On Thursday, October 1, health workers, patients, and activists protested Palantir’s role in the National Health Service (NHS) at more than 40 locations across England. Their demonstrations were part of a global week of action demanding that governments cut ties with the spy-tech firm over human rights and privacy concerns.
Rallies took place in front of Palantir’s London headquarters, as well as in Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Sheffield and many more cities.
“Palantir’s tools are used by the Israeli military in Gaza and by ICE to track and surveil migrants in the US,” campaign groups – including Just Treatment, Health Workers for a Free Palestine, Medact, and Global Justice Now – stated. “A company profiting from human rights violations has no place in the NHS or in any of our public services.”
Palantir’s track record opposes core health values
Palantir currently holds a £330 million (approximately USD 436 million) NHS contract and has rolled out the service’s Federated Data Platform (FDP), managing sensitive patient data. The project has drawn criticism from virtually every group involved in the NHS: data workers say it lags behind local systems; patients share privacy and data ownership fears; and health workers insist Palantir’s record opposes the very values their profession embodies.
“I cannot stay true to that [Hippocratic] oath and tolerate Palantir continuing to profit from, and grow its malign business model through an NHS contract,” said physician Rhiannon Osborne from Medact at Thursday’s rally. “Every pound we give them helps to legitimize and sustain human rights abuses and erosion of democratic rule of law across the world.”
A central concern is the company’s support for Israel throughout the genocide in Gaza. “When we strive to save every possible life, they champion their ability to kill and celebrate their role in the repeated war crimes committed by Israel – including unprecedented deliberate attacks on the doctors, nurses, and paramedics I worked with,” pediatric neurologist Omar Abdel-Mannan stated. “No moral government should tolerate their involvement in our NHS or indeed any of our public services.”
Campaigners repeated calls for Prime Minister Andy Burnham to end the contract as soon as possible. Under an exit clause in the original agreement, that moment could arrive as early as February 2027. Campaigners and several commissions are pressing the government to notify Palantir of its intention to withdraw ahead of this date.
“The government only has two months to say no to Palantir and the momentum is all with us,” Good Law Project activists said at the rally in London. “All the energy is to say no to Palantir, say no to their global human rights abuses, say no to their crap technology that doesn’t work and get Palantir out of the NHS.”
Unions back appeal to bar Palantir from public sector contracts
Calls to break Palantir’s grip on public services resonate beyond Britain. On September 28, more than 120 groups and unions called upon European governments and the European Commission to “scrap all existing public sector contracts with the US tech company Palantir.” As reported by the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU), the appeal seeks to end current agreements and bar the firm from future public contracts. It also urges governments to develop “alternative data solutions compatible with public service,” echoing NHS data workers’ recommendations.
“Palantir’s ramping up of ‘war-related’ support for Israel during the genocide in Gaza and the apparent disdain of its leadership for democracy are just two clear signs that this company serves the interests of the rich and powerful, not the general public,” said Tim Bierley of Global Justice Now. “Yet it has been allowed to embed dubious technologies across our public services, giving it access to sensitive data and creating worrying new technical dependencies.”
“The UK must work with other countries to end dependence on companies involved in human rights abuses, and end the outsourcing of the public sphere to a dangerous class of big tech oligarchs.”
People’s Health Dispatchis a monthly bulletin published by thePeople’s Health MovementandPeoples Dispatch. For more articles and subscription to People’s Health Dispatch, clickhere.
Dix ans après le référendum sur le Brexit, l'hypothèse d'un rapprochement entre Londres et Bruxelles revient dans le débat politique britannique. Le Premier ministre Andy Burnham a même évoqué la possibilité d'une réintégration du Royaume-Uni au sein l'UE. Si la perspective d'un "Breturn" semble encore éloignée, "il y a certainement beaucoup mieux à faire que de maintenir le statu quo", estime Sébastien Maillard, conseiller spécial à l'Institut Jacques Delors.
The Annual I3 Instrument Forum 2026 brought the I3 Instrument community together in Brussels to showcase how interregional cooperation is turning regional strengths into investment, market opportunities and stronger European value chains. On 1 October, I3 Instrument project representatives, businesses, policymakers, and innovation stakeholders gathered in Brussels for the Annual I3 Instrument Forum 2026. Five […]
Cette semaine, Caroline De Camaret reçoit Maciej Witucki, président de BusinessEurope depuis le 1er juillet 2026. Plus grande organisation patronale d'Europe, BusinessEurope représente plus de 40 fédérations patronales nationales issues de 35 pays. Polonais de nationalité, il dresse avec nous un bilan du paysage entrepreneurial européen, de ses défis et de ses pistes d'amélioration.
Il ne fait pas bon prendre sa voiture. Pas à cause des embouteillages, mais à cause des prix de l'essence qui n'ont jamais été aussi élevés en Europe. Dans un contexte géopolitique toujours aussi tendu – au Moyen-Orient et en Ukraine – le coût du litre d'essence bat des records, tout comme celui du gazole.
Il ne fait pas bon prendre sa voiture. Pas à cause des embouteillages, mais à cause des prix de l'essence qui n'ont jamais été aussi élevés en Europe. Dans un contexte géopolitique toujours aussi tendu – au Moyen-Orient et en Ukraine – le coût du litre d'essence bat des records, tout comme celui du gazole.
It was common practice during the Cold War to exaggerate the threat from the Soviet Union. Nowadays, Russia has assumed that role. Although the circumstances have changed, some of the political methods employed to create a sense of insecurity are still remarkably similar. Europe is not formally engaging in preparations for war since it desires […]
New rules open the way to offshore hubs and longer detention as legal safeguards move into focus BRUSSELS — European Union governments have completed the adoption of a sweeping new system for returning people who have no legal right to remain in the bloc. The regulation allows member states to transfer people to “return hubs” […]
Since Sunday, September 27, residents of Garvaghy Road in Portadown have prevented the Orange Order’s Drumcree march from passing through their community. Linking arms, locals and supporters warned that the parade could undo years of progress against sectarian violence in the north of Ireland.
More than 4,000 people signed petitions opposing the march, yet authorities formally allowed it to move ahead. First, the Parades Commission approved a limited procession. Then, the Court of Appeal lifted an injunction imposed by the High Court, paving the way for the march attempt on Sunday.
Negotiations to end the stand-off continued Thursday evening. According to local media, an earlier proposal suggested residents would accept the Orange Order’s legal right to walk down the road in return for the Order choosing not to march. The organization rejected the deal, insisting on passing through the neighborhood.
Stand-offs at Drumcree previously used to launch loyalist attacks
Recent events carry particular weight because of Drumcree’s history. During the Troubles, loyalist stand-offs in the area became a notable flash point of violence, with effects rippling out beyond Portadown. Following the Good Friday Agreement, the march had been rerouted for almost 30 years.
“The Orange Order organized stand-offs at Drumcree (particularly in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998) were regularly used by unionist death squads as a rallying cry and pretext to launch attacks, block roads, and intimidate Catholic families,” Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition spokesperson Breandán Mac Cionnaith wrote in August. “At least ten murders were carried out in Portadown and other areas during this period by those same death squads.”
Speaking to the People Before Profit party, Mac Cionnaith emphasized that the march had been rerouted because of the devastation it unleashed. “I always make a point that people need to remember that between 1996 and 1999, 21 people lost their lives across the north because of killings and murders carried out by loyalists acting in support of Drumcree,” he said. “Several of those victims were our neighbors, they were our friends, they lived in this community.”
Past decades gave the Garvaghy Road community a chance to rebuild, yet the memory of the violence was passed on through generations. “My family moved to England to escape the viciously sectarian climate around the marches,” one resident said. “My aunt went to school with Robert Hamill, a young man kicked to death by loyalists in the midst of the marches.”
“For 28 years, the Garvaghy Road community has lived in peace,” wrote Chris Hazzard of Sinn Féin. “That peace didn’t need a solution – it needed protection. Forcing an unwanted, sectarian march through this area defies all logic.”
“Why did the Orange Order want to march down a Catholic community?”, asked Sinn Féin’s Vice President and First Minister of Northern Ireland Michelle O’Neill. “It’s about supremacy, it’s about domination, it’s about ‘we’re in charge,’ and this community deserve better than that.”
“There is no going back, we’re not going back to the days of the past. What I want is to build upon the progress that’s been made over the last 28 years. What I want to do is actually ensure that we continue to let this community to flourish. Right now, what this community is being told by the Orange Order and political unionism is that they’re second class citizens and that their rights can be railroaded over.”
Solidarity messages from as far as Palestine
Progressive organizations, parties, musicians and artists across Ireland have voiced support for Garvaghy Road, many joining protesters in Portadown to warn against the standoff’s possible ripple effects. “The Garvaghy Road community is still living with the legacy of traumatic street conflict and state violence stretching back decades,” the Irish Republican Socialist Party wrote. “This latest attempt by the Orange order is merely a continuation of that conflict.”
Messages of solidarity arrived from as far as Palestine, where a Gazan teenager wrote in support of Garvaghy Road residents. “I know what it feels like when basic peace and dignity are stripped away, and how painful it is to fight for safety in your own home,” she emphasized. “The residents of Garvaghy Road deserve to live in peace without fear or intimidation, just as every family in Gaza does.”
Ukraine says it has used its domestically developed FP-7 tactical ballistic missile in combat for the first time, in what would mark another significant milestone in the country’s rapidly expanding indigenous long-range strike program.
President Volodymyr Zelensky announced today that Ukraine had conducted the first combat use of the FP-7, a ground-launched ballistic missile developed by Ukrainian defense company Fire Point. He also said production of the weapon would follow.
Ukrainian tactical ballistic missile. FP-7. First combat use. Thank you for the result. Next up: production. Glory to Ukraine! pic.twitter.com/IxdjVg51c1
— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) October 1, 2026
The claim has not been independently verified, and Ukrainian authorities have not disclosed the target, location, number of missiles involved, or other details surrounding the reported strike. A video has been published showing what’s said to be a nighttime launch of the missile.
The FP-7 is one of several increasingly ambitious weapons being developed by Fire Point, a Ukrainian defense company that has expanded rapidly since Russia’s full-scale invasion. The company began with drones and has subsequently moved into long-range strike missiles and ballistic missile technology.
Test launch of the FP-7 surface-to-surface ballistic missile. Fire Point
Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh previously described the company’s development and manufacturing model in an interview with TWZ, detailing an effort to rapidly scale production while maintaining a dispersed industrial base inside Ukraine. The company’s better-known systems include the FP-1 and FP-2 long-range strike drones and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile.
According to Ukrainian and company-released information, the FP-7 has a range of approximately 250 kilometers (155 miles) and a warhead weighing around 150 kilograms (331 pounds). Other published figures have put its velocity at approximately 1,500 meters per second (around 3,350 miles per hour). Rather than striking targets deep in the Russian rear areas, the missile is optimized for use against objectives such as logistics hubs, air defense sites, and drone bases. This makes it more of a shorter-range complement to the U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missile, rather than a direct replacement, although it comes without any restrictions on the kinds of targets that it can be used against.
Details from missile debris shown by Russia confirm Ukraine launched ATACMS at Voronezh region on November 18, marking the first use of U.S.-made missiles on Russian territory during Trump’s presidency. According to the Russian MoD, S-400 and Pantsir-S1 systems helped repel the… pic.twitter.com/8SeQCo9OEO
At the same time, those specifications should likewise be treated as reported figures rather than independently verified performance data. Actual range, payload and accuracy can vary according to missile configuration and mission profile.
The FP-7’s development is particularly notable because Fire Point is also using the basic missile architecture as the foundation for a very different weapon.
Fire Point has developed the FP-7.X, an anti-ballistic missile interceptor derived from the surface-to-surface FP-7.
A video showing a test launch of an FP-7.X surface-to-air missile:
Держави програють війни на полі бою значно рідше, ніж вони програють їх у інститутах, лабораторіях та на виробництві за десять років до їх початку.
Коли країна роками недофінансовує інженерну освіту, скорочує дослідження, втрачає виробничі компетенції або звикає покладатися на… pic.twitter.com/Ti1Ayn4INf
Fire Point’s expectation is that commonality between the two systems can shorten development and provide manufacturing efficiencies by allowing the company to draw upon work already conducted on the FP-7’s propulsion, airframe, guidance, and production processes.
The FP-7.X forms part of Project Freyja, a European effort to develop a comparatively inexpensive and potentially more numerous ballistic-missile-defense interceptor. Fire Point has also discussed an eventual production rate of thousands of interceptors annually, although such targets represent company ambitions rather than demonstrated production capacity.
Fire Point has said it is working with European and Ukrainian partners on the system, including work on the interceptor’s seeker. The company has described an initial interceptor using a blast-fragmentation approach, with more sophisticated hit-to-kill capability envisioned for later versions.
Earlier this year, Diehl Defense confirmed that it plans to launch production of the Flamingo cruise missile in Germany. Previously, Diehl had signed a technology agreement with Fire Point but had not disclosed any details. Potentially, that could open a path to Fire Point’s ballistic and cruise missiles helping to meet the growing demand for long-range fires capabilities among NATO’s European members.
A video of the Flamingo cruise missile in action:
As it stands, the baseline FP-7 is only one element of Fire Point’s ballistic missile ambitions.
A rendering of the FP-7 surface-to-surface ballistic missile. Fire Point
The company is also developing the larger FP-9, which Fire Point has described as having a planned range of approximately 850 kilometers (528 miles). The larger missile requires substantially more solid propellant and has driven the company to establish new industrial capabilities for manufacturing large solid-rocket motors.
As with the FP-7, the available FP-9 performance figures are based primarily on statements from Fire Point and Ukrainian sources and should not be treated as independently established specifications.
The development of these weapons reflects Ukraine’s broader effort to expand domestic production of long-range strike systems. Kyiv has relied heavily on Western-supplied weapons during the war while simultaneously attempting to establish an indigenous capacity for drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
For Fire Point, that effort has produced an unusually broad portfolio in a relatively short period: long-range attack drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and, potentially, interceptors designed to defeat ballistic missiles.
The claimed combat debut would give Ukraine a fast, hard-to-intercept strike option for targets within the FP-7’s reported range, with its combination of kinetic energy and relatively heavy warhead making it particularly useful against hardened targets. If targeting and launch procedures can keep pace, its short flight time can also enable rapid-response strikes against more time-sensitive targets. More broadly, the FP-7 represents the culmination of years of Ukrainian efforts to close a major ballistic-missile gap with Russia and establish an indigenous capability.
FP-7 surface-to-surface ballistic missile. Fire Point
The reported combat debut of the FP-7 also comes as the long-range strike campaign between Russia and Ukraine continues to intensify, with both sides increasingly seeking to hold targets deep behind the other’s front lines at risk. That dynamic will become particularly important as the two countries head into another winter, when strikes against energy, industrial, and military infrastructure ramp up significantly. At the same time, the FP-7’s reported range gives it a considerably more limited target set than Ukraine’s longer-range cruise missiles and drones, constraining where it can be employed and distinguishing it from systems designed for deep strikes hundreds of miles beyond the front.
The significance of Zelensky’s announcement will ultimately depend heavily on whether the FP-7 can move from a claimed combat debut into sustained production and operational service.
Ukraine has not publicly disclosed the number of FP-7 missiles produced, current production rates, or when significant quantities could become available.
Using theFP-7 in combat for the first time would mark an important transition for Fire Point’s ballistic missile program, from development and testing toward operational employment. The company’s ability to manufacture the weapon at scale will become the next critical question.
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Taking a break from fighting Russians in the Kostiantynivka sector of the eastern Donetsk region, the commander of a Ukrainian uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) unit spoke with us about innovations in the use of these systems. One was the first deployment of a UGV specifically designed for amphibious operations to deliver supplies to frontline troops in areas impeded by water obstacles. Large areas of the front line are bisected by rivers and wetlands, and the country has many other small waterways and marsh areas. As we have frequently reported, the use of UGVs by both Ukraine and Russia has exploded as the ubiquity of aerial attack drones makes it far too dangerous for human battlefield movements.
In an exclusive interview with TWZ, the commander of the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade’s “Alter Ego” UGV unit, who goes by the call sign “Electric,” offered us unique insights into the challenges of developing amphibious UGVs and how they were deployed.
In the first of two parts, Electric talks about why Alter Ego developed amphibious UGVs – including modifying a Triton variant for this – and how the unit made them work. The second part features his insights into using heavy ‘bomber drones’ to drop UGVs behind enemy lines for kamikaze raids. In addition, a representative of Brave1, Ukraine’s weapons technology accelerator, spoke about developing these systems at scale.
Some of the questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity.
Q: How did the need for amphibious UGVs for logistics operations first come up?
A: We had this idea for a long time, but recently one of the units of the Armed Forces asked for our help to solve this problem, so that the UGV could overcome water obstacles.
There was a crucial need for this kind of means at certain parts of the front, but the units that are located there didn’t have the capacity by themselves to solve this task. So our battalion was asked to solve this problem because we are one of the most experienced units in terms of UGVs.
A first-ever logistics mission on an amphibious UGV: the robot covered 40 kilometers across land and water.
Operators of the "Alter Ego" unit (93rd Brigade) deployed the robotic system across mixed terrain. Facing water obstacles, the UGV seamlessly switched to swimming mode to… pic.twitter.com/rH8waq04a4
Q: How long did it take to design and test the amphibious UGV, and what went into that process?
A: The whole process from development to battle deployment took less than three months.
Q: What did you have to do to make this work?
A: First of all, we looked at amphibious solutions that were on the market, not only in Ukraine, but in the world, and we took two separate approaches. One was taking one of the main UGVs that our unit is using on the ground, and we made it amphibious. And the other approach was that we took one of the solutions that was on the market that already had amphibious capabilities, and we solved several disadvantages that it had. And at the moment, we are using both.
Q: What did you have to do to make the UGV amphibious, and then what were some of the obstacles that had to be overcome to get this operational?
A: First of all, we have to explain that there are different solutions on the market that kind of work on the testing ground — like they can swim, they can drive on the ground, and in the vision of the manufacturer, they are working. But the fact is that these solutions are not ready for the reality on the front line, which is often very different from what is on the testing ground.
And the second point is that the unit has its own workshops where people work near the front line, and the experts, the engineers that work there, they have a very high level of competence to evaluate different solutions and select the one that has potential. And that’s what’s completely different between this unit and everyone else, like manufacturers and others who are working on these solutions, because they don’t understand what’s needed on the battlefield.
The Alter Ego unit’s uncrewed amphibious ground vehicle (UGV). (Brave1)
Q: So what did you have to change to make it work?
A: Regarding the amphibious one, basically the unit changed almost everything that that UGV had, starting from electronics, the software, the waterproofing, the communications – we basically changed everything. Regarding the one that we already used on the ground, we basically tried to retain what was allowing it to be an effective UGV on the ground, and we added waterproofing and specific mechanics, so that it can work in the water environment.
Q: You mentioned communications. What kind of communications did you add?
A: The communication means that was installed on the UGV by the manufacturer was not sufficient at all. Basically, it didn’t have enough quality for the battlefield situation. It was not working. But we already have our own communications that we were working on, and we have a lot of experience because we have been working for a long time in this UGV area. So we basically helped to install a sufficient level of communications on this UGV.
Q: So how does the amphibious UGV communicate with the controller? Does it use Starlink or some other satellite communications system for navigation?
A: This is satellite navigation, but not only. Satellite navigation is a part of this communication system.
Q: What are the other parts?
A: It’s better not to talk in detail about the other part of the communication system.
Triton amphibious UGV communications and camera systems. (Brave1)
Q: There were probably a lot of different missions that could have been used for this first amphibious UGV logistics delivery. Why was this particular mission chosen?
A: The Alter Ego unit has so much experience in terms of UGVs, and not just experience of using UGVs, but the experience of being the first in the world. We had one of the first evacuation missions, we had one of the first strike missions using UGVs, the paratrooper UGV, and now the amphibious UGV. So basically, we have the systems to make it work for the first time when nobody knows how to conduct this mission.
Q: No, I mean why did this particular mission get chosen to be the first one?
A: There are certain places on the front line where we have water obstacles that prevent logistics from being done by UGV. At the moment, UGVs are carrying hundreds of tons of logistics, probably the most compared to any other means on the front line, but before this, these water obstacles would prevent UGVs from providing logistics for those parts of the front, and that need can’t be fully satisfied by UAVs or other means. That’s why we did this mission with the amphibious UGV, and now our task here is to scale this technology and provide this logistics system for other similar parts of the front where there are water obstacles.
Kostiantynivka, Ukraine. (Google Earth)
Q: Tell me about where and when this mission took place and what it was like to watch it unfold.
A: So unfortunately, we can’t provide information about when and where this operation took place. But regarding how it went and what we felt, this was another big challenge, because this is something that wasn’t done before, and nobody thought this is real. So this was quite difficult, and to tell the truth, the mission didn’t succeed on the first try, actually, and it required a lot of effort in terms of planning, preparing, engineering, and basically it required 100% effort from everyone involved in that mission.
Q: How many times did it fail before, and what went wrong?
A: We had one failed attempt. The reason for failure was a certain technical problem. After that, we analyzed what went wrong, and we worked on solving those issues. Basically, it’s something that nobody had tried to do, it’s kind of hard to know what can go wrong before you actually try it. So the best way to find a solution like that is to try and then iterate on that attempt and make it better and better and better.
Also, I would like to add that although this was the first successful mission regarding an amphibious UGV, it’s not that there was no work on that before that. We were actively talking to and collecting the experience of everyone who was working on these kinds of missions before, and that was also a reason why this mission succeeded.
Q: How far did the amphibious UGV go for this mission?
A: So the UGV went 40 kilometers one way, and then it returned. So probably around 70 kilometers in total, and it carried food and other supplies.
Q: Did this UGV come under Russian fire on this mission?
A: Yes, and it survived.
Q: How does the UGV switch from water to land operations?
A: So the UGV has two separate control systems, one for water and one for land, and basically it switches to the one that is required at the moment. That’s how it can operate in both environments.
The Alter Ego unit’s uncrewed amphibious ground vehicle (UGV). (Brave1)
Q: Is that autonomous, or is that something that the controller at the base has to do as they watch the UGV on its mission?
A: At the moment, the operator fully controls the UGV manually. And basically, before, the operators of UGVs only knew how to move them on land, but now they also had to learn how to move them in the water. So not only was the technology itself developed, but we also had to prepare the operator and come up with tactics for this UGV.
Q: Did you use AI on this mission in any way, and if so, how?
A: We didn’t use AI.
Q: Have there been other missions using amphibious UGVs?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you say how many and what was delivered?
A: No.
Q: Is this designed only for logistics missions, or will it be used in the future for strike missions, either as a one-way attack system or as a platform for machine guns or other weapons?
A: We can use it in different ways in the future.
Q: Mud season is fast approaching, when much maneuvering becomes impossible or severely degraded because of how difficult it is to move in the thick, oozing slop. Will your amphibious UGVs work in the mud?
A: I think it can operate in the mud in the same way it operates in the water.
In the next segment of our interview, Electric talks about using bomber drones to deliver UGVs behind the lines, and a Brave1 representative talks about how the organization is working to develop these systems at scale for wider use.
October will see almost all global ocean carriers make a tentative return to Suez transits on Asia-Europe sailings, after revised pro forma shipping schedules show the Premier Alliance is set to send one of its vessels on the route through the Red Sea and Egyptian waterway.
For the EU Screening Week 2026, during which the European Commission proposed a Council Recommendation on cardiovascular health checks,HaDEA spoke with Benedetta Armocida, coordinator of the Joint Action JACARDI co-funded by the EU4Health programme, about the importance of preventing cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) and diabetes, identifying risks early and ensuring that interventions reach the right people […]
More rearmament talks are underway in Brussels as European politicians continue building an increasingly tense anti-Russian discourse. On Wednesday, September 30, defense ministers and industry representatives joined the Euronews Defense and Space Summit, focusing on the bloc’s growing defense expenditure and member cooperation.
The summit took place after weeks of allegations of hybrid attacks on EU members, which pushed the already tense rearmament narrative permeating the European political establishment up a couple more notches. It also followed, by only a couple of days, the Council of the EU’s announcement of the next phase of five European Defense Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs) – projects that “allow EU countries to work together on major defense initiatives that are too large or too complex for individual countries to develop on their own.”
While separate, the two events shared several points in common, starting with a focus on increasing coordination between EU countries to arm more efficiently – and spend the billions of euros planned for defense over the coming years. They also emphasized sections of the military sector to receive the most attention – including drones and military capacities in Eastern Europe.
This geographical focus goes beyond EU members, expanding to – at least – Ukraine and Moldova. Most EDPCIs – like the Drone and Counter-Drone European Resolve (DECODER) and the Eastern Flank Watch – list Ukraine as a partner. Ukrainian arms entrepreneurs were also present at the summit in Brussels, including leading figures from Fire Point, one of the country’s most prominent arms companies.
Very imminent investments into arms
While NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated in his summit intervention that there is “no imminent danger” to the alliance members’ territories, he and others did not hold back in offering anticipations of an unstable period.
Belgian Minister of Defense Theo Francken, for one, anticipated “more hybrid threat actions” and an overall “dark winter for Europe” – a scenario he seems to want to address by spending more on arms and cutting social services, as he has explicitly stated on numerous occasions.
“Europe has been very good in investing in soft power, in social security,” Francken said. “And it’s beautiful to have a pension system, to have social welfare systems when someone gets sick, when somebody loses his job – we have everything. But when there’s a war or there’s hybrid threats, we don’t have anything.”
Considering the significant amount of money European countries have already invested into armament, his assessment that “we don’t have anything” is inaccurate at best.
It also remains contested on a regular basis on the streets of many European cities, where trade unions, students, and peace movements continue to protest against austerity budgets that aim to provide for war.
Europe needs a policy that builds security with its neighbors
In addition to large-scale demonstrations against social security and labor cuts in France’s proposed 2027 budget and student strikes against conscription in Germany last week, mobilizations are expected to grow over the coming months – including an international youth strike in November.
“We reject the militarization of our societies and support the young people who are refusing it,” the Stop ReArm Europe coalition wrote on September 23. “Thousands of high school students and university students across Europe are rising up to refuse militarization and the return of conscription.”
“Nearly 20 million children in the EU – one in four – live at risk of poverty or social exclusion,” the group added. “Meanwhile, governments have committed to military spending that the EU’s own Defense Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius, puts at €7 trillion by 2035.”
“The trillions earmarked for militarized security will leave us staring down the barrel of a gun and indebted to global financiers,” Stop ReArm wrote, calling for a solidarity- and care-based alternative. “This must go hand in hand with a non-aligned foreign policy that resolves conflicts through diplomacy, upholds international law and human rights, and builds common security for all: security with our neighbors, not against them.”
Is Ukraine becoming an “Eastern European Israel” for the EU? Sociologist and author Volodymyr Ishchenko joins Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra to discuss Ukraine’s eroding sovereignty, who profits from keeping the fighting going, and whether an off-ramp still exists to a war with Russia now costing Ukraine 27,000 casualties per month, according to Poland’s prime minister.
Europe is pushing record defense budgets and warning that Russia could test NATO within months. But this month Ukraine launched its largest drone attack yet on Moscow, Washington approved a $2.68 billion air defense sale, and the EU unblocked €6.6 billion in military aid. Is Europe readying to defend itself from a Russia with imperialist ambitions? Or preparing for a forever war, where profiteers abound and working-class Ukrainians do the fighting and dying at the direction of a state they’ve come to hate?
Ishchenko describes an emerging vision for Ukraine amongst Kyiv’s power brokers: a militarized, ethnonationalist frontier state serving as outsourced security for the European Union against Russia. Sound familiar?
“Maybe NATO at this point is not an alliance for security, but actually a source of insecurity in Europe.”
The Geran-4 appeared last May, according to the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR). Unlike the Geran-3, which largely used a modified Shahed-136 airframe, the new drone has one purpose-built for higher-speed flight because “the structural strength [of the older model] was insufficient for high-speed flights, and even less so for maneuvering under high G-loads,” GUR noted.
A Geran 4 attempting to be intercepted by a Ukrainian drone. (Via X) (GUR)
The Geran-4’s new airframe features a blended air intake and overall “improved aerodynamic efficiency, a reinforced structure, and a turbojet engine with increased thrust,” GUR stated. “The wings are now permanently integrated into the center wing section. To reduce air resistance, the number of technological hatches on the fuselage has been minimized.”
In an overnight attack across Ukraine that lasted until Monday, “Russia launched 165 drones overnight, 79 of them jet-powered, the Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 112, and hits were recorded at 14 locations.” You can see the aftermath of one of those attacks in the following video.
We’re under constant attackUnfortunately, just a few minutes ago, a jet-powered Shahed drone hit a residential building . #Odesa Burn in hell, ruzzianspic.twitter.com/EXTWM1yVIN
Recently,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) got its hands on one of these weapons. Its report offers the best view yet of what makes these drones so dangerous.
The Geran-4 is “a new, faster version of the attack drone that is proving harder for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept,” the report states. “We were given a rare opportunity to literally take this surviving drone apart and find out what makes it so much faster, more maneuverable, and more accurate.”
“The first part we uncover is the turbojet engine. It is one of the Geran-4’s most significant upgrades, allowing the drone to fly at altitudes of up to eight kilometers,” the report explained. “That’s twice as high as the older propeller-powered drones. According to specialists, drones equipped with this type of engine have already flown from Russia-occupied Crimea to Lutsk in northwestern Ukraine, a distance of more than 700 kilometers.”
RFE/RL takes apart a Russian Geran-4 drone to uncover what makes the jet-powered unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) faster, harder to intercept, and capable of operating deep inside Ukraine — from its turbojet engine and advanced camera to foreign-made communications and navigation… pic.twitter.com/WGNdlpS9w1
“This engine allows it to fly at speeds of up to 450 to 500 kilometers per hour over Ukrainian territory. Sometimes even faster,” RFE/RL proffered. “It flies fast and high, which is why it is still difficult to intercept.”
As the camera pans down over the engine, the reporters noted that while it is made in China, “we have investigated cases where these engines were assembled in Russia using Chinese components.”
The next component examined was the drone’s camera.
“It has several modes: daylight, night vision, and infrared,” the report stated. “The camera offers 10-times optical zoom and up to 32-times digital zoom, allowing the drone operator to view terrain from an altitude of eight kilometers.”
“If there is a relay station and it is connected to the network, an operator sitting in an automated workstation somewhere in Bryansk, Oryol, or Crimea can control the drone and guide it to its target,” RFE/RL stated.
“Once the drone is inside Ukraine, regular cellular SIM cards can help keep it connected,” the report continued. “We also found two GSM modems inside this drone. Using SIM cards, they can transmit the Geran-4’s location over mobile networks, allowing the operator to track it in real time.”
Back in 2024, we explained how Shaheds fitted with 4G modems and SIM cards from Ukrainian telecom firms, combined with a camera installed on the drone and the ability to use wireless networks, could be one of a number of avenues that would transform the Shahed into a relatively long-range reconnaissance and strike asset capable of beyond-line-of-sight real-time operations. This could help plug what at the time was a glaring gap in the Russian arsenal, although the stability of its connectivity is still unknown and providing man-in-the-loop guidances in real-time for strikes may be beyond the capabilities of this configuration, at least consistently.
Regardless, most of these drones do not have cameras or modems, they fly to a specific set of coordinates and dive on a target before detonating.
The following images offered a glimpse into that system.
Drone specialists who have investigated the remains of these weapons told the outlet that they had found SIM cards “from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and even some European Union countries. And the deeper we go inside the drone, the more foreign-made components we find.”
The RFE/RL team also found a Chinese mesh modem the Russians use to help guide the drone.
“It’s responsible, among other things, for radio and video communications. Essentially, this device allows the drone operator to see the video feed from the Geran-4 almost in real time,” RFE/RL stated. “The modem has a range of up to 300 kilometers and can also act as a signal relay. That means several drones flying near each other can relay and strengthen the signal, making it possible to control them over much greater distances.”
The discovery of the Chinese mesh modem illustrates something we reported earlier this year: “For some time now, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, a feature that was confirmed when they started to appear with cameras and cellular modems, something TWZ explored in detail at the time. These developments allow the drone to be connected to an operator. Standard Shaheds fly autonomous routes to pre-planned targets on autopilot with no man-in-the-loop control. They are ‘fire and forget’ weapons.“
“Meanwhile, the range at which MITL can be achieved has been steadily increased. At first, the drones were adapted to exploit patchy cellular networks to provide additional connectivity when available. More recently, Shaheds have been flying with antennas allowing for direct line-of-sight control close to the front lines. This allows them to hit targets dynamically like an FPV drone, while packing a much heavier punch and being able to loiter for long periods of time. You can read all about this development here. Now, the datalink range is being extended using airborne signal relays, possibly creating a mesh network with multiple line-of-sight links.”
درون”Geran-4“ توقف محرك الـMicro-turbojet قبل الانقضاض على الهدف، وتتَّخذ وضعية الانزلاق البطيء، ربّما لتوفير الوقود او لدقة افضل اثناء البحث بالعدسة البصرية. ايضاً يظهر بوضوح هوائيات الارسال Mesh Antennas اثنان مثبَّتان على الذَّيل، أحدهما موجّه الى الاعلى والاخر الى الاسفل. pic.twitter.com/cQIyHhvbmm
Finally, the Ukrainian journalists found something else we have long reported on. Like many other Russian weapons, the Geran-4 even contains components made in America.
“Despite international sanctions, a significant portion of its components are still coming from abroad, highlighting gaps in global export control enforcement,” RFE/RL showcased. “We just opened up the drone’s onboard computer, and these circuit boards contain components made by a U.S. company. The markings on this component are partly worn off, but you can still see the manufacturer, Texas Instruments.”
“According to the specialists, what is actually Russian-made here is mainly the drone’s body and its assembly. This particular drone was manufactured and assembled at Alabuga, a major Russian drone production site. According to Ukraine’s military intelligence, Russia is now producing around 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month at Alabuga and other facilities across Russia.”
Satellite images of the site first emerged in 2023, which you can see below.
As if the Geran-4 drones were not challenging enough for Ukraine, Russian Geran-5 jet-powered drones are equipped with “a DSMAC (Digital Sensor Module for Autonomous Navigation) module for navigation using reference images of the Earth’s surface, similar to the X-101 missile,” the Ukrainian technology monitoring channel Polkovnyk GSh reported on Telegram. DSMAC allows for a weapon to navigate without any external help from global positioning satellites. The Tomahawk also uses this system. You can read all about it and how AI embedded in Shahed models will be the next leap in true autonomy far beyond the front lines, even for hunting and killing targets of opportunity, in our special feature linked here.
In addition, Russia has installed mesh repeaters on these weapons for radio signals so that video of the attacks can be “recorded (and immediately transmitted),” presidential adviser on defense technology Serhii Beskrestnov, known as Flash, said on Telegram.
The Russian military is now capable of acquiring real-time, high-quality BDA of its strikes with Geran-type OWA-UAVs/cruise missiles in downtown Kyiv.
In the footage below, we can see the moment of a Russian strike with Geran-5 cruise missile on the "Inkom" business center… pic.twitter.com/mPx4Kf9tmH
The Russian jet-powered drones were largely outrunning the drone interceptors Ukraine began using with great success against the piston-driven Shaheds. Those interceptors were not only saving lives, but they were also saving money because they cost a tiny fraction of far more expensive, higher-end munitions like the PAC-3 MSE fired by the Patriot system or the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile variants fired from the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) air defense launchers.
Seeking a more efficient and effective defense, Ukraine adapted by fielding higher-performing interceptor drones that are purpose-built to take on the jet-powered Russian munitions. Still, the engagement window for hitting the Russian drones is small, and these are more expensive to build. However, they will remain far less costly and faster to acquire than surface-to-air missiles.
In his speech earlier this week at the U.N. General Assembly, President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that “our soldiers have already successfully tested four new jet-powered interceptor drones against Russian jet-powered Shaheds. So we are scaling up production.”
It is unclear exactly which interceptors the Ukrainian president was talking about; however, other types designed to take on Russian jet-powered Gerans have become public. One of them is the Sting S, a variant of the bullet-shaped Sting interceptor drone made by the Ukrainian Wild Hornets drone company.
On Sept. 19, the company posted a video on X claiming that “a crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment took down a Russian Geran-5 using the new STING S. This drone is faster and carries a larger explosive payload than other Geran variants.”
TWZ cannot independently verify these claims.
STING S takes down a Geran-5 jet-powered drone-missile
The crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment took down a Russian Geran-5 using the new STING S. This drone is faster and carries a larger explosive payload than other Geran variants.
When we asked for more details, Wild Hornets told us “that the tests are going well. About a dozen enemy ‘Geran-4′ jet-powered strike UAVs have already been shot down, as well as several ‘Geran-5’ models, just in the last few days. We should note that at this stage we are talking about only the first results of combat testing within a few select units.”
The Sting S “is a high-speed quadcopter-type interceptor,” the Wild Hornets spokesperson added. “When choosing this model, we took into account that the solution should be inexpensive, easy to use, and quickly scalable.”
“Furthermore, most of the targets during combat testing have been destroyed using ‘Hornet Vision Ctrl’ remote control technology,” the spokesman stated. Wild Hornets claims the system provides low-latency image transmission, long-range communication, and resistance to electronic warfare.
100 remote interceptions in 100 seconds: Hornet Vision CTRL in action
Since deployment, Ukraine’s Defense Forces have remotely destroyed 1,000+ enemy targets using the system.
All thanks to the skill of crews taking down enemy drones with STING interceptors every day pic.twitter.com/9sUthdjsvF
“We expect this will allow us to rapidly scale up the deployment of the new interceptor once mass production begins,” the spokesperson noted.
As we have frequently noted, Russia and Ukraine continuously create new weapons and ways to defeat them. The jet-powered Russian drones, and Ukraine’s newest interceptors designed to destroy them, are the latest examples of a seemingly endless weapons evolution cycle in this war.
In this week's Wider Europe, Rikard Jozwiak drills down on whether the EU could drop some of its Belarus sanctions and the road map for the most advanced EU candidates.
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