Yemen’s Houthis have denied targeting a power station in the city of Medina. A Saudi-led coalition earlier accused the militant group of targeting the facility supplying power to the Prophet’s Mosque – one of the holiest sites in the Muslim world.
A senior Houthi official branded the accusation a “lie” aimed at tarnishing the group’s image and reinforcing similar claims made by the coalition in the past.
On Thursday, the Saudi coalition’s spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, accused the Yemeni militants of striking the Taibah electricity distribution station in Medina earlier this week in what he called a “cowardly terrorist act” and a part of an alleged broader campaign by the Houthis to “target the Two Holy Mosques.”
In mid-September, Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of launching a drone towards the holy city of Mecca. The unmanned aerial vehicle was intercepted and destroyed, it added. The Yemeni movement’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, dismissed that claim as a “heinous lie” in a televised address at the time, claiming Riyadh was “weaponizing lies” to advance its own agenda.
The developments have sparked concerns in Türkiye and Pakistan, which signed a joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in August. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called any “threat to the sanctity” of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina a “red line that must never be crossed.”
Ankara denounced this week’s alleged Medina attack. “Any attack targeting the sanctity, peace, and security of the Two Holy Mosques is an unacceptable affront directed at the shared sensitivities of the entire Islamic world,” the Turkish government spokesman, Burhanettin Duran, said on X on Friday. He vowed that Türkiye “will continue to stand by Saudi Arabia.”
The developments come amid the continued escalation between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Riyadh has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government against the Houthis since intervening in the country’s civil war in 2015.
Large-scale fighting largely subsided after a UN-brokered truce in 2022, but the conflict erupted again this summer after an airport in the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital of Sanaa was bombed to prevent a returning Houthi delegation that had flown to Iran from landing.
September 30 – the deadline for a possible Iranian kinetic move against the Trump naval blockade – came and went. Iran stuck to its guns – without essentially releasing them on the “blockading” (sooooo far away) U.S. Navy. But the show must go on. As Plan B, we did get prime time spectacle – actually a double fake: the remixed 9/11 on FlyDubai.
This pathetic stunt was never a “terror attack”; it was a mediocre-packaged Mossad psy op with lots of improbable extras, complete with a plumber who took control of the plane because he saw it on TV.
The manipulators were the death cult in West Asia, the UAE itself and Washington. The official narrative is for people with an IQ below 50: a “jihadist” co-pilot – conveniently from Oman, demonization requires it – tries to crash a plane full of Zionists. The proverbial heroic passengers – plumber included – overpower him with their bare hands.
The death cult is pulling all stops to absolve Emiratis of any responsibility. The focus is on the Omani “terrorist”.
Talk about the perfect trifecta: Muslims are and will always be terrorists; the death cult is always a victim; and Saudi Arabia needs to hand over the “terrorist” to the death cult.
Piece of cake then for a co-pilot to smuggle a knife at ultra-surveilled Dubai airport onboard one of the most surveilled routes on the planet. And what about the death cult Air Force being unable to stop the landing of the plane in Tabuk.
Because the plan was always to land in Tabuk. That’s the largest Saudi airbase in the northwest, and the closest to Israel; the death cult has been trying for years to get access to it. Now they may end up getting The Full Monty: access to Saudi airspace; privileged intel; and more, courtesy of joint pressure by Abu Dhabi and Washington.
At Transition Protocol we established that when the leader of the death cult “secretly” flew to Abu Dhabi to meet UAE head honcho MbZ in a bilateral, he also may have met people from several Arab nations, including Qatar, Oman, Libya and Morocco.
The Saudis vehemently denied they were part of the package. So did Jordan. Oman appears only via one Israeli source. There’s no official confirmation by Qatar, Oman, Morocco or Libya.
Tehran anyway reacted with extreme irritation, warning of “very dangerous consequences”. The Iranian determination is clear – not to let those chihuahuas derail the fundamental process of reducing to the max U.S./Israeli influence in West Asia.
Islamabad for its part continues to pursue the Sisyphean task of inching towards minimalistic progress mediating both Saudi Arabia–Ansarallah and U.S.-Iran.
Qatar did hand Iran Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi the U.S. answer in Doha this past Tuesday. The clash seems to be over sequencing, rather than components. The text, as it stands, is a sort of enhanced version of the notorious dead cat MoU – also known as the Islamabad framework. Nobody is betting the dead cart will resurrect – again.
Russia, Iran, Yemen: let’s pummel those bastards with no mercy
Now let’s get to the real nitty-gritty: Yemen. And what degree of annihilation Sana’a’s badasses are prepared to inflict on Riyadh. Obliteration of oil installations is too easy – just the soft opening. Yemen is raging. And they will stop at nothing.
We can already see a startling confluence between the House of Saud, the U.S. Navy outside of Persia, and NATO in country 404: they are all being pummeled with no mercy. Russia and Iran haven’t even started yet. And talk about Yemen.
Sergey Karaganov earlier this week once again called it in public: Russia’s Stavka has finally reached the fateful decision to put the Kiev neo-nazis out of their misery. And at an off the record, two-hour long session at the Valdai outside of Moscow, Grandmaster Sergey Lavrov, totally relaxed, reaffirmed again that Russia is ready for Europe’s war. And yes, it will be swift. No holds barred.
Ansarallah and the Yemeni Armed Forces are waiting for 3 vectors to gel: an inescapable Zero Hour ringin’ all across West Asia; the potent simmering and ebulition of intra-royal and inter-tribal clashes inside Saudi Arabia; and all pieces of the puzzle falling in place for the Coming Yemeni Storm to be unleashed over Saudi.
As it stands, Riyadh does not acknowledge any attacks from Yemen, while Sana’a announces every day, like clockwork, the number of Saudi airstrikes on Yemen – targeting markets, farms, homes, bridges, water facilities, telecom networks: the proverbial Epstein Syndicate playbook.
Iran for its part has already upped the ante, striking ADNOC’s Bu Hasa southwest of Abu Dhabi: that’s one of the UAE’s largest onshore oil and gas fields, feeding the strategic Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, the UAE’s only export route bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.
Saudi Arabia’s own bypass, the East-West pipeline, has been struck 3 weeks ago and re-bombed by Yemen earlier this week, at Abqaiq.
Hitting ADNOC and Abqaiq nearly simultaneously may account for taking as many as 13 million barrels of oil a day off market. It’s never enough to remind everyone that Iran and Yemen come as a package. That’s the package that counts – and no puny false flag crypto 9/11 will change that.
On the 25th of September, President of the Presidential Leadership Council of Yemen Rashad al-Alimi called for a general mobilisation of the Yemeni people against the Houthis and promised amnesty to Houthi defectors. From his base in Riyadh, he summoned “the sons and daughters of our great people” to a “general mobilisation” to join the […]
The Houthi takeover of parts of the Red Sea gives the armed group a new platform to challenge global shipping. The group has taken over the port of Mocha, the island of Mayyun, and the Zuqar and Hanish archipelago about 160km north of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. These areas were previously controlled by Yemeni government […]
Il 19 settembre 2026, ai microfoni dell’emittente turca NTV, il ministro degli Esteri Hakan Fidan ha pronunciato una frase insieme misurata e densa di conseguenze. L’Arabia Saudita, sotto il fuoco degli Houthi, «potrebbe avere alcune necessità militari, soprattutto su questioni tecniche», e la Turchia «non avrebbe problemi a soddisfarle». Nessuna dichiarazione di guerra, nessun contingente annunciato. Eppure, per la prima volta, il Patto della Mecca — l’alleanza difensiva che lega Riyadh, Ankara e Islamabad — veniva evocato come strumento operativo e non come architettura sulla carta. La domanda che circola nei commenti più mordaci è se Ankara stia per ripetere l’errore che due volte le costò carissimo: mettere piede negli altopiani dello Yemen. La risposta seria è più interessante della provocazione, e va nella direzione opposta.
L’accordo firmato alla Mecca il 7 agosto 2026 da Mohammed bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan e Shehbaz Sharif è modellato sull’articolo 5 della NATO: un attacco armato contro uno dei tre è un attacco contro tutti. Il fronte che oggi lo sollecita è yemenita. Dal luglio 2026, dopo aver dichiarato il blocco dei porti sauditi e dello Stretto di Bab al-Mandab, gli Houthi hanno colpito ripetutamente il territorio del Regno, fino agli attacchi su Riyadh e sull’impianto Aramco di Yanbu. È il prolungamento, sul versante saudita, della guerra più ampia aperta dai raid statunitensi e israeliani sullo Yemen.
Il dato che conta, però, è la distanza fra il linguaggio del trattato e la postura reale dei suoi membri. Fidan offre sostegno «tecnico», non truppe. Islamabad precisa che nessuna reazione militare è in discussione e che agirà «quando sarà il momento». Washington, dal canto suo, ha respinto le richieste saudite di appoggio diretto. Tutti invocano la solidarietà; nessuno impegna forze sul terreno. Quella reticenza condivisa non è timidezza diplomatica: è il vero oggetto dell’analisi.
La lunga storia di vittorie yemenite contro la Turchia
Fra i tre firmatari, la Turchia è l’unico per cui lo Yemen non è un’astrazione strategica ma una ferita di archivio. Gli ottomani vi entrarono due volte, e due volte ne uscirono sconfitti. La prima occupazione data al 1538, dettata dalla necessità di proteggere le rotte del Mar Rosso dai portoghesi e di custodire l’accesso ai luoghi santi. Presero la Tihama e Sanaa, ma l’altopiano zaydita non fu mai domato per intero; dopo quasi un secolo di guerra intermittente, entro il 1635 gli imam qasimidi li avevano espulsi dal paese. Sul primo ciclo, ricordiamo la conquista del 1538, la rifondazione dell’imamato zaydita a opera di al-Mansur al-Qasim (1597) e la completa espulsione ottomana entro il 1635-1636 a opera degli imam qasimidi. La seconda occupazione si consuma tra l’occupazione della Tihama (1849), la presa di Sanaa (1872) e il ritiro definitivo dopo il 1918.
Il ritorno, a metà Ottocento, fu peggiore. L’occupazione della Tihama e la presa di Sanaa, incentivate dall’apertura del Canale di Suez nel 1869 e dal controllo del Mar Rosso, inaugurarono decenni di rivolta permanente. Le sollevazioni dell’imam Yahya resero l’altopiano ingovernabile con la forza, finché il Trattato di Daan del 9 ottobre 1911 ne riconobbe l’autorità sugli zayditi: la registrazione formale di uno stallo che nessuna spedizione riusciva a rompere. Il ritiro definitivo arrivò dopo il 1918. Il bilancio, lungo la seconda occupazione e la campagna della Grande Guerra, si conta in decine di migliaia di caduti; a ucciderli fu più la malattia che la battaglia. Non a caso lo Yemen entrò nel lessico ottomano come «tomba dei turchi», e il cimitero militare di Sanaa ne custodisce ancora l’inventario. Le perdite ottomane in Yemen lungo la seconda occupazione e la campagna dell’Arabia meridionale nella Grande Guerra si contano nell’ordine delle decine di migliaia complessive, con la malattia — non il combattimento — quale causa prevalente, in linea con la mortalità dell’esercito ottomano nel suo insieme. Il cimitero militare turco di Sanaa, restaurato nel 2011, ne conserva la memoria.
Ridurre tutto alla nostalgia neo-ottomana sarebbe però un errore di prospettiva, perché il problema non è ottomano: è geografico e sociale. Lo stesso terreno ha disfatto altri. L’Egitto nasseriano vi si impantanò tra il 1962 e il 1967, in quello che molti chiamarono il suo Vietnam; la coalizione a guida saudita, dal 2015, ha riversato sull’altopiano anni di potenza aerea e denaro senza mai sottometterlo. L’intervento egiziano nella guerra civile nord-yemenita (1962-1967), costato a Nasser un logoramento spesso paragonato a un «Vietnam» arabo, e la coalizione a guida saudita attiva dal 2015 confermano lo stesso esito: potenza di fuoco e risorse ingenti, altopiano mai sottomesso.
La ragione è strutturale. La verticalità del territorio, i villaggi-fortezza, una struttura tribale che assorbe e sopravvive all’occupante, e una tradizione religioso-politica — la dottrina zaydita del dovere di insorgere contro il sovrano ingiusto — che rigenera la resistenza a ogni generazione: sono i fattori che premiano il difensore e dissanguano chi proietta forza dall’esterno. Gli Houthi sono l’ultima incarnazione di questa costante, non un’anomalia. Ed è precisamente per questo che gli attori esterni scelgono il registro navale — il Mar Rosso, Bab al-Mandab, la forza marittima a guida saudita di cui si parla: perché li tiene lontani dalla terra.
Una memoria incancellabile
La provocazione da cui siamo partiti — la Turchia «impaziente» di rivivere la sua disfatta — capovolge dunque la logica dei fatti. La memoria dello Yemen non tenta Ankara: la disciplina. La Turchia di Erdoğan si è proiettata in molti teatri, dalla Siria alla Libia, dal Nord dell’Iraq al Caucaso attraverso l’Azerbaigian, ma sempre dove poteva applicare forza decisiva e circoscritta o agire per procura, mai dentro un’insurrezione d’altopiano priva di via d’uscita. Il fraseggio prudente di Fidan — bisogni «tecnici», patto che «non sostituisce le alleanze esistenti» e semmai «potrà allargarsi» — è il linguaggio di una potenza che vuole il dividendo politico della solidarietà senza la sua ipoteca militare.
Letto in chiave multipolare, il Patto della Mecca è un riallineamento sunnita sotto regia saudita-turco-pakistana, una copertura che matura mentre le garanzie statunitensi si mostrano condizionate, ma un trattato di difesa collettiva calibrato sull’articolo 5 incontra il suo limite proprio qui: quel modello risponde all’aggressione di uno Stato attraverso un confine, non possiede una dottrina contro un attore non statale che non si può conquistare e non si lascia dissuadere. È lo scarto tra la grammatica dell’alleanza e la natura dell’avversario.
Sul piano previsionale, e con un orizzonte di dodici mesi: è probabile che il sostegno turco resti tecnico — difesa aerea, sorveglianza, munizioni, consiglieri — anziché tradursi in dispiegamento combattente; è altamente improbabile che Ankara impegni truppe di terra in Yemen.
Gli indicatori che smentirebbero questa lettura sono netti e osservabili: l’arrivo di reparti da combattimento turchi o pakistani, un’attivazione formale della clausola di mutua difesa, il passaggio dall’interdizione navale nel Mar Rosso a operazioni terrestri sull’altopiano. Fino ad allora, il valore del patto sarà di segnale e di deterrenza per associazione, non di strumento contro gli Houthi.
Il cimitero degli imperi, del resto, non ha bisogno di essere riaperto per continuare a funzionare: gli basta essere ricordato.
Ansar Allah military spokesman Yahya Saree said on Tuesday that Yemeni forces recorded 35 Saudi airstrikes over the previous 24-hour period, which comes as ground fighting between Ansar Allah and Saudi-backed forces continues mainly in the southwestern Taiz province. “Over the past 24 hours, Saudi warplanes launched 35 airstrikes using F-15 and Typhoon aircraft, taking […]
A Saudi airstrike hit a home in Yemen’s Taiz province on Monday, killing at least four civilians, according to the Yemeni Health Ministry within the Ansar Allah-led government. The Health Ministry said that three women and an elderly man were killed in the attack and that three other civilians were wounded. Yemeni media also reported […]
Yemen’s Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, has told the EU that it doesn’t intend to target European shipping, The Financial Times has reported, as the group has maintained that its Red Sea blockade applies only to Saudi shipping. Ansar Allah began its blockade on Saudi shipping after Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes against the […]
Saudi airstrikes hit a market in Yemen’s Taiz province on Sunday, killing at least seven people and wounding 40, including five children, according to Ansar Allah officials and Yemeni media reports. Footage from Yemen’s Al Masirah TV shows the aftermath of the strike, which hit several shops, and Yemeni civilians being treated for their wounds. […]
So, “Britain is back” and ready to provide glorious leadership to the rest of the world, to “solve shared problems we face.”
British Prime Minister Andy Burnham made his debut at the United Nations this week, addressing the 81st session of the General Assembly in New York.
“You can count on us,” assured Burnham. “Count on us to stand up for those long-standing British values of fairness and justice – our shared values – and for the UN Charter.”
Please, don’t make me vomit. Burnham was oozing noble values on the podium of the UN while Saudi warplanes were massacring Yemeni civilians in their homes – warplanes that are directed and refuelled by Britain (and the United States).
This week, Yemeni media reported that over 100 people, including women and children, were killed as Saudi F-15 and Typhoon fighter jets intensified air strikes on residential areas in the Red Sea cities of Mocha and Taiz. Al Masirah TV showed bloody images of two children killed by a Saudi airstrike in Mocha
On his way to the UN, Burnham announced that he had ordered the deployment of RAF refuelling planes to enable the Saudi air assault on Yemen. Of course, the British media described the move as “defensive aid”.
Earlier this month, Downing Street also approved the dispatch of British military advisors to Saudi Arabia. American advisors are also stationed there to assist in the war of aggression against its southern neighbor.
Yemen’s armed forces and the Ansar Allah militia are hitting back hard. They have overrun Saudi forces in key Red Sea positions and have shut down the Saudi oil industry and pipelines with drone and missile attacks.
But make no mistake, this is a Saudi war of genocidal aggression fully supported by the United States and Britain. The war has been going on since 2015, together with a blockade on Yemen that has resulted in an estimated 400,000 Yemeni deaths. A lull in fighting from 2022 was broken when the Saudis launched air strikes on the Yemeni capital’s airport in July. The Yemenis have hit back with a vengeance, targeting Saudi oil installations.
The Saudi monarchy has begged Trump to give more military assistance. But Trump is bogged down and out of his depth with his losing seven-month war with Iran.
This is where Burnham has entered the fray, responding to Saudi pleas for help by signing off on military deployment. This could prove to be a disastrous strategic blunder. No doubt Burnham is trying to ingratiate himself with Washington. His decision to send the RAF into battle this week came ahead of his first meeting with Trump on the sidelines of the UN. The American president gave him a symbolic pat on the head, saying, “he’s going to be a great prime minister.”
Trump had often ridiculed Burnham’s predecessor, Keir Starmer, for supposedly not offering more military support to the U.S. war aims in the Middle East. Burnham is showing himself to be more amenable, that is, pliable.
The British Butler is slaughtering his way into favor with Washington. Women and children are sacrificed in Yemen all to satisfy the sick “special relationship” between the U.S. and Britain.
Burnham is a fraud with this working-class Manchester accent and glib talk about the “need to do more to help people with the everyday cost of living.”
If you can bear to listen to his speech at the UN, it is a masterclass in British disinformation. It takes a special kind of person to deliver such arrant nonsense with a pose of sincerity.
The thrust of his whole address was to blame Russia for everything. From poverty and inequality in British society, to seething discontent among Britons towards their ruling class, to the war in Ukraine. It truly was a consummate performance in misdirection, the kind of charade that British politicians excel at.
He announced that Britain was launching a new National Centre for Information Defence, purportedly to combat Russian disinformation, which he claimed was “a poisonous tide” sowing division and instability among Britons.
According to Burnham, all that is broken and dysfunctional in British society is due to Russian infiltration. Nothing was said about bankrupt British capitalism and the warmongering of the British state fuelling a proxy war in Ukraine or aggression in the Middle East at the expense of social conditions in Britain.
Burnham’s “solution” to Britain’s endemic problems is to increase “national security” and state control over public information – all under the guise of “defending” Britons from being manipulated by Russian propaganda.
The Orwellian condition that Britain is sliding into is awesome.
This British prime minister dares to speak about British values and leadership and condemn Russia while he is approving the supply of long-range air strikes against Russia with British cruise missiles and drones.
The proof of Burnham’s fraudulence and moral bankruptcy is his decision to materially support Saudi warplanes in committing atrocities in Yemen. Murderous aggression is labelled “defense”.
Burnham’s dubious asset as a politician is his ability to articulate justification for slaughter and war with empty platitudes.
A particularly odious point in his UN speech was his claim that English workers allied with Abraham Lincoln in the American Civil War against slavery. As if English mill workers were representative of British “values”. What Burnham conveniently omitted was the much more heinous role of the British ruling class in creating the Atlantic slave trade.
Britain’s historic role in global exploitation and waging genocidal wars is something that damns its governments forever. Its ongoing role in enabling the slaughter in Ukraine and in Yemen is but two of the latest episodes of this British systemic criminality.
These are the British “values” that Burnham deftly concealed this week with his performative debut at the UN.
The persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
For the past ten years, the Southern Red Sea has been a pivotal factor in the UAE’s foreign policy. Over the past decade, the UAE has built a layered maritime, air, and commercial infrastructure network, including military bases, in the Red Sea or near Yemen, Somaliland, Somalia and Sudan, starting from 2015.
According to some estimates, the value of UAE investments along Africa’s coastal regions and the Arabian Peninsula amounts to $60 billion.
In September 2015, the UAE established its first military base in Africa, in Eritrea. These bases possessed strategic advantages: the ‘protection of interests’ and control over the security and economic architecture of international maritime routes.
With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, cooperation between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi in the Red Sea intensified.
The UAE’s approach—channeled through companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports—is centered on controlling ports, strategic waterways, military bases, and key trade and energy routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in coordination with the United States and its allies. Abu Dhabi’s approach also included engagement with non-state armed actors and separatist movements in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia.
Factors Behind the UAE’s Diminishing Role
Over the past decade, the UAE emerged as a party to the conflicts in the southern Red Sea. However, geopolitical developments over the past year signal a gradual decline in the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Several factors are also significant, stemming from US and Israeli military strikes against Iran, the war between Sanaa and Saudi Arabia, Saudi-Emirati rivalry in the region, and disputes among African states.
Sudan’s value lies in its geopolitics. With 853 kilometres of coastline and several key ports, Sudan constitutes a vital link in the Red Sea.
The Sudan war since April 2023 has created conditions for the expansion of the UAE’s role. The UAE faces accusations of providing training and logistical support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Human rights and political demands against the UAE has increased.
The UAE also maintains bases inside Sudanese territory. However, the ongoing war in Sudan and the support of allies for the Sudanese government have led to increased pressure on the UAE.
Riyadh regards the Red Sea as part of its strategic interests and its exclusive backyard. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh each view the other as a direct threat to their position and interests in parts of the southern Red Sea. Thus, the reduction of the UAE’s footprint in the southern Red Sea constitutes a strategic gain for Riyadh. Riyadh has effectively sought to weaken Abu Dhabi’s role.
In late 2025, Saudi Arabia’s support for Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) resulted in pressure being brought to bear on UAE-backed forces.
In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks among 14 countries—including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia—which established a multinational maritime defence alliance. The UAE and Ethiopia were excluded from the list.
The formation of a Riyadh-led Red Sea maritime task force—with the participation of Turkey, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea—without coordination with the UAE amounts to a further constriction of the UAE’s role in the region.
Despite ongoing Egyptian–Emirati consultations on guaranteeing maritime navigation security in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, Egypt’s foreign policy is not aligned with the UAE’s interests in Sudan and the Red Sea. Additionally, the alignment and coordination among Israel, India, the UAE, and Ethiopia are not particularly consonant with Egypt’s interests in Ethiopia and the Red Sea.
Until last September, the UAE played a significant role in the southern Yemeni islands of the Red Sea and in southwestern Yemen. However, Sanaa’s advance in the eastern Red Sea—the port of Mokha, Mayun Island, and other archipelagos north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait—in September 2026 inflicted negative and fundamental consequences on the UAE’s regional role.
Sanaa’s advance amounts to the nullification of the presence of Emirati actors in Yemen’s future political sphere. Sanaa is seeking to consolidate itself as a strategic “node” within the Iran-led Axis of Resistance.
Despite Cairo’s opposition to Sanaa’s proposal for maritime navigation coordination in the Red Sea, Sanaa—having secured control over the most important islands and cities overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait on the Yemeni side—is calling for the formulation of new rules to ensure security and navigation in the region. Ansar Allah’s control over Bab al-Mandab could put the UAE under pressure. Any expansion of Sanaa’s role in Sudan could likewise prove detrimental to the UAE.
Amid tensions between the United States and Iran, Abu Dhabi finds itself facing a more constrained strategic space.
The UAE’s alignment with the United States is, in a sense, also an intensification of Abu Dhabi’s tensions with Iran in areas such as the Red Sea. Unlike the UAE, Iran is seeking better relations with the Sudanese government. Many in Iran believe that Israel and the UAE are devising an economic and geopolitical plan to control the vital routes of the Red Sea and Yemen’s ports.
With Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, many in the countries of the southern Red Sea have linked it to the UAE.
After years, Eritrea revoked the UAE’s access to its military infrastructure. Eritrean officials have recently made sharp statements about the UAE and Israel—particularly regarding Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland.
Eritrea is providing frontline support to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Any deeper alliance between Eritrea and Sudan, Iran, Russia, China, and Sanaa could diminish the UAE’s regional role in the Red Sea. Additionally, some countries and actors near the Red Sea also hold a negative view of the UAE’s regional role.
The Somali government’s decision in January 2026 to sever relations with the UAE is, in a sense, a counter to the UAE’s role in the Somaliland and Puntland regions. Somalia has revoked all agreements with the UAE, including cooperation as well as security and defence arrangements. This move has negative implications for the UAE’s role in the southern Red Sea.
Moreover, the southern Red Sea plays a pivotal role in the regional strategy of Russia and Beijing. For example, apart from China’s role in Djibouti, Beijing is Eritrea’s principal creditor and has expanded its influence in Sudan.
The developments of the past year have also contributed to a decline in the standing of the UAE’s allies in the region.
Outlook
The US presence in the Red Sea’s African states is rooted in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations.
The European Union’s presence in the region, via Operation ASPIDES, is limited to commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Despite the UAE’s formal withdrawal from some bases, its economic and security influence, as well as its soft-power instruments, remain strong.
A decrease in UAE military deployments in the region could negatively impact its support for allies in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.
The UAE continues to have significant economic potential, secure partnerships, and influence in the southern Red Sea. In a way, this is considered a threat and a risk to certain African nations in the Red Sea region.
Certainly, a more extensive Sanaa presence over Bab al-Mandab, strategic coasts, and islands could confront Abu Dhabi’s maneuver and role in the southern Red Sea with a structural challenge.
The UAE’s approach in ports, logistics, energy, and other strategic infrastructure—along with deeper defense and security coordination with the West in the southern Red Sea—is likely to continue. However, the expansion of the UAE’s role also requires an extensive US presence in the Red Sea.
Moreover, the persistence of current geopolitical alignments, the attention of Eastern actors to the region, the strengthening of Sanaa’s position in the Red Sea, and the expansion of regional opposition to the UAE’s role will diminish Abu Dhabi’s role in the region.
Samyar Rostami is а political observer and senior researcher in international relations.
In a live television interview Thursday night Paris time, French President Emmanuel Macron said he was sending an unspecified number of troops and equipment to Saudi Arabia to protect the Yanbu energy hub, located on the Red Sea.
“This is the agreement we have finalized with the Saudis,” Macron explained. “We are going to send military resources, that is to say, soldiers, radar systems and defense systems, to protect this site — not to get us involved in any conflicts, but to protect this site.”
The French leader did not elaborate on the exact equipment he would send, how many troops, or when they would arrive. Nor did he address what would happen if French personnel were killed or injured or equipment damaged or destroyed. We have reached out to the French Embassy for further details. Based on his mention of radars and seeing that the threat to Saudi oil infrastructure is almost entirely from aerial attacks from drones and missiles, these will likely be air defense forces.
Nous agissons pour protéger nos compatriotes des conséquences de la crise au Moyen-Orient. Objectifs : sécuriser les approvisionnements et faire baisser les prix à la pompe. pic.twitter.com/kvrgHcV4E4
An infographic illustrating how Saudi Arabia has diverted oil from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. (Photo by Murat Usubali/Anadolu via Getty Images) Anadolu
Before Macron’s announcement on Thursday, the Houthis claimed they had carried out two more waves of attacks on Saudi targets, including one on the Saudi Aramco facility in Yanbu, “using a number of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones.”
In addition, the Houthis claimed they struck Riyadh.
Earlier in the day, the Houthis said they struck “enemy command and control centers, operations rooms, weapon depots, missile launch platforms, and military sites belonging to Saudi-led enemy formations in Jizan,” a Red Sea port city.
“The Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen said on Thursday that it had shot down six ballistic missiles fired by the Iran-backed Houthi militia, in what appeared to be one of the largest cross-border attacks by the group since its conflict with Saudi Arabia [flared back up],” The New York Times reported.
The missiles were aimed at the Saudi cities of Taif and Yanbu, Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki, a spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition, claimed on X. “Escalations and violations by the terrorist Houthi militia will be dealt with firmly,” he stated, without specifying where the missiles were intercepted.
TWZ cannot independently verify any of these claims.
Today’s attacks are the latest in the escalating conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. Earlier this year, the Houthis imposed a blockade on the Bab al-Mandab Strait (BAM) and began striking Saudi ships in the southern part of the Red Sea as well as critical energy terminals on that body of water and Saudi refineries. Iranian proxies have also struck the vital East-West pipeline that carries oil to the Red Sea to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran vastly curtailed shipping after the launch of Operation Epic Fury. The East-West pipeline reportedly reopened after being shut down following a long-range drone attack.
The stark reality facing Macron is that if Saudi oil infrastructure and transport nodes near the Red Sea are destroyed or the pipeline that feeds it is shut down for months, the last major oil lifeline from the region — and especially to Europe — will be closed off, sparking a deeper energy crisis.
Iran has already severely curtailed the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz since the U.S. and Israel attacked it on Feb. 28. The movement of oil has been further impeded by a U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. However, transits have been increasing as of late, thanks in large measure to U.S. military escorts that U.S. Central Command claims have allowed more than a billion barrels of crude to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Still, the traffic is far below what it was before the war broke out.
Having both the Strait of Hormuz largely closed and energy exports out of the Red Sea shut down simultaneously is a nightmare scenario. By Thursday evening Eastern time, the per-barrel price of Brent crude oil shot up to nearly $107, according to OilPrice.com. It had fallen below $100 per barrel just two days earlier.
Given all this, the French president sought to offer reassurance about oil supplies, according to France 24.
“He said he had carried out ‘intense diplomatic activity,’ meeting in recent weeks with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Nigeria, all hydrocarbon suppliers, to ensure France keeps receiving the same volumes,” the publication noted.
“We have replenished gas stocks and also oil stocks” for the months ahead, the French president also said.
“Escalating tensions in the Gulf could have negative consequences here in the UK—such as rising prices, disruptions to energy supplies, and increased costs for British businesses,” the U.K. Defense Ministry (MoD) explained in announcing the deployment. “The Houthis pose a threat to stability in the Middle East; therefore, it is in the UK’s national interest—economically and in terms of security—that they do not succeed in their aims.”
“We unequivocally condemn Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, and our position is clear: both Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government have the right to self-defense,” the ministry added.
The jet will operate from a U.K. air base in Cyprus and will begin air-to-air refueling operations in the coming days, the BBC reported.
A Royal Saudi Air Force Voyager aerial refueling jet. (Air Tanker)
The French and British deployments contrast decisions by the U.S. and other nations not to get involved with the Saudi-Houthi fight.
Last week, Trump turned down a direct plea from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom’s de facto leader, to attack the Houthis. Meanwhile, Pakistan and Turkey, which signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia, have yet to provide any direct military aid. The pact holds that an attack on one is considered an attack on all; however, it doesn’t stipulate exactly what actions should be taken.
The security situation in Yemen has drastically deteriorated since the launch of Epic Fury after the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter.
The Houthis have been directly attacking Saudi Arabia over claims that the kingdom has imposed a blockade on them. Beyond that, the mostly dormant civil war between the Houthis and internationally recognized Yemeni government forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, reignited in the wake of Operation Epic Fury. The Houthis have made large territorial gains in the renewed conflict, including capturing the port city of Mokha and two key islands in the Red Sea. This has strengthened the Houthi hold on the BAM. You can read more about that in our story here.
3. The Houthis have reportedly attempted to seize ROYG-controlled islands in the Red Sea from which Houthi fighters could launch attacks on international shipping. Houthi forces reportedly landed on the Hanish Islands in the southern Red Sea on the morning of September 10 after… pic.twitter.com/tiFPgNDOHZ
The civil war in Yemen erupted in 2014 and expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis. The fighting between Saudi-led forces and the Houthis largely abated after a tenuous ceasefire took hold in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict, which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. The United Kingdom was another significant player in that air campaign.
Meanwhile, exacerbating concerns about the flow of oil from the Red Sea, “a senior adviser to Iran’s supreme leader warned Thursday that Iranian forces and their Houthi allies in Yemen could respond to any new U.S. attacks by opening ‘a new front’ in its war with the U.S. by targeting energy supplies in the Red Sea,” CBS News reported.
The statements came after U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday once again threatened Iran.
“Will a deal be made with Iran that lets them rebuild and create a far greater country than it ever was before?” Trump asked rhetorically. “Or do I annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly, never giving them a chance to kill and destroy people and countries again?”
Trump added that he believed he would make a peace deal with Iran after the upcoming U.S. midterm elections, which will decide the control of Congress.
Trump to the UN: "Do I annihilate the Islamic Republic, and do it quickly? Do I drive them into hell?" pic.twitter.com/cIYBO1Mp3w
The fact that France is sending forces to Saudi Arabia is an ominous development and another indication that the current spate of unrest that began with Epic Fury does not appear to show any signs of ending anytime soon.
Ansar Allah announced on Thursday that its forces launched another wave of missile and drone attacks targeting the Saudi capital of Riyadh and oil infrastructure in Yanbu on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast as the war continues to escalate. Ansar Allah military spokesman Yahya Saree said in a statement that Yemeni forces carried out “successful […]
Amid the ongoing US–Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the emergence of a Saudi-Houthi confrontation has added a new layer of complexity to the Middle Eastern conflict, with the potential to widen and prolong the war while drawing additional regional actors into an increasingly broader confrontation. The Saudi-Houthi conflict is not […]
A suspected US drone strike hit a vehicle carrying two alleged al-Qaeda members in Yemen’s southeastern Hadramout province on Tuesday, China’s Xinhua news agency has reported. A local security source told the news agency that one of the men in the vehicle was killed while the other was wounded. So far, there’s been no confirmation […]
Yemen’s SABA news agency reported on Wednesday that Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, launched a major attack on southern Saudi Arabia that caused dozens of casualties. An Ansar Allah military source claimed to the outlet that an attack hit military camps and weapons depots in al-Tawal, a district in Saudi Arabia’s southwestern Jazan […]
Ansar Allah, commonly known as the Houthis, has issued a warning against the US directly intervening in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, saying that US “interests” in the region would be targeted in response. The US and Ansar Allah agreed to a ceasefire in May 2025 after a heavy US bombing campaign that lasted about […]
The Royal Air Force (RAF) is deploying one of its Voyager aerial refueling jets to help Saudi Arabia defend against ongoing attacks from the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels of Yemen. The decision marks the first publicly known international military assistance offered to Saudi Arabia specifically for its fight against the Houthis, which erupted over the summer. The move came hours before U.S. President Donald Trump told the United Nations General Assembly meeting that he believes a peace deal with Iran will be reached after the U.S. midterm elections in November.
The British action is significant because, while it involves just one tanker, other key Saudi allies have yet to heed the Kingdom’s request for military help specifically to battle the Houthis. Although it’s important to note some assets already deployed to defend against Iranian attacks could be helping with the Houthi threat now.
A Royal Air Force Typhoon FGR4 accompanies a Voyager tanker during a Quick Reaction Alert training scenario in March 2026. (Crown Copyright) Crown Copyright
Last week, Trump turned down a direct plea from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom’s de facto leader, to attack the Houthis. Meanwhile, Pakistan and Turkey, which signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia, have yet to provide any direct military aid. The pact holds that an attack on one is considered an attack on all; however, it doesn’t stipulate exactly what actions should be taken.
At issue, beyond protecting the Saudis, is growing concern over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a key chokepoint now largely controlled by the Houthis, who are preventing the Saudis from using it to ship oil.
Earlier this year, the Houthis imposed a blockade on the Strait, and began striking Saudi ships in the southern part of the Red Sea as well as critical energy terminals on that body of water. Iranian proxies have also struck the vital East-West pipeline that feeds oil to be transferred and shipped via the Red Sea in order to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran vastly curtailed shipping after the launch of Operation Epic Fury. The pipeline reportedly reopened today after being shut down following a long-range drone attack.
The stark reality is that if Saudi refineries are destroyed and the pipeline is shut down for months, if not longer, the last major lifeline from the region — and especially to Europe — would be closed off, sparking a deeper energy crisis.
Concern over these factors spurred Britain to act, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) noted. It said it was acting on a request from Saudi Arabia and that the jet would “support Saudi Arabia’s defensive operations in aid of the legitimate Yemeni government.”
“Escalating tensions in the Gulf could have negative consequences here in the UK—such as rising prices, disruptions to energy supplies, and increased costs for British businesses,” the ministry explained. “The Houthis pose a threat to stability in the Middle East; therefore, it is in the UK’s national interest—economically and in terms of security—that they do not succeed in their aims.”
“We unequivocally condemn Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, and our position is clear: both Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government have the right to self-defense,” the ministry added.
The jet will operate from a U.K. air base in Cyprus and will begin air-to-air refueling operations in the coming days, the BBC reported.
The MoD said the Voyager will fly only in support of missions to shoot down missiles and drones, though Saudi aircraft are also bombing Houthi ground positions in Yemen, in part to get at drone and missile launchers and storage sites. Houthi officials have accused the Saudis of killing civilians in some of these attacks.
It should be noted that, more than a decade ago, the U.S. was supporting the Saudi coalition’s previous bombing campaign against the Houthis by providing aerial refueling and intelligence. However, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis ended that in 2018 during the first Trump presidency after growing concerns over the large number of civilian casualties.
The Voyager can only refuel the Royal Saudi Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons, Panavia Tornados, and Italian Air Force Typhoons that have been in the Kingdom since before the fighting with the Houthis broke out, as well as any other similarly equipped allied aircraft. That’s because the tanker only has probe-and-drogue aerial refueling, not the boom required for gassing up other receptacle-equipped aircraft. You can read more about this in our story here.
The view from the cockpit of an A400M during air-to-air refueling with a Voyager KC3 using its probe and drogue system, via the fuselage refueling unit. Crown Copyright
The Voyager will not be the first British asset to be sent to help Saudi Arabia since the launch of Epic Fury. In March, the U.K. sent its Sky Sabre air defense system and troops to the Kingdom to help defend against attacks from Iran.
The British Army Sky Sabre state-of-the-art intermediate air defence system. (Corporal Adam J Wakefield) Corporal Adam J Wakefield
“This support builds upon the UK’s existing military contribution to Saudi air defense, which includes the deployment of an air defense system and British personnel to help protect against missile and drone attacks,” the MoD pointed out on Tuesday. “Saudi Arabia and Yemen are steadfast partners of the UK and play a vital role in regional stability. It is in the UK’s interest to safeguard regional stability, protect vital trade and energy supplies, and encourage a diplomatic resolution to the conflict in Yemen.”
The civil war in Yemen erupted in 2014 and expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis. The fighting between Saudi-led forces and the Houthis largely abated after a tenuous ceasefire was signed in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis, and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. The United Kingdom was the other significant player in that air campaign.
Tensions, as we noted earlier in this story, reignited in recent weeks after the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter.
On Tuesday, Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Sare’e claimed that Saudi Arabia conducted 19 airstrikes across rebel-held territory in Yemen that involved the latest round of civilian casualties. The Saudis have not directly responded.
Brig. Gen. Yahya Sare’e. (Houthi Telegram)
As we stated earlier in this story, hours after the U.K. announced it was sending a Voyager tanker to Saudi Arabia, Trump addressed the ongoing conflict with Iran during his speech to the U.N. General Assembly in New York.
The American leader called for international isolation of Iran and repeated his stance that he was at an inflection point on deciding what course to take moving forward. The situation has settled into an uneasy pause interrupted by sporadic Iranian attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. It has been weeks since the U.S. last struck Iranian targets.
“Will a deal be made with Iran that lets them rebuild and create a far greater country than it ever was before?” Trump asked rhetorically. “Or do I annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly, never giving them a chance to kill and destroy people and countries again?”
Trump added that he believes he will make a peace deal with Iran after the upcoming U.S. midterm elections, which could decide which party controls Congress. With gasoline and diesel price increases damaging the economy, the war and Trump’s handling of it have been very unpopular with voters.
In a CNN and SSRS poll, released Tuesday, 64% of those responding said the U.S. is not winning the war in Iran, while 36% disagreed. In addition, 78% of participants said Trump is not doing enough to end the conflict with Iran and 22% said he was.
Trump to the UN: "Do I annihilate the Islamic Republic, and do it quickly? Do I drive them into hell?" pic.twitter.com/cIYBO1Mp3w
“They want to talk to us,” he said. “They have been talking to us, even today they’ve been talking to us, and the relationship is developing. But we can’t let them – and they understand that – we can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.”
A U.S. negotiating team, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, met with Iranian officials on the sidelines of Tuesday’s U.N. meeting. That sideline session lasted about three hours and went well, according to Trump, who offered no details on the discussions.
Trump: US officials met with the Iranian delegation for three hours – "it was a good meeting"
For their part, the Iranians said they are willing to negotiate, but on their terms.
“A senior Iranian official said Iran could reopen the Strait of Hormuz to Gulf shipping within seven days if the U.S. fulfilled Tehran’s demands to ease military pressure and lift an American blockade on Iranian ports,” Reuters reported. “The official added that Tehran had conveyed its latest proposal to Washington via mediators last week.”
Warning: Graphic photo below Saudi airstrikes that hit Yemen on Monday night into Tuesday killed at least 17 people, including civilians and detainees at a prison, according to Ansar Allah officials and reports in Yemeni media. Abdul Qader al-Murtada, the head of the Yemeni National Committee for Prisoners’ Affairs, said that on Monday night, Saudi […]
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