Paul Krugman is the greatest econ writer in the world, and also a legendary economist. But I sometimes feel that he has a blind spot when it comes to the value of new technologies. In 1998 he famously wrote: The growth of the Internet will slow drastically, as the flaw in ‘Metcalfe’s law’—which states that […]
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Certain ideas define us. Some earned names of our own along the way. Others have run through nearly 240 pieces without ever being formally christened. Put together, they amount to a worldview. That worldview has been assembled one essay at a time since 2023. Many readers have walked in mid-conversation. Mention the hardware/software flip, super […]
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In the first half of 2026, UK AI companies raised €12.6 billion, which is more than the rest of the European Union combined. If the UK were to re-enter the EU, as Prime Minister Andy Burnham suggested last week, it would join a regulatory regime that makes a large part of those investments obsolete.
AI was one of the rare Brexit success stories, precisely because the UK chose regulatory divergence. After Brexit, the EU embarked on a frenzy of tech regulation: on AI, crypto, digital services and digital markets. The UK pursued a softer regulatory approach in all of these sectors, especially AI. On re-entry, the country would have to accept the EU’s AI regulation lock, stock and barrel, in what is known as the acquis communautaire. This is not a negotiation between UK regulation and that of Brussels. There may be transitional periods, but any new entrant has to adopt the entirety of the EU regulatory framework.
Continental Europe’s AI ventures have been mostly disappointing. Companies such as Germany’s Aleph Alpha and France’s Mistral started out with the ambition to produce frontier models and challenge global market leaders. Both are still around, albeit with reduced ambitions. They are now focused on implementation, with Mistral the more successful of the two, having raised some $3 billion in a funding round earlier this month. Still, this pales in comparison to the US, whose AI industry has invested over $500 billion so far this year.
The European commentariat has been insisting for some time now that the global AI investment boom will hit a wall, in doing so underestimating the technology’s economic significance and overestimating its dangers. These journalists share a lack of interest in a capital markets union as a precondition for making large AI investments possible. If AI succeeds, Europe will not partake fully.
In a parallel universe, there might be a situation where the EU, under more strategic leadership, would regard a Brexit reversal as an opportunity to accomplish two tasks at once. These would involve building an EU-wide capital market on top of the UK’s financial sector, and piggy-backing on Britain’s more successful regulatory regime for AI, quietly dropping its own AI Act in the process.
This is unlikely to happen, with a more probable outcome being that AI emerges as an unexpected obstacle during re-entry negotiations, as tech companies warn the UK Government that their investments are at risk in a more restrictive regulatory environment. Britain, in turn, would be shocked to find out that the EU is not ready to accept its regulatory regime as the more successful one.
If the issue of Britain rejoining the EU came up today, Rejoiners would no doubt argue that the benefits of the single market outweigh the costs of losing an edge in AI. A snapshot of current economic activity might go some way towards vindicating this assessment. But in three or four years’ time, the situation will be quite different. In any case, it is never a good idea to base economic judgements on snapshots. The dynamic interactions are far more important.
This story ties in with speculation around a coming financial crisis. The rise in US bond yields this week reflects worries about future inflation and interest rates. What weighs against this negative sentiment is the hope of a positive productivity shock due to AI. An EU that does not invest in AI will not benefit from higher productivity, but will suffer the consequences of a global sovereign debt crisis. One need only remember how the global financial crisis, which had its origins in the US mortgage market, ended up almost killing the EU’s monetary union. Static Rejoiner thinking could have very serious consequences indeed.
Original article: unherd.com
Brazil’s alignment with Europe amid current geopolitical tensions poses a serious threat to Brazil’s traditional policy of neutrality.
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On September 30, all major Brazilian newspapers published a report stating that the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin) had allegedly warned European authorities about supposed simultaneous interference by the United States and Russia in Brazilian elections. The case raises questions that go far beyond the 2026 electoral dispute. The central issue is the accusation against Moscow, as well as the political and institutional circumstances in which it was presented.
Within Brazil’s intelligence system, Abin is institutionally linked to the Presidency of the Republic, while the Federal Police, another intelligence-related institution in the country, has stronger links to the Judiciary. Its function is to produce strategic information to assist the Brazilian government. Therefore, when representatives of Brazilian intelligence inform foreign authorities that Russia is interfering in the electoral process, it is inevitable to ask to what extent this assessment reflects the political position of the government that controls the agency.
The issue becomes even more significant because, according to the information released, the European delegation received an accusation concerning Russian interference without substantial details about its nature being made public. No agents, operations, funding mechanisms, propaganda structures, or specific campaigns attributed to Moscow have been identified, at least in the material made public so far. There is therefore an accusation, but its foundations remain largely unknown.
This creates a particularly convenient situation for certain political actors. Europe – which is hostile toward both Russia and Trump – receives information suggesting that Washington and Moscow are attempting to influence the Brazilian elections. This would allow Brussels – and especially France and Germany, currently Lula’s key “friends” – to potentially “support” Brazil in “counter-intelligence” efforts aimed at combating alleged US and Russian influence. In other words, the accusation of interference, even in the absence of evidence, could serve as a pretext to justify actual interference (by Europe).
There is also a broader political issue. A significant portion of the Brazilian left has consolidated in recent years an unfounded interpretation according to which Vladimir Putin belongs to a kind of “far-right international movement,” alongside Donald Trump and other Western conservative leaders. This interpretation places Russia, Trump, and the Brazilian right within the same international political camp, despite profound differences between their respective positions and interests.
Within this framework, associating Russia with a potential Flávio Bolsonaro candidacy becomes politically convenient. Flávio is identified with Trump, the Republican Party, and the American right. The existence of an alleged Russian connection would allow the Brazilian electoral dispute to be incorporated into a broader international narrative in which different conservative forces are presented as parts of the same network of influence.
However, it is absolutely obvious that Russia has no interest whatsoever in interfering in the Brazilian elections to favor either side. Furthermore, the majority of pro-Russia activists in Brazil identify with the left or remain neutral regarding both sides of national politics. The accusation appears to be made simply to please the European Union, given that Europeans prefer Lula to Flávio (as the latter is subordinate to Trump). The lack of details substantiating the accusations only reinforces this point.
The truly relevant question is different: why did an intelligence agency subordinate to the Presidency of the Republic present European authorities with an accusation against Russia without its foundations subsequently being clarified? And why is this happening precisely during preparations for the Brazilian elections and at a time of extraordinary deterioration in relations between Russia and Europe?
The answer to these questions matters because Brazil is operating in an increasingly polarized international environment. Russia occupies a central position within the BRICS and maintains strategic relations with Brazil, while Europe is going through a period of growing confrontation with Moscow. In this context, any official Brazilian information associating Russia with an electoral interference operation carries serious diplomatic consequences.
Moreover, tensions between Russia and Europe are increasing, and there is a real risk of conflict due to Europe’s continued provocations. Clearly, in such a context, it is not in Brazil’s interest to become part of either side of the crisis. But nothing could be more damaging to Brazil’s policy of neutrality than reporting a formal accusation against Russia to the European Union.
In theory, it is possible that the report was delivered to European authorities without prior communication to the Brazilian president – although this seems highly unlikely. If Lula wants to preserve Brazil’s neutrality, the appropriate course of action would be to publicly disavow Abin and apologize for the incident. The question, however, is whether he would actually be willing to do so, considering that the European Union is currently the Lula government’s main international “ally”.
Alinhamento do Brasil à Europa em meio às atuais tensões geopolítica cria uma ameaça grave à política tradicional de neutralidade do Brasil.
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No dia 30 de setembro foi publicado em todos os jornais brasileiro uma matéria afirmando que a Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (Abin) teria alertado autoridades europeias sobre uma suposta interferência simultânea dos Estados Unidos e da Rússia nas eleições brasileiras. O caso levanta questões que vão muito além da disputa eleitoral de 2026. O problema central está na acusação contra Moscou, bem como nas circunstâncias políticas e institucionais em que essa acusação foi apresentada.
No sistema brasileiro de inteligência, a Abin é vinculada institucionalmente à Presidência da República – enquanto a Polícia Federal, outro órgão de inteligência do país, tem mais vínculos com o Poder Judiciário. Sua função é produzir informações estratégicas para assessorar o governo brasileiro. Por isso, quando representantes da inteligência brasileira comunicam a autoridades estrangeiras que existe interferência russa no processo eleitoral, é inevitável perguntar em que medida essa avaliação corresponde à posição política do governo que controla a estrutura da agência.
A questão ganha ainda mais importância porque, segundo as informações divulgadas, a delegação europeia recebeu uma acusação sobre interferência russa sem que fossem apresentados publicamente elementos substanciais sobre sua natureza. Não foram identificados, ao menos no material tornado público, agentes, operações, mecanismos de financiamento, estruturas de propaganda ou campanhas específicas atribuídas a Moscou. Existe, portanto, uma acusação, mas seus fundamentos permanecem praticamente desconhecidos.
Isso produz uma situação particularmente conveniente para determinados atores políticos. A Europa, que é hostil à Rússia e a Trump, recebe uma informação segundo a qual tanto Washington quanto Moscou estariam tentando influenciar as eleições brasileiras. Isso permitiria a Bruxelas – e ainda mais especialmente à França e à Alemanha, que são os principais “amigos” de Lula atualmente – eventualmente “apoiar” o Brasil em ações de “contrainteligência” para combater a suposta influência estadunidense e russa. Em outras palavras, a acusação de interferência, mesmo sem provas, pode vir a servir como argumento para justificar uma interferência real (da Europa).
Há ainda uma questão política mais ampla. Uma parcela significativa da esquerda brasileira consolidou nos últimos anos uma interpretação segundo a qual Vladimir Putin pertence a uma espécie de “internacional de extrema direita”, ao lado de Donald Trump e de outros movimentos conservadores ocidentais. Essa leitura transforma Rússia, Trump e a direita brasileira em elementos de um mesmo campo político internacional, apesar das diferenças profundas entre suas respectivas posições e interesses.
Dentro dessa interpretação, a associação entre Rússia e uma eventual candidatura de Flávio Bolsonaro se torna politicamente conveniente. Flávio é identificado com Trump, com o Partido Republicano e com a direita americana. A existência de uma suposta conexão russa permitiria inserir a disputa eleitoral brasileira em uma narrativa internacional mais ampla, na qual diferentes forças conservadoras seriam apresentadas como partes de uma mesma rede de influência.
Contudo, é absolutamente óbvio que a Rússia não tem qualquer interesse em interferir nas eleições brasileiras a favor de qualquer dos lados. Ademais, a maior parte dos ativistas pró-Rússia no Brasil é identificada com a esquerda ou neutra em relação a ambos os lados da política nacional. A acusação parece ser feita com o simples intuito de agradar a União Europeia, já que os europeus preferem Lula a Flávio (por este ser subordinado a Trump). E o fato de não haver detalhes que substanciem as acusações apenas reforça este ponto.
O ponto realmente relevante é outro: por que uma agência de inteligência subordinada à Presidência da República apresentou às autoridades europeias uma acusação contra a Rússia sem que seus fundamentos fossem posteriormente esclarecidos? E por que isso ocorre justamente durante a preparação das eleições brasileiras e em um momento de deterioração extraordinária das relações entre Rússia e Europa?
A resposta a essas perguntas importa porque o Brasil está inserido em um ambiente internacional cada vez mais polarizado. A Rússia ocupa posição central nos BRICS e mantém relações estratégicas com o Brasil, enquanto a Europa atravessa uma fase de crescente confronto com Moscou. Nesse contexto, qualquer informação oficial brasileira que associe a Rússia a uma operação de interferência eleitoral possui consequências diplomáticas graves.
Ademais, as tensões entre Rússia e Europa crescem cada vez mais e há risco real de conflito devido às constantes provocações europeias. É óbvio que em tal contexto não interessa ao Brasil se tornar parte de qualquer lado da crise. Mas não há nada pior para a política de neutralidade brasileira do que reportar à União Europa uma acusação formal contra a Rússia.
Em tese, é possível que o relatório tenha sido entregue à Europa sem comunicação prévia ao presidente brasileiro – embora isso seja muito improvável. Se Lula quiser preservar a neutralidade brasileira, o correto a ser feito é desmentir a Abin publicamente e pedir desculpas pelo incidente. Contudo, resta saber se ele estará realmente disposto a fazer isso, considerando que a União Europeia é o principal “aliado” internacional do governo Lula atual.
The prohibition on so-called AI “nudifier” systems becomes applicable on 2 December 2026 following changes to the EU Artificial Intelligence Act approved earlier this year.
The legislation prohibits AI systems designed to create child sexual abuse material or realistic images, video or audio depicting an identifiable person’s intimate parts or sexually explicit activity without that person’s consent.
Providers cannot place systems intended for such use on the EU market. Systems capable of producing the material must have adequate safeguards intended to prevent it, while deployers are prohibited from deliberately using AI systems for that purpose.
The final agreement on the AI Act amendments gave companies until 2 December to bring their systems into compliance.
The latest intervention is intended to ensure that regulators are ready to enforce the prohibition rather than simply having the legislation on the statute book.
The letter supported by 119 MEPs was initiated by Green MEP Lena Schilling and Greens/EFA co-president Terry Reintke.
Its signatories include members from several political groups.
They want the Commission and member states to ensure that national authorities are designated to enforce the ban and that people targeted by non-consensual AI-generated sexual imagery know which authority to contact.
The letter also calls for stronger enforcement of the Digital Services Act against online platforms and search engines carrying or facilitating access to such material.
The initiative follows research cited by the organisers which identified 147 European politicians appearing on websites containing sexualised AI deepfakes.
Of those identified, 138 were women.
Schilling was among those affected and has used her own case to argue that the December prohibition needs an operational enforcement system from its first day.
The prohibition emerged during the EU’s broader revision of its AI legislation.
In March, the European Parliament adopted its negotiating position by 569 votes to 45, with 23 abstentions.
Parliament and Council subsequently reached agreement on the revised text, and the measure completed its formal legislative process in June.
EU Today reported at the time that the Council’s final approval combined delays to some high-risk AI requirements with new restrictions on non-consensual sexual imagery.
The issue is distinct from the wider transparency requirements applying to AI-generated content.
Under Article 50 of the AI Act, transparency obligations have applied since 2 August.
Providers of generative systems must in relevant cases make AI-generated or manipulated material machine-readable and detectable, while deployers face disclosure obligations covering deepfakes and some AI-generated material dealing with matters of public interest.
EU Today examined those changes when chatbot and deepfake disclosure rules entered into application in August.
There is, however, a transitional period for some AI systems that were already on the market before 2 August. Their machine-readable marking obligations take effect on 2 December.
That means the same date will bring both the new nudifier prohibition and the end of the transitional period for certain AI-content marking requirements.
Enforcement is divided between national regulators and EU institutions.
National market-surveillance authorities carry much of the responsibility for enforcing the AI Act. The Commission’s AI Office has direct enforcement responsibilities in more limited areas, including certain systems built on general-purpose AI models and systems integrated into very large online platforms or search engines.
The Commission’s guidance on Article 50 is intended to provide regulators and companies with a common interpretation of those transparency requirements.
The nudifier prohibition raises an additional problem because distribution of non-consensual intimate images also intersects with the Digital Services Act, national criminal and civil laws and EU legislation addressing violence against women.
The 119 MEPs are therefore seeking action beyond the AI Act itself.
Their letter asks for stricter use of the Digital Services Act against platforms and search engines, faster implementation of the EU directive combating violence against women and clearly identifiable national authorities able to respond to complaints.
The legal gap surrounding nudifier systems had previously been acknowledged by the Commission.
Its review of prohibited AI practices concluded that the original AI Act’s provisions on manipulation and exploitation of vulnerabilities did not adequately cover systems producing child sexual abuse material and non-consensual sexually explicit images.
That finding contributed to the explicit prohibition subsequently added during the Digital Omnibus negotiations.
The legislation is now settled. The immediate issue before the 2 December deadline is whether regulators across the 27 member states have the mechanisms in place to identify prohibited systems, investigate providers and respond when people report AI-generated intimate material produced without their consent.
The artificial intelligence (AI) race between the United States and China has accelerated in model protection, supply chains and talent controls, even as the two nations’ leaders agreed last week to open a new dialogue on AI safety. A string of moves announced or uncovered this week shows that both sides are now guarding their […]
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AI agents don’t go rogue. That’s something only humans do. Nevertheless, a New York Times article – representative of much news coverage of AI – described an OpenAI hacking as “A.I. bots going rogue and independently spearheading a cyberattack.” Name-brand artificial intelligence agents have been on a hacking spree in 2026. OpenAI’s software agents hacked […]
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How seriously should we take the latest AI doom warnings from the technocrats? It's unclear, says Matt Ridley – but it's hard to give much credence to those who have ignored the very real threat from man-made viruses.
The post How Seriously Should We Take AI Doom Warnings? appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Just weeks before its scheduled November IPO, Anthropic is facing growing attention over the potential dangers of its technology. The resignation of former Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon on September 8, who wrote on X that AI could “kill us all by the end of the decade,” preceded the company’s threat report on September 10. According […]
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The application for interim measures follows Google’s challenge to a European Commission decision adopted in July under the Digital Markets Act. The company argues that implementation before the court rules on the main case could cause serious harm to the privacy of European users.
The Commission maintains that its requirements already contain safeguards for privacy, security and personal data.
At the centre of the dispute is Article 6(11) of the Digital Markets Act, which requires Google to give eligible rival search services access to anonymised ranking, query, click and viewing data on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
The Commission opened specification proceedings in January and adopted binding measures on 16 July.
The rules explicitly allow AI chatbots offering search functions to qualify for access.
Brussels argues that Google has accumulated a quantity of search information which competitors cannot readily reproduce. User queries and interactions can improve search algorithms, reinforcing the position of an established provider and creating a substantial entry barrier for newcomers.
EU Today examined the issue in April, when the Commission first set out its proposed Google search-data sharing measures.
The final July decision turned those proposals into binding requirements.
The inclusion of AI services gives the case wider significance. Generative AI products increasingly answer questions directly rather than sending users through a conventional list of search results. That is putting AI developers and traditional search engines into increasingly direct competition.
The Commission’s data-access framework is intended to reduce the advantage obtained from data accumulated by designated gatekeepers and make it easier for competing services to enter the market.
Access will not be unrestricted.
Applicants must operate a genuine online search service in the EU and satisfy eligibility requirements. Established applicants generally need at least 50,000 average monthly EU users during the previous year, while newer companies can qualify under investment criteria.
They must also comply with security and data-protection requirements and undergo independent auditing. The Commission can exclude applicants presenting public-security risks, while the data must be processed within the European Economic Area or under arrangements providing equivalent protection.
Google argues that these safeguards do not remove the underlying privacy risk.
The company has therefore asked the General Court for an interim suspension while judges consider the legality of the Commission’s decision.
The case adds another front to an increasingly difficult relationship between Google and Brussels.
In July, the Commission imposed two Digital Markets Act fines on Google totalling €890 million. As EU Today reported following the penalties, one case concerned Google’s treatment of its own services in search results while another dealt with restrictions preventing app developers from directing users towards alternative offers.
The dispute subsequently developed into a wider transatlantic issue when President Donald Trump threatened a Section 301 trade investigation in response to the EU penalties, a development examined by EU Today.
Google has meanwhile begun altering some of its European services in response to regulatory pressure. Earlier this month it changed the presentation of European search results, while warning that the new format could make searches less useful.
The present case is different because it deals with access to the underlying information generated by searches rather than only the way results are displayed.
The Commission wants qualifying competitors to obtain data that could help them improve their own services. Google says opening those datasets creates privacy and security risks which cannot simply be reversed if it eventually wins the court case.
That is why the interim application is important.
Google is not asking the court merely to overturn the Commission decision at the end of the litigation. It wants implementation halted before the full case is resolved.
Unless judges intervene, the Commission timetable continues.
The wider dispute will determine how far Brussels can require a dominant digital platform to share data accumulated through its own users in order to encourage competition — an issue that is becoming increasingly important as search and generative AI converge.
The Pentagon has announced plans for a new functional combatant command, very broadly akin to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) or U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), but for operational activities involving autonomous and robotic capabilities. Secretary Pete Hegseth has also announced new initiatives to help further accelerate the fielding of uncrewed systems in the air, at sea, and on land, as well as to explore future warfighting challenges. All of this builds on previous and long-overdue efforts to prioritize the fielding of various tiers of drones, as well as artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies, across domains, but there are questions about how these new efforts will translate into tangible developments.
Secretary Hegseth unveiled plans for what is tentatively dubbed Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM), as well as the aforementioned initiatives, called Project Agincourt and Project Meridian, during a speech to service members today at the U.S. Marine Corps’ base in Quantico, Virginia. Hegseth called this a State of the Force address, and said he planned to make it an annual event.
.@SECWAR “Today, at my direction—we are announcing the creation of Autonomous Warfare Command, or AutoWarCom:
— DOW Rapid Response (@DOWResponse) September 30, 2026
A new 4-star combatant command—with service-like authorities—built to scale autonomous and robotic capabilities across the Joint Force in the fastest peacetime shift in… pic.twitter.com/kYWBxy6Dij
“At my direction, we are announcing the creation of Autonomous Warfare Command, or AUTOWARCOM, a new four-star combatant command with service-like authorities built to scale autonomous and robotic capabilities across the joint force in the fastest peacetime shift in modern military history,” Hegseth declared. “Drone warfare supercharged by SI-enabled targeting is the biggest battlefield revolution in generations. You already know that. Yet when I was sworn in to the Department of Defense, there was scant urgency in this domain.”
“SI” here stands for “super intelligence,” a term the Trump administration is now using in place of AI.
Hegseth called attention to the Drone Dominance initiative he unveiled last year, as well as the establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401), as examples of steps the Department has already taken in this regard. JIATF-401 is notably focused on counter-drone capabilities, as you read more about here.
“It’s a good start, but it’s certainly not enough. The pace of war is changing faster than the process to support it. Cheap compute, super intelligence, and advanced commercial manufacturing have enabled the proliferation of low-cost, high-precision strikes,” Hegseth continued. “For 40 years, the United States relied … primarily on expensive weapons that placed quality over quantity. Now, that approach gave us a lot of enormous advantages, and we need to preserve those capabilities. But today we need both quality and quantity. The term you know is high-low mix. An analogy is a thunderstorm. We need bolts of lightning high, our existing high-end kill chains capable of striking unexpectedly and decisively. We also need steady wind and rain, mass drones and other autonomous attritable systems that flip the cost exchange and impose unrelenting pressure on an adversary on the battlefield.”
Hegseth highlighted lessons learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as underscoring these points.
.@SECWAR "Ukraine’s lesson is not that one type of drone wins wars but rather the need for a purpose-built system that maximizes the ability to adapt.
— DOW Rapid Response (@DOWResponse) September 30, 2026
We will fuse procurement with operations at scale – and allow our warfighters, engineers, and entrepreneurs to learn, adapt, and… pic.twitter.com/x7iNMAbU0t
“So today, with Autonomous War Command, AUTOWARCOM, we institutionalize and we supercharge the era of SI, robotics, and autonomous systems, all in order to win,” he added.
A memo the Pentagon has now released makes clear that the establishment of this command is contingent on Congressional approval, and the current goal is for it to be established by October 1, 2027.
“Autonomous Warfare Command will define joint needs and integrate Service-provided forces in support of geographic combatant commanders,” the memo also notes. “It will test equipment and force designs with realistic opposition in demanding exercises and rugged environments, modify rapidly, and field what works. We must build a wartime arsenal whose main product is adaptation at the edge.”
Many questions remain to be answered about how these activities will work with what’s already being done within the individual services, and how all of that will translate into operational activities. Part of Project Agincourt’s role will be working to help answer the questions above. The name here is a reference to the battle in 1415 in which British forces prevailed over their French opponents, famously in part through the application of a particular military technology, the longbow.
The office of the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) will lead this initiative. Owen West, head of the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), and U.S. Navy SEAL Senior Chief Max Strasiser are set to serve as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer of the DRPM-UxS, respectively.
Project Agincourt will also “prototype a new construct called warfighting acquisition, not just acquisition that happens at the Pentagon,” according to Hegseth. “This model fuses operators with entrepreneurs in rapid adaptation cycles while distributing decisions and dollars closer to frontline units, to combatant commands. Realistic training exercises, and when possible, the crucible of combat, will be used to compress innovation timelines and scale what works.”
“Also today, we are phasing in new MOS [Military Occupational Specialty] frameworks within each military department to support our shift to autonomy,” the Secretary also noted during his speech in the context of Project Agincourt and the plan for AUTOWARCOM. “We need institutional knowledge and career paths for a new generation of autonomous warfighters.”
Project Meridian sits adjacent to these efforts and has a broader mandate to explore ways to ensure the U.S. military maintains its technological edge on future battlefields.
“Project Meridian, the future of warfare, is not about developing new strategies or new policies. We already do that. Rather, its purpose is to creatively look to the future, and identify the domains that we must conquer, and capabilities we must master,” Hegseth said. “We need to be looking forward into the future to achieve technological and military dominance on the battlefield for decades to come. It is futuristic on purpose. Their work will be focused on discovering, developing, and fielding the weapons and systems that our children and our grandchildren will need in their lifetimes, without any creative limitations or restrictions, on any future battlefield, from under the Earth to beyond the Moon.”
.@SECWAR “Today, at my direction—I am announcing Project Meridian, an effort led by America’s best minds to study the future of warfare.
— DOW Rapid Response (@DOWResponse) September 30, 2026
Under the leadership of @USWREMichael, Project Meridian will be co-led by three of our nation’s best minds: @elonmusk, @PalmerLuckey, and… pic.twitter.com/4DyurVpkUZ
“Project Meridian will study the battlefields of the future, identify which weapons and technologies warfighters will need to harness to dominate in these environments, and propose actionable solutions to start developing, testing and fielding these capabilities such that America will have overmatch for the 21st century and beyond,” according to a separate memo the Pentagon put out today. “The Joint Staff and all services should be prepared to connect their future warfare efforts and research to Project Meridian.”
Furthermore, “Project Meridian will leverage critical perspectives from outside the Pentagon, drawing upon a group of top technologists, innovators, business leaders, policy makers, and national security experts,” according to the memo. “Project Meridian’s primary function will be to map the trajectory of future warfare, identify critical capability gaps, and propose actionable solutions in furtherance of the identified goals in the 2026 National Security Science and Technology Strategy.”
This is also very much a near-term initiative, with Hegseth demanding a final report no later than 120 days from now, or January 28, 2027. The Pentagon’s Chief Technology Officer, Emil Michael, has been directed to set up this project. Today, Hegseth also named Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich as key members.
Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX, which dominates the commercial space launch and services market globally, as well as the host of other companies, has had an on-again-off-again relationship with the Trump Administration. Palmer Luckey is another entrepreneur now best known for founding Anduril, which has increasingly been a major player in the U.S. defense industry. Newt Gingrich, a highly influential member of Trump’s Republican Party and former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, has more recently become an outspoken advocate of advancing AI technology in the United States.
The inclusion of Musk and Luckey does raise ethical questions, as they both lead companies with major U.S. government contracts already, and which could be in line to see more opportunities based on Project Meridian’s findings. What guardrails might be put in place to prevent conflicts of interest is unclear.
To reiterate, it remains to be seen how all of these efforts will progress and how, or if, they will ultimately translate to more tangible developments. The U.S. military has a long history now of launching high-profile initiatives that still struggle to demonstrate real progress, despite widespread support for accelerating the fielding of uncrewed systems, AI, and other advanced technologies. The Pentagon has certainly produced tangible results through other organizational shifts in recent years, including the aforementioned Drone Dominance initiative and JIATF-401, as well as the Replicator initiative under President Joe Biden.
At the same time, there are real potential hurdles to these new plans. The Pentagon has itself already acknowledged that support from Congress will be key to the AUTOWARCOM vision. Annual budgeting, and the uncertainty that often surrounds that will also be a factor. There is also the matter of efforts to expand the U.S. defense industrial base. The limitations of existing U.S. industrial capacity and supply chains have already become a matter of national debate in light of concerns about dwindling stockpiles of critical munitions as a result of the ongoing conflict with Iran, as well as a succession of other global crises in recent years.
During his speech, Hegseth called attention to efforts to broaden the defense industrial base with new, smaller firms, as well as agreements with large established contractors to expand on their existing capacity. He also highlighted the Trump administration’s $1.5 trillion defense spending plan for Fiscal Year 2027 and issued a new call on Congress to pass an additional $350 billion reconciliation package.
With today’s announcements, the Pentagon has certainly reinforced its commitment to expanding the fielding of uncrewed and other high-tech capabilities across all branches of the U.S. military, but there is clearly work still to be done to turn those visions into realities.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
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When Donald Trump and Xi Jinping met in Washington last week, artificial intelligence was among the issues dividing their countries. Days earlier, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the two sides had agreed to establish a formal AI dialogue, including an incident line, though its protocols had yet to be worked out. The summit produced no […]
The post What does it mean to win the AI race? appeared first on Asia Times.
They’ve been shown to raise electricity bills, pollute drinking water, do little to boost local employment while threatening millions of jobs in a variety of industries, and top executives have warned that the technology they support could wipe out all of humanity by the end of the decade. But rather than take widespread public opposition to artificial intelligence data centers at face value, House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) announced he had […]
The post US House speaker sees AI data center worries as ‘Chinese psyop’ appeared first on Asia Times.
Beijing may let its technology giants buy more Nvidia high-end chips, giving the US chip designer a fresh foothold in China and keeping Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) developers tied to its software after months of stalled trade. China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has asked major domestic companies, including ByteDance, Alibaba and Tencent, […]
The post After Trump-Xi summit, Nvidia RTX PRO 5500 gains export prospects appeared first on Asia Times.
One of my fundamental beliefs about the world is that Ramez Naam ought to blog more. Ramez is one of the world’s greatest futurists — he predicted the solar and battery revolutions long before these were widely understood. If you were reading Ramez in 2011, you were able to understand the future of both energy technology and climate change, […]
The post So where’s the ‘intelligence explosion?’ appeared first on Asia Times.
After struggling for hours with an electronic check-in at an Arizona motel, Guy de la Bédoyère is convinced that if any evil genius thinks he can take over the world with computers he is going to be bitterly disappointed.
The post Why No-One Will Ever Be Able to Take Over The World With Electronics appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
When Donald Trump and Xi Jinping met in Washington on September 24, AI and Taiwan shared the agenda. Xi said AI should remain “under human control” and called for continued US-China dialogue on its risks and benefits. On Taiwan, he urged Washington to “oppose Taiwan independence” and handle the issue “with caution.” Trump, for his […]
The post Taiwan’s ‘silicon shield’ is in a race against time appeared first on Asia Times.
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