/littoral environment while not exceeding the limited ACV space, weight, and power claim allotted to the SK C-UAS solution,” according to MARCORSYSCOM. “This will provide the ACV with an essential defensive capability, directly contributing to increased survivability and force protection while not sacrificing the mobility and operational tempo of the ACV.”

Pulsar-L is already “in use by the Special Operations Command due to the system’s low weight, proven performance in engaging multiple UASs, and simultaneous execution of the full kill-chain while static or on the move,” the justification document adds. “Additionally, it is the only known commercially available system that meets the minimum requirement to rapidly identify and respond to emerging UAS technologies and tactics without frequent updates to predefined threat data libraries. The Pulsar-L is the only solution that uses machine based learning to continually adapt to these ever-changing threats without requiring vendor updates, allowing the warfighters to continually be effective in the fight.”

The latter point here is a particularly important consideration for electronic warfare systems, in general, which need to be able to accurately detect, categorize, and respond to different waveforms to be most effective. The emergence of new waveforms, as well as changes to how existing ones are emitted, together with new tactics, techniques, and procedures, can all negatively impact a system’s performance. Historically, the process of responding to those developments with updates to built-in threat libraries has been lengthy and complex. The conflict in Ukraine has shown that the cycle of new developments in the electromagnetic spectrum and then the need for new countermeasures can be regularly measured in weeks.

The U.S. military has been heavily investing in so-called cognitive electronic warfare capabilities to help automate and otherwise accelerate various aspects of this process. The ability of a particular electronic warfare suite to adapt autonomously in real-time, even in the middle of operations, has been viewed as the absolute ‘holy grail’ of this concept, which you can read more about here. How exactly Pulsar-L leverages machine-learning and artificial intelligence to this end, and the speed with which it can adapt to changing threats, is still not entirely clear.

Regardless, “there is an unusual and compelling need for the rapid deployment of SK C-UASs to forward-deployed ground units as Marines currently lack the ability to conduct self-defense against emerging UAS threats,” the justification document stresses. “Failure to deliver this capability places Marines at unnecessary risk, potentially leading to mission failure and loss of life, and hampers the Government’s ability to keep them safe during forward deployments.”

MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the sole-source deal to Anduril does not otherwise elaborate on the urgent requirements that drove the deal, which it says were only formalized on April 7. That is notably roughly a week after the United States and Israel first launched major combat operations against Iran, which is a prolific developer and user of various tiers of weaponized drones. There is no explicit confirmation of any link, but Iranian drones, as well as missiles and other capabilities, have been a real threat to U.S. forces in the region. We have also just gained more insights recently into how forward-deployed Marine Corps elements contributed to those operations. Counter-drone capabilities would also be especially critical in any future amphibious landing operation, wherever it might occur.

All that being said, threats posed by armed Group 1 and 2 drones are not at all limited to Iran and the Middle East, nor are they new. They are only likely to become a more ubiquitous feature in the hands of nation-state armed forces and non-state actors in conflict zones globally as time goes on. The nature of these threats is also expanding significantly in scale and scope, especially when it comes to more automated targeting capabilities, thanks heavily to the increasing democratization of AI-driven technologies, something TWZ has explored in depth in the past.

A number of other significant developments in this arena have emerged from the conflict in Ukraine, where electronic warfare systems are heavily employed against drones. This includes the introduction of physical fiber-optic control links that cannot be jammed, as well as the use of mesh-like and often ad-hoc networks to increase resiliency.

The fighting in Ukraine has also underscored the threat that even small kamikaze drones pose to armored vehicles, including types that are far more heavily protected to start with than the Marine Corps’ ACVs. As mentioned, Ukrainian forces have been sidelining their M1 Abrams and other main battle tanks in the face of constant drone attacks.

MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the Pulsar-L order makes clear that this is just one part of a larger plan to boost the ACV’s defenses.

“Marine Corps program of record for SK C-UAS is planned to initiate in FY27,” the document mentions toward the very end. “The components of this future program will be procured through full and open competition as it is expected that advanced non-kinetic and SK defeat technologies should be mature by this time.”

Marine Corps officials have also talked in the past about integrating active protection systems (APS), which could be blended together with C-UAS capabilities, and other defensive features to the service’s ACV fleet.

“We’re constantly looking at what the next generation of APS is and how we can get that onto the [ACV] platform in a lightweight form factor,” Chris Melkonian, the Marine Corps’ Program Manager for Advanced Amphibious Assault (PM AAA), told TWZ and other attendees at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition in April.

Improved “situational awareness, that’s kind of a gateway to counter-UAS, in terms of the ability to sense your environment,” Melkonian also highlighted at that time. “Take all that video on board and then be able to feed that into [a] counter-UAS system.”

Additional “overhead protection right now is a critical thing that we’re working on right now for this platform,” he added. The practice of adding on anti-drone armor screens on armored vehicles (and now other platforms), especially to protect against top-down attacks, first emerged in Russia in the lead-up to the all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, the installation of this kind of so-called ‘cope cage’ type armor has now become a global trend, including in the U.S. military.

The U.S. Marine Corps is also pressing ahead with a larger vision to field several tiers of counter-drone capabilities at all levels of its forces, to better protect everything from static installations at home and abroad right down to individual squads.

When it comes to the Marine Corps ACV fleet, the rush order for Pulsar-Ls is an important new step in boosting those vehicles’ defenses against threats that exist now. At the same time, drones are increasingly calling the role of armored vehicles in future conflicts into question.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Marines Rushing To Equip Amphibious Combat Vehicles With New Anti-Drone Jammers appeared first on TWZ.

Politik und Medien schüren seit Jahren eine wahre Kriegshysterie, indem sie Russland die Führung eines hybriden Krieges gegen Europa vorwerfen. So haben die Medien beispielsweise fast ein Jahr lang breit berichtet, Russland habe Kabel in der Ostsee sabotiert, aber als sich herausstellte, dass die Vorfälle natürlichen Ursprungs waren und dass es keine „russische Spur“ gab, […]

Read in English here

La campaña de Donald Trump para poner a Groenlandia bajo el control de los Estados Unidos a menudo se ha descartado como pura fanfarronería. Eso es un error. Detrás del lenguaje de un acuerdo inmobiliario se esconde un intento serio de revivir un antiguo principio imperial: que Washington pueda decidir el futuro político y económico de todo el hemisferio occidental. Groenlandia, estratégicamente ubicada entre América del Norte y Europa, se ha convertido en una prueba de esa afirmación – y de si la soberanía de una pequeña nación indígena cuenta cuando entra en conflicto con las ambiciones de una gran potencia.

Trump planteó la idea de comprar Groenlandia durante su primer mandato presidencial en 2019. Tras su reelección, la propuesta se volvió más agresiva. En diciembre de 2024 declaró que la “propiedad y el control” de Groenlandia por parte de los Estados Unidos eran una “necesidad absoluta”. El 7 de enero de 2025, se negó a descartar la coacción militar o económica contra Groenlandia y el Canal de Panamá, afirmando: “Necesitamos Groenlandia por motivos de seguridad nacional”. Posteriormente, insistió en que los Estados Unidos se haría con la isla “de una forma u otra”. Esta afirmación combinaba varios argumentos: Groenlandia es vital para la defensa antimisiles; Rusia y China amenazan el Ártico; los yacimientos de tierras raras de Groenlandia tienen un valor estratégico; y, supuestamente, los groenlandeses acogerían con agrado el dominio estadounidense.

Esta última afirmación resultó ser demostrablemente falsa. Una encuesta de enero de 2025, realizada tanto en groenlandés como en danés, reveló que el 85% de la población de Groenlandia se oponía a abandonar el reino danés para unirse a los Estados Unidos, mientras que solo el 6% lo apoyaba. Sin embargo, la misma encuesta mostró que una mayoría estaba a favor de una eventual independencia. Esa distinción es fundamental. El deseo de los groenlandeses de poner fin a la tutela colonial danesa no puede interpretarse como un consentimiento a la anexión estadounidense.

Una relación militar sin anexión

El argumento de seguridad a favor de la propiedad estadounidense es engañoso, ya que Washington ya goza de amplios derechos militares en Groenlandia. La relación comenzó durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Con Dinamarca ocupada por la Alemania nazi, su embajador en Washington firmó un acuerdo de 1941 que permitía a los Estados Unidos defender Groenlandia y construir instalaciones allí. Dinamarca solicitó la retirada estadounidense después de la guerra, pero prevaleció la estrategia de la Guerra Fría.

El Acuerdo de Defensa de Groenlandia de 1951, celebrado en el marco del Tratado del Atlántico Norte, autorizó a los Estados Unidos a establecer y operar “zonas de defensa”. Esto permitió la rápida construcción de la Base Aérea de Thule – rebautizada como Base Espacial de Pituffik en 2023 – en un lugar ideal para las rutas aéreas y de misiles más cortas entre la Unión Soviética y América del Norte. En el apogeo de la Guerra Fría, los Estados Unidos operaba numerosas instalaciones en toda Groenlandia. Hoy en día, Pituffik, la base militar más septentrional de Washington, desempeña funciones de alerta de misiles, defensa antimisiles y vigilancia espacial.

El acuerdo ofrece a Washington una amplia libertad operativa. Una enmienda de 2004 – el Acuerdo de Igaliku – reconoció al Gobierno autónomo de Groenlandia, estableció a Pituffik como la única zona de defensa existente y exigió la consulta previa antes de realizar cambios significativos o crear nuevas zonas de defensa. También estableció la cooperación en temas económicos, técnicos y ambientales. En otras palabras, si los Estados Unidos considera que se necesitan más radares, puertos, aeródromos o personal, ya existe un mecanismo legal para negociarlo con Dinamarca y Groenlandia. La soberanía, por lo tanto, no es un requisito militar.

La historia de las bases también explica por qué “seguridad” no es un término neutral en Groenlandia. En 1953, las autoridades danesas ordenaron a 116 inughuit – 27 familias – que abandonaran la recién fundada Qaanaaq, mientras que el resto se reubicó en asentamientos en otras partes del distrito. Camp Century se construyó bajo el hielo entre 1959 y 1960 y estaba vinculado a la propuesta secreta del Proyecto Iceworm, que contemplaba una extensa red de bases de lanzamiento de misiles nucleares.

En 1968, un B-52 estadounidense que transportaba cuatro bombas de hidrógeno se estrelló sobre el hielo marino en la Base Aérea de Thule, lo que provocó contaminación por plutonio y otras sustancias. El accidente puso de manifiesto la inconsistencia entre la política declarada públicamente por Dinamarca en contra de las armas nucleares en territorio danés en tiempos de paz y los permisos secretos otorgados por el Gobierno danés a los Estados Unidos para almacenar armas nucleares en Groenlandia. Las instalaciones abandonadas dejaron combustible, desechos y otros contaminantes. Los reportajes de Groenlandia continúan cuestionando quién pagará por las futuras limpiezas. La relación militar protegió los intereses estratégicos de los Estados Unidos, mientras que los costos humanos y ambientales recayeron de manera desproporcionada sobre los groenlandeses.

Groenlandia dejó de ser formalmente una colonia en 1953, obtuvo autonomía en 1979 y amplió su autogobierno en 2009. La Ley de Autogobierno reconoce a los groenlandeses como un pueblo con derecho a la autodeterminación y establece un camino hacia la independencia. Washington reabrió su consulado en Nuuk en 2020, y la cooperación se intensificó en materia de comercio, educación, minería e investigación. Los gobiernos de Groenlandia (desde Kuupik Kleist hasta Jens-Frederik Nielsen) han acogido con beneplácito los vínculos económicos con Washington, pero rechazan la tendencia de este último a exigir cada vez más a la isla para satisfacer sus necesidades militares.

De Monroe a Donroe

La exigencia de Trump respecto a Groenlandia forma parte de una política hemisférica más amplia. La Doctrina Monroe de 1823 advertía a las potencias europeas contra nuevas intervenciones coloniales en las Américas. Presentada como anticolonial, se transformó en una reivindicación de la supremacía estadounidense. El corolario de Theodore Roosevelt de 1904 afirmaba el derecho de intervención en América Latina, proporcionando una justificación ideológica para ocupaciones, cambios de régimen y el control de activos estratégicos.

Los partidarios de Trump rebautizaron su última versión como la “Doctrina Donroe”. Esta denominación vincula la presión sobre Groenlandia con las exigencias relativas al Canal de Panamá, las amenazas contra Cuba y Colombia, las reivindicaciones sobre Canadá y la intervención de los Estados Unidos en Venezuela. A finales de 2025, la Casa Blanca proclamó formalmente un Corolario  Trump a la Doctrina de Monroe, en el que se afirmaba el liderazgo de los Estados Unidos en todo “nuestro hemisferio”. Groenlandia queda arrastrada a esta esfera porque geográficamente forma parte de América del Norte, aunque esté vinculada políticamente a Dinamarca y su pueblo inuit posea su propio derecho a la autodeterminación. Esta doctrina contiene una contradicción reveladora. Trump denuncia el control europeo sobre Groenlandia como un anacronismo, al tiempo que exige que la isla sea transferida a los Estados Unidos. El colonialismo no se ha abolido; simplemente cambia el colonizador propuesto. Las referencias de Trump a los minerales, las rutas marítimas y la geografía militar reducen a Groenlandia a un activo y a sus 56.000 habitantes a un obstáculo en una transacción entre potencias.

Una crisis dentro de la alianza occidental

Las amenazas de Trump provocaron una ruptura extraordinaria entre los Estados Unidos y Europa. Dinamarca no es un adversario, sino un aliado de la OTAN cuyas tropas lucharon junto a los soldados estadounidenses en Afganistán. La amenaza de arrebatar territorio a un aliado por la fuerza ataca la premisa misma de la alianza. La primera ministra danesa, Mette Frederiksen advirtió que un ataque de los Estados Unidos contra otro país de la OTAN pondría fin al orden de seguridad de la posguerra. Los gobiernos europeos se unieron en torno al principio de que las fronteras no pueden modificarse mediante la coacción, un principio que invocan contra Rusia en Ucrania.

La crisis puso de manifiesto la dependencia de Europa. La OTAN no cuenta con un procedimiento claro para defender a un miembro frente a su miembro más poderoso. Los Estados europeos dependen en gran medida del poderío militar de los Estados Unidos, al tiempo que se les pide que resistan la coacción estadounidense. Copenhague respondió con una diplomacia cautelosa, un mayor gasto militar en el Ártico y la insistencia en que las decisiones corresponden a Groenlandia y a Dinamarca. Francia, Alemania, los países nórdicos y la Unión Europea expresaron su solidaridad, pero el episodio intensificó los llamado a la autonomía estratégica europea. También dañó la pretensión de Washington de liderar una alianza de democracias contra el revisionismo autoritario.

El 18 de septiembre de 2026, Trump anunció un nuevo acuerdo trilateral de seguridad tras meses de negociaciones, reivindicando el “control permanente” sobre la seguridad de Groenlandia. Los líderes daneses y groenlandeses lo describieron en términos más limitados: una ampliación de la cooperación militar con los Estados Unidos que preserva la soberanía y la autodeterminación de Groenlandia. El texto completo aún debe firmarse y aprobarse. Si su versión es correcta, el resultado confirma lo que era evidente desde el principio: los Estados Unidos podría obtener acuerdos de seguridad adicionales sin llegar a ser dueño de Groenlandia. Sin embargo, la presión que precedió al acuerdo sigue siendo una advertencia sobre las negociaciones llevadas a cabo bajo amenazas.

Groenlandia habla por sí misma

La respuesta de Groenlandia ha combinado rechazo, unidad y complejidad política. Kalaallit Nunaat – el nombre groenlandés del país – se convirtió en el centro de las declaraciones de que Groenlandia pertenece a su pueblo y no está en venta. En marzo de 2025, grandes manifestaciones en Nuuk, Sisimiut y Qaanaaq marcharon bajo la bandera roja y blanca de Erfalasorput. Los manifestantes le pidieron a Trump que respetara a los inuit, a su país y a su nacionalidad. Los partidos políticos de Groenlandia, a pesar de profundos desacuerdos sobre el ritmo y las condiciones económicas de la independencia, condenaron conjuntamente la presión externa. El Parlamento prohibió las donaciones políticas extranjeras y anónimas, defendiendo explícitamente la integridad de la democracia groenlandesa en medio del interés de las grandes potencias.

El colonialismo danés dejó profundas heridas: asimilación forzada, ingeniería social, desarrollo desigual y decisiones tomadas en Copenhague sobre la tierra y el pueblo groenlandeses (toda la cuarta temporada de la popular serie de televisión Borgen, en 2022, se centró en un conflicto entre Copenhague y Nuuk por el descubrimiento de un nuevo yacimiento de petróleo con implicaciones de China y Rusia). Muchos groenlandeses desean la independencia, y algunos ven el creciente interés de los Estados Unidos como una ventaja para atraer inversiones y lograr una relación más equitativa con Dinamarca.

Groenlandia revela el verdadero contenido de la Doctrina Donroe: una afirmación del siglo XXI de que la geografía otorga a Washington derechos superiores sobre los pueblos vecinos. La respuesta de Groenlandia es igualmente moderna y universal. La ubicación estratégica no anula la soberanía popular, los minerales no borran la identidad nacional, y ninguna gran potencia adquiere un país simplemente por declarar que lo necesita.

Vijay Prashad es un historiador y periodista indio. Es autor de cuarenta libros, entre los que se incluyen Balas de Washington, Una estrella roja sobre el Tercer Mundo, Las naciones oscuras: una historia del Tercer Mundo; Las naciones pobres: una posible historia del Sur Global y How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, escrito con Grieve Chelwa. Es el director ejecutivo de Tricontinental: Instituto de Investigación Social, corresponsal jefe de Globetrotter, y el editor jefe de LeftWord Books (Nueva Delhi). También ha hecho apariciones en las películas Shadow World (2016) y Two Meetings (2017).

Este artículo fue elaborado por Globetrotter.

In just one year, the number of foreigners staying illegally in Poland has risen by about 40 percent. From January to the end of August 2026 alone, the Polish Border Guard identified 8,300 such people.

Many foreigners work illegally and rent apartments outside the official system; some make a living from crime. They live without documents or residence permits. It often takes the services years to identify them and establish where they are. Polish news outlet Rzeczpospolita describes a “gray zone” in which foreigners staying illegally operate. The Border Guard and other services identify people who have overstayed the permitted period of residence, work without the required permits, or use invalid documents. Inspections also turn up people who have previously been banned from entering Poland or other Schengen countries.

“From January 1 to the end of August this year, the Border Guard identified almost 8,300 foreigners who had breached Polish law on the conditions of entry and stay in the Republic of Poland. By comparison, in the same period of 2025 the figure was nearly 6,000, and for the whole of 2025 it was more than 9,300,” Major Anna Sobieska-Tekień of the Border Guard, spokesperson for Border Guard Headquarters, told the newspaper.

Ukrainians and Colombians predominate

Of those illegal migrants arrested, Ukrainians (2,200) and Colombians (1,400) dominate the figures. Also detained were 748 Georgians, 400 Belarusians and 354 Moldovans. Those who were detained did not have documents entitling them to stay in Poland.

“Everything indicates that Poland is entering a full-scale crisis in managing foreigners already present on its territory. If a state can control the border but loses the ability to determine effectively who remains after the right of residence expires, a security gap is created,” said Tomasz Safjański, a professor at WSB University in Dąbrowa Górnicza and deputy director of the Center for Research on Cross-Border Security.

Extensive networks support illegal migration

Rzeczpospolita points to an extensive support network that makes it possible to operate outside the legal system. It includes illegal employment, informal apartment rentals, and the forging of visas, work permits and other documents. The paper also recalls cases in which fictitious companies were set up and used to obtain work visas for foreigners.

Growth of the shadow economy is leading to more illegal employment, which allows employers to avoid taxes and social-security contributions. Experts also point to the risk of a rise in ordinary and organized crime, including human trafficking and document forgery.

People who remain outside the official registration system may also be harder to monitor and, according to those interviewed, may be used by foreign intelligence services for sabotage or other hostile activity.

The post Poland is losing control over foreigners: Border agency warns of sharp increase in illegal migrants appeared first on Remix News.

Die Lage der Ukraine wird zusehends dramatisch. Dem Land geht das Geld aus, aber die EU verweigert zuvor versprochene Zahlungen, solange Selensky nicht die von der EU geforderten Reformen umsetzt, die der EU de facto die totale Kontrolle über das Land geben und Selensky entmachten würden, und die US-Regierung, die wegen ihres fehlgeschlagenen Irankriegs selbst […]

Taiwan has provided the first public look at its new 105mm 8×8 mobile gun system in action, with the domestically developed vehicle engaging moving and stationary targets during a live-fire demonstration in southern Taiwan. The vehicle is being developed as Taiwan continues to modernize its ground forces in response to the growing capabilities and increasingly frequent military activity of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around the island.

During the demonstration, held by the Republic of China Army (ROCA) at a training area in Tainan today, the vehicle reportedly engaged a moving target at approximately 0.75 miles and a stationary target at around 0.6 miles. It also fired against targets positioned 90 degrees to the side of the vehicle while operating on a gentle slope, demonstrating the gun system’s ability to engage targets while the vehicle is positioned on uneven terrain.

pic.twitter.com/dn6lHDbf5k

— 青年日報 Youth Daily News, ROC(Taiwan) (@YDN_NEWS) September 23, 2026

Eight wheels. Six-wheel steering. One 105mm gun.
Definitely not your average ride.#ROCArmedForces #MobileGunSystem#MadeInTaiwan pic.twitter.com/oaHsyMNtev

— 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, ROC(Taiwan) (@MoNDefense) September 23, 2026

The vehicle subsequently fired its 7.62mm coaxial machine gun simultaneously with its main gun as part of a scenario intended to demonstrate engagement of multiple targets, including simulated amphibious assault vehicles.

台灣105公厘獵豹輪型戰車實彈射擊https://t.co/cHaXthUCfA pic.twitter.com/aKBBzoVsKz

— 新‧二七部隊 軍事雜談 (New 27 Brigade) (@new27brigade) September 23, 2026

An apparent weapon malfunction was also recorded during the demonstration. One of the 105mm rounds initially failed to fire, according to reports. The crew waited approximately two minutes in accordance with safety procedures before reloading the weapon, after which the vehicle fired normally. Maj. Gen. Chen Chien-chung, head of Taiwan’s Arsenal 202, the Production and Manufacturing Center of the Armament Bureau, said an investigation would be conducted into the misfire.

The 155 mm infantry fighting vehicle showcased to media before entering production phase. pic.twitter.com/DBhs66aw5Q

— Taepodong (@stoa1984) September 23, 2026

Despite the incident, the demonstration provided an important look at a vehicle that Taiwan is developing specifically around the country’s geography and battlefield requirements, including a potential amphibious invasion by the Chinese PLA.

A new direct fire support variant of the Clouded Leopard 8×8 infantry fighting vehicle was first publicly displayed at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition in 2023. It passed initial combat readiness testing with the ROCA in October 2023, and it was authorized for mass production in April 2024.

The production configuration has undergone significant changes since then.

Its height has been reduced by approximately 12 inches, bringing the overall vehicle height to below 9 feet 10 inches. Its turning radius has also been reduced from 36 feet to 26 feet. The reduction in turning radius was achieved by providing steering to three pairs of wheels, rather than two pairs on the earlier configuration.

Those changes are especially relevant to Taiwan, where large sections of the island feature restrictive terrain, dense urban development, narrow roads, drainage channels, and other obstacles that can limit the movement of heavy armored vehicles.

Taiwanese officials specifically highlighted the system’s suitability for culverts and urban areas, as well as the challenging terrain of Hualien and Taitung on the island’s mountainous east coast.

The vehicle’s principal weapon is a 105mm gun. The weapon can fire the general-purpose ammunition already developed for tank guns, in addition to ammunition developed specifically for the new system. The ROCA displayed armor-piercing, anti-personnel, and training ammunition during the demonstration. The gun also offers useful ammunition commonality with Taiwan’s older, but still active M60A3 and CM11 tanks.

That compatibility potentially gives the vehicle access to an existing ammunition ecosystem while allowing Taiwan to develop specialized rounds for its particular requirements.

Against a PLA assault, the 105mm system would provide mobile direct firepower against amphibious vehicles, armored personnel carriers, fortifications, and other ground targets, complementing Taiwan’s heavier tanks and other anti-armor weapons. Its wheeled configuration also allows the vehicle to rapidly reposition along Taiwan’s road network, giving commanders a mobile source of direct firepower that could respond to amphibious landings and reinforce threatened sectors.

The system falls into the same broad category as other modern 8×8 mobile gun systems, including Italy’s Centauro family and Japan’s Type 16 Mobile Combat Vehicle.

Less successful was a mobile gun system version of the U.S. Army Stryker, also with a 105mm gun, but the service divested that in 2021 because of problems with its dated cannon and autoloader. The U.S. Army then received the M10 Booker Combat Vehicle. Armed with a 105mm main gun, the Booker is a tracked vehicle with a much higher degree of armor protection and off-road mobility, but this, too, was canceled in 2025, amid cost and weight increases.

A wheeled 105mm gun system can provide substantial direct-fire capability while offering advantages in road mobility and potentially lower logistical demands. It also lacks the combination of protection, cross-country mobility, and heavy armament associated with a tracked main battle tank.

For Taiwan, this kind of vehicle provides a comparatively compact armored platform able to move rapidly between positions and bring heavy direct firepower to areas where larger vehicles could face mobility constraints.

If fighting reaches Taiwan’s cities, the ROCA regularly trains for the challenges of urban warfare. The service has also demonstrated unusual measures to conceal and protect its armored vehicles, including disguising tanks and other vehicles as scrap piles or civilian construction equipment to complicate PLA targeting.

The vehicle’s development is also being influenced by the threat of battlefield drones. Taiwanese military officials say the system is expected to receive additional counter-drone capabilities before entering mass production. One planned modification is an anti-drone cage around the vehicle.

More ambitious changes could involve the installation of a larger-caliber automatic weapon. Reportedly, the vehicle could eventually receive another machine gun or larger-caliber automatic cannon, with the 30mm M230 chain gun identified as one possible option. The proposed weapon could use canister-type ammunition designed to disperse numerous fragments against small drones.

Adding dedicated counter-drone equipment to the mobile gun system would therefore give the vehicle another role beyond direct engagement of conventional ground targets.

The prominence of counter-drone measures in the planning of the vehicle also reflects the increasingly contested environment in which Taiwan’s armored forces would have to operate. In a conflict with China, armored units have to operate under the threat of persistent surveillance and attacks from a wide range of uncrewed systems, making concealment, mobility, dispersion, and organic counter-drone capabilities very important to any change of survival. Questioning just how long any armor would last in a full-on invasion scenario is absolutely relevant. As we have seen in Ukraine, the drone threat alone has sidelined even the most capable armor. At the same time, Taiwan is working toward its own drone-heavy battlefield doctrine, part of a broader plan to turn the island into a “hellscape” for any invading force.

Overall, the September 23 demonstration offered a useful glimpse into the thinking behind Taiwan’s indigenous armored vehicle program.

As part of a wider modernization of ROCA armor, the service has also received 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, broadly equivalent to the M1A2 SEPv3 version — or System Enhancement Package version 3 — which you can read more about here.

With production of 178 series examples of the new vehicle scheduled to begin in 2027, Taiwan’s new 105mm mobile gun system is moving toward becoming a significant component of the island’s domestically produced armored fleet.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post This Is Taiwan’s New 105mm 8×8 Mobile Gun System appeared first on TWZ.

It’s stunning to comprehend how much has changed since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. The conflict quickly turned into one dominated by artillery, with both sides scrambling to source shells wherever possible. Drones have since replaced tubed artillery as the ‘king of battle’ along the front, but cannons still have an important place on the battlefield. The commander of a new combined drone-artillery brigade offered some fresh insights into how his guns are now being deployed to achieve effects that drones still can’t provide. 

As we have frequently documented, the ubiquity of drones has changed the nature of combat, especially when it comes to artillery. Not only can drones hold artillery positions at risk, many are cheaper than shells and easier to produce at scale. Most types are also precision guided munitions capable of hitting moving targets with pinpoint accuracy and can also provide battlefield surveillance. However, they are not a panacea, especially amid the cat-and-mouse game of electronic warfare countermeasures and improving kinetic and passive defenses.

In a recent interview with the Ukrainian Oboronka news outlet, Lt. Col. Vitalii Korniienko, commander of the 7th Artillery Brigade, talked about the changing nature of artillery warfare. Korniienko, whose unit is part of the Ukrainian National Guard, explained what is being done to keep his array of domestically produced Bogdana 155mm systems, donated weapons like M777 howitzers, remaining Soviet-era 2S7 Pion 203mm self-propelled howitzers and other guns, relevant. Here are some takeaways from that discussion.

How The Game Changed

“Guns used to be massed at positions to create an ‘artillery wall’ and a barrage of fire,” the lieutenant colonel said. “That practice is gone now. So, how effective is artillery today? We can create an artillery barrage, but what is the point of mindlessly churning up the earth? I’d rather send 20 FPV drones to destroy the target. The cost of that mission is $20,000.”

“Alternatively, I could fire 200 shells, but the cost would be astronomical,” he pointed out. “Plus, if we fired 100 shells from a gun in a single day, it likely wouldn’t survive until evening. The sky is full of drones; every shot gives away the position, leading to detection and an attempt to dismantle it using every available means. Nowadays, a typical mission involves a series of up to 10 shots. First, 3–5 shells for ranging, followed by fire on the target. That’s a minimum of five shells, with each costing at least $2,000.”

What Does The Drone-Artillery Brigade Do Differently?

“It is a concept of ours that was approved: combining artillery and drones within a single brigade,” Korniienko said. “Drones take out enemy artillery and logistics, while our guns provide cover for the infantry, destroy targets, and pin the enemy down in their dugouts. This way, we mitigate the limitations of both systems and boost overall effectiveness.”

“Our primary operations are focused within the corps’ area of ​​responsibility—targeting positions 10 kilometers deep or farther behind enemy lines. Of course, we will also engage closer targets if requested by the brigade holding the defense. In addition, we are shifting logistics tasks from pickup trucks to ground-based robotic systems. They are already transporting ammunition to drone and artillery positions, as well as food and fuel for generators.”

What Artillery Can Do That Drones Can’t

“Let’s be honest: 95% of strikes right now are carried out by drones,” Korniienko explained. “Yet, we cannot simply abandon artillery. The focus of our operations has shifted from merely striking the enemy to destroying, suppressing, and halting the actions of assault groups and armored columns—and the need for that remains as critical as ever. There are tasks that only artillery can handle.”

The high art of war, as practiced by the warriors of the National Guard's Artillery Brigade.

So high, it lands beyond the horizon.

: @ng_ukraine pic.twitter.com/v06aJ8KcjM

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) September 23, 2026

“For instance, we currently have several enemy targets in the Kupyansk sector that drones cannot reach due to electronic warfare (EW) interference, while slow fiber-optic drones are simply shot down,” the officer noted. “What do we do? We call in artillery. Nothing affects its shells. Fog, strong winds, snow, or headwinds—it makes no difference to artillery; it will operate regardless.”

Preparing Artillery For The Modern Battlefield

“At the beginning, both we and the Russians might have had two or three guns at a single position,” Korniienko proffered. “The enemy was doing this as late as 2023. Then it tapered off, because if you deployed six guns, an hour later they’d be gone. No one drives out into an open field anymore. Today, a gun wouldn’t even make it to the position without being spotted.”

As a result, the artillery crew’s deployment “is prepared in advance,” the officer stated. “First, anti-aircraft drone teams ‘clear’ the sky above the site of enemy reconnaissance assets. The position itself is a fully underground-dugout caponier with well-camouflaged access routes. We put a lot of effort into ensuring the artillery doesn’t get destroyed. Losing a gun is a huge blow to us.”

Short Range Versus Long Range Shells

“There is currently an ongoing debate about phasing out ‘short’ shells and switching entirely to long-range variants,” the officer stated. “This is intended to protect artillery from drone strikes.”

“What exactly is a ‘short’ shell, and should we stop using it?” he asked rhetorically. “The M107 155mm round is what is known as a ‘short’ shell. It is inexpensive and mass-produced; all our allies—and even our own country—manufacture it. We have sufficient stocks of them for combat operations. While accurate, its range is limited to 14–18 km, depending on the propellant used.”

Long-range options “include the M795 and its foreign equivalents,” Korniienko explained. “These are longer, heavier, and significantly more expensive. With high-quality propellant, they can reach 30 km, or even further if equipped with a base-bleed unit. However, both these shells and the necessary propellants are in short supply.”

“I do not believe abandoning the M107 is the right move,” the officer suggested. “Long-range shells cause faster barrel wear and compromise position concealment; firing a long-range charge produces a massive burst of flame from the muzzle—visible for kilometers at dusk or dawn.” “Besides,” he added, “18 km is a respectable range. If the gun is positioned 15 km back, it still has a 3-km margin to spare. That is sufficient for engaging frontline infantry. In my view, the ideal mix for most brigades would be 60% long-range shells and 40% standard M107 rounds.”

Big Versus Small Guns

“I operated 105mm guns in the Serebryanka area, on the Kharkiv axis,” Korniienko noted. “Based on intercepted communications, the enemy thought it was a mortar and searched for it within a five-to-six-kilometer range. But the howitzer was positioned eight or nine kilometers away and fired out to 10–12 kilometers.”

“There is almost no muzzle flash, just a bit of dust,” he added. “The shell arrives, and the enemy doesn’t even hear the sound of the shot. It’s compact and lightweight—you can transport it on a pickup truck. So yes, it would be useful.”

“I’d also like to see the development of 203mm artillery; why move away from that caliber?” the officer wondered aloud. “Our ‘Pion’ systems fire a massive 100-kilogram shell capable of punching through at least two floors of a building or a bunker. And it’s reasonably accurate, too. You wouldn’t want to be on the receiving end when guns like that are firing at you. Overall, I believe we need competition. Right now, the ‘Bogdana’ is evolving under wartime conditions, which is good. But in a few years, momentum could stall. They might just keep producing the same system without significant upgrades because there’s no incentive to innovate. Yet, the nature of war doesn’t stand still.”

Wary Of Asian Shells

“We have a wide range of shells from different countries, and the ones coming from the West are fine,” Korniienko said. “However, their counterparts produced in certain Asian countries… the quality is frankly poor.”

“What is wrong with them?” queried Korniienko, who did not name the country in question. “On paper, the shell weight is listed as 46 kilograms, but when we weigh them, we find 46.9 or 45.4 kg. And that half-kilogram difference—give or take—has a huge impact on where the shell lands.”

As a result, “we no longer trust the standard firing tables provided with the shells; instead, we compile our own for each manufacturer. We weigh every batch and sort them by weight so that the difference between the ‘piles’ is minimal, ensuring a reasonably tight grouping. I can’t afford to make a mistake that causes a shell to land 2 kilometers off-target—right where our infantry guys are positioned. I should add that our artillerymen are actually wary of shells from one specific country. There have been instances where they tore off the muzzle brake or even caused the barrel to burst. A barrel burst is a disaster.” 

Homegrown Is The Best

Korniienko said his unit was one of the first to test the Bogdana system, adding that he prefers it to other guns.

“We tested them and provided feedback to the manufacturer, which was then used to refine the design,” he explained. “It is a solid gun now, and it is my preferred choice. It might not be the absolute best, but I am very satisfied with the support and service.”

“If there’s a breakdown, the gun is back in position within a day or two,” he pointed out. “For instance, a gun broke down today, and we needed a repair team from the manufacturer. I know I’ll have it fixed by the day after tomorrow. They arrive in the morning, and by midday, the gun is ready. Then it takes another day or two to get it back to the position. That is very fast.”

That’s a very different experience than what he sees with donated weapons like the U.S.-made M777.

“As for the Western partners helping us—we are deeply grateful,” the officer avowed. “However, by the time you actually receive a part—say, a sensor—the gun might have been sitting idle for six months. And you can’t try to fix it yourself, because that would void the warranty.”

While artillery may no longer be the reigning weapon of war, as far as Ukraine is concerned, it has not been relegated to the dustbin of history yet either.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post The Evolving Role Of Ukraine’s Artillery In The Age Of Drones appeared first on TWZ.

Seit Monaten hören wir von europäischen Politikern und Medien, die ukrainischen Angriffe tief ins russische Hinterland, die unter anderem zu einer Benzinknappheit geführt haben, würden die Russen kriegsmüde machen, weshalb der Druck auf die russische Regierung wachse, einem Friedensschluss zu den Bedingungen der EU zuzustimmen. Und aus der EU hört man ja auch ganz offen, […]