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Hamas mudou completamente o mapa do Oriente Médio, impediu a causa palestina de cair no esquecimento e dificultou a normalização de relações entre Israel e os países muçulmanos.
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Em 7 de outubro de 2023 iniciou-se, a partir de Gaza, uma memorável operação militar, na qual aproximadamente 4 mil homens armados das unidades de elite dos vários movimentos da resistência palestina local (Jihad Islâmica Palestina, FPLP, FDLP, Comitês de Resistência Popular, etc., liderados pelo Hamas) lançaram-se como um copo transbordando sobre os assentamentos sionistas dos arredores.
A ação era, simultaneamente, resposta à intensificação das expropriações de famílias palestinas na Cisjordânia, à pressão crescente sobre a Mesquita Al-Aqsa e à política de apaziguamento dos países árabes, e visava através da captura de militares (ativos e reservas) israelenses forçar a entidade sionista a uma guerra de atrito que pudesse conduzir a um desgaste significativo de Israel, internamente e externamente, e a uma reproposição da questão do Estado Palestino.
Ao que tudo indica, uma das expectativas da liderança do Hamas era de que o Hezbollah e o Irã e, talvez, as organizações militares da Cisjordânia se engajariam, também, brevemente e de forma sustentada, no conflito com Israel. Por uma série de motivos – totalmente diferentes para cada um dos atores – isso não aconteceu, exceto no caso do Hezbollah, e de forma limitada até a invasão terrestre do Líbano e, no caso do Irã, também de forma limitada durante a Guerra dos 12 Dias.
O evento levou a transformações cataclísmicas no Oriente Médio que podemos já descrever e a um panorama que, talvez, seja desconcertante para muitos que previram um cenário de vitória total sionista.
Não é nossa pretensão fazer uma descrição minuciosa dos processos que foram iniciados a partir da Guerra de Gaza, de modo que apenas tentaremos resumir cada um dos cenários em seus principais eventos e panorama atual.
Quanto à Gaza em si, a sua população foi vítima de limpeza étnica. Os números de mortes, se somarmos todas as causas, talvez chegue a 200 mil, ou seja, 10% da população a Faixa de Gaza. Uma parte significativa da liderança do Hamas, por sua vez, foi assassinada durante a guerra. Israel, porém, foi derrotada no conflito, considerando que não conseguiu alcançar os seus objetivos de destruir o Hamas, ocupar permanentemente toda a Faixa de Gaza e deslocar a população palestina. Os danos materiais e sociais para Israel, por sua vez, foram imensos. 60 bilhões de dólares em perdas econômicas gerais, aumento das tensões sociais internas e destruição total – talvez irreversível – da imagem internacional de Israel. Ademais, incapaz de derrotar o Hamas, Israel foi obrigada a aceitar um acordo de paz imposto pelos EUA. Enquanto isso, o Hamas segue com aproximadamente 12 mil soldados ativos e mais 15 mil recrutas jovens em treinamento, de modo que em breve retornará a aproximadamente o mesmo nível de força que antes de 7 de outubro de 2023.
Na frente libanesa, o conflito levou ao deslocamento de mais de 1 milhão de libaneses de suas casas, ao assassinato de Hassan Nasrallah, líder do Hezbollah, e de alguns outros líderes do movimento, à desestabilização política do Líbano, e envolveu a invasão por terra do país por parte do Estado de Israel, que, porém, não conseguiu também alcançar seus objetivos de forçar o governo libanês a desarmar o Hezbollah. O Hezbollah, por sua vez, que foi degradado de forma significativa entre 2023 e 2024 por tentar operar como forças armadas regulares, retornou à guerra de insurgência e com o aumento no uso de drones e novas ferramentas tecnológicas, bloqueou o avanço de Israel em 2026.
Quanto à Síria, testemunhamos o colapso do governo de Bashar Al-Assad e a tomada do país pelas milícias terroristas ligadas à Al-Qaeda, ao ISIS e outros grupos extremistas, os quais levaram à presidência Ahmed Sharrah. Israel se aproveitou do momento para destruir a maior parte do hardware militar sírio e ocupar uma faixa de segurança no entorno das Colinas de Golã, estabelecendo uma tênue aliança com as tribos e milícias druzas da região. A Queda de Assad impôs dificuldade para a logística do Hezbollah, que contava com a Síria para o trânsito de equipamento vindo do Irã. Se Israel esperava ter passagem livre pela Síria, porém, a situação é tornada mais complexa pelo fato de que a região é disputada, enquanto área de influência, com a Turquia, de modo que as tensões entre ambos países segue aumentando.
Os cenários palestino, libanês e sírio permitiam dizer, no início de 2025, por exemplo, que Israel estaria avançando significativamente em seus objetivos delineados no Plano Oded Yinon de desestabilizar e fragmentar os países vizinhos para facilitar a construção da Grande Israel. Teríamos aqui, naquele momento, a derrocada da estratégia do Crescente Xiita e do projeto geopolítico de Qassem Soleimani. Quando acrescentamos os cenários iraquiano e iraniano, bem como o contexto geral do Oriente Médio, a situação muda significativamente.
Porque no espaço entre a Guerra dos 12 Dias e a Guerra do Irã vimos o colapso do poder regional dos EUA no Oriente Médio, a ascensão do Irã a principal pretendente à hegemonia regional e o recuo de Israel para uma posição mais defensiva e de retaguarda.
Sinais de que o projeto israelense era mais frágil do que parecia à primeira vista apareceram já no conflito com o Irã em 2025. Incapaz de derrotar o Irã, que fustigava as defesas e infraestruturas israelenses com enxames de drones e mísseis, Israel teve que apelar por ajuda aos EUA, que realizaram um ataque aéreo majoritariamente simbólico contra instalações nucleares vazias no Irã. Isso não passou despercebido.
A nova rodada de conflito em 2026, iniciando-se no final de fevereiro, apesar de iniciar com o assassinato do Aiatolá Ali Khamenei, levou à eliminação de boa parte das bases dos EUA no Oriente Médio, ao bloqueio do Estreito de Ormuz, à destruição das capacidades antiaéreas israelenses, à evacuação das tropas estadunidenses no Iraque e à destruição do mito da superioridade militar incontestável dos EUA.
De fato, a incapacidade dos EUA de alcançar seus objetivos políticos militarmente no Oriente Médio (após o fracasso da tentativa de revolução colorida de janeiro), mesmo usando 2 porta-aviões (1 dos quais pode ter sido seriamente danificado nas operações), sua incapacidade de proteger seus aliados árabes, a própria incapacidade dos aliados árabes de defenderem a si mesmos, o esgotamento parcial dos estoques de mísseis dos inimigos do Irã, e a capacidade iraniana de rapidamente repor sua liderança e de agir militarmente de forma descentralizada, bem como sua demonstração de que sua capacidade industrial-militar permanecia ativa, mudaram o mapa geopolítico no Oriente Médio.
Em alguma medida, hoje, é o Irã quem dá as cartas. A evacuação do Iraque pelos EUA reabre o país para a penetração da influência iraniana, o que põe em risco até mesmo o domínio da Síria por Ahmed Sharrah.
Para contornar o controle iraniano de Ormuz, os sauditas têm experimentado com usar o Mar Vermelho e rotas terrestres. Se esses esforços fossem bem-sucedidos, a importância de Ormuz diminuiria e, com isso, o poder de barganha do Irã. O problema é que, exatamente quando isso começou a acontecer, o Ansarullah iemenita entrou no tabuleiro, iniciando uma operação militar em larga escala para derrotar os rebeldes apoiados por Riad. A resposta saudita aos avanços houthis levou ao fechamento parcial do Estreito de Bab-el-Mandeb e a ataques não apenas contra as instalações da ARAMCO, mas até mesmo contra poços de petróleo sauditas.
Se retornamos ao panorama geopolítico israelense, enfim, o país se encontra ainda com um problema palestino em Gaza, o Hezbollah ativo no Líbano, sem poder avançar na Síria por causa da ameaça turca e com suas capacidades militares defensivas bastante reduzidas.
Longe da “Pax Judaica” e da “Grande Israel” estamos vendo o reposicionamento dos atores geopolíticos e o ator na posição mais vantajosa é, hoje, o Irã. As negociações recentes entre Israel e os países árabes sunitas não muda significativamente o cenário.
3 anos depois da Operação Dilúvio Al-Aqsa, portanto, não nos é possível dizer se os objetivos de Ismail Hanyeh e Yahya Sinwar foram alcançados, mas é impossível negar que a ousadia do Hamas mudou completamente o mapa do Oriente Médio, impediu a causa palestina de cair no esquecimento e dificultou a normalização de relações entre Israel e os países muçulmanos.
“I’m okay.” That was the last message I sent my mother before an Israeli strike hit us, a group of seven journalists reporting in southern Lebanon.
Three years ago, on 13 October 2023, my colleague Dylan Collins and I headed to the southern border of Lebanon to cover the situation following cross-border shelling between Israeli forces and Hezbollah. We spent the morning filming UN peacekeeping force patrols along the blue line dividing Lebanon and Israel. The atmosphere was calm and nothing suggested that the day was about to change and upend our lives. We went to a coffee shop near a UN post where journalists from different outlets had gathered and there we met our friend and Reuters colleague Issam Abdallah.
Around 4:50PM, we heard a bombardment in a nearby town so we moved to an exposed hill in Alma Al-Shaab, where Al-Jazeera journalists Carmen Joukhadar and Elie Brakhya were positioned. Together with colleagues from Reuters, we were a group of seven journalists, all wearing press vests, reporting next to a car marked “TV”. We were clearly identifiable as press and spent about an hour filming while an Israeli drone hovered above us. At 5:57 I finished filing my photos and sent a message to my mother to tell her I was okay. Seconds later, I found myself on the ground, bleeding and screaming for help. Dylan rushed over with a tourniquet, but before he even had the time to put it, another strike hit.
Everyone disappeared and I was left alone, unable to move and the heat of the flames creeping closer to my face. I was terrified of burning alive, so I started crawling away with the camera still hanging from my neck and its strap tightening around my neck with every move. Two weeks later, I woke up from an induced coma with one leg missing, the other severely damaged, and Issam dead.
What followed was as horrific and brutal as the attack itself and it didn’t stop there. What happened to us was not an isolated incident — for three years I watched journalists being killed in Lebanon and Gaza by Israeli forces in ways that felt painfully familiar.
In October 2024, Israeli forces struck a compound in Hasbaya where journalists were staying and killed media workers Ghassan Najjar, Mohammed Reda and Wissam Kassem, while they slept.
Human Rights Watch found no evidence of military activity at the site and concluded that the strike was deliberate and should be investigated as war crime.
Then in April 2026, journalist Amal Khalil was killed in southern Lebanon after an Israeli strike hit the building where she had taken shelter with her colleague Zainab Faraj, leaving both women trapped under the rubble. Investigations found that Israeli forces repeatedly obstructed rescue efforts.
Since our attack, dozens of journalists have been killed in Lebanon, and nearly 200 journalists have been killed in Gaza by Israeli forces.
Many have been mired by Israel with the same false allegations that they were “terrorists.” The dead can’t defend themselves against such accusations, but I survived and I can speak about what happened to us.
In June 2026 in an interview on France 2, Israel’s ambassador to France described the 13 October attack as a “mistake” saying that we were not targeted because we were journalists, but because Israeli forces had mistaken us for “terrorists.” The evidence tells a different story.
Five independent investigations by Agence France-Presse, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Reuters, and UNIFIL found no indication of fighters or military activity at the site, and no cross-border exchange of fire for more than 40 minutes before we were struck with a 120mm tank shell.
These investigations matter because they establish with certainty evidence beyond my own personal account.
What remains unanswered is who gave the order, who fired the double-tap strike, and why no one has been held accountable. These are basic questions that can be answered by Israel if they were sought by EU member states.
Three years on, Issam’s family and the survivors of this attack deserve to know: Who gave the order?
Evidence alone cannot deliver justice, someone must be willing to act on it. In the face of this attack, including the targeting of four of its own citizens on Lebanese soil, the Lebanese government has failed us.
Neither Lebanon nor Israel are party to the Rome Statute, meaning that the International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for the attack.
In 2024, Lebanon approved a special declaration that would have allowed the Court to investigate war crimes committed after 7 October 2023, only to later reverse its decision for political reasons.
And now, making our legal path even more complicated, in June 2026 Lebanon signed a new framework agreement with Israel whereby Clause 13 commits both sides to cease “all hostile and adverse actions in international and legal fora.”
I have no hope left that we will ever get justice for what we lost, but I will not rest before I know the names and faces of those responsible.
Our case is the most documented instance of Israeli forces targeting the press on record. The October 13 targeted attack was perpetrated by Israeli forces on a group of journalists clearly identifiable as press.
If we cannot get answers in the face of such overwhelming evidence, what does it mean for the hundreds of journalists killed by Israeli fire throughout the region for which there is no such evidence?
This is where the European Union must act. The EU has repeatedly said that journalists must not be attacked and that violations of international law must be met with accountability. Today, we demand actions not just words and statements. The EU must demand that Israel provide a full account of the 13 October attack, including who ordered, authorized and carried out the strikes.
For me, this is not an abstract question of foreign policy. Issam was my friend. I survived that attack with one leg missing. I know what it means when the people responsible for an attack are allowed to remain unnamed and unaccountable.
I am asking the EU not simply to stand with journalists in words, but to stand with us in action.
The EU has political, diplomatic, and legal leverage. It should use it. If Israel refuses to fully explain what occurred and disclose those responsible for killing and maiming journalists who were visibly identifiable as press, EU member states should use every available mechanism to pursue accountability, including further targeted sanctions or suspending trade with Israel.
I refuse to believe that a military with advanced surveillance could have simply mistaken us for fighters and attacked us in a double-tap strike, a tactic repeatedly used by Israel in this war. But, if that’s truly what happened, then Israel must still answer for how such incompetence and failure was possible.
For now, justice evades us, but the truth of who gave the order is within reach and we must demand it.
Sacrifice the inconvenient, never the project. “Pal-washing” in action.
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A familiar script
On 9 October 2026, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to Navanethem Pillay, an 85-year-old South African jurist, former judge at the International Criminal Court and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The citation speaks of a person who has paved the way for a more comprehensive global legal order. The Committee’s chair, Jorgen Watne Frydnes, added that the prize is a message to those who attack and undermine the international system and its institutions. The verdict is avowedly political, and it is on this level that it must be discussed.
The very same figure who, in 2011, is said to have ‘toppled’ Gaddafi, paving the way for the plundering of Libyan oil and the enslavement of African migrants, would now ‘topple’ Netanyahu, thereby paving the way for Israel’s rehabilitation. The underlying logic would be neither morality nor peace, but the agenda of George Soros’s Open Society: to sacrifice those who have become inconvenient, never the essence of the project itself. Some have dubbed it ‘pal-washing’. The fundamental question is a serious one, for it asks whether there is a pattern behind the prizes and jurisdictions of the liberal order.
It must be emphasised that the script is already familiar. Do you remember when Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize, whilst launching war after war? Or do you recall figures in search of a cause such as Machado, Mohammadi, or the defenders of Ukrainian criminals? But let us proceed in order.
Act One: Libya
In February 2011, Pillay, the High Commissioner, called on the Human Rights Council to take vigorous action to stop the violence and hold those responsible to account; the Council condemned the violations and established a commission of inquiry. The next step fell to the Security Council: referral to the ICC via Resolution 1970, followed by Resolution 1973, approved with ten votes in favour and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russia). No one claims that Pillay decided to go to war. What matters is the sequence of events: the language of human rights opened the door, that of the protection of civilians authorised the use of force, and the operation gradually shifted towards regime change. As early as April, Lavrov was accusing NATO of exceeding its mandate, and a French minister admitted that regime change would have required a new vote.
Then there are the costs. In 2017, the IOM documented auctions of sub-Saharan migrants in southern Libya, sold for sums ranging from 200 to 500 dollars. The link with the collapse of the state after 2011 is the most plausible interpretation, although the source documents the phenomenon rather than its cause. Libya and the migrants paid the price; the legal framework emerged, formally speaking, intact, even if the controversy over the mandate would later weigh on the vetoes of Moscow and Beijing in other matters.
Act Two: Bibi
On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Gallant, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Pillay had left the Court in 2008, but chaired the UN Commission of Inquiry which, on 16 September 2025, concluded that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza. This is where ‘pal-washing’ comes into play. International criminal law deals with individuals: a defendant, a charge, a period of time. If the case concludes with the fate of a leader, a narrative break occurs – the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of a man – after which the state can present itself as restored. Libya offers an analogy: there, the case concluded with the fall of a man.
The limitations of the process work in favour of this interpretation. The Court has no police force and the execution of warrants depends on the States Parties; the Commission is not a court and does not speak on behalf of the entire UN; the Committee itself, according to AFP, has stated that it is up to a court to determine whether genocide has taken place. The award has no legal effect, as we know, but it lends legitimacy to a system that promises justice yet cannot guarantee it.
We must also bear in mind that we have already seen dynamics of this kind on numerous occasions within the globalist order that dominates the West. The Open Society Foundations presents itself as the world’s largest private funder of groups working for justice, democracy and human rights, active in over one hundred countries, and Pillay received the Stockholm Human Rights Award, the same prize that went to Soros and Neier in 2011. It certainly seems that the pattern of the Soros agenda is repeating itself once again – an agenda comprising foundations, NGOs, tribunals, commissions and bureaucracies that share a common lexicon and worldview: that of a liberal order to be perfected and never called into question. Those operating within that lexicon may denounce a government, a leader, or even a state, but they cannot challenge the underlying assumptions of the order that grants them legitimacy.
Some will object that Pillay’s Commission attributes responsibility to Israel as a state, not merely to its leaders, which contradicts the idea of a purely personalised operation. The second point concerns the reaction. Netanyahu accused the Committee of having lost its moral compass; the Israeli Foreign Ministry spoke of a grotesque exploitation of the prize; and Washington announced sanctions against the ICC just a few hours after the announcement. All true. But it would make sense and have value if the Western system were not rotten to its very core, if its legal system were functioning properly, but this is not the case, in any respect (and we have already seen sufficient evidence of this – let us not forget the Epstein case either).
If, over the next twelve months, Netanyahu’s political downfall is presented as the conclusion of the case, rather than as a stage in proceedings concerning the state, ‘Pal-washing’ will gain traction. If the proceedings continue beyond his person, and if the State Parties execute the warrants, perhaps it will lose ground. Given the current evidence, the argument is plausible and, until proven otherwise, this is yet another ‘Non-Peace’ Nobel Prize – one we cannot call ‘war’.
© MOHAMMED SABER/EPA
© JOÃO PORFÍRIO/OBSERVADOR
© DAVIDE ELIAS/EPA
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