Taking a break from fighting Russians in the Kostiantynivka sector of the eastern Donetsk region, the commander of a Ukrainian uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) unit spoke with us about innovations in the use of these systems. One was the first deployment of a UGV specifically designed for amphibious operations to deliver supplies to frontline troops in areas impeded by water obstacles. Large areas of the front line are bisected by rivers and wetlands, and the country has many other small waterways and marsh areas. As we have frequently reported, the use of UGVs by both Ukraine and Russia has exploded as the ubiquity of aerial attack drones makes it far too dangerous for human battlefield movements.

In an exclusive interview with TWZ, the commander of the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade’s “Alter Ego” UGV unit, who goes by the call sign “Electric,” offered us unique insights into the challenges of developing amphibious UGVs and how they were deployed.

In the first of two parts, Electric talks about why Alter Ego developed amphibious UGVs – including modifying a Triton variant for this – and how the unit made them work. The second part features his insights into using heavy ‘bomber drones’ to drop UGVs behind enemy lines for kamikaze raids. In addition, a representative of Brave1, Ukraine’s weapons technology accelerator, spoke about developing these systems at scale.

Some of the questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.

Q: How did the need for amphibious UGVs for logistics operations first come up?

A: We had this idea for a long time, but recently one of the units of the Armed Forces asked for our help to solve this problem, so that the UGV could overcome water obstacles.

There was a crucial need for this kind of means at certain parts of the front, but the units that are located there didn’t have the capacity by themselves to solve this task. So our battalion was asked to solve this problem because we are one of the most experienced units in terms of UGVs.

Q: How long did it take to design and test the amphibious UGV, and what went into that process?

A: The whole process from development to battle deployment took less than three months.

Q: What did you have to do to make this work?

A: First of all, we looked at amphibious solutions that were on the market, not only in Ukraine, but in the world, and we took two separate approaches. One was taking one of the main UGVs that our unit is using on the ground, and we made it amphibious. And the other approach was that we took one of the solutions that was on the market that already had amphibious capabilities, and we solved several disadvantages that it had. And at the moment, we are using both.

Q: What did you have to do to make the UGV amphibious, and then what were some of the obstacles that had to be overcome to get this operational?

A: First of all, we have to explain that there are different solutions on the market that kind of work on the testing ground — like they can swim, they can drive on the ground, and in the vision of the manufacturer, they are working. But the fact is that these solutions are not ready for the reality on the front line, which is often very different from what is on the testing ground.

And the second point is that the unit has its own workshops where people work near the front line, and the experts, the engineers that work there, they have a very high level of competence to evaluate different solutions and select the one that has potential. And that’s what’s completely different between this unit and everyone else, like manufacturers and others who are working on these solutions, because they don’t understand what’s needed on the battlefield.

Q: So what did you have to change to make it work?

A: Regarding the amphibious one, basically the unit changed almost everything that that UGV had, starting from electronics, the software, the waterproofing, the communications – we basically changed everything. Regarding the one that we already used on the ground, we basically tried to retain what was allowing it to be an effective UGV on the ground, and we added waterproofing and specific mechanics, so that it can work in the water environment.

Q: You mentioned communications. What kind of communications did you add?

A: The communication means that was installed on the UGV by the manufacturer was not sufficient at all. Basically, it didn’t have enough quality for the battlefield situation. It was not working. But we already have our own communications that we were working on, and we have a lot of experience because we have been working for a long time in this UGV area. So we basically helped to install a sufficient level of communications on this UGV.

Q: So how does the amphibious UGV communicate with the controller? Does it use Starlink or some other satellite communications system for navigation?

A: This is satellite navigation, but not only. Satellite navigation is a part of this communication system.

Q: What are the other parts?

A: It’s better not to talk in detail about the other part of the communication system.

Q: There were probably a lot of different missions that could have been used for this first amphibious UGV logistics delivery. Why was this particular mission chosen?

A: The Alter Ego unit has so much experience in terms of UGVs, and not just experience of using UGVs, but the experience of being the first in the world. We had one of the first evacuation missions, we had one of the first strike missions using UGVs, the paratrooper UGV, and now the amphibious UGV. So basically, we have the systems to make it work for the first time when nobody knows how to conduct this mission.

Q: No, I mean why did this particular mission get chosen to be the first one?

A: There are certain places on the front line where we have water obstacles that prevent logistics from being done by UGV. At the moment, UGVs are carrying hundreds of tons of logistics, probably the most compared to any other means on the front line, but before this, these water obstacles would prevent UGVs from providing logistics for those parts of the front, and that need can’t be fully satisfied by UAVs or other means. That’s why we did this mission with the amphibious UGV, and now our task here is to scale this technology and provide this logistics system for other similar parts of the front where there are water obstacles.

Q: Tell me about where and when this mission took place and what it was like to watch it unfold.

A: So unfortunately, we can’t provide information about when and where this operation took place. But regarding how it went and what we felt, this was another big challenge, because this is something that wasn’t done before, and nobody thought this is real. So this was quite difficult, and to tell the truth, the mission didn’t succeed on the first try, actually, and it required a lot of effort in terms of planning, preparing, engineering, and basically it required 100% effort from everyone involved in that mission.

Q: How many times did it fail before, and what went wrong?

A: We had one failed attempt. The reason for failure was a certain technical problem. After that, we analyzed what went wrong, and we worked on solving those issues. Basically, it’s something that nobody had tried to do, it’s kind of hard to know what can go wrong before you actually try it. So the best way to find a solution like that is to try and then iterate on that attempt and make it better and better and better.

Also, I would like to add that although this was the first successful mission regarding an amphibious UGV, it’s not that there was no work on that before that. We were actively talking to and collecting the experience of everyone who was working on these kinds of missions before, and that was also a reason why this mission succeeded.

Q: How far did the amphibious UGV go for this mission?

A: So the UGV went 40 kilometers one way, and then it returned. So probably around 70 kilometers in total, and it carried food and other supplies.

Q: Did this UGV come under Russian fire on this mission?

A: Yes, and it survived.

Q: How does the UGV switch from water to land operations?

A: So the UGV has two separate control systems, one for water and one for land, and basically it switches to the one that is required at the moment. That’s how it can operate in both environments.

Q: Is that autonomous, or is that something that the controller at the base has to do as they watch the UGV on its mission?

A: At the moment, the operator fully controls the UGV manually. And basically, before, the operators of UGVs only knew how to move them on land, but now they also had to learn how to move them in the water. So not only was the technology itself developed, but we also had to prepare the operator and come up with tactics for this UGV.

Q: Did you use AI on this mission in any way, and if so, how?

A: We didn’t use AI.

Q: Have there been other missions using amphibious UGVs?

A: Yes.

Q: Can you say how many and what was delivered?

A: No.

Q: Is this designed only for logistics missions, or will it be used in the future for strike missions, either as a one-way attack system or as a platform for machine guns or other weapons?

A: We can use it in different ways in the future.

Q: Mud season is fast approaching, when much maneuvering becomes impossible or severely degraded because of how difficult it is to move in the thick, oozing slop. Will your amphibious UGVs work in the mud?

A: I think it can operate in the mud in the same way it operates in the water.

In the next segment of our interview, Electric talks about using bomber drones to deliver UGVs behind the lines, and a Brave1 representative talks about how the organization is working to develop these systems at scale for wider use.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Inside Ukraine’s First Combat Deployment Of Robotic Amphibious Vehicles appeared first on TWZ.

By Buğra Sarı | MEMO | October 1, 2026

Israel’s pursuit of security increasingly rests on a destabilizing proposition: that its neighbours become less threatening when their capacity to exercise sovereignty is diminished. Since the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, this approach has become particularly visible across several distinct arenas. Military operations, territorial incursions and restrictions on political and economic autonomy suggest a conception of security dependent on keeping others vulnerable. The consequences extend beyond individual confrontations. When states cannot control their territory, rebuild institutions or protect their populations, the regional conditions necessary for durable security begin to erode.

The argument is not that Israel created every conflict in the Middle East. Authoritarian rule, sectarian violence, armed groups and competing regional interventions have all contributed to the region’s instability.

The question is whether the means Israel uses to pursue its own security deepen that instability. Repeatedly weakening neighbouring states and political communities may bring short-term military gains, but it can also erode their ability to contain violence and maintain order, making the region more dangerous—including for Israel itself.

This pattern can be understood as the denial of sovereignty. Sovereignty involves more than diplomatic recognition: it requires institutions capable of governing, providing services and exercising legitimate authority over the use of force. When these capacities are persistently degraded, formal independence becomes increasingly hollow.

The cases differ in their circumstances and severity, but together they reveal a troubling hierarchy: Israeli freedom of military action repeatedly takes precedence over other societies’ ability to govern and secure themselves.

Syria offers a particularly revealing example. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, Israel launched extensive attacks against Syrian military infrastructure and moved into the separation zone established under the 1974 disengagement agreement. Israel justified the destruction of military assets as necessary to prevent advanced weapons from falling into extremist hands. Yet the targets included airfields, air-defence systems and naval facilities—capabilities relevant to the functioning of a state, whatever government eventually controls them.

The longer-term problem is that preventing a hypothetical future threat can obstruct the reconstruction of an already devastated country. Syria needs accountable security institutions capable of controlling territory, containing armed factions and protecting communities. Destroying military capabilities without a credible framework for rebuilding legitimate state authority risks leaving those functions unfulfilled. In July 2025, Israeli strikes on Damascus, including the defence ministry, further demonstrated Israel’s willingness to impose military limits on the new authorities.

Syria’s transitional authorities must themselves answer for abuses and protect minorities; state consolidation cannot justify repression. Nevertheless, externally imposed military vulnerability is no substitute for accountable governance.

A government expected to prevent threats from emerging within its territory must have the capacity to exercise authority there. Undermining that capacity can preserve the fragmentation through which armed groups survive.

Lebanon exposes a related contradiction. Hezbollah’s independent military power has long constrained the Lebanese state’s authority and its ability to determine questions of war and peace. Reducing that parallel authority could, under appropriate political arrangements, strengthen state sovereignty. But Israeli military action does not automatically transfer power from Hezbollah to the Lebanese government. Bombardment, displacement and violations of Lebanese territory can weaken the institutions expected to assume responsibility for national security.

The distinction is crucial: weakening an armed organization and strengthening a state are separate outcomes. In March 2026, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called both for respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty and for stronger support to its armed forces so that they could become the country’s sole military force. That combination identifies what repeated unilateral intervention overlooks: security requires an institutional successor capable of governing after military operations end.

Where that capacity remains inadequate, another cycle becomes possible. Armed groups invoke external attacks to justify retaining their weapons; the state struggles to establish authority; Israel cites the continuing armed presence to justify further intervention. Hezbollah bears responsibility for its own decisions, but Israeli policies can reinforce the conditions sustaining its claim that the Lebanese state cannot protect the population.

The attack on Doha on September 9, 2025 extended this logic into the diplomatic sphere. Qatar was mediating negotiations involving Israel and Hamas when Israel struck Hamas representatives on its territory. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the attack as a breach of international law and an assault on mediation. The significance exceeded the violation of Qatari sovereignty: even a state facilitating negotiations could find its territory treated as an extension of the battlefield.

Mediation depends on practical assurances that communication with an adversary will remain possible. Targeting interlocutors in a mediating country makes those assurances harder to provide. It raises the costs of hosting negotiations and can undermine channels needed for ceasefires, hostage releases and humanitarian arrangements. Military reach may expand while opportunities for a political settlement contract.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025 raises a different sovereignty question along the region’s Red Sea periphery. Somaliland has maintained separate institutions for decades, and its claim to recognition has its own history. Nevertheless, Israel’s recognition challenged Somalia’s internationally recognized territorial framework. The African Union rejected the move and warned that such recognition could undermine peace and stability.

Recognition is not equivalent to bombardment, and the cases should not be collapsed into a single legal category. Their connection is political: the territorial arrangements on which other governments rely become subject to unilateral decisions shaped by Israeli interests. In an already contested regional environment, such decisions risk adding another dispute to fragile processes of state consolidation.

The confrontation with Iran illustrates the danger of extending preventive military logic to a powerful regional adversary. On February 28, 2026, Guterres condemned the use of force by the United States and Israel against Iran and Iran’s subsequent retaliation across the region. He warned that these actions undermined international peace and security. The escalation demonstrated how efforts to eliminate threats militarily can expose additional countries to attack.

Iran’s support for armed groups and its own military conduct cannot be excluded from this assessment. Nevertheless, degrading an adversary’s capabilities does not necessarily resolve the political incentives driving confrontation. It may instead encourage dispersal, rearmament or greater reliance on asymmetric methods. Tactical destruction can coexist with a more dangerous strategic environment.

The Palestinian case represents the most profound expression of this problem because it concerns both collective self-government and the conditions of human survival. In the West Bank, withholding revenues owed to the Palestinian Authority weakens the institutions expected to administer daily life.

The World Bank documented how the suspension of transfers in 2025 intensified fiscal distress, reduced salary payments and placed pressure on essential services. These measures undermine the practical foundations of Palestinian self-government.

A political authority cannot provide credible governance indefinitely while lacking reliable access to its own revenues. Weakening public administration also weakens its legitimacy, potentially benefiting actors who argue that institutional politics offers no meaningful route to Palestinian rights. The resulting dysfunction can then be invoked as evidence that Palestinians are incapable of governing themselves. Restrictions on capacity thus risk producing the very incapacity used to justify continued control.

In Gaza, the destruction has reached beyond institutional viability. The devastation of housing, healthcare, water systems and livelihoods, compounded by restrictions on humanitarian access, has endangered the material conditions necessary for life. In August 2025, a joint statement by UN agencies confirmed famine in Gaza Governorate and described a crisis involving starvation and preventable deaths. The issue was no longer merely whether Palestinians could build a state, but whether civilians could survive.

Hence, in Gaza, the denial of sovereignty has escalated into a denial of survival. In September 2025, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry concluded that Israel had committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. Earlier, on November 21, 2024, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Benjamin Netanyahu, finding reasonable grounds to believe that he bore criminal responsibility for the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare and the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution and other inhumane acts. These findings expose the devastating human consequences of denying a population access to the essentials of life. The systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure and deprivation of food, water and medical care undermine Palestinians’ ability to survive as a community in their homeland. Viewed through this analysis, the genocide identified by the UN commission represents the most extreme manifestation of denial: a progression from obstructing a people’s capacity to govern themselves to destroying the conditions necessary for their continued existence.

Taken together, these cases suggest a self-reinforcing cycle. Military intervention and institutional weakening can generate insecurity, displacement and political fragmentation. Those conditions create opportunities for armed actors, whose activities then provide further grounds for intervention. This is a causal risk, not an inevitable outcome of every operation. Its importance lies in the contradiction between immediate military advantage and the requirements of lasting security.

Breaking that cycle requires a different measure of success: whether policies leave behind institutions capable of governing, populations able to live securely and diplomatic arrangements that reduce incentives for violence. Protecting Israeli civilians and respecting neighbouring societies’ sovereignty are mutually reinforcing necessities.

A regional order built around one state’s freedom to intervene and everyone else’s enforced vulnerability cannot offer durable peace. By denying others the capacity to govern—and, in Gaza, devastating the conditions necessary to survive—Israel risks perpetuating the insecurity from which it seeks protection.

In this tense, riveting first-person excerpt from his new book This Cursed Beautiful Land: A Russian Story, Evan Gershkovich recounts the harrowing months he spent as a prisoner in Russia, leading up to his eventual release in a complex, multi-country prisoner exchange. Even in the darkness, Gershkovich offers rays of light: care packages from friends, letters by the hundred, and a cautiously blossoming love with a friend in Berlin. We may know the ending, but the details of these days reveal what it takes to get there.

A few hours after my arrival, I heard a cart rolling down the hallway. A guard opened a kormushka — a feeder window in the door about the size of a human head. A man in a chef’s uniform filled my bowl with porridge, placed a piece of rancid-smelling boiled fish on my plate and gave me some weak tea. The reality of my new surroundings slammed into me.

Thoughts ricocheted inside my head. Earlier in the day I’d had a comforting one: they’ve taken me for a swap, I told myself. That’s all this is.

Now, curled up on the bed in my 12ft by 8ft cell, knees pulled to my chest, I thought, what if the FSB really does think I’m a spy and wants to make an example out of me? Maybe they don’t want to swap me at all. Maybe I really will spend 20 years here.

“What is remarkable is that Ukraine and Moldova, despite finding themselves in a very tense situation regarding their security, are extremely keen to move closer to the EU and have therefore already begun negotiations and opened the first cluster.”

These are the words of the deputy director of the European Council on foreign relations (ECFR), Vesela Cherneva, and they come just as the official negotiation process for the two countries’ accession to the European Union has begun.

With this, the EU embarked on a truly geopolitical enlargement – driven not only by the pursuit of shared values, a larger market, and stronger common institutions, but also by the need to safeguard the continent’s security in a shifting environment.

Ukraine: a battle-hardened nation’s journey from the post-Soviet world to the EU

According to Cherneva, the EU’s upcoming enlargement is the only way to institutionally anchor Ukraine within a serious and lasting framework, given that the US position has remained clear under both presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden: Nato enlargement to include Ukraine is not possible.

“Currently, EU membership is the only way to integrate Ukraine’s and Europe’s security systems. This is an entirely different discussion from negotiations on chapters, clusters, sanitary standards and other accession requirements. We are talking about security guarantees, but also about the transfer of military technologies from Ukraine to Europe and, more broadly, about how Ukraine – which currently possesses the strongest and most combat-capable army in Europe – can, while defending Europe, also become part of the European security debate,” Cherneva says.

Ognyan Minchev, political scientist, professor and executive director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies, an independent think-tank in Bulgaria, also believes that Ukraine’s importance is substantial and that the questions surrounding its integration are highly complex.

“Ukraine currently possesses the only genuinely combat-capable army on the European continent. Western European armies have very limited personnel numbers and, until recently, received extremely low levels of funding. The lack of real resources, including weapons, to address the challenges of military security makes Ukraine a more attractive partner,” he says.

Although many experts would point to Ukraine’s contribution to European security as the greatest benefit of its accession to the EU, the country can also contribute to development in other areas. There is undoubtedly great potential for development in the fields of agriculture and farming.

The country has a vast area of cultivated land and is among the world’s leading producers of a number of cereal crops such as wheat, maize, barley, rice, and others. It exports these products to third countries, and membership would increase the EU’s economic influence in these regions.

Ukraine’s accession could also lead to cooperation between different sectors and result in an increase in meat and dairy production as a consequence of increased cereal production.

Beyond agriculture, Ukraine’s pharmaceutical industry could offer the EU an opportunity to reduce its reliance on imports of generic medicines from China and various Asian countries. Thanks to its favourable climate, Ukraine also has great potential for various types of renewable energy.

Deposits of gallium, rutile, graphite, magnesium ores, lithium and other minerals vital to the green transition could contribute to European production and help the EU compete with China.

According to Minchev, integrating Ukraine represents a major challenge because it involves a large country that is institutionally weak, with high levels of corruption, poor economic organisation and significant shortcomings in the functioning of public life.

“Ukraine has been forced to transform itself into an effective fighting machine, but in other respects it remains a post-Soviet society with serious problems in the areas mentioned above. This makes its rapid integration into the EU extremely difficult,” Minchev says.

Moldova: a key piece in Europe’s security architecture continues to struggle under Russia’s shadow

“For Moldova, we can say that it is a small but significant element in the broader domino effect of Black Sea security, which is becoming an increasingly crucial aspect of overall European security. This is because the confrontation between the Kremlin regime and Europe is effectively unfolding along the line of a new Iron Curtain being formed across Ukraine and the Black Sea region,” Minchev says.

According to Cherneva, Moldova’s accession is also crucial precisely because the country is a buffer state, and Russia has demonstrated that it does not tolerate buffers.

“Russia seeks to conquer and control such buffer zones. If Moldova does not want to share the fate of Belarus or Georgia, it must take rapid steps towards European integration,” Cherneva says.

For years, Moldova has served as a testing ground for Russia’s hybrid warfare. As Western European countries are only now confronting the full scale of Russian hybrid attacks, Moldova has already spent years developing its own resilience and countermeasures.

The country brings to European security valuable expertise gained from combating Russian disinformation and resisting repeated attempts by the Kremlin to interfere in its domestic political processes.

Yet Moldova’s accession would have implications extending far beyond security. Although it possesses far less agricultural land than Ukraine, the country has the potential to make a meaningful contribution to the European agricultural sector. Moldova has been gradually integrating into the EU’s Single Market through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Palestine This Week | Middle East Monitor | September 30, 2026

This week’s MEMO review examines claims about Netanyahu’s advance knowledge of 7 October, his provocative UN speech and Israel’s sweeping West Bank closure. We discuss calls to free Marwan Barghouti, moves to bar Arab-led parties from Israeli elections, Trump’s rejection of Iran’s proposal and allegations of election interference involving Israeli firms.

Chapters:

00:00 Introduction & Overview

01:41 Claims of Netanyahu’s Advance Knowledge of 7 October

18:14 Netanyahu’s UN Speech: Props, Provocations and Defiance

22:58 Israel’s West Bank Closure and Its Impact on Palestinians

26:30 Growing Calls to Free Marwan Barghouti

29:40 Israel’s Political Opposition and the Two-State Solution

35:00 Arab Party Disqualifications: Democracy and Apartheid

38:07 Trump Rejects Iran’s Proposal: What Was on Offer?

41:42 Meta’s Restrictions on Lula and Allegations of Israeli Election Interference

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By Justin K.P. | The Dissident | September 30, 2026

The U.S. Senate just voted 47-51 against a bill introduced by the Senators Chris Van Hollen, Tim Kaine and Bernie Sanders which would have “forced Secretary of State Marco Rubio to submit to Congress, within 30 days, a report on what information is available about the killings of the nine US citizens, the status of US and Israeli investigations into the killings, the number of US citizens currently held in Israeli prisons, the treatment of Palestinian children in Israeli prisons, and a description of the steps the US government has taken to reduce violence in the West Bank.”

In other words, the Zionist occupied Senate voted against releasing information about Israel killing American citizens in order to protect Israel.

The bill would have forced Marco Rubio to release the information about nine US citizens who have been killed by settlers and Israeli security forces, including the late Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, who was killed by Israeli occupation forces while reporting in the West Bank in 2022, an intentional murder that was covered up by the Biden administration.

The Biden administration covered up for Israel, claiming that her murder was the “result of tragic circumstances during an IDF-led military operation against factions of Palestinian Islamic Jihad”.

But later, the whistleblower Colonel Steve Gabavics, who worked at the time for the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator in Jerusalem and led the investigation into Shireen Abu Akleh, revealed that his team found she was intentionally targeted, but the U.S. covered it up to protect Israel.

In an interview with Democracy Now!, he noted, “We were able to disprove very quickly the assertion that there was a Palestinian gunman in front of Shireen Abu Akleh, that the IDF had shot at, and they had accidentally shot her instead… the indications of everything we read from the reports that we got from the IDF on their locations, and proximity to where the event happened, what we got from the investigation from the Palestinian Authority, and our investigation, to us it was very clear that the (IDF) individual in the vehicle who took the shot, would have had a clear line of sight and would have had visibility of Shireen Abu Akleh walking down the middle of the street for a period of time before he took the shots”.

But he revealed that the Biden administration covered up this information, saying, “After we had completed this we were on regular video calls, classified and unclassified with the state department … I indicated that the evidence to me indicated that there would have been enough if we actually built a criminal case to have enough information and facts to beyond a reasonable doubt, for a conviction at some level. We were pushing for the fact that they needed to formally admit the fact that it was not an accident, that a (Israeli) soldier killed Shireen Abu Akleh, that it was an intentional shooting, and unfortunately, that was not what came out … When the actual statement came out, that was absolutely not what I expected… I was shocked … all the data indicates the exact opposite, it was not fog of war… This was not what we had found”.

He added, “It all came down to not trying to anger the Israelis by holding them accountable for intentionally killing an American citizen”.

Yet again, AIPAC-bought members of the Senate want to continue the cover-up of the Israeli murder of American citizens in order not to anger Israel and its lobby.

By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | September 30, 2026

When I first saw footage of Gaza doctor Munir al-Bursh and his family kneeling beside the white-shrouded body of his son, surrounded by mourners, I thought it was an old video. It was not.

My conclusion, however, was understandable. In December 2023, only months after the start of the Israeli genocide in Gaza, the al-Bursh family was targeted in an Israeli attack. Dr. Munir, director-general of Gaza’s Ministry of Health, was wounded. So were other members of his family. His daughter, Jinan, only 13, was killed.

That same day, Gaza’s beloved doctor was back at work, joining the many doctors across the Strip trying to save lives as Israel’s killing machine claimed them by the thousands.

Alas, the latest footage was not old footage resurfacing. It was a new coffin, a new funeral, another child buried by the same family. This time, the attack took place during what some in the media continue to call the ‘Gaza ceasefire.’

On September 19, an Israeli drone strike killed al-Bursh’s eldest son, Basir, outside a tent west of Jabaliya refugee camp.

“We were together side by side,” the grieving father recalled. Basir had warned him: “The Israelis are targeting both of us.” Moments later, his son stepped outside the tent and was killed.

One can be forgiven for confusing Gaza’s present with its recent past. The scenes emerging today are almost indistinguishable from those that preceded the so-called ceasefire of October 2025. The sequence repeats itself with terrible familiarity: Israeli strikes, shelling and sniping; Palestinians killed; the bereaved carrying their dead through Gaza’s destroyed streets, searching among the ruins for somewhere to bury them.

Al-Bursh’s story is part of this terrible continuum, but its significance extends beyond his personal loss. Throughout the genocide, he and other Palestinian doctors became Gaza’s de facto spokespeople. They counted the dead and wounded, documented hunger and destruction, and chronicled the collapse of the medical system from within its hospitals.

In the process, they became Gaza’s highest moral authority, more credible than politicians or self-proclaimed leaders.

And the world listened. Gaza’s doctors forged a bond with global civil society that no political institution could manufacture.

Perhaps that helps explain the staggering price Gaza’s medical community has been made to pay. According to the World Health Organization, more than 1,700 healthcare workers have been killed since 2023, amid at least 920 attacks on healthcare.

Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya, like Dr. al-Bursh, became a symbol of that medical resistance. The director of Kamal Adwan Hospital remained at his post through siege and repeated Israeli attacks before Israeli forces detained him in December 2024. He remains imprisoned without charge or trial, amid reports from his lawyer of beatings and deteriorating health.

Dr. al-Bursh, meanwhile, remains steadfast despite repeated blows that would have broken many others. His wife, too, embodies sumud, the Palestinian tradition of steadfastness nurtured at home and passed from one generation to the next.

Even in the immediate aftermath of his son’s killing, al-Bursh continued warning about Gaza’s collapsing healthcare system. Indeed, hospitals have been forced to suspend scheduled surgeries and outpatient services, while severe shortages of fuel, medicines and equipment continue.

“The limited quantities of fuel reaching the enclave barely keep health facilities alive,” al-Bursh warned a day after his son’s murder.

His statement came as world leaders gathered thousands of miles away, in New York, for the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly.

And once again, Palestine echoed through speech after speech, though this time the language carried a new urgency.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez condemned “the genocide that Netanyahu continues to perpetrate in Gaza.” UN Secretary-General António Guterres described Israel’s mass extermination as involving “a scale of killing and destruction unlike anything I have witnessed” during his tenure. Even French President Emmanuel Macron called Gaza “a spectacle that shames us all,” asking: “What is our credibility worth if we remain inactive on Gaza?”

Then came Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Dozens of delegates walked out as he approached the podium, leaving row upon row of empty seats, while protests continued outside the UN. Netanyahu responded by calling those who departed “moral cowards.”

One might pause here and speak of tides turning, currents changing and a world slowly loosening the decades-long grip of Israel and its American benefactor.

But Gaza does not have the luxury of time. While the words reverberate through the halls of the United Nations, children are still killed in front of their families. Mass funerals remain part of Gaza’s daily rhythm.

Approximately 1.7 million people remain displaced, many under inadequate shelter, without sufficient clean water or sanitation. Hospitals remain crippled. And above this landscape of ruin, the drones still circle.

Between today and the next UN General Assembly lies an entire year—365 days in which those words can either acquire meaning or become yet another entry in the long archive of speeches on Palestine. However, there is time for rhetoric to become policy: for sanctions to be imposed, boycotts activated, meaningful aid delivered and those responsible for war crimes held accountable.

Until then, Dr. Munir al-Bursh and thousands of Gaza’s men and women will continue to hold the fort amid shattered hospitals, destroyed homes and an exhausted population.

Their resilience is extraordinary. But Gaza cannot be expected to endure simply because it has proved capable of enduring.

In New York, Palestine is spoken of from the podium. In Gaza, Palestinians are still being carried to their graves.

It is time to close the distance between words and action, once and for all.

Palestinian Center for Human Rights – September 28, 2026

In cooperation with the Centre for Palestine Studies at SOAS University London and Friends of Palestinian Universities, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) has released a new report, “Scholasticide and Genocide in Gaza: Assessment, Testimonial and Legal Analysis,” documenting Israel’s systematic destruction of Gaza’s educational system and examining how this policy forms an integral part of Israel’s ongoing three-year genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

The report demonstrates that Israel’s attacks on education in Gaza, including on UNRWA educational faciltiies and staff, go far beyond the destruction of schools and universities or the killing of Palestinian teachers. They constitute a comprehensive policy aimed at dismantling the educational, intellectual, social and cultural foundations necessary for the continued existence and development of Palestinian society.

Drawing on dozens of testimonies and affidavits collectd by PCHR field researchers and lawyers in Gaza, alongside PCHR’s extensive documentation, open-source material, United Nations reports, academic research and relevant international jurisprudence, the report identifies five interconnected patterns of scholasticide: the killing of students, teachers and academics; causing serious bodily and mental harm to them; destroying of educational facilities; obstructing the establishment alternative educational structures; and imposing genocidal conditions that prevent students from accessing education.

By July 2026, PCHR had documented the killing of approximately 20,051 students, more than 830 teachers and educational staff, and over 194 scholars, academics and researchers. Nearly the entire educational infrastructure in in Gaza has been extensively damaged or destroyed, while hundreds of thousands of students have endured prolonged interruption of their education amid displacement, starvation, bombardment, loss of family members, destruction of homes, lack of electricity and internet access, and the collapse of essential services.

PCHR’s report finds that certain acts committed within Israel’s campaign of scholasticide constitute genocidal acts under Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, including killing members of the protected group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

The report further highlights the long-term impact on Palestinian children and young Palestinians, including psychological harm, educational loss, diminished future opportunities and intergenerational trauma. Israel’s erasure of the educational infrastructure and broader civilian life in Gaza does not only constitute an attack on the rights of the present generation but also on the future generations.

Education has historically played a central role in sustaining Palestinian identity, knowledge, social cohesion and cultural continuity, particularly in the context of prolonged displacement and occupation. Israel’s destruction of universities, schools, libraries, academic records and cultural institutions therefore carries consequences far beyond the loss of physical infrastructure. It seeks to sever Palestinians from their history and intellectual life, diminish their capacity to rebuild their society, and deprive future generations of the means to learn, develop and participate fully in their community.

PCHR stresses that the destruction of Gaza’s education system did not begin on 7 October 2023. For decades, Palestinian schools, universities and educational institutions have been subjected to attacks, restrictions and destruction during successive Israeli military operations. The unprecedented scale of destruction since October 2023 however represents the culmination and intensification of this longstanding pattern.

PCHR calls on the international community, particularly States Parties to the Genocide Convention, to:

• Take immediate and effective measures to bring Israel’s genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza to an end, including its policy of scholasticide.
• Ensure full compliance with the three provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice in the case of South Africa v. Israel.
• Impose a comprehensive arms embargo on Israel and halt all military, financial and other assistance that may contribute to the commission of international crimes.
• Support international accountability mechanisms, including the International Criminal Court, and ensure that those responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are investigated and prosecuted.
• Take concrete measures to protect Palestinian students, teachers, academics and educational institutions and guarantee the restoration of the right to education in Gaza.
• Provide sustained support for the reconstruction of Gaza’s schools, universities, libraries and educational infrastructure, while ensuring that reconstruction does not substitute for accountability.
• Address the long-term psychological, educational and developmental consequences suffered by Palestinian children and young people and ensure their access to rehabilitation, mental-health support and inclusive education.

More rearmament talks are underway in Brussels as European politicians continue building an increasingly tense anti-Russian discourse. On Wednesday, September 30, defense ministers and industry representatives joined the Euronews Defense and Space Summit, focusing on the bloc’s growing defense expenditure and member cooperation.

The summit took place after weeks of allegations of hybrid attacks on EU members, which pushed the already tense rearmament narrative permeating the European political establishment up a couple more notches. It also followed, by only a couple of days, the Council of the EU’s announcement of the next phase of five European Defense Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs) – projects that “allow EU countries to work together on major defense initiatives that are too large or too complex for individual countries to develop on their own.”

Read more: “Militarization of rules and minds” in Europe threatens workers and welfare

While separate, the two events shared several points in common, starting with a focus on increasing coordination between EU countries to arm more efficiently – and spend the billions of euros planned for defense over the coming years. They also emphasized sections of the military sector to receive the most attention – including drones and military capacities in Eastern Europe. 

This geographical focus goes beyond EU members, expanding to – at least – Ukraine and Moldova. Most EDPCIs – like the Drone and Counter-Drone European Resolve (DECODER) and the Eastern Flank Watch – list Ukraine as a partner. Ukrainian arms entrepreneurs were also present at the summit in Brussels, including leading figures from Fire Point, one of the country’s most prominent arms companies.

Very imminent investments into arms

While NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated in his summit intervention that there is “no imminent danger” to the alliance members’ territories, he and others did not hold back in offering anticipations of an unstable period.

Belgian Minister of Defense Theo Francken, for one, anticipated “more hybrid threat actions” and an overall “dark winter for Europe” – a scenario he seems to want to address by spending more on arms and cutting social services, as he has explicitly stated on numerous occasions.

“Europe has been very good in investing in soft power, in social security,” Francken said. “And it’s beautiful to have a pension system, to have social welfare systems when someone gets sick, when somebody loses his job – we have everything. But when there’s a war or there’s hybrid threats, we don’t have anything.”

Considering the significant amount of money European countries have already invested into armament, his assessment that “we don’t have anything” is inaccurate at best. 

It also remains contested on a regular basis on the streets of many European cities, where trade unions, students, and peace movements continue to protest against austerity budgets that aim to provide for war.

Europe needs a policy that builds security with its neighbors

In addition to large-scale demonstrations against social security and labor cuts in France’s proposed 2027 budget and student strikes against conscription in Germany last week, mobilizations are expected to grow over the coming months – including an international youth strike in November.

“We reject the militarization of our societies and support the young people who are refusing it,” the Stop ReArm Europe coalition wrote on September 23. “Thousands of high school students and university students across Europe are rising up to refuse militarization and the return of conscription.”

Read more: German students say ‘we don’t want to go to war’

“Nearly 20 million children in the EU – one in four – live at risk of poverty or social exclusion,” the group added. “Meanwhile, governments have committed to military spending that the EU’s own Defense Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, puts at €7 trillion by 2035.”

“The trillions earmarked for militarized security will leave us staring down the barrel of a gun and indebted to global financiers,” Stop ReArm wrote, calling for a solidarity- and care-based alternative. “This must go hand in hand with a non-aligned foreign policy that resolves conflicts through diplomacy, upholds international law and human rights, and builds common security for all: security with our neighbors, not against them.”

This article was originally published by Truthout on Sept. 29, 2026. It is shared here under a  Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) license.

An NFL official reportedly threatened to remove Houston Texans linebacker Azeez Al-Shaair from his game earlier this month unless he removed his memorial for an 8-year-old Palestinian girl killed by Israel in Gaza.

During the Texans’s week two game against the Cincinnati Bengals on September 20, Al-Shaair wrote the name of Wafaa Akila on his eye black, which refers to the strip or paint streaks that many football players wear on their cheeks.

Wafaa was an 8-year-old girl who was killed, along with her father, in an Israeli airstrike on a vehicle in Gaza City on September 6. She and her father were on their way home from her first day of school, according to Al Jazeera.

Al-Shaair, who is rated as one of the top linebackers in the league, was reportedly told by an NFL official that he would have to remove his eye black or else be barred from playing in the game, an anonymous NFL source told The Athletic. Al-Shaair complied, the reports said. Fox News’s sports vertical also confirmed the league’s threat.

The linebacker’s latest tribute came just days after the NFL gave him an $11,941 fine for writing Hind Rajab’s name on his eye black during the Texans game against the Buffalo Bills on September 13. In a show of solidarity, Dallas Mavericks player Kyrie Irving said in a post on social media that he would “take care of his fine.”

“It’s bigger to me. What’s a life worth? Is a life worth $11,000? I think it’s priceless,” said Al-Shaair when asked about the penalty.

“You can’t get so lost in your own problems that you can’t have compassion for other people in the world,” he went on. “We don’t have to have all the answers to everything to know that an innocent man, an innocent woman, an innocent child losing her life is not right … whether they’re here in America or somewhere halfway across the world.”

Ahead of the Texans game against the Indianapolis Colts this past Sunday, Al-Shaair once again wore the names of children killed by Israel — Lana and Bana Ahmed, two sisters who Israel killed along with their family in an airstrike earlier this month. The sisters were 12 and 8 years old.

The NFL gave Al-Shaair a similar fine in January when he wrote “stop the genocide” on his eye black during the pregame, but took it off for the actual game. At the time, he said that he was similarly told that he would be banned from playing in the game if he kept the message on.

“At the end of the day, it’s bigger than me. When things that are going on makes people uncomfortable — imagine how those people feel. I think that’s the biggest thing. I have no affiliation, no connection to these people other than the fact that I’m a human being,” Al-Shaair told reporters after that fine. “Even when I’m walking off this field, that’s the type of stuff that goes through my head, that I have to check myself — when I’m sitting here crying about football, when there’s people dying every single day.”

He was told that he violated league rules about displaying non-approved personal messages — but he pointed out that other players have written messages on their eye black without a fine.

“They always fine you, but I was told if I wore that in the game, I would be pulled out of the game,” he said. “I understood it was a fine, but I ain’t never seen Stef get pulled out of the game for having eye tape with writing on it.” Al-Shaair was referring to New England Patriots receiver Stefon Diggs, who frequently writes messages honoring his Christian faith on his face tape.

• The Ukrainian army stays in control of front lines, but safety in cities deteriorates.

• Kyiv was on fire again as Russian attacks on cities intensify.
• Rubikon published stats on destroyed Ukrainian drones, decoys being the second most prominent.
• Russia’s defence ministry will not let go of the Armata: it wants to turn it into an air-defence system, drawing ridicule.
• Maps of the day: Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction; Orikhiv direction, Oleksandrivsk direction, Kupiansk direction.
• Videos of the day: a burning Tu-95MS strategic bomber; a Ukrainian firefighter showed how they extinguished the Academy of Sciences building.

The Ukrainian army stays in control of front lines, but safety in cities deteriorates. The war has reached a stage in which two separate conflicts appear to be taking place simultaneously.

While Ukraine is currently losing the battle in the air and its cities are continually suffering missile and strikes by jet drones, the situation on battlefields is far better.

Last week, Denník N spent time in Ukraine with former chief of the general staff Daniel Zmeko. During the trip, reporters met commanding officers from several brigades and battalions operating from the Izium area to Zaporizhzhia, and all of them said they had the situation under control.

The officers spoke about the accuracy of Russian maps, which they said did not correspond to reality. In some places, Russian soldiers are as far as 20 km from the locations where, according to the Kremlin, they are supposed to be.

Northern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration: This is a specific section of the front where the Ukrainian army has been reporting its advances only very slowly, while Ukrainian analysts have remained silent so as not to disclose anything sensitive. Russian bloggers, by contrast, are depicting the situation more closely to reality.

Yet official Russian maps persist with utterly nonsensical lines. We do not know to what extent this is an effort to deceive domestic and foreign audiences, and to what extent they genuinely believe it in Moscow. It is worth looking at how the regime wants the situation to appear, and what it is really like.

The first map in the overview was produced by the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti and depicts the area around Lyman, on the northern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction, as of 29 September. Lyman is shown as occupied in the middle of the map. The map’s author also continues to insist that the Russian army had captured Sviatohirsk — at the tip of the red salient in the centre of the map — and that Russia controls the entire, now non-existent salient with the village of Novoselivka at its centre. Yet Russian outlets Rybar and Two Majors write that fighting is taking place on the Zherebets river around the villages of Terny — on the far right of the map — and Yampil.

The following map is much closer to reality. According to it, the front line roughly follows the Zherebets river, which corresponds to Rybar’s claims.

Rybar’s map looks like this:

Kupiansk direction: The city of Kupiansk is a similar case to Sviatohirsk. Putin declared it captured in August last year. And once the commander-in-chief had declared this, his news agency continued to draw the map as though it were true. Kupiansk is shown as occupied in its centre, but there are further inaccuracies.

For example, the Kremlin agency claims that the Ukrainian bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Oskil river south of the city no longer exists. Ukrainians do face major difficulties supplying it, and various analysts have repeatedly warned of an impending disaster, but the Russian map is nevertheless hopelessly inaccurate.

Also note the small town of Borova at the bottom centre. RIA Novosti also shows it as occupied, although this is not the case.

This time, we will compare the Russian agency’s data with a map by Ukrainian analysts at DeepStateUA, because they updated it on Tuesday to reflect a new advance by Ukrainian units north of Kupiansk — again in the centre of the map — near the village of Dvorichne. In recent weeks, they have succeeded in reducing the Russian bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil; the change since the end of August is marked in blue. Borova is again at the bottom centre, while below Kupiansk is the Ukrainian bridgehead that Russia claims does not exist.

Orikhiv: This is one of the places where Ukrainian officers said during reporters’ trip to Ukraine that Russian maps were particularly inaccurate.

The Russian map is again from RIA Novosti and again ignores reality along the entire length of this section of the front. Its main target is the city of Zaporizhzhia, with a population of three quarters of a million, in the centre left, while the small town of Orikhiv, at the bottom centre, is a defensive hub.

Putin’s news agency places soldiers roughly 12 km from the southern edge of Zaporizhzhia; in reality, they are around 24 km away. It shows Orikhiv as occupied and the Russian army advancing from the east towards the village of Novorozivka, north of Orikhiv.

The OSINT project Playfra covers this area in the greatest detail. Its map appears to depict a different war altogether. Everywhere, Russian positions are significantly shifted compared with those shown by RIA Novosti.

The differences have a simple explanation. On the western flank near Zaporizhzhia, the Kremlin agency simply ignores the successful counterattacks carried out by Ukrainians there this year. On the eastern flank, it uncritically accepts every claim by the Russian defence ministry and, with equal lack of scrutiny, considers captured every small village where a Russian soldier raised a flag during a suicidal mission, even several months ago. Although those soldiers have since been killed or captured, RIA Novosti acts as though they still control the village.

Playfra also offers a more detailed view of the current fighting around Orikhiv, drawing on analyses by Ukrainian analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets.

Of course, Russians too occasionally notice that they are living in a parallel reality. Most recently, the influential Aleksandr Kharchenko wrote about it:

“Comparing our maps with Ukrainian ones can be shocking. The zones of control differ by dozens of kilometres,” he acknowledged, adding that both sides lie, although he focused specifically on false Russian reports.

He described Russian soldiers who are the first to break into a village as heroes. But, according to him, wars are not won through heroism, but through a functioning system.

“Errors in our maps and information arise because they rely on heroes. Everywhere a Russian soldier is sitting is considered our territory,” Kharchenko argued that this had to change because “our territory is only where a Russian soldier is sitting with food, water and ammunition. This is territory from which we can fight the enemy”.

Kyiv was on fire again as relentless Russian attacks on cities intensify. In the capital, Russians particularly targeted energy infrastructure. “Not a single day has passed since the summer without the enemy attacking energy infrastructure. But this is the first such massive and complex attack since the end of the previous heating season,” Ukrainian PM Serhiy Koretskyi told NV.

In addition to causing serious damage, the attacks on Kyiv and other cities killed at least five residents and injured another 14.

President Volodymyr Zelensky also said that, thanks to the delivery of new surface-to-air missiles, five Russian ballistic missiles had been shot down.

Rubikon published stats on destroyed Ukrainian drones, decoys being the second most prominent. Ukraine’s response is continuing in parallel with the Russian offensive against cities. But the stats currently weigh against Ukraine.

While the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defence has fallen dramatically since the arrival of Russian jet drones, Russia has successfully shot down Ukrainian ones. For example, the recent large-scale drone raid on Moscow involved several hundred drones — and, according to some sources, more than 1,000 — but only 10 penetrated the airspace above the Russian capital.

In this context, the Russian Rubikon unit published interesting statistics. Although it operates at and near the front, its data for September show that, of 827 Ukrainian drones hit, as many as 247 were Maya-type drones — unmanned decoys intended to deceive Russian air defences. They look very similar to FP-1 attack drones but, unlike them, carry no warhead.

Russia’s defence ministry will not let go of the Armata: it wants to turn it into an air-defence system, drawing ridicule. Zvezda News is a media outlet directly controlled by the Russian defence ministry. On Monday evening, it published technical news on the long-forgotten T-14 Armata tank, which Russian propaganda had claimed would revolutionise tank warfare.

Today, it is beyond any doubt that the project is dead and new information confirms this, but its authors presumably intended to convey precisely the opposite.

“Rostec has upgraded the Russian T-14 Armata tank into a short-range air-defence system,” the report stated, citing military expert Oleg Shaladin.

The list of new features appears impressive at first glance. The new version of the Armata has received new electronic equipment; its 125 mm main gun is to be replaced by a 152 mm gun, allowing the tank to fire Kornet anti-tank missiles with a range of 10 km. The new Armata will also be able to use Krasnopol guided artillery shells, which are used by more modern howitzers, while the tank is also to gain the ability to operate as the aforementioned short-range air-defence system.

Further changes have already been made to the project, but even the brief list above makes it clear that the Armata is no longer intended to be a tank, but rather some kind of hybrid capable of fighting everything and nothing at the same time.

Among others, the Russian Telegram channel Military Informant commented on the report, openly mocking it. It said Rostec had mixed together “all the old tales from 10 years ago” in its list of changes, but that in practice “the tank never got beyond parades and training grounds, because it was created for an entirely different war, which ultimately never happened. It became conceptually obsolete from the outset, without even having had the chance to fight”.

Videos of the day

Russia has lost another Tu-95MS strategic bomber. This is the 12th confirmed loss of this type — the Oryx website has not yet updated its figures, so it records only 11. According to available information, the aircraft crashed shortly after taking off from a base in Amur region. Six crew members were reportedly killed, while one survived with injuries. Armed with cruise missiles, the aircraft was probably heading for Olenya air base, from which Russia attacks Ukraine.

Denník N wrote on Tuesday about the attack on the headquarters of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. A video has since emerged from the helmet camera of one of the firefighters involved in the rescue operation.

After years of European governments condemning Israel’s illegal occupation but maintaining extensive economic relations, some economic consequences are reportedly now forthcoming.

This comes amid wider scrutiny of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, including systemic discrimination, unlawful occupation and genocide in Gaza.

On 8 September, twelve governments announced moves towards restricting trade with illegal Israeli settlements. This is a limited but welcome response to grassroots pressure.

It also raises a question: where does the economy of an illegal Israeli settlement end?

Most emerging measures follow economic relationships towards illegal Israeli settlements: do not buy goods produced there, invest there or provide services that enable their construction. 

Norway’s proposed legislation is seemingly comprehensive, covering property purchases and services connected to construction and property transactions.

The UK has also announced a ban on advertising property in illegal Israeli settlements, after such property had been advertised at a London real-estate event.

But this all still largely considers illegal Israeli settlements within their territorial bounds.

The problem is treating a spatial category as though the economic relationships producing it share the same boundary. We all know the world does not work like that.

Kinnula, a municipality in central Finland, is now facing this reality: when money from the illegal settlement economy moves into public land in Europe. It is a small case, but it makes the problem unusually visible.

In August, Kinnula council voted 10–3 in favour of a €4m resort development by Israeli property company Dror Bonim Atid, before councillors had been informed of the company’s promotion of projects in illegal Israeli settlements.

The municipality paused the process while requesting a background report on the company from Israel. Its municipal manager told Finnish news media that nothing had yet emerged that required closer examination.

However, illegal Israeli settlements are not illicit enterprises from the perspective of Israel. Their expansion is enabled through Israeli state institutions.

A background check sought from Israel is therefore absurd. A more obvious background check reveals something else.

On its own website, Dror Bonim Atid presents its Finnish development alongside a development in Efrat, an illegal Israeli settlement in the occupied West Bank, as well as a development in Dror-Hiran in the Negev. The latter is being built on land where Umm al-Hiran stood until November 2024, when the Bedouin village was completely demolished and its community forcibly displaced.

One company website therefore takes us from an illegal Israeli settlement, through the site of a demolished Bedouin village, to holiday accommodation beside a Finnish lake.

Finland’s ministry of defence must still approve the acquisition because the purchaser comes from outside the EU and EEA. But that system principally examines questions such as national security and defence.

Involvement in illegal Israeli settlements does not fit neatly into the categories through which the transaction is being examined.

Kinnula exposes a gap in the emerging European restrictions on trade with illegal Israeli settlements. Those restrictions follow economic relationships from Europe towards the settlements.

Here the relationship points the other way. What happens when the economies of illegal Israeli settlements come to Europe to acquire public assets, invest and make money here?

This may be a relatively new question for European policymakers. For Palestinian civil society, it is not. Their call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) was issued in 2005, drawing in turn on a much longer history of Palestinian boycott and economic resistance.

The movement has spent years developing corporate-complicity criteria and strategies for divestment and exclusion from contracts, moving beyond asking where a product came from to examining the companies with which institutions maintain economic relationships.

You could be forgiven for rolling your eyes as European policy discovers these questions inch by inch.

Palestinians have spent generations analysing the economic relationships through which occupation is sustained. BDS has spent more than twenty years turning that knowledge into practical strategies for institutions elsewhere.

So, when a Finnish municipality is deciding whether to sell public land to a company openly involved in illegal occupation, there is clear guidance from Palestinian civil society on how to respond.

There is also now the fact that Europe accepts that it should not economically support illegal Israeli settlements, meaning it should also accept that companies involved in illegal settlements should not be able to come to Europe for public land, contracts and investment.